[Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3754-S3769]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 6574. Mr. COTTON (for himself and Mr. Warner) submitted an
amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities
of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for
defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which
was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
DIVISION __--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This division may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this
division is as follows:
DIVISION __--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--MATTERS RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 301. Appointment of Deputy Director of National Intelligence and
Assistant Directors of National Intelligence.
Sec. 302. Repeal of National Intelligence Management Council.
Sec. 303. Repeal of various positions, units, centers, councils, and
offices.
Sec. 304. Limitation on domestic activities at the National
Counterterrorism Center.
Sec. 305. Timely provision of security direction to intelligence
community whistleblowers.
Sec. 306. No police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal
security functions for Director of National Intelligence.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Modification relating to security personnel at certain
installations.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
Sec. 501. Authority of National Security Agency to correlate, evaluate,
and disseminate certain intelligence.
Sec. 502. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with and
by the National Reconnaissance Office.
Sec. 503. Modification of annual report on Federal Bureau of
Investigation case data.
Sec. 504. Establishment of Office of Counterintelligence.
Sec. 505. Role of National Security Agency in collection and analysis
of signals intelligence.
TITLE VI--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 601. Amendments to presidential appointments for intelligence
community positions.
Sec. 602. Analytic standards for all-source intelligence products.
Sec. 603. Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship
Program.
Sec. 604. Countering hostile foreign cyber actors as a national
intelligence priority.
Sec. 605. Notification of criminal referrals regarding current or
former intelligence community employees.
Sec. 606. Modification of definitions in National Security Act of 1947
and scope of intelligence sharing responsibilities of
Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 607. Prohibition on intelligence community use of adversary
unmanned ground vehicles.
Sec. 608. China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task Force.
Sec. 609. Limitations relating to Chinese products and services.
[[Page S3755]]
Sec. 610. Biological intelligence activities of the intelligence
community.
Sec. 611. Prohibition on participation in prediction markets.
Sec. 612. Repeal of certain report and briefing requirements.
Sec. 613. Intelligence community personnel travel, allowances, and
related expenses regulations.
Sec. 614. Prohibition on sending and receiving objects using entities
owned or controlled by persons or governments of certain
countries.
Sec. 615. Enhancing intelligence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
region.
Sec. 616. Intelligence activities related to Ukraine.
Sec. 617. Requirements relating to intelligence sharing with countries
and partners of significant importance to the United
States.
Sec. 618. United States-Israel intelligence sharing enhancement.
TITLE VII--ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
Sec. 701. Artificial intelligence exploitation guard and intelligence
sharing.
Sec. 702. Director of National Intelligence review of intelligence
community use of artificial intelligence to support
targeting.
Sec. 703. Improvements for artificial intelligence policies, standards,
and guidance for intelligence community.
Sec. 704. Additional functions and requirements of Artificial
Intelligence Security Center.
Sec. 705. Reports on novel uses of artificial intelligence technology.
Sec. 706. Clear labeling of artificial intelligence outputs for
targeting workflows.
Sec. 707. Research on use of artificial intelligence relating to
inadvertent escalation.
Sec. 708. Research on interaction of adversarial artificial
intelligence systems with intelligence community systems.
Sec. 709. Review of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities
under Vulnerabilities Equities Process.
Sec. 710. Prohibition on certain artificial intelligence models on
intelligence community systems.
TITLE VIII--OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 801. Modification to notification requirements for authorized and
ordered departures.
Sec. 802. Intelligence support to the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation.
Sec. 803. Technical amendments.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this division:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning
given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in such section.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2027 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the Federal Government.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to
be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the
intelligence activities of the Federal Government are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany this division.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,
within the executive branch of the Federal Government.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2027 the sum of $568,000,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In
addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the
Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a),
there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account for fiscal year 2027 such
additional amounts as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
SEC. 104. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund
$514,000,000 for fiscal year 2027.
TITLE III--MATTERS RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
SEC. 301. APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AND ASSISTANT DIRECTORS OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Redesignation of Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence as Deputy Director of National Intelligence.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 103A of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026) is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Principal'';
and
(B) by striking ``Principal'' each place it appears.
(2) Conforming amendments.--Subsection (c) of such section
is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Principal'';
and
(B) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking ``Principal''.
(3) Additional conforming amendment.--
(A) National security act of 1947.--Such Act is further
amended--
(i) in section 103(c)(2) (50 U.S.C. 3025(c)(2)), by
striking ``Principal'';
(ii) in section 103I(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 3034(b)(1)), by
striking ``Principal'';
(iii) in section 106(a)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 3041(a)(2)(A)), by
striking ``Principal''; and
(iv) in section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 3053(b)), by striking
``Principal''.
(B) Damon paul nelson and matthew young pollard
intelligence authorization act for fiscal years 2018, 2019,
and 2020.--Section 6310 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3351b) is amended by striking
``Principal'' each place it appears.
(C) National defense authorization act for fiscal year
2022.--Section 1683(b)(3) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(b)(3))
is amended by striking ``Principal'' both places it appears.
(b) Elimination of Deputy Directors of National
Intelligence and Establishment of Assistant Directors of
National Intelligence.--
(1) In general.--Section 103A(b) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026(b)) is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Deputy'' and
inserting ``Assistant'';
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may'' and all that
follows through the period at the end and inserting the
following: ``is an Assistant Director of National
Intelligence for Mission Integration and an Assistant
Director of National Intelligence for Policy and
Capabilities, who shall be appointed by the Director of
National Intelligence.''; and
(C) in paragraph (2), by striking ``Deputy'' and inserting
``Assistant''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--The National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended--
(A) in section 102A(l)(4)(F) (50 U.S.C. 3024(l)(4)(F)), as
redesignated by section 402(g)(1)(B), by striking ``a
Deputy'' and inserting ``an Assistant''; and
(B) in section 103(c) (50 U.S.C. 3025(c)), by striking
paragraph (3).
(c) References to Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence in Law.--Any reference in law to the Principal
Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall be treated as
a reference to the Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(d) Clerical Amendments.--
(1) Section heading.--Section 103A of such Act (50 U.S.C.
3026) is further amended, in the section heading, by striking
``deputy directors of national intelligence'' and inserting
``deputy director of national intelligence and assistant
directors of national intelligence''.
(2) Table of contents.--The table of contents for such Act,
in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by
striking the item relating to section 103A and inserting the
following:
``Sec. 103A. Deputy Director of National Intelligence and Assistant
Directors of National Intelligence.''.
SEC. 302. REPEAL OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL.
(a) In General.--Section 103M of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3034d) is repealed.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act
is amended by striking the item relating to section 103M.
SEC. 303. REPEAL OF VARIOUS POSITIONS, UNITS, CENTERS,
COUNCILS, AND OFFICES.
(a) Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer.--
[[Page S3756]]
(1) Repeal.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by striking section 103K
(50 U.S.C. 3034b).
(2) Conforming amendment.--Section 103G of such Act (50
U.S.C. 3032) is amended by striking subsection (d).
(3) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such Act
in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by
striking the item relating to section 103K.
(b) Intelligence Community Innovation Unit.--
(1) Termination.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and
wind down the operations of the Intelligence Community
Innovation Unit before the date specified in paragraph (3).
(2) Repeal.--
(A) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended by striking
section 103L (50 U.S.C. 3034c).
(B) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such
Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is
further amended by striking the item relating to section
103L.
(3) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Technical Amendment Regarding Expired Climate Security
Advisory Council.--
(1) Repeal.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended by striking
section 120 (50 U.S.C. 3060).
(2) Conforming amendment.--Section 331 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law
117-81; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended by striking paragraph
(2) and inserting the following:
``(2) The term `climate security' means the effects of
climate change on the following:
``(A) The national security of the United States, including
national security infrastructure.
``(B) Subnational, national, and regional political
stability.
``(C) The security of allies and partners of the United
States.
``(D) Ongoing or potential political violence, including
unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism,
rebellion, revolution, civil war, and interstate war.''.
(3) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such
Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is
further amended by striking the item relating to section 120.
(d) Framework for Cross-Disciplinary Education and
Training.--
(1) Repeal.--Subtitle A of title X of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by striking
section 1002 (50 U.S.C. 3192).
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such
Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is
further amended by striking the item relating to section
1002.
(e) Joint Intelligence Community Council.--
(1) Termination.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council
is terminated.
(2) Conforming amendment.--Title I of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by striking
section 101A (50 U.S.C. 3022).
(3) Repeal of requirement to consult with joint
intelligence community council for national intelligence
program budget.--Section 102A(c)(1)(B) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(c)(1)(B)) is amended by
striking ``, as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of
the Joint Intelligence Community Council,''.
(4) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such Act
in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by
striking the item relating to section 101A.
SEC. 304. LIMITATION ON DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES AT THE NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.
(a) Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence.--Subsection (e)
of section 119 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3056) is amended to read as follows:
``(e) Limitation on Domestic Activities.--The Center may,
consistent with applicable law, the direction of the
President, and the guidelines referred to in section 102A(b),
receive and retain intelligence pertaining to domestic
terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18, United
States Code) only as necessary to enable the Center to
collect, retain, and disseminate intelligence pertaining to
international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title
18, United States Code).''.
SEC. 305. TIMELY PROVISION OF SECURITY DIRECTION TO
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWERS.
(a) Intelligence Community Employees.--Section
103H(k)(5)(D)(ii)(II) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)(D)(ii)(II)) is amended by inserting ``,
unless the Director does not provide such direction not later
than 7 calendar days after the date on which the employee
furnishes the statement required by subclause (I)'' after
``practices''.
(b) Central Intelligence Agency Employees.--Section
17(d)(5)(D)(ii)(II) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)(D)(ii)(II)) is amended by
inserting ``, unless the Director does not provide such
direction not later than 7 calendar days after the date on
which the employee furnishes the statement required by
subclause (I)'' after ``practices''.
SEC. 306. NO POLICE, SUBPOENA, OR LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS OR
INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS FOR DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3024) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(z) No Police, Subpoena, or Law Enforcement Powers or
Internal Security Functions.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall have no police, subpoena, or law
enforcement powers or internal security functions.''.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. MODIFICATION RELATING TO SECURITY PERSONNEL AT
CERTAIN INSTALLATIONS.
Section 15(a)(1)(D) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)(1)(D)) is amended by inserting
``or the National Reconnaissance Office'' after ``Office of
the Director of National Intelligence''.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
SEC. 501. AUTHORITY OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TO CORRELATE,
EVALUATE, AND DISSEMINATE CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 23. AUTHORITY TO CORRELATE, EVALUATE, AND DISSEMINATE
CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE.
``The Director of the National Security Agency may--
``(1) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to
national security; and
``(2) disseminate such intelligence to legislative and
executive branch customers as the Director considers
appropriate.''.
SEC. 502. FUNDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED
WITH AND BY THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 421
the following:
``Sec. 421a. Funds for foreign intelligence activities
conducted with and by the National Reconnaissance Office
``(a) Use of Appropriated Funds.--The Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office may use appropriated funds
available to the National Reconnaissance Office for
intelligence and communications purposes to pay for the
expenses of arrangements with foreign countries for
intelligence activities conducted with and by the National
Reconnaissance Office.
``(b) Use of Funds Other Than Appropriated Funds.--The
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office may use funds
other than appropriated funds to pay for the expenses of
arrangements with foreign countries for intelligence
activities conducted with and by the National Reconnaissance
Office, except that--
``(1) no such funds may be expended, in whole or in part,
by or for the benefit of the Department of Defense for a
purpose for which Congress had previously denied funds;
``(2) proceeds from the sale of items or services may be
used only to purchase replacement items similar to the items
that are sold; and
``(3) the authority provided by this subsection may not be
used to acquire items or services for the principal benefit
of the United States.
``(c) Reports.--
``(1) Use of appropriated funds.--Any funds expended under
the authority of subsection (a) shall be reported, pursuant
to the provisions of title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), to--
``(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
``(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense
of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
``(2) Use of funds other than appropriated funds.--Funds
expended under the authority of subsection (b) shall be
reported to the committees described in paragraph (1)
pursuant to procedures jointly agreed upon by such committees
and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of such subchapter is amended by inserting after
the item relating to section 421 the following:
``421a. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with and by
the National Reconnaissance Office.''.
