[Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 106 (Wednesday, June 24, 2026)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3441-S3443]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 6303. Mr. HUSTED submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of subtitle D of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1252. REPORT ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POWER OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3
years, the Secretaries, in consultation with the covered
agency heads, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives a report on the advanced artificial
intelligence capabilities of the PRC, including the efforts
by the PRC relating to supply chains for advanced artificial
intelligence systems.
(b) Components.--Each report required under subsection (a)
shall also include the following:
(1) An assessment of integrated circuits designed or
optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training or
inference by leading artificial intelligence chip designers
in the PRC, including Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. and
Cambricon Technologies, that includes--
(A) with respect to such integrated circuits, the--
(i) total processing power;
(ii) integer and floating point operations per second at
relevant precision levels;
(iii) memory capacity and bandwidth;
(iv) interconnect bandwidth;
(v) power efficiency;
(vi) transistor count and die size;
(vii) process node used per design;
(viii) energy efficiency;
(ix) manufacturing cost and yield assumptions;
(x) ability of the integrated circuit to effectively run
artificial intelligence models trained on a different chip
designer's integrated circuit, including measurements such as
model inference in tokens per second and cost per token with
and without a software application layer that improves model
translation ability;
(xi) the capability of the most advanced server
configuration produced using the chip designer's integrated
circuits including such technical specifications like
floating point operations per second, memory capacity and
bandwidth, energy efficiency, and ability to function at
scale; and
(xii) any future specification that becomes relevant to the
development of future artificial intelligence capability; and
(B) with respect to such chip designers--
(i) the total number and types of integrated circuits
produced in the year preceding submission of such report and
the projected production number for the year proceeding
submission of such report;
(ii) the foundries used in the production of the integrated
circuits;
(iii) the software ecosystem, including any parallel
computing platforms, programming models, or development
frameworks that enable accelerated computing for artificial
intelligence training or inference;
(iv) the method and extent to which such integrated
circuits are used in other countries, including in the United
States; and
(v) the manufacturer's ability to produce a software
application layer required to achieve an improved token per
seconds and cost per token rate.
(2) An assessment of leading semiconductor fabrication
facilities in the PRC that produce logic integrated circuits
for use in advanced artificial intelligence training or
inference, including such facilities owned or operated by the
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, that
includes, with respect to such facilities, the--
(A) total monthly production capacity per advanced process
node with non-planar transistors or 16/14 nm and below and
the percentage of that monthly production capacity dedicated
to production of logic integrated circuits for use in
advanced artificial training or inference;
(B) yield for producing such logic integrated circuits for
use in advanced artificial intelligence training or inference
at each facility with an assessment of that yield in industry
relevant terms, such as compared to PRC firms, compared to
non-PRC firms, or how many are in current industry-leading
datacenters;
(C) most advanced process node under production;
(D) types and volume of semiconductor manufacturing
equipment used, the country of origin for such equipment, and
the export control regulatory regime under which such
equipment was procured;
(E) collaborations, licit or illicit, between PRC firms or
their subsidiaries and non-PRC firms and the advancements
those collaborations produce for the PRC firm;
(F) progress PRC firms are making at indigenizing export
controlled technologies;
(G) market share PRC firms have in the PRC and
internationally; and
(H) year-over-year trends in leading semiconductor
fabrication facilities during at least the preceding 5-year
period;
(3) An assessment of leading semiconductor fabrication
facilities in the PRC that produce memory integrated circuits
used for advanced artificial intelligence training or
inference, including such facilities owned or operated by
ChangXin Memory Technologies or Yangtze Memory Technologies
Corp., that includes--
(A) with respect to such circuits, the--
(i) most advanced generation of high-bandwidth memory,
including the technical specifications and stack height;
(ii) memory cell area and memory density of other dynamic
random access memory integrated circuits; and
(iii) highest number of layers in three-dimensional NOT-AND
memory integrated circuits;
(B) with respect to such facilities, the--
(i) yield and total monthly production capacity for memory
integrated circuits, including dynamic random access memory
such as high-bandwidth memory, and NOT-AND memory; and
(ii) types and volume of semiconductor manufacturing
equipment used, including the country of origin of such
equipment and the export control regulatory regime such
equipment was procured under.
