[Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 145 (Tuesday, September 15, 2026)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO OFFER RESOLUTION RAISING A QUESTION OF THE
PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to clause 2(a)(1) of rule IX, I
seek recognition to give notice of my intent to raise a question of the
privileges of the House.
The form of the resolution is as follows:
Impeaching Peter Brian Hegseth, Secretary of Defense, for high crimes
and misdemeanors.
Resolved, that Peter Brian Hegseth, Secretary of Defense, also
referred to as ``Secretary of War'' by the administration, is impeached
for high crimes and misdemeanors and that the following articles of
impeachment be exhibited to the United States Senate:
Articles of Impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives of
the United States of America in the name of itself and of the people of
the United States of America against Peter Brian Hegseth, Secretary of
Defense, in maintenance and support of its impeachment against him for
high crimes and misdemeanors.
Article I: Waging War in Contravention of the War Powers Resolution
of 1973, Section 2(c): The Constitution provides that the House of
Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment and that
civil officers of the United States, including the Secretary of
Defense, shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction
of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
In his conduct while Secretary of Defense, Peter Brian Hegseth, in
violation of his oath to support and defend the Constitution of the
United States and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed, especially with regard to the
commission of war, has abused the powers of the Department of Defense
in that:
The Declare War Clause of the United States Constitution--Article I,
Section 8, Clause 11--vests in Congress the exclusive initiatory powers
of war, while the military, administrative, and clemency clause of the
United States Constitution--Article II, Section 2, Clause 1--
establishes the President as the Commander in Chief of the armed
forces, and vests in him operational control over wars lawfully
authorized by Congress.
In an effort to statutorily delineate the circumstances under which
the President may introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities
absent congressional authorization, the 93rd Congress of the United
States enacted into law H.J. Res. 542, the War Powers Resolution of
1973, Public Law 93-148, by overriding the veto of President Richard
Nixon.
Peter Brian Hegseth, in his capacity as Secretary of Defense, has
executed unlawful orders in contravention of section 2(c) of the War
Powers Resolution of 1973, section 1541(c) of title 50, United States
Code.
Section 2(c) provides that ``the constitutional powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces
into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised
only pursuant to one, a declaration of war; two, specific statutory
authorization; or three, a national emergency created by attack upon
the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed
forces.''
The War Powers Resolution further expressly provides that nothing
contained therein shall be construed as granting any authority to the
President to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities
which the President would not otherwise possess in the absence of the
resolution.
Accordingly, the reporting and termination procedures subsequently
established by the resolution do not themselves constitute affirmative
statutory authorization to commence hostilities. Rather, the
introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities must
rest upon one of the authorities or circumstances identified in section
2(c) in order for a conflict to be considered lawful.
With respect to United States Armed Forces being entered into
hostilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran on February 28, 2026,
Secretary Hegseth directed and caused United States Armed Forces to be
introduced into hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran,
notwithstanding that one, Congress had not declared war against the
Islamic Republic of Iran; two, Congress had not enacted any specific
statutory authorization for the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
three, no national emergency had been created by an attack by the
Islamic Republic of Iran upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces.
Furthermore, no imminent attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its armed forces existed, as affirmed in
the March 17, 2026, resignation letter of Joe Kent, then-Director of
the National Counterterrorism Center, in which he stated: ``I cannot in
good conscience support the ongoing war in Iran. Iran posed no imminent
threat to our Nation.''
The introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities
against the Islamic Republic of Iran, therefore, satisfied none of the
circumstances expressly identified in section 2(c) of the War Powers
Resolution and was undertaken, from its inception, without
congressional authorization or independent Article II authority,
thereby rendering both the initial introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, and all subsequent actions taken thereafter,
unlawful.
{time} 1210
Secretary Hegseth, nevertheless, knowingly executed and implemented
the unlawful order to commence such hostilities, employing powers,
personnel, weapons, and resources of the Department of Defense to
initiate military action against another sovereign nation, in violation
of section 1541(c) of title 50, United States Code.
Secretary Hegseth abused the powers of his high office through the
following means:
One, executing an unlawful order to commence hostilities, despite the
absence of a declaration of war; specific statutory authorization; or a
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its Armed Forces.
Two, continuing to employ the personnel and resources of the
Department of Defense in these hostilities after their unlawful
initiation and in the continued absence of any subsequent declaration
of war or specific statutory authorization by Congress.
Through these actions, Secretary Hegseth knowingly executed and
implemented unlawful orders to initiate war against a foreign nation,
notwithstanding the absence of congressional authorization, an attack
upon the United States giving rise to the national emergency
contemplated by law, or an imminent threat requiring immediate
defensive action, thereby substituting unlawful executive action for
the constitutional and statutory judgment of Congress.
In all of this, Secretary Hegseth has acted in a manner contrary to
his trust as Secretary of Defense and subversive of constitutional
government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and justice and
to the manifest injury of the people of the United States of America.
Wherefore, Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth, by such conduct, has
demonstrated that he will remain a threat to the Constitution if
allowed to remain in office and has acted in a manner grossly
incompatible with his duties and the rule of law. Peter Brian Hegseth,
thus, warrants impeachment and trial, removal from office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the United States.
Article II, waging war in contravention of the War Powers Resolution
of 1973, section 5(c): The Constitution provides that the House of
Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment and that civil
officers of the United States, including Secretary of Defense, shall be
removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
In his conduct while Secretary of Defense, Peter Brian Hegseth, in
violation of his oath to support and defend the Constitution of the
United States and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed, especially with regard to the
commission of war, has abused the powers of the Department of Defense
in that:
The Declare War Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I,
Section 8, Clause 11, vests in Congress the exclusive initiatory powers
of war, while the Military, Administrative, and Clemency Clause of the
United States Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 1,
establishes the President as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
and vests in him operational control over wars lawfully authorized by
Congress.
In an effort to statutorily delineate the circumstances under which
the President may introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities
absent congressional authorization, the 93rd Congress of the United
States of America enacted into law H.J. Res. 542, the War Powers
Resolution of 1973, by overriding the veto of President Richard Nixon.
Secretary Hegseth carried out unlawful orders and continues to do so
in contravention of section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution of 1973,
section 1544(c) of title 50, United States Code.
Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 provides that, at
any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities
outside the territory of the United States, its possessions, and
territories, without a declaration of war or specific statutory
authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if
Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.
With respect to the United States Armed Forces being engaged in
hostilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, pursuant to section 5(c),
the House of Representatives and the Senate agreed, by the yeas and
nays, to a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove
United States Armed Forces from unauthorized hostilities in Iran, H.
Con. Res. 86 of the 119th Congress. The House agreed to this concurrent
resolution on June 3, 2026, and the Senate agreed to it on June 23,
2026, marking the first successful passage of such a legislative
vehicle by both Chambers of Congress in the history of the United
States.
In response, and without lawful cause or excuse, Secretary Hegseth
continued to direct the United States Armed Forces into hostilities
with the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 26, 2026, and continues to do
so in violation of section 1544(c) of title 50, United States Code.
Secretary Hegseth abused the powers of his high office through the
following means:
One, directing, authorizing, and sustaining hostile United States
military actions in Iran after both Chambers of Congress agreed to H.
Con. Res. 86, thereby disregarding Congress' express and lawful
direction that the United States Armed Forces be removed from such
hostilities.
Two, failing and refusing to take all necessary steps within his
authority as Secretary of Defense to withdraw United States Armed
Forces from hostilities in Iran.
Three, directing the Department of Defense to ignore the duly agreed
concurrent resolution, thereby substituting the judgment of the
executive branch for the constitutional and statutory judgment of
Congress and nullifying Congress' exercise of its war powers.
Through these actions, Secretary Hegseth knowingly executed and
sustained unlawful orders that treated the executive branch as
possessing authority to determine when war may be commenced, how long
it may be sustained, and whether Congress' directive to terminate
hostilities must be obeyed.
By implementing these orders, he effectuated, in practice, the
unilateral continuation of military operations against Iran, despite
Congress' exclusive constitutional authority to declare war and despite
Congress' formal action directing the removal of United States Armed
Forces from hostilities.
This abuse of office frustrated Congress' ability to exercise its
most solemn constitutional responsibility, enabled the continuation of
unlawful war, and ignored and, thus, nullified the fundamental
safeguard designed to prevent United States Armed Forces from being
used at the will of the executive alone.
In all of this, Secretary Hegseth has acted in a manner contrary to
his trust as Secretary of Defense and subversive of constitutional
government to the great prejudice of the cause of law and justice and
to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.
Wherefore, Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth, by such conduct, has
demonstrated that he will remain a threat to the Constitution if
allowed to remain in office and has acted in a manner grossly
incompatible with his duties and the rule of law. Peter Brian Hegseth,
thus, warrants impeachment and trial, removal from office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the United States.
Article III, waging war in contravention of the War Powers Resolution
of 1973, section 5(b): The Constitution provides that the House of
Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment and that civil
officers of the United States, including the Secretary of Defense,
shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of
treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
In his conduct while Secretary of Defense, Peter Brian Hegseth, in
violation of his oath to support and defend the Constitution of the
United States and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed, especially with regard to the
commission of war, has abused the powers of the Department of Defense
in that the Declare War Clause of the United States Constitution,
Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, vests in Congress the exclusive
initiatory powers of war while the Military, Administrative, and
Clemency Clause of the Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 1,
establishes the President as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
and vests in him operational control over wars lawfully authorized by
Congress.
In an effort to statutorily delineate the circumstances under which
the President may introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities
absent congressional authorization, the 93rd Congress of the United
States enacted into law H.J. Res. 542, the War Powers Resolution of
1973, Public Law 93-148, by overriding the veto of President Richard
Nixon.
{time} 1220
Secretary Hegseth carried out unlawful orders, and continues to do
so, in contravention of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution of
1973, section 1544(b) of title 50, United States Code.
Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 provides that,
within 60 calendar days after a report is submitted or required to be
submitted to Congress by the President of the United States upon the
Executive introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, whichever is earlier, the Executive
shall terminate any use of the United States Armed Forces . . . unless
Congress has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for
such use of the United States Armed Forces, has extended by law such
60-day period, or is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed
attack upon the United States.
Section 5(b) further provides that, absent a formal congressional
declaration of war, specific statutory Authorization for the Use of
Military Force, or an extension of the 60-day period enacted into law
during that period ``such 60-day period shall be extended for not more
than an additional 30 days if the President determines and certifies to
the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting
the safety of the United States Armed Forces requires the continued use
of such Armed Forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal
of such forces.''
With respect to the United States Armed Forces being entered into
hostilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and indicating reliance on
and fealty to the War Powers Resolution of 1973 as legal justification
for entering United States Armed Forces into hostilities with Iran
without the initiatory authority of Congress, President Donald J. Trump
transmitted, on March 2, 2026, ``a letter informing Congress of action
taken consistent with the War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148,
pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1543(a)(3); Public Law 93-148, Sec. 4(a); (87
Stat. 555) and 50 U.S.C. 1543(b); Public Law 93-148, Sec. 4(b); (87
Stat. 555),'' concerning hostilities that had commenced in Iran on
February 28, 2026.
In the 60-day period following said transmission, Congress did not,
and still has not, enacted any declaration or specific statutory
authorization for the use of the United States Armed Forces in
hostilities against Iran or extended the applicable 60-day period by
law, despite remaining physically capable of meeting and carrying out
its constitutional responsibilities.
Moreover, President Donald J. Trump did not submit the written
certification required to invoke the additional 30-day withdrawal
period by May 1, 2026. Even assuming the President had validly invoked
that separate and limited 30-day extension, it would likewise have
expired on June 1, 2026.
Without lawful cause or excuse, and despite the Executive's initial
observation of the reporting requirements under section 4(a) of the War
Powers Resolution, section 1543(a)(3) of title 50 United States Code,
through the President's transmission to Congress of a letter
acknowledging the commencement of the statutory timeline, Secretary
Hegseth continued to direct, authorize, and sustain the use of United
States Armed Forces in hostilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran
after the expiration of every potentially applicable statutory period.
Secretary Hegseth continued such hostilities after the 60-day period
expired on May 1, 2026, and after June 1, 2026, the date on which even
the maximum possible additional 30-day withdrawal period would have
expired, despite the absence of a declaration of war, specific
statutory authorization, or extension enacted by Congress.
