[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 16389-16390]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                       A MILITARILY STRONG ISRAEL

  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I have been very encouraged in recent days 
by the peace offensive initiated by the new government of Ehud Barak in 
Israel. The people of Israel long for peace. The new Prime Minister, in 
his first few days in office, has been energetically trying to lay the 
groundwork for a secure, lasting peace in the Middle East. I applaud 
his efforts and trust that Prime Minister Barak's actions will be fully 
discussed and carried forward in his upcoming talks in Washington 
during the next week.
  While I applaud these steps toward peace, I also believe it is 
imperative that, at the same time, Israel remain militarily strong. The 
only way a durable peace will be successfully negotiated and maintained 
in this dangerous but vital region of the world is if Israel deals from 
a strong hand. Even if Israel is successful in reaching an 
accommodation with its closest neighbors, it will continue to face very 
serious strategic threats from Iran, Iraq, and Libya for the 
foreseeable future.
  To counter these terrorist states which possess weapons of mass 
destruction and lie within easy striking distance of Israel's homeland, 
it is critical that Israel have an effective strategic strike 
capability that will provide effective deterrence. To do this and to 
move simultaneously forward in implementing the Wye River Agreement and 
pursuing peace initiatives with its neighbors, Israel will need more 
military assistance funding for aircraft purchases from the United 
States.
  In this regard, I recently came across a thoughtful Lexington 
Institute Issue Brief, authored by well-known defense strategist Loren 
Thompson, ``Bolstering Israel's Strategic Air Power Serves America's 
Interests.'' In this essay, Dr. Thompson argues that helping Israel to 
increase it military strength at this time not only will help Israel 
and further Middle East peace but also help protect America's interests 
in the region, especially since the U.S. may have less access to bases 
in

[[Page 16390]]

the region and more threats to American security interests in the 
future.
  Dr. Thompson states, among other things, that:

       It (Israel) needs enough money to buy and equip 15 more F-
     15's for a total force of 40. . . . Making such a purchase 
     would nearly double the Israeli Air Force's capacity for 
     long-range strikes. . . . The US economic and political 
     interest in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region will continue 
     to grow in the years ahead (and) Israel is the only stable, 
     reliable US ally willing to take the necessary risks. 
     Congress and the Clinton Administration need to equip it 
     (Israel) so that it is ready when the time comes.

  Mr. President, to share Dr. Thompson's thoughts with my colleagues, I 
ask unanimous consent that this essay be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the essay was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

   Bolstering Israel's Strategic Air Power Serves America's Interests

                     (By Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D.)

       Israel's government is currently considering a major 
     purchase of military aircraft from the United States. The 
     pending sale has attracted media attention in the U.S. 
     because it pits two highly-regarded tactical aircraft--the 
     Boeing F-15 and Lockheed Martin F-16--against each other in a 
     competition that may be the last opportunity to keep the F-15 
     in production.
       The F-15 is more capable than the F-16 in some roles, but 
     it is also more expensive. That is one reason why the F-16 
     has won most of the recent international arms-sale 
     competitions in which both aircraft were offered. With global 
     tensions greatly reduced from the Cold War period, many 
     nations would prefer the operational flexibility of acquiring 
     a larger number of planes for the same price.
       Israel will probably be no exception. It is a foregone 
     conclusion that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) will select one 
     of the two planes because the U.S. government subsidizes 
     Israeli arms purchases and the F-15 and F-16 are the only 
     U.S. aircraft being offered in the current competition. But 
     the IAF has over a hundred aging F-4 fighters and A-4 attack 
     planes reaching the end of their useful life, and the multi 
     role F-16 is a much more affordable replacement than the F-
     15, both in terms of up-front acquisition costs and later 
     support costs. So the F-15 is likely to lose the competition.


                         The Strategic Context

       The U.S. government should not try to dictate to Israel how 
     it organizes or equips its military. On the other hand, 
     Washington should be sensitive to the fact that Israel is one 
     of America's few democratic allies in the Middle East, and 
     its armed forces in the future may be called on to serve as 
     substitutes for U.S. military power. This has happened in the 
     past, most notably when the IAF destroyed Iraq's Osirak 
     reactor in 1981--a facility the Iraqis planned to use for 
     making weapons-grade nuclear material.
       The Osirak mission was carried out by Israeli F-16 strike 
     aircraft escorted by F-15 fighters. Its success was good news 
     for every nation in the region, although few Arab states 
     could publicly say so. Saddam Hussein's subsequent behavior 
     demonstrated it was also good news for America, which avoided 
     having to deal with a nuclear-capable dictatorship in a 
     volatile, strategically-important region.
       But things have changed in the Middle East since 1981. A 
     number of countries other than Iraq--some of them more 
     distant from Israel--have begun acquiring access to weapons 
     of mass destruction. Iran is developing nuclear, chemical and 
     biological weapons, along with the ballistic missiles to 
     deliver such weapons over long distances (it tested the new 
     Shahab medium-range ballistic missile in July 1998). Libya 
     has made similar efforts. And Sudan has become a center of 
     global terrorism, one suspected of sponsoring the manufacture 
     of chem-bio weapons.
       These trends, which are likely to grow worse, already pose 
     a serious threat to both Israeli and Western interests in the 
     region. But whereas policymakers in Washington have the 
     luxury of seeing such developments in tactical terms, for 
     Israel they are strategic: the very survival of the Jewish 
     state is at stake. And although it is now fashionable to 
     think of America as the world's policeman, it is clear that 
     Israel will often have more incentive and latitude than the 
     U.S. to respond expeditiously to such threats in the future.


