[Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 97 (Tuesday, June 9, 2026)]
[House]
[Pages H4037-H4044]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NO AID FOR GHOST STUDENTS ACT OF 2026
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1333, I call
up the bill (H.R. 7892) to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to
require to the Secretary of Education to use an identity fraud
detection system to review each FAFSA to determine whether the FAFSA
presents a reasonable suspicion of identity fraud, and ask for its
immediate consideration in the House.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Kennedy of Utah). Pursuant to House
Resolution 1333, in lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute
recommended by the Committee on Education and Workforce, printed in the
bill, an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text
of Rules Committee Print 119-31 is adopted and the bill, as amended, is
considered read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:
H.R. 7892
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``No Aid for Ghost Students
Act of 2026''.
SEC. 2. IDENTITY FRAUD DETECTION SYSTEM.
(a) Identity Fraud Detection System.--Section 483 of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1090) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(e) Identity Fraud Detection System.--
``(1) In general.--In addition to, or in conjunction with,
other verification processes carried out under this title,
the Secretary shall--
``(A) use an identity fraud detection system to screen and
assess each application submitted under this section on or
after October 1, 2026, to determine whether the application
presents a reasonable suspicion of identity fraud based on
one or more indicators associated with suspected fraud risk;
and
``(B) carry out notifications in accordance with paragraph
(2).
``(2) Notification of reasonable suspicion of identity
fraud.--If the Secretary determines that an application
submitted under this section presents a reasonable suspicion
of identity fraud, the Secretary shall--
``(A) provide the applicant with notice--
``(i) of such determination;
``(ii) that the information described in subparagraph (B)
will be transmitted to each institution of higher education
designated by the applicant in the application; and
``(iii) that the applicant is subject to additional
identity verification requirements in accordance with section
487(a)(15)(B); and
``(B) transmit to each institution designated by the
applicant in the application, a notice--
``(i) that such application presents a reasonable suspicion
of identity fraud; and
``(ii) that the applicant is subject to additional identity
verification requirements to be carried out by the
institution in accordance with section 487(a)(15)(B), before
the institution may disburse Federal financial aid under this
title to such applicant.
``(3) Congressional notices and report.--
``(A) Notices.--The Secretary shall submit to the
authorizing committees--
``(i) not later than November 1, 2026, a written
description of the identity fraud detection system required
under this subsection; and
``(ii) not later than 30 days after implementing any
substantial change to such system, a written description and
rationale for such change.
``(B) Annual evaluation and report.--Not later than October
1, 2027, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall conduct
an evaluation of the effectiveness of the identity fraud
detection system carried out under this subsection, and
submit to the authorizing committees a report on the use and
effectiveness of such system.
``(4) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection
shall be construed to prohibit the Secretary from meeting the
requirements of paragraph (1), in whole or in part, through a
capability or system used by the Secretary on or before the
date of enactment of the No Aid for Ghost Students Act of
2026.''.
(b) Additional Verification Requirements.--
(1) Amendments.--Section 487(a)(15) of the Higher Education
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(15)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``(15) The institution acknowledges'' and
inserting ``(15)(A) The institution acknowledges''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B) Beginning on October 1, 2026, the institution will
not disburse Federal financial aid under this title to an
applicant with an application under section 483 that presents
a reasonable suspicion of identity fraud under section
483(e), unless the institution, directly or through a
contracted third-party service provider and in accordance
with procedures established by the Secretary--
``(i) before the disbursement of such aid--
``(I) determines that a reasonable suspicion of identity
fraud is not present by confirming the identity of such
applicant using--
``(aa) in-person identity verification;
``(bb) live, synchronous audiovisual identity verification;
``(cc) identity verification compliant with National
Institute of Standards and Technology Identity Assurance
Level 2 (NIST IAL2), or an equivalent successor;
``(dd) any additional identity verification method approved
by the Secretary that provides a level of identity assurance
that is equal to or greater than the level of assurance
provided by an identify verification method described in
items (aa) through (cc); or
``(ee) a combination of two or more of the verification
methods described in items (aa) through (dd); and
``(II) notifies the Secretary that the identity of the
applicant has been verified; and
``(ii) maintains a record of such identity verification.''.
(2) Guidelines on institutional verification procedures.--
Not later than October 1, 2026, the Secretary of Education
shall establish guidelines with respect to identity
verification procedures to be carried out by institutions of
higher education under subparagraph (B) of section 487(a)(15)
of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(15)),
as amended by paragraph (1).
SEC. 3. PROGRAM REVIEW PRIORITY CATEGORY.
Section 498A(a)(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1099c-1(a)(2)) is amended--
[[Page H4038]]
(1) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (G);
and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following:
``(F) institutions that have demonstrated a pattern of
disbursing, on or after October 1, 2026, Federal financial
aid under this title for an award year to students with an
application under section 483 for such award year that
presented a reasonable suspicion of identity fraud under
section 483(e), except that the Secretary shall exclude any
institution that demonstrates to the Secretary that the
institution is in compliance with the requirements of section
487(a)(15)(B); and''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for
1 hour, equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking
minority member of the Committee on Education and Workforce, or their
respective designees.
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Walberg) and the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Scott) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Walberg).
{time} 1910
General Leave
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks
and to insert extraneous material on H.R. 7892.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 7892, the No Aid for
Ghost Students Act of 2026, a simple and commonsense piece of
legislation to fight fraud in our Federal student aid system.
This legislation, authored by Representative Burgess Owens, also
includes key provisions from Representative Glenn ``GT'' Thompson's
H.R. 7891, the Student Aid Fraud Oversight and Accountability Act of
2026, which further strengthens this important bill.
Student aid should go to real students. This is simple but somehow
contested, an idea that Republicans are committed to protecting.
Over the past few years, it has become increasingly apparent that
fraudsters are exploiting Federal programs at every level. Instead of
helping children get meals or supporting students' educations,
Americans' tax dollars have been lining criminals' pockets, helping
fraudsters get rich while Americans suffer the consequences.
At the Committee on Education and Workforce, Mr. Speaker, we have
been examining this issue closely and working hard to expose the
rampant fraud in our Federal assistance programs.
