[Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3836-S3840]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 6639. Mr. BARRASSO (for himself and Mrs. Shaheen) submitted an
amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities
of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for
defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which
was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the appropriate place in title XII, insert the
following:
Subtitle __--Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026
SEC. __1. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Strategic Subsea Cables
Act of 2026''.
SEC. __2. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the
term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Select Committee
on Intelligence, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(3) Appropriate federal agencies.--The term ``appropriate
Federal agencies'' means the following:
(A) The Department of Commerce.
(B) The Department of Defense.
(C) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(D) The Department of State.
(E) The Federal Communications Commission.
(F) The Department of the Treasury.
(G) The Department of Justice.
(H) Any additional Federal agencies, as determined by the
President.
(4) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical
undersea infrastructure'' refers to both subsea
communications infrastructure and subsea energy
infrastructure.
(5) Interagency committee.--The term ``interagency
committee'' means the entity established under section
__1(b).
(6) Non-federal entity.--The term ``non-Federal entity''
means any nongovernmental entity that is an individual,
organization, or business involved in the operation,
maintenance, repair, or construction of critical undersea
infrastructure, including critical undersea infrastructure
owners.
[[Page S3837]]
(7) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means any act, or
attempt to commit such an act, undertaken with the intent to
cause damage to, or substantial interruption or impairment
of, the safe and reliable operation of, critical undersea
infrastructure, including by materially degrading the
confidentiality, availability, and integrity of data
transmitted via subsea communications infrastructure.
(8) Subsea energy infrastructure.--The term ``subsea energy
infrastructure'' means a subsea cable, pipeline, or other
equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed,
including--
(A) to transmit electricity, including via subsea
electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or
equipment related to the support of offshore energy
production installations;
(B) to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between
land-based or off-shore infrastructure; and
(C) associated landing stations and facilities.
(9) Subsea communications infrastructure.--The term
``subsea communications infrastructure'' has the same meaning
as ``submarine cable system'', as defined in section
1.70001(h) of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, and any
subsequent update to such meaning.
PART I--INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON CRITICAL UNDERSEA
INFRASTRUCTURE
SEC. __1. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a
growing threat to United States and allied security and
economic prosperity.
(2) In recent years, numerous critical undersea
infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, including--
(A) in January 2022, the reported damage to subsea
communications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian
mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, home of
SvalSAT, the largest commercial satellite ground station on
Earth;
(B) in February 2023, the reported damage to subsea
communications infrastructure connecting the main island of
Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;
(C) in October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-
Estonia Balticconnector natural gas pipeline spanning the
Gulf of Finland, in addition to the reported damage to subsea
communications cables connecting Estonia and Sweden and
Finland and Estonia;
(D) in November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-
to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea communications cables and the
Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea communications cable in the
central Baltic Sea;
(E) in December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-
to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable
and nearby subsea communications cables in the Gulf of
Finland;
(F) in January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-
Pacific Express subsea communications cable connecting Taiwan
to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan;
(G) in February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea
communications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan
with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;
(H) in January 2026, the reported damage to subsea
communications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea
linking Liepaja and Sventoji; and
(I) in January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable
connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel named the
Fitburg.
(3) In February 2024, NATO Defense Ministers established
the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to coordinate
information and threat intelligence sharing among private and
public sector actors to protect critical undersea
infrastructure.
(4) In January 2025, following critical undersea
infrastructure sabotage in the Baltic Sea in December 2024,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched Baltic
Sentry to strengthen the protection of critical undersea
infrastructure.
(5) On February 21, 2025, the European Union published an
EU Action Plan on Cable Security to include the development
and deployment of an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for
Submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub
in the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated
surveillance approach.
(6) The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN)
published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair
of Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to
``build a secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable
network'' and ``to facilitate the expeditious deployment,
repair, maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine
cables, between ASEAN Member States''.
(7) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United
States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its
commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and
Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for
digital infrastructure collaboration, organizing a subsea
cables forum to be hosted by the United States and India and
encouraging regulatory harmonization between Quad partners.