Secretary Hegseth further contravened the limited purpose of any such
additional 30-day withdrawal period by directing United States Armed
Forces to continue engaging in hostilities against the Islamic Republic
of Iran in a manner calculated not to terminate the unauthorized use of
such forces and bring about their prompt removal but, rather, to
continue prosecuting the war to pursue additional military objectives
not authorized by Congress, and has therefore directed the Department
of Defense in violation of section 1544(b) of title 50, United States
Code.
Secretary Hegseth abused the powers of his high office through the
following means:
One, directing, authorizing, and sustaining hostile United States
military actions in Iran after the expiration of the 60-day period
established under section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution of 1973,
despite the absence of a declaration of war, specific statutory
authorization, or an extension enacted by Congress.
Two, continuing to direct and sustain hostilities in Iran in pursuit
of additional military objectives during and after the expiration of
any potentially applicable additional 30-day period, notwithstanding
that such 30-day period could be used only when required by unavoidable
military necessity, respecting the safety of the United States Armed
Forces in the course of bringing about their prompt removal, as
certified as necessary by the President of the United States, a
certification never transmitted to Congress by President Donald J.
Trump pursuant to section 1544(b) of title 50 United States Code.
Three, failing and refusing to take all necessary steps within his
authority as Secretary of Defense to terminate the unauthorized use of
United States Armed Forces and promptly withdraw such forces from
hostilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Four, directing the Department of Defense to treat the mandatory
termination requirement as discretionary, thereby substituting the
judgment of the executive branch for the constitutional and statutory
judgment of Congress, and nullifying the express command that the
unauthorized use of United States Armed Forces shall be terminated.
Through these actions, Secretary Hegseth knowingly executed and
sustained unlawful orders that, in practice, displaced the
constitutional and statutory judgment of Congress by permitting the
executive branch to determine when war may be commenced, how long it
may be sustained, whether statutory deadlines governing unauthorized
hostilities must be obeyed, and whether a war may continue after the
expiration of every period permitted by law.
In all of this, Secretary Hegseth has acted in a manner contrary to
his trust as Secretary of Defense and subversive of constitutional
government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and justice, and
to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.
Wherefore, Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth, by such conduct, has
demonstrated that he will remain a threat to the Constitution if
allowed to remain in office and has acted in a manner grossly
incompatible with his duties and the rule of law, Peter Brian Hegseth
thus warrants impeachment and trial, removal from office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the United States.
Article IV: ignoring laws that minimize civilian casualties. The
Constitution provides that the House of Representatives shall have the
sole power of impeachment and that civil officers of the United States,
including the Secretary of Defense, shall be removed from office on
impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors.
In his conduct as Secretary of Defense, and in violation of his
constitutional oath to faithfully execute the office of Secretary of
Defense, and to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend
the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his
constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,
especially during the commission of war, Peter Brian Hegseth has abused
the powers of the Department of Defense in that:
Using the powers of his office, Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth
directed the Department of Defense in a manner that resulted in the
death or injury of more than 200 civilians at the Shajareh Tayyebeh
Elementary School in Minab, Hormozgan Province, Iran. He did so through
a scheme or course of conduct that affected the systemic deterioration
and removal of Department of Defense infrastructure that Congress has
mandated by law to limit collateral damage to civilians and nonmilitary
objects during military operations.
While doing so, Secretary Hegseth also cultivated a warmaking culture
at the Department of Defense which he boasts as being dismissive of,
``stupid rules of engagement,'' with preference for ``maximum
lethality, not tepid legality.''
Such combination chilled and rendered ineffective components of the
Department of Defense responsible for preventing, mitigating, and
responding to civilian harm.
{time} 1230
By directing the Department of Defense in a manner that foreseeably
dismantled the safeguards necessary to distinguish civilian objects
from military objects, Secretary Hegseth thereby effected the murder of
civilians and abused the trust of men and women under his command by
requiring them to conduct military operations within a targeted and
legal-review system that he had deliberately degraded. This undermined
the integrity and diplomacy of the United States and its Armed Forces.
He thus ignored and injured the interests of the Nation.
Secretary Hegseth engaged in this scheme or course of conduct through
the following means:
One, Secretary Hegseth willfully disregarded and acted to defeat the
requirements of section 184 of title 10 United States Code by
systematically dismantling civilian-protection infrastructure in that:
A, Secretary Hegseth submitted a legislative proposal to Congress on
May 29, 2025, requesting a repeal of section 184 of title 10 the United
States Code, the statutory requirement for civilian-protection systems
at the Department of Defense, even as Congress had fully funded such
systems for fiscal year 2025 and fiscal year 2026, and after Congress
did not enact the requested repeal, Army officials nevertheless
confirmed that such civilian harm mitigation activities had been
halted.
B, Secretary Hegseth immediately stalled and reversed implementation
of the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan and rendered
ineffective the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence, despite it
being congressionally mandated by section 2082 of the James M. Inhofe
National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 117-263, and section 936
of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law
115-232.
C, Secretary Hegseth eliminated funding for the Army's casualty
tracking database--the institutional system for recording and verifying
civilian harm reports--so that should civilians be harmed as a result
of the United States military action, there would be no functioning
system within the Department of Defense to review, verify, and report
on such harm.
D, Secretary Hegseth willfully refused to ensure that DOD components
received adequate resources to satisfy the civilian harm mitigation and
response staff assigned--sorry--requirements, including by removing
more than 90 percent of civilian harm mitigation and response staff
assigned to combatant commands.
E, Secretary Hegseth failed by the end of fiscal year 2025 to satisfy
any of the 11 objectives or complete 133 actions mandated by Congress
for the prevention and mitigation of civilian harm during armed
conflict, thereby rendering every such component of the Department of
Defense's civilian harm prevention apparatus partially or totally
ineffective by the time the United States military combat operations
against Iran began in early 2026.
Two, Secretary Hegseth removed, without reason or cause, the senior-
most judge advocate generals of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, thereby
undermining independent legal oversight of combat operations and legal
advice to commanders on the law of armed conflict.
Three, Secretary Hegseth promulgated the 2026 National Defense
Strategy with all references to civilian protection omitted, marking a
deliberate and unprecedented departure from prior defense policy that
had recognized, in accordance with law, civilian harm mitigation as a
strategic priority.