(C) collaborations, licit or illicit, between PRC firms or
their subsidiaries and non-PRC firms and the advancements
those collaborations produce for the PRC firm;
(D) progress PRC firms are making at indigenizing export
controlled technologies;
(E) market share PRC firms have in the PRC and
internationally; and
(F) year-over-year trends in the PRC's advanced memory
integrated circuit production for a minimum of the 5 previous
years.
(4) An assessment of leading semiconductor manufacturing
equipment companies in the PRC, including NAURA Technology
Group, KINGSEMI, Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment Inc.,
Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment, and Shenzhen SiCarrier
Technologies Co., Ltd, that includes--
(A) a categorical breakdown of annual unit production
volume and technical specifications, including minimum
feature size, throughput, and defect rate, of all major
equipment classes installed or under development for wafer
production in foundries in the PRC, including--
(i) lithography tools, including photolithography,
nanoimprint, and electron beam lithography tools;
(ii) etch equipment, including wet etching and dry etching;
(iii) deposition equipment, including chemical vapor
deposition, physical vapor deposition, and atomic layer
deposition;
(iv) cleaning systems;
(v) chemical mechanical planarization tools;
(vi) ion implantation and diffusion systems;
(vii) wafer inspection, metrology, and process control
tools;
(viii) back-end packaging equipment, including wafer dicing
equipment and wire bonders;
(ix) capabilities and advancements in advanced packaging
technologies;
(x) thermal processing equipment;
(xi) bonding equipment, including thermo compression
bonders and hybrid bonders;
(xii) environmental control systems;
(xiii) laser systems; and
(xiv) reticle and photomask writing and inspection tools;
(B) the country of origin and supplier company for each
piece of semiconductor manufacturing equipment used in
foundries in the PRC for advanced-node logic or high-
bandwidth memory production by such companies;
(C) the foreign-sourced subcomponents integrated into the
semiconductor manufacturing equipment produced by such
companies, including precision motion stages, lasers,
electrostatic chucks, optical systems, radio frequency
generators, or extreme-purity gas handling systems;
(D) collaborations, licit or illicit, between PRC firms or
their subsidiaries and non-PRC firms and the advancements
those collaborations produce for the PRC firm;
(E) progress PRC firms are making at indigenizing export
controlled technologies;
(F) market share PRC firms have in the PRC and
internationally; and
(G) year-over-year trends in leading semiconductor
manufacturing equipment companies in the PRC for a minimum of
the 5 previous years.
(5) An assessment of electronic design automation (EDA)
software used in the design of integrated circuits for
advanced artificial intelligence applications in the PRC,
including software developed or provided by leading PRC EDA
companies such as Empyrean Technology Co., Ltd. and Primarius
Technologies Co., Ltd., that includes--
(A) with respect to such software tools, the--
(i) range of design stages supported, including front-end
design such as architecture and register-transfer level
design, logic synthesis, verification, physical design,
place-and-route, timing closure, and final signoff;
[[Page S3442]]
(ii) compatibility with advanced process nodes, including
sub-7 nanometer technologies, gate-all-around devices, and
three-dimensional integration;
(iii) capabilities for designing artificial intelligence-
specific components of such integrated circuits, including
tensor processing cores, systolic array processing units,
matrix multiplier units, and high-bandwidth memory
interfaces;
(iv) ability to model and optimize for power, performance,
and thermal constraints in artificial intelligence workloads;
(v) scale and performance of the software in handling large
designs, such as chips exceeding 50-100 billion transistors;
and
(vi) integration with cloud compute resources or
distributed workflows for large-scale artificial intelligence
chip development;
(B) with respect to such companies, the--
(i) total market share within the PRC and internationally,
including the share of advanced-node integrated circuits
designed or optimized for advanced artificial intelligence
training or inference designs supported by each company; and
(ii) types, volume, and origin of critical technology
components used in software development, including
intellectual property cores, third-party libraries,
verification suites, and artificial intelligence-assisted
optimization algorithms;
(C) progress PRC firms are making at indigenizing export-
controlled or foreign-origin technologies used in EDA,
including high-performance computing integration, advanced
verification engines, and proprietary intellectual property
cores;
(D) year-over-year trends for the PRC's EDA industry over a
minimum of the previous 5 years, including technology
adoption, market share, and software capability evolution;
and
(E) identification of technical gaps relative to leading
global EDA providers, particularly in relation to artificial
intelligence-focused design, advanced nodes, and large-scale
verification.
