[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 10]
[Senate]
[Pages 13651-13663]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. GRAMS:
  S. 1245. A bill to allow access for researchers to Continuous Work 
History Sample data of the Social Security Administration; to the 
Committee on Finance.


        social security's continuous work history sample (cwhs)

  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I want to take this opportunity to 
introduce another Social Security-related bill.
  This bill would give all researchers access to Social Security's 
Continuous Work History Sample (CWHS).
  The access to the CWHS is critical for the general public and other 
government agencies to fully evaluate the working of the current system 
and estimate the budgetary impact of any changes that need to be made 
in the future.
  The CWHS is a key set of data which holds information on the work and 
benefit histories of Social Security program participants. Until 1976, 
this data was widely available to federal, state agencies, universities 
and private research groups.
  There is no evidence of any misuse of the CWHS in the period before 
1976.
  The 1976 Tax Reform Act denied access to CWHS data to almost all 
users outside of the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security 
Administration.
  Although it later extended the access to a few units of government 
agencies, private researchers are still denied access. The excuse was 
to protect privacy.
  However, the IRS is covered by the same law. But it has interpreted 
the law to enable it to make samples of individual tax returns 
available to researchers on the basis that identifiers must be removed 
and the research must be bona fide.
  Mr. President, if the IRS can make its data available to researchers, 
why cannot the SSA do the same?
  Last year, during a Budget Committee hearing, I asked SSA 
Commissioner Apfel about this. Here is his reply:

       The SSA supports, in principle, the idea of making data 
     from our administrative records available to researchers in 
     order to better inform the ongoing debate on the future of 
     Social Security.

  The National Research Council and other academic institutions also 
support to give researchers access to the CWHS.
  My legislation would amend the 1976 Tax Reform Act to allow bona fide 
researchers access to CWHS data, and at the same time protect the 
confidentiality and privacy of program participants.
  It also requires researchers to sign a legally binding agreement that 
restricts use of the data to the research and forbids the disclosure of 
information that could be used to identify individuals.
  Mr. President, this is ``good government'' legislation. Allowing 
access to CWHS data will open the entire Social Security system to 
outside scrutiny.
  It will significantly improve oversight of the program and enable 
Americans to know everything they need to know about how the system 
operates and what changes are needed to make it solvent.
  I, therefore, urge my colleagues to support these legislative 
initiatives.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. TORRICELLI (for himself, Mr. Lieberman and Mr. Dodd):
  S. 1246. A bill to amend title 4 of the United States Code to 
prohibit the imposition of discriminatory commuter taxes by political 
subdivisions of States; to the Committee on Finance.


                     tax fairness for commuters act

  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I rise today with my colleagues from 
Connecticut, Senator Lieberman and Senator Dodd to introduce the Tax 
Fairness for Commuters Act. Last month, Governor Pataki of New York 
signed legislation to ``repeal'' the New York City commuter tax. 
However, the legislation signed into law only repealed the tax for 
residents of New York. The over 300,000 residents of Connecticut and 
New Jersey will still be subjected to this tax.
  I believe that the lawsuit jointly undertaken by New Jersey and 
Connecticut along with the city of New York and affected commuters will 
ultimately prevail and this attempt will be proven unconstitutional. 
However, I am concerned about the attempted precedent that has been 
set.
  Our legislation will remove the temptation of any State or any city 
to impose higher taxes on non-residents than it does on residents. The 
bill is very simple. It says that a State or city may not impose a 
higher tax on the income earned by non-residents than it does on 
residents. I hope that each Senator, no matter what part of the country 
they are from, will recognize the inherent danger in discriminatory 
taxes of this nature and will support this effort.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the 
legislation be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

[[Page 13652]]



                                S. 1246

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON IMPOSITION OF DISCRIMINATORY 
                   COMMUTER TAXES BY POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF 
                   STATES.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 4 of title 4, United States Code, 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 116. Prohibition on imposition of discriminatory 
       commuter taxes by political subdivisions of States

       ``A political subdivision of a State may not impose a tax 
     on income earned within such political subdivision by 
     nonresidents of the political subdivision unless the 
     effective rate of such tax imposed on such nonresidents who 
     are residents of such State is not less than such rate 
     imposed on such nonresidents who are not residents of such 
     State.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections for 
     chapter 4 of title 4, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:

``116. Prohibition on imposition of discriminatory commuter taxes by 
              political subdivisions of States.''.

       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to taxable years ending after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to join my distinguished 
colleague from New Jersey, Senator Torricelli, and my colleague from 
Connecticut, Senator Dodd, to introduce legislation that would amend 
title 4 of the United States Code to prohibit the imposition of 
discriminatory commuter taxes by political subdivisions of States.
  On May 26, 1999, New York Governor George Pataki signed into law a 
repeal of the commuter tax for people who work in New York City but 
live outside of the five boroughs. This repeal only applies to 
residents of New York state; it does not include the 330,000 people 
from New Jersey and Connecticut who work in New York City.
  In 1966, Governor Nelson Rockefeller and Mayor John Lindsay initiated 
the commuter tax. To the present day, New York City has enforced the 
0.45% tax on commuters' income much like a payroll tax. Estimates show 
that this tax generates $360 million a year in revenue that helps to 
supports services such as police and fire protection and emergency 
medical care. New York state residents contribute $210 million a year 
in commuter tax revenue, while New Jersey and Connecticut residents 
account for the remaining $150 million in tax revenue. The commuter tax 
repeal eliminates more than $200 million from New York City's annual 
tax revenue.
  New York State's unilateral, partial repeal of the commuter tax only 
for its residents is an unfortunate development after 33 years of 
assessing the tax on all commuters who work in New York City. This is 
an unprecedented action on the part of a legislative body and state 
executive to repeal a tax on its residents but maintain it for non-
residents. The imposition of taxes only on out-of-state commuters could 
violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Limited 
repeal discriminates against out-of-state commuters and inhibits 
interstate commerce and travel.
  Approximately 86,000 of my constituents work in New York City, 
contributing an estimated $100 million in commuter tax revenue; 244,000 
New Jersey constituents account for an estimated $50 million in tax 
revenue that goes to New York City. According to Connecticut Attorney 
General Richard Blumenthal, the taxable income of Connecticut commuters 
is lower than non-commuters because of this tax that commuters pay to 
New York. The commuter tax essentially draws away millions of dollars 
in tax revenue from Connecticut and gives them to New York City to 
subsidize services and other public works.
  This Connecticut and New Jersey subsidy to New York City is 
unacceptable. If a commuter tax is imposed all commuters--whether they 
are from Newark, New Rochelle, or New Haven--are equally responsible to 
bear it. There is no reason that our commuter constituents should be 
paying for New York City services while New York state residents are 
not.
  Senator Torricelli and I are joined by others who have taken action 
to force a repeal of the law passed by the New York state legislature. 
Two attorneys, Richard Swanson and Thomas Igoe, filed a complaint in 
Manhattan Supreme Court that seeks class-action status for other 
commuters from New Jersey and Connecticut. Swanson from New Jersey and 
Igoe from Connecticut are colleagues at the Manhattan law firm of 
Thelen, Reid & Priest. Moreover, Governor Rowland of Connecticut and 
Governor Whitman of New Jersey plan to challenge the constitutionality 
of the commuter tax repeal bill in federal courts. New York City Mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani also intends to file a lawsuit against the state, 
although his claim stands on different grounds than the ones brought 
forth by Governors Whitman and Rowland.
  The partial commuter tax repeal bill that Governor Pataki signed 
includes a provision that says that the tax will be repealed for all 
commuters if a partial repeal is found unconstitutional in federal 
courts. Even if the lawsuits succeed in their legal challenges, we 
still need legislation that will prevent state governments from 
discriminating against nonresidents and imposing unfair commuter taxes 
in the future.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. GRAMS:
  S. 1247. A bill to develop and apply a Consumer Price Index that 
accurately reflects the cost-of-living for older Americans who receive 
Social Security benefits under title II of the Social Security Act; to 
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.


         fair cost of living adjustment for seniors act of 1999

  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, 1999 has been declared the ``International 
Year of the Older Person'' by the United Nations.
  In honor of this special tribute, I rise today to introduce 
legislation specially designed to provide fair and accurate Social 
Security benefits in order to help all Americans achieve retirement 
security.
  I believe senior citizens in this country have made, and continue to 
make, valuable contributions to their families, communities and to 
society as a whole.
  One of the most troubling aspects of the debate over Social 
Security's future has been attempts to frighten older Americans. Many 
seniors fear that they may lose their Social Security benefits.
  To ease their fears and worries, I introduced legislation last month 
that would require the government to legally guarantee seniors full 
Social Security benefits plus accurate COLA adjustments.
  In essence, this bill would give older Americans property rights to 
their Social Security benefits, which they do not have now. It is no 
wonder they now worry about loss of benefits.
  However, an accurate method for how we calculate Social Security 
remains a subject of debate.
  In order to understand this issue, Mr. President, we need to go back 
and take a closer look at how seniors' COLAs are currently calculated 
by the government.
  To compensate for the effects of inflation, Congress passed 
legislation in 1972 to give Social Security beneficiaries an automatic 
cost of living adjustment, or a COLA.
  This COLA is based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as tracked and 
surveyed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) under the Labor 
Department.
  Currently, the BLS produces two official CPIs, one for All Urban 
Consumers called the CPI-U, and one for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical 
Workers, called the CPI-W.
  The CPI-U represents the spending habits of about 80 percent of the 
population of this nation, and the CPI-W is a subset of the formula, 
representing about 32 percent of the total population. The government 
uses the later the CPI-W to measure COLAs for Social Security benefits.
  But clearly, this does not reflect the older American population and 
their consumption habits. Spending habits of urban wage earners cannot 
be equated with those seniors. Nevertheless, the government continues 
to use it calculating COLAs for Social Security beneficiaries.

