[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 1489-1490]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



         THE IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

 Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, let me begin by saying that the 
reason we are here today, the reason the United States Senate is being 
asked to exercise what Alexander Hamilton termed the ``awful 
discretion'' of impeachment, is because of the wrongful, reprehensible, 
indefensible conduct of one person, the President of the United States, 
William Jefferson Clinton. Indeed, I believe it is conduct deserving of 
the censure of the Senate, and I will support such a resolution when it 
comes before us.
  The question before the Senate, however, is not whether the 
President's conduct was wrong, or immoral, or even censurable. We must 
decide solely as to whether or not he should be convicted of the 
allegations contained in the Articles of Impeachment and thus removed 
from office. In my opinion, the case for removal, presented in great 
detail in the massive 60,000 page report submitted by the House, in 
many hours of very capable but often repetitive presentations to the 
Senate by the House Managers and the President's defense team, and in 
many additional hours of Senators' questioning of the two sides, fails 
to meet the very high standards which we must demand with respect to 
Presidential impeachments. Therefore, I will vote to dismiss the 
impeachment case against William Jefferson Clinton, and to vote for the 
Senate resuming other necessary work for the American people.
  To this very point, I have reserved my judgment on this question 
because of my Constitutional responsibility and Oath to ``render 
impartial justice'' in this case. Most of the same record presented in 
great detail to Senators in the course of the last several weeks has 
long been before the public, and indeed most of that public, including 
editorial boards, talk show hosts, and so forth, long ago reached their 
own conclusions as to the impeachment of President Clinton. But I have 
now heard enough to make my decision. With respect to the witnesses the 
House Managers apparently now wish to depose and call before the 
Senate, the existing record represents multiple interrogations by the 
Office of the Independent Counsel and its Grand Jury, with not only no 
cross-examinations by the President's counsel but, with the exception 
of the President's testimony, without even the presence of the 
witnesses' own counsel. It is difficult for me to see how that record 
would possibly be improved from the prosecution's standpoint. Thus, I 
will not support motions to depose or call witnesses.
  In reaching my decision on impeachment, there are a number of factors 
which have been discussed or speculated about in the news media which 
were not a part of my calculations.
  First of all, while as political creatures neither the Senate nor the 
House can or should be immune from public opinion, we have a very 
precise Constitutionally-prescribed responsibility in this matter, and 
popular opinion must not be a controlling consideration. I believe 
Republican Senator William Pitt Fessenden of Maine said it best during 
the only previous Presidential Impeachment Trial in 1868:

       To the suggestion that popular opinion demands the 
     conviction of the President on these charges, I reply that he 
     is not now on trial before the people, but before the Senate 
     . . . The people have not heard the evidence as we have heard 
     it. The responsibility is not on them, but upon us. They have 
     not taken an oath to ``do impartial justice according to the 
     Constitution and the laws.'' I have taken that oath. I cannot 
     render judgment upon their convictions, nor can they transfer 
     to themselves my punishment if I violate my own. And I should 
     consider myself undeserving of the confidence of that just 
     and intelligent people who imposed upon me this great 
     responsibility, and unworthy of a place among honorable men, 
     if for any fear of public reprobation, and for the sake of 
     securing popular favor, I should disregard the convictions of 
     my judgment and my conscience.

