[Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 95 (Thursday, June 4, 2026)]
[House]
[Pages H3879-H3896]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
UKRAINE SUPPORT ACT
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Pursuant to House Resolution
518, the House will proceed to the immediate consideration of the bill
(H.R. 2913) to authorize support for Ukraine, and for other purposes,
which the Clerk will report by title.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 518, the bill
is considered read.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 2913
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Ukraine
Support Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--DIPLOMACY AND SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE
Sec. 101. Affirming support for Ukraine.
Sec. 102. Reaffirming the importance of NATO.
Sec. 103. Condemning the kidnapping of Ukrainian children.
Sec. 104. Support for Ukraine under title II of the BUILD Act of 2018.
Sec. 105. Vessel war risk insurance.
Sec. 106. Insurance for Ukraine Initiative.
Sec. 107. Codification of a Special Coordinator for Ukrainian
Reconstruction.
Sec. 108. Support for Radio Free Europe.
Sec. 109. Authorizing programs to counter and combat Russian
disinformation activities.
Sec. 110. Establishment of Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund.
Sec. 111. United States-European Nuclear Energy Cooperation.
TITLE II--SECURITY ASSISTANCE
Sec. 201. Lend-lease authority.
Sec. 202. Direct loans and foreign military financing.
Sec. 203. Support for Baltic countries.
Sec. 204. Extension of Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.
Sec. 205. Report on allied and partner military contributions.
Sec. 206. Report on United States-Ukraine intelligence support and
cooperation.
TITLE III--SANCTIONS AND EXPORT CONTROLS
Sec. 301. Sanctions trigger determination.
Sec. 302. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Russian financial
institutions.
Sec. 303. Impositions of sanctions with respect to Russian oil and
mining industry.
Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons affiliated with or
supporting the Government of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 305. Crimea tunnel sanctions.
Sec. 306. Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant sanctions.
Sec. 307. Rosatom sanctions.
Sec. 308. Imposition of price cap vessel sanctions.
Sec. 309. SWIFT sanctions.
Sec. 310. Russian sovereign debt sanctions.
Sec. 311. Imposition of sanctions on Russia-North Korea cooperation.
Sec. 312. Sanctions for kidnapping Ukrainian children.
Sec. 313. Imposition of dual-use export controls.
Sec. 314. Duties on the Russian Federation.
Sec. 315. Ending Russian oil import loophole.
Sec. 316. Taxing capital gains on Russian sovereign assets.
Sec. 317. Sanctions described.
Sec. 318. Implementation; regulations; penalties.
Sec. 319. Exceptions; waiver.
Sec. 320. Termination.
Sec. 321. Congressional review of Russia sanctions.
Sec. 322. Definitions.
TITLE I--DIPLOMACY AND SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE
SEC. 101. AFFIRMING SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation launched
an unprovoked and brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine,
violating Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity,
subjecting the nation to acts of aggression that have
threatened its independence and security.
(2) For three years, the people of Ukraine have
demonstrated extraordinary resilience, courage, and
determination in the face of relentless attacks on their
homes, communities, sovereignty, and fundamental freedoms.
(3) Since the beginning of the invasion, Russia has engaged
in widespread and systematic war crimes, including--
(A) deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure,
including residential buildings, schools, hospitals, and
evacuation corridors;
(B) the forced deportation and kidnapping of at least
19,000 Ukrainian children to Russian-controlled territories
in an attempt to erase Ukrainian identity;
(C) the destruction of Ukraine's agricultural and energy
infrastructure to create humanitarian crises and disrupt
global food supply chains; and
(D) the use of torture, extrajudicial killings, and mass
graves in occupied Ukrainian territories, as documented by
the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, and
leading human rights organizations.
(4) Despite these atrocities, the people of Ukraine remain
unyielding, demonstrating that their spirit and commitment to
self-determination cannot be extinguished.
(5) The Russian Federation, despite its overwhelming use of
force, has suffered catastrophic military losses, with
estimates exceeding 800,000 casualties, illustrating that
President Vladimir Putin's war of conquest has become both a
strategic failure and a humanitarian disaster for Russia.
(6) Ukraine, despite facing an adversary with a far larger
population, army, and military arsenal, continues to fight
courageously for its sovereignty, demonstrating its
resilience and determination.
(7) Russia's war has destabilized global security,
undermining the principles of sovereignty and nonaggression
and emboldening authoritarian regimes seeking to redraw
international borders by force.
(8) The United States, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the European Union, and allied nations
have demonstrated historic unity in their support for
Ukraine, reaffirming their commitment to upholding
international law, territorial integrity, and democratic
values.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States--
(1) recognizes that discussions surrounding the future of
Ukraine must include Ukraine;
(2) condemns in the strongest possible terms the Russian
Federation's ongoing war crimes, its targeted destruction of
Ukrainian society, and its blatant violations of
international law;
(3) reaffirms its commitment to the people of Ukraine and
the principles of sovereignty, independence, and territorial
integrity within internationally recognized borders;
(4) urges the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all
Russian forces from Ukrainian territory, including Crimea and
the Donbas, and affirms that any negotiations must be based
on Ukraine's sovereignty, not dictated by Russian ultimatums;
(5) demands international institutions take decisive action
to ensure the safe return of at least 19,000 kidnapped
Ukrainian children, recognizing that their forced deportation
is a war crime and an act of genocide under international
law;
(6) supports the continued prosecution of Vladimir Putin
and Russian political and military leaders for war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide, reinforcing that those
who orchestrate such atrocities must be held accountable
before the world; and
(7) stresses that any sustainable peace deal must be built
with Ukraine and our European allies at the table.
SEC. 102. REAFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF NATO.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States and its democratic allies and
partners face unprecedented international challenges and
evolving threats to global security.
(2) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was
founded on April 4, 1949, to counter Soviet expansion,
prevent further world wars in Europe, and strengthen
transatlantic security, and is built on the democratic
principles of freedom, security, and national sovereignty.
(3) Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty underpins the
principle of ``collective defense'' and has served as a
guiding value of United States foreign policy for over 75
years.
(4) The United States commitment to Article 5 enhances
deterrence against adversaries such as Russia, China, and
Iran that seek to spread their malign influence.
(5) The unity of NATO allies strengthens collective
security and the stability of democratic states.
(6) NATO serves as a bulwark against the proliferation of
malign influence, technologies, and destabilizing operations
by adversaries.
(7) Authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, Iran, and
North Korea have increased collaboration in political,
economic, and security sectors to undermine democratic
principles.
[[Page H3880]]
(8) In the only invocation of Article 5, NATO allies
provided military and intelligence support to the United
States following the September 11, 2001, attacks, and many
NATO allies incurred significant casualties in Afghanistan.
(9) NATO has remained steadfast in its support for Ukraine,
with member countries providing military and non-security
assistance, strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities, and
imposing costs on Russia for its illegal invasion.
(10) Finland and Sweden made the sovereign decision to
accede to NATO following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
(11) NATO continues to address systemic challenges posed by
China to Euro-Atlantic interests and security.
(12) NATO member states have strengthened their defense and
cyber capabilities, including through the Defense Innovation
Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) program.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States reaffirms its full and unwavering
commitment to NATO;
(2) NATO remains vital to United States national security
interests and the United States remains fully committed to
defending its allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty;
(3) NATO's open door policy is essential to European
security, and every sovereign state has the right to
determine its security arrangements, including Ukraine;
(4) the United States remembers and honors the thousands of
NATO coalition soldiers who sacrificed their lives following
the invocation of Article 5 after the September 11, 2001,
attacks;
(5) all NATO allies should dedicate at least 2 percent of
their gross domestic product to national defense or establish
concrete plans to meet their 2 percent obligations by the
Washington Summit; and
(6) NATO allies must continue cooperation in advanced
defense technologies, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity
programs to counter evolving threats from adversaries such as
Russia, China, and Iran.
SEC. 103. CONDEMNING THE KIDNAPPING OF UKRAINIAN CHILDREN.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) On January 12, 1951, the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (commonly known as
the ``Genocide Convention'') entered into force. The Russian
Federation is a party to the Convention and is therefore
bound by its obligations.
(2) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation escalated
its 8-year occupation of sovereign Ukrainian territory by
launching a full-scale, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.
(3) Russian armed forces have committed widespread and
systematic atrocities against Ukrainian civilians, including
the targeting of civilian infrastructure and protected sites.
(4) On March 9, 2022, Russian forces attacked a maternity
hospital in Mariupol, Ukraine, resulting in the deaths of 5
individuals and injuries to 17 others, in violation of
international humanitarian law.
(5) On March 22, 2022, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs announced that the Russian military had illegally
abducted and forcibly transferred 2,389 Ukrainian children
from temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian
Federation.
(6) On June 2, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelenskyy stated that an estimated 200,000 Ukrainian children
had been forcibly transferred to Russia.
(7) Article II(e) of the Genocide Convention defines
``forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group'' as an act of genocide.
(8) Maria Lvova-Belova, Children's Rights Commissioner for
the President of Russia, publicly admitted to overseeing the
abduction and forced transfer of Ukrainian children and their
adoption by Russian families.
(9) Ukrainian authorities have stated that many abducted
children have living family members in Ukraine but have been
separated due to Russia's renewed invasion.
(10) On June 16, 2022, Russian authorities announced that
children born in occupied Ukrainian territories after the
February 24, 2022, invasion would automatically be deemed
Russian citizens, contributing to the erasure of Ukrainian
identity.
(11) On June 22, 2022, the United Nations Human Rights
Office of the High Commissioner verified that at least 320
children had been killed as a result of Russia's renewed
invasion of Ukraine.
(12) On July 11, 2022, United Nations Secretary-General
Antonio Guterres ordered an investigation into the deaths and
injuries of Ukrainian children in the context of the
conflict.
(13) On July 13, 2022, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken
called on the Russian Federation to ``immediately halt its
systemic filtration operations in Ukraine'', which have
resulted in the disappearance, detention, or forcible
deportation of between 900,000 and 1,600,000 Ukrainians,
including approximately 260,000 children.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the abduction and forcible transfer of children and
facilitation of illegal adoptions of Ukrainian children by
the Russian Federation is contrary to Russia's obligations
under the Genocide Convention and constitute acts of
genocide;
(2) the Russian Federation is deliberately seeking to wipe
out a generation of Ukrainian children, thereby crippling
Ukraine's ability to nurture the next generation of Ukrainian
citizens and leaders and to rebuild their country after
Russia's unprovoked war, with the purpose of demolishing
Ukraine's unique language, culture, history, and identity;
(3) the Russian Federation's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine
has significantly increased the risks of children being
exposed to human trafficking and exploitation, child labor,
gender-based violence, hunger, injury, trauma, deprivation of
education and shelter, and death; and
(4) the Government of the Russian Federation, under the
leadership of Vladimir Putin, bears full responsibility for
the wrongful and illegal abduction and forcible transfer of
children from Ukraine, and Congress condemns these actions in
the strongest terms.