While childcare and hospice care have dominated the headlines in
recent months, our Federal student aid programs have also fallen victim
to fraud.
The most pressing threat comes from ghost students, fraudsters who
use stolen or synthetic identities to submit the Free Application for
Federal Student Aid, or FAFSA, and steal student aid dollars. These
fraudsters commonly operate in foreign or domestic crime rings,
submitting large numbers of FAFSAs to net huge amounts of cash. Until
recently, these schemes were far too often successful.
This was largely possible because the Biden-Harris administration
removed critical, commonsense guardrails during the COVID-19 pandemic
that weakened fraud prevention measures and made it easier than ever to
loot our Federal student aid programs.
Those foolish policies didn't help students. In fact, they did the
opposite by creating more opportunities for fraudsters and criminals to
endlessly exploit Federal student aid assistance programs and steal
from taxpayers.
The good news, Mr. Speaker, is that under Education Secretary Linda
McMahon's leadership, the Department of Education has made great
strides in combating this fraud, restoring key safeguards, increasing
identity screenings, and strengthening verification requirements. As a
result, the Department blocked more than $1 billion in attempted fraud
in 2025.
Those efforts, while effective, are not guaranteed to remain in place
under future administrations, as we saw under the Biden administration.
That is why committee Republicans are advancing legislation that not
only builds on the Trump administration's efforts to stop fraud but
also puts effective fraud prevention measures where they belong, in the
law.
I know we all want to help students pursue an education and obtain a
degree if they choose to do so. Unfortunately, that opportunity is
stolen from students and borrowers when we allow fraud to continue
unchecked.
H.R. 7892, the No Aid for Ghost Students Act of 2026, creates an
invaluable opportunity to stop this kind of incessant fraud and protect
access to higher education.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 7892, and I reserve
the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 7892, the so-called No Aid
for Ghost Students Act.
Let me say at the outset that protecting taxpayer dollars and
preventing fraud in our student Federal aid program is always a good
idea. As stewards of public funds, we should all agree that fraud
should be identified, investigated, and stopped, but this bill is not
about a thoughtful, evidence-based solution as its supporters claim.
The bill would direct the Department of Education to create an
identity fraud detection system within the Free Application for Federal
Student Aid process and authorize the Department to open accelerated
program reviews against colleges.
Mr. Speaker, I have got to point out that the Department of Education
just recently, this past April, launched a new identity fraud detection
system as part of the FAFSA process. That system is still being tested,
and Congress has not seen any meaningful evidence about its
effectiveness or its impact upon students. Yet, this legislation would
rush to codify requirements and penalties before we know whether the
Department's current efforts are even working.
Federal student aid helps nearly 13 million students every year who
are pursuing higher education and economic opportunity. However, the
bill's creation of vague enforcement standards and punitive mandates,
without clear guidance for students and institutions, risk making it
harder for legitimate students to access the aid they need to attend
colleges.
For example, we don't have evaluations on the effect this bill may
have on legitimate students who are incorrectly flagged as suspicious.
The bill prohibits colleges from distributing funds to those students
until the suspicion is cleared up. These students could face hardships
obtaining housing, transportation, or even buying books for who knows
how long.
Mr. Speaker, we should allow the Department's new antifraud system to
operate and wait for the Department to evaluate the results. The
Department should work with colleges, financial aid administrators, and
fraud experts to determine what additional tools and guardrails may be
necessary. Codifying this new system without assessing its
effectiveness just doesn't make any sense.
Moreover, H.R. 7892 could reasonably be viewed as part of a broader
strategy to weaponize student aid. The Trump administration has issued
numerous threats and made efforts to withhold title IV funding as a
weapon to enforce ideological control over educational institutions.
Already, this administration has rewritten the accreditation
handbook, threatened funding to select institutions that violate its
legally dubious executive orders, and embedded ideological conditions
into annual participation agreements.
The bill would give the administration another tool to further target
colleges by allowing the Department to initiate and conduct program
reviews based on little evidence. In fact, during the committee's
debate on the bill, the committee Democrats sought to have a clear
definition of what ``reasonable suspicion of identity fraud'' actually
means in the legislation.
Regrettably, the bill has made its way to the floor without
addressing this concern. As a result, the vague language in the bill
would enable the Trump administration and future administrations to
weaponize fraud investigations to target certain colleges or States.
[[Page H4039]]
Fraud prevention and student access to affordable college education
are not competing goals. We can achieve both. Unfortunately, this bill
does not strike that balance.
For that reason, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no,'' and I reserve
the balance of my time.
{time} 1920
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my good friend, colleague, and ranking
member's comments. I am a bit surprised because I had hoped that he
could support this bill since in committee he supported this bill. In
fact, one of the two bills in this bill that has been combined was
unanimous in support by my Democratic colleagues.
In response to weaponization that this bill could provide, the bill
does not single out any State, student, or institution. The bill's
identity fraud detection system simply screens and assesses each FAFSA
submission, which is working now, for indicators of fraud risk. When an
application is flagged for identity verification, it is based on real
fraud risk, not political agenda.
Further, the bill's program review priority categories applies only
to institutions that display a pattern of disbursing aid to flagged
applications, and only after giving those schools an opportunity to
demonstrate compliance with the bill's reasonable, commonsense identity
verification requirements. In other words, the bill simply requires
institutions to do their part in ensuring that taxpayer dollars are
going to real students, not fraudsters.
Additionally, the bill promotes transparency. It requires the
Department to provide Congress with a written description of the
system, notice of substantial changes, and annual reports on the
system's use and effectiveness.
Mr. Speaker, bottom line, this bill keeps the focus where it belongs:
on stopping fraud and protecting legitimate students.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr.
Owens), the vice chairman of the Education and Workforce Committee and
the sponsor of this legislation.
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Speaker, in a speech given by Frederick Douglass in
1894, he said: ``Education . . . [is] the light only by which men can
be free. To deny education . . . is one of the greatest crimes against
human nature [because] it is to deny them the means of freedom and the
rightful pursuit of happiness.''
