[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 10]
[Senate]
[Pages 14887-14890]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                          COLOMBIA'S FOUR WARS

  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, we have just concluded the foreign 
operations bill, and I congratulate Senator McConnell, Senator Leahy, 
and others who have worked so very diligently on this difficult and 
tough bill. Contained in the bill we just passed, among other things, 
was a sense-of-the-Senate resolution. This sense-of-the-Senate 
resolution was proposed and offered by myself and by my colleague from 
Georgia, Senator Coverdell. It deals with the situation in Colombia and 
the United States relationship to that troubled country.
  I want to talk this evening about that sense-of-the-Senate resolution 
and about the situation in Colombia.
  For the past several months, United States foreign policy has really 
been dominated by the crisis in Kosovo. Certainly we have to continue 
to work with the NATO alliance and Russia to help bring the Albanian 
Kosovars back to their homeland and to bring a stable peace to the 
region. But tonight I want to discuss another compelling and very 
serious foreign policy crisis that is taking place right in our own 
hemisphere.
  Like Kosovo, it is a crisis that has displaced hundreds of thousands 
of people, more than 800,000 since 1995, and instead of a small 
province being ethnically cleansed by its own government, this 
democratic country is fighting multiple conflicts--a war against two 
threatening and competing guerrilla groups, a war against paramilitary 
organizations, and, finally, a war against drug lords who traffic in 
deadly cocaine and in heroin.
  I am, of course, talking about the four wars that are taking place 
tonight in Colombia. While a 19-nation NATO alliance struggles to 
prevent the disintegration of a small province, the disintegration of 
an entire nation is going practically unnoticed by our own Government 
in Washington. The decade-long struggle in the Balkans is being 
duplicated in Colombia, which is fracturing into politically and 
socially unstable ministates and is posing a significant threat to our 
own hemisphere. Colombia is shaping up to be the Balkan problem of the 
Americas.
  More than 35,000 Colombians have been killed in the last decade. More 
than 308,000 Colombians were internally displaced in 1998 alone. In 
Kosovo, 230,000 people were displaced during this same period of time 
before NATO took action. And like the Albanian Kosovars, Colombians are 
fleeing their country today in large numbers. More than 2,000 crossed 
into Venezuela in a matter of a few days recently. A Miami Herald 
article recently reported a growing number of Colombians leaving for 
south Florida.
  Our Nation has a clear national interest in the future of the 
stability of our neighbor to the south, Colombia. In 1998, legitimate 
two-way trade between the United States and Colombia was more than $11 
billion, making the United States Colombia's No. 1 trading partner, and 
Colombia is our fifth-largest trading partner in the region.
  In spite of this mutually beneficial partnership, the United States 
simply has not devoted the level of time nor resources nor attention 
needed to assist this important democratic partner as it struggles with 
drug problems, with violent criminal and paramilitary organizations, 
and guerrilla insurgents. In fact, in December 1998, a White House 
official told the Washington Post that Colombia, quote, ``poses a 
greater immediate threat to us than Bosnia did, yet it receives almost 
no attention.''
  Attention is needed--now more than ever. According to the State 
Department, Colombia is the third most dangerous country in the world 
in terms of political violence, and accounts for 34 percent of all 
terrorist acts committed worldwide. The Colombian National Police 
reported that Colombian rebels carried out 1,726 terrorist strikes in 
1998--that's 12 percent more than in the previous year.
  Kidnapping is also a significant problem. Approximately 2,609 people 
were kidnapped in 1998, and there have been 513 reported kidnappings in 
the first three months of this year. Guerrillas are responsible for a 
high percentage of these incidents.
  The wholesale acts of violence that have infected this country are 
symptoms of four wars that are going on in Colombia. Any single one of 
them would pose a significant threat to any country. Together, these 
wars represent a threat beyond the borders of Colombia. Let me describe 
them in detail.
  For more than three decades, the guerrilla groups known as Colombian 
Revolutionary Armed Forces--the FARC--and the National Liberation 
Army--the ELN--have waged the longest-running anti-government 
insurgency in Latin America.
  Determining the size of these guerrilla organizations is an inexact 
science. Most open sources range their combat strength from about 
10,000 to 20,000 full-time guerrillas. However, irregular militias, 
part-time guerrillas, and political sympathizers also play a role that 
is hard to quantify.
