[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 10]
[House]
[Pages 13864-13865]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                NORTH KOREA: EXPERIENCE DICTATES CAUTION

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, despite a number of highly contentious 
foreign policy issues that have been debated in this body in recent 
months, this Member continues to believe that American interests are 
best served by a bipartisan foreign policy. When the executive and 
legislative branches, furthermore, speak with one voice, the Nation is 
more likely to enjoy success in preserving its vital interests.
  As chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the 
Committee on International Relations, this Member has had the 
opportunity to focus closely on the Clinton administration's policy 
toward this important region. Frankly, the administration deserves 
credit on several fronts in its overall policy there, including its 
active support for democracy in Indonesia and a peaceful resolution to 
the festering situation that is East Timor, the successful 
renegotiation of the U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines, its commitment 
with Congress to maintain 100,000 U.S. military personnel in the Asian 
region, and the judgment to elevate the import of the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Forum.
  Genuine bipartisanship in Congress complementary to formulating a 
foreign policy, however, requires that Members of the Congress speak 
out when serious foreign policy failings by this or any other 
administration are detected. It is in this context that this Member 
expresses deepening concerns over the Clinton administration's 
continued lack of a coherent, comprehensive strategy towards Pyongyang, 
toward North Korea. This situation presents a grave challenge to vital 
U.S. national security interests.
  In recent weeks, two important U.S. missions have traveled to the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that is, North Korea. The first 
mission was that of former Secretary of Defense William Perry who has 
been tasked by the President to complete a congressionally mandated, 
comprehensive review of U.S. policy regarding the problems of the 
Korean Peninsula. Dr. Perry is an outstanding public servant, 
extraordinarily well qualified to undertake this important assignment. 
In large part because of his reputation, his qualifications and the 
high bipartisan respect he has here on Capitol Hill, expectations are 
very high that he will be successful in engaging Pyongyang and 
presenting them with a clear choice of another track for its 
relationship with the United States, the Republic of Korea--that is 
South Korea--and our allies in the region.
  The second mission involved the inspection of the suspected 
underground nuclear facility at Kumchang-ni, North Korea. That country, 
my colleagues will remember, agreed to abandon its nuclear aspirations 
in return for the construction of two light-water reactors for power 
generation through the U.S.-led international consortium called the 
Korean Energy Development Organization, or KEDO. If it is learned that 
the DPRK has a secret nuclear program, this, of course, would 
completely undermine the credibility of the Clinton administration's 
policy of constructive engagement and would end KEDO.
  If these missions proved satisfactory in their results, it was hoped 
that the Clinton administration would begin to lay a solid foundation 
for eliminating or at least dramatically reducing hostilities and 
ultimately for wholly transforming the relationship between North Korea 
and the United States and our regional allies. Working towards this 
objective certainly is a laudable and desirable goal if North Korea 
truly does wish to break from its history of brinksmanship and 
blackmail. Regrettably, this Member does not find the results of the 
administration's missions to be wholly reassuring, particularly when 
viewed against the backdrop of North Korean provocations. Of course, 
despite the completion of the Kumchang-ni inspection to determine if 
Pyongyang is covertly continuing its nuclear development program at 
other locations in violation of the agreed framework, we really do not 
have evidence that they have stopped.
  Certainly, former Secretary Perry effectively delivered a strong 
message to the upper echelons of North Korean leadership, and the 
American inspection team performed its mission very well. While 
applauding these efforts, this body nevertheless must urge careful 
scrutiny of both the results and the administration's impending policy 
proposal.
  There is an old adage that says ``actions speak louder than words.'' 
With Pyongyang, actions shout louder than words. So, indeed, this 
Member is troubled by the provocative language and the actions of the 
North Korean leadership both during and after the Kumchang-ni 
inspection and Secretary Perry's visit. Not much time has passed since 
Dr. Perry's visit but Pyongyang's behavior thus far shows no real 
evidence of an interest in confidence-building measures or tension 
reduction. Rather, its behavior rings of persistent hostility, and 
appears to be inconsistent with defusing tensions, advancing regional 
security, and improving relations.
  Here are just a few examples. First, the media has been reporting 
widely that Pyongyang will test fire the Taepo Dong II ballistic 
missile in July or August. If these reports are accurate, the growing 
capability of North Korea's missile development program, including an 
intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the continental 
United States, cannot be overstated. North Korea, perhaps the most 
volatile and unstable regime on earth, is fast acquiring the ability to 
strike the continental United States with weapons of mass destruction.
  Press reports indicate that talks between North Korean officials and 
Dr. Perry on halting the ballistic missile program and sales, a key 
requirement outlined by Dr. Perry as he prepared for his visit, 
apparently ended with the same North Korean attempts at extortion that 
the U.S. has received at earlier meetings. The North demanded a large 
direct cash payment to terminate the program. True to form, the DPRK 
behaves as the modern equivalent of the Barbary pirates, extorting 
tribute in return for barely tolerable behavior.
  It is also important to note that during Dr. Perry's visit, the North 
Korean press condemned the U.S. with the most contemptuous invective--
and also vitriolically denounced South Korea and Japan--on issues 
ranging from a supposed U.S. master attack plan, an alleged U.S. dress 
rehearsal for an attack on the DPRK being staged in the Balkans, and a 
condemnation of Western economic policies that must be prevented from 
so-called poisoning their society. Pyongyang further lambasted Seoul's 
``sunshine policy''--South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's policy

