[Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 105 (Tuesday, June 23, 2026)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3106-S3110]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 5968. Mr. SCHIFF submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the
following:
Subtitle ___ Human Authority in Lethal Operations
SEC. ___1. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Human Authority in
Lethal Operations Act of 2026'' or the ``HALO Act of 2026''.
SEC. ___2. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
(2) Artificial intelligence.--The term ``artificial
intelligence'' has the meaning given such term in section
5002 of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act
of 2020 (15 U.S.C. 9401).
(3) Autonomous weapon system.--
(A) In general.--The term ``autonomous weapon system''
means a weapon system that, once activated, can identify,
select, or engage targets without further intervention by or
communication with a human operator.
(B) Includes.--The term defined in subparagraph (A)
includes weapon systems that have human-operated supervision
with the ability to override complete operation of the
system, but can select and engage targets without further
human operator input, recalibration, or communication after
activation.
(4) Covered artificial intelligence capability.--The term
``covered artificial intelligence capability'' means an
artificial intelligence designed, tested, developed,
procured, deployed, or used by, on behalf of, or shared with
the Department.
(5) Designated commander.--The term ``designated
commander'' means the highest ranking commissioned officer
within the chain of command who exercises operational or
administrative command authority over an autonomous or semi-
autonomous weapons system.
(6) Department.--The term ``Department'' means Department
of Defense.
(7) Ethical principles for artificial intelligence.--The
term ``Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence'' means
the Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence adopted by
the Department on February 24, 2020, as in effect on January
1, 2025.
(8) Military departments.--The term ``military
departments'' has the meaning given such term in section
101(a) of title 10, United States Code.
(9) Responsible artificial intelligence strategy and
implementation pathway.--The term ``Responsible Artificial
Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway'' means the
Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and
Implementation Pathway dated June 2022 and prepared by the
Department of Defense Responsible Artificial Intelligence
Working Council in accordance with the memorandum issued by
Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks on May 26, 2021,
Implementing Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the
Department of Defense, as in effect on January 1, 2025.
(10) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Defense.
(11) Semi-autonomous weapon system.--
(A) In general.--The term ``semi-autonomous weapon system''
means a weapon system that, once activated, is intended to
only engage individual targets or specific target groups that
have been previously selected by a human operator.
(B) Included.--The term defined in subparagraph (A)
includes weapon systems that autonomously conduct engagement-
related functions, including the following:
(i) Acquiring, tracking, and identifying potential targets.
(ii) Cuing potential targets to human operators.
(iii) Prioritizing selected targets.
(iv) Providing input on timing of when to fire.
(v) Providing terminal guidance on how to narrowly
categorize selected targets, only if human operator control
is retained for the purpose of selecting individual targets
and specific target groups for engagement.
(12) Specific target group.--
(A) In general.--The term ``specific target group'' means a
discrete group of potential targets, such as a particular
flight of enemy aircraft, a particular formation of enemy
tanks, or a particular flotilla of enemy vessels.
(B) Excluded.--The term defined in subparagraph (A) does
not include a general class of targets or a specific type of
target, such as a particular model of tank or aircraft.
(13) Unintended engagement.--The term ``unintended
engagement'' means the use of force outcomes resulting in
damage to persons or objects that human operators did not
intend to be the targets of United States
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military operations, including levels of collateral damage
beyond those consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict and
relevant laws of the United States and international laws,
applicable rules of engagement, and commander's intent.
SEC. ___3. DESIGN AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTONOMOUS AND
SEMI-AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS.
(a) General Requirement.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall, acting through each
of the Secretaries of the military departments, ensure that
whenever the Department designs, tests, develops, procures,
deploys, or uses a system described in paragraph (2), the
system meets the requirements of this section.
(2) Systems.--A system described in this paragraph is an
autonomous weapon system or semi-autonomous weapon system
that uses artificial intelligence to create, generate,
prioritize, recommend, or engage targets or courses of action
in support of use of force decisions.