  The insurgents have their own armament capabilities and are 
manufacturing high-quality improvised mortars. Organized crime links 
also have long been suspected. The Chief of the Colombian National 
Police, General Jose Serrano, has reported in the past that the FARC 
has completed guns-and-cash-for-drugs deals with organized crime groups 
in Russia, Ukraine, Chechnya and Uzbekistan. A Colombian army study 
recently stated that the two main leftist guerrilla groups had raised 
at least $5.3 billion from 1991 to 1998 from the drug trade, 
abductions, and extortions to fund their long-running uprising against 
the state.
  According to the State Department's 1998 Human Rights Report, the 
FARC and ELN, along with other, smaller groups, initiated armed action 
in nearly 700 of the country's 1073 municipalities, and control or 
influence 60 percent of rural Colombia. Although these groups have had 
no history of major urban operations, a number of recent guerrilla-
sponsored hostage takings recently have taken place.
  Colombian President Pastrana is trying to make peace at all costs 
with FARC rebels, who have little incentive to agree to any peace deal. 
Throughout these negotiations, the FARC has continued to assault and 
kill dozens of Colombian military and police.
  The current prospects for peace are dismal. If Pastrana were to 
accept the demands of the FARC and ELN for political and territorial 
autonomy, he would have to splinter his country into Balkan-type 
factions. The effects of this would be increased paramilitary violence 
and increased regional instability.
  In fact, one of the FARC conditions already agreed to by President 
Pastrana was the creation of a temporary, demilitarized zone the size 
of

[[Page 14888]]

Switzerland. All Colombian Armed Forces and Police were ordered out of 
the area. Despite this enormous concession on the part of the Colombian 
government, the FARC has not agreed to any cease-fire and has made no 
concessions. In fact, they made it clear to the Colombian Government 
that they should expect continued guerrilla operations and attacks.
  ``Farclandia'' is the name some local residents have given to this 
odd state-within-a-state. The area has over 90,000 residents. Despite 
its creation as a temporary demilitarized zone, the FARC appear to be 
cementing control and taking steps to ensure that expulsion from the 
zone would be extremely difficult, particularly if the talks break 
down.
  According to the Catholic Bishop residing in the DMZ area, residents 
are required to feed the FARC, which is simply a form of taxation. The 
FARC has attempted to expel a Catholic priest for being an ``enemy of 
peace.'' The priest argued the FARC is violating human rights, usurping 
the locally elected government, interfering with economic activity, 
imposing labor duty, and recruiting minors, teenagers, and married men. 
The bottom line is that FARC fighters are using their armed 
stranglehold on the zone to abuse Colombian citizens.
  In April, FARC leaders asked Pastrana to extend rebel control over 
another zone in southern Colombia--approximately 7,600 square miles--
that is allegedly the home to some of the most concentrated cocaine-
production facilities in the world. The Pastrana Government agreed to 
place the request on the negotiating table. While the additional zone 
was not approved, Pastrana agreed to allow FARC rebels to have 
continued control over the DMZ. This is the second time, since November 
1998, that President Pastrana has extended the DMZ to the FARC during 
the talks.
  This decision provoked outrage within Colombian military ranks, 
particularly since military officers had been humiliated by the 
creation of the original zone. That earlier decision required the 
withdrawal of hundreds of police and army troops. By the end of May, 
Colombian Defense Minister Ricardo Lloreda announced his resignation.
  Following his announcement, dozens of military officers resigned in 
solidarity with Lloreda. Of the total of 30 Colombian army generals, 
reports indicate that between 10 and 17 resigned in solidarity with 
Lloreda. With the exception of Lloreda's resignation, Pastrana did not 
accept any other resignations. However, as a result of this mass 
protest, Pastrana agreed that the FARC zone would be demilitarized for 
only six more months and that a retired general would be included in 
the negotiating team for the talks.
  In another important development, the Colombian Congress too is 
beginning to express its doubt in the peace process. Earlier this 
month, the Congress rejected a bill that would have given Pastrana 
sweeping powers to grant political concessions--including an amnesty 
for convicted guerrillas.
  Lloreda's resignation was truly unfortunate. I met Defense Minister 
Lloreda in Colombia last November. Lloreda, described by his peers as 
someone who could help bring about needed reform in the military, was 
just beginning to gain some ground. He had already begun rebuilding the 
army, a difficult task given its record of human rights violations. In 
fact, he had forced the resignation of Colombian military officers 
suspected of human rights violations and had others arrested.