[[Page 13865]]

of engagement with the North--as a blatant attempt to absorb North 
Korea.
  Mr. Speaker, this Member also would note that the mid-June, North 
Korea-South Korea naval stand-off in the Yellow Sea escalated to an 
armed confrontation, reportedly provoked by North Korean ships that 
violated the demarcation line. Pyongyang subsequently threatened to 
cancel long-postponed talks with the South, and agreed to sit down only 
after a final shipment of humanitarian aid arrived in North Korea. This 
was the last shipment of $50 million in fertilizer aid that Seoul had 
agreed to provide in exchange for these talks.
  The potential challenges for the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific region 
posed by recent North Korean activities highlight the need to remain 
very wary of the North's intentions and actions, despite the initial 
results of the Kumchang-ni expeditious withdraw and its Perry missions. 
In some ways, the results of these missions raise more questions and 
concerns than they answered. For example, it is no real surprise that 
the inspection team found no evidence linking the underground site at 
Kumchang-ni to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. If this evidence 
had existed, it is obvious that the United States never would have been 
permitted to inspect that facility.
  In addition, this Member's concern about the possibility of a covert 
North Korean nuclear development program are exacerbated by press 
reports that the North is not cooperating sufficiently with the IAEA 
regarding reactor parts that are missing from Yongbyon, a subject which 
is covered by the Framework Agreement. More worrisome, however, are 
reports that Pyongyang has been trying to obtain items related to 
uranium enrichment. This material would help North Korea develop 
nuclear weapons without violating the Framework Agreement. Lastly, 
accentuating this list of concerns is the genuine difficulty we have in 
monitoring North Korean activities in that, the most closed society on 
earth.
  Mr. Speaker, North Korea's continuing provocations demonstrate how 
important it is for the administration to clearly and, I emphasize, 
expeditiously lay out for Congress its policy proposal for North Korea. 
North Korea's behavior certainly seems to reflect a leadership that 
still has little intention of working constructively with the U.S. and 
our regional allies. North Korea's leadership appears to remain 
committed to its policy of orchestrating crises as a means of extorting 
financial and humanitarian assistance. If this is the case, forthcoming 
Clinton administration policy proposals that derive principally from 
the perceptions of the inspection team and Dr. Perry in may leave 
unanswered the particularly thorny policy question of how to deal with 
a truculent, mercurial, and menacing North Korea--one that continues to 
use posturing and threats to extract resources and other concessions 
while offering nothing meaningful in return.
  Mr. Speaker, relations with North Korea are highly problematic and 
precarious. A policy failure on our part for the Korean Peninsula would 
put tens of thousands of American troops and the South Korean people at 
risk. Misjudging our adversary could result in virtually any Americans 
on the continent being vulnerable to North Korean ballistic missile 
attack. The administration has a responsibility to extensively and 
routinely consult with Congress, particularly on a threat of this 
magnitude, and this body has both the responsibility and right to act 
as a partner in the formulation of North Korean policy. This body 
should have further dialog with, and a road map from, the Clinton 
administration that clearly outlines the benefits that would be 
extended to Pyongyang for working in earnest with the United States, 
the conditions that the North must meet to obtain these benefits, and 
the potential consequences of remaining intractable. We also should 
work to ensure that any administration plan is backed by both United 
States willingness and capability to undertake the tough measures to 
bolster our national security that North Korea appears to understand.

                              {time}  1830

  Pyongyang subsequently threatened to cancel the long postponed talks 
with the south. That is not a good start to a more constructive path.
  I urge my colleagues to watch this issue very carefully and to work 
with the administration, demanding a full report on progress on the Dr. 
Perry mission.

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