[[Page 13653]]

  Back in 1987, after considerable criticism of the CPI-W and its 
applicability to senior consumers, Congress amended the Older Americans 
Act of 1965 to require the BLS to develop an experimental CPI that 
would better reflect the buying habits of consumers 62 years of age or 
older. This is now known as the CPI-E.
  The CPI-E places greater weight on the cost of such goods and 
services as medical care and prescription drugs, areas where seniors 
spend more than other Americans.
  Although it's still experimental, the preliminary finding shows 
annual increases in Social Security benefit payments received by older 
Americans are not keeping pace with inflation on the goods and services 
on which they spend much of their money.
  Over the past 15 years, goods purchased by seniors increased 6 
percentage points more than goods purchased by the general public. 
Their medical costs skyrocketed 156 percent. The main reason that the 
CPI-E has been higher than the other two CPIs.
  My concern is, as inflation on medical and pharmaceutical goods 
continues to rise, without a fair COLA increase, older Americans' hard-
earned Social Security benefits are worth less and less. Their 
purchasing power will continue to diminish.
  Mr. President, that's why I am introducing legislation today to 
prevent that from happening. My legislation is simple and 
straightforward. It first calls for the establishment of a CPI Review 
Committee made up of well-known economists who have expertise in the 
field, plus representatives of our senior citizens population.
  The Committee will be given the task of studying how to analyze and 
improve the CPI-E method, make recommendations, and form an 
implementation plan to produce a CPI that accurately reflects the 
senior population and their consumption that will be used to determine 
the Social Security COLA each year.
  Appointing economic professionals will de-politicize this issue, and 
allow us to make sound policy based on merits rather than on political 
consideration.
  This is also consistent with the measures recommended by the Advisory 
Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index, or the Boskin Commission, 
which calls for Congress to establish an independent committee or 
commission of experts to review progress in developing a new system of 
measuring the overall cost of living adjustments.
  Within a year, the Committee I recommend is required to complete its 
work. A pilot program will test the accuracy of the CPI-E over a 3 year 
period by using improved and recommended methods.
  However, I must point out that the experimental CPI-E currently 
computed by the BLS has limitations. For instance, the number of 
consumer units was relatively small, only 19 percent of the total 
sample.
  Expenditure weights used in the construction of the CPI-E have a 
higher sampling error than those used for larger populations.
  That's the reason that my legislation specifically instructs the 
Committee to remove this and other major limitations. To construct an 
improved CPI-E that is more scientific, accurate and representative of 
older Americans' spending habits.
  We had the right idea in 1987. My legislation will improve on that 
law after we've had some time to analyze it.
  Now, Mr. President, I know some of my colleagues will raise questions 
about this bill.
  First, they are going to say, what about the issue of cost? Mr. 
President, it is perhaps true that moving from the CPI-W to the 
improved CPI-E to determine Social Security COLA increases may increase 
federal spending.
  As a consistent fiscal conservative, I am concerned about the 
budgetary impact. I believe we must exercise caution and discipline on 
how government spends our money.
  However, the issue of a fair Social Security COLA is not at its root 
a fiscal one, but rather an issue of fairness, particularly in the case 
of retired workers who rely upon their fixed Social Security pensions 
for survival.
  I have argued repeatedly that the federal government has entered into 
a sacred covenant with the American people to provide benefits for 
their retirement if they pay into the system.
  We have also committed to give them a fair COLA to keep up with 
inflation. It's our moral and contractual duty to honor that 
commitment, and to ensure the program will be there for current and 
future beneficiaries.
  Senior citizens are a unique consumer population that should not be 
lumped into a category that considers spending habits the same as the 
average American family of four.
  Once again, Mr. President, this is an issue of fairness and justice, 
not an issue of cost. All my legislation asks for is an accurate CPI 
and a fair COLA, up or down.
  Second question: if an official CPI-E is created, wouldn't it set a 
potentially dangerous precedent for creating a CPI for every seemingly 
distinct population group? The answer is no.
  Senior citizens comprise nearly 60 percent of Social Security 
beneficiaries, and this number will increase substantially as the Baby 
Boomer generation retires. Furthermore, the Social Security program is 
specifically intended to benefit senior citizens. It's only fair and 
rational to create an accurate CPI for them.
  However, we have not forgotten that there is another distinct group 
of Social Security beneficiaries who receive disability benefits.
  Because this group also spends more of their money for medical and 
pharmaceutical goods and services, their purchasing power could be 
affected by the inaccurate CPI and therefore COLA increase.
  My legislation specifically requires the Committee to look into this 
issue and make recommendations on how to resolve it.
  Third question: would this legislation overlap and contradict the 
study conducted by the Boskin Commission? The answer again is no.
  On the contrary, my legislation is a complement to the Boskin 
Commission report. It parallels the general recommendations of the 
Boskin Commission.
  These include development of a new Consumer Expenditure Survey that 
is larger and therefore more representative of the American consumer; 
development of a new market basket of goods and services that can 
register changes in the quality of products, the introduction of new 
products, and the substitution of less or more expensive goods when 
prices change; and development of a point-of-purchase survey that can 
register consumer shifts to lower price outlets.
  Finally, would this legislation set back Social Security reform 
efforts? The answer is no. As I mentioned earlier, it would be wrong to 
let Social Security beneficiaries bear the burden of a mistake which is 
not of their own making.
  In fact, when we give a legal guarantee to older Americans that they 
will receive Social Security benefits in full plus a fair COLA increase 
and take this fear away from them, it will be much easier to move the 
retirement system from a PAYGO system to a fully funded system.
  This would in effect secure retirement income for our children and 
grandchildren.
  In conclusion, Mr. President, retirement security for today's and 
tomorrow's seniors is essential to the social stability and economic 
prosperity of our society. This is all my legislation attempts to 
achieve.
  I urge the Senate to make this issue the top priority for the 106th 
Congress. Working together, we will meet the demographic challenges and 
move towards a society that allows all ages to progress in the new 
millennium.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. LOTT (for Mr. McCain (for himself and Mr. Hollings)):
  S. 1248. A bill to correct errors in the authorizations of certain 
programs administered by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation.

[[Page 13654]]




         legislation to increase the nhtsa authorization level

 Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise to introduce legislation 
that would increase the authorization level of the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration. The recently passed TEA-21 legislation 
authorized NHTSA at its requested level, approximately $87.4 million.
  Although the Department of Transportation requested $87.4 million, 
Secretary Slater now informs us that this authorization level will not 
permit the funding of key safety initiatives. The bill would increase 
the funding levels to approximately $107.8 million. This amount is 
consistent with the amount recently reported by the House Commerce 
Committee. It is my intention to move this matter quickly in the 
committee.
  I know that no one in this body wants a situation where highway 
safety is degraded in any way. I look forward to working with my 
colleagues to address this important issue of highway safety in a 
manner that provides the appropriate funding level to meet safety needs 
while also meeting our budget obligations and the consensus of the 
Appropriations Committee.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. TORRICELLI:
  S. 1249. A bill to deny Federal public benefits to individuals who 
participated in Nazi persecution; to the Committee on the Judiciary.


               the nazi benefits termination act of 1998

  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce, the Nazi 
Benefits Termination Act of 1999. This legislation seeks to halt an 
unintended and unwarranted series of public benefits payments to 
utlimately deportable individuals who assisted or otherwise 
participated in persecution sponsored by the Nazis or their allies 
during World War II. The bill also closes a loophole in the current law 
which allows some of these deportable individuals to avoid the 
suspension of their benefits by fleeing the United States. Such 
individuals who illegally gain access to the bounty of the United 
States, for example, by misrepresenting the facts of their wartime 
conduct, should not be allowed to benefit from their deceit at the 
expense of the Treasury, including the Social Security Trust Funds. So 
too, individuals who avoid entry of an order of deportation or removal 
by fleeing the United States should not be permitted to circumvent the 
intent of the law at the expense of the Trust Funds.
  Recognizing the excellent work of the Department of Justice's Office 
of Special Investigations (OSI) in bringing and winning cases against 
those who participated in Nazi persecution, the Nazi Benefits 
Termination Act of 1999 delegates to the Attorney General the 
discretionary authority to initiate proceedings to prohibit the payment 
of public benefits to any benefits receipient or applicant whom the 
Attorney General has reason to believe may have been a participant in 
persecution sponsored by the Nazis or their allies. Although OSI's 
success in deporting former Nazi persecutors has resulted in the 
cessation of social security benefits payments to numerous persons, 
this bill will, among other things, permit termination of benefits even 
before (or without) an order of deportation. This bill will apply to 
persons eventually subject to deportation who have assisted in Nazi 
persecution in any way. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence of 
such assistance or other participation in persecution is required. The 
Attorney General need not prove that a particular respondent is or was 
a war criminal. Rather, this legislation adopts the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals' properly broad interpretation of the Holtzman 
Amendment (now Sections 212(a)(3)(E) and 237(a)(4)(D) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act) terms ``participated'' or ``assisted'' 
in persecution. In Schellong v. I.N.S., the Sevneth Circuit properly 
interpreted the Holtzman Amendment, which is incorporated into this 
bill's statutory standard. The standard set out by the Sixth Circuit in 
Petkiewytsch v. I.N.S., ignores the plain language of the Holtzman 
Amendment and is specifically rejected by this bill. The Nazi Benefits 
Termination Act of 1999, like the Holtzman Amendment, applies to 
persons who assisted or otherwise participated in Nazi-sponsored 
persecution in any way, and does not require a showing by the 
government of personal or direct involvement in atrocities, 
voluntariness or motive.
  Section 2(b)(2)(B)(1) of the bill is drafted to cover naturalized 
citizens whose admission to the United States was unlawful due, inter 
alia, to assistance in persecution or who otherwise procured their 
citizenship illegally or by concealment of a material fact or 
misrepresentation.
  Section 3(a) of the legislation provides that Immigration Judges 
appointed by the Attorney General pursuant to the procedure established 
under the regulations implementing Section 1101(b)(4) of Title 8 will 
preside over the benefits hearings established by this bill. The rules, 
procedures, and rights applicable in these hearings are to be governed 
by the terms of this bill, existing regulations under Title 8, and any 
necessary additional implementing regulations.
  The preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof will apply in 
hearings conducted under Section 3(a) of the bill. This standard is 
applicable in federal benefits revocation proceedings and most civil 
proceedings. Under this standard, we can avoid the delays incident to 
assembly of proof in denaturalization and deportation cases brought 
against this class, and consequently stem current depletion of the 
Treasury.
  Section 3(f) of the bill makes clear that findings under section 
3(c)(3)(A) of the bill may be based upon the collateral estoppel effect 
of denaturalization, deportation, or other appropriate judgments.
  It is important to pass this legislation to help protect the public 
against unintended and unwarranted waste in paying benefits to 
ultimately deportable individuals. This measure will help to conserve 
resources so that future generations can continue to rely upon social 
security and other necessary public benefits payments.
  I hope all my colleagues will be able to support this important 
legislation and I ask unanimous consent that the legislation be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1249

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Nazi Benefits Termination 
     Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. DENIAL OF FEDERAL PUBLIC BENEFITS TO NAZI 
                   PERSECUTORS.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, an individual who is determined under this Act to have 
     been a participant in Nazi persecution is not eligible for 
     any Federal public benefit.
       (b) Definitions.--In this Act:
       (1) Federal public benefit.--The term ``Federal public 
     benefit'' shall have the meaning given such term by section 
     401(c)(1) of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
     Reconciliation Act of 1996, but shall not include any benefit 
     described in section 401(b)(1) of such Act (and, for purposes 
     of applying such section 401(b)(1), the term ``alien'' shall 
     be considered to mean ``individual'').
       (2) Participant in nazi persecution.--The term 
     ``participant in Nazi persecution'' means an individual who--
       (A) if an alien, is shown by a preponderance of the 
     evidence to fall within the class of persons who (if present 
     within the United States) would be deportable under section 
     237(a)(4)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; or
       (B) if a citizen, is shown by a preponderance of the 
     evidence--
       (i) to have procured citizenship illegally or by 
     concealment of a material fact or willful misrepresentation 
     within the meaning of section 340(a) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act; and
       (ii) to have participated in Nazi persecution within the 
     meaning of section 212(a)(3)(E) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act.