Mr. Speaker, this is why the issue of fraud in our financial aid
system is so pernicious. Taxpayer dollars are finite, and each dollar
that is defrauded represents another lost opportunity for the students
who need it the most.
Ghost student fraud is a growing problem in higher education. Bad
actors use fake or stolen IDs to enroll in classes, collect the
refundable portion of the student aid, and then disappear, leaving
taxpayers on the hook and denying real students an education.
Students and taxpayers deserve a student aid system that supports
opportunity, not fraud. This bill builds on the good work already done
by the Trump administration to protect taxpayer dollars and help
safeguard the integrity of the student aid system by ensuring Federal
aid goes to real students.
The No Aid for Ghost Students Act takes a straightforward approach:
identify suspicious student aid applications and ensure these
applicants are who they say they are before dollars go out the door.
The bill requires the Department of Education to use an identity
fraud detection system to screen and assess each FAFSA application for
fraud risk.
Just as importantly, the bill requires schools to verify the
student's identity for applications flagged by the Department of
Education for identity fraud risk before disbursing Federal student
aid. This is a commonsense safeguard to ensure taxpayer dollars are
kept out of the hands of fraudsters.
The verification methods in the bill are practical. Institutions may
verify identity through in-person verification or a variety of other
secure methods and must keep a record of each successful verification.
The legislation also requires the Department to establish guidelines
for verification procedures, helping ensure schools have a consistent
framework for carrying out these straightforward processes.
Since taking office, the Trump administration has made significant
progress in combating student aid fraud. Last year, the Department
blocked more than $1 billion in attempted fraud. In April, the
Department implemented a new identity fraud detection tool directly
into the FAFSA form, which blocked $60 million in the first 2 weeks.
However, these safeguards, while effective, are not guaranteed to
remain in place.
Under the Biden administration, we saw verification safeguards rolled
back under false pretenses of equity and fairness, opening the door for
fraudsters. This legislation addresses that vulnerability by putting
fraud protections where they should be--in law.
Finally, the bill also promotes transparency and oversight. It
requires the Department to provide Congress with a written description
of the fraud detection system, notify Congress of substantial changes,
and provide annual reports on the system's use and effectiveness.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this commonsense bill.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Menefee).
Mr. MENEFEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose H.R. 7892, the so-called
No Aid for Ghost Students Act. Think about a first-generation student
who is applying with a FAFSA for the first time. It is already one of
the most confusing processes out there, but all this bill does is make
it worse.
This bill would require the government to run every single financial
aid application through a fraud detection algorithm, and if you get
flagged, the college that you have been admitted to cannot release a
single dollar until you jump through hoops to prove who you are.
When a student gets flagged, there is no timeline, no appeals
process, no accuracy standards. For a kid who does not know the system,
that could mean a missed enrollment deadline. It could mean lost
housing. It could mean the end of a dream before it even starts. I know
that as a first-generation college grad.
However, I want to be very clear about how this bill will impact
folks. We heard earlier that this only applies when there is a real
fraud risk, but that is a misnomer. Study after study on identification
verification programs and fraud detection algorithms consistently show
a higher false positive for Black and Hispanic users. Who are the
students who are going to get flagged the most here? I bet they are
going to be disproportionately Black. I bet they are going to be
disproportionately Latino. I bet they are going to be lower income,
those experiencing homelessness, eligible noncitizens, working adults
who cannot afford to take a day off to drive to the financial aid
office.
My colleague on the other side of the aisle said it best, and I
completely agree: Taxpayer dollars are finite. Therefore, why is this
body supporting the President and his war of choice? Why is this body
supporting the President's creation of a ballroom? Why is this body
supporting a President who is creating a fund for folks who stormed the
Capitol?
My colleagues on the other side of the aisle could have targeted the
fraud where it actually exists in higher education, but they didn't.
Instead, they are locking in a brand-new unevaluated system into law
with zero guardrails. That does not protect taxpayers. It just gives
this administration unchecked power to delay aid to the students who
need it the most.
If even one student in this country is denied financial aid wrongly
because this algorithm did not work out properly because we rushed the
process and didn't have accuracy standards, that would be an absolute
travesty to the people that we serve.
Mr. Speaker, I oppose this bill, and I urge my colleagues to do the
same.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my colleague from Texas' concern about
students and not missing one. We certainly don't want to do that.
However, we have been doing that for years until the reforms that have
taken place in FAFSA, and we know they are working now. It has come
down to days as opposed to weeks and months before in
[[Page H4040]]
getting feedback. Now, in fact, most recently it has gotten down to
immediate feedback in most cases.
We are seeing it work, and we have no evidence that it is unjustly
pulling out certain groups or certain individuals. Again, we don't want
that to take place, but we do not want fraudsters and ghost students,
and that is what we are dealing with.
FAFSA finally, finally is working, and people--parents and students--
are calling my office, and I bet other offices, as well.
Mr. Speaker, with great appreciation, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Kiley), the chairman of the Early
Childhood, Elementary, and Secondary Education Subcommittee of the
Committee on Education and Workforce.
Mr. KILEY of California. Mr. Speaker, as a cosponsor of the No Aid
for Ghost Students Act, I am very glad that it passed our committee
with overwhelming bipartisan support, and I look forward to it
receiving bipartisan support on the floor.
{time} 1930
Our experience in California has demonstrated the need for this
legislation. California community colleges were victimized by a
staggering amount of fraud. We learned there were 1.2 million
fraudulent applicants. One-third of the applicants were fake.
I talked to my local community college, and they said they noticed
something odd going on where they saw this huge spike in applications,
three times as many as we normally get.
They said:
We know we are doing a good job, but maybe not that good of
a job that the number of applicants suddenly triples.
They actually were on top of things and managed to root out the
fraud, but not every community college has the wherewithal and the
resources to do that.
The State has been, frankly, kind of missing in action. So myself and
some of my colleagues, one of which was Representative Kim, from
California, asked the Secretary of Education to institute new identity
verification requirements, and this has largely solved the problem.
This bill is simply going to codify those best practices to prevent
fraud going forward. This is important because it will save our
taxpayers millions of dollars, but also because it will assure that the
aid goes where it is really needed.