  Lloreda had also lifted the morale among the military, having 
suffered significant defeats by the FARC forces. According to the 
Economist magazine, the defense budget has doubled this year to $1.2 
billion. In March, the army even managed a successful offensive, which 
left 50 guerrillas dead.
  The resignation, however, threw Pastrana's 10-month-old government 
into crisis and placed the future of the nation's fragile process in 
doubt. It has also left open important questions about the future of 
the Colombian military.
  Mr. President, Colombian military operational mobility is widely 
acknowledged to be a shortcoming. Colombia is a very large country. One 
of their departments is as large as the nation of El Salvador. In 
fighting an insurgency, the state has to defend many critical areas, 
but also has to have the capability to mass and economize forces to 
attack guerrilla formations when they present themselves. Colombia's 
army has barely 40 helicopters for a territory the size of Texas and 
Mexico combined. El Salvador, 1/50th the size of Colombia, had 80--
twice as many--during its civil war.
  Although the Army has 122,000 soldiers, most of them are 1-year 
conscripts. Approximately 35-40% are high school graduates not assigned 
to combat duties by law. At any time, about 30% are undergoing basic 
training. A large portion of the remaining force (50-60%) is assigned 
to static defense of key economic or isolated municipal outposts. That 
leaves approximately 20,000 soldiers remaining for offensive combat 
operations. These are the veterans or volunteers that constitute--apart 
from the officer corps-- the only true repository of combat experience 
in their army. Now consider that the active guerrilla combatants alone 
number between 11,000 and 20,000. You do the math. It doesn't look 
good. It is conceivably a one to one ``fighting'' ratio. How can a 
military, with limited resources, fight two guerrilla movements which 
have virtually unlimited resources from drug trafficking, kidnappings, 
extortion and arms trafficking?
  The Colombian Army has already suffered a string of military defeats. 
In 1998, the Colombian Armed Forces suffered three major blows in 
March, August, and November. In fact, the FARC executed one of its 
major blows against the military just as President Pastrana was meeting 
with FARC leaders on the peace talks.
  The FARC currently holds over 300 military and police POW's. And 
according to Jane's Intelligence Review, Colombian guerrillas killed 
445 soldiers during 1998. If you include Colombian National Police, the 
figure would rise to 600. The CNP too has experienced significant 
losses. Over 4,000 policemen have been killed in Colombia in the past 
decade.
  As if the FARC weren't enough of a problem, let me complicate this 
situation further by discussing the war with the ELN. The ELN has been 
envious of the attention the FARC has been getting, particularly at the 
negotiating table. As a result, the ELN has resorted to a series of 
recent hostage takings. Shortly after Pastrana and the FARC announced 
in April that formal negotiations would take place in the summer, the 
ELN hijacked a Colombian commercial airliner in mid-April, kidnapping 
41 passengers and crew.
  Then, shortly after Defense Minister Lloreda's resignation, about 30 
ELN guerrillas invaded a church service in an upper-class neighborhood 
in Cali and abducted over 140 worshipers. In response, the Government 
deployed more than 3,000 soldiers and policemen to locate them. While 
some hostages have been released from the hijacking and church 
incidents, approximately 50 are still being held including two 
Americans.
  I have outlined, Mr. President, the two main guerrilla groups which 
are a significant threat to Colombia. Unfortunately, however, I have 
not yet spoken of another ongoing war which poses an additional and 
substantial threat--the Colombian paramilitaries. In fact, the 
Colombian paramilitaries are also seeking a role at the negotiations 
table.
  The Colombian paramilitaries are an umbrella organization of about 
5,000 armed combatants. Their mission has been to counter the grip of 
leftist guerrillas. Carlos Castano, the powerful leader of the 
paramilitary umbrella organization United Self-Defense Groups of 
Colombia, has been quoted defending the strategy of killing villagers 
who are guerrilla supporters and sympathizers.
  The paramilitaries are funded by wealthy landowners and, in some 
cases, cocaine traffickers. They exercised increasing influence during 
1998, extending their presence into areas previously under guerrilla 
control.
  The presence of paramilitary groups have driven a wedge in the peace 
talks because the FARC leadership refuses to

[[Page 14889]]

negotiate until the government effectively clamps down on the right 
wing gunmen. The problem is that the government also has a problem in 
trying to control the paramilitaries.