SEC. 104. SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE UNDER TITLE II OF THE BUILD ACT
OF 2018.
Section 1412(c) of the Better Utilization of Investments
Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(c)) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``in Ukraine and'' after
``the provision of support under title II''; and
(2) in paragraph (2)--
(A) by striking ``The Corporation'' and inserting the
following:
``(A) In general.--The Corporation'';
(B) by striking ``(A) the President'' and inserting the
following:
``(i) the President'';
(C) by striking ``(B) such support'' and inserting the
following:
``(ii) such support''; and
(D) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) Non-applicability to ukraine.--The provisions of
subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to Ukraine.''.
SEC. 105. VESSEL WAR RISK INSURANCE.
(a) Eligibility.--Notwithstanding section 53902 of title
46, United States Code, for the period beginning on the date
of enactment of this Act, and ending 5 years after such date,
a covered vessel shall be deemed to be eligible for insurance
or reinsurance under chapter 539 of title 46, United States
Code, if such vessel is engaged in transportation in
waterborne commerce importing cargo to, or exporting cargo
from, Ukraine.
(b) Expansion of Cargo.--Subparagraphs (B) through (D) of
section 53903(a)(3) of title 46, United States Code, shall
not apply to cargo imported or exported to or from Ukraine.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered vessel.--The term ``covered vessel'' means a
vessel that is owned by a citizen of--
(A) a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization;
(B) Ukraine; or
(C) any other country the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation,
determines, in the interest of national security, shall be
considered eligible for insurance or reinsurance under
chapter 539 of title 46, United States Code.
(2) Owned by a citizen.--The term ``owned by a citizen''
means ownership by an entity that is considered to be a
citizen of a country in the same manner as an entity is
deemed to be a citizen of the United States under section
50501 of title 46, United States Code.
SEC. 106. INSURANCE FOR UKRAINE INITIATIVE.
(a) Establishment.--There is established in the Department
of State an entity to be known as the ``Insurance for Ukraine
Initiative''.
(b) Objectives.--The objectives of the Insurance for
Ukraine Initiative are the following:
(1) Bolster confidence in Ukraine's eventual economic
recovery from Russia's full-scale invasion through the
provision of war risk insurance.
(2) Encourage European allies and partners to finance and
invest in Ukraine's economic recovery, including through the
provision of war risk insurance.
(3) Promote closer economic integration between Ukraine and
other countries in Europe as well as the United States and
further Ukraine's accession to the European Union.
(4) Coordinate dialogue and fora for extensive outreach
with private sector insurance companies relating to the
provision of war risk insurance to Ukraine.
(5) Work with Ukraine, international organizations, and
Middle Eastern and African allies and partners to ensure the
bountiful and affordable shipment of grain and other food
commodities from Ukraine.
(c) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the
following 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that includes
assessments of--
(1) progress towards the achievement of each of the
objectives set forth in subsection (b); and
(2) legislative proposals that would further the objectives
set forth in subsection (b).
(d) Diplomatic and Political Support.--The Secretary of
State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant
Federal departments and agencies, shall seek to provide
diplomatic and political support to countries that provide or
provide support for war risk insurance for Ukraine, including
by using the diplomatic and political influence and expertise
of the Department of State to build the capacity of such
countries.
(e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term
[[Page H3881]]
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
SEC. 107. CODIFICATION OF A SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR UKRAINIAN
RECONSTRUCTION.
(a) In General.--There is established within the Department
of State a Special Coordinator for Ukrainian Reconstruction.
(b) Selection.--The Special Coordinator shall be chosen by
the Secretary of State and shall report directly to the
Secretary.
(c) Qualifications.--The Special Coordinator shall be an
individual with--
(1) private sector experience; and
(2) knowledge of Ukraine and foreign policy pertaining
thereto.
(d) Duties.--The Special Coordinator shall assist in--
(1) harnessing the tools of different agencies of the
United States Government to promote the reconstruction of
Ukraine;
(2) coordinate cooperation amongst different agencies and
bureaus of the United States Government to aid the recovery
of Ukraine following its war to protect its sovereignty; and
(3) work with the United States Development Finance
Corporation to mobilize private capital for the
reconstruction of Ukraine.
SEC. 108. SUPPORT FOR RADIO FREE EUROPE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty shall be immediately
restored to its full capacity and operational position prior
to Executive order attempting to shutter the agency;
(2) Radio Free Europe provides reliable, uncensored, and
accessible news and reporting in Ukraine and other countries
where media freedom is restricted;
(3) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is one of the most
critical sources of unrestricted, independent news and
reporting for audiences on the periphery of the Russian
Federation;
(4) the Government of the Russian Federation has engaged in
systematic targeting of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
reporters inside the Russian Federation, which has negatively
impacted the organization's ability to provide timely,
reliable, and accurate news from inside the country; and
(5) despite pressure from the Government of the Russian
Federation, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's audience
continues to grow inside the Russian Federation and
surrounding countries.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated $250,000,000 for Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty for fiscal year 2026.
(c) Authorization of New Bureaus.--Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty may explore opening new bureaus to help expand its
ability to reach audiences on the periphery of the Russian
Federation.
(d) Initiatives To Bolster Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Bureaus Around Russian Federation's Periphery.--To help
expand its reach to Russian-speaking audiences and increase
its reach to audiences through digital media, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty should--
(1) evaluate where Russian disinformation is most deeply
pervasive in the Eurasia region;
(2) develop strategies to better communicate with
predominately Russian-speaking regions;
(3) build on efforts to increase capacity and programming
to counter disinformation in real time;
(4) expand Russian language investigative journalism;
(5) improve the technical capacity of the Ukraine bureau;
and
(6) continue efforts to increase digital news services.
(e) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report that
includes--
(1) recommendations of locations to open new bureaus to
help reach new audiences in the broader Eurasia region;
(2) an assessment of current staffing and anticipated
staffing needs in order to effectively reach audiences in the
broader Eurasia region; and
(3) an assessment of the impact of the Government of the
Russian Federation closing down Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty within the Russian Federation.
(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
SEC. 109. AUTHORIZING PROGRAMS TO COUNTER AND COMBAT RUSSIAN
DISINFORMATION ACTIVITIES.
(a) Countering Russian Influence Fund.--The Secretary of
State should use funds available for obligation in the
Countering Russian Influence Fund--
(1) to prioritize assisting Ukraine to detect and combat
disinformation from the Russian Federation and its proxies;
and
(2) to assist the Government of Ukraine in developing new
defense strategies and technologies.
(b) Strategy Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a plan for countering and combating disinformation by
the Russian Federation and supporting free and independent
media in Ukraine that includes--
(A) a plan to assist the Government of Ukraine in combating
and responding to malign influence operations of the Russian
Federation aimed at inflaming tensions and dividing Ukrainian
society;
(B) an assessment of effective efforts and programs to
improve media literacy in Ukraine and recommendations for how
the United States can assist in supporting and expanding
those programs;
(C) a plan to assist the Government of Ukraine improve
efforts to detect and remove content originating from Russian
troll farms, bots, and other sources aimed at sowing division
and disseminating disinformation in Ukraine or targeting
Ukrainian audiences;
(D) recommendations to increase support for independent
media outlets, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; and
(E) recommendations to increase support for independent
media outlets catering to Russian-speaking populations
residing in Russian-occupied Crimea, the Donbas region of
Ukraine, and throughout Ukraine.
(2) Form.--The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex if necessary.
SEC. 110. ESTABLISHMENT OF UKRAINE RECONSTRUCTION TRUST FUND.
(a) In General.--Subchapter A of chapter 98 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``SEC. 9512. UKRAINE RECONSTRUCTION TRUST FUND.
``(a) Creation of Trust Fund.--There is established in the
Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the
`Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund', consisting of such
amounts as may be appropriated to such fund as provided in
this section.
``(b) Transfers to Trust Fund.--There are hereby
appropriated to the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund amounts
equivalent to the net revenues received in the Treasury from
the taxes imposed under section 892A.
``(c) Expenditures From Trust Fund.--Amounts in the Ukraine
Reconstruction Trust Fund shall be available, as provided in
appropriations Acts, only to the Secretary of State for
purposes of--
``(1) reconstruction and rebuilding efforts in Ukraine,
``(2) humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine,
``(3) fostering long-term economic growth and private
sector development in Ukraine, and
``(4) bolstering transparent and accountable governance of
the Ukrainian economy.
``(d) Trust Fund Not Interest-Bearing.--Section 9602(b)
shall not apply to the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund.
``(e) Requirements Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.--
Any assistance made available from amounts in the Ukraine
Reconstruction Trust Fund shall be subject to all applicable
requirements for the provision of such assistance for the
same or similar purpose authorized by the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), including requirements
under such Act relating to administrative authorities,
congressional notifications, and reporting.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for
subchapter A of chapter 98 of such Code is amended by adding
at the end the following new item:
``Sec. 9512. Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund.''.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3
years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report detailing the use of any
funds made available from the Ukrainian Reconstruction Trust
Fund.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways
and Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
SEC. 111. UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation initiated
a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which has severely
threatened energy security in the United States, Europe, and
around the world.
(2) The security of Ukraine's energy grid has been vital to
Ukraine's success in its defense of its territory and
ensuring the Ukrainian government can effectively provide
goods and services to Ukrainian citizens.
[[Page H3882]]
(3) Ukraine has operated four nuclear power plants with 15
reactors, primarily Russian-designed water-water energetic
reactor (VVER) reactors.
(4) Russia, in its war of aggression against Ukraine, has
systematically targeted Ukraine's energy infrastructure
through heavy shelling and targeted attacks, particularly in
the winter months when innocent Ukrainian civilians are most
vulnerable.
(5) Since March 2022, Russian forces have illegally
occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station, the largest
nuclear power plant in Europe, and Russian forces have
surrounded the station with landmines, further threatening
regional security.
