[Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 103 (Thursday, June 18, 2026)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2961-S2962]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 5865. Mr. MERKLEY (for himself and Mr. Cruz) submitted an 
amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities 
of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for 
defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military 
personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which 
was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of title XII, insert the following:

             Subtitle F--Blue Skies for Taiwan Act of 2026

     SEC. 1281. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Blue Skies for Taiwan 
     Act of 2026''.

     SEC. 1282. DEFINITIONS.

       In this subtitle:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, the Committee on the Budget, and the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, the Committee on the Budget, and the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
       (2) Blue uas.--The term ``Blue UAS'' refers to UAS 
     components and systems that comply with Defense Contract 
     Management Agency's Blue UAS program and its associated list.

     SEC. 1283. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Taiwan is a longstanding and vital democratic partner 
     whose security is central to United States strategic 
     interests and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
       (2) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly 
     employing gray-zone tactics, including routine use of 
     unmanned aerial systems and other low-cost platforms, to 
     pressure Taiwan and undermine its security.
       (3) As set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 
     (Public Law 96-8), it is United States policy to maintain its 
     capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of 
     coercion against Taiwan and provide Taiwan with arms of a 
     defensive nature.
       (4) As set forth in the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act 
     (subtitle A of title XII of Public Law 117-263), it is the 
     sense of Congress that the United States should support 
     Taiwan's acquisition and employment of capabilities that 
     advance asymmetric strategies.
       (5) The vast majority of commercially available UAS contain 
     PRC-sourced components, creating significant cybersecurity, 
     supply chain, and operational risks for both Taiwan and the 
     United States.
       (6) Taiwan is well-positioned to develop and produce UAS 
     components and systems but faces challenges in competing with 
     PRC commercial companies, accessing capital, and meeting 
     United States certification and cybersecurity requirements.
       (7) The United States should support UAS supply chain 
     development in Taiwan to strengthen Taiwan's asymmetric 
     defense posture and expand United States access to secure, 
     PRC-independent UAS components and systems.
       (8) The Army Organic Industrial Base, including its 
     arsenals, depots, and ammunition plants, is undergoing 
     modernization to support emerging technologies and may 
     provide opportunities to support the testing and sustainment 
     of unmanned aerial systems and related components in 
     coordination with allies and partners.

     SEC. 1284. BLUE UAS WORKING GROUP.

       (a) Establishment.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
     coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall establish a 
     Blue UAS working group, leveraging existing workstreams and 
     expanding scope as needed, inclusive of government, industry, 
     and academic experts, to--
       (1) assess Taiwan's domestic drone production capacity, 
     including research and development, legal and regulatory 
     frameworks, testing, certification, and production capacities 
     for dual-use drones;
       (2) evaluate opportunities for public-private partnerships 
     between the United States and Taiwan for co-development and 
     co-production of UAS systems and components, including pilot 
     programs;
       (3) identify barriers to the inclusion of Taiwan-
     manufactured components and systems manufactured in Blue UAS 
     programs;
       (4) identify regulatory, export-control, and certification 
     barriers that impede Taiwan's participation in Blue UAS 
     programs;
       (5) provide recommendations to expand and improve 
     incorporation of Taiwanese suppliers into Blue UAS programs;
       (6) identify specific UAS components or systems that could 
     be integrated into Blue UAS programs within 12 to 24 months;
       (7) analyze opportunities and impediments to include Taiwan 
     in the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group and similar 
     initiatives;
       (8) assess opportunities for collaboration with the Army 
     Organic Industrial Base, including its arsenals, depots, and 
     ammunition plants, to support the testing, evaluation, 
     production, maintenance, and sustainment of Blue UAS 
     components and systems, including those co-developed or co-
     produced with Taiwan; and
       (9) institute lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, in 
     consultation with the United States European Command (EUCOM) 
     and Ukrainian officials.
       (b) Reporting.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for three 
     years, the Working Group shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees an unclassified report on its 
     activities, including findings, recommendations, timelines, 
     resource needs, and potential funding mechanisms, with a 
     classified appendix as necessary.

     SEC. 1285. COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK WITH ALLIES.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination 
     with the Secretary of Defense, shall establish a cooperative 
     framework, drawing on the Partnership for Indo-Pacific 
     Industrial Resilience (PIPIR), among the United States, 
     Taiwan, and regional allies and global partners to promote 
     secure, PRC-independent UAS supply chains and enhance 
     interoperability.
       (b) Elements.--The cooperative framework shall include--
       (1) support regional allies in the acquisition of Blue UAS 
     components or systems from Taiwan in lieu of PRC-sourced 
     components; and
       (2) fast-track Blue UAS certification for components co-
     developed or co-produced by Taiwan and regional allies.

[[Page S2962]]

  


     SEC. 1286. FAST-TRACK CERTIFICATION.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination 
     with the Secretary of Defense, shall develop a fast-track 
     process for Blue UAS companies in Taiwan to obtain Blue UAS 
     certification.
       (b) Elements.--The fast-track certification process shall 
     include the following procedures:
       (1) Expedited export control reviews and licensing for 
     Taiwan drone and drone component manufacturers, including 
     streamlined technical reviews for components with no PRC-
     connected subcomponents.
       (2) A fast-track certification procedure for Taiwanese 
     manufacturers, including reciprocal testing arrangements or 
     recognition of equivalent Taiwan cybersecurity standards 
     where appropriate.

     SEC. 1287. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed--
       (1) to alter United States policy towards Taiwan as 
     codified in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-
     8);
       (2) to alter the United States commitment to the One China 
     Policy, including commitments made in the Three United 
     States-China Communiques and the Six Assurances to Taiwan; or
       (3) to alter the United States Government's position with 
     respect to the international status of Taiwan.
                                 ______