Four, Hegseth, from the outset of his tenure instigated a
departmental culture hostile to the law of armed conflict and the
protection of civilians through his public and repeated denigration of
rules of engagement as ``stupid,'' ``politically correct,'' and
``overbearing'' in that:
A, on September 30, 2025, while addressing the largest assembled
gathering of United States generals and admirals in American history,
Secretary Hegseth boasted that we, the United States military, ``don't
fight with stupid rules of engagement.''
B, upon unlawfully renaming the Department of Defense, the Department
of War on September 5, 2025, he poetically proclaimed: ``Maximum
lethality, not tepid legality. Violent effect, not politically
correct.''
C, during his confirmation hearing on January 14, 2025, he told the
Senate Armed Services Committee he had ``thought very deeply about the
balance between legality and lethality, ensuring that men and women on
the front lines have the opportunity to destroy with and close the
enemy and that lawyers aren't the ones getting in the way.''
Five, Secretary Hegseth undermined effective journalistic oversight
by expelling the traditional Pentagon press corps and imposing
credentialing rules that restricted journalists from soliciting or
publishing unapproved materials, thereby weakening independent
reporting on civilian harm and on matters affecting the welfare and
safety of United States servicemembers by journalists most familiar
with the Department of Defense.
These actions were not isolated, administrative, or rhetorical
choices. Taken together, they degraded the personnel, institutional
systems, independent legal review, and civilian protection safeguards
upon which the Department of Defense relies to verify the current
status of proposed targets, distinguish civilian objects from military
objectives, reassess targets as circumstances change, and prevent or
mitigate civilian harm.
The foreseeable consequences of Secretary Hegseth's scheme manifested
in the United States strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School
which killed and injured more than 200 civilians and exposed systemic
failures in the Department of Defense targeting process. The events of
that strike and the reported events leading to it are as follows:
One, on the morning of February 28, 2026, at approximately 9:45 a.m.
local time, the United States, in partnership with Israel, launched
Operation Epic Fury commencing the 2026 Iran war. Within the first hour
of the U.S.-Israeli offensive into southern Iran, three BGM-109
Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from the United States Navy warships
impacted the elementary school between 10:34 and 10:45 a.m. local time.
Two, because the war was commenced midmorning on a Saturday, the
first day of the Iranian workweek, students were in attendance at the
school. Despite an attempted evacuation at the school, at the time of
the first cruise missile's impact, between 170 and 267 students were
present in the facility, most of whom were girls between the ages of 7
and 12 years.
Three, whereas it is unclear how many casualties were inflicted by
the first impact, which caused partial destruction of the structure and
the collapse of its roof, it is reported that the students were then
sheltered in a prayer room deeper in the facility waiting for rescuers,
when a second and third missile, in rapid succession, impacted the
building.
Four, reported death tolls from the strikes on the elementary school
indicate that at least 156 civilians were killed, with some reports
suggesting that civilian death tolls surpassed 170. Those killed
include at least 120 schoolchildren, 26 teachers, and 7 parents
attempting to evacuate their children, a schoolbus driver, a pharmacy
technician from a nearby clinic and the 6-month old unborn child of one
of the teachers also killed in the attack. An estimated 95 other
individuals were wounded.
Under United States military doctrine and the law of armed conflict,
which Secretary Hegseth is obligated to uphold, the lawfulness of an
attack does not depend solely on whether civilians were deliberately
selected for the purpose of harming them. The obligations of
distinction, target verification, and feasible precaution require
military decisionmakers to determine, in good faith, that an object is
a lawful military objective on the basis of information reasonably
available at the time. A failure to undertake the verification and
review required by those obligations may render an attack unlawful, a
failure directly caused by Secretary Hegseth's dismantling of key
infrastructure designed to prevent such errors. With respect to the
strike on the elementary school, those institutional failures
manifested in systemic noncompliance with Department of Defense
targeting doctrine and legal guidance.
The strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School was not an
isolated targeting failure divorced from the conduct of the Secretary
of Defense, nor can Secretary Hegseth's conduct be dismissed as a
single targeting error or isolated failure in the fog of war.
{time} 1240
The elementary school was struck after Secretary Hegseth sought to
repeal congressionally mandated civilian-protection requirements,
dismantled the Department's civilian-harm mitigation infrastructure,
removed the senior-most judge advocates general responsible for
independent legal oversight, stripped civilian protection from the
National Defense Strategy, and publicly denigrated legal restraints on
military force as obstacles to maximum lethality. He thereby weakened
nearly every institutional safeguard designed to minimize civilian
casualties inflicted by the United States military and then presided
over a targeting process in which a functioning elementary school was
struck three times, killing and wounding more than 200 civilians,
mostly children.
Such conduct reflects not merely a failure of judgment but an
extraordinary abuse of powers entrusted to the Secretary of Defense and
a profound disregard for the civilians his Department was obligated to
protect and the servicemembers he was entrusted to lead.
In all of this, Secretary Hegseth willfully and systemically refused
to comply with laws and directives mandated for the protection of
civilians during the commission of armed conflict, chilled and rendered
ineffective such components to prevent and mitigate harm to civilians,
and, therefore, foreseeably effected the death and injury of over 200
civilians, to the manifest injury of the United States.
Wherefore, Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth, by such conduct, has
demonstrated that he will remain a threat to civilians, the lawful
conduct of United States military operations, the integrity and
credibility of the United States Armed Forces, and the Constitution if
allowed to remain in office, and has acted in a manner grossly
incompatible with his duties and the rule of law. Peter Brian Hegseth
thus warrants impeachment and trial, removal from office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the United States.
Article V, Extrajudicial Killings: The Constitution provides that the
House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment and
that civil officers of the United States, including the Secretary of
Defense, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
In his conduct as Secretary of Defense, Peter Brian Hegseth, in
violation of his oath to support and defend the Constitution of the
United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed--especially with regard to the
commission of war--has abused the powers of the Department of Defense
in that:
Using the powers of his office, Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth
directed the Department of Defense in a manner that resulted in the
extrajudicial killings of at least 221 persons aboard seagoing vessels
alleged to be smuggling narcotics in the Caribbean Sea and the eastern
Pacific Ocean, principally in international waters. He did so through a
scheme or course of conduct that chilled independent legal review
within the Department of Defense; constructed a purported legal basis
for the use of military force without constitutional or statutory
authorization; and displaced longstanding precedent and codified
maritime law enforcement practices that are jurisdictionally assigned
to the Coast Guard and law enforcement agencies by substituting in such
place the use of summary lethal force by Army, Navy, Air Force, or
Marine Corps elements. While doing so, Secretary Hegseth also oversaw
orders denying quarter and failing to provide rescue, including
secondary strikes against shipwrecked survivors who were hors de
combat, and the abandonment of shipwrecked survivors at sea, thereby
endangering members of our Armed Forces in future military engagements
by encouraging adversaries to subject American servicemembers to the
same treatment.