Through this initiative, the Quad seeks to defend and promote
resilient, secure, and transparent digital infrastructure
across the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. __2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) critical undersea infrastructure represents vital
strategic and economic links between the United States and
its partners and allies;
(2) according to NATO, ``undersea cables carry an estimated
$10 trillion in transfers every day; two-thirds of the
world's oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported
by sea; and around 95 percent of global data flows are
transmitted via undersea cables'';
(3) since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022,
there has been a marked increase in high-profile suspected
sabotage incidents resulting in damage to critical undersea
infrastructure, especially across Northern Europe and East
Asia;
(4) private sector owners and operators of critical
undersea infrastructure are responsible for the installation,
maintenance, security, and repair of critical undersea
infrastructure, and the role of the United States Government
is to support, not supplant, those responsibilities through
domestic and international coordination, including with the
private sector and allied foreign governments, to improve
security, threat detection, and incident response to address
sabotage and policies that undermine critical undersea
infrastructure resilience;
(5) the United States Government has an important role to
play in supporting international bodies concerned with the
protection of critical undersea infrastructure, including
promoting network resilience and redundancy, and encouraging
the implementation of appropriate standards and best
practices in support of these goals;
(6) the United States Government should deepen its
contribution to multilateral efforts to protect critical
undersea infrastructure, including appropriate participation
in NATO initiatives such as the NATO Maritime Centre for the
Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, the Critical
Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, the Critical
Undersea Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU Task Force
on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, allied maritime
security efforts such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, Indo-
Pacific initiatives, including the Quad Partnership for Cable
Connectivity and Resilience, and international organizations
such as the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC),
in order to advance United States national security and
economic interests; and
(7) the United States should work with allies and partners
to support the private sector deployment of resilient
critical undersea infrastructure networks, enhance shared
situational awareness, strengthen joint preparedness, and
formalize coordinated responses among allies and partners
through improved information sharing and cooperation with
private sector owners and operators to prevent, deter, and
mitigate sabotage.
SEC. __3. ENHANCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT WITH
RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO SAFEGUARD
UNITED STATES INTERESTS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination
with the interagency committee, as appropriate, shall seek to
deepen United States Government engagement with relevant
international bodies to advance United States national
security and economic interests as it relates to critical
undersea infrastructure.
(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years,
the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees that includes the
following:
(1) A description of how strengthened United States
Government engagement with relevant international bodies,
including in coordination with the United States domestic
subsea cable industry, could support United States national
security objectives as it relates to the protection of
critical undersea infrastructure.
(2) A description of key objectives for promoting and
protecting United States national security interests within
relevant international bodies.
(3) A description of how the People's Republic of China
entities leverage their engagement with relevant
international bodies to further their strategic interests.
(4) A description of how encouraging other countries and
regional bodies to engage with relevant international bodies
can better ensure coordinated, consistent global critical
undersea infrastructure policies.
(5) A description of international bodies relevant for
critical undersea infrastructure where the United States
should increase its diplomatic engagement.
SEC. __4. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL
UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.
(a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall
impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect
to any foreign person that the President determines, on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible
for acts of sabotage or knowingly facilitates acts of
sabotage against critical undersea infrastructure,
including--
(1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of
which knowingly--
(A) commits acts of sabotage; or
(B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support,
security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act
of sabotage; and
[[Page S3838]]
(2) any foreign person that the President determines
knowingly--
(A) owns, operates, or manages the vessel or entity
described in paragraph (1);
(B) provides underwriting services or insurance or
reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;
(C) facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to
support a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1);
(D) provides port or logistics services or facilities for
technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or
retrofitting or tethering of, a vessel described in paragraph
(1) for the purpose of evading sanctions;
(E) provides documentation, registration, or flagging
services for a vessel described in paragraph (1) for the
purpose of evading sanctions; or
(F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior
leadership of such a vessel or entity.
