[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 10]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 14709-14711]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



 SECRETARY ALBRIGHT PROVIDES THE BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN 
                         THE POST-KOSOVA WORLD

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. TOM LANTOS

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, June 29, 1999

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, yesterday in an address to the Council on 
Foreign Relations in New York, our exceptional Secretary of State, 
Madeleine K. Albright, discussed the current international interests of 
the United States as we move beyond Kosovo. She presented a thoughtful 
and insightful analysis of our nation's role in the post-Cold War 
world.
  Mr. Speaker, the 11 week NATO campaign to protect the rights of 
ethnic Albanians in the

[[Page 14710]]

province of Kosovo was an important turning point in the history of 
Southeastern Europe. For the past decade we have dealt with inflamed 
Serbian nationalism incited and fomented by Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevic for his own narrow political goals. The war over Kosovo has 
established the vital principle that ethnic cleansing and racial 
discrimination against a minority cannot and will not be tolerated by 
the international community.
  Three months ago, Mr. Speaker, press pundits and politicians--many of 
them here on the floor of this House--were quick to criticize and to 
express doubts about the policy of the Administration, which was ably 
articulated and implemented by Secretary Albright. Now we have 
succeeded in removing the threat to ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and have 
begun the process of implementing the principles of the Ramboulliet 
agreement that was signed by Albanian representatives shortly before 
the Serbian reign of terror was unleashed upon the Albanian population 
of Kosovo.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to pay tribute to Secretary Albright for her 
outstanding leadership and her tireless diplomatic efforts which were 
so critical to the success of our military action in Kosovo. Secretary 
Albright has provided the vision that has guided our action in Kosovo.
  Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, Secretary Albright again provided that vision 
as she discussed with the members of the Council on Foreign Relations 
her view of the role of the United States in the post-Kosovo world. The 
military action of the NATO allies in Kosovo is a critical victory that 
will help define the nature of international relations.
  Secretary Albright was thoughtful in articulating the role that the 
United States should play in the post-Kosovo world. ``Some hope, and 
others fear, that Kosovo will be a precedent for similar interventions 
around the globe,'' she told the Council. ``I would caution against any 
such sweeping conclusions.'' At the same time, she expressed the hope 
that the NATO action against Serbia would serve to deter rogue 
governments in the future from engaging in such ethic, religious, and 
racial repression: ``By meeting massive ethnic cleansing in the Balkans 
with a red light, we make it less likely that NATO will be called upon 
to use force in the future.''
  Mr. Speaker, I ask that Secretary Albright's thoughtful address to 
the Council on Foreign Relations be placed in the Record, and I urge my 
colleagues to give it careful attention.

      [Address to the Council on Foreign Relations, June 28, 1999]

                 After Kosovo: Building A Lasting Peace

             (By Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright)