By subjecting persons merely suspected of criminal conduct to lethal
military force without judicial process, without congressional
authorization, and without establishing a lawful basis for treating
such persons or vessels as military targets, Secretary Hegseth
arrogated to himself and the executive branch the roles of judge, jury,
and executioner and asserted a unilateral power to determine who may
live and who may die. Such a power is foreign to the rule of law,
repugnant to the legal traditions and fundamental values of the United
States and the Western world, and contrary to the United States law and
customary international law. This conduct undermined the integrity and
credibility of the United States and its Armed Forces, damaged the
diplomatic standing of the United States, and injured the interests of
the Nation.
Secretary Hegseth engaged in this scheme or course of conduct through
the following means:
One, Secretary Hegseth authorized strikes, beginning on September 2,
2025, without authorization from Congress pursuant to Article I,
Section 8, Clause 11 of the United States Constitution, and in the
absence of a declaration of war, specific statutory authorization for
the use of military force, or a national emergency created by an attack
upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its Armed
Forces, as provided in chapter 33, title 50, United States Code.
Secretary Hegseth ordered and oversaw the strike campaign against
seagoing vessels alleged to be smuggling narcotics in international
waters, comprising at least 63 separate attacks--44 in the Eastern
Pacific Ocean, 17 in the Caribbean Sea, and 2 in unspecified
locations--which struck 67 vessels and killed at least 221 individuals.
In doing so, Secretary Hegseth displaced the statutory framework
established by sections 70503 and 70504 of title 46, United States
Code, under which Congress expressly treated maritime narcotics
offenses, including conduct occurring on the high seas, as Federal
crimes subject to apprehension, prosecution, and trial in an
appropriate United States district court and, instead, treated such
offenses as predicates for lethal military targeting.
Secretary Hegseth disregarded the statutory restrictions in sections
274 and 275 of title 10, United States Code, governing direct
participation by members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps
in civilian law enforcement activities, including Federal narcotics
enforcement, by employing lethal military force against persons
suspected of drug trafficking absent any congressional enacted
authorization for the use of military force or other statutory
authorization for such direct military action.
Secretary Hegseth disregarded the maritime enforcement framework
established by sections 102 and 522 of title 14, United States Code, as
well as section 279 of title 10, United States Code, under which only
the Coast Guard is authorized to conduct interdiction, search, seizure,
and arrest, and he did so by directing members of the Army, Navy, Air
Force, or Marine Corps to employ lethal military force in place of the
law enforcement processes.
Three, Secretary Hegseth established targeting guidelines for such
strikes on August 5, 2025, by issuing an execute order directing the
use of United States military force against persons alleged to be
members or affiliates of certain designated terrorist organizations as
follows:
A, Secretary Hegseth established guidelines that:
Used designated terrorist organizations as a targeting category,
notwithstanding that term is not a congressionally created designation
conferring authority to use military force;
Did not require positive identification of any targeted person, but
instead required only reasonable certainty that such person was a
member or affiliate of a designated terrorist organization, a threshold
lower than the near-certainty standard established for drone strikes on
suspected al-Qaida militants during the congressionally authorized
global war on terror; and
Did not require the presence of weapons or narcotics on targeted
vessels alleged to be smuggling narcotics in association with a
designated terrorist organization.
{time} 1250
Four, Secretary Hegseth, in the course of such strikes, oversaw
orders resulting in the denial of quarter to and the failure to provide
timely rescue for, shipwrecked survivors of initial strikes, including,
on September 2, 2025, during the first strike of the campaign, the
United States Navy attacked a seagoing vessel carrying 11 persons
between the coast of Venezuela and nearby Caribbean nation of Trinidad
and Tobago. The strike destroyed and capsized the vessel.
Approximately 45 minutes later, while two survivors clung to the
wreckage, a second strike was ordered, killing both survivors.
In doing so, Secretary Hegseth has endangered members of our Armed
Forces in future military engagements by encouraging adversaries to
subject American servicemembers to the same treatment.
On December 30, 2025, United States Southern Command attacked three
vessels, approximately 400 nautical miles southwest of Ocos, Guatemala,
in the eastern Pacific Ocean, killing three persons and leaving eight
others shipwrecked. Although the campaign had been underway for
approximately 4 months, no recovery assets had been prepositioned to
rescue survivors. Rescue assets did not arrive until approximately 45
hours after the strikes, by which time all eight shipwrecked survivors
had died at sea.
In doing so, Secretary Hegseth has endangered members of our Armed
Forces in future military engagements by encouraging adversaries to
subject American servicemembers to the same treatment.
Five, Secretary Hegseth took actions to preempt, constrain, and
overcome independent legal objections within the Department of Defense
concerning the lawfulness of such strikes, including: Secretary Hegseth
removed the senior-most judge advocates general of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force without stating a reason or cause, thereby foreseeably
chilling the exercise of independent legal judgment by judge advocates
tasked with advising military commanders on the lawfulness of combat
operations and subsequently stating at a Pentagon press conference on
February 25, 2025 he did not want military lawyers to serve as
``roadblocks to orders that are given by a commander in chief.''
Secretary Hegseth employed an interagency group of lawyers comprising
four career officials and four political appointees from the Department
of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the White House, and the Office of Legal Counsel
to develop a classified memorandum purporting to establish a legal
basis for such strikes and to address anticipated objections to their
execution, falsely asserting that the United States is engaged in a
noninternational armed conflict with 24 Latin American Designated
Terrorist Organizations, thereby attempting to displace the governing
law enforcement framework, as established in paragraph 2, and
substitute an armed conflict framework for the conduct of military
operations against such organizations, despite the absence of
congressional authorization for such military action, notwithstanding
that, pursuant to Little v. Barreme, 1804, and Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA, 2014, an executive branch legal memorandum cannot enlarge
authority conferred by Congress or legalize conduct otherwise
unauthorized by statutes.
