[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 16689-16698]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the clerk will 
report the bill.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 1555) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2000 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government, the Community 
     Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement and Disability System, and other purposes.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the unanimous consent agreement, the 
junior Senator from Arizona, Mr. Kyl, is to be recognized to offer an 
amendment after the general statements.
  Mr. SHELBY. What is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized to make 
an opening statement on the bill.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, on May 5 of this year the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence unanimously reported out of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. It subsequently referred to the 
Committee on Armed Services, where it was reported out on June 8.
  Senator Kerrey and I have once again worked very closely together to

[[Page 16690]]

address our critical need for high-quality intelligence by allocating 
resources in a manner designed to ensure that this need is met.
  In preparing this legislation, the committee conducted a detailed 
review of the administration's three major intelligence budget requests 
for fiscal year 2000. They are the National Foreign Intelligence 
Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program, and the Tactical 
Intelligence and Related Activities of the Military Services.
  The committee held briefings and hearings with senior intelligence 
officials, reviewed budget justification materials, and considered 
responses to specific questions posed by the committee.
  As in the past, the committee also impaneled a group of outside 
experts composed of distinguished scientists, industry leaders, and 
retired general and flag officers to review specific technical issues 
within the intelligence community.
  The panel is known as the Technical Advisory Group and is similar to 
the Defense Department's Defense Science Board in some ways.
  This group brings an invaluable level of expertise to the committee's 
work, and we owe them a debt of gratitude for their service.
  Many of their recommendations have been incorporated into this bill 
before the Senate this evening.
  Once again the committee has focused on what we refer to as the 
``five C's''. They are: counterproliferation, counterterrorism, 
counternarcotics, covert action, and counterintelligence.
  The last of the five, counterintelligence, has received a great deal 
of congressional and media attention in recent months in light of 
revelations of espionage activities by the People's Republic of China.
  I am proud to say that the Intelligence Committee has been attempting 
to address the shortcomings of the Department of Energy's 
counterintelligence program for nearly 10 years, often to no avail.
  In fact, it was the Intelligence Committee that directed the study 
that finally led to the drafting and signing of Presidential Decision 
Directive 61.
  Before I turn to the legislative provisions in this bill, I feel 
compelled to share with our colleagues some comments about the current 
state of our defense and intelligence preparedness.
  In the immediate aftermath of the cold war, optimistic appraisals of 
our intelligence and security requirements generated calls for dramatic 
cuts in defense and intelligence spending.
  The first national security decision made by President Clinton on 
taking office in 1993 was to cut more than $120 billion from the 
defense budget. Substantial cuts were also made to classified 
intelligence programs.
  Unfortunately, such optimistic estimates have proved sadly wrong.
  Today we face a series of transnational threats spanning the spectrum 
of conflict from terrorist acts committed on U.S. territory to the 
development of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery 
by Third World countries.
  I recently traveled to the Balkans and reviewed some of our 
intelligence activities in Europe. Military and civilian personnel were 
routinely working in excess of 80 hours a week, and that pace was 
nonstop throughout the Kosovo conflict.
  Regretfully, the problems the military and the intelligence community 
are experiencing are partly our fault. Congress accepted ``defense on 
the cheap,'' and we have gotten exactly what we paid for as we always 
do--an intelligence community and military force stretched to its 
limits.
  I believe the result is clear: We are not prepared to meet the 
challenges of a complex and dangerous world.
  National security cannot be had on the cheap, and we have attempted 
to address some of the shortfalls in this year's bill.
  The bill's classified schedule of authorizations and annex--I remind 
every Senator--are available for review just off the Senate floor. I 
repeat: The bill's classified schedule of authorizations and annex are 
available to every Senator in this body for review just off the Senate 
floor.
  I will now discuss the significant unclassified legislative 
provisions contained in the bill.
  First, section 304 directs the President to require an employee who 
requires access to classified information to provide written consent 
that permits an authorized investigative agency to access information 
stored in computers used in the performance of Government duties.
  This provision is intended to avoid the problems we have seen with 
the FBI's reluctance to access ``Government'' computers without a 
warrant in the course of an espionage investigation.
  There should be no question--yes, there should be no question--that 
investigative agencies may search the computer of an individual with 
access to classified information. This provision makes that perfectly 
clear.
  Second, sections 501 through 505 comprise the Department of Energy 
Sensitive Country Foreign Visitors Moratorium Act of 1999.
  What is that? Section 502 establishes a moratorium on foreign 
visitors to classified facilities at Department of Energy National 
Laboratories.
  The moratorium applies only to citizens of nations on the Department 
of Energy ``sensitive countries list.''
  Section 502 also provides for a waiver of the moratorium on a case-
by-case basis if the Secretary of Energy justifies the waiver and 
certifies that the visit is necessary for the national security of the 
United States.
  Section 503 requires that the Secretary of Energy perform background 
checks on all foreign visitors to the National Laboratories. The term 
``background checks'' means the consultation of all available, 
appropriate, and relevant intelligence community and law enforcement 
databases.
  Section 504 requires an interim report to Congress on the 
counterintelligence activities at the National Laboratories and a net 
assessment of the Foreign Visitors Program at the National Laboratories 
to be produced by a panel of experts.
  Most importantly, the report must include a recommendation as to 
whether the moratorium should be continued or repealed.
  The Senate Intelligence Committee has been critical of the Department 
of Energy's counterintelligence program for nearly 10 years. Beginning 
in 1990, we identified serious shortfalls in funding and personnel 
dedicated to protecting our Nation's nuclear secrets.
  Yet year after year--and this year as well--the committee has 
provided funds and directed many reviews and studies in an effort to 
persuade the Department of Energy to take action.
  Unfortunately, this and prior administrations failed to heed our 
warnings.
  Consequently, a serious espionage threat at our National Labs has 
gone virtually unabated and it appears that our nuclear weapons program 
may have suffered extremely grave damage.
  I believe we must take steps to ensure the integrity of our National 
Labs. We understand that a moratorium on the Foreign Visitors Program 
may be perceived by some as a draconian measure, but until the 
Department of Energy fully implements a comprehensive and sustained 
counterintelligence program, we believe that we must err on the side of 
caution. The stakes are too high.
  The moratorium requires a net assessment to be conducted by a panel 
of experts; this is an integral part of a comprehensive report by the 
Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the FBI on the 
counterintelligence activities at the National Laboratories.
  Only then should we decide whether to lift the moratorium in favor of 
a comprehensive plan. I believe this is a very important point.
  During our preliminary look in the committee into the problems at the 
DOE labs, we were convinced that the FBI could and should be required 
to inform an agency or department that they are investigating an 
employee of that particular agency.
  Accordingly, section 602 of the bill requires the FBI to establish 
meaningful liaison with the relevant agency at the beginning stages of 
a counterintelligence investigation.