What these fraudsters were doing was they basically submit fake
applications, then get the financial aid and then pocket that portion
of the financial aid that was above and beyond room and board for
discretionary use by the student. When these funds are going to
fraudsters and scam artists, they are not going to the students who
really need the aid in our community colleges.
Our community colleges are vital ladders of economic opportunity.
They are vitally important to our workforce, and so we need to assure
that they do not continue to be victimized by scam artists and
fraudsters at the expense of the students who use them as ladders of
opportunity.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Utah for introducing the
measure. I am proud to cosponsor it, and I urge an ``aye'' vote.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a letter in opposition to the
bill from the American Federation of Teachers.
AFT,
June 3, 2026.
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Representative: I write on behalf of the AFT's 1.8
million members working in education, healthcare and public
services. Our members decry fraud; we fight for federal
funding for the work we do, and none of us wants that funding
diverted for corrupt or fraudulent purposes. We write in
opposition to three bills on the House floor this week
because they are about weaponizing the federal government
against states and institutions of higher education the Trump
administration views as political enemies. The AFT supports
efforts to address fraud where it exists, but these bills do
not do that. Instead, they would harm marginalized
households, create significant administrative barriers, and
discourage eligible people from seeking assistance.
H.R. 7726, the Stop Child Care Scams Act of 2026; H.R.
7892, the No Aid for Ghost Students Act of 2026; and H.R.
8872, the Preventing Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in TANF Act
simply give additional authority to an administration that
makes a habit of weaponizing charges of fraud in federal
healthcare, childcare and higher education programs by
cutting research grants, targeting free speech and
restricting classroom materials.
For example, H.R. 7892, the No Aid for Ghost Students Act,
is seemingly about cracking down on the real concern about
fraud in the federal financial aid system. However, according
to the secretary of education's own recent congressional
testimony, that fraud is already being successfully addressed
with existing tools at the Department of Education's
disposal. The main impact of this bill would be to provide
the secretary with a wide-ranging authority to subject
colleges to additional review for failing to meet vague and
ill-defined metrics around ``suspected fraud.''
Similarly, H.R. 7726, the Stop Child Care Scams Act, and
H.R. 8872, the Preventing Waste, Fraud and Abuse in TANF Act,
would add additional layers of red tape to the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families program and childcare programs
in states, while granting sweeping powers to administration
officials to withhold that funding, without meaningfully
addressing fraud. We've seen this administration's playbook
in Minnesota, Maine, California and elsewhere; fraud is
simply a smokescreen to attack Americans who are not
politically aligned with the president.
These bills would further empower the administration to use
accusations of fraud to attack perceived political enemies.
The Trump administration has already withheld federal funding
for ``blue'' states on allegations of fraud--ironically at
the same time it has pardoned those convicted of stealing
billions of dollars from Medicare and Medicaid and wiped out
the imposed penalities on Mississippi for criminal TANF fund.
Meanwhile, Americans across the country are struggling to
pay their bills, and everyday costs continue to rise.
Congress should be focused on helping Americans access
affordable food and healthcare, not make the childcare
affordability crisis worse or use access to Pell grants as a
political cudgel. Congress must reject these bills that aim
to weaponize federal funds and should instead turn its focus
to helping students and families afford life's necessities.
Thank you for considering our views on this matter.
Sincerely,
Randi Weingarten,
President, AFT.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. It says, in part: ``H.R. 7892, the No Aid for
Ghost Students Act, is seemingly about cracking down on the real
concern about fraud in the Federal financial aid system. However,
according to the Secretary of Education's own recent congressional
testimony, that fraud is already being successfully addressed with
existing tools at the Department of Education's disposal. The main
impact of this bill would be to provide the Secretary with a wide-
ranging authority to subject colleges to additional review for failing
to meet vague and ill-defined metrics around `suspected fraud.' ''
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a link to another article
titled: ``The Hidden Power Grab in `Fraud Prevention'--and the Students
Who Will Pay,'' from the Alliance for Higher Education and The Hope
Center: https://hope.temple.edu/newsroom/hope-blog/hidden-power-grab-
fraud-
prevention-students-who-will-pay.
It says, in part, ``The bill's operative trigger . . . `reasonable
suspicion of identify fraud,' is a broad legalistic term with little
history in Federal financial aid policy. This term has typically been
used only when referring potential matters to the Department's
inspector general, where facts and evidence could be carefully gathered
by career employees with experience in fraud investigations. This bill
radically expands the agency's powers to make the Secretary the judge,
jury, and executioner.''
It goes on further to say that the reasonable suspicion standard
``should require articulable, credible grounds to believe fraud has
occurred, not an unexamined `hunch.' It is also critical that such
powers cannot be weaponized against perceived political enemies--
perhaps a State or college that isn't politically aligned with the
administration.''
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record another article that is titled:
``Stop Fraud, Not Students: A Balancing Act for Financial Aid Offices
and Administrators,'' from the Institute for College Access and
Success.
[April 27, 2026]
Stop Fraud, Not Students: A Balancing Act for Financial Aid Offices and
Administrators
(Author: Emmanuel Rodriguez)
AI-driven application fraud is rising fast, but without
adequate staffing and resources,
[[Page H4041]]
prevention efforts risk blocking the very students aid is
meant to serve.
Applying for financial aid is one of the most critical
actions a low-income student can take to make their
postsecondary education a reality. Completing the Free
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) unlocks federal,
state, and institutional resources that can bring the coAts
of college within reach. Each year, the U.S. Department of
Education (the Department) selects millions of student
applications for a taxpayer safeguard and compliance process
known as verification. Financial aid verification is split
into three main categories--V1, V4, and V5--all of which are
used to confirm that the income, household size, and identity
information reported by a student on their FAFSA is accurate.
This process can involve submitting tax records,
identification documents, or other materials to resolve
potential discrepancies. While the goal is to ensure that
limited financial aid resources are distributed
appropriately, verification creates a real tension: trying to
safeguard public taxpayer dollars without introducing delays,
confusion, or additional barriers that disproportionately
impact the students who can least afford them, and
potentially pushing them out of the educational pipeline.