(b) Human Responsibility Over Use of Force.--
(1) Accountable individuals.--For each system described in
subsection (a)(2)--
(A) not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary shall promulgate rules for clear
chain of command and command hierarchy for military
operations involving a system described in subsection (a)(2)
to mirror the chain of command and command hierarchy for
military operations that do not involve such systems;
(B) the Secretary shall ensure that a designated commander
is identified as accountable under applicable military and
international laws for each engagement or class of
engagements involving a system described in subsection
(a)(2), regardless of the degree to which artificial
intelligence contributed to the identification, development,
recommendation, selection, or engagement of the target; and
(C) the designated commander identified under subparagraph
(B) shall exercise ultimate discretion, judgment, and control
over the use of force.
(2) System requirements.--Each system described in
subsection (a)(2) shall incorporate the following:
(A) A system design that incorporates capabilities and
interfaces that require the designated commander to exercise
ultimate discretion, judgment and control in the envisioned
development, planning, deployment, and use processes for the
weapon system, including constraints on each such system's
authorized actions, targets, and geographic, temporal, and
contextual scope, which the system may not expand or modify
without explicit human authorization.
(B) System capabilities, human-machine interfaces,
doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and human operator
training must require commanders and human operators to use
the system with deference to their discretion regarding care,
and to analyze the output, in accordance with the Law of
Armed Conflict and relevant laws of the United States and
international laws, applicable treaties, weapon system safety
rules, and rules of engagement that are applicable or
reasonably expected to be applicable.
(C) The creation and ongoing maintenance of records of
target selection data, decision logic, and human operator
actions, including the individual designated under subsection
(b)(1)(B), sufficiently detailed to enable post-engagement
review of compliance.
(D) The design, testing, development, procurement,
deployment, legal analysis and review, and use of artificial
intelligence capabilities in autonomous and semi-autonomous
weapon systems shall be consistent with, but not limited to,
the Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence and the
Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and
Implementation Pathway.
(3) Availability to the public.--The Secretary shall ensure
that--
(A) the Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence and
the Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and
Implementation Pathway are available to the public; and
(B) any revision to the Ethical Principles for Artificial
Intelligence or the Responsible Artificial Intelligence
Strategy and Implementation Pathway adopted by the Secretary
is made available to the public before the date that is 30
days before the date on which the revision goes into effect.
(c) Engagement Constraints and Termination.--
(1) In general.--Each system described in subsection (a)(2)
shall be designed--
(A) to complete engagements within a designated timeframe
and designated geographic area and against a designated set
of potential targets, as well as other relevant constraints,
consistent with commander and human operator intentions;
(B) to require independent review and analysis of a
designated commander before using force against previously
unauthorized targets, materially expanding target sets or
geographic scope, taking actions contravening applicable law,
rules of engagement, other relevant laws of the United States
and international laws, or taking actions likely to result in
unintended engagement; and
(C) if unable to complete an engagement consistent with the
parameters described in paragraph (1), to terminate the
engagement until additional human operator and commander
evaluation is completed.
(2) Evaluation criteria.--The evaluation criteria used
under subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) shall consist of
assessment of deficiencies and recommendations for changes to
be compliant with subparagraph (A) of such paragraph before
restarting preparation for engagement.
(d) Transparency, Auditability, and Explainability.--
Consistent with the potential consequences of an unintended
engagement or unauthorized interference with the operation of
a system described in subsection (a)(2), the physical
hardware and software of such system shall be designed with--
(1) technologies and data sources that are available to,
auditable by, and explainable to the greatest extent possible
by relevant personnel of the Department with the necessary
clearance level; and
(2) system safety, anti-tamper mechanisms, and
cybersecurity in accordance with Department instructions and
military standards governing cybersecurity and system safety.
(e) Activation, Termination, and Human Operator
Interface.--Each system described in subsection (a)(2) shall
be designed so that--
(1) system design and human-machine interfaces are readily
understandable to trained human operators, including by
clearly disaggregating which actions human operators need to
perform and which actions the weapon system will perform;
(2) clear procedures exist for trained human operators to
activate, terminate, and disable all weapon system functions;
(3) the system provides timely feedback on system status,
including regarding the quality and sufficiency of the data
inputs relied upon, to human operators in real time or near-
real time; and
(4) adequate training, tactics, techniques, procedures, and
doctrine are available, reviewed on a quarterly basis, by
weapon system human operators and designated commanders to
understand the functioning, capabilities, and limitations of
the system's autonomy in realistic operational conditions.