[[Page 16691]]

  This section also amends the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 1995 to make clear that the FBI's obligation to consult 
with departments and agencies concerned begins when the FBI has 
knowledge of espionage activities from other sources or as a result of 
its own information or investigation.
  In closing, I must remind the Members of this body, my colleagues, of 
an unfortunate fact. This is the last time that Senator Kerrey, the 
distinguished senior Senator from Nebraska, will bring an intelligence 
authorization bill to the floor of the Senate as the vice chairman of 
the committee.
  Senator Kerrey's tenure on the committee will conclude at the end of 
this year.
  This past March 14, as some of you will recall, marked the 30th 
anniversary of the day that Lieutenant, Junior Grade, Bob Kerrey, 
leading his SEAL team on an operation on an island in the bay of Nha 
Trang earned our Nation's highest award for valor, the Medal of Honor.
  No one who knows Bob Kerrey's military record would question his 
physical courage, but I would like to talk for just a few minutes about 
another type of courage he has, and that is moral courage.
  In a town like Washington that rewards neither, he is the rare man 
who has both, I believe. The wartime history of the United States Navy 
has documented his physical courage, but I want to recognize his moral 
courage. And I want to tell you why.
  Senator Kerrey has taken stands that many of us would consider 
politically unwise.
  He took a stand on entitlements reform here in the Senate long before 
it was politically wise to do so. It can be said he laid his bare hand 
on the ``third rail of American politics'' and took the heat--something 
few in this body were willing to attempt.
  As vice chairman of this committee, Senator Kerrey has often taken 
issue with his own administration when he believed it was in the 
national interest to do so. Indeed, he always puts the interests of the 
Nation ahead of politics.
  Also, Senator Kerrey's knowledge of our intelligence needs is 
unparalleled in the Senate. And I will miss his service, as others 
will, on the Intelligence Committee.
  Senator Kerrey has set a very high standard for his successor, and I 
thank him for his dedication and integrity, and also for his personal 
friendship. It has been a pleasure and an honor to work with Nebraska's 
senior Senator.
  I look forward to joining him on the floor one last time when the 
conference report for this bill reaches the floor later this year.
  Until that time, though, we will continue to work closely to conduct 
vigorous oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States 
in the nonpartisan spirit that created this important and unique 
committee.
  Mr. President, before I yield the floor, I ask unanimous consent that 
a copy of the Congressional Budget Office cost estimate for S. 1009 be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

     S. 1009--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000
       Summary: S. 1009 would authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2000 for intelligence activities of the United States 
     government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, 
     and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability 
     System (CIARDS).
       This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of 
     the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that enacting 
     the bill would result in additional spending of $172 million 
     over the 2000-2004 period, assuming appropriation of the 
     authorized amounts. The unclassified portion of the bill 
     would affect direct spending; thus, pay-as-you-go procedures 
     would apply. However, CBO cannot give a precise estimate of 
     the direct spending effects because the data necessary to 
     support a cost estimate are classified.
       The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) excludes from 
     application of that all legislative provisions that are 
     necessary for the national security. CBO has determined that 
     the unclassified provisions of this bill either fit within 
     that exclusion or do not cover intergovernmental or private-
     sector mandates as defined by UMRA.
       Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
     budgetary impact of the unclassified portions of S. 1009 is 
     shown in the following table. CBO cannot obtain the necessary 
     information to estimate the costs for the entire bill because 
     parts are classified at a level above clearances held by CBO 
     employees. For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that 
     the bill will be enacted by October 1, 1999, and that the 
     authorized amounts will be appropriated for fiscal year 2000.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     By fiscal years in millions of dollars--
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                                                   1999    2000    2001    2002    2003    2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
 
Spending Under Current Law for Intelligence Community
 Management:
  Budget Authority \1\..........................................     102       0       0       0       0  ......
  Estimated Outlays.............................................     104      39       9       2       0  ......
Proposed Changes:
  Authorization Level...........................................       0     172       0       0       0  ......
  Estimated Outlays.............................................       0     106      52      10       3  ......
Spending Under S. 1009 for Intelligence Community Management:
  Authorization Level\1\........................................     102     172       0       0       0       0
  Estimated Outlays.............................................     104     145      61      12       3       0
 
                                           CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING
 
Estimated Budget Authority......................................       0   (\2\)   (\2\)   (\2\)   (\2\)   (\2\)
Estimated Outlays...............................................       0   (\2\)   (\2\)   (\2\)   (\2\)  (\2\)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 1999 level is the amount appropriated for that year.
\2\ CBO cannot give a precise estimate of direct spending effects because the data necessary to support a cost
  estimate are classified.

       Outlays are estimated according to historical spending 
     patterns. The costs of this legislation fall within budget 
     function 050 (national defense).
       The bill would authorize appropriations of $172 million for 
     the Intelligence Community Management Account, which funds 
     the coordination of programs, budget oversight, and 
     management of the intelligence agencies. In addition, the 
     bill would authorize $209 million for CIARDS to cover 
     retirement costs attributable to military service and various 
     unfunded liabilities. The payment to CIARDS is considered 
     mandatory, and the authorization under this bill would be the 
     same as assumed in the CBO baseline.
       Section 305 would allow an individual who is or has been 
     affiliated with a Communist or similar political party to 
     become a naturalized citizen, if the individual has made a 
     contribution to the national security or national 
     intelligence mission of the United States. Under current law, 
     such individuals are not allowed to become naturalized 
     citizens, unless the affiliation was involuntary. Enacting 
     this provision could effect certain federal assistance 
     programs and the amount of fees collected by the Immigration 
     and Naturalization Service. Because the number of affected 
     individuals is expected to be very small, however, CBO 
     estimates that any effects on direct spending would not be 
     significant.
       Section 402 of the bill would extend the authority of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency to offer incentive payments to 
     employees who voluntarily retire or resign. This * * * which 
     is currently scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 
     1999, would be * * * through fiscal year 2000. Section 402 
     would also require the CIA to make a deposit to the Civil 
     Service Retirement and Disability Fund equal to 15 percent of 
     final pay for each employee who accepts an incentive payment. 
     CBO estimates that these payments would amount to less than 
     $3 million. We believe that these deposits would be 
     sufficient to cover the cost of any long-term increase in 
     benefits that would result from induced retirements, although 
     the timing of agency payments and the additional benefit 
     payments would not match on a yearly basis. CBO cannot 
     provide a precise estimate of the direct spending effects 
     because the data necessary for an estimate are classified.
       Section 501 of the bill would require a background 
     investigation of citizens of a foreign nation before they 
     could enter a national laboratory of the Department of 
     Energy. Based on information from two of the three national 
     laboratories, CBO expects the laboratories to host about 
     10,000 foreign visitors a year. The cost to conduct an 
     investigation would depend on the type of background check. 
     According to the Defense Department, the cost for a minimum 
     national agency check is about $70, and the cost can increase 
     to $300 with additional credit bureau or local police agency 
     checks. Because some of these costs would be incurred under 
     current law, CBO estimates that the additional costs of 
     section 501 would be minimal.
       Pay-as-you-go considerations: Sections 305 and 402 of the 
     bill would affect direct spending, and therefore the bill 
     would be subject to pay-as-you-go procedures. CBO estimates 
     that the direct spending costs of section 305 would be very 
     small. CBO cannot estimate the precise direct spending 
     effects of section 402 because the necessary data are 
     classified.
       Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The Unfunded 
     Mandates Reform Act excludes from application of the act 
     legislative provisions that are necessary for the national 
     security. CBO has determined that the unclassified provisions 
     of this bill either fit within that exclusion or do * * * 
     intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined by 
     UMRA.
       Previous CBO estimate: On May 5, 1999, CBO prepared a cost 
     estimate for the unclassified portion of H.R. 1555, the 
     Intelligence