(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President may exercise all
of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary
to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
interests in property of a foreign person described in
subsection (a), if such property and interests in property
are in the United States, come within the United States, or
are or come within the possession or control of a United
States person.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien described in
subsection (a) shall be--
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to
enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into
the United States or to receive any other benefit under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--The visa or other entry documentation of
an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked,
regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is
or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under clause (i)
shall--
(I) take effect immediately; and
(II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry
documentation that is in the possession of the alien.
(c) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702
and 1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in subsections
(b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to any
person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to
violate, or causes a violation of any prohibition of this
section, or an order or regulation prescribed under this
section, to the same extent that such penalties apply to a
person that commits an unlawful act described in section
206(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(a)).
(d) Exceptions.--
(1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters
agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under
this section shall not apply with respect to an alien if
admitting or paroling the alien is necessary--
(A) to permit the United States to comply with the
Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force
November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United
States, or other applicable international obligations of the
United States; or
(B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement
activity in the United States.
(2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.--
Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity
subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any
authorized intelligence activities of the United States.
(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--The authorities and requirements to impose
sanctions under this section shall not include the authority
or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of
goods.
(B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term ``good''
means any article, natural or manmade substance, material,
supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test
equipment, and excluding technical data.
(4) Exception for humanitarian assistance.--Sanctions under
this section shall not apply to--
(A) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the
provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine,
medical devices, or humanitarian assistance, or for
humanitarian purposes; or
(B) transactions that are necessary for or related to the
activities described in subparagraph (A).
(5) Exception for safety of vessels and crew.--Sanctions
under this section shall not apply with respect to a person
providing provisions to a vessel otherwise subject to
sanctions under this section if such provisions are intended
for the safety and care of the crew aboard the vessel, the
protection of human life aboard the vessel, or the
maintenance of the vessel to avoid any environmental or other
significant damage.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms ``admission'',
``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings given those
terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C. 1101).
(2) Agricultural commodity.--The term ``agricultural
commodity'' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of
the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
(3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an
individual or entity that is not a United States person.
(4) Medicine.--The term ``medicine'' has the meaning given
the term ``drug'' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
(5) Medical device.--The term ``medical device'' has the
meaning given the term ``device'' in section 201 of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
(6) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States
or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including
any foreign branch of such an entity; or
(C) any person in the United States.
(f) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may
waive the application of sanctions under this section if,
before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees--
(1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the
waiver is in the national security interests of the United
States; and
(2) a report, including an optional classified annex,
explaining the basis for the certification.
SEC. __5. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) Report.--To ensure appropriate deterrence, escalation
management, and responses related to critical undersea
infrastructure, not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years,
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),
in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies,
shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional
committees that includes the following:
(1) A description, with respect to the applicable reporting
period, of the subsea cable manufacturing, installation, and
maintenance capabilities of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) and the Russian Federation.
(2) An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and
activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research
(GUGI) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
including--
(A) a description of GUGI's use of ostensibly civilian
research vessels to conduct critical undersea infrastructure
seabed warfare, and potential sabotage;
(B) an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability
of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as
well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions; and
(C) a list of suspected GUGI research or scientific
vessels, including vessel names and International Maritime
Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity numbers,
and related equipment that are suspected of engaging in dual-
use operations and probing of critical undersea
infrastructure.
(3) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and
activities of the People's Liberation Army, the PRC Coast
Guard, the China Ship Scientific Research Center, HMN
Technologies, and other PRC-based entities, including
unmarked or dual-use maritime militia or commercial vessels
related to monitoring and sabotage of critical undersea
infrastructure, including--
(A) a description of recent capability developments related
to sabotaging critical undersea infrastructure, including for
both deep-sea and littoral purposes; and
(B) a description of the PRC's use of ostensibly civilian
fishing, merchant, and research vessels for sabotage of
critical undersea infrastructure, including in the Indo-
Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the Western
Hemisphere.