     SEC. 3. DETERMINATIONS.

       (a) Hearing by Immigration Judge.--If the Attorney General 
     has reason to believe that an individual who has applied for 
     or is receiving a Federal public benefit may have been a 
     participant in Nazi persecution (within the meaning of 
     section 2 of this Act), the Attorney General may provide an 
     opportunity for a hearing on the record with respect to the 
     matter. The Attorney General

[[Page 13655]]

     may delegate the conduct of the hearing to an immigration 
     judge appointed by the Attorney General under section 
     101(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
       (b) Procedure.--
       (1) Right of respondents to appear.--
       (A) Citizens, permanent resident aliens, and persons 
     present in the united states.--At a hearing under this 
     section, each respondent may appear in person if the 
     respondent is a United States citizen, a permanent resident 
     alien, or present within the United States when the 
     proceeding under this section is initiated.
       (B) Others.--A respondent who is not a citizen, a permanent 
     resident alien, or present within the United States when the 
     proceeding under this section is initiated may appear by 
     video conference.
       (C) Rule of interpretation.--This Act shall not be 
     construed to permit the return to the United States of an 
     individual who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(3)(E) of 
     the Immigration and Nationality Act.
       (2) Other rights of respondents.--At a hearing under this 
     section, each respondent may be represented by counsel at no 
     expense to the Federal Government, present evidence, cross-
     examine witnesses, and obtain the issuance of subpoenas for 
     the attendance of witnesses and presentation of evidence.
       (3) Rules of evidence.--Unless otherwise provided in this 
     Act, rules regarding the presentation of evidence in the 
     hearing shall apply in the same manner in which such rules 
     would apply in a removal proceeding before a United States 
     immigration judge under section 240 of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act.
       (c) Hearings, Findings and Conclusions, and Order.--
       (1) Findings and conclusions.--Within 60 days after the end 
     of a hearing conducted under this section, the immigration 
     judge shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law with 
     respect to whether the respondent has been a participant in 
     Nazi persecution (within the meaning of section 2 of this 
     Act).
       (2) Order.--
       (A) Finding that respondent has been a participant in nazi 
     persecution.--If the immigration judge finds, by a 
     preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent has been a 
     participant in Nazi persecution (within the meaning of 
     section 2 of this Act), the immigration judge shall promptly 
     issue an order declaring the respondent to be ineligible for 
     any Federal public benefit, and prohibiting any person from 
     providing such a benefit, directly or indirectly, to the 
     respondent, and shall transmit a copy of the order to any 
     governmental entity or person known to be so providing such a 
     benefit.
       (B) Finding that respondent has not been a participant in 
     nazi persecution.--If the immigration judge finds that there 
     is insufficient evidence for a finding under subparagraph (A) 
     that a respondent has been a participant in Nazi persecution 
     (within the meaning of section 2 of this Act), the 
     immigration judge shall issue an order dismissing the 
     proceeding.
       (C) Effective date; limitation of liability.--
       (i) Effective date.--An order issued pursuant to 
     subparagraph (A) shall be effective on the date of issuance.
       (ii) Limitation of liability.--Notwithstanding clause (i), 
     a person or entity shall not be found to have provided a 
     benefit to an individual in violation of this Act until the 
     person or entity has received actual notice of the issuance 
     of an order under subparagraph (A) with respect to the 
     individual and has had a reasonable opportunity to comply 
     with the order.
       (d) Review by Attorney General; Service of Final Order.--
       (1) Review by attorney general.--The Attorney General may, 
     in her discretion, review any finding or conclusion made, or 
     order issued, under subsection (c), and shall complete the 
     review not later than 30 days after the finding or conclusion 
     is so made, or order is so issued. Otherwise, the finding, 
     conclusion, or order shall be final.
       (2) Service of final order.--The Attorney General shall 
     cause the findings of fact and conclusions of law made with 
     respect to any final order issued under this section, 
     together with a copy of the order, to be served on the 
     respondent involved.
       (e) Judicial Review.--Any party aggrieved by a final order 
     issued under this section may obtain a review of the order by 
     the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by 
     filing a petition for such review not later than 30 days 
     after the final order is issued.
       (f) Issue and Claim Preclusion.--In any administrative or 
     judicial proceeding under this Act, the ordinary rules of 
     issue preclusion and claim preclusion shall apply.

     SEC. 4. JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
                   THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT OVER APPEALS UNDER THIS 
                   ACT.

       Section 1295(a) of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (13);
       (2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (14) and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(15) of an appeal from a final order issued under the 
     Nazi Benefits Termination Act of 1999.''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. ROCKEFELLER:
  S. 1250. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to ensure a 
continuum of health care for veterans, to require pilot programs 
relating to long-term health care for veterans, and for other purposes; 
to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.


          the veterans' long-term care enhancement act of 1999

  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce the 
``Veterans' Long-Term Care Enhancement Act of 1999.'' There is no doubt 
that demand for long-term care--for veterans and non-veterans alike--is 
increasing. In the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), however, we 
face an even more pressing demand.
  The numbers are staggering. About 34 percent of the total veteran 
population is 65 years or older, compared with about 13 percent of the 
total United States population. In the year 2000, the number of 
veterans aged 65 or older will peak at 9.3 million. In my state of West 
Virginia alone, we have approximately 57,000 World War II veterans.
  Because VA has already faced considerable demand for long-term care, 
it has been forced to become a leader in this field. I am proud of VA's 
work in developing geriatric evaluation teams, home-based primary care, 
and adult day health care. Our older veterans are leading richer lives 
because of these innovations. But to quote from the Report of the 
Federal Advisory Committee on the Future of VA Long-Term Care, despite 
VA's high quality and long tradition, ``VA long-term care is 
marginalized and unevenly funded.''
  Frequently I hear from families of World War II combat veterans who 
need long-term care because of a debilitating disease, such as 
Alzheimer's or Parkinson's, or a stroke. A number of these families do 
not have the money to place the veteran in a private nursing home for 
the necessary long-term care; and because of the veteran's sacrifices 
during World War II, they turn to the VA.
  Or I will get a call from a wife of an aging, sick veteran who wants 
desperately to keep her husband at home with her, but in order to do 
that she needs home health care services, so she turns to the VA.
  But when these West Virginian families are told by VA that the 
services they need are not available to them, they simply cannot 
understand how they could be denied, and they turn to me in despair.
  The challenge for all of us, of course, is to find a way to furnish 
the appropriate array of services, in a cost efficient way, to all 
those needing extended care.
  As the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs noted in its March 15, 
1999, letter to the Budget Committee with the Committee's views on VA's 
budget for FY 2000, ``The health care issue that VA must face over the 
intermediate term--indeed, the health care issue that the Nation must 
face over the next decade--is the need for long-term care among the 
aging World War II generation. WWII veterans saved Western 
civilization. We cannot turn our backs on them now.''
  At the outset, I want to say that my wish would be for VA to provide 
long-term care to all veterans who need and want it. While the 
legislation I am introducing today is only one step toward determining 
what VA should be doing to meet the needs of veterans for long-term 
care, I believe that it is an important step in that regard.
  There are three key elements in the bill. First, are provisions which 
clarify that long-term care is not only nursing home care, and that 
existing differences in law between eligibility for institutional long-
term care and other types of care offered by VA do not affect VA's 
ability to furnish a full array of noninstitutional long-term care 
services.
  Specifically, the provision would add ``noninstitutional extended 
care services'' to the definition of ``medical services,'' thereby 
removing any doubt about VA's authority to furnish such services to 
veterans eligible for and enrolled in VA care. The term would be

[[Page 13656]]

defined to include the following: home-based primary care; adult day 
health care; respite care; palliative and end-of-life care; and 
homemaker or home health aide visits.
  Second, the bill would add clear authority for VA to furnish assisted 
living services, including to the spouses of veterans. VA already 
furnishes a form of assisted living services through its domiciliary 
care program, but the provision in the bill would provide express 
authority to furnish this modality of care to older veterans, thereby 
expanding the continuum of extended care services offered by VA.
  Third, VA would be mandated to carry out a series of pilot programs, 
over a period of three years, which would be designed to gauge the best 
way for VA to meet veterans' long-term care needs--either directly, 
through cooperative arrangements with community providers, or by 
purchasing services from non-VA providers.
  While VA has developed significant expertise in long-term care over 
the past 20-plus years, it has not done so with any mandate to share 
its learning with others, nor has it pushed its program development 
beyond that which met the current needs at the time. Some experts even 
believe that VA's expertise is gradually eroding.
  For VA's expertise to be of greatest use to others, it needs both to 
better capture what it has done and to develop new learning that would 
be most applicable to other health care entities.
  Those who would benefit by further action to develop and capitalize 
on VA's long-term care expertise include older veterans, primarily our 
honored World War II veterans; those health organizations, including 
academic medicine and research entities, with which VA is now 
connected; and finally, the rest of the U.S. health care system, and 
ultimately all Americans who will need some form of long-term care 
services.
  Each element of the pilot program would establish and carry out a 
comprehensive long-term care program, with a full array of services, 
ranging from inpatient long-term care--in intermediate care beds, in 
nursing homes, and in domiciliary care facilities--to comprehensive 
noninstitutional services, which include hospital-based home care, 
adult day health care, personal assistance services, respite care, and 
other community-base interventions.
  In each element of the pilot programs, VA would also be mandated to 
furnish case management services, to ensure that veterans participating 
in the pilot programs receive the optimal treatment and placement for 
services. Some form of assisted living services for veterans and their 
families would be provided, as well. Preventive health care services, 
such as screening and patient education, and a particular focus on end-
of-life care are also emphasized. In my view, VA must have ready access 
to all of these services.
  As part of the pilot program, VA would be encouraged to seek the 
involvement of State Veterans Homes, so as to draw them into 
noninstitutional approaches to long-term care. Our State Veterans Homes 
are valuable assets.
  Finally, a key purpose of the pilot program would be to test and 
evaluate various approaches to meeting the long-term care needs of 
eligible veterans, both to develop approaches that could be expanded 
across VA, as well as to demonstrate to others outside of VA the 
effectiveness and impact of various approaches to long-term care. To 
this end, the pilot program within in the ``Veterans' Long-Term Care 
Enhancement Act of 1999'' would include specific data collection on 
matters such as cost effectiveness, quality of health care services 
provided, enrollee and health care provider satisfaction, and the 
ability of participants to carry out basic activities of daily living.
  From this effort, a number of things would result. First, VA would 
gain more precise information on exactly which services to offer, how 
best to coordinate those services, and the relative cost and 
effectiveness of various services. There is no doubt that our veterans 
would benefit from such findings.
  Second, there would be a concrete demonstration of the feasibility of 
furnishing a coordinated range of long-term care services, which in 
turn could lead to a greater likelihood that such an approach would be 
shared with, and replicated by, others.
  Third, the value of such an approach, measured in quality of care, 
quality of life, cost effectiveness, and patient and provider 
satisfaction would be demonstrated, thereby promoting its use by 
others.
  Mr. President, I look forward to working with the chairmen and the 
members of the Committees on Veterans' Affairs--in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate--to advance the cause of long-term care 
in VA.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the bill 
be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1250

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Veterans' Long-Term Care 
     Enhancement Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. CONTINUUM OF CARE FOR VETERANS.