[[Page 16692]]

     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as ordered reported 
     by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, The 
     House version authorizes * * * Intelligence Community 
     Management, and the estimated costs of H.R. 155 are * * * 
     higher.
       Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Estimate for 
     Naturalization Provision: Valerie Baxter. Estimate for 
     Voluntary Separation Pay: Eric Rollins. Estimate for 
     Remaining Provisions: Dawn Sauter. Impact on State, Local, 
     and Tribal Governments: Teri Gullo. Impact on the Private 
     Sector: Eric Labs.
       Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant 
     Director for Budget Analysis.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following 
members of the committee staff be granted floor privileges during the 
pendency of this bill: Dan Gallington, Jim Barnett, Al Cumming, Pete 
Dorn, Peter Flory, Lorenzo Goco, Ken Johnson, Ken Myers, Linda Taylor, 
Jim Wolfe; and also Dr. Michael Cieslak on Senator Bingaman's staff.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith of Oregon). Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. SHELBY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to join my chairman, Senator Shelby 
of Alabama, with whom I have had the pleasure to work now for several 
years. This is my last year on this select committee. It has been an 
opportunity, for the last 8 years, to acquire an understanding of what 
it takes to collect intelligence, to analyze that intelligence, to 
process it, produce it, and disseminate it.
  It is nowhere near as easy as it used to be. In the old days, you 
basically sent human beings out there to try to figure out what was 
going on. You hoped they spoke the language and were smart enough to 
figure things out. They would come back and bring you the best stuff 
they could. Oftentimes it would be too late to act upon it.
  I had a small piece of that some 30 years ago in the service, where 
we used to collect intelligence as well. So I have at least some 
independent understanding of the difficulty, especially on the human 
side. But the importance of what intelligence can bring to an operation 
cannot be overstated-- the recent operation in Kosovo, the Dayton peace 
agreement, incident after incident that cannot be disclosed to the 
public because most of it occurs in a secret environment where 
warfighters and policymakers get information in a timely fashion and, 
as a consequence, lives are saved, success is achieved, and national 
security is improved.
  This bill is a result of a bipartisan effort to make the year 2000 a 
watershed year for intelligence. This bill sets the intelligence 
community on a course to respond to the very complex world we are 
facing. The era of downsizing has ended. Intelligence must be 
positioned to collect, analyze, and inform policymakers on the complex 
threats we face.
  As my colleagues are no doubt aware, most of the bill is classified. 
As always, Chairman Shelby and I have made the classified sections 
available to our colleagues for their review. Further, committee staff 
is readily available to brief on any aspect of this bill. I believe 
Members have found the bill to be the result of a completely bipartisan 
effort to fund intelligence activities in fiscal year 2000.
  Chairman Shelby and I have tried, and I think on most occasions have 
consistently applied a single test, to determine whether or not a 
funding level or a provision or an oversight hearing or a letter or 
some other action is required. And that test is, will this make the 
people of the United States of America and our interests more secure as 
a consequence? If the answer is yes, we have done it. If the answer is 
no, we have not.
  We do not, in these committees, check with our leadership to 
determine whether or not there is a Democratic position or a Republican 
position. What we do is check to determine whether or not the action 
will be in the best interest of the United States of America and keep 
the United States as secure as our best judgments can make it. It has 
been a pleasure to work with Senator Shelby, and it has been an honor 
for me to have the opportunity to watch him participate and to 
experience his leadership on this committee.
  As I said, I believe the year 2000 must be a watershed year for 
intelligence. That is because the intelligence community has been 
significantly downsized in the decade of the 1990s. Again, in 
classified briefings, we are pleased to provide Members with the 
information on that. I think most Members will be shocked to see the 
budget and the number of people, especially the number of people we 
have today, who are doing the collection, doing the analysis, doing the 
work of trying to figure out, with new technologies, how to produce and 
then how to disseminate this intelligence as quickly and accurately as 
possible. The number of people doing that has gone down.
  This is not a simple task, such as we sometimes see in crime reports, 
where somebody will go into a 7-Eleven store, and they will have a 
camera that shows who they are. It is not that simple. These are, on 
the imaging side, complicated images; on the signal side, complicated 
signals; and always, on the human side, a very complicated set of 
circumstances out there that have to be first observed and then 
interpreted by men and women who have the requisite skills to get the 
job done.
  Furthermore, we are making decisions today that don't just affect 
this year. We are making decisions today that will affect intelligence 
collectors and intelligence efforts 10 years from now.
  In the area of technology, one has to try to anticipate where the 
world is going to go. The chairman and I put together what is called a 
technical advisory group, a group of not only highly skilled but highly 
motivated men and women, who love their country and are concerned about 
what we need to do to keep our country safe. We were able to basically 
take very complicated subjects; in my case--I am sure it is not true 
for the chairman --they had to convert sophisticated subject matter 
into very unsophisticated phrases so I would be able to understand what 
it was they were saying and make better judgments as well about what we 
need to do. Their contributions have been enormously important and have 
added significant value to our ability to make these kinds of 
decisions.
  I pay them a very high compliment and urge my colleagues to consider 
that it is not just the highly professional and skilled staff--a couple 
years ago, we went away from a system where Republicans got so many 
staff members, Democrats got so many staff members or an individual got 
staff as well, to a professional staff--we have enjoyed the benefit of 
tremendous input coming from our private sector technical advisory 
group.
  The cold war has ended.
  And it is quite appropriate for us to have downsized our intelligence 
collection. As I said, in my strong and considered judgment, we have 
reached the point of no return. We have reached the point now where we 
are beginning to drawdown, as we say in farm country, our seed corn. We 
are drawing down our basic stockpile of resources to the point where we 
are doing great damage to our ability to answer the call of 
warfighters.
  Though nobody knew the direction the world was going to take, or the 
size and seriousness of the threats the United States was going to face 
after the cold war, during the transition I believe it was quite 
correct to restructure many national priorities and get our economy 
back on sound footing. However, this transition must be considered to 
be open especially now that we have a better understanding of where the 
rest of the world is heading and we have a much more precise 
understanding of the kinds of threats the people of the United States 
face in that world.
  Unfortunately, in some areas in the world, the world is heading in 
the