SEC. 503. MODIFICATION OF ANNUAL REPORT ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION CASE DATA.
Section 512A(b)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3111a(b)(6)) is amended by striking ``country
affiliation'' and inserting ``terrorist organization''.
SEC. 504. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
Section 311 of title 31, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (2), the following new
paragraph (3):
[[Page S3757]]
``(3) identify and mitigate counterintelligence threats to
the Department of the Treasury; and''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(c) Office of Counterintelligence.--There is established,
within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Office of
Counterintelligence, which shall be responsible for
implementing the policies and procedures across the bureaus
of the Department of the Treasury required to carry out the
counterintelligence responsibilities described in subsection
(a).''.
SEC. 505. ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN COLLECTION AND
ANALYSIS OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 23. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.
``The Director of the National Security Agency shall--
``(1) provide overall direction for and coordination of the
collection and analysis of signals intelligence by elements
of the intelligence community authorized to undertake such
collection and analysis; and
``(2) in coordination with other departments, agencies, and
elements of the United States Government that are authorized
to undertake such collection, ensure that--
``(A) the most effective use is made of resources; and
``(B) appropriate account is taken of the risks to the
United States and those involved in such collection.''.
TITLE VI--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 601. AMENDMENTS TO PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS FOR
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POSITIONS.
(a) Appointment of Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.--Section 104B(a) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3037(a)) is amended by
inserting ``, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate'' after ``President''.
(b) Appointment of Deputy Director of the National Security
Agency.--Section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of
1959 (50 U.S.C. 3602) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(c) There is a Deputy Director of the National Security
Agency, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate.''.
(c) Appointment of Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center.--Section 119(b)(1) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3056(b)(1)) is amended by
striking ``President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''.
(d) Appointment of Director the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center.--Section 902(a) of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50
U.S.C. 3382(a)) is amended by striking ``President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting
``Director of National Intelligence''.
(e) Appointment of General Counsel of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.--Section 103C(a) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3028(a)) is amended
by striking ``by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``by the Director of
National Intelligence''.
(f) Appointment of General Counsel of the Central
Intelligence Agency.--Section 20(a) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3520(a)) is
amended by striking ``by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``by the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
SEC. 602. ANALYTIC STANDARDS FOR ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCTS.
(a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``SEC. 1115. ANALYTIC STANDARDS FOR ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCTS.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) All-source intelligence product.--The term `all-
source intelligence product'--
``(A) means any intelligence product published by an
element of the intelligence community using multiple types of
intelligence for purposes of providing an analytic assessment
or situational update; and
``(B) does not include a product containing purely law
enforcement information.
``(2) Assumption.--The term `assumption' means a
supposition used to frame or support an argument.
``(3) Judgment.--The term `judgment' means a conclusion
based on underlying intelligence information, analysis, and
assumptions.
``(b) Establishment.--
``(1) In general.--The production of any all-source
intelligence product shall adhere to--
``(A) the analytic standards described in subsection (c);
and
``(B) any guidance or policy issued under paragraph (2).
``(2) Guidance and policy.--The Director of National
Intelligence or any other head of an element of the
intelligence community may issue guidance or policy that
expands upon the standards described in subsection (c) as
such head considers appropriate, except that any such
guidance or policy shall not contradict or otherwise
circumvent such standards.
``(c) Analytic Standards.--The standards described in this
subsection are the following:
``(1) Objectivity.--In producing any all-source
intelligence product, an analyst--
``(A) shall--
``(i) perform the analyst's functions with objectivity and
with awareness of their own assumptions and reasoning;
``(ii) employ reasoning techniques and practical mechanisms
that reveal and mitigate bias;
``(iii) be alert to influence by existing analytic
positions or judgments; and
``(iv) consider alternative perspectives and contrary
information; and
``(B) shall not be unduly constrained by previous judgments
when new developments indicate a modification is necessary.
``(2) Independent of political consideration.--Any all-
source intelligence product shall not be--
``(A) distorted by, or shaped for, advocacy of a particular
audience, agenda, or policy viewpoint; or
``(B) influenced by the force of preference for a
particular policy.
``(3) Timely.--Any all-source intelligence product shall be
disseminated in time for the product to be actionable by
customers.
``(4) Based on all relevant information available.--Any
all-source intelligence product shall be informed by all
relevant information available.
``(5) Analytic tradecraft standards.--Any all-source
intelligence product shall adhere to the following analytic
tradecraft standards:
``(A) Sourcing.--Any all-source intelligence product
shall--
``(i) identify and properly describe the quality and
credibility of underlying sources, data, and methodologies
upon which judgments are based; and
``(ii) use source descriptors in accordance with sourcing
guidance prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence.
``(B) Uncertainty.--Any all-source intelligence product
shall--
``(i) indicate and explain the basis for the uncertainties
associated with major analytic judgments, specifically the
likelihood of occurrence of an event or development, and the
analyst's confidence in the basis for the judgment;
``(ii) note causes of uncertainty, including assumptions
and gaps, and explain how uncertainties affect analysis; and
``(iii) for expressions of likelihood or probability, use
one of the sets of terms defined in Intelligence Community
Directive 203.
``(C) Distinguishing.--Any all-source intelligence product
shall--
``(i) clearly distinguish statements that convey underlying
intelligence information used in analysis from statements
that convey assumptions or judgments;
``(ii) state an assumption explicitly when the assumption
serves as the linchpin of an argument or when the assumption
bridges key information gaps;
``(iii) explain the implications for judgments if
assumptions prove to be incorrect; and
``(iv) as appropriate, identify indicators that, if
detected, would alter judgments.
``(D) Incorporate analysis of alternatives.--Any all-source
intelligence product shall--
``(i) identify and assess plausible alternative hypotheses;
``(ii) in discussing alternatives, address factors such as
associated assumptions, likelihood, or implications related
to United States interests; and
``(iii) identify indicators that, if detected, would affect
the likelihood of identified alternatives.
``(E) Relevance.--Any all-source intelligence product shall
provide information and insight on United States national
security issues.
``(F) Argumentation.--Any all-source intelligence product
shall--
``(i) present a clear main analytic message up front;
``(ii) in the case of a product containing multiple
judgments, have a main analytic message that is drawn
collectively from those judgments; and
``(iii) be effectively supported by relevant intelligence
information and coherent reasoning.
``(G) Analytic line.--Any all-source intelligence product
shall--
``(i) state how its major judgments on a topic are
consistent with or represent a change from major judgments in
previously published analysis, or that it represent initial
coverage of a topic; and
``(ii) fully consider and bring to the attention of
customers significant differences in analytic judgment, such
as between two analytic elements of the intelligence
community.
``(H) Accuracy.--Any all-source intelligence product
shall--
``(i) apply expertise and logic to make the most accurate
judgments and assessments possible, based on the information
available and known information gaps; and
``(ii) express judgments as clearly and precisely as
possible, reducing ambiguity by addressing the likelihood,
timing, and nature of the outcome or development.
``(I) Visuals.--Any all-source intelligence product shall
incorporate effective visual information as appropriate. Any
content of any all-source intelligence product depicted
visually shall adhere to the analytic standards described in
this subsection.
``(d) Required Information.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), any
all-source intelligence product shall include a section
dedicated to
[[Page S3758]]
explaining the tradecraft related to the analytic tradecraft
standards described in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), and
(G) of subsection (c)(5).
``(2) Exceptions.--The requirement of paragraph (1) shall
not apply to--
``(A) any all source-intelligence product less than 300
words; or
``(B) any all-source intelligence product produced for the
President's Daily Brief.
``(e) Tracking Adherence to Analytic Standards.--The
Director of National Intelligence and each other head of an
element of the intelligence community shall--
``(1) develop metrics for evaluating the performance of
their respective element in adhering to the analytic
standards described in subsection (c); and
``(2) use such metrics to evaluate individual performance,
develop analytic workforce training, and inform Congress on
matters related to analytic performance.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 1115. Analytic standards for all-source intelligence
products.''.
SEC. 603. BEN SASSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY
FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Title X of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 1002 the following:
``SEC. 1003. BEN SASSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY
FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.
``(a) In General.--There is established a program (in this
section referred to as the `Program') under which selected
employees of the intelligence community may train at certain
nongovernmental entities as technology fellows.
``(b) Designation.--The program shall be known as the `Ben
Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship Program'.
``(c) Agreements.--
``(1) Nongovernmental entities.--Each head of an element of
the intelligence community described in paragraph (3) shall
seek to enter into agreements with nongovernmental entities
with experience in cutting-edge technology under which such
entities may host technology fellows under the Program.
``(2) Selected employees.--For each employee of an element
of the intelligence community selected for participation in
the Program in accordance with subsection (e), the head of
the element of the intelligence community that selected the
employee shall provide for a written agreement among that
element of the intelligence community, the nongovernmental
entity concerned, and the employee. The agreement shall--
``(A) require that the employee of the element of the
intelligence community, upon completion of the fellowship,
serve in that element, or elsewhere in the intelligence
community if approved by the head of the element that
selected the employee, for a period equal to twice the length
of the fellowship;
``(B) provide that if the employee of the element of the
intelligence community fails to carry out the agreement, the
employee shall be liable to the United States for payment of
all expenses of the fellowship, unless that failure was for
good and sufficient reason, as determined by the head of the
element that selected the employee; and
``(C) contain language ensuring that the employee of the
element of the intelligence community does not improperly use
information that the employee knows relates to an acquisition
or procurement of the element of the intelligence community
for the benefit or advantage of the nongovernmental entity.
``(3) Elements described.--The elements of the intelligence
community described in this paragraph are the following:
``(A) The Central Intelligence Agency.
``(B) The National Security Agency.
``(C) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
``(D) The National Reconnaissance Office.
``(E) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
``(d) Board.--
``(1) In general.--There is established a board for the
Program (in this section referred to as the `Board').
``(2) Membership.--The Board shall be composed of the
directors of science and technology, or equivalents, of the
elements of the intelligence community described in
subsection (c)(3).
``(3) Co-chairs.--The members of the Board shall serve as
co-chairs of the Board.
``(4) Selection criteria.--The Board shall establish
selection criteria for the participation of employees in the
Program.
``(e) Selection.--Each year, each head of an element of the
intelligence community described in subsection (c)(3) shall
select two employees of such element to participate in the
Program.
``(f) Term.--An employee selected for participation in the
Program may serve for one year as a technology fellow at a
nongovermental entity that has entered into an agreement
under subsection (c)(1) with the head of the element of the
intelligence community concerned.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act
is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
1002 the following:
``Sec. 1003. Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship
Program.''.
SEC. 604. COUNTERING HOSTILE FOREIGN CYBER ACTORS AS A
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) In 2025, foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations,
such as foreign scam centers that engage in sophisticated
investment fraud, cyber-enabled extortion activity, and
impersonation-based fraud, stole at least $7,566,000,000 from
Americans according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Internet Crime Complaint Center, which has emphasized that
these estimates are conservative and only includes losses
reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(2) According to the Consumer Federation of America,
Americans are losing an estimated $119,000,000,000 each year
to online scams.
(3) Investigative reporting, Federal indictments, and
sanctions designations issued by the Department of the
Treasury have revealed the extent to which foreign malicious
cybercriminal organizations collaborate with foreign
governments, illicit finance actors, and foreign militia
groups whose activities present a threat to the economic and
national security of the United States.
(4) Foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations rely
extensively on communications and financial services of
United States companies, enabling the organizations'
targeting of vulnerable Americans.
(5) Targeted efforts against the United States intelligence
community by foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations to
defraud or extort by using deepfakes, voice-cloning, or other
sophisticated technological advancements presents a
counterintelligence threat.
