[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 11]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 15362-15364]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




   CRISIS IN KOSOVO (ITEM NO. 14), REMARKS BY ALISTAIR MILLAR OF THE 
                          FOURTH FREEDOM FORUM

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, June 30, 1999

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, on June 24, 1999, I joined with 
Representative Cynthia A. McKinney, Representative Barbara Lee, and 
Representative John Conyers in hosting the sixth in a series of 
Congressional Teach-In sessions on the Crisis in Kosovo. If a lasting 
peace is to be achieved in the region, it is essential that we 
cultivate a consciousness of peace and actively search for creative 
solutions. We must construct a foundation for peace through 
negotiation, mediation, and diplomacy.
  Part of the dynamic of peace is a willingness to engage in meaningful 
dialogue, to listen to one another openly and to share our views in a 
constructive manner. I hope that these Teach-In sessions will 
contribute to this process by providing a forum for Members of Congress 
and the public to explore options for a peaceful resolutions. We will 
hear from a variety of speakers on different sides of the Kosovo 
situation. I will be introducing into the Congressional Record 
transcipts of their remarks and essays that shed light on the many 
dimensions of the crisis.
  This presentation is by Alistair Millar, program director and 
Washington Office Director of the Fourth Freedom Forum, an independent 
research organization that sponsors scholarly conferences, cultural 
programs and research fellowships to promote awareness of peace and 
security issues. Before joining the Forum, Mr. Millar was a Senior 
Analyst at the British American Security Information Council. He is a 
British citizen and has a Masters Degree in International Studies from 
the University of Leeds.

                              Presentation

                (By Alistair Millar and David Cortright)

       A peace settlement, no matter how tenuous, has been reached 
     and the war in Yugoslavia over Kosovo is now over. NATO's

[[Page 15363]]