       (a) Inclusion of Noninstitutional Extended Care Services in 
     Definition of Medical Services.--Section 1701 of title 38, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (6)(A)(i), by inserting ``noninstitutional 
     extended care services,'' after ``preventive health 
     services,''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(10) The term `noninstitutional extended care services' 
     includes--
       ``(A) home-based primary care;
       ``(B) adult day health care;
       ``(C) respite care;
       ``(D) palliative and end-of-life care; and
       ``(E) homemaker or home health aide visits.
       ``(11) The term `respite care' means hospital or nursing 
     home care which--
       ``(A) is of limited duration;
       ``(B) is furnished on an intermittent basis to an 
     individual who is suffering from a chronic illness and who 
     resides primarily at home; and
       ``(C) is furnished for the purpose of helping the 
     individual to continue residing primarily at home.''.
       (b) Assisted Living.--Subchapter II of chapter 17 of such 
     title is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``Sec. 1720F. Assisted living

       ``(a) The Secretary may, subject to subsection (b), provide 
     assisted living services to a veteran who is eligible to 
     receive care under section 1710 of this title and to the 
     spouse of such veteran in connection with the provision of 
     such services to such veteran.
       ``(b) The Secretary may not provide assisted living 
     services under this section to a veteran eligible to receive 
     care under section 1710(a)(3) of this title, or to a spouse 
     of any veteran, unless such veteran or spouse agrees to pay 
     the United States an amount equal to the cost, as determined 
     in regulations prescribed by the Secretary, of the provision 
     of such services.
       ``(c) For purposes of this section, the term `assisted 
     living services' means services which provide personal care, 
     activities, health-related care, supervision, and other 
     assistance on a 24-hour basis within a residential or similar 
     setting which--
       ``(1) maximizes flexibility in the provision of such care, 
     activities, supervision, and assistance;
       ``(2) maximizes the autonomy, privacy, and independence of 
     an individual; and
       ``(3) encourages family and community involvement with the 
     individual.''.
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--(1)(A) Section 1720 of such 
     title is amended by striking subsection (f).
       (B) The section heading of such section is amended by 
     striking ``; adult day health care''.
       (2) Section 1720B of such title is repealed.
       (d) Clerical Amendments.--The table of sections for chapter 
     17 of such title is amended--
       (1) in the item relating to section 1720, by striking ``; 
     adult day health care'';
       (2) by striking the item relating to section 1720B; and
       (3) by inserting after the item relating to section 1720E 
     the following new item:

``1720F. Assisted living.''.

     SEC. 3. PILOT PROGRAMS RELATING TO LONG-TERM CARE OF 
                   VETERANS.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Veterans Affairs shall 
     carry out three pilot programs for the purpose of determining 
     the feasibility and practicability of a variety of methods of 
     meeting the long-term care needs of eligible veterans. The 
     pilot programs shall be carried out in accordance with the 
     provisions of this section.
       (b) Locations of Pilot Programs.--(1) Each pilot program 
     under this section shall

[[Page 13657]]

     be carried out at two Veterans Integrated Service Networks 
     (VISNs) selected by the Secretary for purposes of this 
     section.
       (2) The Secretary may not carry out more than one pilot 
     program in any given Veterans Integrated Service Network.
       (c) Scope of Services Under Pilot Programs.--(1) The 
     services provided under the pilot programs under this section 
     shall include a comprehensive array of health care services 
     and other services that meet the long-term care needs of 
     veterans, including--
       (A) inpatient long-term care in intermediate care beds, in 
     nursing homes, and in domiciliary care facilities;
       (B) noninstitutional long-term care, including hospital-
     based primary care, adult day care, personal assistance 
     services, respite care, and other community-based 
     interventions and care; and
       (C) assisted living services for veterans and their 
     families.
       (2) As part of the provision of services under the pilot 
     programs, the Secretary shall also provide appropriate case 
     management services.
       (3) In providing services under the pilot programs, the 
     Secretary shall emphasize the provision of preventive care 
     services, including screening and education.
       (d) Direct Provision of Services.--Under one of the pilot 
     programs under this section, the Secretary shall provide 
     long-term care services to eligible veterans directly through 
     facilities and personnel of the Department of Veterans 
     Affairs.
       (e) Provision of Services Through Cooperative 
     Arrangements.--(1) Under one of the pilot programs under this 
     section, the Secretary shall provide long-term care services 
     to eligible veterans through a combination (as determined by 
     the Secretary) of--
       (A) services provided under cooperative arrangements with 
     appropriate public and private non-Governmental entities, 
     including community service organizations; and
       (B) services provided through facilities and personnel of 
     the Department.
       (2) The consideration provided by the Secretary for 
     services provided by entities under cooperative arrangements 
     under paragraph (1)(A) shall be limited to the provision by 
     the Secretary of appropriate in-kind services to such 
     entities.
       (f) Provision of Services by Non-Department Entities.--(1) 
     Under one of the pilot programs under this section, the 
     Secretary shall provide long-term care services to eligible 
     veterans through arrangements with appropriate non-Department 
     entities under which arrangements the Secretary acts solely 
     as the case manager for the provision of such services.
       (2) Payment for services provided to veterans under the 
     pilot programs under this subsection shall be as follows:
       (A) By the medicare program or the medicaid program, but 
     only--
       (i) if the veterans concerned are entitled to benefits 
     under such programs; and
       (ii) to the extent that payment for such services is 
     provided for under such programs.
       (B) By the Department, to the extent that payment for such 
     services is not otherwise provided for under subparagraph 
     (A).
       (g) Data Collection.--As part of each pilot program under 
     this section, the Secretary shall collect data regarding--
       (1) the cost-effectiveness of such program, including any 
     savings achieved under such program when compared with the 
     medicare program, medicaid program, or other Federal program 
     serving similar populations;
       (2) the quality of the services provided under such 
     program;
       (3) the satisfaction of participating veterans, non-
     Department, and non-Government entities with such program; 
     and
       (4) the effect of such program on the ability of veterans 
     to carry out basic activities of daily living over the course 
     of such veterans' participation in such program.
       (h) Reports.--(1) The Secretary shall annually submit to 
     Congress a report on the pilot programs under this section.
       (2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the 
     following:
       (A) A detailed description of activities under the pilot 
     programs during the one-year period ending on the date of the 
     report.
       (B) An evaluation of the data collected under subsection 
     (g) during that period.
       (C) Any other matters regarding the programs that the 
     Secretary considers appropriate.
       (i) Duration of Programs.--(1) The Secretary shall commence 
     carrying out the pilot programs required by this section not 
     later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (2) The authority of the Secretary to provide services 
     under the pilot programs shall cease on the date that is 
     three years after the date of the commencement of the pilot 
     programs under paragraph (1).
       (j) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``eligible veteran'' means the following:
       (A) Any veteran entitled to hospital care and medical 
     services under section 1710(a)(1) of title 38, United States 
     Code.
       (B) Any veteran (other than a veteran described in 
     subparagraph (A)) if the veteran is enrolled in the system of 
     annual patient enrollment under section 1705 of title 38, 
     United States Code.
       (2) The term ``long-term care needs'' means the need by an 
     individual for any of the following services:
       (A) Personal care.
       (B) Nursing home and home health care services.
       (C) Habilitation and rehabilitation services.
       (D) Adult day care services.
       (E) Case management services.
       (F) Social services.
       (G) Assistive technology services.
       (H) Home and community based services, including assistive 
     living.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. DORGAN (for himself, Mr. Bingaman, and Mr. Byrd):
  S. 1252. A bill to provide parents, taxpayers, and educators with 
useful, understandable school reports; to the Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions.


                  standardized school report card act

  Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, I am introducing today a piece of 
legislation called the Standardized School Report Card Act, along with 
my colleagues, Senator Bingaman and Senator Byrd.
  Every 6 to 9 weeks every parent in this country who has children in 
our public schools gets a report card to tell him or her how that 
student is doing in school.
  Rarely, however, do parents get a report card telling them how the 
school is doing for the students.
  A number of States already do have school report cards--about 36, 
actually--but they vary around the country. Some have almost no 
information. Others are hundreds of pages long and very difficult to 
understand. Regardless, however, most parents never see a report card 
for their child's school.
  I think it would be useful, and my colleagues do as well, to ask that 
there be a uniform or standardized school report card that will allow 
parents to understand what they are getting for the dollars they are 
investing in that school. What is their school doing versus the 
neighboring town's school? How are the schools in one State doing 
versus schools in another State? How can you compare what the parents 
and taxpayers are getting with respect to the dollars invested in 
education?
  The Standardized School Report Card Act will require schools to 
report on eight key, basic areas in their report card and do so in an 
easily understandable manner.
  The eight areas graded in the report cards would be: students' 
performance, attendance and graduation rates, professional 
qualifications of teachers, average class size, school safety, parental 
involvement, student drop-out rates, and access to technology.
  Some might say this legislation is unnecessary because there are 
already some States that do have school report cards. As I have already 
indicated, that is true. However, the content varies widely, so they 
are not good tools for comparison.
  In my home State of North Dakota, the State Department of Public 
Instruction has designed a school district profile that is published 
for each school district. It does include a lot of interesting 
information, but a numbers of areas that are required under this 
legislation are not covered at all.
  My point is that we have a public education system in this country on 
which we spend a great deal of money. We send our young boys and girls 
to the classroom door, and we invest money, we build the schools, pay 
teachers, and buy the books. The question is, What do we get for all of 
that?
  Most of the classrooms I have visited are led and taught by wonderful 
teachers. I am very impressed by many of the schools I have had an 
opportunity to visit across the country and especially in North Dakota. 
As a nation, when we spend $350 billion a year to provide an education 
to elementary and secondary students, parents and taxpayers need some 
uniform way to understand how there school is doing versus other 
schools. How is our State doing versus other States relative to the 
investments we are making in education?
  That is the basis for the school report card legislation which I am 
introducing today. I am pleased to be joined by Senators Bingaman and 
Byrd in introducing this bill, and I hope others of our colleagues will 
join us in cosponsoring it.