The strikes do not constitute hostilities within the meaning of
chapter 33 of title 50, United States Code, because they do not place
United States personnel in danger, presumptively on the basis that such
vessels are incapable of self-defense, a predicate that would likewise
mean that any military action conducted by drone, or any airstrike
against a target lacking air defense capabilities, could also not
constitute hostilities; and the designated terrorist organizations are
engaged in armed conflict against the security forces of allied
nations, including Mexico, and such violence is financed through
cocaine trafficking, such that the strikes may be characterized as
attacks against cocaine shipments and the deaths of persons aboard
targeted vessels as collateral damage, a rationale inconsistent with
the execute order targeting guidelines described in paragraph 3, which
did not require narcotics to be present aboard a targeted vessel and
instead authorized targeting based on designated terrorist organization
membership or affiliation.
Secretary Hegseth abused the authority and trust vested in him as
Secretary of Defense not only by directing the unlawful use of lethal
military force resulting in the summary execution of at least 221
persons in international waters but also by using his office to compel
members of the Armed Forces to carry out such operations under false
legal authorities that he caused to be constructed and imposed on the
chain of command.
In denying quarter and refusing rescue, Secretary Hegseth endangered
members of the United States Armed Forces in future military
engagements by encouraging adversaries to subject American
servicemembers to such treatment.
Secretary Hegseth further endangered United States law enforcement
personnel by substituting lethal military targeting for the established
maritime law enforcement practices of interdiction, search, seizure,
arrest, and prosecution. By demonstrating that vessels merely suspected
of narcotics trafficking may be destroyed and their occupants killed,
rather than interdicting and arresting, Secretary Hegseth foreseeably
increased the likelihood that persons aboard such vessels will perceive
future encounters with United States authorities as threats to their
lives and respond with lethal force rather than surrender.
In this manner, his conduct not only endangered the persons
unlawfully targeted by the strike campaign but also made lawful
enforcement of United States narcotics laws at sea more dangerous for
the Coast Guard and other Federal personnel charged with carrying them
out.
In all of this, Secretary Peter Hegseth has acted in a manner
contrary to his trust as Secretary of Defense and subversive of
constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law
and justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United
States of America.
Wherefore, Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth, by such conduct, has
demonstrated that he will remain a threat to civilians and the laws of
war, the integrity of United States diplomacy, and the Constitution if
allowed to remain in office, and has acted in a manner grossly
incompatible with his duties and the rule of law. Peter Brian Hegseth
thus warrants impeachment and trial, removal from office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the United States.
Article VI: suppressing free speech: The Constitution provides that
the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment
and that civil officers of the United States, including the Secretary
of Defense, shall be removed from office on impeachment for and
conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
In his conduct while Secretary of Defense, Peter Brian Hegseth, in
violation of his oath to support and defend the Constitution of the
United States and to well and faithfully discharge the duties of his
office, abused the powers entrusted to him by retaliating against a
Member of Congress for constitutionally protected speech and attempting
to subject a Member of a coordinate branch of government to executive
branch punishment for the exercise of his legislative and oversight
responsibilities, in that: On November 18, 2025, Senator Mark Kelly, a
retired United States Navy captain and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration astronaut, who flew 39 combat missions during the first
Gulf War, and who sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee and the
Senate Intelligence Committee, appeared in his official capacity as a
Senator in a video addressed to members of the United States Armed
Forces concerning the unlawful strike campaign against vessels
suspected of narcotics trafficking in international waters, stating:
``Our laws are clear: You can refuse illegal orders.''
Despite such a statement being consistent with decisions in United
States v. Kennan, 1969, and United States v. Calley, 1973, Secretary
Hegseth weaponized the Department of Defense to retaliate against and
intimidate Senator Mark Kelly for such a statement. Secretary Hegseth
did so despite the fact that Senator Kelly is a sitting United States
Senator who cannot fulfill his role in representative government if he
fears executive branch reprisals for expressing his views.
As the Supreme Court held in Bond v. Floyd, 1966, representative
government requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to
express their views on issues of policy.
{time} 1300
Members of Congress, moreover, enjoy Speech or Debate immunity under
Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, and
Senator Kelly, as a retired servicemember, is entitled to the full
breadth of First Amendment protection.
Using the powers of his office, Secretary Hegseth retaliated against
and sought to intimidate United States Senator Mark Kelly for his
statement through a scheme or course of conduct intended to interfere
with Congress' constitutional authority to oversee the executive
branch, grossly expand Article II power at the expense of both the
legislative and judicial branches of government, and establish a
precedent that would chill the protected speech of millions of retired
United States servicemembers and inflict irreparable harm upon their
First Amendment freedoms.
Secretary Hegseth engaged in this scheme or course of conduct through
the following means:
On November 24, 2025, the Department of Defense, through a social
media post on X, threatened that Senator Mark Kelly could be recalled
to Active Duty for court-martial proceedings or administrative measures
for his statement.
On November 25, 2025, Secretary Hegseth directed the Secretary of the
Navy to review Senator Kelly.
On January 5, 2026, Secretary Hegseth issued a Secretarial Letter of
Censure against Senator Kelly for: saying, you can refuse illegal
orders; saying he would ``always defend the Constitution''; questioning
the legality of military operations as a member of the Senate Armed
Services and Intelligence Committees; criticizing military leadership,
Hegseth, for surrounding themselves, himself, with ``yes men''; and
accusing Secretary Hegseth of war crimes.
In the letter of censure, Secretary Hegseth also threatened Senator
Kelly with criminal prosecution or further administrative action,
including the reduction of Senator Kelly's retired military grade
should the Senator continue to question the legality of military
operations or criticize Secretary Hegseth.