(f) Degraded Communications Safeguard.--Any autonomous or
semi-autonomous weapon system that is, or is part of, an
unmanned platform shall be designed such that, in the event
of degraded or lost communications, the system does not
autonomously select and engage individual targets, specific
target groups, or general classes or specific types of
targets that have not been previously selected by an
authorized human operator.
(g) Continuous Monitoring.--The Secretary shall, in
coordination with the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, and the appropriate Secretary of a military
department or Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict, establish and maintain procedures for
continuous monitoring of each system, to the greatest extent
possible, described in subsection (a)(2) to identify and
address circumstances in which changes to the system design
or operational environment require additional testing and
evaluation or legal review to provide sufficient confidence
that the system will continue--
(1) to function as intended;
(2) to avoid unintended engagements;
(3) to resist interference by unauthorized parties; and
(4) to remain compliant with relevant laws of the United
States, the Law of Armed Conflict, and international laws.
(h) Robust Artificial Intelligence Design.--For any system
described in subsection (a) that incorporates artificial
intelligence capabilities, such system shall be designed to
utilize robust artificial intelligence, in accordance with
the Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and
Implementation Pathway so that the system is resilient in
real-world settings and against adversarial attacks and
spoofing.
SEC. ___4. ADVANCED REVIEW AND APPROVAL AUTHORITY.
(a) General Requirement for Advanced Review.--With the
exception of systems described in subsection (e), the
Secretary shall ensure that each system described in section
___3(a)(2) is approved in accordance with this section before
formal development and before fielding.
(b) Pre-development Review.--Before a decision to enter
formal development of a system described in subsection (a),
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly
verify that--
(1) the weapon system design incorporates the necessary
capabilities to allow a designated commander to exercise
ultimate discretion, judgment, and control over the use of
force in the envisioned planning, deployment, and use
processes for the weapon;
(2) the system is designed to complete engagements within a
designated timeframe and designated geographic area and
against a designated set of potential targets, as well as
other applicable parameters, consistent with designated
commander intentions, and if unable to do so, to terminate
use until additional human operator and commander evaluation
is completed before continuing the engagement;
(3) the combination of the system's design and concept of
use, including its target selection and engagement logic,
accounts for risks of armed conflict, including to civilians,
civilian populations, civilian objects, and other protected
entities, consistent with commander and human operator intent
and obligations under the Law of Armed Conflict,
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or other relevant laws of the United States and international
laws;
(4) the system design, including system safety, anti-tamper
mechanisms, and cybersecurity, addresses and minimizes the
probability and consequences of failures;
(5) plans are in place for verification and validation and
test and evaluation to establish system reliability,
effectiveness, predictability of effects, and accuracy under
realistic conditions, including possible adversary actions,
interference, or unintended consequences;
(6) for systems incorporating artificial intelligence
capabilities, plans are in place to ensure consistency with
the Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence and the
Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and
Implementation Pathway; and
(7) a thorough legal analysis, review, and risk assessment
of a system described in subsection (a) has been completed in
coordination with the General Counsel of the Department and
other relevant Department General Counsels and in accordance
with applicable directives governing the Defense Acquisition
System, the Department of Defense Law of War Program, the Law
of Armed Conflict, and other relevant laws of the United
States and international laws.