[[Page 16693]]

wrong direction. Rogue states are trying to acquire chemical, nuclear, 
and biological weapons for the purpose of threatening us and our 
friends. Many countries are actively pursuing long-range missile 
programs, which also threaten international peace.
  A potential strategic partner, Russia, is in the midst of economic 
chaos and under extreme political difficulties. In recent war game 
exercises involving 50,000 conventional forces in Russia, the defense 
minister said those conventional forces did not have the capability 
they had 7 or 8 years ago when it was the Soviet Union. They have now 
made a decision to use nuclear weapons much more quickly than under 
previous battlefield instructions. That increases the threat to the 
people of the United States and signals the kind of decisionmaking that 
other powers out there that do not have conventional parity with the 
United States and other powers with bad intent might do in order to 
compensate for their lack of conventional strength.
  Even more problematic, Russia's nuclear stockpile is aging. It is 
subject to the vagaries of the political and economic problems that 
confront its national leaders and too large to serve its essential 
defense requirements. Moreover, other nations are either at war or on 
the brink of war.
  Prior to the Fourth of July recess, I spoke on the floor about the 
escalating military confrontation building between India and Pakistan. 
That conflict appears to have been resolved and a stand-down has 
occurred, but that conflict could flash up in an instant and put the 
interests of the people of the United States at considerable risk. 
Elsewhere, in Kosovo and Bosnia, and with Serbia, as well, our 
relations are extremely unsettled and are the focus of very close 
attention.
  The list goes on and on. We have 37,000 Americans forward deployed in 
South Korea. Americans are forward deployed in many other regions in 
this world for the purpose of stabilizing those parts of the world. We 
believe--and I think quite correctly--that forward deployment increases 
stability in the world and adds to the chances of success to the 
struggling democratic nations--struggling to make the transition from 
command economies to market. It is very important for the United States 
to deploy our forces. It tends to act as a deterrent against potential 
bad actors. We have a mission in Iraq we are flying on a daily basis, 
and we are trying to watch literally the entire planet simultaneously 
so as to prepare our policymakers for something that could happen which 
could put American lives and interests at risk.
  I am not trying to turn this statement into an international tour de 
force over foreign or defense policy. Instead, I want to remind my 
colleagues and the citizens whom they represent, that in many regions 
the world order is very disordered, and the Intelligence Community is 
the edge our policymakers must have in order to stay ahead of what has 
happened.
  Without timely intelligence support, we cannot respond effectively. 
This means the era of downsizing intelligence has to end or we will 
find ourselves at a point where Congress discovers there are things we 
can't do. There is a tendency to take our intelligence efforts for 
granted and see it as sort of an invisible force. We see an image that 
is presented to us, such as a bomb damage assessment, and we don't 
understand what went into that. We didn't merely pull it off of a 
shelf. Or we see a report of an analysis that is done, where decisions 
are made and troops are deployed, and we don't ask ourselves as often 
as we should what was the intelligence collection fraction that went 
into that effort.
  Was it possible to just pick up the forces and go into an area? The 
answer is no. A significant amount of analysis is done, and that 
analysis has given us an edge. It gives us battlefield superiority and 
the capability of doing things that, in previous wars, we were simply 
unable to do.
  Our enemies know that. Our intelligence capability, all by itself, 
acts as a considerable deterrent. Because people know we have the 
capabilities, they are much less likely to take an action that would be 
hostile to us, dangerous to us and at the end of the day dangerous for 
them as well.
  As colleagues may recall, last year when introducing the Fiscal Year 
1999 Intelligence Authorization Act, I referred, as I mentioned, to 
this technical advisory group that Chairman Shelby had the foresight to 
create. This highly qualified group of Americans evaluated some of the 
most esoteric and technical subjects the committee had to confront in 
order to position intelligence for future challenges. We used their 
services this year. They provided us with extremely valuable advice and 
saved taxpayers, my guess is--it would not be out of line to say they 
have saved hundreds of millions of dollars.
  They have identified the areas where we might be able to use 
technology to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Because 
of the enormous contributions these men and women on the technical 
advisory group have made to the intelligence oversight effort, we had 
the ability not to just write a bill but, as I have said, write a bill 
that will keep Americans more safe.
  I would be remiss if I didn't mention a subject that held a lot of 
media attention over the past 3 or 4 months, and that is 
counterintelligence. This bill contains provisions intended to help 
intelligence and law enforcement meet the espionage challenges we face. 
I am sure it is obvious that because of who we are, many nations want 
to know what we do. Espionage is a fact of life. We should act 
decisively when we detect it and prosecute fully those who engage in 
it. But it will not go away. Thus, we need to strengthen 
counterintelligence to meet the challenges. The bill contains important 
provisions to help us attack this very real and present danger.
  As my colleagues are no doubt also aware, there will be an important 
amendment on the bill concerning a reorganization of parts of the 
Department of Energy. Most of the amendment is not about intelligence 
or counterintelligence; it is about nuclear weapons security. The 
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board's report entitled 
``Science At Its Best, Security At Its Worst'' reminds us it is also 
about accountability.
  I look forward to a full debate on the amendment of which I am a 
cosponsor and to our discussion on the intelligence and 
counterintelligence provisions.
  Again, I thank Senator Shelby, the chairman of the committee, for his 
bipartisan and patriotic approach to developing this bill. I thank the 
entire staff for their work to present the committee a bill they could 
fully support. Because of the spirit of working together, the bill was 
reported out of committee unanimously. I urge my colleagues to support 
it.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, under the previous order, is it in order to 
proceed to the Kyl-Domenici amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. KYL. Is the amendment already at the desk or does it need to be 
called up?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is not at the desk.