(b) Sense of Congress.--
(1) In general.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations, and
foreign affiliates associated with those organizations,
constitute hostile foreign cyber actors and are valid targets
for intelligence operations under existing intelligence
authorities; and
(B) the Director of National Intelligence should treat
collection, analysis, and disruption toward hostile foreign
cyber actors as a national intelligence priority as part of
the National Intelligence Priorities Framework.
(2) Hostile foreign cyber actors.--The hostile foreign
cyber actors described in paragraph (1) include, at a
minimum, the following:
(A) Prince Group.
(B) Huione Group.
(C) L.Y.P. Group.
(D) Jin Bei Group.
(E) Funnull Technology Inc.
(F) TransAsia International holding Group Thailand Company
Limited.
(G) The Democratic Karen Benevolent Army.
(H) HH Bank Cambodia PLC.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to Congress a
report on hostile foreign cyber actors, such as foreign scam
centers.
(2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) An identification of the individuals and entities
operating as hostile foreign cyber actors, including foreign
scam centers, that pose the most significant threat.
(B) An identification of the locations from which the
individuals and entities identified under subparagraph (A)
operate.
(C) A description of the infrastructure, tactics, and
techniques hostile foreign cyber actors, including foreign
scam centers, commonly use, including reliance on any
products or services subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.
(D) A description of any relationships between the
individuals and entities that operate as hostile foreign
cyber actors, including foreign scam centers, and their
governments or countries of origin that could impede the
ability to counter threats from such centers.
(E) An identification of communications and financial
services providers subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States that provide enabling services to individuals and
entities identified under subparagraph (A).
(F) A description of any relationships that the individuals
and entities identified under subparagraph (A) have with
transnational organized crime groups.
(3) Form; public availability.--The report required by
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex. The unclassified form of the
report shall be made available to the public.
SEC. 605. NOTIFICATION OF CRIMINAL REFERRALS REGARDING
CURRENT OR FORMER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
EMPLOYEES.
(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the
end the following:
``SEC. 519. NOTIFICATION OF CRIMINAL REFERRALS REGARDING
CURRENT OR FORMER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
EMPLOYEES.
``(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress'
means the following:
``(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
``(2) The Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.
[[Page S3759]]
``(3) The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives.
``(b) Notice Requirement.--If an element of the
intelligence community makes a criminal referral to the
Department of Justice regarding a current or former employee
of any element of the intelligence community, the general
counsel of the element of the intelligence community that
made the referral shall notify the appropriate committees of
Congress of the referral on the date such referral is made
and provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a
summary of the referral.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 518
the following:
``Sec. 519. Notification of criminal referrals regarding current or
former intelligence community employees.''.
SEC. 606. MODIFICATION OF DEFINITIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY
ACT OF 1947 AND SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING
RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Definitions.--Section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``includes'' and
inserting ``means''; and
(2) in paragraph (5)--
(A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by striking
``refer to all'' and inserting ``means'';
(B) by amended subparagraph (B) to read as follows:
``(B) involves foreign threats to the United States, its
people, property, or interests.''.
(b) Scope of Intelligence Sharing Responsibilities.--
Section 102A(f)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3024(f)(1)) is
amended, in the first sentence, by inserting ``, and other
Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate,''
after ``community''.
SEC. 607. PROHIBITION ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY USE OF
ADVERSARY UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered foreign country.--The term ``covered foreign
country'' means any of the following:
(A) The People's Republic of China.
(B) The Russian Federation.
(C) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
(D) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(2) Covered foreign entity.--The term ``covered foreign
entity'' means an entity that is domiciled in a covered
foreign country, or subject to influence or control by the
government of a covered foreign country as determined by the
Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary of Defense,
and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity.
(3) Covered unmanned ground vehicle system.--The term
``covered unmanned ground vehicle system''--
(A) means a mechanical device that--
(i) is capable of locomotion, navigation, or movement on
the ground; and
(ii) operates at a distance from one or more operators or
supervisors based on commands or in response to sensor data,
or through any combination thereof; and
(B) includes--
(i) remote surveillance vehicles, autonomous patrol
technologies, mobile robotics, and humanoid robots; and
(ii) the vehicle, its payload, and any external device used
to control the vehicle.
(b) Prohibition on Procurement of Covered Unmanned Ground
Vehicle Systems From Covered Foreign Entities.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided under paragraph (2),
the head of an element of the intelligence community may not
procure any covered unmanned ground vehicle system that is
manufactured or assembled by a covered foreign entity.
(2) Exemption.--The heads of elements of the intelligence
community are exempt from the restriction under paragraph (1)
if the procurement is required in the national interest of
the United States and--
(A) is for the sole purposes of research, evaluation,
training, testing, or analysis for electronic warfare,
information warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development
of unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground
vehicle system technology;
(B) is for the sole purposes of conducting counterterrorism
or counterintelligence activities, protective missions, or
Federal criminal or national security investigations,
including forensic examinations, or for electronic warfare,
information warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development
of an unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned
ground vehicle technology; or
(C) is an unmanned ground vehicle system that, as procured
or as modified after procurement but before operational use,
can no longer transfer to, or download data from, a covered
foreign entity and otherwise poses no national security
cybersecurity risks as determined by the exempting official.
(c) Prohibition on Operation of Covered Unmanned Ground
Vehicle Systems From Covered Foreign Entities.--
(1) Prohibition.--
(A) In general.--Beginning on the date that is one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act and except as
provided in paragraph (2), no element of the intelligence
community may operate a covered unmanned ground vehicle
system manufactured or assembled by a covered foreign entity.
(B) Applicability to contracted services.--The prohibition
under subparagraph (A) applies to any covered unmanned ground
vehicle systems that are being used by any element of the
intelligence community through the method of contracting for
the services of covered unmanned ground vehicle systems.
(2) Exemption.--The heads of the elements of the
intelligence community are exempt from the restriction under
paragraph (1) if the operation is required in the national
interest of the United States and--
(A) is for the sole purposes of research, evaluation,
training, testing, or analysis for electronic warfare,
information warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development
of unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground
vehicle system technology;
(B) is for the sole purposes of conducting counterterrorism
or counterintelligence activities, protective missions, or
Federal criminal or national security investigations,
including forensic examinations, or for electronic warfare,
information warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development
of an unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned
ground vehicle system technology; or
(C) is an unmanned ground vehicle system that, as procured
or as modified after procurement but before operational use,
can no longer transfer to, or download data from, a covered
foreign entity and otherwise poses no national security
cybersecurity risks as determined by the exempting official.
SEC. 608. CHINA-TAIWAN STRATEGIC WARNING TASK FORCE.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall establish a task force to be known as the
China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task Force (referred to in
this section as the ``Task Force'') to lead the efforts of
the intelligence community with respect to providing
indications and warning of any military aggression by the
People's Republic of China against Taiwan.
(b) Objectives.--The objectives of the Task Force are the
following:
(1) The synchronization of all intelligence community
efforts related to China-Taiwan indications and warning,
including the generation of indicators and development of
collection requirements related to such indicators.
(2) The coordination of analysis related to China-Taiwan
indications and warning and the development of analytic
methodologies for use across the intelligence community in
conducting analysis related to China-Taiwan indications and
warning.
(3) The development and implementation of information
technology solutions to synchronize the access of the
intelligence community to information relating to indications
and warning.
(c) Membership.--The Task Force shall be composed of the
following members (or their designees):
(1) The Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(4) The Director of the National-Geospatial Intelligence
Agency.
(5) The Director of the National Security Agency.
(6) The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Intelligence and Analysis.
(7) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research.
(8) Such other heads of the elements of the intelligence
community as the Director of National Intelligence determines
appropriate.
(d) Leadership; Organization; Meetings.--
(1) Chair.--The Director of National Intelligence (or a
designee of the Director) shall be the chair of the Task
Force.
(2) Working groups.--The Task Force may create subordinate
working groups as determined by the chair.
(3) Meeting frequency.--The Task Force shall meet regularly
but not less than quarterly.
(e) Staffing.--
(1) In general.--The Task Force may hire staff and create
joint duty assignments assigned to the Task Force. The Task
Force may not exceed 25 full-time equivalent staff in total.
(2) Agency liaison.--Each member listed in subsection (b)
shall appoint a senior intelligence officer from the agency
concerned to serve as a liaison to the Task Force. Such
liaison shall be responsible for coordinating the
participation and support of the agency concerned to the Task
Force.
(f) Initial Reports.--. Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional defense committees a report on the status of
the Task Force, including--
(1) a summary of the efforts of the intelligence community
with respect to China-Taiwan indications and warning;
(2) a summary of efforts by the Task Force to develop a
common set of indicators and organize collection efforts by
the intelligence community against such indicators;
(3) a description of the resources provided by each Task
Force member towards efforts with respect to China-Taiwan
indications and warning, disaggregated by--
(A) dollars spent or planned to be spent during fiscal year
2027; and
[[Page S3760]]
(B) total full-time equivalent personnel; and
(4) recommendations to improve the collection and analysis
of the intelligence community with respect to China-Taiwan
indications and warning.
(g) Sunset.--The provisions of this section shall terminate
on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment
of this Act.
SEC. 609. LIMITATIONS RELATING TO CHINESE PRODUCTS AND
SERVICES.
(a) Prohibition on Use by Intelligence Community.--
(1) In general.--Paragraph (1) of subsection (e) of section
6604 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2026 (50 U.S.C. 3334m note; division F of Public Law 119-60)
is amended to read as follows:
``(1) Covered application.--The term `covered application'
means--
``(A) the DeepSeek application or any successor application
or service; or
``(B) any product or service from any entity of the
People's Republic of China that is included on--
``(i) the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry
and Security of the Department of Commerce;
``(ii) the list (sometimes known as the `Non-SDN Chinese
Military-Industrial Complex Companies List') maintained by
the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the
Treasury under Executive Order 13959, as amended by Executive
Order 14032 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to addressing the
threat from securities investments that finance certain
companies of the People's Republic of China), or any
successor order; or
``(iii) the list of Chinese military companies required
under section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10
U.S.C. 113 note; Public Law 116-283) and maintained by the
Department of Defense.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The heading for such section is
amended by striking ``deepseek'' and inserting ``products and
services from people's republic of china''.
(b) Limitation on Procurement by Intelligence Community.--
Section 414 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2022 (28 U.S.C. 532 note; division X of Public Law 117-
103) is amended--
(1) in the section heading, by striking ``by federal bureau
of investigation'';
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking
``Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation'' and
inserting ``head of an element of the intelligence
community'';
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Federal Bureau of
Investigation'' and inserting ``element''; and
(C) in paragraph (3), by striking ``Director (or a designee
of the Director)'' and inserting ``head'';
(3) in subsection (b), by striking ``the Director (or a
designee of the Director, as applicable) approves a
recommendation pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the Director
shall'' and inserting ``the head of an element of the
intelligence community approves a recommendation pursuant to
subsection (a)(3), the head shall'';
(4) in subsection (c), by amending paragraph (2) to read as
follows:
``(2) People's republic of china product or service.--The
term `People's Republic of China product or service' means--
``(A) an information or communication technology product
manufactured in China, Hong Kong, or Macau and designed,
developed, or maintained by a firm that is domiciled in
China, Hong Kong, or Macau; or
``(B) an information or communication technology product or
service provided or manufactured by--
``(i) an entity that is fully or partially owned or
controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the government of
China; or
``(ii) an entity included on the list submitted by the
Director of National Intelligence under section 6706(c) of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026
(division F of Public Law 119-60; 139 Stat. 1648).''.
SEC. 610. BIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``SEC. 124. BIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Biological data.--The term `biological data' means
multiomic information and other relevant information,
including associated descriptors, derived from the structure,
function, or process of a biological system, that is
measured, collected, or aggregated for analysis, including
information from humans, animals, plants, or microbes.
``(2) Biological intelligence.--The term `biological
intelligence' includes the information collected or
disseminated by the intelligence community concerning
biological threats through genomic surveillance,
immunological monitoring, environmental sampling, multiomic
analysis, and other scientific methodologies.
``(3) Biological threat.--The term `biological threat'
includes any naturally occurring infectious disease,
engineered pathogen, toxin, or other biological agent that
poses a risk to human, animal, or plant health or to the
national security of the United States.