[[Page 13658]]


  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my distinguished 
colleagues, Senators Dorgan and Byrd, in introducing the Standardized 
School Report Card Act. This bill would require States and schools to 
distribute an annual, easy-to-read report card to parents, taxpayers, 
educators, and the public. One of the top issues facing the nation's 
education system is the need for greater accountability and the need 
for greater parent involvement in schools. The bill we are introducing 
today will go a long way in helping to achieve these goals.
  In our efforts to make schools accountable for the resources they are 
given, we must develop better means for measuring and communicating 
progress in our schools; if we cannot measure progress, we cannot 
attain it. Our bill would require each school to report several key 
measures of progress. The bill would require reports of student 
performance in language arts and mathematics, as well as any other 
subject areas in which the State requires assessment. The report cards 
would breakdown student data by gender, major racial and ethnic groups, 
English proficiency, migrant status, disability status, and economic 
status. In this way, we can ensure that our schools are meeting the 
needs of all students and that all students are being taught to the 
same high standards. I also requested that the bill require reporting 
of dropout rates, because our educational system needs to do everything 
possible to keep our children in school until graduation. Many States 
with report cards do not currently report this measure of educational 
progress. Obviously, we are not making much progress if our children 
are giving up prior to graduation. We need to target our efforts to 
ensure that our children stay in school and an important step in 
achieving that goal is to monitor and raise awareness of the problem.
  The report cards required in this bill also would provide parents and 
taxpayers with valuable information regarding the resources available 
and environment at each school. Our bill would require schools to 
report average class sizes and student access to technology, including 
the number of computers for educational purposes, the number of 
computers per classroom, and the number of computers connected to the 
Internet. In addition, schools would be required to report measures of 
school safety, including the safety of school facilities and incidents 
of school violence, and measures of parental involvement. Based on this 
information, parents--as consumers of public education--can make 
informed decisions about their children's education and monitor how 
public resources are being used in their community.
  Last session, I introduced an amendment to the Higher Education Act--
which was ultimately passed and signed into law--which requires 
colleges of education to report their performance in producing 
qualified teachers. That effort will help to ensure that teachers 
coming into a school system have been properly prepared to teach. The 
bill we are introducing today will build on that legislation, by 
holding states and schools district accountable for the training, level 
of preparation, and proper placement of new teachers as well as 
teachers already in the system. Under the Standardized Report Card Act, 
schools would be required to report the professional qualifications of 
its teachers, including the number of teachers teaching out of field 
and the number of teachers with emergency certification.
  I have spoken with many parents in my home state of New Mexico about 
their role in the public education system. These parents are eager to 
support their local schools and participate in their children's 
education. But in order to do this, they need to be better informed 
about how schools are performing and what resources are being devoted 
to each school.
  With over $350 billion spent each year on education, parents and 
taxpayers deserve to know how their schools are performing. We owe it 
to them and to ourselves to provide public measures of progress which 
will assist our communities in their efforts to improve our systems of 
education. Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to join me by supporting 
the standardized School Report Card Act.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. INOUYE (for himself, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Kerry, 
        and Mr. Breaux, and Mrs. Boxer):
  S. 1253. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Commerce, through the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, to provide financial 
assistance for coral reef conservation projects, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.


                   coral reef protection act of 1999

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Coral Reef 
Protection Act of 1999.
  This legislation will provide one hundred million dollars over a 
period of five years to preserve, sustain and restore the health of 
U.S. coral reef ecosystems; assist in the conservation and protection 
of coral reefs by supporting conservation programs; and provide 
financial resources for those programs. Additionally, this legislation 
will leverage the federal dollars appropriated for these purposes by 
establishing a formal mechanism for collecting and allocating matching 
monetary donations from the private sector to be used for coral reef 
conservation projects.
  The United States has substantial coral reef holdings in both the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans totaling more than 6,500 square miles. More 
than 83% of these reefs lie among the islands of Hawaii and another 10% 
of them live among the other American islands in the Pacific including 
American Samoa, Johnston Island, Palmyra Atoll, and the Northern 
Mariana Islands. Hawaii, alone, is home to 47 different species of 
coral. These coral reefs provide numerous recreational opportunities, 
are linked ecologically to adjacent coastal ecosystems such as 
mangroves and sea grasses, support substantial biodiversity, and 
protect shorelines from wave damage. They also support major economic 
activities, such as tourism and fishing, in coastal communities that 
generate billions of dollars annually. Despite this importance to both 
the environment and the American economy, little is currently known 
about the condition of coral reefs in the United States. Two points, 
however, are clear: coral reefs are threatened whenever they are close 
to large concentrations of people, and coral reefs are in decline.
  This legislation will provide funding for research, conservation and 
restoration of these extremely important resources and will complement 
the efforts of the President's Coral Reef Task Force which was 
established by Executive Order last year. I ask that the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1253

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Coral Reef Protection Act of 
     1999''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds the following:
       (1) Coral reefs and coral reef ecosystems are considered 
     the marine equivalent of tropical rain forests, containing 
     some of the planet's richest biological diversity, habitats, 
     and systems and supporting thousands of fish, invertebrates, 
     reef algae, plankton, sea grasses, and other species.
       (2) Coral reefs and coral reef ecosystems have great 
     commercial, recreational, cultural, and esthetic value to 
     human communities as shoreline protection, areas of natural 
     beauty, and sources of food, pharmaceuticals, jobs, and 
     revenues through a wide variety of activities, including 
     education, research, tourism, and fishing.
       (3) Studies indicate that coral reefs in the United States 
     and around the world are being degraded and severely 
     threatened by human and environmental impacts including land-
     based pollution, overfishing, destructive fishing practices, 
     vessel groundings, and climate change.
       (4) Since 1994, under the United States Coral Reef 
     Initiative, Federal agencies, State, local, territorial, 
     commonwealth, and local governments, nongovernmental 
     organizations, and commercial interests have worked together 
     to design and implement additional management, education, 
     monitoring, research, and restoration efforts to conserve 
     coral reef ecosystems.

[[Page 13659]]

       (5) 1997 was recognized as the Year of the Reef to raise 
     public awareness about the importance of conserving coral 
     reefs and to facilitate actions to protect coral reef 
     ecosystems.
       (6) On October 21, 1997, the 105th Congress passed House 
     Concurrent Resolution 8, a concurrent resolution recognizing 
     the significance of maintaining the health and stability of 
     coral reef ecosystems by promoting comprehensive stewardship 
     for coral reef ecosystems, discouraging unsustainable 
     fisheries or other practices harmful to coral reefs, 
     encouraging research, monitoring, assessment of, and 
     education on coral reef ecosystems, improving coordination of 
     coral reef efforts and activities of Federal agencies, 
     academic institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and 
     industry, and promoting preservation and sustainable use of 
     coral reef resources worldwide.
       (7) 1998 was declared to be the International Year of the 
     Ocean to raise public awareness and increase actions to 
     conserve and use in a sustainable manner the broader ocean 
     environment, including coral reefs.
       (8) On June 11, 1998, President William Jefferson Clinton 
     signed Executive Order 13089 (64 Fed. Reg. 323701) which 
     recognizes the importance of conserving coral reef 
     ecosystems, establishes the Coral Reef Task Force under the 
     joint leadership of the Departments of Commerce and Interior, 
     and directs Federal agencies whose actions may affect United 
     States coral reef ecosystems to take steps to protect, 
     manage, research, and restore such ecosystems.
       (9) The Nation benefits from--
       (A) specific actions and programs involving coral reefs and 
     coral reef ecosystems including National Marine Sanctuaries, 
     National Wildlife Refuges, National Parks, and other marine 
     protected areas that conserve for future generations vital 
     marine resources, ecosystems, and habitats;
       (B) the identification of coral habitats as essential fish 
     habitat under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
     Management Act, which requires aggressive efforts to minimize 
     adverse effects on such habitat caused by fishing;
       (C) identification of other actions to encourage the 
     conservation and enhancement of such habitat; and
       (D) State and territorial coastal management programs for 
     the protection, development, and where possible, restoration 
     and enhancement of the resources of the Nation's coastal zone 
     for this and succeeding generations under the Coastal Zone 
     Management Act and other related statutes.
       (10) Legislation solely dedicated to the comprehensive and 
     coordinated conservation, management, protection, and 
     restoration of coral reefs and coral reef ecosystems would 
     supplement Executive Order 13089 and House Concurrent 
     Resolution 8, and complement the management, protection, and 
     conservation provided by such programs as those administered 
     under the National Marine Sanctuaries Act, Coastal Zone 
     Management Act, and Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
     Management Act, as well as those administered by other 
     Federal, State, and territorial agencies.

     SEC. 3. POLICY.

       It is the policy of the United States--
       (1) to conserve and protect the ecological integrity of 
     coral reef ecosystems;
       (2) to maintain the health, natural conditions, and 
     dynamics of those ecosystems;
       (3) to reduce and remove human stresses affecting reefs;
       (4) to restore coral reef ecosystems injured by human 
     activities; and
       (5) to promote the long-term sustainable use of coral reef 
     ecosystems.

     SEC. 4. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of this Act are--
       (1) to preserve, sustain, and restore the health of coral 
     reef ecosystems;
       (2) to assist in the conservation and protection of coral 
     reefs by supporting conservation programs;
       (3) to provide financial resources for those programs; and
       (4) to establish a formal mechanism for collecting and 
     allocating monetary donations from the private sector to be 
     used for coral reef conservation projects.

     SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Coral.--The term ``coral'' means species of the phylum 
     Cnidaria, including--
        (A) all species of the orders Antipatharia (black corals), 
     Scleractinia (stony corals), Alcyonacea (soft corals), 
     Gorgonacea (horny corals), Stolonifera (organpipe corals and 
     others), and Helioporacea (blue coral) of the class Anthozoa; 
     and
        (B) all species of the order Hydrocorallina (fire corals 
     and hydrocorals) of the class Hydrozoa.
       (2) Coral reef.--The term ``coral reef'' means any reef, 
     shoal, or other natural feature composed primarily of the 
     solid skeletal structures in which stony corals are major 
     framework constituents, within all maritime areas and zones 
     subject to the jurisdiction or control of the United States 
     (e.g. Federal, State, territorial, or commonwealth waters), 
     including in the south Atlantic, Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, 
     and Pacific Ocean.
       (3) Coral reef ecosystem.--The term ``coral reef 
     ecosystem'' means the interacting complex of species 
     (including reef plants of the phlya Chlorophyta, Phaeophyta, 
     and Rhodophyta) and nonliving variables associated with coral 
     reefs and their habitats which--
       (A) function as an ecological unit in nature; and
       (B) are mutually dependent on this function to continue.
       (4) Conservation.--The term ``conservation'' means the use 
     of methods and procedures necessary to preserve or sustain 
     coral reefs and coral reef ecosystems as diverse, viable, and 
     self-perpetuating ecosystems, including--
       (A) all activities associated with resource management, 
     such as assessment, science, conservation, protection, 
     restoration, sustainable use, management of habitat, and 
     water quality;
       (B) habitat monitoring;
       (C) assistance in the development of management strategies 
     for marine protected areas and marine resources consistent 
     with the National Marine Sanctuaries Act (16 U.S.C. 1431 et 
     seq.) and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
     Management Act (16 U.S.C.1801 et seq.) and other Federal, 
     State, and territorial statutes;
       (D) law enforcement;
       (E) conflict resolution initiatives;
       (F) community outreach and education; and
       (G) promotion of safe and ecologically sound navigation.
       (5) Person.--The term ``person'' has the meaning given that 
     term by section 1 of title 1, United States Code, but 
     includes departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the 
     United States Government or any State or local government.
       (6) Foundation.--The term ``foundation'' means any 
     qualified non-profit organization that specializes in natural 
     resource conservation.
       (7) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of Commerce.
       (8) State.--The term ``State'' means any coastal State of 
     the United States that contains coral within its seaward 
     boundaries, and American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana 
     Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and any 
     other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United 
     States that contains coral within its seaward boundaries.

     SEC. 6. CORAL REEF RESTORATION AND CONSERVATION PROGRAM.

       (a) Financial Assistance.--The Secretary subject to the 
     availability of funds, may provide financial assistance for 
     projects that--
       (1) provide for the restoration of degraded or injured 
     coral reefs or coral reef ecosystems, including developing 
     and implementing cost-effective methods to restore or enhance 
     degraded or injured coral reefs and coral reef ecosystems; or
       (2) provide for the conservation of coral reefs or coral 
     reef ecosystems through projects other than those under 
     paragraph (1), that provide for the management, conservation, 
     and protection of coral reefs and coral reef ecosystems, 
     including mapping and assessment, management, protection 
     (including enforcement), scientific research, and short-term 
     and long-term monitoring that benefits the long-term 
     conservation of coral reefs and coral reef ecosystems.
       (b) Matching Requirements.--
       (1) 75-percent federal funding.--Except as provided in 
     paragraph (2), Federal funds for any project under this 
     section shall not exceed 75 percent of the total cost of such 
     project. In calculating that percentage, the non-Federal 
     share of project costs may be provided by in-kind 
     contributions and other noncash support.
       (2) Exceptions.--
       (A) Small projects.--There are no matching requirements for 
     grants under subsection (a) for projects costing not more 
     than $25,000.
       (B) Higher level of support required.--If the Secretary 
     determines that a proposed project merits support and cannot 
     be undertaken without a higher rate of Federal support, then 
     the Secretary may approve grants under this section with a 
     matching requirement other than that specified in paragraph 
     (1).
       (c) Eligibility.--Any relevant natural resource management 
     authority of a State or territory of the United States or 
     other government authority with jurisdiction over coral reefs 
     or whose activities directly or indirectly affect coral reefs 
     or coral reef ecosystems, or educational or non-governmental 
     institutions with demonstrated expertise in the conservation 
     of coral reefs, may submit a coral reef restoration or 
     conservation proposal to the Secretary under subsection (a).
       (d) Allocation.--The Secretary shall ensure that financial 
     assistance provided under subsection (a) during a fiscal year 
     is distributed so that--
       (1) not less than 40 percent of the funds available are 
     awarded for coral reef restoration and conservation projects 
     in the Pacific Ocean;
       (2) not less than 40 percent of the funds available are 
     awarded for coral reef restoration and conservation projects 
     in the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean 
     Sea; and
       (3) remaining funds are awarded for coral reef restoration 
     and conservation projects

[[Page 13660]]

     that address emerging priorities or threats identified by the 
     Secretary in consultation with the Coral Reef Task Force 
     under subsection (j).
       (e) Project Proposals.--Each proposal for a grant under 
     this section shall include the following:
       (1) The name of the individual or entity responsible for 
     conducting the project.
       (2) A succinct statement of the purposes of the project.
       (3) A description of the qualifications of the individuals 
     who will conduct the project.
       (4) An estimate of the funds and time required to complete 
     the project.
       (5) Evidence of support of the project by appropriate 
     representatives of States or territories of the United States 
     or other government jurisdictions in which the project will 
     be conducted.
       (6) Information regarding the source and amount of matching 
     funding available to the applicant, as appropriate.
       (7) A description of how the project meets one or more of 
     the criteria in subsection (g) of this section.
       (8) Any other information the Secretary considers to be 
     necessary for evaluating the eligibility of the project for 
     funding under this Act.
       (f) Project Review and Approval.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary shall review each final 
     coral reef conservation project proposal to determine if it 
     meets the criteria set forth in subsection (g).
       (2) Review; approval or disapproval.--Not later than 3 
     months after receiving a final project proposal under this 
     section, the Secretary shall--
       (A) request written comments on the proposal from each 
     Federal, State or territorial agency of the United States and 
     other government jurisdictions, including the relevant 
     regional fishery management councils established under the 
     Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), or any National Marine Sanctuary, with 
     jurisdiction or management authority over coral reefs or 
     coral reef ecosystems in the area where the project is to be 
     conducted, including the extent to which the project is 
     consistent with locally-established priorities;
       (B) for projects costing less than $25,000, provide for 
     expedited peer review of the proposal;
       (C) for projects costing $25,000 or greater, provide for 
     the regional, merit-based peer review of the proposal and 
     require standardized documentation of that peer review;
       (D) after considering any written comments and 
     recommendations based on the reviews under subparagraphs (A) 
     and (B), approve or disapprove the proposal; and
       (E) provide written notification of that approval or 
     disapproval to the person who submitted the proposal, and 
     each of those States, territories, and other government 
     jurisdictions.
       (g) Criteria for Approval.--The Secretary may approve a 
     final project proposal under this section based on the 
     written comments received and the extent that the project 
     will enhance the conservation of coral reefs by--
       (1) implementing coral reef conservation programs which 
     promote sustainable development and ensure effective, long-
     term conservation of coral reefs;
       (2) addressing the conflicts arising from the use of 
     environments near coral reefs or from the use of any living 
     or dead specimens, port, or derivatives, or any product 
     containing specimens, ports, or derivatives, of any coral or 
     coral reef ecosystem;
       (3) enhancing compliance with laws that prohibit or 
     regulate the taking of corals, species associated with coral 
     reefs, and coral products or regulate the use and management 
     of coral reef ecosystems;
       (4) developing sound scientific information on the 
     condition of coral reef ecosystems or the threats to such 
     ecosystems;
       (5) promoting cooperative projects on coral reef 
     conservation that involve affected local communities, non-
     governmental organizations, or others in the private sector; 
     or
       (6) increasing public knowledge and awareness of coral reef 
     ecosystems and issues regarding their long term conservation.
       (h) Implementation Guidelines.--Within 90 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall promulgate 
     necessary guidelines for implementing this section. In 
     developing those guidelines, the Secretary shall consult with 
     regional and local entities, including States and 
     territories, involved in setting priorities for conservation 
     of coral reefs.
       (i) Technical Assistance.--The Secretary may provide 
     technical assistance to any State or Federal agency with 
     jurisdiction over coral reefs and coral reef ecosystems to 
     further the purposes of this Act.
       (j) Coral Reef Task Force.--The Secretary shall consult 
     with the Coral Reef Task Force established under Executive 
     Order 13089 (64 Fed. Reg. 323701), to obtain guidance in 
     establishing coral reef conservation project priorities under 
     this section.

     SEC. 7. NATIONAL PROGRAM.

       (a)  In General.--The Secretary may conduct activities that 
     further the conservation of coral reefs or coral reef 
     ecosystems on a regional, national, or international scale, 
     or that further public awareness and education regarding 
     coral reefs and coral reef ecosystems on a regional, 
     national, or international scale. The activities should 
     supplement and be consistent with the programs, policies, and 
     statutes of affected States and territories, the National 
     Marine Sanctuaries Act, the Coastal Zone Management Act, and 
     the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 
     other applicable Federal statutes, and, at a minimum, should 
     include mapping and assessment, monitoring, management, and 
     scientific research that benefits the long-term conservation 
     of coral reefs and coral reef ecosystems.
       (b) Financial Assistance.--The Secretary may enter into 
     joint projects with any Federal, State, territorial, or local 
     authority, or provide financial assistance to any person for 
     projects consistent with subsection (a), including projects 
     that--
       (1) support, promote, and coordinate the assessment of, 
     scientific research on, monitoring of, or restoration of 
     coral reefs and coral reef ecosystems of the United States;
       (2) cooperate with global programs that conserve, manage, 
     protect, and study coral reefs and coral reef ecosystems; or
       (3) enhance public awareness, understanding, and 
     appreciation of coral reefs and coral reef ecosystems.

     SEC. 8. DOCUMENTATION OF CERTAIN VESSELS.

       Section 12102 of title 46, United States Code, is amended 
     by adding at the end thereof the following:
       ``(e) A vessel otherwise eligible to be documented under 
     this section may not be documented as a vessel of the United 
     States if--
       ``(1) the owner of the vessel has abandoned any vessel on a 
     coral reef located in waters subject to the jurisdiction of 
     the United States; and
       ``(2) the abandoned vessel remains on the coral reef or was 
     removed from the coral reef under section 5 or 6 of the Coral 
     Reef Protection Act of 1999 (or any other provision of law in 
     pari materia enacted after 1998),

     unless the owner of the vessel has reimbursed the United 
     States for environmental damage caused by the vessel and the 
     funds expended to remove it.''.

     SEC. 9. CERTAIN GROUNDED VESSELS.