                           Amendment No. 1258

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative assistant read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl], for himself, Mr. 
     Domenici, Mr. Murkowski, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Specter, Mr. 
     Gregg, Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Warner, Mr. Bunning, 
     Mr. Helms, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Lott, Mr. Kerrey, Mrs. 
     Feinstein, and Mr. Smith of New Hampshire, proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1258.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under 
``Amendments Submitted.'')

[[Page 16694]]


  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me first compliment Senator Shelby and 
Senator Kerrey, the chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee, for their work in presenting the intelligence authorization 
bill to the floor. This amendment to the Intelligence Authorization 
bill deals with the all-important question of how the Department of 
Energy will be reorganized to ensure the theft of our nuclear secrets, 
as has occurred in the past, will be a question of the past and will 
not occur in the future.
  As we heard earlier today, over the past several months, there have 
been a lot of sobering stories about how our Nation's security has been 
damaged by China's theft of America's most sensitive secrets--literally 
the crown jewels of our nuclear arsenal. In searching for a solution to 
this problem and examining how best to safeguard our Nation and its 
nuclear secrets, it has become clear the only way this can be 
accomplished is through a complete overhaul of how the Department of 
Energy is organized and how it is managed.
  I think everyone can agree the system is broken. As the bipartisan 
Cox committee report pointed out, security and counterintelligence at 
U.S. nuclear facilities has been grossly deficient for many years, 
enabling China to steal classified information on all of the nuclear 
warheads currently deployed by the United States, as well as the 
neutron bomb, and a variety of other military know-how, including 
missile guidance and reentry vehicle technology.
  This is incredibly important when a nation has been able to steal the 
secrets on how to build the most sophisticated weapons ever devised by 
mankind, those most sophisticated nuclear weapons in our arsenal.
  When reports of the Chinese espionage at our nuclear labs became 
public earlier this year, President Clinton asked his Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board, led by former Senator Warren Rudman, to 
investigate the cause of these terrible security breaches. Over the 
course of several weeks, the Presidential panel reviewed more than 700 
reports and studies, thousands of pages of classified and unclassified 
documents, conducted interviews with scores of senior Federal 
officials, and visited the Department of Energy sites at the heart of 
the inquiry.
  At the end of this exhaustive investigation, the panel concluded that 
the root cause of the Energy Department's dismal security and 
counterintelligence report was ``organizational disarray, managerial 
neglect, and a culture of arrogance . . . [which] conspired to create 
an espionage scandal waiting to happen.''
  The Presidential board went on to note that the Department of Energy 
(DOE) ``represents the best of America's scientific talent and 
achievement, but it has also been responsible for the worst security 
record on secrecy that the members of this panel have ever 
encountered.''
  Senator Rudman and his colleagues pulled no punches in describing the 
problems that exist at DOE or in prescribing bold solutions stating,

       Reorganization [of DOE] is clearly warranted to resolve the 
     many specific problems with security and counterintelligence 
     in the weapons laboratories, but also to address the lack of 
     accountability that has become endemic throughout the entire 
     Department.

  The Rudman report noted that,

       The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy 
     that has proven it is incapable to reforming itself. 
     Accountability at DOE has been spread so thinly and 
     erratically that it is now almost impossible to find. The 
     long traditional and effective method of entrenched DOE and 
     lab bureaucrats is to defeat security reform initiatives by 
     waiting them out.

  That is from the Rudman report.
  I ask that our colleagues keep that in mind when they consider 
amendments that may be offered a little bit later to this amendment--
amendments that people at the Department of Energy would very much like 
to see passed because it would leave them in control, the very 
situation that the Rudman report notes is unacceptable and must be 
changed.
  Furthermore, the authors of the Rudman report go on to say,

       We are stunned by the huge numbers of DOE employees 
     involved in overseeing a weapons lab contract. We repeatedly 
     heard from officials at various levels of DOE and the weapons 
     labs how this convoluted and bloated management structure has 
     constantly transmitted confusing and often contradictory 
     mandates to the labs.

  Although Energy Secretary Richardson has announced several new 
initiatives to change management and procedures at DOE, the 
Presidential panel's report states, ``we seriously doubt that his 
initiatives will achieve lasting success,'' and notes, ``moreover, the 
Richardson initiatives simply do not go far enough.''
  In their report, the Presidential board also described the record of 
problems with implementing organizational changes ordered by previous 
Energy Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries, since the entrenched 
bureaucracy has often reverted to its old tricks once these people 
left. For example, the report notes that in 1990, then-Secretary 
Watkins ordered a new series of initiatives on safeguards and security 
to be implemented. According to the Rudman panel, once Secretary 
Watkins left two years later, ``the initiatives all but evaporated.'' 
And furthermore, the panel's report notes, ``Deputy Secretary Charles 
Curtis in late 1996 investigated clear indications of serious security 
and counterintelligence problems and drew up a list of initiatives in 
response. Those initiatives were also dropped after he left office.''
  It is because of these problems that the Presidential panel 
recommended that Congress act to reorganize the Department by statute, 
so that the bureaucracy could not simple wait out another Secretary of 
Energy. Senator Domenici, Senator Murkowski, and I have written 
legislation to implement the group's recommendations. Our proposal 
would gather all of the parts of our nation's nuclear weapons research, 
development, and production programs under one semi-autonomous agency 
within the Energy Department.
  We need to create a specific separate organizational structure for 
the weapons programs at DOE, managed by one person who reports only to 
the Secretary of Energy. And furthermore, we need to separate the 
nuclear weapons programs at DOE from the rest of the Department that is 
responsible for energy conservation and environmental management 
issues. As the Rudman report concluded, semi-autonomous agency, created 
by statute, is the only way we are going to solve the problems with 
DOE's management of the nuclear weapons complex.
  Before explaining the details of this amendment, let me first mention 
that while the Cox Committee and the President's Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board, led by Senator Rudman, have done a great service to the 
nation by producing high quality reports with excellent 
recommendations, they are by no means the first people to recommend 
such changes. Over the past 20 years, at least 29 GAO reports, 61 
internal DOE studies, and more than a dozen reports by outside 
commissions have called for restructuring how the Department is 
managed. Let us not wait until another forest is consumed to print more 
studies before we act to correct the serious management problems at 
DOE.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, may I interrupt to make a unanimous consent 
request.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Robert Perret, a fellow 
in my office, be entitled to floor privileges during the pendency of 
this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. I apologize to my friend.
  Mr. KYL. I am happy to comply.
  Mr. President, the point of referring to these 29 GAO reports, 61 
internal DOE studies, and more than a dozen reports by outside 
commissions over the past 20 years is to make the point that now is the 
time for us to move forward and not to await important studies, and not 
to await more discussions about how this ought to be done. We have 
enough evidence of what needs to be done. It is now time to get on with 
the serious subject of fixing this broken management structure at DOE.
  Here is the summary of the amendment.
  This amendment would create a semi-autonomous agency within DOE