  Nor was my decision premised on the notion, suggested by some, that 
the stability of our government would be severely jeopardized by the 
impeachment of President Clinton. I have full faith in the strength of 
our government and its leaders and, more importantly, faith in the 
American people to cope successfully with whatever the Senate decides. 
There can be no doubt that the impeachment of a President would not be 
easy for the country but just in this Century, about to end, we have 
endured great depressions and world wars. Today, the U.S. economy is 
strong, the will of the people to move beyond this national nightmare 
is great, and we have an experienced and able Vice President who is 
more than capable of stepping up and assuming the role of the 
President.
  Third, although we have heard much argument that the precedents of 
judicial impeachments should be controlling in this case, I have not 
been convinced and did not rely on such testimony in making my 
decision. After a review of the record, historical precedents, and 
consideration of the different roles of Presidents and federal judges, 
I have concluded that there is indeed a different legal standard for 
impeachment of Presidents and federal judges. Article 11, Section 4 of 
the Constitution provides that ``the President, Vice President, and all 
civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Article III, Section I of the Constitution 
indicates that judges ``shall hold their Offices during good 
Behavior.'' Presidents are elected by the people and serve for a fixed 
term of years, while federal judges are appointed without public 
approval to serve a life tenure without any accountability to the 
public. Therefore, under our system, impeachment is the only way to 
remove a federal judge from office while Presidents serve for a 
specified term and face accountability to the public through elections. 
With respect to the differing impeachment standards themselves, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist once wrote, ``the terms `treason, bribery and other 
high crimes and misdemeanors' are narrower than the malfeasance in 
office and failure to perform the duties of the office, which may be 
grounds for forfeiture of office held during good behavior.''
  And my conclusions with respect to impeachment were not based upon 
considerations of the proper punishment of President Clinton for his 
misdeeds. During the impeachment of President Nixon, the Report by the 
Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry concluded that ``impeachment is the 
first step in a remedial process--removal from office and possible 
disqualification from holding future office. The purpose of impeachment 
is not personal punishment; its function is primarily to maintain 
constitutional government.'' Regardless of the outcome of the Senate 
impeachment trial, President Clinton remains subject to censure by the 
House and Senate, and criminal prosecution for any crimes he may have 
committed. Whatever punishment President Clinton deserves for his 
misdeeds will be provided elsewhere.
  Finally, I do not believe that perjury or obstruction of justice 
could never rise to the level of threatening grievous harm to the 
Republic, and thus represent adequate grounds for removal of a 
President. However, we must approach such a determination with the 
greatest of care. Impeachment

[[Page 1490]]

of a President is, perhaps with the power to declare War, the gravest 
of Constitutional responsibilities bestowed upon the Congress. During 
the history of the United States, the Senate has only held impeachment 
trials for two Presidents, the 1868 trial of President Johnson, who had 
not been elected to that office, and now President Clinton. Although 
the Senate can look to impeachment trials of other public officials, 
primarily judicial, as I have already said, I do not believe that those 
precedents are or should be controlling in impeachment trials of 
Presidents, or indeed of other elected officials.
  My decision was based on one overriding concern: the impact of this 
precedent-setting case on the future of the Presidency, and indeed of 
the Congress itself. It is not Bill Clinton who should occupy our only 
attention. He already stands rebuked by the House impeachment votes, 
and by the words of virtually every member of Congress of both 
political parties. And even if we do not remove him from office, he 
still stands liable to future criminal prosecution for his actions, as 
well as to the verdict of history. No, it is Mr. Clinton's successors, 
Republican, Democrat or any other Party, who should be our concern.
  The Republican Senator, Edmund G. Ross of Kansas, who ``looked down 
into my open grave'' of political oblivion when he cast one of the 
decisive votes in acquitting Andrew Johnson in spite of his personal 
dislike of the President explained his motivation this way:

       . . . In a large sense, the independence of the executive 
     office as a coordinate branch of the government was on trial 
     . . . If . . . the President must step down . . . upon 
     insufficient proofs and from partisan considerations, the 
     office of President would be degraded, cease to be a 
     coordinate branch of government, and ever after subordinated 
     to the legislative will. It would practically have 
     revolutionized our splendid political fabric into a partisan 
     Congressional autocracy.