(6) Russian-designed VVER reactors have been built across
Europe, including in Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine.
(7) Russia uses its nuclear power plant designs and fuel
services to spread malign influence and threaten United
States and European energy security.
(8) As of 2021, Russia owned about 20 percent of the total
uranium conversion infrastructure worldwide and in 2020, had
the largest uranium enrichment capacity at close to 46
percent.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) in countries seeking or developing a nuclear power
industry, the Department of State should prioritize the
utilization of products and services from the United States,
and then prioritize products and services from Europe and
other allied or partner countries, including Canada, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea when not
directly competing with the United States;
(2) the United States and its allies must focus on
cooperation, including capacity building and early-stage
project support, to expand the nuclear industry in Europe in
a way that maintains nonproliferation, security, and safety
standards and aligns with international obligations and
treaties while combating Russian and Chinese malign
influence; and
(3) the United States should continue to pursue the
Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small
Modular Reactor Technology program as a means of helping
partner countries meet their clean energy needs with
scalable, flexible, secure, and safe nuclear power programs.
(c) Strategy Required.--The Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the heads of
other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall
develop a strategy to strengthen United States-European
nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian malign
influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.
(d) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (c)
shall include, at a minimum, the following elements:
(1) An overview and assessment of the Secretary of State's
efforts to broaden participation by United States nuclear
industry entities in Europe and promote the accessibility and
competitiveness of United States, European, and partner
technologies and services against Russian and Chinese
technologies in Europe.
(2) An overview of different nuclear reactor types that are
currently deployed or under regulatory review in Europe,
including large light-water reactors, small modular light-
water reactors, and non-light-water reactors, and--
(A) what role, if any, each reactor type could have in
reducing Russia's influence over European energy supply by
2030, 2035, 2040, 2045, and 2050;
(B) challenges that each reactor type may face with rapid
deployment, including costs, market barriers to first-of-a-
kind designs, supply chain constraints, and regulatory
requirements;
(C) the impacts of each reactor type on maintaining strong
nonproliferation standards, including the minimization of
weapons-usable nuclear material; and
(D) opportunities for the use of United States, European,
and partner technologies and services in the deployment or
potential deployment of each reactor type.
(3) An overview of different fuel cycles that are currently
deployed or under consideration in Europe, including use of
low enriched uranium, including high assay low enriched
uranium, and spent fuel reprocessing, along with an analysis
of the implications of each fuel cycle on--
(A) reducing and eliminating Russia's market share in
Europe for uranium, conversion, enrichment, and reactor fuel
between now and 2030;
(B) achieving long-term energy security free of Russian
influence; and
(C) maintaining strong nonproliferation standards,
including the minimization of weapons-usable material as well
as high nuclear safety and security standards.
(4) An overview of nuclear reactor designs and fuel cycle
infrastructure that the United States Government is currently
funding the development of, and--
(A) the potential, if any, that each of these technologies
have to decrease or eliminate Russia's market share in the
United States and Europe for nuclear power reactors, uranium
mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication,
deconversion, and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing in the
short-, medium-, and long-term;
(B) the impact of these technologies on the minimization of
weapons-usable nuclear material, including the use of highly
enriched uranium or plutonium fuels; and
(C) an assessment of the use cases for each of these
designs and fuel cycles.
(5) An overview of the United States Government's
diplomatic engagements regarding the nuclear energy sector in
Europe.
(6) A list of countries in Europe with active nuclear power
programs, and--
(A) an analysis of each country's nuclear energy policy;
(B) an overview of existing areas of cooperation with
regards to nuclear energy between each country and--
(i) the United States;
(ii) other European and friendly countries; and
(iii) adversarial countries including China and Russia;
(C) an overview of potential areas for future cooperation
between each country and the United States with regards to
nuclear energy; and
(D) a summary of fuel types used in each country's nuclear
power programs.
(7) An overview of Russian and Chinese influence in the
European nuclear energy sector.
(8) An overview of how the United States Government is
working with allies and partners to counter Russian malign
influence within the European energy sector to include steps
taken to counter Russian influence in the mining and milling,
conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication processes as
well as in reactor construction.
(9) An overview of how the United States Government
balances the urgent strategic need for collaboration with
allies and partners on countering Russia's influence on
nuclear energy in Europe, with commercial competitiveness
issues that may arise between United States companies and
companies in Europe, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of
Korea.
(10) An assessment of Rosatom's role in Russia's energy
sector, to include an overview of strengths and
vulnerabilities of the conglomerate.
(e) Submission.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees the
strategy required by subsection (c).
(f) Form.--The strategy required by subsection (c) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex, so long as such annex is provided separately from the
unclassified strategy.
(g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated $30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025
through 2029 to support critically needed engagement in
Europe consistent with the strategy required by subsection
(c) on countering Russian malign influence and with a
particular focus on responsible nuclear power program
capacity building, early stage nuclear power project support,
and countering Russian disinformation campaigns.
(h) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
the Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the
Senate.
(2) High assay low enriched uranium.--The term ``high assay
low enriched uranium'' means uranium enriched so that the
concentration of the fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235) is
between 5 percent and 20 percent of the mass of uranium.
(3) Low enriched uranium.--The term ``low enriched
uranium'' means fuel in which the weight percent of U-235 in
the uranium is less than 20 percent.
TITLE II--SECURITY ASSISTANCE
SEC. 201. LEND-LEASE AUTHORITY.
Section 2 of the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act
of 2022 (Public Law 117-118; 136 Stat. 1184) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``fiscal years 2022
and 2023'' and inserting ``fiscal years 2022 through 2028'';
(2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection:
``(c) Report.--Not later than 90 days after any use of the
authority provided by subsection (a), the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit
to Congress a report that includes--
``(1) a description of the defense articles loaned or
leased to the Government of Ukraine, or to the government of
an Eastern European country impacted by the Russian
Federation's invasion of Ukraine, under such authority; and
``(2) a strategy and timeline for recovery and return of
such defense articles.''.
SEC. 202. DIRECT LOANS AND FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.
(a) Direct Loans.--
(1) In general.--Through fiscal year 2026, direct loans
under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act may be made
available for Ukraine and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
allies, notwithstanding section 23(c)(1) of the Arms Export
Control Act, gross obligations for the principal amounts of
which shall not exceed $8,000,000,000.
[[Page H3883]]
(2) Other unobligated balances.--The unobligated balances
of amounts made available by any Act making appropriations
for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related
programs, under the heading ``International Security
Assistance--Funds Appropriated to the President--Foreign
Military Financing'' shall also be made available for the
cost of loans and loan guarantees as authorized by this
section.
(b) Terms and Conditions.--The terms and conditions
described in section 2606 of the Ukraine Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 2022 (division N of Public Law 117-103)
shall apply to amounts made available by this section in the
same manner and to the same extent as amounts made available
by such section except that subsection (b) of such section
shall be applied by striking ``$4,000,000,000'' and inserting
``$8,000,000,000''.
(c) Emergency Designation.--Amounts repurposed pursuant to
this section that were previously designated by the Congress
as an emergency requirement pursuant to a concurrent
resolution on the budget or the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, are designated by the Congress
as being for an emergency requirement pursuant to section
251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985: Provided, That such amounts shall be
available only if the President designates such amounts as an
emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(i).
SEC. 203. SUPPORT FOR BALTIC COUNTRIES.
(a) Assistance Authorized.--The Secretary of State shall
carry out programs, projects, and activities to build the
capacity of the national militaries and border guard forces
of Baltic countries, pursuant to the 2024 Bilateral Defense
Cooperation Roadmaps for 2024-2028, which provide for the
promotion of ``defense cooperation in integrated air and
missile defense, maritime domain awareness, cyber, irregular
warfare, participation in international military operations
and exercises, infrastructure development, and training''.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary of State, for each of the
fiscal years 2026, 2027, and 2028, in addition to amounts
already authorized to be appropriated for such purposes to
carry out the assistance described in subsection (a)--
(1) $30,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing grants
authorized under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2763) for each Baltic country; and
(2) $4,000,000 for Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related programs, including as authorized under
the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) for each
Baltic country.
(c) Briefing.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
regarding--
(1) the most pressing security needs of Baltic countries;
(2) a plan for the disbursement of funds so obligated; and
(3) an analysis of European and other allied country
support for Baltic countries.
SEC. 204. EXTENSION OF UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE
INITIATIVE.
Section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1068) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (f), by adding at the end the following:
``(11) For fiscal year 2026, $300,000,000.
``(12) For fiscal year 2027, $300,000,000.''; and
(2) in subsection (h), by striking ``December 31, 2026''
and inserting ``December 31, 2027''.
SEC. 205. REPORT ON ALLIED AND PARTNER MILITARY
CONTRIBUTIONS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives a report including--
(1) a detailed description of all military contributions
made or planned by allied and partner countries,
disaggregated by country, including details of types and
quantities of platforms and systems provided;
(2) a description and analysis of military capabilities
identified as current Ukrainian operational needs; and
(3) a description of United States efforts to meet
identified Ukrainian operational needs through transfers of
United States arms and military equipment or through support
and facilitation of allied and partner transfer of arms and
military equipment.
(b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a
classified annex that is submitted separately from the
unclassified portion.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
SEC. 206. REPORT ON UNITED STATES-UKRAINE INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT AND COOPERATION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the
Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees, a report
including--
(1) a detailed description of current United States
intelligence support and cooperation to and with Ukrainian
military and intelligence services;
(2) a description and analysis of the consequences of
ceasing such intelligence support and cooperation to Ukraine,
including as related to targeting, battlefield effectiveness,
early warning capabilities, counterintelligence, and
cybersecurity; and
(3) a description of United States efforts and initiatives
currently underway or planned to increase Ukrainian
intelligence, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity
capabilities.
(b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in classified form.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
TITLE III--SANCTIONS AND EXPORT CONTROLS
SEC. 301. SANCTIONS TRIGGER DETERMINATION.
Not later than 15 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, and at minimum every 90 days thereafter, the President
shall make a determination as to whether the Russian
Federation or any proxy thereof, is engaged in--
(1) conducting a war of aggression against Ukraine; or
(2) refusing to sincerely and actually negotiate a peace
agreement with Ukraine; or
(3) acting in violation of a negotiated peace agreement
with Ukraine.