[[Page 16695]]

called the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship.
  The Agency will be headed by an Under Secretary who ``shall report 
solely and directly to the Secretary and shall be subject to the 
supervision and direction of the Secretary.''
  Let me digress for a moment to make this point.
  There are some who would put additional layers of bureaucracy between 
the Secretary and this Agency for Nuclear Stewardship. That would be a 
grave mistake. As the Rudman report itself notes, the point is to 
streamline this agency's responsibility, starting with the Secretary at 
the top and everyone else reporting to the Deputy Secretary who reports 
strictly to the Secretary of Energy. If you insert other management 
layers, you are only getting back to the same kind of problem that the 
Rudman report has criticized in the past.
   The Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship will have authority over 
all programs at DOE related to ``nuclear weapons, non-proliferation and 
fissile material disposition.''
   The agency's semi-autonomy (as recommended by the Rudman report) is 
created by making all employees of the agency accountable to the 
Secretary and Under Secretary of Energy but not to other officials at 
DOE outside the Agency.
  The language reads:

       All personnel of the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship, in 
     carrying out any function of the Agency, shall be responsible 
     to, and subject to the supervision and direction of, the 
     Secretary and the Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship or 
     his designee within the Agency, and shall not be responsible 
     to, or subject to the supervision or direction of, any other 
     officer, employee, or agent of any other part of the 
     Department.

   The Secretary, however, ``may direct other officials of the 
Department who are not within the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship to 
review the Agency's programs and to make recommendations to the 
Secretary regarding the administration of such programs, including 
consistency with other similar programs and activities in the 
Department.''
  There is another proposed amendment which we will get to later which 
suggests that all of the programs and activities of this special new 
autonomous agency are to act in ways consistent with all other 
departmental rules and regulations promulgated for all of the other 
departments within the Department of Energy.
  That would be a big mistake and get right back to the problem that 
the Rudman commission noted; that is, that this is a special, unique 
entity, and that you cannot have everybody else within the Department 
of Energy controlling what goes on within this particular group.
  The Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship will have 3 Deputy 
Directors, who will manage programs in the following areas:
  No. 1. Defense Programs. The national lab directors and heads of 
weapons production and test sites will report directly to this person, 
who will be responsible for managing the programs necessary to maintain 
the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile.
  No. 2. Nonproliferation and fissile materials disposition. This 
person would manage the Energy Department's efforts to help Russia and 
other states of the former Soviet Union secure their nuclear weapons 
and fissile material, as well as plan for how to dispose of dozens of 
tons of excess plutonium in the United States and Russia; and
  No. 3. Naval Reactors. This highly successful program which designs, 
constructs, operates, and disposes of the nuclear reactors used in the 
U.S. Navy's fleet will continue to operate as it does today, except the 
Admiral in charge will now report to the Under Secretary for Nuclear 
Stewardship as well as the Secretary of Energy.
  As recommended by the Rudman panel, under our amendment, the Under 
Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship will appoint Chiefs of 
Counterintelligence, Security, and Intelligence.
  The Chief of Counterintelligence will develop and implement the 
Agency's programs to prevent the disclosure of loss of classified 
information and be responsible for personnel assurance programs, like 
background checks.
  The Chief of Security will be responsible for the development and 
implementation of programs for the protection, control, and accounting 
of fissile material, and for the physical and cyber-security of all 
sites in the Agency.
  And the Chief of Intelligence will manage the Agency's programs for 
the analysis of foreign nuclear weapons programs.
  These 3 chiefs will report to the Under Secretary and shall have 
statutorily provided ``direct access to the Secretary and all other 
senior officials of the Department and its contractors'' concerning 
these matters.
  The amendment calls on the Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship to 
report annually through the Secretary to Congress regarding:
  No. 1. The adequacy of DOE procedures and policies for protecting 
national security information.
  No. 2. Whether each DOE national laboratory and nuclear weapons 
production and test site is in full compliance with all Departmental 
security requirements, and if not what measures are being taken to 
bring a lab into compliance; and
  No. 3. A description of the number and type of violations of security 
and counterintelligence laws and requirements at DOE nuclear weapons 
facilities.
  Furthermore, the amendment calls for the Under Secretary to keep the 
Secretary and the Congress fully and currently informed about any 
potentially significant threat to, or loss of, national security 
information.
  The amendment would require every employee of DOE, the national labs, 
or associated contractors to alert the Under Secretary whenever they 
believe there is a problem, abuse or violation of the law relating to 
the management of national security information.
  And, in order to address concerns that DOE officials were blocked 
from notifying Congress of security and counterintelligence breaches, 
the amendment contains a provision stating that ``no officer or 
employee of the Department of Energy or any other Federal agency or 
department may delay, deny, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with the 
preparation'' of these reports to Congress.
  Mr. President, the Senate should act with urgency to correct the 
serious problems that exist at our nuclear facilities to halt the flow 
of our precious nuclear secrets to countries like China.
  Our amendment is a sound approach to rectifying the systematic 
problems that have been identified and that exist today, and I am 
disappointed that Secretary Richardson has not yet embraced the 
proposal we have submitted. Since as recently as April of 1999, the 
Secretary of Energy's own Management Review Report stated:

       Significant problems exist [in DOE] in that roles and 
     responsibilities are unclear; lines of authority and 
     accountability are not well understood or followed; the 
     distinction between headquarters, line and staff functions is 
     unclear, and each is operating with autonomy.

  Statistics support this view. According to the GAO, from 1980 to 
1996, DOE terminated 9 of 18 major defense program projects after 
spending $1.9 billion and completed only two projects: One behind 
schedule and overbudget, with the other behind schedule and 
underbudget. Schedule slippages and cost overruns occurred on many of 
the remaining seven projects ongoing in 1996.
  Finally, I note that management problems cannot be divorced from 
security concerns. As the GAO noted in testimony to the House, 
continuing management problems at DOE were ``key factors contributing 
to security problems at the laboratories'' and a ``major reason why DOE 
has been unable to develop long-term solutions to recurring problems 
reported by the advisory groups.''
  The amendment we offer enjoys broad bipartisan support. In addition 
to Senator Domenici who chairs the Energy and Water Appropriations 
Subcommittee, and Senator Murkowski who chairs the Energy Committee, it 
is cosponsored by the chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee, Senators Shelby and Kerrey;