  In an attempt to become a player at the negotiating table, Castano's 
organization kidnapped a Colombian Senator last month. In fact, Castano 
said shortly after the abduction that his aim was to gain political 
recognition and a place at the negotiating table for his movement. The 
Senator was freed after being held for two weeks. The Senator later 
commented that Pastrana should eventually include Colombia's 
paramilitary forces in negotiations to end the 35 year civil war. Since 
the leftist rebels vehemently oppose their participation in the peace 
talks, prospects for the peace negotiations are complicated even 
further.
  Before I talk about the increasing drug threat from Colombia, let me 
spend a few minutes on the general violence in Colombia.
  According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Colombia 
led the world in kidnappings in 1998, and may be the most likely place 
in the world to be abducted. The country averages five people a day 
snatched by guerrillas or other criminals. Guerrillas from the FAR, ELN 
and the smaller Popular Liberation Army accounted for approximately 
1,600 kidnappings of the 2,609 reported in 1998.
  A report issued by the Colombian Government's anti-kidnapping office 
in May calculated that at least 4,925 people have been abducted since 
January 1996, with the largest total coming in 1998. The problem with 
this statistic is that many families and businesses prefer to deal 
directly with kidnappers and not report abductions to the police. 
Hence, this figure is only the official one. It is understandably 
difficult to count how many kidnappings truly occur in Colombia.
  Imagine, if you will, living in a country where you can't send your 
child on school field trip; where you can't decide to go out of Bogota 
for the weekend to visit relatives in a nearby city. In fact, the 
situation is so grave that you think twice about going to the grocery 
store or even to a movie.
  A recent New York Times article described the lives of Colombians and 
the precautions they must take on a daily basis. The article stated 
that Colombians are refusing to fly on any airplane that is not a jet. 
They cite the example of ELN hijacking of a prop plane. The Colombian 
quoted in the article commented that it is almost impossible for 
guerrillas to take over a big jet and make it land at some little 
airstrip out in the jungle.
  In the week before Easter, a traditional vacation time throughout 
Latin America, travel within Colombia was down 40% over last year, 
according to a Colombian civic group. With increasing regularity, the 
five million residents of Bogota are canceling trips to towns that are 
barely a two hour drive away, while traffic on highways to the 
Caribbean coast has also dropped significantly.
  Kidnapping is such a significant threat that a Colombian government 
study made public estimates that the country's three main guerrilla 
groups have obtained more than $1.2 billion in kidnapping ransoms in 
recent years.
  Mr. President, the situation in Colombia has gotten so bad that the 
State Department recently issued a warning, advising Americans to not 
travel to Colombia. You see, Colombians are not the only targets in 
their country. There have been U.S. casualties as well.
  In late 1997, the State Department added the FARC to its list of 
terrorist organizations.
  In January 1999, guerrillas announced that all U.S. military and law 
enforcement personnel in Colombia would be considered legitimate 
targets to be killed or captured. In late February, the FARC viciously 
murdered three U.S. human rights workers. This horrific execution met 
with no reaction from the Clinton Administration. A resolution was 
recently introduced in the House, calling on the Colombian government 
to pursue the killers, members of the FARC and extradite them to the 
U.S.
  Colombian terrorists continue to target Americans, kidnapping over a 
dozen U.S. citizens in 1999 so far--this is double the total amount for 
1998. The 1998 State Department Terrorism Report also suggests that 
terrorists also continued to bomb U.S. commercial interests, such as 
oil pipelines and small businesses.
  There has also been much concern that the civil war in Colombia could 
spill over into neighboring countries--including Venezuela, where 
President Chavez is alleged to have had contacts in the past with the 
ELN. A spill-over into Venezuela would be disastrous for the United 
States, given that Venezuela is our number one--let me repeat this--
number one supplier of foreign oil. The situation is so grave that 
Venezuela has sent 30,000 troops to the border with Colombia.
  There has been a recent exodus of Colombians into Venezuela. In a two 
day period recently, over 2,000 Colombians began their exodus to 
Venezuela after death squads massacred about 80 people near a border 
town. Many of the Colombians were said to be coca farmers.
  At first, Venezuelan President Chavez said Venezuela was prepared to 
offer the Colombians temporary refuge until they could return safely to 
their homes. However, only one day after the recent cross-over began, 
Venezuela had already started repatriating Colombians back to Colombia. 
And within a few days, all Colombians have been repatriated.
  Colombian-Venezuelan relations have been tense. For example, while 
Chavez has agreed to play a role in the negotiations, in mid-May Chavez 
announced he was seeking a direct meeting with FARC commander Manuel 
Marulanda. In fact, two months earlier, he angered President Pastrana 
by suggesting that the FARC's armed struggle was legitimate and 
declaring that Venezuela remained ``neutral'' in the conflict.