       (a) In General.--The vessels described in subsection (b), 
     and the reefs upon which such vessels may be found, are 
     hereby designated for purposes of section 104 of the 
     Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
     Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9604) as a site at which 
     there is a substantial threat of release of a hazardous 
     substance into the environment. For purposes of that Act, the 
     site shall not be considered to have resulted from an act of 
     God.
       (b) Description of Site.--The vessels to which subsection 
     (a) applies are 9 fishing vessels driven by Typhoon Val in 
     1991 onto coral reefs inside Pago Pago harbor near the 
     villages of Leloaloa and Aua.

     SEC. 10. REGULATIONS; CORAL REEF CONSERVATION FUND.

       (a) Regulations.--Within 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall promulgate 
     necessary regulations for implementing this section. In 
     developing those regulations, the Secretary shall consult 
     with regional and local entities, including States and 
     territories, involved in setting priorities for conservation 
     of coral reefs.
       (b) Fund.--The Secretary may enter into an agreement with a 
     foundation authorizing the foundation to receive, hold, and 
     administer funds received by the foundation pursuant to this 
     section. The foundation shall invest, reinvest, and otherwise 
     administer the funds and maintain such funds and any interest 
     or revenues earned in a separate interest bearing account, 
     hereafter referred to as the Fund, established by the 
     foundation solely to support partnerships between the public 
     and private sectors that further the purposes of this Act.
       (c) Authorization to Solicit Donations.--Consistent with 
     section 3703 of title 16, United States Code, and pursuant to 
     the agreement entered into under subsection (b) of this 
     section, a foundation may accept, receive, solicit, hold, 
     administer, and use any gift or donation to further the 
     purposes of this Act. Such funds shall be deposited and 
     maintained in the Fund established by a foundation under 
     subsection (b) of this section.
       (d) Review of Performance.--The Secretary shall conduct a 
     continuing review of the grant program administered by a 
     foundation under this section. Each review shall include a 
     written assessment concerning the extent to which that 
     foundation has implemented the goals and requirements of this 
     section.
       (e) Administration.--Under the agreement entered into 
     pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the Secretary may 
     transfer funds appropriated under section 11(b)(1) to a 
     foundation. Amounts received by a foundation under this 
     subsection may be used for matching, in whole or in part, 
     contributions (whether in currency, services, or property) 
     made to the foundation by private persons and State and local 
     government agencies.

     SEC. 11. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Secretary $20,000,000 for each of 
     fiscal years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 to carry out 
     this Act, which may remain available until expended.

[[Page 13661]]

       (b) Use of Amounts Appropriated.--
       (1) Restoration and conservation projects.--Not more than 
     $15,000,000 of the amounts appropriated under subsection (a) 
     shall be used by the Secretary to support coral reef 
     restoration and conservation projects under section 6(a), of 
     which not more than 20 percent shall be used for technical 
     assistance provided by the Secretary.
       (2) National program.--Not more than $5,000,000 of the 
     amounts appropriated under subsection (a) shall be used by 
     the Secretary to support coral reef conservation projects 
     under section 7.
       (3) administration.--Not more than 1 percent of the amounts 
     appropriated under paragraph 1 may be used by the Secretary 
     for administration of this Act.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. ABRAHAM (for himself, Mr. Torricelli, Mr. Hatch, and Mr. 
        McCain):
  S. 1255. A bill to protect consumers and promote electronic commerce 
by amending certain trademark infringement, dilution, and 
counterfeiting laws, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the 
Judiciary.


               Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act

  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act on behalf of myself, Senator 
Torricelli, Senator Hatch, and Senator McCain. This legislation will 
combat a new form of high-tech fraud that is causing confusion and 
inconvenience for consumers, increasing costs for people doing business 
on the internet, and posing an enormous threat to a century of pre-
Internet American business efforts. The fraud is commonly called 
``cybersquatting,'' a practice whereby individuals reserve internet 
domain names or other identifiers of online locations that are similar 
or identical to trademarked names. The easiest prey for cybersquatters 
has turned out to be computer-unsavvy trademark-owners in the non-
internet world. Once a ``brick and mortar'' trademark is registered as 
an on-line identifier or domain name, the ``cybersquatter'' can engage 
in a variety of nefarious activities--from the relatively-benign parody 
of a business or individual, to the obscene prank of redirecting an 
unsuspecting consumer to pornographic content, to the destructive 
worldwide slander of a centuries-old brand name. For the enterprising 
cybersquatter, holding out a domain name for extortionate compensation 
is a tried-and-true business practice, and the net effect of this 
behavior is to undermine consumer confidence, discourage consumer use 
of the internet, and destroy the value of brand-names and trademarks of 
this nation's businesses.
  Many companies simply pay extortionate prices to cybersquatters in 
order to rid themselves of a headache with no certain outcome. For 
example, Gateway recently paid $100,000 to a cybersquatter who had 
placed pornographic images to the website ``www.gateway20000''. Rather 
than simply give up, several companies already have instead sought 
protection from cybersquatters through the legal system. For example, 
the investment firm Paine Webber was forced to sue an internet Web 
site, wwwpainewebber.com'' and its creator. The domain name at issue 
took advantage of a typographical error--the missing ``.'' (dot) 
between ``www'' and ``painewebber''--in order to direct consumers 
desiring to do business with Paine Webber to a website containing 
pornographic images. As with much of the pre-internet law that is 
applied to this post-internet world, precedent is still developing, and 
at this point, one cannot predict with certainty which party to a 
dispute will win, and on what grounds, in the future.
  Mr. President, some Americans continue to do a thriving, if 
unethical, business collecting and selling internet addresses 
containing trademarked names. Whether perpetrated to defraud the public 
or to extort the trademark owner, squatting on internet addresses using 
trademarked names is wrong. It must be stopped for the sake of 
consumers, for the sake of trademark owners and for the sake of the 
vast, growing electronic commerce that is doing so much to spur 
economic growth and innovation in this country.
  Mr. President, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act will 
help to establish uniform rules for dealing with this attack on 
interstate commerce. This legislation would establish penalties for 
criminal use of a counterfeit trademark as a domain name. Using a 
company's trademark or its variant as the address of an internet site 
would constitute criminal use of a counterfeit trademark if the 
defendant registered the address either knowingly and fraudulently or 
in bad faith. Among the evidence establishing bad faith would be 
registry of a domain name with (1) intent to cause confusion or mistake 
or deception, to dilute the distinctive quality of a famous trademark, 
or intent to divert consumers from the trademark owner's domain to 
one's own; and (2) providing false information on the application to 
register the identifier, or offering to transfer the registration to a 
rightful owner for consideration for any thing of value. Bad faith 
could not be shown where the identifier is the defendant's legal first 
name or surname or where the defendant used the identifier in 
legitimate commerce before the earlier of either the first use of the 
registered trademark or the effective date of its registration. 
Violation of this prohibition would constitute a Class B misdemeanor 
for the first offense; subsequent offenses would be classified as Class 
E felonies.
  In addition, Mr. President, the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act provides for statutory civil damages in trademark cases 
of at least $1,000, but not more than $100,000 ($300,000 if the 
registration or use of the trademark was willful) per trademark per 
identifier. The plaintiff may elect these damages in lieu of actual 
damages or profits at any time before final judgment.
  These provisions will discourage anyone from ``squatting'' on 
addresses in cyberspace to which they are not entitled. In the process 
it will protect consumers from fraud, protect the value of countless 
trademarks, and encourage continued growth in our electronic commerce 
industry.
  Mr President, the growth of the Internet has provided businesses and 
individuals with unprecedented access to a worldwide source of 
information, commerce, and community. Unfortunately, those bad actors 
seeking to cause harm to businesses and individuals have seen their 
opportunities increase as well. In my opinion, on-line extortion in 
this form is unacceptable and outrageous. Whether it's people extorting 
companies by registering company names, misdirecting Internet users to 
inappropriate sites, or otherwise attempting to damage a trademark that 
a business has spent decades building into a recognizable brand, 
persons engaging in cybersquatting activity should be held accountable 
for their actions.
  I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation, and I ask 
unanimous consent that the full text of the bill, a section by section 
analysis and additional materials be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the materials were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1255

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Anticybersquatting Consumer 
     Protection Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds that the unauthorized registration or use of 
     trademarks as Internet domain names or other identifiers of 
     online locations (commonly known as ``cybersquatting'')--
       (1) results in consumer fraud and public confusion as to 
     the true source or sponsorship of products and services;
       (2) impairs electronic commerce, which is important to the 
     economy of the United States; and
       (3) deprives owners of trademarks of substantial revenues 
     and consumer goodwill.

     SEC. 3. TRADEMARK REMEDIES.

       (a) Recovery for Violation of Rights.--Section 35 of the 
     Act entitled ``An Act to provide for the registration and 
     protection of trade-marks used in commerce, to carry out the 
     provisions of certain international conventions, and for 
     other purposes'', approved July 5, 1946, (commonly referred 
     to as the ``Trademark Act of 1946'') (15 U.S.C. 1117) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:

[[Page 13662]]

       ``(d)(1) In this subsection, the term `Internet' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 230(f)(1) of the 
     Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(f)(1)).
       ``(2)(A) In a case involving the registration or use of an 
     identifier described in subparagraph (B), the plaintiff may 
     elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered by the 
     trial court, to recover, instead of actual damages and 
     profits under subsection (a)--
       ``(i) an award of statutory damages in the amount of--
       ``(I) not less than $1,000 or more than $100,000 per 
     trademark per identifier, as the court considers just; or
       ``(II) if the court finds that the registration or use of 
     the registered trademark as an identifier was willful, not 
     less than $3,000 or more than $300,000 per trademark per 
     identifier, as the court considers just; and
       ``(ii) full costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
       ``(B) An identifier referred to in subparagraph (A) is an 
     Internet domain name or other identifier of an online 
     location that is--
       ``(i) the trademark of a person or entity other than the 
     person or entity registering or using the identifier; or
       ``(ii) sufficiently similar to a trademark of a person or 
     entity other than the person or entity registering or using 
     the identifier as to be likely to--
       ``(I) cause confusion or mistake;
       ``(II) deceive; or
       ``(III) cause dilution of the distinctive quality of a 
     famous trademark.''.
       (b) Remedies for Dilution of Famous Marks.--Section 
     43(c)(2) of the Act entitled ``An Act to provide for the 
     registration and protection of trade-marks used in commerce, 
     to carry out the provisions of certain international 
     conventions, and for other purposes'', approved July 5, 1946, 
     (commonly referred to as the ``Trademark Act of 1946'') (15 
     U.S.C. 1125(c)(2)) is amended by striking ``35(a)'' and 
     inserting ``35 (a) and (d)''.