[[Page 16696]]

the chairman of the Armed Services Committee and its Subcommittee on 
Strategic Forces, Senators Warner and Smith; chairman of the 
Governmental Affairs Committee, Senator Thompson; chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms; former chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee, Senator Specter; as well as Senator Feinstein, 
Senator Hutchinson, Senator Gregg, Senator Bunning, Senator Fitzgerald, 
and the distinguished majority leader, Senator Lott.
  We cannot delay the implementation of important security and 
counterintelligence upgrades at our nuclear labs and facilities. Great 
harm to our Nation's security has already been done, and if we want to 
prevent further damage, we must act to reform the way we manage our 
nuclear weapons programs and facilities to create accountability and 
responsibility. Our most fundamental duty as Senators is to protect the 
security and the safety of the American people. They deserve no less 
than our best in this regard. I urge my colleagues to act now to halt 
the hemorrhage of America's nuclear secrets and to support the adoption 
of this important amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona. He is persistent with this legislation. I appreciate very much 
his interest in the beginning in trying to do something about, as he 
knows, what many people have previously said needs to be done.
  The distinguished Senator from Virginia finally succeeded in getting 
a provision accepted by the administration in the national defense 
authorization bill having to do with an oversight committee appointed 
by the leadership, which I think will add a lot of value to our effort 
to make these labs produce good science and the best security as well.
  I was asked the question, I say to my friend from Arizona, not long 
after our caucuses, which the Senator from Arizona might be interested 
in: Do you think the Republicans want an issue or do they want to get 
something done?
  My view is, Senator Kyl of Arizona, Senator Murkowski of Alaska, and 
Senator Domenici of New Mexico want to get something done. It has been 
probably 20 years people have been calling to our attention the need to 
change the structure of this organization. It is basically a hodgepodge 
of various agencies that were combined in, I believe, 1978 or 1979--in 
the 1970's. Various agencies were combined into the Department of 
Energy. It is very important we seize this opportunity.
  Senator Rudman said he did not know what happened exactly, but all of 
a sudden the focus is on it. A series of things have occurred that 
present us with an opportunity to change this law. The law needs to be 
changed. The law needs to be changed to restructure this agency to make 
it more likely that the United States of America and our interests are 
going to be safe and secure, and that we will continue to produce the 
high-quality science these laboratories are known throughout the world 
for producing.
  I have very high praise for the Senator from Arizona. I appreciate 
very much his perseverance in this matter and his willingness to change 
his own bill to accommodate former Senator Rudman, the PFIAB's 
recommendations, and accommodate some of the concerns I had as well.
  We are trying to write a law. I know Senator Levin and Senator 
Bingaman, Senator Reid, and others, are going to offer some amendments. 
I say to my colleagues on the Democratic side, I believe, and I believe 
so strongly, that the Republicans do not desire an issue. They want to 
make real change.
  It would have been real easy, in fact, to say: OK, we got 10 or 11 
things on the defense authorization bill. You can say that is a 
success; why fight that battle. We have encryption to do. We have lots 
of other issues--all of us do--to take care of.
  I am very impressed with the fact there is a determination to get a 
good piece of legislation that will improve the security of the United 
States of America and will enable us to stay in the high-quality 
science direction these laboratories produce. I hope the debate, which 
I am not sure is going to occur tonight--I understand we may not have 
any amendments offered to this bill until tomorrow. I hope I am wrong. 
It will be nice to have people offer these amendments and get them out 
of the way so we can move on to other business.
  I hope the debate is engaged in the same high-level manner that we 
have negotiated the changes in this legislation. By high level, I mean, 
as I referenced earlier in praise of Chairman Shelby, the only test 
that is important is: Does it make the United States of America more 
secure?
  I believe the amendment of the Senator from Arizona does. I am 
pleased to be a cosponsor of it. I intend to vote for it, and I hope 
some of the changes being suggested can be accommodated, but most 
important, I hope we end this year changing the law and are able to 
look into the future 10 years from now and say the laboratories are 
producing the finest science and the highest level of security as well.
  Mr. KYL. I ask the indulgence of the chairman for just a moment. I 
know he wants to proceed and make a brief comment or two. I want to 
comment on a couple of things the Senator from Nebraska just said.
  First of all, I compliment him. He is vice chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee and probably one of the most productive members 
of the committee in doing the hard work of protecting our Nation's 
security, which most people will never know about.
  For his constituents and others in America who are concerned about 
these things, they need to know it is the day-in-and-day-out work of 
the chairman of the committee, Senator Shelby, and Senator Kerrey from 
Nebraska who make this effort work.
  Second, I compliment Senator Kerrey for working on this legislation 
and agreeing to support it at a time when his party's administration 
was not yet supportive. Secretary Richardson did not agree to the 
concept of a semiautonomous agency until relatively recently. But 
Senator Kerrey agreed this was the best approach to take, I think even 
before Senator Rudman came out with his report.
  Coming out early and saying it is important to reorganize and to pay 
attention to the national security concerns at the Department of Energy 
was something he was willing to do early on in a bipartisan way. His 
conduct throughout this whole matter is exemplary and should offer 
guidance to all of us on any issue we face. Party aside, when there is 
a problem to be addressed, we get in and try to address it.
  I assure Senator Kerrey and others on the Democratic side this is not 
something the Republicans look to as an issue but rather as something 
to get done. I hope before we finish with the amendments, we can 
continue to work on them and try to get as much of a bipartisan 
coalition in support of the legislation as is possible because there is 
nothing partisan about national security and there is nothing partisan 
when it comes to espionage at our National Laboratories.
  I thank the Senator from Nebraska for the comments he made, and I 
compliment both Senator Kerrey and Senator Shelby for the great job 
they have done.
  Senator Warner is on the floor. He has been stalwart in his support 
of our efforts, each day asking: What is new; we will stick with you; 
we know this has to be done. That kind of support is encouraging.
  We can get this done. If we get it done quickly, it is good for the 
American people.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague for his 
comments. I have worked along with the team, the principals. They were 
going to put the amendment on the armed services authorization bill. I 
thought at that point in time that an insufficient number of Senators 
had had an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the seriousness of 
this issue and that we should wait for the bill of our distinguished 
colleagues from Alabama and Nebraska. A number of Senators have now 
acquainted themselves