  There has also been some concern of a spillover of the conflict into 
Ecuador, another nation bordering Colombia. In fact, Ecuadoran 
government officials indicate that rebel forces have crossed over to 
their nation, primarily for rest and relaxation. With the end of its 
border dispute with Peru, Ecuador is in the process of relocating 
10,000 troops to the Colombian border. In addition, Ecuadoran 
intelligence has reportedly periodically taken down some guerrilla 
supply routes.
  Colombia also borders Panama, which should be of significant concern 
to our nation. It is a known fact that Colombian rebels have been 
infiltrating the Darien province in Panama for quite some time in 
search of supplies.
  In late May, hundreds of Panamanians fled their homes near the border 
with Colombia, fearing a violent clash between Colombian guerrillas and 
paramilitary bounty hunters. Witnesses claim that there were about 500 
FARC rebels in Panama.
  Mr. President, this rebel crossing is occurring just 250 miles 
southeast of the Panama Canal. And let me remind you that U.S. military 
forces are departing from Panama.
  The United States should be extremely concerned. The departure of 
U.S. forces could encourage Colombian rebel groups to become more 
active in the deep, inaccessible rainforests of Panama's Darien region. 
And while Panama has increased a border police force to 1,500, they are 
no match to the Colombian rebels. Panama has no military, and our total 
U.S. troop presence is scheduled to depart Panama by the end of this 
year. We just closed down operations out of Howard Air Force Base in 
May, and we are about to turn over the Panama Canal and remaining 
military facilities at the end of this century.
  Mr. President, while the United States is complying with the Panama 
Canal Treaties, in terms of giving Panama the Canal at the end of this 
year, the treaties state that the United States has the continued 
responsibility to protect and defend the Panama Canal. And the duration 
of this treaty is indefinite. In the event that something happens to 
the Panama Canal, just a few hundred miles from Colombia, how would the 
United States respond then?

[[Page 14890]]

  I have spent most of my time talking about the worsening civil strife 
in Colombia. But I cannot end this speech without talking about the 
final war in Colombia. It's the war Americans probably have heard the 
most about--the war prompted by the fact that Colombia is the world's 
most important cocaine producer and a leading producer of heroin.
  According to our State Department, over 75% of the world's cocaine 
HCL is processed in Colombia. 1998 marked the third consecutive year of 
significant increase in Colombia coca crop size; recent statistics 
indicate that about 75% of the heroin seized in the northeast United 
States is of Colombian origin. Colombian heroin is so pure--roughly 80% 
to 90%--that in 1998, the number of heroin overdose cases in the United 
States went up significantly. In fact, in 1998, the number of heroin 
overdoses in Orlando surpassed the number of homicides.
  Drug trafficking is profitable, and provides the FARC with the 
largest share of its income. Sixty percent of FARC fronts are involved 
in the drug trade. About 30% of ELN war fronts are likewise engaged in 
drug trafficking. This includes extortion/taxation of coca fields and 
yields, precursor chemicals and security of labs and clandestine air 
strips. The insurgents control the southern rural terrain of Colombia 
where the largest density of cocaine fields and production is found.
  Mr. President, I have outlined a deteriorating situation in Colombia. 
I have spoken to you about Colombia's ongoing and escalating four wars. 
These are significant issues that have a direct impact on our 
hemisphere and our Nation. The future of Colombia as a unified country, 
and the stability of an entire hemisphere is at risk. The sad reality 
is that our country is not yet making an adequate response to this 
crucial foreign policy challenge. We are simply not paying attention, 
nor are we adequately responding.
  U.S. leadership in this Colombian crisis is needed. This is no time 
to keep our backs turned. Continued inattention will only contribute to 
continued instability. Like Kosovo, the U.S. should mobilize the 
international community to play a role in resolving the Colombian 
conflict. Certainly we should pledge our support to the democratically 
elected Government. We should also be ready to provide other types of 
support such as training, equipment, and professional development to 
help Colombia overcome these threats to democracy and freedom.
  Finally, we must continue to work to disrupt and dismantle the drug 
trafficking organizations and to reduce their financial control of 
antidemocratic elements in Colombia.
  We are doing some things in Colombia. I had the opportunity to see 
those myself when I traveled there a few months ago. But we simply have 
to do more. We have to become more engaged.
  I remember President Ronald Reagan's profound wisdom in negotiating 
from a position of strength in his efforts to strengthen our military. 