Across the nation, college and financial aid administrators
have warned that the rate of financial aid fraud has
surpassed anything they've seen in the past, with ``ghost
students'' emerging as a major concern. These bad actors are
using stolen or synthetic identities to apply for aid and
enroll in colleges with no intent to attend, instead seeking
to collect financial aid and then disappear. Community
colleges, which often have more open-access admissions and
higher volumes of aid applicants, have been
disproportionately affected by this trend. While this problem
has long existed, the use of advancing technology to scale
fraudulent aid applications has surged as it facilitates mass
enrollment and can even generate coursework that can appear
legitimate.
This is not isolated to one or even a few states. In
Minnesota, colleges flagged more than 7,000 fraudulent or
suspicious applications in a single year. In Nevada, one
college reported over $7 million lost in a single semester
due to fraudulent enrollments. And nationally, federal
investigators have examined more than $350 million in ghost
student fraud cases over the past five years. Unfortunately,
the most staggering numbers are coming out of California,
where colleges have reported roughly 900,000 fraudulent
college applications in 2024 and more than $11 million lost
in aid. While the total money lost remains very small
compared to total aid, the rise in this activity is swamping
limited aid administration capacity and can undermine trust
in the program for key stakeholders, including policymakers
who allocate the funds for aid.
In response, both states and institutions are acting.
Colleges are deploying AI-powered detection tools,
implementing stricter identity verification, or front-loading
identity verification through their application process,
amongst other measures. At the federal level, the Department
is reinstating fraud detection protocols, including identity
screenings and cross-agency data checks. Even Congress has
begun to respond through the recent introduction of the
Student Aid Fraud Oversight and Accountability Act of 2026
(H.R. 7891), the No Aid for Ghost Students Act of 2026 (H.R.
7892), and the FAFSA Verification Efficiency Act (H.R. 7893).
Taken together, these efforts signal a growing recognition
that fraud prevention must be strengthened. But how it's done
matters for students. A lot.
The California Case Study
For the past few years, the California Community Colleges
(CCC) have been fighting an uphill battle against ghost
students who are getting their hands on federal, state, and
even institutional aid by taking advantage of the community
college mission to provide open access to all students no
matter when they start their educational journey.
TICAS has learned from financial aid administrators that
the AI tools they are using to combat this problem are
getting better and increasing detection. Online verification
platforms and methods have replaced paper-based systems,
allowing students to more easily submit required documents
rather than coming in person. And staff at many colleges are
proactive in their student outreach to offer support in
navigating this process, even with limited resources.
Compliance and protective measures taken by California's
colleges, no matter how thoughtfully designed and
implemented, are just one side of this equation. On the other
side, we need to track and center the experiences of students
with the processes--especially as the Department is stepping
in by expanding V4/V5 verification rates. For undocumented
students, students from mixed-status families, formerly
incarcerated students, foster youth, and others who already
navigate institutions with caution, being told ``show me your
ID'' or ``come into the office to prove you're real and that
you are as poor as you reported'' can feel threatening.
Without careful communication, these processes can feel
punitive, invasive, and in today's reality, connected to
immigration enforcement or federal data sharing that students
fear. This fear is not hypothetical, and addressing it will
take time, intentionality, and both fiscal and human
resources.
Yet, across California, financial aid offices are being
asked to do more with less. Adding identity verification on
top of their normal duties of helping students file a FAFSA
or CADAA or navigate processes like Satisfactory Academic
Progress and professional judgement requests are heavy lifts.
The CCC system and its financial aid administrators cannot
sufficiently carry out increased, more complex, and student-
centered verification practices along with their other work
without sufficient resources.
If California wants to protect taxpayer dollars as well as
students' access to an affordable education, the state must
adequately fund financial aid offices to do both well and in
an equitable way. Widely supported budget requests reflect
this reality, such as an existing ask for an additional $10
million ongoing CA Proposition 98 funds to support the
Student Financial Aid Administration (SFAA), which many
advocates support and the Chancellor's Office has uplifted.
Alternatively, California could implement a reoccurring cost-
of-living adjustment to the SFAA base or ensure they earmark
a portion of any Student Support Block Grant investments for
this purpose.
Regardless of the approach, California has the opportunity
to create a national model for balancing program integrity
with student access. To do so, it must begin with a sustained
state investment in financial aid offices to augment
resources that support vital counseling and advising, clear
communication, and secure technology.
Looking Ahead
As policymakers and institutions respond across the
country, it's critical that they all intentionally balance
program integrity with student access. TICAS offers the
following high-level principles to help guide decision-makers
grappling with how to address this issue:
Ensure all verification processes are clear, transparent,
and student-centered, with strong communication to all
affected parties about why verification is happening.
Center the experiences of students--particularly those from
vulnerable populations--who may experience verification as
confusing, intimidating, or even unsafe.
Prepare multilingual outreach materials for students and
families whom English is a second language to clearly explain
the reasons for verification, next steps, and other supports.
Avoid unnecessarily expanding verification requirements
beyond the student applying for aid--especially towards
dependents or family members.
Protect student privacy and data security, especially as
new technologies like AI are introduced and used to mine or
filter sensitive data.
Provide adequate funding and staffing so financial aid
offices can have training to understand these processes and
implement them effectively.
If colleges choose to build systems that front-load
documentation and identity verification through their
applications, invest in that infrastructure early and test it
thoroughly to ensure it is as simple and easy as possible to
complete.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. It says, in part: ``While the goal is to
ensure that limited financial aid resources are distributed
appropriately, verification creates a real tension: trying to safeguard
public taxpayer dollars without introducing delays, confusion, or
additional barriers that disproportionately impact the students who can
least afford them, and potentially pushing them out of the educational
pipeline.''
Mr. Speaker, finally, I include in the Record an article from
StateScoop with a letter from Al Sharpton of the National Action
Network, outlining many issues involved in identity verification done
by artificial intelligence.
[From STATESCOOP, Aug. 1, 2024]
New York lawmaker questions state's use of identity-verification vendor
(By Keely Quinlan)
In a letter to the state chief information officer, New
York state Sen. Jeremy Cooney raises concerns with the
state's use of AI-powered software from the identity-
verification firm Socure. The company says many of the claims
are false.