[[Page 16697]]

with those provisions. We have an impressive number of cosponsors, and 
I am privileged to be one.
  I don't view this as any retribution against the President or the 
Secretary of Energy. It is something that simply has to be done with 
these institutions that are enormously valuable to the Nation and our 
national security. I use the word ``enormously'' because I can't think 
of another word that connotes a greater degree of importance to our 
country.
  I went out a week ago yesterday and spent several hours at Los Alamos 
and then went on to the other laboratory. I must say, the impression I 
gained from talking with a fairly significant number of individuals, 
both at Sandia and Los Alamos, was that they are willing to work with 
this proposition as laid out in the Senator's amendment and make it 
work.
  I have listened to those who have some questions. As a matter of 
fact, I made myself available to work with Senator Levin. We worked 
together on the Armed Services Committee. It is still not clear in my 
mind exactly what he hopes to achieve. It is my expectation we will 
address it tomorrow when the amendments come forward.
  I know it is the right thing to be done in the interests of the 
country. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee. Indeed, his committee has held 11 hearings. The Senate Armed 
Services Committee also has had several. One broke a record; it was 7 
continuous hours of hearing. It convinced our membership we are behind 
it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I also support the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski 
amendment that is the pending business in the Senate.
  I take just a minute to commend the Senator from Arizona, Senator 
Kyl, and Senator Domenici and Senator Murkowski for working together on 
this very important amendment. It is important for the restructuring of 
our labs following the Rudman recommendation and others.
  Most Members know the horror stories that have been going on for 
years and years. This won't solve everything, but it will be a positive 
step in the right direction.
  I also note my colleague from Nebraska, the vice chairman of the 
committee, Senator Kerrey, and I both support this. That is unusual. We 
believe this is not a partisan issue. This is important for the Nation 
as far as national security is concerned. It is a step in the right 
direction. It is above politics, above party.
  I mention again, as I did yesterday, the Rudman report, which was 
requested by the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, 
concluded that purely administrative reorganizational changes at the 
Department of Energy labs are inadequate, totally inadequate to the 
challenge at hand. He said:

       To ensure its long-term success, this new agency must be 
     established by statute.

  That is exactly what the amendment of Senators Kyl, Domenici, and 
Murkowski does.
  As an indication of how badly the Department of Energy is broken, I 
only have to remind my colleagues it took over 100 studies of 
counterintelligence, security and management practices by the FBI, 
other intelligence agencies, the General Accounting Office, the 
Department of Energy itself and others, plus one enormous espionage 
scandal to create the impetus for change that is before the Senate this 
evening.
  I think it is time for the Senate to act. I believe this is a good 
amendment. It is positive. It has been worked. I believe we will pass 
it.
  Mr. President, I support the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski amendment to 
restructure the Department of Energy.
  I am a cosponsor of that amendment, as is the distinguished vice 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Kerrey.
  By now, my colleagues are familiar with the findings of the Rudman 
report, entitled ``Science at its Best; Security at its Worst: A Report 
on Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy.'' But I think 
certain key conclusions are worth restating, because they underline the 
need for action.
  The Rudman report found that:

       At the birth of DOE, the brilliant scientific breakthroughs 
     of the nuclear weapons laboratories came with a troubling 
     record of security administration. Twenty years later, 
     virtually every one of its original problems persists. . . . 
     Multiple chains of command and standards of performance 
     negated accountability, resulting in pervasive inefficiency, 
     confusion, and mistrust. . . .
       In response to these problems, the Department has been the 
     subject of a nearly unbroken history of dire warnings and 
     attempted but aborted reforms.

  Building on the conclusions of the 1997 Institute for Defense 
Analyses report and the 1999 Chiles Commission, the Rudman panel 
concluded that:

       The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy 
     that has proven it is incapable of reforming itself. . . . 
     Reorganization is clearly warranted to resolve the many 
     specific problems . . . in the weapons laboratories, but also 
     to address the lack of accountability that has become endemic 
     throughout the entire Department.
       The panel is convinced that real and lasting security and 
     counterintelligence reform at the weapons labs is simply 
     unworkable within DOE's current structure and culture. . . . 
     To achieve the kind of protection that these sensitive labs 
     must have, they and their functions must have their own 
     autonomous operational structure free of all the other 
     obligations imposed by DOE management.

  To provide ``deep and lasting structural change that will give the 
weapons laboratories the accountability, clear lines of authority, and 
priority they deserve,'' the Rudman Report endorsed two possible 
solutions:
  Creation of a wholly independent agency such as NASA to perform 
weapons research and nuclear stockpile management functions; or
  Placing weapons research and nuclear stockpile management functions 
in a ``new semi-autonomous agency within DOE that has a clear mission, 
streamlined bureaucracy, and drastically simplified lines of authority 
and accountability.''
  The latter option is the approach contained in the Kyl-Domenici-
Murkowski amendment. The new semi-autonomous agency, the Agency for 
Nuclear Stewardship, will be a single agency, within the DOE, with 
responsibility for all activities of our nuclear weapons complex, 
including the National Laboratories--nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, 
and disposition of fissile materials.
  This agency will be led by an Undersecretary. The Undersecretary will 
be in charge of and responsible for all aspects of the agency's work, 
will report--directly and solely--to the Secretary of Energy, and will 
be subject to the supervision and direction of the Secretary. The 
Secretary of Energy will retail full authority over all activities of 
this agency. Thus, for the first time, this critical function of our 
national government will have the clear chain of command that it 
requires.
  As recommended by the Rudman report, the new agency will have its own 
senior officials responsible for counterintelligence and security 
matters within the agency. These officials will carry out the 
counterintelligence and security policies established by the Secretary 
and will report to the Undersecretary and have direct access to the 
Secretary. The Agency will have a Senior official responsible for the 
analysis and assessment of intelligence, who will also report to the 
Undersecretary and have direct access to the Secretary.
  The Rudman report concluded that purely administrative re-
organizational changes are inadequate to the challenge at hand: ``To 
ensure its long-term success, this new agency must be established by 
statute.''
  For if the history of attempts to reform DOE underscores one thing, 
it is the ability of the DOE and the labs to hunker down and outwait 
and outlast Secretaries and other would-be agents of change--even 
Presidents.
  For example, as documented by Senator Rudman and his colleagues, 
``even after President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 
61 ordering that the Department make fundamental changes in security 
procedures, compliance by Department bureaucrats was grudging and 
belated.''

[[Page 16698]]

  At the same time, we in the Senate should recognize that our work 
will not be done even after this amendment is adopted and enacted into 
law. As the Rudman report warned,

       DOE cannot be fixed by a single legislative act: management 
     must follow mandate. . . . Thus, both Congress and the 
     Executive branch . . . should be prepared to monitor the 
     progress of the Department's reforms for years to come.

  Mr. President, it is an indication of how badly the Department of 
Energy is broken that it took over one hundred studies of 
counterintelligence, security and management practices--by the FBI and 
other intelligence agencies, the GAO, the DOE itself, and others, plus 
one enormous espionage scandal--to create the impetus for change.
  Now is the time for the Senate to act.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I will use some leader time allocated to me today to 
talk about another matter.

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