  While our government is certainly on a stronger foundation now than 
in the aftermath of the Civil War, the basic point remains valid. If 
anything, in today's world of rapidly emerging events and threats, we 
need an effective, independent Presidency even more than did mid-19th 
Century Americans.
  While in the history of the United States the U.S. Senate has never 
before considered impeachment articles against a sitting elected 
official, we do have numerous cases of each House exercising its 
Constitutional right to, ``punish its Members for disorderly behavior, 
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds expel a Member.'' However, 
since the Civil War, while a variety of cases involving personal and 
private misconduct have been considered, the Senate has never voted to 
expel a member, choosing to censure instead on seven occasions, and the 
House has rarely chosen the ultimate sanction. Should the removal of a 
President be subject to greater punishment with lesser standards of 
evidence than the Congress has applied to itself when the Constitution 
appears to call for the reverse in limiting impeachment to cases of 
``treason, bribery and other high crimes or misdemeanors''? In my view, 
the answer must be NO.
  Thus, for me, as one United States Senator, the bar for impeachment 
and removal from office of a President must be a high one, and I want 
the record to reflect that my vote to dismiss is based upon a standard 
of evidence equivalent to that used in criminal proceedings--that is, 
that guilt must be proven ``beyond a reasonable doubt''--and a standard 
of impeachable offense which, in my view, conforms to the Founders' 
intentions that such an offense must be one which represents official 
misconduct threatening grievous harm to our whole system of government. 
To quote Federalist #65, Hamilton defined as impeachable, ``those 
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other 
words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a 
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as 
they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society 
itself.'' As I have said before, I can conceive of instances in which 
both perjury and obstruction of justice would meet this test, and I 
certainly believe that most, if not all, capital crimes, including 
murder, would qualify for impeachment and removal from office. However, 
in my judgment, the current case does not reach the necessary high 
standard.
  In the words of John F. Kennedy, ``with a good conscience our only 
sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds,'' I believe 
that dismissal of the impeachment case against William Jefferson 
Clinton is the appropriate action for the U.S. Senate. It is the action 
which will best preserve the system of government which has served us 
so well for over two hundred years, a system of checks and balances, 
with a strong and independent chief executive.
  In closing, I wish to address those in the Senate and House, and 
among the American public, who have reached a different conclusion than 
have I in this case. I do not question the sincerity or legitimacy of 
your viewpoint. The process itself pushes us to make absolute 
judgments--yes or no to conviction and removal from office--and the 
nature of debate yields portraits of complex issues in stark black-and-
white terms, but I believe it is possible for reasonable people to 
reach different conclusions on this matter. Indeed, I recognize that, 
while my decision seeks to avoid the dangers of setting the impeachment 
bar too low, setting that bar too high is not without risks. I believe 
the House Managers spoke eloquently about the need to preserve respect 
for the rule of law, including the critical principle that no one, not 
even the President of the United States, is above that rule. However, I 
have concluded that the threat to our system of a weakened Presidency, 
made in some ways subordinate to the will of the legislative branch, 
outweighs the potential harm to the rule of law, because that latter 
risk is mitigated by:
  An intact, independent criminal justice system, which indeed will 
retain the ability to render final, legal judgment on the President's 
conduct;
  A vigorous, independent press corps which remains perfectly capable 
of exposing such conduct, and of extracting a personal, professional 
and political price; and
  An independent Congress which will presumably continue to have the 
will and means to oppose Presidents who threaten our system of 
government.
  By the very nature of this situation, where I sit in judgment of a 
Democratic President as a Democratic Senator, I realize that my 
decision cannot convey the non-partisanship which is essential to 
achieve closure on this matter, one way or the other. Indeed, in words 
which could have been written today, the chief proponent among the 
Founding Fathers of a vigorous Chief Executive, Alexander Hamilton, 
wrote in 1788, in No. 65 of The Federalist Papers, that impeachments 
``will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and 
to divide them into parties, more or less friendly or inimical, to the 
accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the pre-existing 
factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, 
influence and interest on one side, or on the other; and in such cases 
there will always be the greatest danger, that the decision will be 
regulated more by the comparative strength of the parties than by the 
real demonstration of guilt or innocence.''
  I have, however, in making my decision laid out for you the standards 
which I believe to be appropriate whenever the Congress considers the 
removal from office of an elected official, whether Executive Branch, 
or Legislative Branch. I will do my best to stand by those standards in 
all such cases to come before me while I have the privilege of 
representing the people of Georgia in the United States Senate, 
regardless of the party affiliation of the accused. I only hope and 
pray that no future President, of either Party, will ever again engage 
in conduct which provides any basis, including the basis of the current 
case, for the Congress to consider the grave question of 
impeachment.




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