(6) An assessment of the advanced artificial intelligence
models determined by the Secretaries to be the most relevant
to the national security of the United States that were
developed by artificial intelligence laboratories or
companies based in the PRC, especially those laboratories and
companies affiliated with the People's Liberation Army or any
university in the PRC, including the most advanced models,
open-weight and closed-weight models, based on model size,
total compute used during training, benchmark performance,
and any other advanced capabilities the Secretaries determine
relevant, that includes, with respect to each such model--
(A) the number of model parameters;
(B) the total training compute used, measured in floating-
point operations and their relevant precision level;
(C) the model performance on benchmark tasks;
(D) an evaluation of the extent to which the model exhibits
advanced cyber offensive capabilities, an advanced
understanding of biological and virological application
domains, and the ability to substantially automate or
accelerate artificial intelligence research, and a comparison
of such models to the most advanced artificial intelligence
models from United States developers;
(E) if the model is open-weight, an evaluation of the files
provided and the security implications of following the
developer's deployment instructions;
(F) a description of the algorithmic alignment training
used;
(G) the type and scale of compute infrastructure used in
training and inference, including the cluster configurations,
the number and type of integrated circuits specifically
designed or optimized for advanced artificial intelligence
training or inference, how such integrated circuits were
acquired and from which companies, where those clusters are
located, and how they are being accessed;
(H) the manner and extent to which the model is used
throughout society in the PRC, including throughout the
following industries or sectors:
(i) the People's Liberation Army;
(ii) the surveillance and intelligence collection functions
of the CCP, including the genocide of Uyghur Muslims and
other religious and ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region;
(iii) the Government of the PRC;
(iv) business and finance;
(v) education;
(vi) healthcare;
(vii) critical infrastructure sectors, including the power
grid and transportation; and
(viii) any other sectors that the Secretaries determines to
be relevant, such as high-risk industries where artificial
intelligence failure would have outsized safety or mission
consequences.
(I) whether and where such models are deployed for public
use, including API access or mobile app deployment;
(J) the manner and extent to which such models are diffused
in other countries, including the United States;
(K) the alignment of those models to CCP propaganda;
(L) the potential of those models to inject or create
vulnerabilities for users or other ways they could be used to
further CCP national security objectives;
(M) an assessment of global market share of PRC models and
the effect that global market share is enabling the PRC to
set artificial intelligence hardware or software standards;
and
(N) the total number of tokens inferenced globally using
the model, the types of hardware utilized for such inference
and the percent breakdown between company of origin for such
hardware, and the percentage of global inferenced tokens
attributable to the model.
(7) An assessment of emerging artificial intelligence
research in the PRC, based on indicators such as academic
publications, patent filings, and research funding,
including--
(A) the development of novel artificial intelligence
algorithms and techniques, including advancements in
reinforcement learning, natural language processing, or
computer vision, with a focus on algorithms and techniques
most relevant for developing or deploying the most advanced
artificial intelligence systems;
(B) advancements in hardware designed to enhance artificial
intelligence capabilities, including custom integrated
circuits, quantum computing technologies, or neuromorphic
computing systems, with a focus on hardware advancements most
relevant for developing or deploying the most advanced
artificial intelligence systems;
(C) the scale and focus of research efforts, including the
number of researchers, institutions, and collaborations
involved, and the funding levels and sources, with a focus on
those most relevant for developing or deploying the most
advanced frontier artificial intelligence systems;
(D) an evaluation of the potential impact of such research
on future artificial intelligence capabilities relevant to
national security competitiveness; and
(E) a description of licit or illicit methods or tactics
such as unauthorized model distillation used by PRC entities
to steal non-PRC artificial intelligence related intellectual
property.