SEC. 302. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
(a) Imposition of Sanctions.--
(1) In general.--Upon making an affirmative determination
under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a
determination, the President shall impose the sanctions
described in section 317 with respect to 3 or more of the
following financial institutions:
(A) Sberbank.
(B) VTB.
(C) Gazprombank.
(D) VEB.RF.
(E) The Russian Direct Investment Fund.
(F) Credit Bank of Moscow.
(G) Alfa Bank.
(H) Rosselkhozbank.
(I) FC Bank Otkritie.
(J) Promsvyazbank.
(K) Sovcombank.
(L) Transkapitalbank.
(M) The Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
(2) Subsidiaries and successor entities.--The President may
impose the sanctions described in section 310(a)(1) with
respect to any subsidiary of, or successor entity to, a
financial institution specified in paragraph (1).
(b) Additional Russian Financial Institutions.--
(1) List required.--Not later than 30 days after making an
affirmative determination under section 301, and every 90
days thereafter, the President shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a list of foreign persons
that the President determines--
(A) are significant financial institutions owned or
operated by the Government of the Russian Federation; and
(B) should be sanctioned in the interest of United States
national security.
(2) Imposition of sanctions.--Upon the submission of each
list required by paragraph (1), the President shall impose
the sanctions described in section 310(a)(1) with respect to
each foreign person identified on the list.
SEC. 303. IMPOSITIONS OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN
OIL AND MINING INDUSTRY.
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301
and not later than 15 days following such a determination,
the President shall impose the sanctions described in section
317 with respect to all Russian companies operating primarily
in any of the following sectors:
(1) Oil and gas extraction, refinement, or production.
(2) Coal extraction mining, refinement, or production.
(3) Mineral extraction and processing.
SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PERSONS
AFFILIATED WITH OR SUPPORTING THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) In General.--Upon making an affirmative determination
under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a
determination, the President shall impose the sanctions
described in section 317 with respect to all individuals
listed under subsection (b) or included in the additional
lists under subsection (c).
(b) Officials Specified.--The officials specified in this
subsection are the following:
(1) The President of the Russian Federation.
(2) The Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.
[[Page H3884]]
(3) The Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.
(4) The Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.
(5) The Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation.
(6) The Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation.
(7) The Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation.
(8) The Minister of Energy and Trade of the Russian
Federation.
(9) The Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian
Federation.
(10) The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.
(11) The Deputy Minister of Transport of the Russian
Federation.
(12) The Deputy Energy Minister of the Russian Federation.
(13) The Deputy Finance Minister of the Russian Federation.
(14) The Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of the
Russian Federation.
(15) The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Russian Federation.
(16) The Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of the
Russian Federation.
(17) The Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces of the
Russian Federation.
(18) The Commander of the Airborne Forces of the Russian
Federation.
(19) The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the Russian
Federation.
(20) The Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces of the
Russian Federation.
(21) The Commander of the Special Operations Forces of the
Russian Federation.
(22) The Commander of Logistical Support of the Armed
Forces of the Russian Federation.
(c) Additional Officials.--
(1) List required.--Not later than 30 days after making an
affirmative determination under section 301 and every 90 days
thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a list of foreign persons that the
President determines--
(A) are--
(i) senior officials of any branch of the Armed Forces of
the Russian Federation leading any of the operations
described in section 302; or
(ii) senior officials of the Government of the Russian
Federation, including any intelligence agencies or security
services of the Russian Federation, with significant roles in
planning or implementing such operations; and
(B) with respect to which sanctions should be imposed in
the interest of the national security of the United States.
(2) Imposition of sanctions.--Upon the submission of each
list required by paragraph (1), the President shall impose
the sanctions described in section 310 with respect to each
foreign person on the list.
SEC. 305. CRIMEA TUNNEL SANCTIONS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In February and March 2014, the Russian Federation
invaded the Crimean peninsula and annexed Crimea,
internationally recognized as Ukrainian territory.
(2) Following its annexation of Crimea, the Russian
Federation constructed the Kerch Strait Bridge to connect the
Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula.
(3) On February 24, 2022, the Government of the Russian
Federation, led by Vladimir Putin, launched an unprovoked,
full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
(4) The Russian Federation has used Crimea as an integral
part of its full scale invasion of Ukraine, including to
house Russian troops, store ammunition and weapons, and host
the Black Sea Fleet.
(5) In October 2023, it was publicly reported that Russian
and Chinese business officials met and exchanged emails to
discuss building a tunnel from the Russian mainland to
illegally occupied Crimea.
(b) Imposition of Sanctions.--Upon making an affirmative
determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days
following such a determination, the President shall impose
the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all
foreign persons that knowingly participate in the
construction, maintenance, or repair of a tunnel or bridge
that connects the Russian mainland with the Crimean
peninsula.
SEC. 306. ZAPORIZHZHIA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SANCTIONS.
(a) In General.--Upon making an affirmative determination
under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a
determination, the President shall impose the sanctions
described in section 317 with respect to all foreign persons
that have endangered the integrity, safety, or undermined
Ukrainian operational control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear
Power Station located in southeastern Ukraine since the
Russian Federation launched an unprovoked, full-scale
invasion of Ukraine.
(b) Exception Related to Ukrainian Operational Control.--
Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any foreign
person seeking to reestablish Ukrainian operational control
of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station or the surrounding
region.
SEC. 307. ROSATOM SANCTIONS.
(a) In General.--Upon making an affirmative determination
under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a
determination, the President shall impose the sanctions
described in section 317 with respect to--
(1) Rosatom;
(2) Rosatom subsidiaries; and
(3) a foreign person that knowingly directly or indirectly
engages in any significant transaction for nuclear reactor
construction and related services with Rosatom.
(b) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of
sanctions for a transaction or transactions with a United
States person, a foreign person, or a foreign financial
institution (as the case may be) described under this section
if--
(1) the President determines that the transaction relates
to activities necessary to the production of medical isotopes
or industrial isotopes; and
(2) the President certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that--
(A) domestic medical isotope or industrial isotope
production is insufficient to meet United States patient and
industry requirements; and
(B) the United States is taking measurable steps to
establish medical isotope or industrial isotope supply chains
that are not reliant on Rosatom or other Russian source
material.
SEC. 308. IMPOSITION OF PRICE CAP VESSEL SANCTIONS.
(a) In General.--Upon making an affirmative determination
under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a
determination, the President shall impose the sanctions
described in section 317 with respect to any foreign vessel
that knowingly transports Russian oil in contravention of the
Russian oil price cap policy.
(b) Exception for Safety of Vessels and Crew.--Sanctions
under this section shall not apply with respect to a person
providing provisions to a vessel otherwise subject to
sanctions under this section if such provisions are intended
for the safety and care of the crew aboard the vessel, the
protection of human life aboard the vessel, or the
maintenance of the vessel to avoid any environmental or other
significant damage.
(c) Strategy.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of the Treasury shall jointly submit to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a
strategy to enhance international compliance with the Russian
oil price cap policy.
(d) Matters.--The strategy under subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) an overview of general international compliance with
the Russian oil price cap policy;
(2) a list of the countries known to have purchased
significant quantities of Russian oil at prices above the
price agreed to in the Russian oil price cap policy set forth
by the Group of Seven (``G7'') nations;
(3) any known methods used by such countries to avoid
detection of their purchases of Russian oil at prices above
the price agreed to in the Russian oil price cap policy;
(4) an assessment of possible incentives the United States
could provide to countries listed pursuant to paragraph (2)
to encourage compliance with the Russian oil price cap
policy;
(5) an assessment of whether the imposition of additional
sanctions, including possible secondary sanctions, would
enhance international compliance with the Russian oil price
cap policy;
(6) a description of the views of the government of each
country participating in the Russian oil price cap policy
regarding whether the price cap under such policy should be
lowered or not; and
(7) a description of the United States diplomatic
engagement with the government of each country participating
in the Russian oil price cap policy regarding the
appropriateness of the current cap, including any diplomatic
engagement intended to encourage support for the lowering of
the price cap.
SEC. 309. SWIFT SANCTIONS.
(a) In General.--Upon making an affirmative determination
under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a
determination, the President shall impose the sanctions
described in section 317 with respect to any global
communication financial service that does not cease the
provision of financial communication messaging services to
any financial institution listed under section 302 of this
Act.
(b) Enabling or Facilitation of Access to Specialized
Financial Messaging Services Through Intermediary Financial
Institutions.--For purposes of this section, enabling or
facilitating direct or indirect access to specialized
financial messaging services includes doing so by serving as
an intermediary financial institution with access to such
messaging services.
SEC. 310. RUSSIAN SOVEREIGN DEBT SANCTIONS.
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 302
and not later than 30 days following such a determination,
the President shall prohibit all transactions by United
States persons involving the sovereign debt of the Government
of the Russian Federation issued on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act, including governmental bonds.
SEC. 311. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA-NORTH KOREA
COOPERATION.
(a) In General.--Upon making an affirmative determination
under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a
determination, the President shall impose the sanctions
described in section 317 with respect to the following:
(1) Any foreign person that is responsible for or
facilitates the transfer or sale of arms
[[Page H3885]]
or material support from North Korea to be used in Russia's
illegal war in Ukraine.
(2) Any foreign person that knowingly, directly or
indirectly, imports, exports, or reexports to, into, or from
North Korea any goods services or technology for weapons that
may be used by Russian forces or their proxies in Russia's
illegal war in Ukraine.
(3) Any foreign financial institution that knowingly
facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant
financial services for a foreign person described in
paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) Any foreign person that engages in a significant
transaction related to the transfer or sale of arms or
material support with a foreign person described in paragraph
(1) or (2) or foreign financial institution described in
paragraph (3).
(5) Any foreign person assisting in the logistical supply
and movement of North Korean personnel, arms or material
support to be used in Russia's illegal war in Ukraine.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that describes significant activities by
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to support the
Russian Federation and its proxies in Russia's illegal war in
Ukraine.
(c) Matters To Be Included.--The report required by this
section shall include the following:
(1) The number of North Korean troops that have been sent
to fight Ukraine, casualties inflicted on these troops, and
the impact on the battlefield of having North Korean military
personnel on the frontlines.
(2) The identity and nationality of foreign persons and
foreign financial institutions that are subject to sanctions
under section 317.
(3) A description of the conduct engaged in by such persons
and institutions.
(4) An assessment of the extent to which a foreign
government has provided material support to the Government of
North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of that
government to conduct significant activities to materially
support Russia's illegal war in Ukraine.