(c) Pre-fielding Review.--Before fielding a system
described in subsection (a), the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Sustainment, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff shall jointly verify that--
(1) system capabilities, human-machine interfaces,
doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and training have
been demonstrated to allow a designated commander to exercise
ultimate discretion, control, and judgment over the use of
force and to use systems whose outcomes are sufficiently
accurate with thorough legal analysis in accordance with the
law of war, Law of Armed Conflict, applicable treaties,
weapon system safety rules, and rules of engagement
reasonably expected to be applicable;
(2) system safety, anti-tamper mechanisms, cyber
survivability, operational resilience, and cybersecurity
capabilities have been implemented to minimize the
probability and consequences of failures, including
unpredictable outcomes, and a monitoring protocol is in place
to identify and address changes in operational environment,
data inputs, and use that could contribute to such failures;
(3) verification and validation and test and evaluation
have--
(A) assessed system performance, capability, reliability,
risk margins, effectiveness, and suitability under realistic
conditions, including possible adversary actions,
interference, or unintended consequences; and
(B) have demonstrated that the system can be revised as
needed with sufficient rapidity to enable timely correction
of any unintended system behaviors that may be observed or
discovered during future system operations;
(4) adequate training, tactics, techniques, procedures, and
doctrine are available, quarterly reviewed, and used by
system operators and commanders to understand the
functioning, capabilities, and limitations of the system in
real world conditions;
(5) system design and human-machine interfaces are readily
understandable to trained human operators, provide
transparent feedback on system status, provide secure logging
to enable traceability, and provide clear procedures for
trained human operators to activate and terminate system
functions;
(6) for systems incorporating artificial intelligence
capabilities, the deployment and use of such capabilities in
the weapon system will be consistent with the Ethical
Principles for Artificial Intelligence, the Responsible
Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway,
the Law of Armed Conflict, and other relevant laws of the
United States and international laws; and
(7) a legal review of the compliance of the weapon system
with the Defense Acquisition System, the Department of
Defense Law of War Program, the Law of Armed Conflict, and
other relevant laws of the United States and international
laws has been completed in coordination with the General
Counsel of the Department.
(d) Re-review of Modified Systems.--A system described in
subsection (a) that is a variant of an existing weapon system
previously approved through the review process under this
section shall not be covered by previous approval if changes
to the system algorithms, intended mission set, intended
operational environments, intended target sets, or expected
adversarial countermeasures materially differ from those
applicable to the previously approved weapon system. Such
systems shall require a new analysis, review, and risk
assessment before formal development and again before
fielding.
(e) Systems Not Requiring Advanced Review.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
advance review described in this section is not required for
weapon systems intended to be used in the following manners:
(A) Semi-autonomous weapon systems used to apply lethal or
non-lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic, force without capability
to function as an autonomous weapon system.
(B) Human operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems
used to select and engage materiel targets for local defense
to intercept attempted time-critical or saturation attacks
for--
(i) static defense of installations with personnel,
including networked defense where the autonomous weapon
system is not co-located with the installation; or
(ii) onboard or networked defense of platforms with onboard
personnel.
(C) Human operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems
used to select and engage materiel targets for purpose of
protecting remotely piloted or autonomous vehicles and
vessels.
(D) Autonomous weapon systems used to apply non-lethal,
non-kinetic force against materiel targets.
(2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a weapon
system intended to be used in the manner described in
subparagraph (B) of such paragraph in a case in which the
engagement zone for the system encompasses densely populated
areas or essential civilian infrastructure. In such a case,
the weapon system shall undergo the advanced review described
in this section to certify that the system can effectively
distinguish between military targets and non-combatants or
civilian objects in high-clutter environments.
SEC. ___5. ROLE OF THE CHIEF DIGITAL AND ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.
(a) Monitoring and Evaluation.--The Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Officer shall monitor and evaluate
artificial intelligence capabilities in, and cybersecurity
for, autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, and shall
advise the Secretary on such matters.
(b) Testable Requirements.--The Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Officer shall, in collaboration with
the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering--
(1) formulate concrete, testable requirements for
implementing the Ethical Principles for Artificial
Intelligence and the Responsible Artificial Intelligence
Strategy and Implementation Pathway;
(2) establish policy and issue guidance on definitions of
requirements and testability for artificial intelligence-
enabled systems to implement and demonstrate adherence to the
Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence and the
Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and
Implementation Pathway; and
(3) issue guidance on test and evaluation practices for
artificial intelligence capabilities in autonomous or semi-
autonomous weapon systems, which shall include an adversarial
assessment (known as ``red-team assessment'') that evaluates
weapon system vulnerability to adversarial manipulation under
operationally realistic conditions.
(c) Common Tools and Infrastructure.--The Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Officer shall coordinate with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and
the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation on developing
and using common tools and infrastructure for test and
evaluation and verification and validation of artificial
intelligence capabilities in autonomous or semi-autonomous
weapon systems, including assurance benchmarks for
reliability, robustness, security, and human-machine team
performance.
SEC. ___6. TESTING AND EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS.