(4) An assessment of cooperation between the Russian
Federation and the PRC on sabotage of critical undersea
infrastructure, including--
(A) any current or planned operational coordination against
United States or allied and partner nation targets;
(B) any joint research, development, testing, or evaluation
of critical undersea infrastructure sabotage or seabed
warfare capabilities;
(C) any technology transfers or joint training related to
critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage, or
seabed warfare; and
(D) any coordination in procurement of advanced
technologies related to critical undersea infrastructure
sabotage, seabed warfare, or circumvention of sanctions
against the Russian Federation.
(5) A list of instances during the previous calendar year
in which the United States, or allies and partners of the
United States, documented anomalous behavior from vessels,
either flagged, crewed, or operated by the
[[Page S3839]]
PRC or Russia, around critical undersea infrastructure,
including--
(A) any official United States Government response to
counter the anomalous behavior; and
(B) any coordinated diplomatic action with allies and
partners.
(6) An assessment of the extent to which PRC-based entities
are involved in laying, maintaining, and repairing United
States-invested cables.
(b) Initial and Subsequent Reports.--The initial report
required under subsection (a) shall cover the period between
January 1, 2022, through the date of the enactment of this
Act. Subsequent reports required by subsection (a) shall
cover the previous calendar year for the reporting period.
(c) Classification.--The report required under subsection
(a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. __6. ENGAGING FOREIGN PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN THE
SECURITY OF CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as international critical undersea infrastructure
expands, the complexity of the deployment and protection of
subsea cables is increasing, which can create operational and
security vulnerabilities that, if exploited, may have
national security implications for the United States and
foreign partners;
(2) the United States, together with its allies and
partners, is well positioned to offer technical, material,
and other forms of support to international partners to
enhance the resilience of international critical undersea
infrastructure;
(3) the United States Government should enhance its
diplomatic engagement with trusted allies to support foreign
governments and private industry efforts to improve the
timely and effective deployment and protection of critical
undersea infrastructure; and
(4) given the importance of critical undersea
infrastructure to United States and allied energy security
and prosperity, adversaries are increasingly prioritizing
capabilities designed to target United States and allied
subsea energy infrastructure.
(b) Commitment of Personnel and Resources.--The Secretary
of State shall devote sufficient personnel and resources
towards--
(1) engaging with foreign countries, in coordination with
other relevant Federal agencies and private industry, to
promote international cooperation on the security and
resilience of critical undersea infrastructure, including by
helping address regulatory and diplomatic obstacles that may
affect the timely deployment and protection by operators; and
(2) working with allies and partners to improve collective
preparedness and response times in the event of sabotage
affecting critical undersea infrastructure, including, as
appropriate, by supporting international coordination
mechanisms that facilitate the timely deployment of cable
repair and support vessels.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next 5
years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with other
relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that outlines efforts by
the United States Government in the prior calendar year to
work with international allies and partners to strengthen the
security and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure,
including--
(1) a list of current foreign policies, laws, or regulatory
practices that may create barriers or constrain the ability
of critical undersea infrastructure operators to install,
maintain, repair, and protect critical undersea
infrastructure and any steps taken through dialogue with
allies and partners to address such challenges; and
(2) a description of the progress made in the previous
calendar year as a result of United States diplomatic
engagement with allies and partners on these issues.
PART II--DEPARTMENT OF STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE EXPERTISE
SEC. __1. EXPANDING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE-RELATED
EXPERTISE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall ensure that
the Department of State has adequate expertise to support the
Department of State's diplomatic and interagency engagement
on matters related to critical undersea infrastructure,
including--
(1) promoting the protection and resilience of critical
undersea infrastructure through international cooperation;
(2) coordinating with United States allies and partners on
foreign policy and security aspects of critical undersea
infrastructure; and
(3) representing United States interests and engagement in
international bodies that address critical undersea
infrastructure.
(b) Assignment.--The Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital
Policy shall ensure that personnel assigned to oversee
critical undersea infrastructure are provided sufficient
time, resources, and ability to carry out those
responsibilities effectively, including, as appropriate, by
prohibiting dual-hatting arrangement that could dilute the
Department's expertise.