(5) A United States strategy to counter North Korea's
efforts to conduct significant activities to support Russia's
war in Ukraine, that includes efforts to engage foreign
governments to halt the capability of the Government of North
Korea and persons acting for or on behalf of that government
to conduct significant activities supporting Russia's illegal
war in Ukraine.
(d) Form.--The report required by this section shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 312. SANCTIONS FOR KIDNAPPING UKRAINIAN CHILDREN.
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301
and not later than 15 days following such a determination,
the President shall impose the sanctions described in section
317 with respect to all foreign persons that have directed or
in anyway participated in the kidnapping and wrongful
patriation of Ukrainian children.
SEC. 313. IMPOSITION OF DUAL-USE EXPORT CONTROLS.
(a) In General.--Upon making an affirmative determination
under section 301, a foreign-produced item shall be subject
to the Export Administration Regulations (pursuant to the
Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.))
if the item--
(1) meets--
(A) the product scope requirements described in subsection
(b); and
(B) the destination scope requirements described in
subsection (c); and
(2) is exported, reexported, or in-country transferred to
the Russia Federation from abroad or involves the Government
of the Russian Federation.
(b) Product Scope Requirements.--A foreign-produced item
meets the product scope requirements of this subsection if
the item--
(1) is a direct product of United States-origin technology
or software subject to the Export Administration Regulations
that is specified in a covered Export Control Classification
Number; or
(2) is produced by any plant or major component of a plant
that is located outside the United States, if the plant or
major component of a plant, whether made in the United States
or a foreign country, itself is a direct product of United
States-origin technology or software subject to the Export
Administration Regulations that is specified in a covered
Export Control Classification Number.
(c) Destination Scope Requirements.--A foreign-produced
item meets the destination scope requirements of this
subsection if there is knowledge that the foreign-produced
item is destined to the Russian Federation or will be
incorporated into or used in the production or development of
any part, component, or equipment subject to the Export
Administration Regulations and produced in or destined to the
Russian Federation.
(d) Licensing Policy.--In carrying out this section, the
Secretary of Commerce shall apply a presumption that an
export, reexport, release, or in-country transfer of items
meets the product scope requirements set forth in subsection
(b) and the destination scope requirements set forth in
subsection (c).
(e) Exceptions.--The license requirements set forth in this
section shall not apply to--
(1) food, medicine, or medical devices that are--
(A) designated as EAR99; or
(B) not designated under or listed on the Commerce Control
List; or
(2) services, software, or hardware (other than services,
software, or hardware for end-users owned or controlled by
the Government of Iran) that are--
(A) necessarily and ordinarily incident to communications;
or
(B) designated as--
(i) EAR99; or
(ii) Export Control Classification Number 5A992.c or
5D992.c, and classified in accordance with section 740.17 of
title 15, Code of Federal Regulations; and
(C) subject to a general license issued by the Department
of Commerce or Department of Treasury.
(f) Department of Commerce Strategy.--
(1) Strategy required.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce
(in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence) shall
develop a strategy to prevent the illegal export to Iran by
United States persons regarding technologies used or that may
be used in the design, development, production, or
operational employment of unmanned aircraft systems by Iran,
including the following microelectronics:
(A) Microcontrollers.
(B) Voltage regulators.
(C) Digital signal controllers.
(D) GPS modules.
(E) Microprocessors.
(2) Elements.--The strategy under paragraph (1) shall
include, at a minimum, the following elements:
(A) A process for the Secretary of Commerce (in
coordination with the Secretaries and heads specified in
paragraph (1)) to proactively identify--
(i) current and emerging technologies used or that may be
used by Iran in the design, development, production, or
operational employment of unmanned aircraft systems
(including critical components thereof);
(ii) United States manufacturers of such technologies; and
(iii) foreign manufacturers and proliferators of such
technologies.
(B) A process for the Secretary of Commerce (in
coordination with the Secretaries and heads specified in
paragraph (1)) to proactively identify third-party
distributors and resellers of the technologies specified in
subparagraph (A)(i) that, through the use of intermediaries
with no or nominal operations or assets, or through other
mechanisms, contrive to circumvent export controls for such
items with respect to Iran.
(C) A methodology for the Secretary of Commerce to
proactively engage the United States manufacturers identified
pursuant to the process under subparagraph (A)(ii), to
provide such manufacturers with timely updates to the list of
third-party distributors and resellers identified pursuant to
the process under subparagraph (B).
(3) Submission.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees the
strategy under paragraph (1).
(4) Form.--The report required by subsection (a)(1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but portions of the report
described in paragraphs (1) and (2) may contain a classified
annex, so long as such annex is provided separately from the
unclassified report.
(g) Department of State Strategy.--
(1) Strategy required.--The Secretary of State (in
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence) shall
develop a strategy to prevent the export to Iran of
technologies from the United States and allied and partner
countries which are used, or may be used, by Iran in the
design, development, production, or operational employment of
unmanned aircraft systems (including the microelectronics
listed in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of subsection
(a)(1)).
(2) Elements.--The strategy under paragraph (1) shall
include, at a minimum, the following elements:
(A) A process for the Secretary of State (in consultation
with the relevant Secretaries and heads specified in
paragraph (1)) to proactively identify foreign manufacturers
of the technologies referred to in such paragraph.
(B) A process for the Secretary of State to engage with any
ally or partner of the United States regarding technologies
which have been incorporated into an unmanned aircraft system
produced by Iran, for the purpose of synchronizing the export
control regime of such ally or partner with the United States
export controls developed by the Secretary of Commerce
pursuant to the strategy under subsection (a) with respect to
such technology.
(3) Submission.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees the
strategy under paragraph (1).
(4) Form.--The report required by subsection (b)(1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but portions of the report
described in paragraphs (1) and (2) may contain a classified
annex, so long as such annex is provided separately from the
unclassified report.
(h) Requirement for Secretary of Defense To Develop Range
of Options.--
[[Page H3886]]
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense (in
coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of
National Intelligence) shall develop a range of options that
may be employed by the Armed Forces of the United States to
counter or otherwise deny Iran the ability to acquire
technologies used, or that may be used, in the design,
development, production, or operational employment of
unmanned aircraft systems by Iran, including the following
technologies:
(A) Microcontrollers.
(B) Voltage regulators.
(C) Digital signal controllers.
(D) GPS modules.
(E) Microprocessors.
(F) Computer Aided Design (CAD) software.
(G) Computer numerical control machines.
(2) Briefing.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall provide
to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the
options developed under paragraph (1).
SEC. 314. DUTIES ON THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 15 days after making an
affirmative determination under section 301, the President
shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law, increase
the rate of duty for all goods and services imported into the
United States from the Russian Federation to a rate of not
less 500 percent ad valorem.
(b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after making an
affirmative determination under section 301, the President
shall submit to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House
of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the
Senate, a report indicating the impact of these ad valorem
tariffs on exports to the United States.
SEC. 315. ENDING RUSSIAN OIL IMPORT LOOPHOLE.
(a) In General.--The Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act
(Public Law 117-109; 136 Stat. 1154) is amended--
(1) by redesignating section 3 as section 4; and
(2) by inserting after section 2 the following:
``SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF ENERGY PRODUCTS
PRODUCED AT REFINERIES OUTSIDE THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.
``All products classified under chapter 27 of the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule that were produced at any refinery
that uses crude oil originating in the Russian Federation
shall be banned from importation into the United States.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 4 of the Ending
Importation of Russian Oil Act (Public Law 117-109; 136 Stat.
1154), as redesignated by subsection (a)(1), is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``or 3'' after
``section 2''; and
(2) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``or 3'' after
``section 2''.
SEC. 316. TAXING CAPITAL GAINS ON RUSSIAN SOVEREIGN ASSETS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 15 days after making an
affirmative determination under section 301, notwithstanding
any other provision of law, there is hereby imposed for each
taxable year on the disqualified income of any specified
foreign government a tax equal to 100 percent thereof.
(b) Withholding.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding section 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (or any other
provision of law), any person having control, receipt,
custody, disposal, or payment of disqualified income with
respect to which tax is imposed under subsection (a) shall
deduct and withhold from such income a tax equal to 100
percent thereof.
(2) Application of certain rules.--For purposes of
subchapter B of chapter 3, section 33, and such other
provisions as the Secretary may provide, paragraph (1) shall
be treated as part of subchapter A of chapter 3.
(c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) Disqualified income.--The term ``disqualified income''
means any interest or dividends payable with respect to
assets which are blocked using the authorities provided by
section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act.
(2) Specified foreign government.--The term ``specified
foreign government'' means the foreign governments (within
the meaning of section 892 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 and the regulations issued thereunder) of Russia and
Belarus.
(d) Override of Treaty Obligations.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, this section (and the amendments made
by this section) shall apply without regard to any treaty
obligation of the United States.
(e) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to interest and dividends received after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 317. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.
The sanctions described in this section are the following:
(1) Property blocking.--The President shall exercise all of
the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary
to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
interests in property of the foreign person if such property
and interests in property are in the United States, come
within the United States, or are or come within the
possession or control of a United States person.
(2) Aliens inadmissible for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.--In the case of an alien,
the alien is--
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to
enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into
the United States or to receive any other benefit under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--The visa or other entry documentation of
an alien described in subparagraph (A) shall be revoked,
regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is
or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under clause (i)
shall--
(I) take effect immediately; and
(II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry
documentation that is in the alien's possession.
(3) Loans from international financial institutions.--The
President shall direct the United States Executive Director
of each international financial institution to use the voice,
vote, and influence of the United States to oppose any loan,
loan guarantee, or equity investment from the international
financial institution that would directly or indirectly
benefit the sanctioned foreign person.
SEC. 318. IMPLEMENTATION; REGULATIONS; PENALTIES.
(a) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and
205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this title.
(b) Regulations.--The President shall issue such
regulations, licenses, and orders as are necessary to carry
out this title.
(c) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
Act or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out
this title shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(b) and
1705(c)).
SEC. 319. EXCEPTIONS; WAIVER.
(a) Exceptions.--
(1) Exception to comply with international obligations.--
Sanctions described in section 317(2) shall not apply with
respect to the admission of an alien if admitting or paroling
the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the
United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success
June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947,
between the United Nations and the United States, or other
applicable international obligations.