This strategic vision led to the crumbling ultimately of our 
adversaries. Unfortunately, this dynamic has not yet taken hold in 
Colombia.
  Because of the Colombian Government's weakness, no incentive appears 
to exist for its multiple adversaries to respect and to adhere to any 
agreements. Their only incentive is to extract further concessions from 
the Government and to further attempt to weaken the Colombian 
Government.
  Before I close, let me quote a passage from a report in Time 
magazine. I quote:

       The six members of the presidential peace commission did 
     not know where they were headed when their Bell 212 
     helicopter took off from Bogota at dawn. The pilot had been 
     given the top-secret coordinates minutes before takeoff, but 
     not even he was sure of the destination. Suddenly, the flag 
     of the FARC, the oldest, largest and bloodiest of the 
     country's numerous anti-government guerrilla groups, was 
     sighted in the jungle below. This time, however, the flag 
     signified the making of history, not war. In a small clearing 
     in the Alto de la Mesa rain forest, FARC guerrillas and the 
     government's representatives met to sign a momentous eleven-
     point cease-fire agreement.
  While this article seems to depict the present situation in Colombia 
in terms of peace talks, the fact is that it does not. The main reason 
is that there has not yet been a cease-fire agreement as a result of 
this latest round of talks.
  Let me repeat that. There has not yet, to this day, been a cease-fire 
agreement as a result of this latest round of talks.
  The article I quoted appeared in Time magazine's issue dated April 
16, 1984.
  In April 1984, the then-Colombian President triumphantly announced on 
national television his Government's formal acceptance of that pact 
with the FARC guerrillas. He thought that he had negotiated an end to 
the guerrilla conflict with the FARC leadership.
  Let me note that there have been numerous other accounts by other 
Colombian Presidents throughout the years to negotiate a resolution to 
the guerrilla wars in Colombia. Each time the peace talks have failed, 
and each time the guerrilla groups have been further strengthened.
  While the current President of Colombia is negotiating with the very 
same FARC leader, a few things have changed over the last 15 years. 
Back in 1984, the Time article reported that the FARC consisted of 
2,050 guerrillas backed by an additional 5,000 people in ``civil 
defense cadres'' spread mainly throughout the countryside. But today 
the FARC has about 10,000 to 15,000 active combatants--quite a change.
  In 1994, the ELN had roughly 200 men and the Popular Liberation Army 
had about 275. The ELN today has between 5,000 and 7,000 troops.
  It is simply amazing to me what a difference 15 years has made in 
Colombia, a difference, unfortunately and tragically, for the worse. We 
have gone from seeing Colombia's combat-ready guerrilla number in the 
2,000 range--2,000 is what it was--to a situation today where there is 
likely a guerrilla combatant rebel for every Colombian military 
combatant person available, a 1-to-1 ratio.
  My question to this Congress and to this administration is, How can 
we expect Colombia to overcome these multiple wars? The rebel personnel 
resources have significantly increased since the mid-1980s and are one 
of the main reasons behind this rise in the alliance between the 
guerrillas and the drug traffickers.
  This strategic alliance, in which each party benefits from the 
other's involvement, makes it very clear that it is extremely difficult 
to separate the drug war from guerrilla and paramilitary wars. That is 
why the United States must play a role to help Colombia overcome all of 
its wars--not just the drug dealers. We must understand that our drug 
consumption only further exacerbates the Colombian crisis. And we must 
be involved in helping them resolve the four wars I have described.
  In the 1980s, the United States made a major investment in the 
struggle for democracy and human rights in Latin America. We pretty 
much succeeded. We basically went from a situation a generation or two 
ago where half the countries were democratic to a situation today where 
every country save one is democratic, or is at least moving rapidly 
towards democracy. We have succeeded.
  But if we want Latin America to continue to evolve into a stable and 
peaceful trading partner and a friend of the United States, we will 
have to make a more serious commitment to Colombia. No one wants to see 
Colombia devolve into a criminal narcostate. But unless we act soon in 
partnership with the democratically elected Government of Colombia, 
unless we act soon to reverse this democratic death spiral, it is only 
a matter of time before Colombia ceases to exist as a sovereign nation 
with democratic principles.
  President Ronald Reagan showed profound wisdom in leading this 
hemisphere toward democracy and toward free markets. We must do all we 
can to make sure that this positive tide is not rolled back for our 
neighbors to the south.
  I thank the Chair for his indulgence.

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