                       israel's strategic dilemma

       Which is why the pending arms sale has a special 
     significance: if the government of Prime Minister Ehud Barak 
     decides its top air-power priority is to refresh its force 
     structure with the improved version of the F-16 (the F-16I), 
     Washington shouldn't dispute that decision. But the issue of 
     Israel's strategic strike capability against emerging threats 
     in distant states like Iran should not be neglected.One of 
     the ways in which the F-15I is superior to the F-16I is in 
     its ability to carry bigger bomb loads to greater distances. 
     It would be easier to sustain a long-range bombing campaign 
     against strategic targets near the Iranian capital of Teheran 
     using F-15I's than F-16I's for the simple reason that the F-
     15I's have about a third more range.
       A single F-16I has a maximum weapons carriage of four 
     2,000-pound bombs, which it can carry to a maximum unrefueled 
     combat radius of over 700 nautical miles. An F-15I can carry 
     the same bombload to a radius of about 1,100 nautical miles, 
     or it can carry up to seven 2,000-pound bombs of lesser 
     range. The performance of the F-15 results from the fact that 
     each of its twin engines generate as much thrust (29,000 
     ponds) as the single engine on an F-16. Unfortunately the 
     twin engines are also the biggest reason why each F-15I would 
     cost the IAF about 30% more, not counting later support 
     costs. In air warfare, the tradeoff between price and 
     performance often is inescapable.
       Fortunately for Israel, long-range strategic strike is a 
     specialized mission that does not require a large number of 
     aircraft, and the IAF already has 25 F-15Is suitable for the 
     mission that it bought in 1995. Furthermore, it's not as 
     though the F-16s can't hit remote targets: it was the strike 
     aircraft against the Osirak reactor. But for truly distant 
     targets, the F-16 imposes performance penalties. Conformal 
     fuel tanks might have to be added at the expense of bombload, 
     or aerial refueling might be necessary in hostile airspace. 
     For these very distant targets, the F-15I is the safer 
     choice.
       The problem is that Israel doesn't have enough F-15I's 
     today to prosecute a sustained bombing campaign over great 
     distances, and within current budget constraints it can't 
     afford to buy more--unless it decides to buy fewer F-16s, 
     which would be a bad idea given the age of existing IAF 
     assets and the myriad other missions the F-16Is are needed to 
     cover.


                            the bottom line

       The bottom line is that Israel needs more military 
     assistance funding for aircraft purchases from the United 
     States. Specifically, it needs enough money to buy and equip 
     15 more F-15Is for a total force of 40, without cutting its 
     planned purchase of F-16s. Some F-15I proponents have called 
     for a ``second squadron'' of F-15Is, but the U.S. should not 
     be in the business of dictating the organization of the 
     Israeli Air Force. What it should be doing is helping Israel 
     meet the full range of its legitimate military needs.
       Fifteen more F-15s for Israel is not enough to keep the F-
     15 line open for an extended period of time, but that's 
     precisely the point: this may be the last chance for Israel 
     to acquire an adequate strategic strike capability before the 
     F-15 line closes. Making such a purchase would nearly double 
     the IAF's capacity for long-range strikes while permitting 
     more efficient use of the support infrastructure bought to 
     support the 25 F-15Is already in the force. It would also 
     free up F-16s for other missions, thus enhancing utilization 
     of the entire tactical-aircraft inventory.
       But the case for funding a viable IAF strategic force 
     transcends Israeli military needs. The U.S. economic and 
     political interest in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region 
     will continue to grow in the years ahead as America becomes 
     more dependent on foreign oil. Unfortunately, its access to 
     bases and freedom to act militarily in the region will 
     probably diminish, forcing it in some cases to rely on allies 
     to achieve military goals. Israel is the only stable, 
     reliable U.S. ally willing to take the necessary risks. 
     Congress and the Clinton Administration need to equip it so 
     that it is ready when the time comes.

                          ____________________