``(b) Determination; Dissemination.--The Director of
National Intelligence, in such coordination with the
Secretary of Defense as the Director considers appropriate,
shall, consistent with applicable Federal law and Executive
Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States
intelligence activities)--
``(1) determine which United States agencies would benefit
from receiving anonymized biological data and biological
intelligence in support of detection, characterization, and
attribution of foreign biological threats; and
``(2) disseminate such anonymized biological data and
biological intelligence to agencies identified under
paragraph (1).
``(c) Standards; Databases.--Not later than 1 year after
the date of the enactment of this section, the Director of
National Intelligence shall, in such coordination with the
Secretary of Defense as the Director considers appropriate
and in consultation with the Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology--
``(1) ensure standards for the collection and data formats
of anonymized biological data and biological intelligence
are, to the extent possible, consistent with standards used
by other United States agencies, including by--
``(A) providing for standardized data categorization and
tagging of biological data;
``(B) considering standardized scientific and laboratory
equipment and data collection methodologies; and
``(C) minimizing collection of any biological data that is
likely to contain biological or genomic information specific
to any United States person, including any derived data that
is specific to any United States person; and
``(2) facilitate the establishment and maintenance of
streamlined and unified accesses to databases of biological
intelligence collected by the intelligence community or the
Department of Defense.
``(d) Priority.--In carrying out subsections (b) and (c),
the Director of National Intelligence shall prioritize
supporting capabilities, including the development of
technical tools, that enable the early detection,
characterization, and attribution of naturally occurring,
novel, or engineered pathogens that could threaten the United
States.
``(e) Rule of Construction.--Unless otherwise authorized by
any other provision of law, nothing in this section shall be
construed to allow the sharing or dissemination of anonymized
biological data derived from law enforcement actions, or to
allow such law enforcement data to be maintained or shared
through databases covered in paragraph (c)(2), unless such
biological data solely relates to a biological threat as
defined by (a)(3).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act
is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
123 the following:
``Sec. 124. Biological intelligence activities of the intelligence
community.''.
SEC. 611. PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATION IN PREDICTION MARKETS.
(a) In General.--Title III of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 304 the following:
``SEC. 304A. PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATION IN PREDICTION
MARKETS.
``(a) In General.--Except as may be necessary to conduct
authorized intelligence activities, a covered individual may
not participate in a prediction market on any topic relating
to nonpublic information to which the covered individual has
access by virtue of being a covered individual, during--
``(1) the period during which the covered individual is
employed or contracted by an element of the intelligence
community; or
``(2) the two-year period beginning on the date on which
the covered individual ceases to be employed or contracted by
such an element.
``(b) Policy.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the
enactment of this section, the Director of National
Intelligence shall issue a policy implementing the
prohibition in subsection (a), including--
``(1) establishing appropriate penalties for violating the
prohibition; and
``(2) providing notice to all covered individuals.
``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered individual.--The term `covered individual'
means an employee or contractor, or a former employee or
contractor, of an element of the intelligence community who
holds a security clearance.
``(2) Prediction market.--The term `prediction market'
means a platform, company, or service that allows agreements,
contracts, transactions, or swaps between users over the
outcome of non-financial future events, such as sports,
military actions, and elections.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act
is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
304 the following:
``Sec. 304A. Prohibition on participation in prediction markets.''.
SEC. 612. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Oversight of Foreign Influence in Academia.--Section
5713 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019,
and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3369b) is repealed.
(b) Report on Efforts to Illicitly Acquire Satellites and
Related Items.--Section 1261 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 2778 note;
Public Law 112-239) is amended by striking subsection (e).
[[Page S3761]]
(c) Monitoring Mineral Investments Under Belt and Road
Initiative of the People's Republic of China.--Section 7003
of the Energy Act of 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3372) is amended by
striking subsection (d).
(d) Briefing on Protocols for Certain Intelligence
Community Employees and Dependents.--Section 605(g) of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50
U.S.C. 3334k(g)) is amended by striking paragraph (3).
(e) Periodic Report on Positions in the Intelligence
Community That Can Be Conducted Without Access to Classified
Information, Networks, or Facilities.--Section 6610 of the
Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50
U.S.C. 3352e) is repealed.
(f) Review of Shared Information Technology Services for
Personnel Vetting.--Section 7701 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (division G of Public
Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 1100) is repealed.
(g) Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management
Task Force.--Section 6306 of the Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3370) is amended
by striking subsection (e).
(h) Report on Best Practices to Protect Privacy, Civil
Liberties, and Civil Rights of Chinese Americans.--Section
620 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021 (50 U.S.C. 3240) is repealed.
(i) Enforcement of Cybersecurity Requirements for National
Security Systems; Report on Exemptions.--Section 6309(f) of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (44
U.S.C. 3557 note; division F of Public Law 117-263) is
amended by striking paragraph (3).
(j) Report on Collaboration Between Intelligence Community
and Department of Commerce to Counter Foreign Commercial
Threats.--Section 6514(b) of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3370b(b)) is amended by
striking paragraph (6).
(k) Timeliness Standard for Rendering Determinations of
Trust for Personnel Vetting; Reviews.--Section 7702(a) of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50
U.S.C. 3352h(a)) is amended by striking paragraph (2).
(l) Briefings on Status of Intelligence Community
Innovation Unit.--Subsections (c) and (d) of section 7502 of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024
(Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 1082) are repealed.
(m) Annual Training Requirement and Report Regarding
Analytic Standards.--Section 6312 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3364 note;
Public Law 117-263) is amended--
(1) by striking subsections (c) and (d); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections
(c) and (d), respectively.
(n) Annual Reports Regarding Intelligence Community Public-
private Talent Exchanges.--Section 6506 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159;
138 Stat. 2497) is amended by striking subsection (e).
(o) Software Licensing.--Section 109 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3044) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
(p) Review and Update of Position Designation Guidance.--
Section 7 of the SECRET Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-173; 132
Stat. 1294) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
(q) Report on Independent Study on Economic Impact of
Military Invasion of Taiwan by People's Republic of China.--
Section 7407 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 1075) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
SEC. 613. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL TRAVEL,
ALLOWANCES, AND RELATED EXPENSES REGULATIONS.
(a) Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 4 of the Central
Intelligence Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3505) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(c) Biennial Reviews and Reports.--Not later than
September 30, 2027, and not less frequently than once every 2
years thereafter, the Director shall--
``(1) review the regulations covered by this section; and
``(2) not later than 10 days after completing a review
under paragraph (1), submit to the congressional intelligence
committees the findings of the Director with respect to the
review, including identification of any changes to the
regulations or personnel coverage thereof that the Director
determines to be necessary for the performance of
intelligence functions.''.
(b) Office of Director of National Intelligence.--Section
102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(z) Biennial Reviews and Reports Regarding Intelligence
Community Personnel Travel, Allowances, and Related Expenses
Regulations.--Not later than September 30, 2027, and not less
frequently than once every 2 years thereafter, in order to
reflect the requirements of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence not taken into account in the
formulation of Government-wide travel procedures covered by
this section, the Director shall--
``(1) review such requirements; and
``(2) not later than 10 days after completing a review
under paragraph (1), submit to the congressional intelligence
committees the findings of the Director with respect to the
review, including any regulations that the Director
determines to be necessary for the performance of
intelligence functions.''.
SEC. 614. PROHIBITION ON SENDING AND RECEIVING OBJECTS USING
ENTITIES OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY PERSONS OR
GOVERNMENTS OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES.
(a) Definition of Covered Nation.--In this section, the
term ``covered nation'' has the meaning given such term in
section 4872(f) of title 10, United States Code.
(b) In General.--
(1) List required.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, shall develop a list of
products, intellectual property, technology, and any other
objects that the Directors determine--
(A) affect the national security of the United States; and
(B) if acquired by a covered nation, would pose a threat to
the national security of the United States.
(2) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) may be in
classified form.
(c) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsection (d), no
element of the intelligence community may send or receive any
product, intellectual property, technology, or other object
as identified pursuant to subsection (b) within the United
States using an entity, including any shipping company, that
is owned or substantially controlled by a person or a
governmental entity domiciled in a covered nation.
(d) Waiver.--The head of an element of the intelligence
community--
(1) may waive the prohibition in subsection (c) for the
element on a case by case basis if the head determines that
in the particular case, sending or receiving any product,
intellectual property, technology, or other object by an
entity identified pursuant to subsection (b) is necessary for
the national security of the United States; and
(2) not later than 3 days after issuing such waiver, shall
notify the Director of National Intelligence of the waiver.
(e) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after the head of
an element of the intelligence community issues a waiver
described in subsection (d), such head shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a written notice of the
waiver, which shall include--
(1) a justification for the waiver, including the product,
intellectual property, technology, or other object subject to
the waiver; and
(2) a description of the national security threat
mitigation measures implemented for permitting the activity
that otherwise would be prohibited under subsection (c).
SEC. 615. ENHANCING INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION.
(a) Definition of Intelligence Cooperation.--In this
section, the term ``intelligence cooperation'' means
activities authorized under the provisions of law
administered by the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community, including the collection, analysis, production,
and dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States to consider intelligence cooperation with allies and
partners of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region a
priority national security investment that will help deter
aggression, reinforce regional stability, and reduce the risk
of miscalculation, all of which will advance the national
security and economic prosperity of the United States by
helping to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
(c) Requirements.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall, acting in close coordination with such heads of
elements of the intelligence community as the Director
considers relevant and the members of the Five Eyes
intelligence-sharing alliance, undertake efforts to bolster
and improve--
(A) the intelligence foundations of alliances between the
United States and Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the
Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand; and
(B) intelligence cooperation between the United States and
other regional partners, such as India and Vietnam.
(2) Priority areas for enhanced cooperation.--Efforts
undertaken pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include efforts--
(A) to address the speed and complexity of potential
strategic and operational contingencies in the Indo-Pacific
region, including any scenarios involving adversarial efforts
to limit the freedom of navigation through critical maritime
chokepoints threaten supply chain security;
(B) relatedly, to ensure shared situational awareness
across the full spectrum of potential contingencies,
including military indications and warnings;
(C) to enhance maritime, air, and space domain awareness,
with the goal of providing decision advantage;
(D) to inform collective defense planning and response by
further integrating intelligence cooperation into joint and
combined operational planning activities, exercises, and
wargames focused on regional contingencies, including the Rim
of the Pacific;
[[Page S3762]]
(E) to encourage intelligence cooperation with Taiwan,
consistent with United States law and policy; and
(F) to promote multilateral intelligence sharing and
collaboration among allies and partners of the United States,
such as through the United States-Japan-Republic of Korea
trilateral mechanism and the United States-Japan-Philippines
trilateral mechanism.
SEC. 616. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO UKRAINE.
(a) Statement of Policy.--
(1) In general.--Section 3 of the Support for the
Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of
Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8902) is amended--
(A) in paragraph (16), by striking ``; and'' and inserting
a semicolon;
(B) in paragraph (17), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(18) to assist Ukraine in maintaining a credible defense
and deterrence capability, including through the provision of
intelligence support, as a means of advancing the national
security of the United States, regional stability, and the
protection of United States interests in Europe.''.
(2) Definition.--Section 2 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 8901) is
amended--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs
(5) and (6), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) Credible defense and deterrence capability.--The term
`credible defense and deterrence capability' means the
ability to defend against and deter any credible conventional
military threat from the Russian Federation acting
unilaterally or in concert with partners, through the use of
conventional military means, possessed in sufficient
quantity, including weapons platforms and munitions, and
command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities.
``(4) Intelligence support.--The term `intelligence
support' means activities authorized under the provisions of
law governing the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community, including the collection, analysis, production,
and dissemination of information, intelligence, and
imagery.''.
(b) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support Absent an
Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.--Until
Ukraine and the Russian Federation voluntarily and freely
enter into an armistice or comprehensive political settlement
of the conflict, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and
the heads of any other relevant element of the intelligence
community, shall continue to ensure the provision of
intelligence support to the Government of Ukraine for
purposes of advancing United States policy goals in Ukraine.