In response to a January 12, 2026, complaint filed by Senator Mark
Kelly against Secretary Hegseth for retaliating against and
intimidating the Senator for his First Amendment-protected speech,
Secretary Hegseth filed a memorandum of opposition to Senator Kelly's
motion for preliminary injunction, egregiously asserting that: A,
Senator Kelly, as retired naval officer, has diminished First Amendment
protections; B, Department of Defense actions against Senator Kelly's
constitutional rights due to his statements relating to military
affairs, and his being a retired naval officer, constitute
nonjusticiable military personnel decisions; C, Secretary Hegseth's
opinions supersede the court's jurisdiction on determining whether the
government could censure, threaten, and financially punish Senator
Kelly because of his speech; and D, Senator Kelly is required to
exhaust military administrative remedies before seeking relief in an
Article III court, thereby seeking to place the adjudication of Senator
Kelly's constitutional rights within military processes controlled by
the executive branch.
Thus, in addition to abusing the powers of the Office of Secretary of
Defense for politically motivated reprisal against Senator Kelly for
the Senator's criticism of conduct implicating potential war crimes,
Secretary Hegseth grossly violated, or sought to violate, the
separation of powers by attempting to subordinate both the legislative
and judicial branches, in matters concerning constitutional rights, to
the authority of the Department of Defense. In the same effort,
Secretary Hegseth sought, without precedent, to extend to retired
servicemembers the diminished First Amendment protections applicable to
Active-Duty servicemembers under Parker v. Levy, 1974, including
retired servicemembers serving in Congress and exercising
constitutional oversight over the military.
He further asserted, in substance, that the military, rather than
Article III courts, possesses supremacy to determine the constitutional
rights of civilians and to adjudicate whether its own actions conform
to the Constitution and the laws of the United States, at minimum with
respect to the speech of retired servicemembers, such position being in
flagrant conflict with Marbury v. Madison, 1803, which holds that it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is, not the military.
The result of such effort, had Secretary Hegseth been successful,
would have subjected the speech and congressional oversight activities
of nearly 20 percent of the current Congress, and whatever proportion
of future Congresses may consist of retired servicemembers, as well as
the speech of millions of other retired servicemembers, to the will and
discretion of the Department of Defense, without any immediate avenue
of recourse outside the department to vindicate their constitutional
rights. Such a result would constitute one of the most extraordinary
expansions of executive branch power in the history of the United
States.
In all of this, Secretary Hegseth abused the powers of the Department
of Defense by retaliating against, and attempting to intimidate, a
sitting United States Senator through threats of punishment for speech
protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in
an effort to deter that Senator from fulfilling his constitutional role
in overseeing the executive branch.
In doing so, Secretary Hegseth weaponized the Department of Defense
to chill a core function of the legislative branch, encroach upon the
constitutional role of the judicial branch by seeking to insulate such
retaliation from meaningful judicial review, and, through the precedent
he sought to establish, place the First Amendment rights of millions of
United States veterans at risk of irreparable harm.
Wherefore, Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth, by such conduct, has
demonstrated that he will remain a threat to the Constitution and the
separation of powers if allowed to remain in office, and has acted in a
manner grossly incompatible with his duties, the rule of law, and the
constitutional liberties entrusted to his protection.
Peter Brian Hegseth thus warrants impeachment and trial, removal from
office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor,
trust, or profit under the United States.
Article VII: kidnapping of a sovereign foreign leader: The
Constitution provides that the House of Representatives shall have the
sole power of impeachment and that civil officers of the United States,
including the Secretary of Defense, shall be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors. In his conduct of the Office of Secretary of
Defense, and in violation of his constitutional oath to faithfully
execute the Office of Secretary of Defense and, to the best of his
ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed, especially during the commission of
war, Peter Brian Hegseth has abused the powers of the Department of
Defense, in that:
Using the powers of his office, Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth
directed the Department of Defense to carry out an unprecedented
military operation--code-named Absolute Resolve--to capture and kidnap
President Nicolas Maduro, the leader of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, and his wife, Cilia Flores, from Venezuela, an act of war
against a sovereign country executed under the guise of narcotics law
enforcement, though in actuality intended to assert U.S. control over
Venezuela's oil reserves. In doing so, he gambled the lives of Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel in order to facilitate the
illegal taking of national oil.
To wit, immediately following such attack, Secretary Hegseth appeared
alongside President Donald J. Trump, during which the President
announced, in reference to Venezuela, we are going to run the country
until such time as we can do a safe, proper, and judicious transaction.
So we don't want to be involved with having somebody else get in, and
we have the same situation that we had. We are going to run it
essentially, and ``we are going to have our very large United States
oil companies, the biggest anywhere in the world, go in . . . and start
making money . . . and we are ready to stage a second and much larger
attack if we need to do so.'' Thus, revealing the motives behind the
forcible removal of President Maduro, which extended far beyond the
narcotics law enforcement rationale on which the operation was falsely
predicated.
{time} 1310
On January 3, 2026, Secretary Hegseth directed the United States
Armed Forces into hostilities in and around Caracas, Venezuela,
employing more than 200 United States Special Operations personnel on
the ground and more than 150 aircraft and drones, including fighter
aircraft, bombers, armed helicopters, and electronic warfare aircraft,
supported by substantial naval force that included the Iwo Jima
Amphibious Ready Group and the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group,
which together, penetrated Venezuelan territory, suppressed and
destroyed Venezuelan air defenses, struck multiple targets in the
Caracas area, inserted an armed ground force into Caracas to seize
Maduro, successfully kidnapped Maduro, killed at least 83 people,
including several civilians, and caused 7 American casualties. In doing
so:
Secretary Hegseth executed unlawful orders effecting the removal of
the President of a sovereign nation, placed boots on the ground,
conducted preparatory bombardments, inflicted substantial casualties,
and subsequently caused regime change, each of which constitutes an act
of war.
Secretary Hegseth executed unlawful orders violating Article I,
Section 8, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution by:
Ordering United States Armed Forces to commit acts of war against
Venezuela without a declaration of war by Congress against such nation;
and
Making rules concerning captures on land, a power specifically vested
in Congress, where Congress had made no rules authorizing or otherwise
applicable to such operation; and
Secretary Hegseth executed unlawful orders in contravention of
section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, section 1541(c) of
title 50, United States Code, by entering United States Armed Forces
into hostilities in Venezuela on January 3, 2026, without a declaration
of war, a specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency
created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its Armed Forces.