In a letter penned this month to Dru Rai, New York state's
chief information officer, state Sen. Jeremy Cooney raised
concerns regarding Socure, a fraud prevention and identity
verification firm used by the state, citing the vendor's data
practices and how it uses artificial intelligence.
The letter from Cooney, dated July 10, asks Rai how the
state's Office of Information Technology Services has vetted
Socure, which in addition to more than 20 state government
agencies and multiple federal agencies, provides New York
state with identity verification services. In an interview
with StateScoop, though, Socure executives said many of
Cooney's claims are simply false and that he misunderstands
how the company's technology works.
Socure's technology relies on AI and machine learning to
analyze several thousand data points to predict fraudulent
identity activity. For governments, it predicts fraud for
resident services, such as by scanning benefits applications.
Fraud is a growing concern for state agencies, which since
the COVID-19 pandemic have seen heightened levels of fraud
across many government functions.
[[Page H4042]]
Cooney, who also chairs the Senate Procurement and
Contracts Committee, said how Socure obtains and uses those
data points--many of which would be considered personally
identifiable data--is concerning.
Referring to the company as a data broker, Cooney said the
company ``collects, purchases and stores billions of data
points, including sensitive personal identifiable
information, on New Yorkers without their consent to confirm
their identities.'' While noting that identity verification
``is critical for ensuring equitable access to public
services,'' Cooney said that the potential risks associated
with using AI include preventing people from accessing
critical government services.
``Innovation should never come at the cost of good
governance and transparency,'' Cooney wrote in an email to
StateScoop. ``Given the widespread concerns around Socure's
business practices and the growing recognition of AI's risks,
it is important to scrutinize any work they are doing for New
York state agencies. I deeply appreciate the hard work and
ongoing efforts of the State CIO's office to make sure our
state's digital systems grant every New Yorker secure,
equitable access to state services and uphold personal
privacy.''
In the letter, Cooney also asked Rai whether the state
requires that Socure include a human review of algorithmic
output to ensure it's accurate and not discriminatory, and
whether the state has tested Socure's fraud prediction models
for bias.
``Has the state confirmed whether Socure's practices fully
comply with NY state privacy law, specifically related to its
mass collection of sensitive PII, partnership with data
brokers, and use of social media data?'' Cooney asked in the
letter.
`we are not a data broker'
Jordan Burris, vice president of public sector strategy for
Socure and the former chief of staff in the White House's
Office of the Federal CIO, told StateScoop that portions of
the letter fundamentally misunderstand what the company does,
noting that Socure is not a data broker. Additionally, New
York state has yet to pass a comprehensive data privacy law
that would legally define within the state what constitutes a
data broker. Its data privacy act is still in committee for
the second year in a row.
``We do not sell data to third parties, we do not use it
for marketing. We do not use it to run a marketplace,
offering online discounts for e-commerce, like other
companies in the space,'' Burris told StateScoop. ``We are
only focused on verifying identity and rooting out fraud, and
ultimately, under looking at what is exactly New York State
law today, we are not a data broker, and to suggest otherwise
is simply false.''
Cooney's letter follows at least two other instances this
year in which New York state leaders have levied concerns
regarding Socure and its data practices. Rep. Ritchie Torres,
D-N.Y., in February wrote a letter to Socure CEO Johnny Ayers
over concerns that his company's digital identity
verification software might lead to discrimination.
``You claim your product, `fuses personal identifiable
information (PID validated by thousands of data sources' in
order to prevent fraud,'' Torres' letter read. ``Companies'
abuse of private data can also lead to the unwanted tracking
and sale of people's sensitive health data, genetic
information, religious participation, and location. Given the
lack of transparency around your services, constituents in my
district have expressed legitimate privacy concerns and
demand to know how you source their data, how it is used, and
whether it is equitable for all American communities.''
While Cooney's recent letter claims Torres' letter went
unanswered, Socure told StateScoop it met with Torres' office
to review some of its complaints. StateScoop contacted
Torres' office for comment, but did not hear back before
publication.
data sources
In March, Rev. Al Sharpton of the National Action Network,
wrote a letter to New York State Attorney General Letitia
James citing concerns with Socure's lack of transparency
regarding the types of data it uses to perform identity
verification.
``Socure also collects data from thousands of data sources,
including personally identifiable information (PII), without
providing any meaningful transparency regarding how that data
is acquired, stored, and used,'' Sharpton's letter read.
``Socure scrapes social media, utilizes geolocation
technology, and deploys artificial intelligence technology to
conduct its business. They have no help line, and people have
no recourse should their identity be denied mistakenly. These
practices have historically and consistently hurt
marginalized communities.''
When asked how Socure obtains data to perform identity
verification, Burris said the company buys and otherwise
obtains data from a variety of public and private sources to
``bring in house.'' These sources include public records,
mobile network operators--like Verizon and AT&T--and higher
education institutions, Burris said. He added that Socure's
data scientists evaluate the ``authoritativeness of that
data.''
``I'm not looking to buy data for data's sake. I'm looking
at data for the purpose of what we can do with it,'' Burris
said. ``The only purpose for us having it is to help with
identity verification in particular. . . . And then we even
have a proprietary database that we've built of known
fraudulent identity identities that we've identified over our
12-year existence.''
`pressure testing'
As far as concerns of effects on marginalized communities,
Burris said the company is ``pressure testing'' its AI models
by testing for bias across demographics like age, race,
gender and other protected classes.
On the topic of human review in the identity verification
process, Burris said ``humans are involved all throughout the
process.''
``The question of are human reviewers evaluating every
identity decision fundamentally misunderstands the challenges
that exist with verifying identity today,'' Burris said. ``We
are going backwards if we heavily rely on human reviews to
verify identity. The cost is long wait times, backlogs and
good people who ultimately will continue to be underserved.''
In an email, a spokesperson for the New York Office of
Information Technology Services said: ``We take our
responsibility to protect the privacy of every single
resident accessing state programs or services very seriously,
and have implemented the strongest possible security measures
to ensure it.''