(c) Pauses in Intelligence Support.--
(1) In general.--Intelligence support to Ukraine required
under this section shall not be suspended or limited unless
the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, identifies a
specific and identifiable national security concern.
(2) Notification.--Not later than 15 days after making the
decision to pause, terminate, restrict, or otherwise
materially downgrade intelligence support to Ukraine, the
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
notification that includes--
(A) a detailed description of the reason for the pause,
termination, restriction, or material downgrade of
intelligence support;
(B) the expected duration of the pause, termination,
restriction, or material downgrade; and
(C) the anticipated impact of such decision on the ability
of Ukraine to conduct effective military operations.
(3) Form.--A notification submitted under paragraph (2)
shall be in unclassified form, but may include an classified
annex.
(d) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support in the
Event of Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.--
(1) In general.--If Ukraine and the Russian Federation
voluntarily and freely enter into an armistice or a
comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the other
relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall adjust
the intelligence support to Ukraine to support implementation
of the armistice or the comprehensive political settlement
and, consistent with the national security interests of the
United States, support building and sustaining the capacity
of Ukraine to detect, deter, and repel any future Russian
attack against the territory of Ukraine.
(2) Report on modifications to united states intelligence
support.--Not later than 30 days after an armistice or a
comprehensive political settlement is entered into force, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination
with the heads of the other relevant elements of the
intelligence community, including the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security
Agency, and the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report that includes--
(A) a description of the details of the armistice or the
comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in
Ukraine, including a description of the role of the
intelligence community in monitoring the adherence by the
parties to specific elements of the agreement;
(B) an assessment of the vulnerabilities that Ukraine will
face under the terms of the agreement and potential measures
that the intelligence community or other parties could take
to help mitigate such vulnerabilities;
(C) a description of the modifications to ongoing
intelligence support the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency has authorized in light of the changed situation on
the ground in Ukraine in order to help build and sustain the
capacity of Ukraine to detect, deter, and repel any future
Russian attack against the territory of Ukraine;
(D) an assessment of the implications of the armistice or
comprehensive political settlement for the national security
interests of the United States in Europe, including the
capacity of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization to deter future aggression by the Russian
Federation; and
(E) a description and assessment of any cooperative
arrangements that Ukraine has with other countries, including
member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
that the intelligence community assesses would contribute to
deterring a future attack or act of aggression by the Russian
Federation aimed at occupying or seizing the territory of
Ukraine.
(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (2) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(4) Early warning.--The Director of National Intelligence,
in coordination with the heads of any other relevant elements
of the intelligence community, shall provide to Ukraine and
member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
intelligence and early warning to allow for an appropriate
and timely response with respect to any potential attack or
act of aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation.
(5) Notification.--
(A) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall promptly notify each Member of the congressional
intelligence committees not later than 5 days after any
intelligence element provides Ukraine any intelligence
pursuant to paragraph (4).
(B) Contents.--A notification submitted pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall include--
(i) a description of the specific threatened attack or act
of aggression shared with Ukraine;
(ii) the date on which the intelligence was provided to
Ukraine;
(iii) details of the channel through which the intelligence
was shared, including the names and titles of the relevant
intelligence community officers and Ukrainian government
officials;
(iv) the response of the Government of Ukraine upon
receiving the intelligence;
(v) an assessment produced by the Defense Intelligence
Agency, in coordination with other relevant elements of
intelligence community, as to what support Ukraine might
require in order to deter or repel the threatened attack or
act of aggression; and
(vi) a summary of subsequent actions that the Director of
National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and other heads of relevant elements of
the intelligence community, directed be taken to support
Ukraine in defending against or otherwise responding to the
threatened attack or act of aggression.
(C) Form.--A notification submitted pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall be in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(e) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support in the
Event of an Armed Attack on Ukraine in Violation of an
Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.--
(1) In general.--In the event of an armed attack by the
Russian Federation on Ukraine that violates an armistice or a
comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the heads of other relevant elements
of the intelligence community, shall immediately resume the
provision of intelligence support to the Government of
Ukraine at a level the Directors deem necessary to support
military operations of the Government of Ukraine that are
intended, or reasonably expected, to help the Armed Forces of
Ukraine defend or liberate the territory of Ukraine and
prevent such territory of Ukraine from being occupied or
attacked by the Russian Federation.
(2) Notification.--
(A) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall promptly notify the congressional intelligence
committees not later than 5 days after resuming intelligence
support pursuant to paragraph (1).
(B) Contents.--A notification submitted pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall include--
(i) a description of the specific attack or act of
aggression against Ukraine;
(ii) a description of any intelligence support that Ukraine
requested from the United States;
(iii) an assessment of the support that Ukraine might
require in order to deter or repel the attack or act of
aggression;
[[Page S3763]]
(iv) a description of any intelligence support that the
Director has authorized to be provided to Ukraine; and
(v) a description of the response of the Government of
Ukraine upon receiving the intelligence support.
(C) Form.--A notification submitted pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall be in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(3) Sunset.--
(A) In general.--The provision of intelligence support for
Ukraine under this subsection shall cease on the date that is
120 days after the date on which the Government of Ukraine
and the Government of the Russian Federation agree to
reinstate the armistice or comprehensive political settlement
that was violated or a new armistice or comprehensive
political settlement is entered into force.
(B) Recommencement.--Upon the cessation of the provision of
intelligence support under subparagraph (A), the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the
heads of any other relevant elements of the intelligence
community, shall resume the provision of intelligence support
to Ukraine pursuant to subsection (d).
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Armistice; comprehensive political settlement.--The
terms ``armistice'' and ``comprehensive political
settlement'' mean a formal written agreement between the
Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian
Federation that has the effect of permanently ending the
armed conflict between both nations.
(2) Intelligence support.--The term ``intelligence
support'' means activities authorized under the provisions of
law governing the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community, including the collection, analysis, production,
and dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.
(3) Specific and identifiable national security concern.--
The term ``specific and identifiable national security
concern'' includes the following:
(A) Credible intelligence that an element of the Government
of Ukraine has been compromised by the Russian Federation or
another foreign adversary.
(B) Protection of sources and methods.
(C) A voluntary request from the Government of Ukraine to
pause intelligence support.
(D) Credible intelligence that an element of the Government
of Ukraine receiving United States intelligence support
engaged in a pattern of human rights violations, atrocities,
or violations of the law of armed conflict.
(4) Territory of ukraine.--The term ``territory of
Ukraine'' means all territory internationally recognized to
be the sovereign territory of Ukraine on February 19, 2014,
including Crimea and the territory that the Russian
Federation claims to have annexed in Kherson and Zaporizhzia.
SEC. 617. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH
COUNTRIES AND PARTNERS OF SIGNIFICANT
IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES.
Section 102A(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3024(j)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Under the direction'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--Under the direction''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Notification required.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 48 hours after a decision
to pause, terminate, or otherwise restrict or materially
downgrade intelligence support or intelligence activities (as
defined in section 501(f)), including information,
intelligence, and imagery collection authorized under
Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to
United States intelligence activities), to Israel, Ukraine,
Taiwan, or any other country or partner determined by the
President to be of significant importance to the United
States, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a notification of
such decision.
``(B) Elements.--The notification required in subsection
(a) shall include--
``(i) a detailed description of the reason for the pause,
termination, restriction, or material downgrade of
intelligence support;
``(ii) a description of the change in intelligence sharing;
``(iii) the categories of information affected;
``(iv) the expected duration of the pause, termination,
restriction, or material downgrade; and
``(v) the anticipated impact of such decision on regional
security and the national security objectives of the United
States.''.
SEC. 618. UNITED STATES-ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE SHARING
ENHANCEMENT.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States--
(1) to maintain and strengthen the strategic security
partnership with Israel as a means of advancing the national
defense of the United States, regional stability, and the
protection of United States personnel and interests in the
Middle East;
(2) to enhance intelligence collaboration through robust
intelligence sharing and analytic partnership with Israel to
counter terrorism, proliferation networks, cyber threats,
state and nonstate aggressors, terror financing, sanctions
evasion, and other transnational security challenges that
threaten both Israel and the United States;
(3) to deter and counter destabilizing activities by the
Government of Iran and Iran-aligned state and nonstate actors
that threaten Israel, United States forces, and regional
partners;
(4) to ensure that security assistance and defense
cooperation are structured to help Israel maintain its
qualitative military edge, consistent with United States law
and broader regional security considerations;
(5) to encourage and support the expansion of regional
security architectures that include Israel and willing
regional partners, with a focus on integrated air and missile
defense, maritime security, early warning systems, and
intelligence-sharing frameworks; and
(6) to leverage security coordination with Israel to
enhance force protection, early warning, and crisis response
capabilities for United States military and diplomatic
personnel in the region.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Israel remains a critical United States security
partner whose defense and intelligence capabilities provide a
strategic advantage that contributes to enhanced operational
effectiveness and technological superiority;
(2) timely and actionable intelligence sharing between the
United States and Israel has saved United States personnel
and property in the region and should remain a central pillar
of the bilateral security relationship;
(3) the evolving threat environment in the Middle East--
including missile proliferation, unmanned systems, cyber
operations, terror financing, and proxy warfare--requires
sustained and adaptive cooperation between the United States
and Israel;
(4) the United States-Israel security partnership has
historically benefitted from bipartisan support, which
strengthens the partnership's credibility, durability, and
deterrent value; and
(5) expanding normalization and practical security
cooperation between Israel and regional states can serve as a
force multiplier for collective deterrence and integrated
defense.
(c) Requirements Relating to Intelligence Sharing.--
(1) In general.--Title XI of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``SEC. 1115. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING.
``(a) Intelligence Sharing With Israel.--
``(1) In general.--The President, acting through the
Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the
Secretary of Defense, shall, subject to applicable law and
the protection of intelligence sources and methods, expand
and enhance intelligence sharing with the Government of
Israel.
``(2) Scope of intelligence sharing.--Intelligence sharing
carried out under this subsection shall include the sharing
of information relating to cybersecurity threats, terrorism,
sanctions evasion, plans and intentions of state and nonstate
actors, adversarial technology proliferation, missile
threats, unmanned aerial systems, cruise missiles, ballistic
missiles, air and space domain awareness, and other aerial
threats relevant to the defense of Israel, United States
forces and interests in the region, and regional security
partners.
``(3) Limitations on reduction of intelligence sharing.--
``(A) In general.--Intelligence sharing and related
security information exchanges with the Government of Israel
shall not be suspended, reduced, or otherwise materially
limited except on the basis of a specific and identifiable
national security concern determined by the President, such
as the protection of intelligence sources and methods,
counterintelligence risk, or another significant security
consideration.
``(B) Documentation requirement.--The President shall
document any determination to suspend, reduce, or otherwise
materially limit intelligence sharing or related security
information exchanges with the Government of Israel,
including a description of the national security rationale
supporting the change.
``(4) Congressional notification.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 15 days after the date of
any decision to materially increase, suspend, reduce, or
otherwise alter intelligence sharing or related security
information exchanges with the Government of Israel, the
President shall notify the congressional intelligence
committees of such decision.
``(B) Elements.--Each notification required by subparagraph
(A) shall include the following:
``(i) A description of the change in intelligence sharing
or security information exchange.
``(ii) The categories of information affected.
``(iii) The national security objectives served by the
change.
``(iv) In the case of a suspension or reduction, the
specific national security concern supporting the change.
``(v) An assessment of the anticipated impact on regional
security, United States forces, and integrated air and
missile defense cooperation.
``(b) Intelligence Sharing and Analytic Cooperation With
Abraham Accords Countries.--
``(1) In general.--The President, acting through the
Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the
Secretary of Defense, shall, consistent with applicable
[[Page S3764]]
law and security agreements, expand and enhance intelligence
sharing and analytic cooperation with countries that have
normalized relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham
Accords (as defined in section 64(k) of the State Department
Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2735a(k)) in order
to strengthen regional security integration.