(8) An assessment of the aggregate public funding and
capital flows supporting artificial intelligence development
in the PRC, including--
(A) the sum total of the PRC's national, provincial, and
municipal investment in artificial intelligence;
(B) subsidies that are underwriting the costs of artificial
intelligence development in areas such as compute,
infrastructure, water, and energy;
(C) an assessment of foreign capital investments, including
the total amount invested and a breakdown by entity,
including the country of origin and the amount invested; and
(D) an assessment of the PRC entities that have received
the funding, including the name of the entity and the amount
of funding received.
(9) The aggregate artificial intelligence computational
capacity in the PRC, including--
(A) a detailed analysis of computational capacity of the 5
most capable PRC entities, including the number and types of
integrated circuits and server systems used and their
aggregate computational power;
(B) the countries and companies with respect to which the
PRC sourced its computational capacity; and
(C) the locations and specifications, including energy and
computational capacity, of datacenters used for advanced
artificial intelligence training and inference.
(10) An assessment of leading humanoid robot manufacturers
in the PRC, including Unitree Robotics and Fourier, that
includes--
(A) with respect to such manufacturers, the--
(i) production capacity per year; and
(ii) unit cost and pricing trends for such robots intended
for commercial deployment; and
(B) with respect to the humanoid robots produced by such
manufactures--
(i) the number, type, and country and company of origin of
the semiconductor components, including integrated circuits,
used to build, run, or train such robots;
(ii) the country and company of origin and the technical
specifications of critical components used in such robots,
including actuators, sensors, and battery systems, and if not
PRC, the progress toward indigenization;
(iii) a description of the tasks such robots can perform;
(iv) whether such robots are teleoperated, operated through
hard-coded instructions, or function autonomously using
artificial intelligence models;
(v) whether inference is performed locally or via remote
cloud services;
(vi) the number of such robots deployed across the PRC,
including in the military, manufacturing, logistics, health
care, security, and personal assistance sectors;
(vii) the extent to which, and ways in which, such robots
are diffused in other countries, including in the United
States; and
(viii) an assessment of the cybersecurity and other
vulnerabilities of PRC origin robotic systems.
(11) An assessment of the most advanced or widely used
artificial intelligence-powered applications developed by PRC
entities or built on PRC artificial intelligence models,
including--
(A) the artificial intelligence models used to power these
applications, including the company and country of origin for
each model and whether the models are open-weight or closed-
weight;
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(B) the means of deployment and the extent to which such
applications are used, including in the United States;
(C) the purposes, capabilities, and promoted uses of the
applications;
(D) an analysis of how data collected or generated by the
applications is used, including for artificial intelligence
model training, surveillance, or other national security-
relevant purposes; and
(E) an evaluation of the potential risks posed by these
applications to United States national security, foreign
policy objectives, or data privacy.
(12) An assessment of the regulatory framework governing
artificial intelligence development, deployment, and usage in
the PRC, that includes--
(A) the explicit restrictions on artificial intelligence
models, including laws, regulations, and government policies
that directly limit or control the development, deployment,
or use of artificial intelligence models in the PRC;
(B) an analysis of the implicit restrictions on artificial
intelligence models, including censorship, data access
limitations, or other indirect controls that may constrain
artificial intelligence model capabilities;
(C) how such explicit and implicit restrictions impact the
development, deployment, and diffusion of artificial
intelligence models both within the PRC and internationally,
including the effects on innovation, competitiveness, and
national security;
(D) an analysis of efforts by the CCP to acquire greater
insight into advanced artificial intelligence and reduce
strategic surprise, such as efforts that require advanced
artificial intelligence developers to disclose information
about artificial intelligence systems or provide models to
government entities;
(E) an analysis of efforts in the PRC to assess or mitigate
national security or public safety threats from advanced
artificial intelligence systems, including efforts to prevent
loss of control from autonomous artificial intelligence
systems; and
(F) the goals for artificial intelligence development
explicitly and implicitly stated by the CCP.