____
Wednesday, May 13, 2026.
From The Desk of Rev. Al Sharpton
Hon. Elizabeth Warren,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Hon. Richard Blumenthal,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Hon. Tammy Duckworth,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Hon. Mazie K. Hirono,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Dear Senators Warren, Blumenthal, Duckworth, and Hirono: I
write in strong support of your May 4, 2026 letters to the
heads of Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion regarding how Buy
Now, Pay Later (BNPL) data is being incorporated into
Americans' credit files. In your letters, you correctly
observed that the credit reporting industry has been ``very
secretive about its scoring models'' and that credit
reporting companies ``are also now performing the functions
of data harvesters themselves.'' The integration of a BNPL
credit vendor like Qlarifi into a massive data aggregator and
harvester like Socure, presents a new and dangerous threat to
consumer data and fairness. I write to urge you to expand the
scope of this inquiry to include Socure and Qlarifi, given
that Socure is quietly building what amounts to a fourth
credit bureau, one that sits entirely outside the regulatory
perimeter you are working to hold to account.
In December 2025, Socure acquired Qlarifi and announced the
creation of what it called ``the First Real-Time BNPL Credit
System.'' Socure, via Qlarifi, now aggregates loan-level BNPL
data on millions of American consumers, runs it through
blackbox AI risk-scoring models, and sells the resulting
credit determinations back into the lending ecosystem. It
does this without the consumer notice, dispute, accuracy, or
fairness obligations that the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) imposes on Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion. It is
concerning for many consumers, particularly consumers of
color, that a fourth consumer rating agency is being
constructed in plain sight. Socure's business effectively
provides the same function as a credit rating agency, coupled
with an absence of accountability, along with a business
model built on the very data harvesting practices your
letters identified as a core consumer protection problem.
This matters profoundly for the communities I represent.
BNPL is concentrated among consumers who already face
structural barriers in the financial system. Black consumers
are over twice as likely than White consumers to use BNPL
products, and Hispanic consumers are about 91 percent more
likely. As you note in your letters, even one misreported
missed payment can ripple through a consumer's credit score
and limit their access to a mortgage, an auto loan, an
apartment, or even a checking account. When the data feeding
those decisions flows through an unregulated AI scoring layer
at Socure before it ever reaches a traditional bureau, or
worse, when lenders bypass the bureaus entirely and rely on
Socure's scores directly, the risk of digital redlining is no
longer theoretical. It is being engineered into the
architecture of consumer credit.
Your letters also flag a related dynamic that deserves to
be drawn out more fully. As you observe, ``alternative data''
such as bank account cash flow is increasingly being
collected on consumers, ``particularly for consumers with
limited credit histories, which tend to be lower-income
consumers.'' That observation cannot be separated from race.
The CFPB has long documented that Black and Hispanic
Americans are significantly overrepresented among the so-
called ``credit invisible'' and consumers with limited credit
files, the very population on which alternative data and AI-
driven scoring are most aggressively deployed. The result is
a two-tier system in which the consumers with the least
margin for error are the ones whose creditworthiness is most
likely to be determined by experimental, opaque, AI-driven
inputs assembled from commercial data sources--the inputs
Socure aggregates and sells. The Senators' question about
alternative data is, in practice, also a question about
racial equity in credit.
That brings me to the broader concern about racial bias
inherent in AI and algorithmic decision-making systems, the
kind
[[Page H4043]]
often inherent in BNPL credit scoring, and of the kind Socure
builds and sells. AI-driven risk models are only as fair as
the data on which they are trained, and the commercial and
alternative data underlying these systems systematically
underrepresent and misrepresent communities of color.
Independent researchers at Northeastern University have found
that data broker records on White non-Hispanic Americans were
25 percent more likely to be accurate than records on
Hispanic Americans, and that only 32 percent of Hispanic
individuals under age 26 were correctly represented in those
records at all. Because vendors like Socure, who are now
providing credit scoring for BNPL companies, train their
models on this same commercial data, those structural gaps
are not corrected by the algorithm, they are encoded into it.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has
likewise documented disparities in credit underwriting and
pricing outcomes for Black and Hispanic applicants, and has
warned that algorithmic models present a serious challenge in
identifying ``variables that may be proxies for prohibited
bases'' of discrimination. Your letters to the bureaus end
with Question 7, which asks whether each bureau has studied
the impact of BNPL data on consumer credit scores. The more
urgent question, and the one I respectfully urge you to add,
is whether anyone, at any of these companies or at Socure,
has studied the impact of BNPL credit reporting and
alternative data inputs on consumers by race, ethnicity, age,
and income.
Socure also collects data from thousands of sources,
including personally identifiable information, social media
activity, and geolocation data, without providing meaningful
transparency about how that data is acquired, stored,
combined, or used. Consumers have no recourse if they are
wrongfully scored, flagged, or denied because of an
inaccurate or biased record buried inside Socure's models.
For a family already living paycheck to paycheck, a single
algorithmic misclassification can be the difference between
keeping the lights on and falling into crisis. A massive data
aggregator must not be permitted to function as de facto
credit reporting infrastructure without the corresponding
obligations and oversight.
For these reasons, I respectfully urge you to:
Add Socure, the new owners of Qlarifi to the scope of your
inquiry. Send a parallel information request to Socure
regarding its acquisition of Qlarifi, the categories of
consumer data it collects and aggregates, the BNPL providers
and lenders that consume its scores, and whether and how it
considers itself subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA).
Press Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion specifically on
Socure and Qlarifi. Ask each bureau whether it receives data
from, sells data to, or competes with Socure's real-time BNPL
credit product, and whether Qlarifi-sourced data is
incorporated, directly or indirectly, into their tradelines
or scoring inputs.
Examine whether Socure's real-time BNPL scoring product
meets the statutory definition of a ``consumer reporting
agency'' under the FCRA, and whether Qlarifi's pre-
acquisition operations should have been regulated as such. If
existing law does not clearly reach this conduct, that gap is
itself a finding worth surfacing.