``(2) Priority areas.--In carrying out paragraph (1), the
President shall prioritize the sharing of appropriate
intelligence and information relating to--
``(A) counterterrorism threats and networks, including
state and nonstate aggressors, and terror financing;
``(B) cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and defensive
best practices;
``(C) air and missile defense early warning and threat
tracking;
``(D) geospatial, overhead, and other imaging intelligence
relevant to shared security concerns; and
``(E) maritime security threats, including threats to
freedom of navigation, commercial shipping, sanctions
evasion, and regional maritime stability.
``(3) Safeguards.--
``(A) Adoption of guidelines.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense,
shall adopt guidelines for intelligence sharing and analytic
cooperation carried out under this subsection that ensure
appropriate safeguards--
``(i) to protect intelligence sources and methods; and
``(ii) to ensure that recipients maintain adequate security
protections consistent with United States requirements.
``(B) Restrictions on access.--If the Director of National
Intelligence determines that a recipient of intelligence
sharing or analytic cooperation carried out under this
subsection has any intelligence, defense, or technological
information sharing relationship with an adversarial nation,
the Director shall restrict all access of such recipient to
such intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation.
``(c) Report Required.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for
5 years, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the status of United
States intelligence sharing with the Government Israel and,
as appropriate, regional partners.
``(2) Matters to be included.--Each report required by
paragraph (1) shall include, to the extent consistent with
the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the
following:
``(A) A description of the categories of intelligence and
security information shared by the United States Government
with the Government of Israel.
``(B) An assessment of progress toward seamlessly
integrating Israel into regional air and missile defense and
early warning architectures with partner countries, including
those that have normalized relations with Israel pursuant to
the Abraham Accords.
``(C) A description of how such intelligence sharing has
contributed, if at all, to--
``(i) improved detection, tracking, warning, interception,
or deterrence of aerial threats, including missiles and
unmanned systems, for Israel, United States forces, or
regional partners; and
``(ii) the overall stability and coordination of security
in the region.
``(D) An assessment of progress in improving
interoperability among technology networks of the United
States, Israel, and partner countries.
``(E) A description of efforts to secure technology
networks and data from cyber threats and unauthorized access.
``(F) An identification of any legal, policy, technical,
counterintelligence, or security barriers limiting deeper
intelligence integration, including risks to intelligence
sources and methods.
``(G) A summary of any significant increases or reductions
in intelligence sharing during the reporting period and the
national security rationale for such changes.
``(3) Form.--Each report required by paragraph (1) report
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex.
``(4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In
this subsection, the term `appropriate congressional
committees' means--
``(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and
``(B) to the extent Department of Defense information is
implicated, the congressional defense committees (as defined
in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code).''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such Act
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 1115. Requirements relating to intelligence sharing.''.
TITLE VII--ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
SEC. 701. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION GUARD AND
INTELLIGENCE SHARING.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Artificial intelligence model.--The term ``artificial
intelligence model'' means a capability or series of
capabilities combined that can, for a given set of
objectives, generate outputs such as predictions,
recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or
input.
(2) Center.--The term ``Center'' means the Artificial
Intelligence Security Center of the National Security Agency.
(3) Classified information.--The term ``classified
information'' has the meaning given such term in section 805
of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3164).
(4) Cleared industry personnel.--The term ``cleared
industry personnel'' means employees or representatives of a
covered person who hold an appropriate security clearance and
have a demonstrated need to know.
(5) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning
given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).
(6) Covered person.--The term ``covered person'' means a
non-Federal person who--
(A) is a United States citizen;
(B) develops, deploys, or operates artificial intelligence
models or critical enabling infrastructure; and
(C) provides the services described in subparagraph (B) to
an element of the intelligence community or Department of
Defense.
(7) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
the National Security Agency.
(8) Intelligence.--The term ``intelligence'' has the
meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security
Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).
(9) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of
the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).
(10) Security clearance.--The term ``security clearance''
means an authorization to access classified information.
(11) Threat information.--The term ``threat information''
means information on--
(A) efforts by foreign adversary countries to use products
or research of covered persons or other entities or
individuals to generate synthetic media for foreign-directed
influence campaigns, develop and manage computer network
exploitation campaigns, design or develop weapons systems, or
enhance surveillance capabilities in ways that undermine the
privacy or threaten the security of citizens of the United
States;
(B) threats posed by foreign adversary countries, including
indications of compromise to networks associated with covered
persons and other entities and individuals, or other
technical indicators, indicating a compromise to the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an artificial
intelligence system, or to the supply chain of an artificial
intelligence system, including training or test data,
frameworks or software libraries, training or inference
computing environments, or other components necessary for the
training, management, or maintenance of an artificial
intelligence system;
(C) activity of foreign entities of concern to
clandestinely, fraudulently, or otherwise maliciously access
the systems of covered persons for purposes of illicit
technology transfer or otherwise gaining unfair economic
advantage, including through techniques to extract a model's
technical capabilities to replicate, develop, or improve a
foreign artificial intelligence model without authorization
by the covered person;
(D) activity of foreign entities of concern to sabotage or
otherwise clandestinely degrade artificial intelligence
systems or the supply chain of an artificial intelligence
system, including training or test data, frameworks or
software libraries, training or inference computing
environments, or other components necessary for the training,
management, or maintenance of an artificial intelligence
system; and
(E) observations, emerging concerns, or other inputs from
vendors or researchers regarding relevant malicious or
clandestine activity of foreign entities of concern toward an
artificial intelligence system, its supply chain, or other
necessary components.
(12) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' has the meaning given that term in section 105A(c)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039(c)).
(b) Establishment of Pilot Program on Sharing of
Intelligence and Threat Information With Covered Persons.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, acting through
the Center, establish a pilot program to assess the
feasibility and advisability of facilitating the secure
sharing with covered persons of intelligence and threat
information germane to the exploitation of access to United
States artificial intelligence systems and enabling
infrastructure to engage in intelligence collection,
intellectual property theft, and other malicious activities.
(2) Participation.--The Director may not select covered
persons to participate in the pilot in a manner that provides
a competitive advantage or procurement preference to any
covered person, to the detriment of another covered person.
(3) Duration.--The Director shall carry out the pilot
program established pursuant to paragraph (1) during the 3-
year period beginning on the date of the establishment of the
pilot program.
(c) Participation Requirements.--
(1) Criteria.--The Director shall establish criteria
governing engagement with covered persons under the pilot
program required by subsection (b), which may include
criteria relating to the following:
(A) Relevance to national security.
[[Page S3765]]
(B) The ability to protect classified or sensitive
intelligence information.
(C) Cybersecurity and information security maturity.
(D) Agreement to comply with intelligence handling, use,
and nondisclosure requirements.
(E) The availability of cleared personnel of covered
persons or willingness of covered persons to increase the
number of cleared personnel.
(2) Nature of participation.--Participation in the pilot
program shall not be construed as a certification,
endorsement, or regulatory approval by the United States
Government of any artificial intelligence system or
commercial activity and the Director may not exclude a
covered person from participating on the basis of political
or ideological viewpoints of the covered person or its
employees.
(3) Process for requesting participation.--The Director
shall, acting through the Center, establish and make
available to covered persons a process by which such covered
person may request access to participate in the pilot program
required by subsection (b). Such process shall include --
(A) submission by a covered person of a formal request to
participate in the pilot program;
(B) evaluation of each such request against, at minimum,
the criteria established under paragraph (1); and
(C) timely notification to the covered person who requested
access of the status of their request and, in the case of
denial, an explanation of the reason for denial.
(d) Intelligence Sharing Structure.--
(1) Authorized modes.--Under the pilot program required by
subsection (b), the Director may, acting through the Center,
authorize the sharing of intelligence and threat information
as described in paragraph (1) of such subsection through--
(A) bilateral exchanges between elements of the
intelligence community and a covered person;
(B) multilateral exchanges among covered persons, as
determined appropriate by the Director; or
(C) another designated intelligence-sharing mechanism
operated or overseen by the Director.
(2) Limitation.--Any mechanism established under this
section shall be limited to the dissemination of intelligence
and threat information and shall not establish standards,
requirements, or best practices governing artificial
intelligence development or deployment.
(e) Tailoring, Handling, and Protection of Intelligence.--
(1) Procedures required.--The Director shall, acting
through the Center, codify procedures to tailor, sanitize, or
downgrade the classification level of intelligence shared
under the pilot program required by subsection (b) to ensure
usability while protecting intelligence sources and methods.
(2) Examples of procedures.--The procedures developed under
paragraph (1) may include the following:
(A) The use of tear lines and segregable summaries.
(B) The preparation of classified annexes where necessary.
(C) Criteria governing the classification level of shared
intelligence.
(D) The appropriate use of cleared industry personnel.
(3) Handling requirements.--The Director shall, acting
through the Center, codify policies governing the handling,
storage, and dissemination of intelligence shared under the
pilot program required by subsection (b), including audit and
compliance mechanisms.
(f) Permissible Use and Nondisclosure.--
(1) Permissible use.--Intelligence shared under the pilot
program required by subsection (b) may be used solely for
detecting, preventing, or mitigating malicious foreign
activity exploiting access to United States artificial
intelligence systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in
intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, and
other malicious activities.
(2) Nondisclosure.--A covered person may not disclose to
any person who is not a covered person or an element of the
intelligence community any intelligence shared with the
covered person under the pilot program required by subsection
(b), except as expressly authorized by the Director acting
through the Center.
(g) Privacy and Civil Liberties.--In planning and
coordinating the pilot program required by subsection (b),
the Director shall, acting through the Center, coordinate
with the Civil Liberties Protection Officer of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence to produce guidance
relating to privacy and civil liberties which shall govern
the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of threat
information containing personal information of United States
persons.
(h) Evaluation and Reporting.--
(1) Evaluation.--The Director shall, acting through the
Center, continuously evaluate the effectiveness and risks of
the pilot program established under subsection (b).
(2) Report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days before the date on
which the pilot program required by paragraph (1) of
subsection (b) terminates pursuant to paragraph (2) of such
subsection, the Director shall, acting through the Center,
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
covering--
(i) the effectiveness of intelligence sharing under the
pilot program;
(ii) the adequacy of safeguards for sources, methods,
privacy, and civil liberties and any recommendations to
mitigate harms;
(iii) the scope of participation;
(iv) a list of covered persons granted access to the pilot
program;
(v) a list of each covered person that requested access and
was denied, including a justification for each such denial;
and
(vi) whether the pilot program should be modified,
extended, or terminated.
(B) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to subparagraph
(A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
a classified annex.
(i) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed--
(1) to authorize the collection of intelligence on United
States persons not authorized by another provision of law;
(2) to authorize the sharing of personally identifiable
information about an individual in a manner that violates
another provision of law;
(3) to require the disclosure of classified information to
unauthorized persons;
(4) to establish commercial, competition, or technology
policy outside the purview of the intelligence community;
(5) to require a non-Federal entity to provide information
to a Federal entity or another non-Federal entity;
(6) to condition the sharing of threat information with a
non-Federal entity on such entity's provision of threat
information to another entity; or
(7) to condition the award of any Federal grant, contract,
or purchase on the provision of threat information to a
Federal or non-Federal entity.
(j) Exemption From Disclosure; Protection.--Any information
shared by a covered person or other entity or individual with
the United States Government pursuant to this section--
(1) shall be exempt from disclosure and withheld, without
discretion, from the public, pursuant to section 552(b)(3)(B)
of title 5, United States Code, and any other provision of
United States law or law of any State, political subdivision
or agency thereof, or Tribe requiring disclosure of
information or records; and
(2) shall not be deemed a waiver of any applicable
privilege or protection, including trade secret protection.
SEC. 702. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY USE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT TARGETING.
(a) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(1) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
National Intelligence.
(2) Intelligence.--The term ``Intelligence'' has the
meaning given the term in section 3 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(b) Reviews Related to Intelligence Community Use of
Artificial Intelligence to Support Targeting.--
(1) Policy and procedure reviews.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall review and
assess the policies and procedures that govern the use by the
intelligence community of artificial intelligence
technologies in the production, or review, of intelligence
used by the United States to inform targeting decisions with
lethal effects.