(2) Exception relating to the provision of humanitarian
assistance.--Sanctions under this title may not be imposed
with respect to transactions or the facilitation of
transactions for--
(A) the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine,
or medical devices; or
(B) the provision of humanitarian assistance; or
(C) financial transactions relating to humanitarian
assistance;
(3) Exception for intelligence, law enforcement, and
national security activities.--Sanctions under this title
shall not apply to any authorized intelligence, law
enforcement, or national security activities of the United
States.
(b) National Security Waiver.--The President may waive the
imposition of sanctions under this title with respect to a
person if the President--
(1) determines that such a waiver is in the extraordinarily
vital to the national security of the United States; and
(2) submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a
notification of the waiver and the reasons for the waiver no
less than 15 days before the use of the waiver.
SEC. 320. TERMINATION.
(a) In General.--The President may terminate the
application of sanctions, export controls, duties,
prohibitions, or penalties under this title if the President
certifies to Congress that the Russian Federation has ceased
conducting a war of aggression against Ukraine or act in
violation of a negotiated peace agreement with Ukraine.
(b) Reimposition.--The President shall immediately reimpose
all previous terminated sanctions, export controls, duties,
prohibitions, and penalties imposed under this title should
the Russian Federation restart a war of aggression against
Ukraine or act in violation of a negotiated peace agreement
with Ukraine.
SEC. 321. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF RUSSIA SANCTIONS.
(a) Submission to Congress of Proposed Action.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership a report that describes the
proposed action and the reasons for that action.
(2) Actions described.--
(A) In general.--An action described in this paragraph is--
(i) an action to terminate the application of any sanction,
export control, duty, or prohibition described in
subparagraph (B);
[[Page H3887]]
(ii) with respect to sanctions, export controls, duties, or
prohibitions described in subparagraph (B) imposed by the
President with respect to a person, an action to waive the
application of those sanctions with respect to that person;
or
(iii) a licensing action that significantly alters United
States foreign policy with respect to Russia.
(B) Sanctions, export controls, duties, and prohibitions
described.--The sanctions, export controls, duties, and
prohibitions described in this subparagraph are sanctions,
export controls, duties, and prohibitions with respect to
Russia provided for under--
(i) this Act;
(ii) Executive Order 13849 (22 U.S.C. 9521 note; relating
to authorizing the implementation of certain sanctions set
forth in the Countering America's Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et seq.));
(iii) Executive Order 13883 (22 U.S.C. 5605 note; relating
to administration of proliferation sanctions and amendment of
Executive Order 12851 (22 U.S.C. 2797 note; relating to the
administration of proliferation sanctions, Middle East arms
control, and related congressional reporting
responsibilities));
(iv) Executive Order 14024 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating
to blocking property with respect to specified harmful
foreign activities of the Government of the Russian
Federation);
(v) Executive Order 14039 (22 U.S.C. 9526 note; relating to
blocking property with respect to certain Russian energy
export pipelines);
(vi) Executive Order 14065 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating
to blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting
certain transactions with respect to continued Russian
efforts to undermine the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Ukraine);
(vii) Executive Order 14066 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating
to prohibiting certain imports and new investments with
respect to continued Russian Federation efforts to undermine
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine);
(viii) Executive Order 14068 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating
to prohibiting certain imports, exports, and new investment
with respect to continued Russian Federation aggression);
(ix) Executive Order 14071 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating
to prohibiting new investment in and certain services to the
Russian Federation in response to continued Russian
Federation aggression); and
(x) Executive Order 14114 (88 Fed. Reg. 89271; relating to
taking additional steps with respect to the Russian
Federation's harmful activities).
(3) Description of type of action.--Each report submitted
under paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in
paragraph (2) shall include a description of whether the
action--
(A) is not intended to significantly alter United States
foreign policy with respect to Russia; or
(B) is intended to significantly alter United States
foreign policy with respect to Russia.
(4) Inclusion of additional matter.--
(A) In general.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
that relates to an action that is intended to significantly
alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia
shall include a description of--
(i) the significant alteration to United States foreign
policy with respect to Russia;
(ii) the anticipated effect of the action on the national
security interests of the United States; and
(iii) the policy objectives for which the sanctions
affected by the action were initially imposed.
(B) Requests from banking and financial services
committees.--The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate or the Committee on Financial Services
of the House of Representatives may request the submission to
the Committee of the matter described in clauses (ii) and
(iii) of subparagraph (A) with respect to a report submitted
under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is not
intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy
with respect to Russia.
(5) Confidentiality of proprietary information.--
Proprietary information that can be associated with a
particular person with respect to an action described in
paragraph (2) may be included in a report submitted under
paragraph (1) only if the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership provide assurances of
confidentiality, unless that person otherwise consents in
writing to such disclosure.
(6) Rule of construction.--Paragraph (2)(A)(iii) shall not
be construed to require the submission of a report under
paragraph (1) with respect to the routine issuance of a
license that does not significantly alter United States
foreign policy with respect to Russia.
(b) Period for Review by Congress.--
(1) In general.--During the period of 30 calendar days
beginning on the date on which the President submits a report
under subsection (a)(1)--
(A) in the case of a report that relates to an action that
is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign
policy with respect to Russia, the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives should, as
appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain
information in order to fully review the report; and
(B) in the case of a report that relates to an action that
is intended to significantly alter United States foreign
policy with respect to Russia, the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold
hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in
order to fully review the report.
(2) Exception.--The period for congressional review under
paragraph (1) of a report required to be submitted under
subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 calendar days if the report is
submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 in
any calendar year.
(3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional
review period.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
during the period for congressional review provided for under
paragraph (1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1)
proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2), including
any additional period for such review as applicable under the
exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not
take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with
respect to that action is enacted in accordance with
subsection (c).
(4) Limitation on actions during presidential consideration
of a joint resolution of disapproval.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval
relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1)
proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes
both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c),
the President may not take that action for a period of 12
calendar days after the date of passage of the joint
resolution of disapproval.
(5) Limitation on actions during congressional
reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint
resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted
under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in
subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in
accordance with subsection (c), and the President vetoes the
joint resolution, the President may not take that action for
a period of 10 calendar days after the date of the
President's veto.
(6) Effect of enactment of a joint resolution of
disapproval.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if
a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report
submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action
described in subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with
subsection (c), the President may not take that action.
(c) Joint Resolutions of Disapproval or Approval.--
(1) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) Joint resolution of approval.--The term ``joint
resolution of approval'' means only a joint resolution of
either House of Congress--
(i) the title of which is as follows: ``A joint resolution
approving the President's proposal to take an action relating
to the application of certain sanctions with respect to
Russia.''; and
(ii) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is
the following: ``Congress approves of the action relating to
the application of sanctions imposed with respect to Russia
proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress
under this section of the Ukraine Support Act with the first
blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the
second blank space being filled with a short description of
the proposed action.''.
(B) Joint resolution of disapproval.--The term ``joint
resolution of disapproval'' means only a joint resolution of
either House of Congress--
(i) the title of which is as follows: ``A joint resolution
disapproving the President's proposal to take an action
relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect
to Russia.''; and
(ii) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is
the following: ``Congress disapproves of the action relating
to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to
Russia proposed by the President in the report submitted to
Congress under this section of the Ukraine Support Act with
the first blank space being filled with the appropriate date
and the second blank space being filled with a short
description of the proposed action.''.
(2) Introduction.--During the period of 30 calendar days
provided for under subsection (b)(1), including any
additional period as applicable under the exception provided
in subsection (b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint
resolution of disapproval may be introduced--
(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader
or the minority leader; and
(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority
leader's designee) or the minority leader (or the minority
leader's designee).
(3) Floor consideration in house of representatives.--If a
committee of the House of Representatives to which a joint
resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has
been referred has not reported the joint resolution within 10
calendar days after the date of referral, that committee
shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint
resolution.
(4) Consideration in the senate.--
(A) Committee referral.--A joint resolution of approval or
joint resolution of disapproval introduced in the Senate
shall be--
(i) referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate if the joint resolution relates
to a report under
[[Page H3888]]
subsection (a)(3)(A) that relates to an action that is not
intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy
with respect to Russia; and
(ii) referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate if the joint resolution relates to a report under
subsection (a)(3)(B) that relates to an action that is
intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy
with respect to Russia.
(B) Reporting and discharge.--If the committee to which a
joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of
disapproval was referred has not reported the joint
resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral
of the joint resolution, that committee shall be discharged
from further consideration of the joint resolution and the
joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
(C) Proceeding to consideration.--Notwithstanding Rule XXII
of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any
time after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate,
as the case may be, reports a joint resolution of approval or
joint resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has been
discharged from consideration of such a joint resolution
(even though a previous motion to the same effect has been
disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the
joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint
resolution (and against consideration of the joint
resolution) are waived. The motion to proceed is not
debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone.
A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed
to or disagreed to shall not be in order.
(D) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals from the
decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the
rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure
relating to a joint resolution of approval or joint
resolution of disapproval shall be decided without debate.
(E) Consideration of veto messages.--Debate in the Senate
of any veto message with respect to a joint resolution of
approval or joint resolution of disapproval, including all
debatable motions and appeals in connection with the joint
resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally
divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and
the minority leader or their designees.
(5) Rules relating to senate and house of
representatives.--
(A) Treatment of senate joint resolution in house.--In the
House of Representatives, the following procedures shall
apply to a joint resolution of approval or a joint resolution
of disapproval received from the Senate (unless the House has
already passed a joint resolution relating to the same
proposed action):
(i) The joint resolution shall be referred to the
appropriate committees.
(ii) If a committee to which a joint resolution has been
referred has not reported the joint resolution within 2
calendar days after the date of referral, that committee
shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint
resolution.
(iii) Beginning on the third legislative day after each
committee to which a joint resolution has been referred
reports the joint resolution to the House or has been
discharged from further consideration thereof, it shall be in
order to move to proceed to consider the joint resolution in
the House of Representatives. All points of order against the
motion are waived. Such a motion shall not be in order after
the House of Representatives has disposed of a motion to
proceed on the joint resolution. The previous question shall
be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption
without intervening motion. The motion shall not be
debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the
motion is disposed of shall not be in order.
(iv) The joint resolution shall be considered as read. All
points of order against the joint resolution and against its
consideration are waived. The previous question shall be
considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final
passage without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate
equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the joint
resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to
reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall
not be in order.