(c) Notification.--Not later than 15 days after fulfilling
the expertise requirement in subsection (a), the Secretary of
State shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(d) International Cooperation on Critical Undersea
Infrastructure Sabotage.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on how the United States Government plans to
prioritize diplomatic engagement within relevant
international bodies to encourage and facilitate appropriate
information sharing between allied and partner governments
and relevant private sector companies regarding threats to,
and the sabotage of, critical undersea infrastructure.
PART III--INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION FROM SABOTAGE
SEC. __1. IMPROVING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COORDINATION ON
PROTECTING SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) There is no single agency where subsea cable owners and
operators can engage the United States Government on security
and resilience, including to seek coordinated assistance in
identifying and addressing shared risks to subsea
communications infrastructure.
(2) United States Federal Government responsibilities for
the protection of subsea communications infrastructure,
damage reporting, information and intelligence sharing, and
emergency response are spread across multiple departments and
agencies.
(3) In order to ensure United States agencies and
departments appropriately account for the risks to subsea
communications infrastructure and provide timely and
coordinated support when warranted, the United States
Government should improve interagency coordination and share
risk assessments and best practices with the subsea
communications infrastructure industry, while respecting the
industry's primary responsibility for security risk
mitigation, investment, and operational decision-making.
(b) Establishment.--Not later than one year after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish
an interagency committee (referred to in this subtitle as the
``interagency committee'') comprised of the heads, or their
designees, of the appropriate Federal agencies and
departments, to coordinate the United States Government
efforts to--
(1) promote awareness of and support for the protection and
resilience of subsea communications infrastructure;
(2) facilitate voluntary collaboration and information
sharing with relevant non-Federal entities, including
relevant members of the subsea communications infrastructure
industry, to identify and address shared challenges to subsea
communications infrastructure security and resilience;
(3) coordinate United States Government policies related to
subsea communications infrastructure security and resilience;
and
(4) address other matters related to subsea communications
infrastructure deemed appropriate and necessary by the
President.
(c) Coordination.--The President shall direct the
interagency committee to conduct an overview of the United
States Federal Government's operational authorities for
subsea communications security and resilience. The overview
shall include an interagency concept of operations describing
how Federal departments and agencies will coordinate with one
another and, on a voluntary basis, partner with non-Federal
entities, including subsea communications owners and
operators, to support the security and repair of subsea
communications infrastructure in a variety of crisis
scenarios.
(d) Analysis of Subsea Communications Infrastructure
Sabotage.--
(1) In general.--The President shall direct the heads of
the appropriate Federal agencies to develop strategies to
coordinate closely within the interagency process and, on a
voluntary basis, with subsea communications industry
stakeholders to review sabotage and other threats to subsea
communications infrastructure, including where appropriate
and consistent with applicable law and voluntary information-
sharing arrangements, by leveraging analysis from aggregated
industry data, to--
(A) identify trends;
(B) refine attributions, particularly in cases of subsea
communications infrastructure sabotage;
(C) identify geographic areas where subsea communications
infrastructure may face elevated risk;
(D) identify Federal Government functions and private
sector engagement methods that can support, rather than
direct, the security of subsea communications infrastructure;
and
(E) inform future risk mitigation efforts by Federal
departments and agencies to support industry-led measures to
reduce damage to subsea communications infrastructure.
(2) Strategy elements.--The strategies required under
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) resourcing requirements to carry out the activities
described in paragraph (1);
(B) coordination with United States allies and partners and
relevant subsea communications infrastructure industry
stakeholders; and
[[Page S3840]]
(C) the necessary technical expertise within the Federal
Government to contribute to the analysis of subsea
communications infrastructure sabotage.
(e) Report.--Not later than 30 days after establishing the
required interagency committee under subsection (b), the
President shall submit to Congress a report that includes the
following elements:
(1) Any resources required to sufficiently staff the
interagency committee and United States Federal agencies
overseeing the objectives outlined in subsection (b).
(2) A detailed plan for how the interagency committee will
advance the objectives outlined in subsection (b).