Expand Question 7 in your follow-up engagement with the
bureaus to require demographic impact analysis. Ask whether
the bureaus, FICO, VantageScore, or their BNPL data partners
have tested how the incorporation of BNPL data affects credit
scores by race, ethnicity, age, and income, and request that
any such analyses be produced.
Request that Socure disclose any independent demographic
audits of its risk-scoring products, and explain how its AI
and machine-learning models are tested for disparate impact,
the same standard the CFPB has urged on the rest of the
credit ecosystem.
The fight against predatory lending has always been, at its
core, a civil rights fight. Your letters of May 4 are exactly
the kind of oversight this moment requires, and I am grateful
for your leadership. I urge you to follow the data where it
leads, past the three traditional bureaus and into the
unregulated scoring layer being built around them. The
American consumer cannot afford a fourth credit bureau that
operates in the dark.
Thank you for your continued commitment to protecting
American consumers and to ensuring that the financial system
works fairly for every community.
Sincerely,
Reverend Al Sharpton,
Founder and President,
National Action Network.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I was caught with the first entity that was mentioned,
AFT, the American Federation of Teachers', concern about higher
education.
They have messed up our K-12 education and the pipeline going into
higher education. I don't see them as any voice that we ought to be
listening to, especially dealing with fraud, waste, and abuse.
It is important to recognize the progress the Department has made,
Mr. Speaker, in addressing ghost student fraud. In just its first 2
weeks, the Department's new real-time identity fraud detention tool
blocked over $60 million in ghost student fraud. That is real money for
students.
That is real success, and it is exactly why this bill is drafted this
way.
The bill makes clear that the Department may satisfy the bill's
identity fraud detection requirement, in whole or in part, through a
system already in use, while also giving the Department room to adapt
its system to evolving threats.
The trouble is that without this bill, strong safeguards against
fraud are not guaranteed, as we said, to remain in place and could
change from administration to administration. Especially if the AFT is
pushing, we know that push is real because of the Biden
administration's failures.
If we agree the current safeguards are working, we should make sure
they remain in place to protect students and taxpayers alike, not just
for now, but far into the future.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Mrs. Kim).
Mrs. KIM. Mr. Speaker, today, I rise to add my voice in strong
support of H.R. 7892, the No Aid for Ghost Students Act. In California,
34 percent of community college applicants have been flagged as likely
fraudulent. That is more than one in three applicants.
These so-called AI ghost students are scammers using fake identities
to enroll in classes, pocket taxpayer dollars, and disappear without
ever setting foot in a classroom.
Between April of 2024 and April of 2025, criminals stole more than
$10 million from California's community colleges, robbing taxpayers and
hurting real students who depend on that aid.
That is why I sent a letter to the Department of Education demanding
an investigation and stronger safeguards to stop this fraud before
taxpayer dollars go out the door. This bill builds on those efforts by
strengthening application verification requirements and ensuring future
administrations cannot weaken them.
Mr. Speaker, I thank Congressman Burgess Owens for introducing this
very commonsense legislation, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. Grothman), who is a working member of our Committee on
Education and Workforce.
Mr. GROTHMAN. Mr. Speaker, in our Committee on Education and
Workforce, as in so many other committees, we have discovered rampant
fraud, in this case, in Federal financial aid programs as ghost
students have been submitting applications for aid, getting the aid,
and then the money just disappears because there is no real student.
Imagine that, Mr. Speaker.
The first lesson we can take out of this is the programs here now are
not going to get rid of it. Anybody who thinks we are going to
institute a Federal program and there is not going to be fraud in it is
nuts. This is one more example of out-of-control things. We believe we
found $350 million of ghost student fraud uncovered since 2019.
{time} 1940
In any event, Burgess Owens has the answer here. In part, we are
going to work to identify these fraudsters before the money goes out
the door. If we identify them before the money goes out the door, we
will dramatically decrease the amount of money that disappears.
Mr. Speaker, I thank Burgess Owens for doing this, and I hope the
rest of the body will remember what was done with these Federal aid
programs. Again and again, it doesn't go for the purposes designed. It
goes to fraudsters who take advantage of the situation.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my
time.
Mr. Speaker, this debate is not about whether or not fraud should be
stopped. Everybody agrees with that, like when Trump University paid
$25 million to settle their fraud investigation. We shouldn't be
debating whether or not fraud should be stopped. We should be debating
the provisions of the bill, not the merits of the title.
[[Page H4044]]
The question before us is not whether or not we should try to reduce
fraud, but whether or not Congress should codify into law a process
that has barely begun to operate and whose effectiveness has not been
evaluated, especially as it affects students who are incorrectly
flagged under the bill. It doesn't add anything to what is already
being done. It only codifies what is being done before the program can
be evaluated.
We should not substitute politics for due diligence. We should wait
for that evaluation. As I said in committee, I was willing to work in
good faith to improve the legislation. Regrettably, my colleagues on
the other side of the aisle chose not to consider the fixes needed to
support students and colleges while also addressing the responsibility
to defer fraud.
This bill circumvents deliberative processes, imposes new punitive
requirements before we have the facts, and risks creating new barriers
for students seeking an education. We should pursue smart enforcement,
be flexible when honest mistakes occur, and be informed by evidence
rather than assumptions.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose the bill, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, fraud has no place in America. I think we can all agree
with that, at least in word. Unfortunately, fraud has spiraled out of
control and allowed criminals to steal billions from American students
and taxpayers.
H.R. 7892, No Aid for Ghost Students Act of 2026, is a powerful
opportunity to put a stop to fraud in our Federal student aid programs
and expand the dream of higher education for the next generation of
Americans.
While Democrats and the Biden-era administration allowed fraudsters
to steal from students and taxpayers, Republicans and the Trump
administration are committed to righting that wrong and ensuring
Federal student aid goes to the people who are meant to receive it:
students.
As lawmakers, it is imperative we do everything in our power to
ensure taxpayer dollars are spent correctly. That means stopping fraud
and putting an end to the parade of criminals who have exploited our
Federal student assistance programs. It makes sense to me.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 7892, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 1333, the previous question is ordered
on the bill, as amended.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and
nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this question will be postponed.
____________________