     SEC. 4. CRIMINAL USE OF COUNTERFEIT TRADEMARK.

       (a) In General.--Section 2320(a) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)'';
       (2) by striking ``section that occurs'' and inserting 
     ``paragraph that occurs''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2)(A) In this paragraph, the term `Internet' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 230(f)(1) of the 
     Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(f)(1)).
       ``(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), whoever 
     knowingly and fraudulently or in bad faith registers or uses 
     an identifier described in subparagraph (C) shall be guilty 
     of a Class B misdemeanor.
       ``(ii) In the case of an offense by a person under this 
     paragraph that occurs after that person is convicted of 
     another offense under this section, that person shall be 
     guilty of a Class E felony.
       ``(C) An identifier referred to in subparagraph (B) is an 
     Internet domain name or other identifier of an online 
     location that is--
       ``(i) the trademark of a person or entity other than the 
     person or entity registering or using the identifier; or
       ``(ii) sufficiently similar to a trademark of a person or 
     entity other than the person or entity registering or using 
     the identifier as to be likely to--
       ``(I) cause confusion or mistake;
       ``(II) deceive; or
       ``(III) cause dilution of the distinctive quality of a 
     famous trademark.
       ``(D)(i) For the purposes of a prosecution under this 
     paragraph, if all of the conditions described in clause (ii) 
     apply to the registration or use of an identifier described 
     in subparagraph (C) by a defendant, those conditions shall 
     constitute prima facie evidence that the registration or use 
     was fraudulent or in bad faith.
       ``(ii) The conditions referred to in clause (i) are as 
     follows:
       ``(I) The defendant registered or used an identifier 
     described in subparagraph (C)--
       ``(aa) with intent to cause confusion or mistake, deceive, 
     or cause dilution of the distinctive quality of a famous 
     trademark; or
       ``(bb) with the intention of diverting consumers from the 
     domain or other online location of the person or entity who 
     is the owner of a trademark described in subparagraph (C) to 
     the domain or other online location of the defendant.
       ``(II) The defendant--
       ``(aa) provided false information in the defendant's 
     application to register the identifier; or
       ``(bb) offered to transfer the registration of the 
     identifier to the trademark owner or another person or entity 
     in consideration for any thing of value.
       ``(III) The identifier is not--
       ``(aa) the defendant's legal first name or surname; or
       ``(bb) a trademark of the defendant used in legitimate 
     commerce before the earlier of the first use of the 
     registered trademark referred to in subparagraph (C) or the 
     effective date of the registration of that trademark.
       ``(iii) The application of this subparagraph shall not be 
     exclusive. Nothing in this subparagraph may be construed to 
     limit the applicability of subparagraph (B).''.
       (b) Sentencing Guidelines.--
       (1) In general.--Pursuant to the authority granted to the 
     United States Sentencing Commission under section 994(p) of 
     title 28, United States Code, the United States Sentencing 
     Commission shall--
       (A) review the Federal sentencing guidelines for crimes 
     against intellectual property (including offenses under 
     section 2320 of title 18, United States Code); and
       (B) promulgate such amendments to the Federal Sentencing 
     Guidelines as are necessary to ensure that the applicable 
     sentence for a defendant convicted of a crime against 
     intellectual property is sufficiently stringent to deter such 
     a crime.
       (2) Factors for consideration.--In carrying out this 
     subsection, the United States Sentencing Commission shall--
       (A) take into account the findings under section 2; and
       (B) ensure that the amendments promulgated under paragraph 
     (1)(B) adequately provide for sentencing for crimes described 
     in paragraph (2) of section 2320(a) of title 18, United 
     States Code, as added by subsection (a).

     SEC. 5. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.

       Section 39 of the Act entitled ``An Act to provide for the 
     registration and protection of trade-marks used in commerce, 
     to carry out the provisions of certain international 
     conventions, and for other purposes'', approved July 5, 1946, 
     (commonly referred to as the ``Trademark Act of 1946'') (15 
     U.S.C. 1121) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(c)(1) In this subsection, the term `Internet' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 230(f)(1) of the 
     Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(f)(1)).
       ``(2)(A) An Internet service provider, domain name 
     registrar, or registry described in subparagraph (B) shall 
     not be liable for monetary relief to any person for a removal 
     or transfer described in that subparagraph, without regard to 
     whether the domain name or other identifier is ultimately 
     determined to be infringing or dilutive.
       ``(B) An Internet service provider, domain name registrar, 
     or registry referred to in subparagraph (A) is a provider, 
     registrar, or registry that, upon receipt of a written notice 
     from the owner of a trademark registered in the Patent and 
     Trademark Office, removes from domain name service (DNS) 
     service or registration, or transfers to the trademark owner, 
     an Internet domain name or other identifier of an online 
     location alleged to be infringing or dilutive, in compliance 
     with--
       ``(i) a court order; or
       ``(ii) the reasonable implementation of a policy 
     prohibiting the unauthorized registration or use of another's 
     registered trademark as an Internet domain name or other 
     identifier of an online location.''.
                                  ____


  The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act--Section-by-Section 
                                Analysis

       A bill to protect consumers and promote electronic commerce 
     by amending certain trademark infringement, dilution, and 
     counterfeiting laws, and for other purposes.


                         section 1: short title

       This Act may be cited as the ``Anticybersquatting Consumer 
     Protection Act.''


                          section 2: findings

       This section sets out Congressional findings concerning the 
     effect of ``unauthorized registration or use of trademarks as 
     Internet domain names or other identifiers of online 
     locations'' (``cybersquatting''). Cyber- squatting (1) 
     results in consumer fraud, (2) impairs electronic interstate 
     commerce, and (3) deprives trademark owners of revenue and 
     consumer goodwill.


                     section 3: trademark remedies

     (a) Recovery for violation of rights
       The Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1117) shall 
     incorporate the definition of ``Internet'' used in the 
     Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230 (f) (1)).
       An ``identifier'' refers to an Internet domain name or 
     another identifier of an online location that is (i) the 
     plaintiff's trademark, or (ii) so sufficiently similar to the 
     plaintiff's trademark as to be likely to ``cause confusion or 
     mistake,'' ``deceive,'' or ``cause dilution of the 
     distinctive quality of a famous trademark.''
       This section expands civil penalties for cybersquatting by 
     providing that before final judgment in a case involving the 
     registration or use of an identifier, a plaintiff may--
     instead of seeking actual damages or profits--elect to 
     recover statutory damages of at least $1,000, but not more 
     than $100,000 (at least $3,000, but not more than $300,000 if 
     court finds that the registration or use of the trademark was 
     willful) per trademark per identifier, as the court considers 
     just. Furthermore, the plaintiff may recover full costs and 
     reasonable attorney's fees.
     (b) Remedies for dilution of famous marks
       This section amends the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 
     1125 (c) (2)) by making the remedies set forth in section 3 
     (a) also available for the willful dilution of famous marks 
     or trade on the owner's reputation.


            section 4: criminal use of counterfeit trademark

     (a) In general
       This section amends 18 U.S.C. 2320 (a) (``Trafficking in 
     Counterfeit Goods or Services'') by adding criminal penalties 
     for the

[[Page 13663]]

     use of a counterfeit trademark on the Internet. Like section 
     3 (a), this section incorporates the definition of Internet 
     used in the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230 (f) 
     (1)). It also incorporates the same definition of 
     ``identifier'' found in section 3 (a).
       Under this section, whoever knowingly and fraudulently or 
     in bad faith registers or uses the trademark of another would 
     be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. Repeat offenders would be 
     guilty of Class E felony.
       Prima facie evidence that a registration or use was 
     fraudulent or in bad faith would require satisfaction of the 
     following elements:
       (1) the defendant registered or used an identifier with 
     intent to (a) cause confusion or mistake, deceive, or cause 
     dilution of the distinctive quality of a famous trademark, or 
     (b) with intention of diverting consumers from the trademark 
     owner to the defendant; and
       (2) the defendant provided false information in its 
     application to register the identifier or offered to transfer 
     the identifier's registration to the trademark owner or other 
     person or entity for something of value; and
       (3) the identifier is not the defendant's legal first name 
     or surname or the defendant had not used the identifier in 
     legitimate commerce before the earlier of either the first 
     use of the registered trademark or the effective date of its 
     registration.
     (b) Sentencing guidelines
       (1) In general
       The United States Sentencing Commission shall provide for 
     penalties for the criminal use of counterfeit trademarks by 
     amending the sentencing guidelines in accordance with the 
     guidelines for crimes against intellectual property (18 
     U.S.C. 2320).
       (2) Factors for consideration
       The United States Sentencing Commission shall take into 
     account the Findings promulgated in Section 2 and ensure that 
     the amendments to the sentencing guidelines adequately 
     provide penalties for the crimes described in this Act.


                   Section 5: limitation of liability

       An Internet service provider (ISP) or domain name registrar 
     shall not be liable for monetary damages to any person if it 
     removes an infringing identifier from domain name server 
     (DNS) service or from registration, or transfers it to the 
     trademark owner: (1) upon written notice from the trademark 
     owner and (2) in compliance with either a court order or the 
     reasonable implementation of a policy prohibiting the 
     unauthorized registration or use of another's registered 
     trademark.
       This limitation shall apply without regard to whether the 
     domain name or other identifier is ultimately determined to 
     be infringing or dilutive.
                                  ____

                                            Information Technology


                                             Industry Council,

                                    Washington, DC, June 21, 1999.
     Hon. Spencer Abraham,
     U.S. Senate, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Abraham: On behalf of ITI's member companies, 
     I am writing to thank you, Senator Hatch and Senator 
     Torricelli for your leadership in introducing the Anti-
     Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act today.
       ITI is the association of leading U.S. providers of 
     information technology products and services. It advocates 
     growing the economy through innovation and supports free-
     market policies. ITI members had worldwide revenue of more 
     than $440 billion in 1998 and employ more than 1.2 million 
     people in the United States.
       Over the past several years, trademark holders have found 
     it difficult and expensive to prevent infringement and 
     dilution of their marks online, especially as 
     ``cybersquatters'' have made a cottage industry out of 
     intentionally registering others' trademarks as domain names 
     and seeking to sell the domain name back to the rightful 
     owners. Such activity damages electronic commerce by sowing 
     confusion among consumers and other Internet users.
       While some ITI members have concerns about the bill's 
     criminal provisions, we believe the importance of federal 
     legislation to stop cybersquatting should not be 
     underestimated and we look forward to working with you as 
     this legislation is considered by the Senate.
           Best regards,

                                                 Phillip Bond,

                                            Senior Vice President,
     Government Relations.

                          ____________________