       Thank you Les, and good evening to you all. Members of the 
     Council on Foreign Relations and distinguished colleagues, 
     friends and guests. NATO's confrontation with Belgrade over 
     Kosovo has ended in accordance with the conditions the 
     Alliance set. Now, we face the even harder task of building a 
     lasting peace there and throughout Southeast Europe. This 
     evening, I would like to discuss with you this historic 
     challenge.
       Churchill once described Russia as a riddle wrapped in a 
     mystery inside an enigma. In Kosovo today, we see a success 
     folded within a tragedy stamped with a question mark.
       Consider the reactions of the refugees and displaced as 
     their time of exile ends. For some, coming home means a 
     joyous reunion of family and friends. For others, it means a 
     heart-stopping confirmation of terrible fears as bodies are 
     identified and mass graves found. For all, it means 
     uncertainty about what will come next.
       As a result, Kosovo today is a cauldron of grief mixed with 
     exhilaration, of unresolved anger and unfilled dreams. Out of 
     this the international community, and the area's people, must 
     build a future secure and free.
       A starting point is provided by UN Security Council 
     Resolution 1244, and the military and political arrangements 
     to which it refers.
       In accordance with these, Serb forces have left, KFOR is 
     deploying, and the Kosovo Liberation Army will demilitarize 
     over the next 90 days.
       In addition, the United Nations Interim Mission is being 
     set up. It will operate in partnership with the EU, the OSCE, 
     donor countries and KFOR. And its duties will encompass civil 
     administration, humanitarian relief, economic recovery, and 
     the creation of democratic institutions, including--most 
     crucially--a new local police.
       Assembling the nuts and bolts of a durable peace in Kosovo 
     is a daunting challenge. Our expectations should be 
     realistic. The mission will take time; complaints will surely 
     be heard; and despite KFOR's presence, the danger of violence 
     will persist. As is usual, the good news will often be 
     treated as no news, while setbacks receive the spotlight. 
     Success will require an extraordinary team effort.
       Notwithstanding all this, I am hopeful--for three reasons.
       First, for most of the past decade, Kosovo Albanians coped 
     with Serb repression by maintaining parallel political, 
     educational and social structures. They have experience 
     managing institutions.
       Second, in past weeks, I have seen an extraordinary 
     determination on the part of European officials to get this 
     job done and done right. This is true from London to Helsinki 
     and from Ankara to Lisbon. Failure is not an option.
       Third, the international community has learned some hard 
     lessons in recent years about the do's and don'ts of building 
     peace in post-conflict situations.
       It is essential that, in Kosovo, these lessons be heeded. 
     The military and civilian components must work together well 
     both internally and with each other. Both must take effective 
     use of their mandates and focus on results. Donors must back 
     them not just with promises, but with resources of sufficient 
     quantity and timeliness to make a difference.
       Above all, we must have faith that the mission's underlying 
     principles of democracy and tolerance, economic reform and 
     the rule of law, are the right ones for all the people of 
     Kosovo.
       There are some who see an insurmountable obstacle in the 
     desire of many Kosovars for immediate independence, a 
     position that neither NATO nor governments in the region 
     support.
       Having met with the Kosovar leadership, I know the yearning 
     for independence is powerful.
       But I also know that Belgrade's withdrawal has altered the 
     reality within which the people of Kosovo will formulate 
     their aspirations. Until now, independence has seemed the 
     only alternative to repression.
       But in the future, Kosovars will have something they have 
     never had, which is genuine self-government. They will be out 
     from under Milosevic's boot, with the freedom to choose their 
     own leaders and shape the laws by which they are governed. 
     Milosevic, meanwhile, won't be able to arrest so much as a 
     jaywalker in Kosovo. And his henchmen won't have the capacity 
     to intimidate Kosovars or deny them their rights.
       That is why the Kosovar Albanian leadership signed on to 
     the Rambouillet Accords, despite the absence of an 
     independence guarantee. And while I will go out on a limb and 
     predict that KFOR will receive strong cooperation from most 
     Kosovars in the months ahead.
       Another key issue is whether the new Kosovo will include 
     its ethnic Serb, Roma and other minorities, and whether they 
     will be able to live safely now that Belgrade's forces have 
     withdrawn.
       Given the extent of destruction inflicted by Serbs, the 
     risk is obvious that some ethnic Albanians will take the law 
     into their own hands. Many unacceptable incidents have 
     already occurred.
       But KFOR takes seriously its mandate to protect all 
     Kosovars, including Serbs. And its effectiveness will 
     increase as deployment continues, and demilitarization gains 
     steam.
       Kosovo will be a better place if Serbs who did not commit 
     crimes stay and help rebuild. But that is their decision to 
     make. We will measure our success by whether the rights of 
     all those who choose to live in Kosovo are respected.
       The same principle, incidentally, should apply elsewhere in 
     the region. The international community must continue to 
     press for the safe return of other refugees, including ethnic 
     Serbs to the Krajina region of Croatia. This is crucial, for 
     there could be few greater gifts to the 21st Century than to 
     bust the ghosts of Balkans past and consign Milosevic's 
     tactics of hate to the trash bin of history.
       Even as we work to help Kosovo regain its feet, we are 
     acting to secure the future of the region. With out partners 
     in the European Union playing a big role, we have launched a 
     Pact to stabilize, transform and eventually integrate all of 
     Southeast Europe into the continent's democratic mainstream.
       We undertake this effort because it is right, but also 
     because it is smart; for we know that America cannot be 
     secure unless Europe is secure, which it will not be if its 
     southeast corner remains wracked by division and strife.
       Our strategy, with our partners, is to apply the model of 
     help and self-help reflected in the Marshall Plan half a 
     century ago, and in efforts to aid democratization in Central 
     Europe this decade. In this spirit, President Clinton will 
     meet with his counterparts in the region this summer.
       Together, they will discuss ways to mobilize the resources 
     of a wide range of governments and organizations, while 
     coordinating with the European Community and World Bank. Our 
     intention is to work urgently and effectively with leaders in 
     Southeast Europe as they strive to attract  capital, raise 
     living standards, reconcile ethnic and religious tensions, 
     and promote the rule of law.
       In this way, we hope over time to enable countries 
     throughout the region to participate fully in the major 
     economic and political institutions of the Trans-Atlantic 
     community. This would greatly serve America's interest in 
     expanding the area within Europe where wars simply do not 
     happen. And it would mark another giant step towards the 
     creation of a continent whole and free.
       We do not start from square one, but rather with a strong 
     base of democratic leadership. Hungary has already joined 
     NATO.