     bombing campaign is being sold as a success, but the problems 
     in the region--in part created by the destruction resulting 
     from allied bombing raids--are far from over. The process of 
     reconstruction, repatriation and rehabilitation is just 
     beginning and will be hugely expensive.
       First we must be clear that this is a problem that does not 
     only affect Kosovo and Serbia. The entire Euro-Atlantic 
     region will suffer the consequences of this conflict for 
     years to come. Regarding the Balkans area suffering the most 
     acute impact of the war, the International Monetary Fund has 
     identified a core group of six countries (Albania, Bosnia-
     Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic 
     of Macedonia and Romania). In a recent analysis the Fund 
     projected that in the best case scenario the total IMF 
     financing for the region will cost $1.3 billion. The 
     breakdown of the costs involved are detailed in the IMF study 
     which looked at two scenarios. Economic output in the region 
     has been reduced by an estimated five percent. This, in turn, 
     will lead to a large trade imbalance--estimated at nearly $2 
     billion. The IMF study along with the United Nations 
     interagency cost projections for the remainder of this 
     calendar year are now available on the internet. http://
www.worldbank.org/
 In Europe, the European Commission has estimated that the 
     reconstruction of Kosovo alone will cost $18 billion. At the 
     G-8 Summit in Cologne, European delegates were hinting 
     strongly that the United States--which currently has a large 
     budget surplus--should bear the brunt. The United States was 
     responsible for 85 percent of the war damage, and it should 
     pay a commensurate share of the reconstruction effort. 
     Incidentally, EU countries have paid 60 percent of the 
     reconstruction costs in Bosnia.
       As for the United States, President Clinton has noted that 
     Washington did its share in providing two-thirds of the 
     aircraft and all the cruise missiles for NATO's 78-day air 
     war. At about $100 million a day, that comes to more than $7 
     billion. In a foreign aid bill approved last Thursday by the 
     US Senate Appropraitions Committee, about $535 million is 
     targeted for the Balkan region but none of it has been 
     allocated for Serbia.
       It is vital that an agreement about who will pay is reached 
     as soon as possible. Responsibility on the part of the United 
     States for the destruction of Yugoslavia's infrastructure as 
     a result of the US-led bombing campaign is an important first 
     step. Considering the costs in human terms, rather than just 
     purely as numbers would also help to focus attention on the 
     severity of this problem. If you make a mess and don't have 
     to clean it up, you aren't likely to think much about the 
     consequences of making another mess in the future.
       Even while the initial assessments are being made, it is 
     almost certain that the costs, not least the costs of 
     maintaining an armed military or peace enforcement presence 
     in the region, are going to increase sharply over short 
     periods of time. One major additional expense will be the 
     peacekeeping operation itself, both military and civilian.
       Given the extended period for which peace enforcement 
     troops are likely to remain in place, some analysts argue 
     that peacekeeping could prove even more expensive than the 
     war. For example, the Royal Institute of International 
     Affairs in London has calculated that, with a projected K-For 
     presence of about 50,000 troops, the bill could amount to as 
     much as $25 billion a year.
       Increases in the costs of enforcing the Dayton peace 
     accords and repatriating displaced refugees affected by the 
     war in Bosnia also provides us with a relevant and recent 
     example of the extent of the problem in Kosovo. The post-
     Dayton pricetag has increased enormously since 1995, and the 
     enforcement of the civilian provisions of the accord has 
     fallen woefully short of its stated goals, creating a 
     multiethnic peaceful society.
       Currently, the Stabilization Force, or SFOR is still made 
     up of 30,000 Troops; 6,900 are Americans. According to the 
     record of the Military Operations in the Federal Republic of 
     Yugoslavia Limitation Act of 1999:
       The deployment of United States ground forces to 
     participate in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, which 
     has resulted in the expenditure of approximately 
     $10,000,000,000 by United States taxpayers to date, which has 
     already been extended past two previous withdrawal dates 
     established by the Administration, and which shows no sign of 
     ending in the near future, clearly argues that the costs and 
     duration of a deployment of United States ground forces to 
     the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to halt the conflict and 
     maintain the peace in the province of Kosovo will be much 
     heavier and much longer than initially foreseen.
       As Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison recently pointed out ``We 
     have tried an experimental Balkan policy in Bosnia. It is not 
     workable. Thousands of American troops are there with no end 
     in sight. The head of the international observer group has 
     fired elected officials and canceled sessions of parliament 
     because opposition parties oppose what we are doing in 
     Kosovo. People vote in elections and then cannot stay and 
     serve where they are elected.''
       Unfortunately the history of the war in Bosnia is repeating 
     itself in Kosovo. NATO officials are interpreting their 
     defeat of Slobodan Milosevic as an important example for the 
     future. The lesson they are drawing is that military force 
     can effectively serve humanitarian purposes, and that NATO 
     must be prepared to use its military might again. A new 
     ``Clinton Doctrine'' is reportedly being developed in 
     Washington to emphasize this point. Bombing and military 
     force are being justified as legitimate means of preventing 
     genocide and human rights abuse. The ground is thus being 
     prepared for future bombing campaigns and military 
     interventions, as NATO increasingly assumes the role of 
     global policeman.
       There is another way. The use of military force was not 
     necessary to resolve the crisis in Kosovo, and it need not 
     serve as a primary basis for securing global peace in the 
     future. More effective and less destructive means exist for 
     exerting pressure on wrongdoers and encouraging international 
     cooperation. The key to securing the peace in Kosovo and 
     beyond is not military might but economic power. Through the 
     judicious application of economic sanctions and incentives, 
     coupled with support for early monitoring to prevent conflict 
     from escalating into wars, the United States and its partners 
     can more effectively enforce civilized standards of behavior 
     and lay the foundations for cooperation and security, not 
     only in Yugoslavia but around the world.
       History teaches that the greatest force on earth is not 
     military might but economic power. Civilizations rise or fall 
     more on the basis of their economic and social vitality than 
     their military prowess. The Soviet Union was a military 
     superpower but an economic weakling. When the underlying 
     economic and social rot caught up with the military-political 
     superstructure, the Potemkin village of Soviet power 
     collapsed. The greatest strength of the United States lies 
     not in bombers and missiles but in the extraordinary dynamism 
     and creativity of its economy. Over the long run the power to 
     give or withhold economic benefits is the most effective and 
     creative way to influence human behavior. The use of economic 
     power--providing inducements for cooperation, and applying 
     sanctions against wrongdoing--offers the best hope for 
     advancing the goals of peace, democracy, and human rights.
       Sanctions are often dismissed as ineffective, but a closer 
     look reveals that they have been successful on a number of 
     occasions, including in the Balkans. During the 1992-95 
     crisis in Bosnia, the U.N. Security Council imposed economic 
     sanctions against Yugoslavia to encourage Serbian support for 
     a negotiated settlement. An extensive system of sanctions 
     monitoring and enforcement was established in cooperation 
     with neighboring European states. These U.N. sanctions were 
     described in a report from the Organization for Security and 
     Cooperation in Europe as ``the single-most important reason 
     for the government of Belgrade changing its policies and 
     accepting a negotiated peace agreement.'' Military analyst 
     Edward Luttwak has written that ``sanctions moderated the 
     conduct of Belgrade's most immoderate leadership.'' While 
     other factors contributed to the Dayton peace accords, 
     including the Croatian-Bosnian military offensive of August/
     September 1995, U.N. sanctions played a role in bringing the 
     parties to the bargaining table.
       U.N. sanctions were employed again at the beginning of the 
     Kosovo crisis, but the effort was half-hearted. In March 
     1998, as fighting in Kosovo intensified, the Security Council 
     imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. No effort was made to 
     enforce the embargo, however, and no further steps were taken 
     to increase sanctions pressure. Nor were efforts made to 
     develop the kind of elaborate monitoring and enforcement 
     machinery that was so effectively employed by the European 
     community during the earlier episode.
       Sanctions could yet contribute to a resolution of the 
     Kosovo crisis, as part of a package of inducements and 
     coercive measures designed to enforce the terms of the peace 
     agreement. Working through the U.N., the United States and 
     its partners should bring to the table a credible package of 
     sanctions and incentives to persuade the Serbs and Albanians 
     to begin to resolve their differences and strive toward 
     cooperation and reconciliation.
       The sanctions part of the package might include the threat 
     to go beyond the present arms embargo to impose targeted 
     sanctions against those who renege on their obligations under 
     the peace settlement. Among the selective measures that might 
     be applied are aviation and travel bans, the freezing of 
     financial assets, and the blocking of government and 
     leadership financial transactions. The prospect of a 
     selective oil embargo, targeted against refined petroleum 
     products, might also be part of a sanctions package.
       The incentives package might include the progressive 
     lifting of sanctions, the encouragement of investment and 
     trade, and a massive aid and reconstruction program for the 
     region's battered infrastructure and crippled economy. Huge 
     levels of humanitarian assistance will be needed for 
     returning Kosovar refugees and vulnerable populations in 
     Yugoslavia and surrounding countries. The delivery of 
     economic assistance and development