Through these actions, Secretary Hegseth knowingly directed United
States Armed Forces into hostilities against a sovereign nation,
without clear constitutional or specific statutory authority, employing
military force of a nature and magnitude rising to the level of
constitutional war. In doing so, Secretary Hegseth usurped Congress'
congressional authority over war and transformed the Department of
Defense into an instrument for objectives extending far beyond the
apprehension of Nicolas Maduro for purposes of narcotics law
enforcement, including regime change and the acquisition of foreign
oil.
In all of this, Secretary Hegseth abused the powers of the Department
of Defense, violated the laws and treaty obligations of the United
States, and subordinated the constitutional allocation of war powers to
executive objectives neither authorized nor approved by Congress.
Wherefore, Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth, by such conduct, has
demonstrated that he will remain a threat to the Constitution and the
well-being of United States military personnel if allowed to remain in
office, and has acted in a manner grossly incompatible with his duties
and the rule of law. Peter Brian Hegseth thus warrants impeachment and
trial, removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.
Article VIII: unlawful war in Yemen: The Constitution provides that
the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment
and that civil officers of the United States, including the Secretary
of Defense, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
In his conduct while Secretary of Defense, Peter Brian Hegseth, in
violation of his oath to support and defend the Constitution of the
United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed--especially with regard to the
commission of war--has abused the powers of the Department of Defense
in that:
Using the powers of his office, Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth
directed the Department of Defense in a manner leading to the deaths of
an estimated 224 civilians, as well as approximately 500 to 600 Houthi
fighters, through the initiation and direction of Operation Rough
Rider. The operation comprised more than 1,100 strikes against targets
in Yemen over approximately 52 days. In less than 8 weeks, there were
nearly as many civilian deaths in Yemen as the United States military
actions had caused in that country during the preceding 23 years.
Secretary Hegseth initiated and directed those hostilities in the
absence of any of the predicates required in section 2(c) of the War
Powers Resolution of 1973 for the President to introduce United States
Armed Forces into hostilities. Moreover, Secretary Hegseth acknowledged
the absence of any imminent threat to the United States, further
undermining any assertion Article II authority to initiate such
hostilities without congressional authorization.
Secretary Hegseth initiated and directed Operation Rough Rider
without congressional authority pursuant to Article I, Section 8,
Clause 11 of the United States Constitution, or statutory
authorization, in that:
Secretary Hegseth executed unlawful orders in contravention of
section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, section 1541(c) of
title 50, United States Code, by entering and sustaining United States
Navy and Air Force personnel into hostilities in Yemen between March 15
and May 6, 2025, without a declaration of war, a specific statutory
authorization, or a national emergency created by attack upon the
United States, its territories or possessions, or its Armed Forces.
Secretary Hegseth executed unlawful orders in contravention of
section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, section 1543(a) of
title 50, United States Code, by continuing to direct United States
Armed Forces into hostilities in Yemen after March 17, 2025, despite
the President of the United States having failed to notify Congress of
such hostilities within 48 hours of their commencement, as required by
section 4(a), and notwithstanding that the President did not transmit
such a report to Congress until March 28, 2025, thereby further
undermining any possible Article II authority for the continued
hostilities, especially during such 13-day period.
Outside of the requirements to engage in hostilities pursuant to the
War Powers Resolution of 1973, Secretary Hegseth directed Operation
Rough Rider in the absence of any imminent threat requiring military
action without prior congressional authorization, as evidenced by a
leaked Signal chat involving Secretary Hegseth, concerning the
potential execution of Operation Rough Rider, in which:
Several senior United States Government officials, including
Secretary Hegseth, each possessing unfettered access to military and
intelligence information, advised there was no immediate need to enter
the United States Armed Forces into hostilities in Yemen, thereby
asserting there was no imminent threat to the United States, its
possessions or territories, or its Armed Forces, including:
Vice President JD Vance stating: ``There is a strong argument for
delaying a month'';
Then-Acting Chief of Staff to the National Security Advisor Joe Kent
stating: ``There is nothing time sensitive driving this timeline. We
will have the exact same options in a month'';
Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe stating: ``A
delay would not negatively impact us and additional time would be used
to identify better starting points for coverage on Houthi leadership'';
Addressing the timing of Operation Rough Rider, Secretary Hegseth
himself stated: ``We can easily pause''; and
Addressing the Vice President's concerns regarding Operation Rough
Rider's immediate commencement, Secretary Hegseth stated: ``VP, I
understand your concerns . . . two immediate risks on waiting: One,
this leaks and we look indecisive; two, Israel takes action first--or
Gaza ceasefire falls apart''--and we don't get to start this war on our
terms; I am sorry--``and we don't get to start this on our own terms. .
. . This is not about the Houthis'' reestablish--``reestablishing
deterrence which Biden cratered.''
{time} 1320
Thus, Secretary Hegseth knew there was no imminent threat to the
United States, its territories or possessions, or its Armed Forces, as,
had such a threat existed, there would have been no basis for him to
state that: ``We can easily pause.'' Moreover, the only immediate risks
identified by Secretary Hegseth concerned media optics and Israeli
affairs rather than the direct affairs of the United States of America,
the Nation to which his oath is sworn.
In all of this, Secretary Hegseth abused the powers entrusted to him
as Secretary of Defense by subordinating the constitutional limits on
the use of military force and the laws governing the conduct of
hostilities to his own policy objectives, notwithstanding his knowledge
that no imminent threat to the United States existed, and demonstrated
a profound disregard for civilian life, the rule of law, the
constitutional authority of Congress, and his duty to ensure the lawful
conduct of the United States Armed Forces.
Wherefore, Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth, by such conduct, has
demonstrated that he will remain a threat to civilians, the lawful
conduct of United States military operations, the integrity and
credibility of the United States Armed Forces, and the Constitution if
allowed to remain in office, and has acted in a manner grossly
incompatible with his duties and the rule of law. Peter Brian Hegseth
thus warrants impeachment and trial, removal from office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the United States.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Onder). Under rule IX, a resolution
offered from the floor by a Member other than the majority leader or
the minority leader as a question of the privileges of the House has
immediate precedence only at a time designated by the Chair within 2
legislative days after the resolution is properly noticed.
Pending that designation, the form of the resolution noticed by the
gentleman from Kentucky will appear in the Record at this point.
The Chair will not at this point determine whether the resolution
constitutes a question of privilege. That determination will be made at
the time designated for consideration of the resolution.
____________________