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     Hungary and Slovenia are well along in accession negotiations 
     with the EU. And officials in Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, 
     Albania and Croatia demonstrated throughout the recent crisis 
     that they want their societies to grow, prosper and live in 
     peace.
       The same is true of Montenegro, where President Djukanovic 
     and his people endured grave danger without wavering in their 
     support for democratic principles. They have earned the right 
     to participate in our initiative.
       We look forward as well to welcoming a new Serbia, because 
     our efforts at regional integration cannot fully succeed 
     until that occurs. But Serbia will not receive help, except 
     for humanitarian relief, until it is democratic and Milosevic 
     is out of work or--better yet--in jail.
       This is only common sense. Milosevic led Serbia into four 
     wars this decade. He has been indicted for crimes against 
     humanity. He has lied repeatedly to his own people and to the 
     world. His regime is hopelessly corrupt. He portrays himself 
     as a hero, but he is a traitor to every honorable Serb and 
     has no place in the region's future.
       We learned in Kosovo, as in Bosnia and Rwanda, that in this 
     era of varied and mobile dangers, gross violations of human 
     rights are everyone's business. Earlier this century, our 
     predecessors confronted not only Hitler, but Fascism; not 
     only Stalin, but Communism.
       In recent weeks, we confronted not only Milosevic, but 
     ethnic cleansing. NATO's leaders simply refused to stand by 
     and watch while an entire ethnic community was expelled from 
     its home in the Alliance's front yard.
       By acting with unity and resolve, NATO reaffirmed its 
     standing as an effective defender of stability and freedom in 
     the region. It validated the strategy for modernizing the 
     Alliance approved at the Washington Summit in April. And it 
     underlined the importance of the leading nations on both 
     sides of the Atlantic acting together in defense of shared 
     interests and values.
       If we are as resolute in building peace as we were 
     persistent in conflict, the crisis in Kosovo may come to be 
     viewed as a turning point in European history.
       In the past, Balkan strife has torn Europe apart, as big 
     powers took sides and made local fights their own. The Dayton 
     accords established a new model of nations coming together to 
     promote peace. Milosevic gambled that Kosovo would prompt a 
     reversion to the earlier model, splitting the Alliance and 
     opening an unbridgeable gap between Russian and the West. 
     Thanks to a careful assessment of mutual interests in Moscow 
     and Allied capitals, he bet wrong.
       Russia and NATO did not see eye to eye on the use of force 
     against Belgrade. But both wanted to prevent the conflict 
     from spreading, and following President Clinton's lead, we 
     worked together to bring the conflict to an end. And now, 
     with Russia in KFOR, we are working together to sustain the 
     peace.
       More generally, the time-tested marriage of diplomacy and 
     force played a central role from the beginning of this 
     crisis. At Rambouillet, we sought an interim political 
     settlement that would have protected the rights of all 
     Kosovars. To the vast detriment of Serb interests, Milosevic 
     rejected that agreement. But the talks helped bring the 
     Kosovar Albanian leadership together in an unprecedented way.
       After NATO launched its campaign, we shifted from diplomacy 
     backed by the threat of force to diplomacy in support of 
     force. We worked hard to assist the frontline states in 
     coping with the flood of refugees. We received help from 
     countries on every continent, including those in the Muslim 
     world. We consulted constantly with our Allies, who stayed 
     together every step of the way. And we made full use of 
     public diplomacy to explain NATO's objectives.
       Ultimately, we were able to use diplomacy to help bring the 
     need for force to an end. Thanks to the tireless efforts of 
     Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, we reached an 
     understanding with Russia's envoy Victor Chernomyrdin on the 
     terms of peace. We solicited the help of Finnish President 
     Ahtisaari in presenting those terms to Belgrade. By then, an 
     isolated Milosevic had no other choice but to accept. And we 
     proceeded to gain Security Council approval for an 