(13) An assessment of the PRC's global artificial
intelligence standards diplomacy efforts, including--
(A) mapping the fora where PRC actors aimed to shape global
standards;
(B) outlining key policy objectives of PRC;
(C) jurisdictions where PRC-promoted standards, model laws,
guidance, or procurement criteria have been adopted or
referenced;
(D) the effects on procurement and vendor eligibility; and
(E) opportunities for the United States to shape global
artificial intelligence standards and counter PRC efforts
when they run contrary to United States interest.
(14) An assessment of the degree to which PRC entities
remotely accessed artificial intelligence computational
resources, including through cloud services, international
data centers, or through circumvention or avoidance of United
States export controls.
(15) An assessment of the methods, pathways, quantities,
and companies and countries of origin of United States-
controlled integrated circuits specifically designed or
optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training or
inference, including graphics processing units or
application-specific integrated circuits, that have been
diverted to mainland the PRC, the estimated total compute
capacity enabled through these chip diversions, and the
percent of the PRC's total compute capacity enabled through
these chip diversions.
(16) An assessment of the effectiveness of United States
export controls in restricting access by the PRC to
artificial intelligence-relevant technologies, including an
identification of loopholes within United States export
controls and recommendations for legislative and
administrative action to strengthen export controls and
enforcement that is consistent with United States national
security and foreign policy objectives.
(c) Prioritization.--In conducting the assessments required
under subsection (b), the Secretaries shall prioritize the
identification and analysis of--
(1) semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment,
and critical components of semiconductor manufacturing
equipment that are, or are likely to become, critical to the
supply chains for the training or inference of the most
advanced artificial intelligence systems; and
(2) items that enable or could enable advanced model
performance, are associated with systems that pose
significant national security or strategic implications to
the United States, or are likely to be foundational to the
development of future advanced artificial intelligence
systems, including those not yet deployed or publicly
disclosed.
(d) Reference Class.--Where applicable, the Secretaries
shall provide context to all statistics regarding the PRC's
artificial intelligence power in the report by presenting the
PRC's capabilities and production numbers in comparison to
relevant United States and partner country production numbers
and capabilities.
(e) Coordination With Expert Entities.--In carrying out
this section, the Secretaries may consult and coordinate with
other Federal departments and agencies, private industry or
research organizations, Federally funded research and
development centers, national laboratories, academic
institutions, relevant media outlets, or any other entities
with expertise in semiconductor technologies, artificial
intelligence, or national security that the Secretaries
determine relevant.
(f) Avoidance of Duplication.--In carrying out this
section, the Secretaries shall, to the maximum extent
practicable, leverage existing and ongoing assessments,
analyses, intelligence products, collection efforts, and
reporting produced by covered agency heads and other Federal
departments and agencies, including elements of the
intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), to avoid
unnecessary duplication of Federal efforts.
(g) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form and may contain a classified
annex.
(h) Mandatory Unclassified Elements.--In the unclassified
portion of the report required under subsection (a), the
Secretaries shall include, subject to the appropriate
treatment of classified information and protection of sources
and methods--
(1) the number of integrated circuits specifically designed
or optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training or
inference produced by leading entities in the PRC in the year
preceding submission of such report;
(2) the projected production numbers of integrated circuits
from the PRC specifically designed or optimized for advanced
artificial intelligence training or inference, including
identification of foundries responsible for such production,
for the year proceeding submission of such report; and
(3) the extent to which and ways artificial intelligence-
relevant technologies in the PRC, including integrated
circuits, models, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and
humanoid robots are diffused in other countries, including
the United States.
(i) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) CCP.--The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist
Party.
(2) Covered agency heads.--The term ``covered agency
heads'' means the--
(A) Secretary of Defense;
(B) Secretary of Energy;
(C) Director of National Intelligence;
(D) Director for the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy; and
(E) head of any other relevant Federal department or agency
the Secretary determines necessary.
(3) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of
China.
(4) Secretaries.--The term ``Secretaries'' means the
Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State.
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