(a) General Requirement.--The Secretary shall ensure that,
regardless of the acquisition pathway or testing and
evaluation oversight status for a weapon system, each system
described in section ___3(a)(2) undergoes--
(1) rigorous hardware and software verification and
validation; and
(2) realistic system developmental and operational test and
evaluation, including analysis of unanticipated emergent
behavior.
(b) Specific Considerations.--Testing and evaluation of a
system under subsection (a)(2) may include testing on how
human operators respond to ensure they are provided with
enough time to exercise judgment and can reject or challenge
suggestions or recommendations.
(c) Specific Requirements.--Testing and evaluation of a
system under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) Verification that the system functions as anticipated
in realistic operational environments against adaptive
adversaries, including with realistic civilian presence,
activities, actions, and reactions, and are sufficiently
robust to minimize failures.
(2) For a system incorporating artificial intelligence
capabilities, rigorous developmental and operational test and
evaluation to verify and validate that the artificial
intelligence is robust according to design requirements.
(3) Testing to confirm that autonomy algorithms in systems
incorporating artificial intelligence capabilities can be
rapidly reprogrammed on new input data.
(d) Post-fielding Testing.--The Secretary shall ensure
that, after initial operational test and evaluation of a
system under subsection (a), as directed by the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation--
(1) system data is collected and any further changes to the
system undergo appropriate verification and validation and
test and evaluation to ensure that critical safety features
have not been degraded;
(2) system software is tested using best-available
Department means and methods to validate that critical safety
features have not been degraded, and automated testing tools,
such as modeling and simulation, are used whenever feasible;
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(3) any new or revised operating states or other relevant
changes in the system are identified and undergoes
appropriate and tailored additional test and evaluation to
characterize the system behavior in that new operating state;
and
(4) changes to the state transition matrix are evaluated to
determine whether they require whole system follow-on
operational test and evaluation.
(e) Iterative Cyber Testing.--The Secretary shall ensure
that hardware and software verification and validation of a
system under subsection (a) includes quarterly cyber test and
evaluation to verify that the system is resilient and
survivable in contested cyberspace.
(f) Role of the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation.--Under this section, the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation shall--
(1) oversee development of realistic operational test, risk
assessments, and evaluation standards for autonomous and
semi-autonomous weapon systems, including requirements for
data collection and standards for test and evaluation of any
changes to the system following initial operational test and
evaluation;
(2) evaluate whether autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon
systems under the Director's oversight have met standards
after being tested for rigorous verification, validation, and
evaluation in realistic operational conditions, including
potential adversary action, to ensure that the system is
robust to minimize failures;
(3) establish standards for data collection post-fielding
and monitoring and assessment by programs;
(4) establish and maintain a centralized repository for
reporting, collecting, and analyzing operational incidents,
weapon system failures, and unintended weapon system
behaviors;
(5) review and approve operational and live fire test plans
for autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems; and
(6) coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering and the appropriate Secretary of a
military department or Assistant Secretary for Low-Intensity
Conflict to provide for monitoring to identify and address
when changes to the system design or operational environment
require additional testing and evaluation to ensure that the
system is robust to minimize failures such as unintended
engagements with civilians and civilian infrastructure,
densely populated areas, and resist interference by
unauthorized parties.
SEC. ___7. PROHIBITED USES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) General Prohibition.--No covered artificial
intelligence capability may be used in any manner that
violates the Constitution of the United States, Federal law,
the Law of Armed Conflict, or international treaty or other
legal obligation of the United States, or in any manner that
poses an unacceptable level of risk to the safety of an
individual or the civil liberty of an individual.