(B) Elements.--In carrying out the review and assessment
required by subparagraph (A), the Director shall--
(i) assess whether policies and procedures of the
intelligence community that were in effect on the day before
the date of the enactment of this Act adequately address
risks posed by the use of artificial intelligence
technologies in the targeting analysis and development and
civilian harm mitigation processes; and
(ii) ensure the review covers all policies of the
intelligence community that regard the production or review
of intelligence, regardless of which element first produced
the intelligence.
(2) Workflow reviews.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall review
and assess all workflows of the intelligence community that
incorporate artificial intelligence used by the United States
to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects.
(c) Artificial Intelligence Errors Exploratory Analysis.--
In carrying out the reviews required by subsection (b), the
Director shall direct the National Intelligence Council to
conduct a structured, exploratory analysis that--
(1) assess ways in which frontier artificial intelligence
models could exhibit bias or cause errors that undermine
intelligence or other information provided by the
intelligence community that informs targeting accuracy;
(2) identify the specific point and cause of error; and
(3) provide proposed process mitigations to catch and
correct such mistakes.
(d) Consultation.--In carrying out the review and
assessments required by subsection (b), the Director shall
consult with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community whose intelligence is commonly consulted to inform
targeting decisions with lethal effects, such as the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Central
Intelligence Agency, to
[[Page S3766]]
solicit input on potential negative consequences resulting
from artificial intelligence supported analysis, and possible
ways to mitigate such consequences.
(e) Policies and Directives.--The Director shall issue or
adjust such policies and directives to the intelligence
community as the Director considers appropriate to improve
risk mitigation in light of the review carried out under
subsection (b).
(f) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the reviews
and assessments carried out under subsection (b) as well as a
summary of any new policies and directives issued pursuant to
subsection (e).
(2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A description of contributions of the intelligence
community to targeting workflows, such as identification of
points of interest, pattern of life analysis, review of
proposed targets, target selection, and civilian impact
reviews, as well as the understanding of the intelligence
community of the delineation of roles and responsibilities
with the Armed Forces where applicable.
(B) Identification of any artificial intelligence tools
utilized and for what tasks or purposes they are used.
(C) The level of autonomy afforded to the tools, and
whether human review of artificial intelligence system
outputs is required to be conducted prior to dissemination of
materials.
(D) The scope of individuals expected to have access to the
materials described in subparagraph (C).
(E) An explanation of whether and how the capability
limitations of artificial intelligence tools available to
personnel of the intelligence community are communicated to
users, including the cutoff date for the tool's training
data, databases to which it does or does not have access
rights, and the tasks the model has been trained for or
approved for use.
(3) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 703. IMPROVEMENTS FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POLICIES,
STANDARDS, AND GUIDANCE FOR INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Section 6702 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) Study for tracking data generated or modified by an
artificial intelligence system.--The Chief Artificial
Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in
coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer
of each element of the intelligence community, shall examine
whether the intelligence community should identify
intelligence information generated or materially modified by
an artificial intelligence system, including determining what
methods are necessary to preserve such information throughout
the intelligence lifecycle.'';
(2) in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following:
``(3) Process for review of artificial intelligence testing
methodologies and benchmarks.--Consistent with applicable
classification and access policies, the Chief Artificial
Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in
coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer
of each element of the intelligence community, shall--
``(A) establish a process to review artificial intelligence
testing methodologies and benchmarks employed within each
element; and
``(B) ensure such methodologies and benchmarks remain
commensurate with the capabilities and impacts of systems
being evaluated.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(f) Process to Systematically Track and Evaluate
Incidents.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this subsection, the Chief Artificial
Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in
coordination with the National Manager for National Security
Systems, shall establish a process to systematically track
and evaluate incidents associated with compromises to the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of artificial
intelligence systems within each element of the intelligence
community.
``(g) Policies for Agentic Artificial Intelligence Systems
and Processes.--
``(1) Definition of agentic artificial intelligence system
or process.--In this subsection, the term `agentic artificial
intelligence system or process'--
``(A) means an artificial intelligence system or process
that, given an objective or instruction--
``(i) determines the action or sequence of actions to be
taken to accomplish that objective; and
``(ii) is capable of executing such actions directly on
information systems, data, or external services; and
``(B) does not include a system or process that solely
generates informational or advisory output for a human
operator to act upon.
``(2) Review of the adequacy of existing identity,
credential, and access management systems for information
within the intelligence community.--
``(A) In general.--Consistent with authority under section
102A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3024(g)), the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the National Manager for National Security
Systems, shall--
``(i) not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
of this paragraph, complete a review of the adequacy of
existing identity, credential, and access management systems
for information within the intelligence community used by
agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes; and
``(ii) not permit access to any information within the
intelligence community by an external department or agency
for use in an agentic artificial intelligence system or
process until the review required by clause (i) is completed.
``(B) Evaluation of effectiveness of mechanisms for agentic
artificial intelligence systems and processes to authenticate
as non-human actors.--The review required by subparagraph
(A)(i) shall include an evaluation of the effectiveness of
mechanisms for agentic artificial intelligence systems and
processes to authenticate as non-human actors, including the
appropriate delegation of clearance entitlements and the
traceability of any action taken by an agentic artificial
intelligence system or process to a cleared individual on
whose behalf the agentic artificial intelligence system or
process is acting.
``(3) Policy guidance.--Upon completion of the review
required by paragraph (2), the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the
National Security Agency, the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office, and the Director of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, shall issue appropriate
policy guidance on--
``(A) the use of agentic artificial intelligence systems
and processes within the intelligence community; and
``(B) the access of agentic artificial intelligence systems
and processes to information within the intelligence
community.
``(4) Specific issues relating to agentic artificial
intelligence systems and processes.--In carrying out
paragraph (3), the Director of National Intelligence, at a
minimum and to the extent such requirements are not already
replicated in existing processes or policies, consider--
``(A) establishing a taxonomy of autonomy and security
risks associated with agentic artificial intelligence systems
and processes that operate on, or have the possibility of
accessing, information within the intelligence community; and
``(B) establishing technical controls, processes, and other
mitigation measures to address the risks identified under
subparagraph (A), including, at a minimum--
``(i) requirements that any element of the intelligence
community or external department or agency incorporating
information from an intelligence community element as part of
an agentic artificial intelligence system or process provide
the relevant element of the intelligence community
controlling such information with documentation of--
``(I) the properties of the agentic artificial intelligence
system or process, including the range of additional systems
or data sources it may access (whether as a system or process
input or as an agent action), the permissions and
classification entitlements associated with such access, as
well as any relevant model or system documentation, such as
model and system cards;
``(II) anticipated mission use cases for any access to
information within the intelligence community in the context
of an agentic artificial intelligence system or process,
including whether any use case constitutes a high-impact
artificial intelligence use as those terms are defined under
existing Federal policies;
``(III) procedures to notify relevant intelligence
community elements controlling such information of any
changes to the properties of the agentic artificial
intelligence system or process, to permissions and
classification entitlements, or to anticipated use cases of
such system or process, that might significantly limit the
utility, confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such
information; and
``(IV) procedures for intelligence community elements to
promptly notify external intelligence community elements or
departments or agencies of any material changes to upstream
classified data or systems that might significantly limit or
impair the utility, confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of any downstream agentic artificial
intelligence system or process maintained by that external
intelligence community element or department or agency;
``(ii) policies and procedures to log any actions, as well
as associated inputs, taken by an agentic artificial
intelligence system or process to information within the
intelligence community, including mechanisms to reverse or
negate unauthorized actions or actions that pose a risk to
the user intent or confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of such information;
``(iii) policies and procedures for safeguards, continuous
monitoring, and the detection of security incidents or other
unexpected behavior of an agentic artificial intelligence
system or process, or failures of associated safeguards, that
may pose a threat to the confidentiality, availability, or
integrity of information within the intelligence community;
[[Page S3767]]
``(iv) policies and procedures for system-level controls of
agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes,
tailored to address each system or process component; and
``(v) criteria for the selection of interoperability
standards for agentic artificial intelligence systems and
processes, with preference, to the extent practicable, for
standards that are openly specified, governed in a vendor-
neutral manner, supported by multiple model providers,
extensible to future requirements, and subject to ongoing
independent security review.''.
SEC. 704. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE SECURITY CENTER.
Section 6504 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2025 (division F of Public Law 118-159) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new
paragraph (3):
``(3) Making available a research test-bed to private
sector and academic researchers, on a subsidized basis, to
engage in artificial intelligence security research,
including through the secure provision of access in a secure
environment for pre-deployment testing of to proprietary
third-party models with the consent of the vendors of the
models.'';
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (f); and
(3) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Test-bed Requirements.--
``(1) Access and terms of usage.--
``(A) Researcher access.--
``(i) In general.--The Director shall establish terms of
usage governing researcher access to the test-bed made
available under subsection (c)(3), with limitations on
researcher publication only to the extent necessary to
protect classified information or proprietary information
concerning third-party models provided through the consent of
model vendors.
``(ii) Equitable access.--In establishing terms of usage
under clause (i), the Director shall ensure that access to
the test-bed is made available to academic and private sector
researchers in an equitable, impartial, and nondiscriminatory
way.
``(iii) Ideological and political viewpoints.--Terms and
conditions under clause (i) may not deny or condition access
on the basis of the ideological or political viewpoints of
the given researcher or the institution with which a given
researcher is affiliated.
``(iv) Preservation of authority.--Nothing in this
subparagraph shall be construed as limiting the authority of
the Director to condition participation on a researcher's
ability to protect classified or sensitive intelligence
information, a researcher's agreement to comply with
intelligence handling, use, and nondisclosure requirements,
or other valid counter-intelligence concerns.
``(B) Availability to federal agencies.--The Director shall
ensure that the test-bed made available under subsection
(c)(3) is also made available to other Federal agencies on a
cost-recovery basis.
``(2) Use of certain infrastructure and other resources.--
In carrying out subsection (c)(3), the Director shall
leverage, to the greatest extent practicable, infrastructure
and other resources provided under section 5.2 of Executive
Order 14110 (88 Fed. Reg. 75191; relating to safe, secure,
and trustworthy development and use of artificial
intelligence).
``(3) Voluntary security guidance.--In order to incentivize
participation by vendors of leading commercial models and to
promote the national security of the United States, the
Director shall share relevant guidance, informed by pre-
deployment testing in the secure test-bed environment
identified in subsection (c), to inform voluntary vendor
actions to mitigate against potential security threats to
such models, or the ability of foreign actors to utilize such
models for computer network exploitation campaigns, the
design or development of weapons systems, or to further
foreign surveillance capabilities.
``(e) Reports on Test-bed Access.--Not less than 1 year
after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027 and annually
thereafter, the Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the test-bed established
under subsection (c)(3) that includes --
``(1) a list of persons that requested access to the test-
bed during the period covered by the report;
``(2) a list of the persons that were granted access to the
test-bed during such period;
``(3) a list of the persons that were denied access to the
test-bed during such period, and a justification for each
such denial; and
``(4) a full copy of the terms of usage established under
subsection (d)(1).''.
SEC. 705. REPORTS ON NOVEL USES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Definition.--In this section, the term ``novel use of
artificial intelligence technology'' means--
(1) an artificial intelligence capability or series of
capabilities combined that has not previously been included
in an intelligence community element's inventory of
artificial intelligence use cases consistent with guidance
issued pursuant to section 6702(b) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m(b));
(2) a use of an artificial intelligence capability that
contravenes a restriction on the use of artificial
intelligence contained in such an inventory; or
(3) a use of an artificial intelligence capability that
constitutes a high-impact artificial intelligence use as that
term is defined under policies of the executive branch.
(b) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the
heads of the other elements of the intelligence community,
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
consolidated report detailing any novel use of artificial
intelligence technology that any element of the intelligence
community is considering employing within the one-year period
following submission of such report.