(B) Treatment of house joint resolution in senate.--
(i) Receipt before passage.--If, before the passage by the
Senate of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution
of disapproval, the Senate receives an identical joint
resolution from the House of Representatives, the following
procedures shall apply:
(I) That joint resolution shall not be referred to a
committee.
(II) With respect to that joint resolution--
(aa) the procedure in the Senate shall be the same as if no
joint resolution had been received from the House of
Representatives; but
(bb) the vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution
from the House of Representatives.
(ii) Receipt after passage.--If, following passage of a
joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of
disapproval in the Senate, the Senate receives an identical
joint resolution from the House of Representatives, that
joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate Senate
calendar.
(iii) No companion measure.--If a joint resolution of
approval or a joint resolution of disapproval is received
from the House, and no companion joint resolution has been
introduced in the Senate, the Senate procedures under this
subsection shall apply to the House joint resolution.
(C) Application to revenue measures.--The provisions of
this paragraph shall not apply in the House of
Representatives to a joint resolution of approval or joint
resolution of disapproval that is a revenue measure.
(d) Tolling.--The requirements of this section may not be
tolled by either the House of Representatives or the Senate.
SEC. 322. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms ``admission'',
``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings given those
terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C. 1101).
(2) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
(3) Financial institution.--The term ``financial
institution'' means a financial institution specified in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I),
(J), (M), or (Y) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United
States Code.
(4) Foreign financial institution.--The term ``foreign
financial institution'' has the meaning given that term in
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
(5) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an
individual or entity that is not a United States person.
(6) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' with respect to
conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person had
actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the
circumstance, or the result.
(7) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States
or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a
foreign branch of such an entity.
(8) War of aggression.--The term ``war of aggression'' is
implicated when any of the following have occurred in the 30
days prior to a sanctions trigger determination--
(A) a ground, amphibious, or airborne assault;
(B) any naval, aerial, or terrestrial blockade;
(C) any drone or missile attack; and
(D) any cyber attack that has any physical repercussion in
the sovereign territory of Ukraine.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill shall be debatable for 1 hour,
equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs or their respective designees.
The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mast) and the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Meeks) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mast).
General Leave
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and
include any extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, the question before this House is simple:
Will we help Ukraine negotiate from a position of strength, or will we
help Putin outlast American resolve?
The Ukrainian people, our NATO allies, and the United States national
security cannot afford to wait any longer for this body to act against
Russia's brutal war in Ukraine.
In the last 17 months, Russia has redoubled its efforts to break the
Ukrainian spirit while waging its illegal war, and this body has failed
to meet the moment.
Let me be clear: The administration could be doing more right now
without waiting for Congress. President Trump promised to end the war
on day one. Seventeen months later, this administration has stalled
delivery of assistance that Congress has passed.
{time} 1820
It has attacked Ukraine, the victim, while providing cover for Putin
who continues to stall, delay, and outlast U.S. support.
We all want this war to end. The question is how? Will we abandon
[[Page H3889]]
Ukraine and force it into a terrible deal? That is what Vladimir Putin
is counting on.
Or will this body live up to the commitments we have made since the
start of this war, that we will support the brave Ukrainians fighting
for their future, deliver them the weapons that they need to defend
themselves, impose costs on the Kremlin for this immoral conflict, and
hold Russia accountable for its war crimes?
This war ends when Putin concludes that prolonged conflict will cost
Russia more than ending it. That means proving through action, not
words, that the United States and our allies will not walk away.
That is exactly what this bill aims to do. It supports Ukraine's
reconstruction, fights Russian malign influence, shores up security
assistance for our Baltic allies, and provides Ukraine urgently needed
foreign military finance loans to purchase the weapons it needs to
defend itself against and push back Russian aggression.
Let me remind my colleagues. Nearly every dollar we invest in
Ukraine's security assistance is spent where? It is spent right here in
these United States of America supporting American workers, supporting
American manufacturers, and supporting American communities.
Mr. Speaker, this is not one of those conflicts where there is a gray
area. Vladimir Putin is an authoritarian thug who ordered the invasion
of Ukraine for his own imperialistic ambitions. He has ordered the
kidnapping of Ukrainian children and the murder of innocent civilians.
And as the United States' support has wavered, the carnage has only
grown. Mr. Speaker, 2025 was the deadliest year for Ukrainian civilians
since the war began.
In the largest land war since World War II, we have seen over a
million casualties that Putin chose. And if you believe his ambitions
will end with Ukraine, you have not been paying attention at all.
History and Putin have told us otherwise. Some colleagues have raised
parts of this bill that could be improved as justification for voting
against it. Mr. Speaker, this bill should have gone through regular
order, but unfortunately, my request to move Russia bills through
regular order have been routinely rejected.
Republican leadership has opposed this bill and repeatedly blocked
bipartisan efforts to hold Russia accountable. The Ukraine Support Act
was introduced some 14 months ago, and we have forced it to the floor
by discharge only because that was the only option left to us.
Now, before I finish, I just have some people that I really need to
thank. For 14 months, our majority leader emeritus Steny Hoyer, he has
been absolutely tremendous, working and getting this bill to this point
today. He used to be the whip or so. He is no longer the whip, but he
hasn't lost those whip skills on how to whip people and get them
together. That is what he has done, and I have got to thank him and
have to say and know that his commitment to the Ukrainian people and to
our allies is unwavering and unshakeable. I thank Steny Hoyer.
Let me also thank Representatives Keating and Kaptur and so many
other Democrats who have worked tirelessly and been instrumental in
this process. Finally, I must thank Representatives Bacon, Fitzpatrick,
and Kiley for courageously signing the discharge petition. This indeed
has been a team effort and something that the Ukrainian people know
that in a bipartisan way we support them in what we will do.
So, Mr. Speaker, it is time for us to do what is right: Support
Ukraine. Hold Russia accountable. Show the world and show Putin that
the United States does not fold to bullies. Putin's belief that
bipartisan U.S. support will fade is as much a fantasy as he believes
that he could take Kyiv in a week.
That is how we end this war, and I urge all my colleagues to support
this legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Arkansas (Mr. Hill) the chairman of the Financial Services Committee.
Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding, and I thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle because
there are not people on the floor of the House that support Putin.
There are not people on the floor of the House tonight that support
Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
I rise to speak, however, in opposition to H.R. 2913, the Ukraine
Support Act, and explain, in my judgment, the flaws in this bill. I
stand here concerned and somewhat sad that I am here because no one has
been a more steadfast supporter of Ukraine than I have, in my judgment.
I thank my colleagues on the Democratic side of the aisle and the
Republican side of the aisle who have been so passionate.
I have consistently advocated and voted in support of Ukraine. I have
consistently advocated for increased sanctions on Russia. My record of
supporting Ukraine is strong. I have made two trips to Kyiv and two
other trips to the region, all to rally support in rejection of Putin's
stand in Ukraine and call for his defeat.
I led the design and successful passage of the REPO Act in this House
and in this Congress to convert billions of dollars of Russian foreign
assets for use in Ukraine.
Unfortunately, today, we are confronted, as my good friend from New
York noted, with a flawed measure.
First, this bill is 14 months old, and therefore, it doesn't
recognize all the changes that have happened over the past year. It
actually cuts $100 million in authorized funding for Ukraine annually.
The funding cuts do not reflect what the House agreed to in our
bipartisan NDAA.
It does not reflect the commitment that our NATO allies have made and
only calls for a 2 percent pledge of their GDP in support of NATO when,
in fact, President Trump has gotten our NATO allies to pledge 5 percent
of their GDP in defense spending. We would be walking back from our own
spending plans here, and we would be walking back from the commitment
we have gotten from our European allies.
But the bill has other issues that I am concerned with. It lists
``Iran provisions'' in the document rather than refer to Russia.
The bill includes poorly written sanctions policy, including
duplicative sanctions that are already in place.
It mandates certain sanctions without any link to a strategic goal of
what those sanctions would achieve or meaningful behavioral change in
Moscow.
It includes sanctions on financial messaging services like SWIFT,
which I think are exaggerated, and in my judgment, could cause
countries to move to a Chinese messaging system rather than a Western-
based system.
{time} 1830
So there are others, and that is why I have disappointment today that
I am on this House floor in opposition to it.
I agree with my friend from New York, too, that this House should
take up a bill that can pass and have bipartisan support to counter
Putin and send a message from both Chambers in this Capitol that we
reject Putin's invasion of Ukraine and the murderous regime that he
leads.
My better alternative is the Financial Services bill passed almost
unanimously by Zach Nunn called the PEACE Act. It would cut off Russian
energy revenues, channel billions from Moscow's sovereign assets to
Ukraine to defend itself, and it is past time for that bill to be on
this House floor. I have urged House leadership to bring the PEACE Act
to the floor. I again ask House leadership to bring the PEACE Act to
the floor.
This is a well-crafted bill that will hold Putin accountable, hold
Russia accountable, and will demonstrate that on a bipartisan,
bicameral basis this Congress is for Putin leaving Ukraine, Ukraine
having a sovereign nation, and this country having a great new friend
on the Continent of Europe.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the esteemed gentleman
from the State of Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), who is an original cosponsor on
this important measure, the former whip, and the majority leader
emeritus of the House.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend, Mr. Meeks, who is ranking
member of this committee. I thank all those who had the courage to
stand up and sign this bill. I would say to my friend who just spoke,
whom I have
[[Page H3890]]
great respect for: Nothing in this bill contradicts the concerns that
he raised. They are consistent with the concerns he raised, and, in
fact, they present a forward movement on the concerns that he raised.
Mr. Speaker, to paraphrase General Eisenhower, the eyes of the world
are upon us. Since Putin launched his perfidious invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022, the House has taken 12 votes to support the Ukrainians
in defense of their freedom, of their sovereignty, and of international
law.
Over all 12, an average of 80 percent of this House--80 percent of
this House--has voted to hold firm to the principle that Ukraine must
win this war and Putin and his war crimes must lose it, 12 bills, an
average of 80 percent of the House of Representatives voting for it,
and, in addition, that America has a pivotal role in supporting
Ukraine.
The last time, however, that we voted on a Ukraine assistance package
was April 2024. My friend said he was for Ukraine, but not today. I
have heard so many times: I am for Ukraine, but not this bill; yes, I
will be with you on Ukraine, but not now.