     international force with NATO at its core.
       Now we are in a new stage of practicing diplomacy to build 
     peace. During the past two weeks, we have consummated 
     agreements on an appropriate role for Russia in KFOR, KLA 
     demilitarization, and the Southeast Europe Stability Pact.
       Our strategy throughout has been grounded firmly in U.S. 
     interests. By meeting massive ethnic cleansing in the Balkans 
     with a red light, we make it less likely that NATO will be 
     called upon to use force in the future. And by supporting 
     democracy and promoting human rights, we contribute to a 
     future of stability and peace throughout Europe. This is 
     fully consistent both with American interests, and with 
     NATO's purpose, which is to prevent war, while defending 
     freedom.
       Some hope, and others fear, that Kosovar will be a 
     precedent for similar interventions around the globe. I would 
     caution against any such sweeping conclusions. Every 
     circumstance is unique. Decisions on the use of force will be 
     made by any President on a case-by-case basis after weighing 
     a host of factors. Moreover, the response to Milosevic would 
     not have been possible without NATO, and NATO is a European 
     and Atlantic, not a global, institution.
       We have been laboring throughout this decade to improve the 
     world's ability to prevent and respond to humanitarian 
     disasters, but this remains a work in progress.
       We conceived the Africa Crisis Response Initiative to 
     improve indigenous capacities on that continent.
       We are the largest contributor to the UN High Commissioner 
     for Refugees.
       We are backing strongly the War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda 
     and the Balkans.
       And we have supported peace initiatives from Northern 
     Ireland to the Middle East and Central Africa.
       The United States remains the world's leading force for 
     justice and stability. But a leader cannot stand still. We 
     need help from Congress to support the President's requests 
     for resources to back our leadership, and to ensure that our 
     commitments in Southeast Europe do not cause the neglect of 
     other priorities.
       Not long ago, I visited a refugee camp in Macedonia. And I 
     was never prouder to be an American than when I heard the 
     chant ``USA, USA, USA'' and saw a little boy's handlettered 
     sign that read, at the top, ``I Love America'' and at the 
     bottom, ``I want to go home.''
       As someone whose own family was twice forced to flee its 
     home when I was still a little girl, I remember how it feels 
     to be displaced. And now I know how it feels, as Secretary of 
     State, to be able to tell that little boy and his family 
     that--with America's help--they would go home, safely and 
     soon.
       There are some who say that Americans need not care what 
     happens to that child or to those like him.
       Others suggest that until we can help all the victims of 
     ethnic violence, we should be consistent and not help any.
       Still other believe that by trying to bring stability to 
     the Balkans, we are taking on a job that is simply too hard.
       Finally, there are some--overseas and even here at home--
     who see NATO's actions as part of a master plan to impose our 
     values on the world.
       Such criticisms are not original. They echo voices heard 
     half a century ago when America led in rebuilding war-torn 
     societies across two oceans, helped to reconcile historic 
     enemies, elevated the world's conception of human rights, and 
     attempted--and achieved--the impossible by supplying more 
     than two million people in Berlin entirely by air for more 
     than nine months.
       From that time to this, the United States has defended its 
     own interests, while promoting values of tolerance and free 
     expression that are not ``Made in America'' or confined to 
     the West, but rather universal and fundamental to world 
     progress and peace.
       It is in this spirit of melding present interests with 
     timeless values--a spirit fully in keeping with the highest 
     traditions of U.S. foreign policy--that we have acted in 
     Kosovo, and that we strive now for lasting peace throughout 
     Southeast Europe.
       It is to the success of this mission, and the continuation 
     of this tradition, that I pledge my own best efforts tonight, 
     and respectfully solicit your wise counsel and support. Thank 
     you very much.

     

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