SEC. __2. STRENGTHENING INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR
STAKEHOLDERS ON SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Public-private Sector Information Sharing.--Consistent
with the necessary protections of classified information, the
sourcing of relevant intelligence material, and privacy and
civil liberties, all appropriate Federal agencies shall, in
direct coordination with the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, and, as appropriate, with intelligence
sharing partnerships with trusted allies, issue procedures--
(1) to enable the timely sharing of classified information
regarding subsea communications infrastructure sabotage, any
indications of potential sabotage, and other threats to
subsea communications infrastructure with non-Federal
entities that possess the necessary security clearances;
(2) to facilitate the timely sharing between members of the
interagency committee and non-Federal entities of information
related to subsea communications infrastructure sabotage,
information relating to indications of potential sabotage, or
other threats when such information can be declassified and
shared at an unclassified level;
(3) to promote the timely sharing by members of the
interagency committee to non-Federal entities, and the
voluntary, cooperative sharing by non-Federal entities to
members of the interagency committee, of unclassified,
including controlled unclassified, information regarding
subsea communications infrastructure sabotage, indications of
potential sabotage, and other threats to subsea
communications infrastructure; and
(4) to support the prevention or mitigation of adverse
effects from sabotage or other threats to subsea
communications infrastructure through the timely sharing by
members of the interagency committee to non-Federal entities,
and the voluntary cooperative sharing by non-Federal entities
to members of the interagency committee, when and if
appropriate, of information relating to indications of
potential subsea communications infrastructure sabotage.
(b) Development of Procedures.--The procedures developed in
accordance with this section shall--
(1) ensure the Federal departments and agencies that are
members of the interagency committee have and maintain the
capacity to identify and inform in near real time information
regarding subsea communications infrastructure sabotage and
indications of potential subsea communications infrastructure
sabotage to other appropriate Federal agencies or non-Federal
entities consistent with the protection of classified
information;
(2) incorporate, whenever possible, existing processes,
roles, and responsibilities of members of the interagency
committee and non-Federal entities for information sharing,
including subsea communications infrastructure-specific
information sharing and analysis entities; and
(3) require members of the interagency committee and other
appropriate Federal agencies which are sharing subsea
communications infrastructure sabotage indicators or
defensive measures to employ any applicable security controls
to defend against unauthorized access to or acquisition of
such information.
(c) Submittal to Congress.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the members of the
interagency committee, shall--
(1) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, submit to the appropriate congressional
committees the procedures required under subsection (b); and
(2) not later than one year after submitting such
procedures, and annually thereafter for 5 years, submit to
Congress a report on the implementation and execution of
information sharing with non-Federal entities in the previous
year pursuant to subsection (a).
PART IV--LIMITATIONS AND RULE OF CONSTRUCTION
SEC. __1. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed--
(1) to confer any new regulatory authority on, or to modify
any existing regulatory of, any Federal department or agency
with respect to owners and operators of critical undersea
infrastructure, to authorize the provision of subsidies to
critical undersea infrastructure, or to alter the
responsibility of the private sector for the deployment,
operation, maintenance, security, and repair of critical
undersea infrastructure;
(2) to involuntarily require non-Federal entities to share
proprietary or confidential business information with the
United States Government;
(3) to alter existing statutory authorities or criteria
governing communications services, or the licensing
permitting, or authorization of submarine cable landings,
spectrum, or domestic communications regulation, including
any requirements under the Act of May 27, 1921 (47 U.S.C. 34
et seq.; commonly known as the ``Cable Landing Licensing
Act'') or related statutes;
(4) to create any new requirement that non-Federal entities
obtain additional Federal approvals, beyond those already
required under existing law, before planning, constructing,
operating, maintaining, or repairing critical undersea
infrastructure; or
(5) to authorize any Federal department or agency to
direct, approve, or veto the day-to-day operational decisions
of owners or operators of critical undersea infrastructure,
including route selection, maintenance scheduling, or other
commercial decisions except as expressly provided by other
applicable law.
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