[[Page 15364]]

     aid should be used to encourage compliance with the peace 
     settlement and a greater commitment to democratization. Aid 
     should be targeted to those constituencies and sectors which 
     have a demonstrated commitment to democracy and human rights 
     and which are most likely to support a long term process of 
     conflict resolution and multi-ethnic cooperation. The 
     delivery of aid should be conditioned on compliance with the 
     peace settlement and should be delayed or suspended if the 
     recipient groups balk or refuse to cooperate with one another 
     in creating a new, more cooperative society.
       The promise of economic prosperity is a powerful incentive 
     for encouraging democracy, human rights, and respect for the 
     rule of law. The desire for participation in the European 
     system of economic development and political cooperation is 
     an especially strong inducement for many people in the 
     Balkans. Even in Serbia political leaders have voiced a 
     desire to be part of the European community. Some argue that 
     the decision to exclude Yugoslavia from Europe in the late 
     1980s contributed to the breakup of the country and the 
     consequent armed conflicts. Offering now to integrate the 
     countries of the Balkans into the European system of 
     prosperity and cooperative development could be an effective 
     inducement for conflict resolution and prevention. This is 
     the concept of ``association-exclusion,'' as opposed to the 
     traditional ``compellence-deterrence'' approach embodied in 
     NATO military policy. The greatest hope for a more 
     cooperative future lies not in the power to punish, but in 
     the creative use of association as a means of rewarding those 
     who abide by civilized standards of behavior while excluding 
     those who do not.
       Because the conflicts in the Balkans are interconnected, 
     and the economies of the region were once closely linked, it 
     is important to view the region as an integrated whole, and 
     to develop an aid program that applies to the entire region. 
     Economic assistance should be designed not only to rebuild 
     war-related damage but to lay the foundations for future 
     economic development and interdependence. Economic assistance 
     should be offered not only to Kosovo but to Serbia, Albania, 
     and all the republics of the region. By making an extra 
     effort now to raise the economic and social standards of the 
     entire region, the United States and its European partners 
     can help to establish the conditions for cooperation in the 
     future and thereby reduce the likelihood of renewed warfare. 
     This in turn will hasten the day when NATO forces can safely 
     leave the region.
       The United States and its allies have made an enormous 
     military commitment to the region. Now they must make an even 
     larger economic commitment to create the conditions for a 
     lasting peace. The centerpiece of an economic strategy for 
     peace should be a massive reconstruction and economic 
     development program for the Balkans. The proposed assistance 
     program should be on the scale of the Marshall Plan. At the 
     end of World War II the victorious allies invested massively 
     in rebuilding war-torn Europe and helped their former enemies 
     recover economically and become functioning democracies. The 
     strategy was a brilliant success that laid the foundation for 
     European prosperity and cooperation and that has helped to 
     secure the peace in Western Europe for more than 50 years.
       No less an effort is needed now to bring prosperity and 
     security to Southeast Europe. The guiding vision of U.S. and 
     European strategy should be to create prosperous, democratic, 
     economically interdependent states throughout the Balkans--to 
     build societies where people trade rather than invade, where 
     commerce, communication, and interdependence gradually break 
     down the animosities that have so often fueled armed conflict 
     in the region.
       The price of a massive multi-year economic assistance and 
     incentives package for the Balkans will be huge, but it is 
     far less than the costs of indefinite military occupation or 
     the losses that would occur in future wars and armed 
     conflicts. The price of peace is surely less than the cost of 
     war.
       Only through a long-term program of economic assistance and 
     political engagement can the United States and its partners 
     ensure that the war for human rights has truly been won.

     

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