(c) Contents.--Each report submitted pursuant to subsection
(b) shall describe the proposed novel use of artificial
intelligence technology, including--
(1) hardware and software requirements;
(2) the proposed application of the technology;
(3) the risks and advantages assessed with respect to the
proposed novel use;
(4) any specific risk mitigation measures contemplated,
including measures specific to the proposed novel use;
(5) any test and evaluation activities conducted in
conjunction with the proposed novel use;
(6) any additional test and evaluation activity that is
still needed, and whether the intelligence community has
resources to conduct and fund such activity; and
(7) any estimated cost increases anticipated in connection
with the proposed novel use.
(d) Form.--Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (b)
shall be submitted in classified form.
(e) Sunset.--This section shall expire on October 1, 2032.
SEC. 706. CLEAR LABELING OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OUTPUTS
FOR TARGETING WORKFLOWS.
(a) Labeling Policy.--Not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Chief Artificial
Intelligence Officers of the elements of the intelligence
community, establish a policy that applies to elements of the
intelligence community, which generate intelligence that
could reasonably be judged useful to develop or inform
targeting with lethal effects, and that requires--
(1) labeling of outputs from any artificial intelligence
system used in the development of such intelligence are
clearly marked to indicate--
(A) that artificial intelligence was used;
(B) the artificial intelligence system or model used;
(C) the manner in which, or task for which, the artificial
intelligence was used; and
(D) a point of contact such as the relevant Chief
Artificial Intelligence Officer, who can address questions
about data inputs, system access, or artificial intelligence
system performance; and
(2) the label or indicator that is used pursuant to
paragraph (1) is attached to the resulting data or work
product in a manner that remains prominent and visible to any
person who subsequently interacts with that data on a system
of the intelligence community, regardless of organizational
affiliation of the person or the role of the person in
developing the data.
(b) Reports on Risk Mitigation Measures.--Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and
annually thereafter, the head of each element of the
intelligence community to which the policy described in
subsection (a) applies shall submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees describing risk
mitigation measures undertaken by the given element regarding
artificial intelligence systems that generate intelligence
that could reasonably be judged useful to develop or inform
targeting with lethal effects.
SEC. 707. RESEARCH ON USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RELATING
TO INADVERTENT ESCALATION.
(a) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of
appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced
Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief
Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence
Community, shall commence a research campaign to deepen the
understanding of the intelligence community with respect to
specific ways in which the use of artificial intelligence
systems by the intelligence community could contribute to
inadvertent escalation with foreign nations or actors.
(b) Elements.--The research campaign required by subsection
(a) shall include--
(1) the identification of scenarios in which artificial
intelligence capabilities could contribute to inadvertent
escalation with foreign nations or actors, including--
(A) analytic judgments that fail to properly consider or
weigh alternative explanations;
(B) automation of imagery classification or signals
intelligence;
(C) distinguishing between civilians and authorized
targets;
(D) operational uses of artificial intelligence, such as
time-constrained uses that do not allow for independent
verification; and
(E) such other scenarios as identified by the Director or
participating subject matter experts;
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(2) a simulation of select scenarios to discern where
miscommunication or miscalculations have a higher likelihood
of occurrence; and
(3)(A) an identification of potential mitigations for
vulnerabilities discovered; or
(B) if no mitigation could be identified, an identification
of vulnerabilities that require follow-up action by the
intelligence community.
(c) Briefings.--
(1) Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of
completion of the research campaign required by subsection
(a), whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence
Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the
Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence
Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence
committees on the findings and recommendations of the
research campaign.
(2) Intelligence community.--The Director of the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in
coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer
of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and
Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the
intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of
the research campaign required by subsection (a), as
appropriate.
SEC. 708. RESEARCH ON INTERACTION OF ADVERSARIAL ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS WITH INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY SYSTEMS.
(a) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of
appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced
Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief
Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence
Community, shall commence a research campaign to deepen the
understanding of the intelligence community with respect to
novel dynamics and vulnerabilities that may arise when an
adversarial artificial intelligence system interacts directly
with systems of, or contracted by, the intelligence community
that include artificial intelligence components.
(b) Elements.--The research campaign required by subsection
(a) shall--
(1) pursue sandbox demonstrations with frontier artificial
intelligence models or leverage other tactics necessary to
uncover vulnerabilities to intelligence community systems,
infrastructure, or personnel that may result from--
(A) the accelerated development of artificial intelligence
capabilities by foreign nations;
(B) the increasing access that non-state and criminal
actors have to commercial artificial intelligence tools that
can identify vulnerabilities and propose or orchestrate
attacks; and
(C) the potential for artificial intelligence systems to
interact directly with each other during an attack; and
(2) pursue findings, including--
(A) an identification of potential mitigations for unique
vulnerabilities discovered; or
(B) if no mitigation could be identified, an identification
of vulnerabilities that require follow-up action by the
intelligence community.
(c) Briefings.--
(1) Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of
completion of the research campaign required by subsection
(a), whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence
Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the
Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence
Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence
committees on the findings and recommendations of the
research campaign.
(2) Intelligence community.--The Director of the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in
coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer
of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and
Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the
intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of
the research campaign required by subsection (a), as
appropriate.
SEC. 709. REVIEW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY
VULNERABILITIES UNDER VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES
PROCESS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Artificial intelligence security vulnerability.--The
term ``artificial intelligence security vulnerability'' means
a weakness in an artificial intelligence system that could be
exploited by a third party to subvert, without authorization,
the privacy, integrity, or availability of an artificial
intelligence system, including through techniques such as--
(A) evasion attacks;
(B) poisoning attacks;
(C) privacy-based attacks;
(D) model theft or extraction attacks; and
(E) attacks designed to circumvent or degrade the safety,
alignment, or access control mechanisms of an artificial
intelligence system.
(2) Artificial intelligence system.--The term ``artificial
intelligence system'' means a capability or series of
capabilities combined that can, for a given set of
objectives, generate outputs such as predictions,
recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or
input.
(3) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process document.--
The term ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process
document'' means the executive branch document entitled
``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United
States Government'' dated November 15, 2017.
(4) Vulnerabilities equities process.--The term
``Vulnerabilities Equities Process'' means the interagency
review of vulnerabilities carried out pursuant to the
Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any
successor document.
(b) Evaluation; Report.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
National Security Agency shall--
(1) evaluate whether the existing Vulnerabilities Equities
Process sufficiently accommodates the submission and review
of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities; and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report describing the applicability of the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process to such vulnerabilities, including whether
the submission and review of such vulnerabilities under the
Vulnerabilities Equities Process would result in an unduly
large volume of notifications to affected vendors and, if so,
an assessment of mechanisms to manage the volume of such
notifications.
(c) Process.--In carrying out subsection (b), if the
Director of the National Security Agency determines that the
existing Vulnerabilities Equities Process does not
sufficiently accommodate the submission and review of
artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities identified
by elements of the intelligence community, and that such
vulnerabilities present public interest considerations
meriting review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process,
the Director shall establish a process for the submission and
review of such vulnerabilities under the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process not later than 30 days after the date of
such determination.
(d) Briefing on Vulnerabilities Identified by Artificial
Intelligence Systems.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National
Security Agency shall provide the congressional intelligence
committees with a briefing on--
(1) the volume of vulnerabilities of information systems
identified by artificial intelligence systems;
(2) the impact of any change in such volume on the
functioning of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
(3) whether the increasingly rapid discovery and
exploitation of such vulnerabilities by external cyber actors
using artificial intelligence systems materially alters the
equity of disclosure.
(e) Consultation Required.--The Director of the National
Security Agency shall carry out subsections (b), (c), and (d)
in consultation with--
(1) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;
(2) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
and
(3) other entities as the Director of the National Security
Agency considers appropriate.
SEC. 710. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
MODELS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SYSTEMS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the following:
(A) The congressional intelligence committees.
(B) The Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(C) The Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Artificial intelligence model.--The term ``artificial
intelligence model'' means a capability or series of
capabilities combined that can, for a given set of
objectives, generate outputs such as predictions,
recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or
input.
(3) Child pornography.--The term ``child pornography'' has
the meaning given that term in section 2256 of title 18,
United States Code.
(4) Covered application.--The term ``covered application''
means any specific artificial intelligence model that has
been confirmed by a head of an element of the intelligence
community, or their designee, as--
(A) failing to adhere to the National Institute of Standard
and Technology Artificial Intelligence Risk Management
Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile with
respect to ``obscene, degrading, and/or abusive content'', or
a successor standard or framework, to the extent the
framework applies to synthetic child sexual abuse material or
non-consensual intimate images of adults;
(B) subject to a Federal court determination that such
artificial intelligence model has generated content depicting
child pornography; or
(C) subject to a Federal court determination that such
artificial intelligence model has generated non-consensual
intimate visual depictions of an identifiable adult or a
minor.
(5) Intimate visual depiction.--The term ``intimate visual
depiction'' has the meaning given that term in section 1309
of the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022
(15 U.S.C. 6851).
(b) Prohibition.--
(1) In general.--The acquisition or use of any covered
application on national security
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systems operated by an element of the intelligence community
or by a contractor of such element is prohibited unless the
appropriate safeguards described in subsection (c) can be
implemented.
(2) Implementation.--
(A) Initial removal.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, any covered application
shall be required to be removed from national security
systems operated by an element of the intelligence community
or a contractor of such element.
(B) Subsequent removals.--Beginning after the 180-day
period described in subparagraph (A), any artificial
intelligence model that becomes a covered application shall
be required to be removed from national security systems
operated by an element of the intelligence community or a
contractor of such element not later than 180 days after the
date that the model is confirmed by the head of an element of
the intelligence community, or their designee, to be a
covered application.
(c) Safeguards.--
(1) In general.--The head of an element of the intelligence
community may implement additional safeguards that prohibit
the generation of child pornography or non-consensual
intimate visual depictions of an identifiable adult or a
minor.
(2) Certification required.--The head of an element of the
intelligence community shall certify to the Director of
National Intelligence that safeguards implemented under
paragraph (1) are sufficient to prevent misuse of covered
applications to generate child pornography or intimate visual
depictions of a minor.
(3) Congressional notification.--The head of an element of
the intelligence community that issues a certification
pursuant to paragraph (2) shall notify the appropriate
committees of Congress of such certification not later than 7
days after issuing such certification. Such a notification
shall identify the safeguards implemented pursuant to
paragraph (1).
(d) National Security and Research Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The head of an element of the intelligence
community may issue a waiver for any artificial intelligence
model that would otherwise be subject to the prohibition
under subsection (b) if the head identifies a national
security or research justification for such artificial
intelligence model that benefits the intelligence community.
(2) Congressional notification.--Not later than 7 days
after issuing a waiver pursuant to paragraph (1), the head of
the element of the intelligence community that issues such
waiver shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
a notification that includes--
(A) an identification of the national security or research
justification for such usage;
(B) an estimate of the approximate cost of such usage; and
(C) a plan to implement a safeguard in such a way as to
allow for continued usage consistent with the general
prohibition described in subsections (b)(1) and (c)(1).
(e) Cure.--If a covered application is identified for
removal or is disqualified from use or acquisition pursuant
to this section, the head of an element of the intelligence
community may offer the provider of the covered application
an opportunity to cure performance to avoid removal pursuant
to subsection (b)(2).
TITLE VIII--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 801. MODIFICATION TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
AUTHORIZED AND ORDERED DEPARTURES.
Section 5173(e) of the Department of State Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (22 U.S.C. 4865 note; division E of
Public Law 119-60) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,''
after ``Foreign Affairs''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, the Select Committee
on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,'' after
``Foreign Relations''.
SEC. 802. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION.
The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with
the heads of the other elements of the intelligence
community, may provide intelligence and analytic support to
the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to
help ensure all projects of the Corporation are appropriately
informed and strategically executed in accordance with the
purpose of the Corporation as described in section 1412(b) of
the BUILD Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(b)).
SEC. 803. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.
(a) Definition of Armed Forces in National Security Act of
1947.--Section 605(8) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3126(8)) is amended by inserting ``Space Force,''
after ``Marine Corps,''.
(b) National Intelligence University.--Section 6801(a)(4)
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026
(Public Law 119-60) is amended in the matter preceding
subparagraph (A) by striking ``3327'' and inserting ``3227''.
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