(b) Specific Prohibitions.--
(1) In general.--No covered artificial intelligence
capability may be used with the intent, purpose, or outcome
of--
(A) profiling, targeting, tracking, monitoring, inferring,
or concluding based on the data points of activity of any
individual based solely on the exercise of rights protected
under the Constitution or Federal law, including freedom of
expression, association, and assembly;
(B) detecting, measuring, or inferring the emotional state
of any individual from data acquired about such individual,
including the support of the health of consenting personnel
of the Federal Government;
(C) inferring or determining an individual's religion,
ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, immigration status,
disability status, gender identity, or political identity;
(D) tracking, monitoring, or inferring the past, real-time,
or anticipated future location of any individual in the
United States, including using data acquired from commercial,
data brokers, data aggregators, or other third-party sources,
unless such acquisition and use is authorized pursuant to an
individualized judicial order, warrant, or otherwise required
by the Constitution or Federal law;
(E) aggregating or analyzing internal data or data acquired
from commercial, data brokers, data aggregators, or other
third-party sources, including but not limited to location
data, financial transaction data, communications metadata, or
biometric data, to accomplish any purpose prohibited under
paragraphs (1) through (4);
(F) removing a human from the chain of decisionmaking for
actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the
President, including initiating or terminating nuclear
weapons employment; or
(G) obtaining, receiving, or otherwise accessing, for a fee
or other consideration, any personal data of a United States
person from a data broker or other third-party source,
including any other governmental entity (including State,
local, or Federal entities) if such data was obtained by that
entity in a manner that would violate this subsection if
performed by the Department.
(2) Personal data.--For purposes of paragraph (1)(G), the
term ``personal data''--
(A) means data, derived data, or any unique identifier that
is linked to, or is reasonably linkable to, an individual or
to an electronic device that is linked to, or is reasonably
linkable to, one or more individuals in a household;
(B) includes anonymized data that, if combined with other
data, can be linked to, or is reasonably linkable to, an
individual or to an electronic device that identifies, is
linked to, or is reasonably linkable to one or more
individuals in a household; and
(C) does not include data that is lawfully available
through Federal, State, or local government records or
through widely distributed media; and
(c) Applicability.--The prohibitions in this section shall
apply to all activities of the Department, including
operational planning, logistics, intelligence analysis, and
operational support to any other agencies or military
personnel, regardless of status of deployment. In any case in
which the Department shares systems, data, or analytical
products derived from a covered artificial intelligence
capability or protected data (as described in subsection
(b)(7)) with another department or agency of the Federal
Government, the receiving department or agency shall be
subject to the same prohibitions and requirements as the
Department with respect to the use, querying, or further
dissemination of such systems, data, or products. The
Secretary shall ensure that such department or agency is
notified of, and in compliance with, the restrictions under
this section.
(d) Joint Operations.--The prohibitions of this section
shall apply to any Departmental participation in joint task
forces, fusion centers, or interagency working groups,
regardless of which agency serves as the lead or providing
entity.
SEC. ___8. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS.
(a) Protections.--The Secretary shall update such
whistleblower protections as the Secretary considers
appropriate to clarify procedures for artificial intelligence
systems, which shall ensure that all personnel who develop,
assess, deploy, operate, or use artificial intelligence as a
component of a National Security System (as defined in
section 3552(b) of title 44, United States Code) or otherwise
for military or intelligence purposes can report concerns
about artificial intelligence, including concerns about
improperly harming civil liberties, privacy, safety, or
compliance with the requirements of this Act, to relevant
oversight officials.
(b) Compliance With Existing Law.--Updates to whistleblower
protections under subsection (a) shall be compliant with--
(1) section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, and its
implementation guidance under Department of Defense Directive
7050.06 (relating to military whistleblower protection);
(2) section 2302 of title 5, United States Code;
(3) title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act of
Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-126; 128 Stat. 1414) and the
amendments made by such title; and
(4) section 4701 of title 10, United States Code.
(c) Anonymity.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall ensure that adequate
and special procedures exist to receive, investigate, respond
to, and redress complaints anonymously, when appropriate, and
that reports may be made confidentially so that personnel may
raise concerns without fear of reprisal for any disclosures
related to artificial intelligence.
(2) Exception.--Confidentiality under paragraph (1) shall
not extend to significant misconduct, including violations of
law or government ethics, or when otherwise precluded by law.
(d) Investigation and Corrective Action.--The Secretary
shall ensure that adequate and special procedures exist for
reporting incidents of artificial intelligence misuse,
investigations of reported incidents, and processes for
taking corrective actions.
SEC. ___9. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Semiannual Report on Artificial Intelligence Use
Cases.--Not later than six months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the
Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report containing the following:
(1) A description of exemplary use cases of artificial
intelligence within the Department during the preceding year,
identifying best practices, failure modes, and risk
mitigation strategies employed.
(2) After-action reports on significant operational use of
covered artificial intelligence capabilities during the
preceding year, including--
(A) an assessment of system performance and effectiveness
of human oversight;
(B) any identified risks or failure modes;
(C) a detailed accounting of any critical incidents,
including incidents resulting in civilian casualties or
injuries, damage to civilian objects or protected
infrastructure, or other unintended effects inconsistent with
the Law of Armed Conflict; and
(D) recommendations for improvements to human oversight,
system safeguards, and the mitigation of future civilian
harm.
(3) A description of training provided to human operators
of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems and other
artificial intelligence capabilities covered by this Act,
including documentation on employment procedures and
responsible retirement of systems.
(b) Annual Report on Infrastructure and Barriers.--Not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress a report identifying--
[[Page S3110]]
(1) any significant barriers to the responsible development
and deployment of artificial intelligence within the
Department;
(2) gaps in infrastructure required to support
traceability, auditability, risk analysis, and forensics for
artificial intelligence capabilities covered by this Act; and
(3) recommended hardware, software, or other infrastructure
needs necessary to fulfill the requirements of this Act.
(c) Semiannual Report on Compliance for Fielded Systems.--
Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the Secretary shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
identifying--
(1) each fielded system for which compliance under this Act
cannot be certified, with a description of the specific
requirement or requirements with which the system does not
comply;
(2) the operational or national security legal
justification, if any, for the continued fielding of each
such non-compliant system; and
(3) a remediation plan and timeline for bringing each such
system into compliance or, if compliance is not practicable,
a plan for the responsible retirement or modification of the
system.
SEC. __10. EXCEPTIONS.
(a) Cyberspace Capabilities.--The requirements of sections
___3, ___4, ___5, and ___7 shall not apply to autonomous or
semi-autonomous cyberspace capabilities.
(b) Unarmed Platforms.--The requirements of sections ___3,
___4, ___5, and ___7 shall not apply to unarmed platforms,
whether remotely operated or operated by onboard personnel,
and whether autonomous or semi-autonomous.
(c) Time-critical Defensive Systems.--In cases where the
time available between threat detection and required
intercept is insufficient to allow for individual human
authorization of each engagement and provided that such
operations do not have death or serious bodily harm to any
person as a reasonably foreseeable consequence, the
requirements of sections ___3, ___4, ___5, and ___7 shall not
apply to--
(1) systems employed exclusively for the defense against
incoming munitions, rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles; or
(2) unmanned aircraft systems.
(d) Other Excluded Systems.--The requirements of sections
___3, ___4, ___5, and ___7 shall not apply to--
(1) unguided munitions;
(2) munitions manually guided by the human operator, such
as laser- or wire-guided munitions;
(3) mines;
(4) unexploded explosive ordnance; or
(5) autonomous or semi-autonomous systems that are not
weapon systems.
(e) Identification Systems.--The requirements of sections
___3, ___4, ___5, and ___7 shall not apply to a system
described in section ___3(a)(2) with the sole purpose and
outcome of identifying potential targets without further
intervention by or communication with a human operator.
SEC. __11. EFFECTIVE DATE; REVIEW OF SYSTEMS CURRENTLY IN
USE.
(a) In General.--This subtitle shall take effect on the
date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(b) Review of Systems Currently in Use.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
effective date set forth in subsection (a), the Secretary
shall conduct a review of all systems described in section
___3(a)(2) that are in use by the Department as of such
effective date.
(2) Attestation.--Upon completion of the review required
under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a written attestation
identifying, for each reviewed system, whether the system is
compliant with the requirements of sections ___3, ___4, ___5,
and ___7.
(3) Noncompliant systems.--For any system that the
Secretary cannot attest is in compliance with sections ___3,
___4, ___5, and ___7, the Secretary shall immediately cease
all use of such system and, concurrent with the attestation
required under paragraph (2), submit to appropriate
committees of Congress a remediation plan that includes--
(A) a description of the specific requirement or
requirements with which the system does not comply;
(B) an operational or national security justification, if
any, for continued use of the system pending remediation; and
(C) a timeline for bringing the system into compliance or,
if compliance is not practicable, for the responsible
retirement or modification of the system.
______