In 2025, American aid to Ukraine fell by 99 percent. Thankfully,
international aid to Ukraine stayed close to 2024 levels because
European allies stepped up and delivered a 67 percent surge--not a 2
percent, not a 4 percent, not a 5--67 percent surge in military
assistance and a 59 percent rise in humanitarian aid.
Europe is carrying its weight in helping Ukraine.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the
gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. HOYER. In the 2 years since we last approved a package,
Ukrainians have endured two bitter winters of war.
It is time for us to act. Russian drones have continued to rain
terror on civilian neighborhoods. Driven, in part, by their
extraordinary advances in drone technology, however, Ukraine is
carrying the day.
A generation of young Russians have been sacrificed for Putin's
pride. In this moment at the end of my tenure in Congress, I hear
echoes from its beginnings when the Cold War was in terminal phase.
Ronald Reagan traveled to Berlin in 1987. Standing in front of the
Berlin Wall, just 2 years before it fell, he told of how the Soviets
tried to outlast the West during that decade's nuclear-arms surge.
The Soviets had dug their heels in, but Reagan declared the alliance
held firm. This is about the alliance holding firm.
Today, we can declare to Vladimir Putin, just as President Reagan
did, that our alliance holds firm and that America holds firm.
President Reagan had said earlier in 1983 our adversaries ``must be
made to understand we will never . . . ''
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has again expired.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the
gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. HOYER. President Reagan said in 1983 our adversaries ``must be
made to understand we will never compromise our principles and
standards [nor] ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses
of an evil empire.''
He was talking about the Soviet Union and Russia today.
``To do so would mean abandoning the struggle between right and wrong
and good and evil.''
Mr. Speaker, this is a moment. This is a moment to choose between
right and wrong and good and evil, not tomorrow, but today, tonight.
This is a moment to stand with those who are fighting on the front
lines for democracy, sovereignty, and international law.
This is a moment for all of us, together, Democrats and Republicans,
Americans and our allies, to hold firm.
Let's hold firm and vote ``yes'' on this bill and send a message to
the world and to the Ukrainians.
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the comments from Mr. Hoyer, and I want to
touch on them for a moment.
He made the point that military spending from Europe has surged 67
percent and aid from Europe has surged 59 percent. I am exceptionally
glad to see that take place.
However, let's make sure that we give credit where credit is due.
There is a reason that military spending in Europe didn't surge by 67
percent in 2024 or 2023. There is a reason that aid didn't surge 59
percent in 2022.
President Trump forced Europe to raise the spending. He said that the
burden is going to be on you, Europe, to carry your weight.
In addition, he did something. He demanded something from Europe:
that they defend their own backyard.
We should all be praising President Trump for getting them to carry
the burden of the war going on in the European backyard. I am glad to
see them spend it, and I hope they spend 10 times more, but let's give
the credit where it is due.
Mr. HOYER. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MAST. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr.
Hoyer). I think that is the pattern, 30 seconds.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, it is his time, and I appreciate that.
I congratulate--I am not sure I like the way he did it--
Mr. MAST. You are almost there.
Mr. HOYER.--but what he did was get the Europeans to understand they
needed to carry their part of the load. I congratulate him for doing
that.
However, why they have surged is because they see the proximate,
immediate danger caused by Russians' avaricious appetite for more land
and empire. That is why they surged, and we ought to stay with them
because we also need to be concerned about a leader in Putin who wants
to create another empire.
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I was happy to yield to the gentleman a few
moments, and I absolutely affirm what he said. I agree with what the
gentleman said, and I think Secretary Rubio has affirmed this no less.
Secretary Rubio said: We are not neutral, a neutral arbiter in the war
between Russia and Ukraine. We believe in Ukraine. We want Ukraine to
win. We are not neutral in this.
Absolutely, they see the threat. Europe sees the threat, and we are
glad that they are now stepping up in a much more substantial way.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Self), who is the chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe.
Mr. SELF. Mr. Speaker, I would like to return our attention to this
bill.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2319.
I am not sure we want the eyes of the world on this bill. I would,
Mr. Speaker, like to ask my colleagues across the aisle who discharged
this bill: Do you want to see an end to this war?
It is increasingly obvious that it will end, and when it ends, it
will be through negotiations. If my friends support this bill, then
clearly they are not interested in peace because the consequences would
tie the hands of this President and could lead to future hostilities
that would bleed over into Europe.
As the chairman of the Europe Subcommittee, I cannot tell you, Mr.
Speaker, how much I believe that, but they offered no solutions. It
went into the spectrum, they have not offered us an AUMF or a
declaration of war. At the other end, they choose to support an
unserious bill that would constrain the President's ability to
negotiate that peace.
Or is this a simple messaging bill against President Trump?
{time} 1840
The Ukraine Support Act is filled with mandatory sanctions provisions
that would significantly constrain the President in his negotiations
with Russia. This includes congressional review requirements,
mechanisms that tie the hands of the President rather than afford him
the leverage to pursue a settlement agreement.
My colleague across the aisle and the ranking member typically
emphasize the importance of diplomacy, dialogue, and development. Yet,
by supporting this bill, they are going back on their words. Successful
diplomacy requires flexibility, yet this bill provides the opposite.
The Ukraine Support Act is also riddled with problems that my
colleague Mr. Hill has already mentioned, problems that call its
credibility into question.
[[Page H3891]]
It contains provisions that are already addressed elsewhere in law,
including redundancies with the fiscal year 2026 National Defense
Authorization Act. It includes outdated provisions, cross-referencing
errors, and language that does not reflect current policy. Iran?
Really?
In one section, the bill extends the Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative at $300 million per year for fiscal years 2026 and 2027, yet
Congress has already authorized $400 million. The legislation would,
therefore, authorize a lower amount than current law.
I ask my Democrat colleagues: Do you support cutting assistance to
Ukraine in addition to tying the President's hands?
The bill also includes a sense of Congress encouraging NATO allies to
spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. This has been a magnificent
achievement to get to 5 percent, 3.5 percent on defense and 1.5 percent
on infrastructure.
Is your intent to reduce the commitment of NATO member nations? They
are watching this debate right now, and they are advocating for 2
percent. Regardless of what they say, the bill has 2 percent in it.
Vladimir Putin would love you for that, especially after President
Trump successfully worked with our allies to raise their commitment to
5 percent.
Mr. Speaker, for this reason and many others, I urge my colleagues to
vote ``no'' on the Ukraine Support Act.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I remind the gentleman that I heard the President of the
United States say that Ukraine should give up, basically, because they
don't have the cards. He said to Vladimir Putin do what you will. These
are words out of the President's office, not mine.
Mr. Speaker, in reference to the bill raised by Chairman Hill, I want
the public to know that I fully supported that bill. In fact, I voted
for it in committee. I am on the Financial Services Committee also, and
the fact that it hasn't hit the floor a year after it was marked up in
committee tells you everything that you need to know about Republican
leadership's willingness to put bills on the floor that hold Putin
accountable. Because if they would put bills on the floor that would
hold him accountable, we would not have had to discharge this bill.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts
(Mr. Keating), the ranking member on the Europe Subcommittee and an
original cosponsor of this important measure.
Mr. KEATING. Mr. Speaker, it is important to recognize as we stand
here today in the midst of a war with Iran, as the President is trying
to secure an agreement that would require them not to pursue nuclear
weapons, that the United States already has a commitment in an
agreement with the then-third largest nuclear power, Ukraine.
In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine agreed to relinquish all of
their nuclear assets and move away from their nuclear ambition in
exchange for an agreement with the United States that we would be
there, be there to defend them in the case of aggression and actions by
another country.
That day has come, and we are going to honor our future agreements.
If we do that, we must certainly honor this agreement. We have to look
at the agreements we are already committed to.
Russia's illegal aggression has been accompanied by mass killings,
kidnapping and displacement of thousands of Ukrainian children, serial
rapes by Russian soldiers, and the targeting of innocent civilians.
These are war crimes, and the war crimes alone command our full
support for Ukraine's defense. At the same time, Russia's illegal
aggression represents a direct threat to our NATO allies, particularly
the Baltic States.
Before the full-scale invasion, Russia made their ambitions crystal
clear that the Baltic States were a target and that NATO sovereignty
was at stake, as well.
It is important to realize that, in Ukraine, we don't share that
commitment alone. Europe as a whole has given $226 billion in
assistance. That is 25 percent more than the $174 billion that the
United States has appropriated.
European countries continue to increase support, while the Trump
administration lessens American support. However, we know that the
future cost of NATO conflicts is far greater in dollars and in lives,
and we know we have to support Ukraine to make sure that we are not
falling into that greater cost.
Our commitment to Ukraine remains our best defense economically and
in terms of our national security as well as for our shared democratic
values.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Fine).
Mr. FINE. Mr. Speaker, let me start with a simple premise: What
Russia did was terrible, and Vladimir Putin is a bad guy. Hopefully,
there is no one in this room who disagrees with that, but I also think
that when you file a piece of legislation, it comes with an obligation
to draft it carefully because laws have meaning. This proposed piece of
legislation is incredibly poorly drafted. It contains numerous critical
drafting errors.
For example, in section 313, which is related to dual-use export
controls for Russia, subsections (e)(2), (f), and (g), the bill starts
to mention Iran rather than Russia. It is clear after re-reading it
that someone just copied and pasted from another bill that didn't have
anything to do with Ukraine or Russia. It was a bill relating to Iran.
They just simply forgot to switch the countries.
We deserve better than that as we debate a bill. Some of the sections
are outdated, and they would harm U.S. national security.
Section 102(b)(5) urges all NATO allies to dedicate at least 2
percent of their GDP to national defense. As has been said at the June
2025 Hague Summit, they agreed to 5 percent. Why would we pass a bill
that says we want you to do 2 percent?
We have NATO allies that ain't so great anymore. I would focus on
Spain, for example. Why would we in this room want to pass something
where we as a body are saying: No, you don't have to do 5 percent. Two
percent would be A-OK.
The worst thing about this bill is that it would actually hurt
Ukraine. It wouldn't even help them. Section 204 extends the USAI at
$300 million for each of fiscal years `26 and `27 and moves the
program's sunset to December 31, 2027. Under current law, thanks to the
FY 2026 NDAA, the $400 million for fiscal year 2026, and roughly $800
million across fiscal years 2026 and 2027, extends the program through
December.
This bill is not about helping Ukraine. This is not about standing up
to Vladimir Putin. This is about engaging in Trump derangement syndrome
as President Trump tries to bring this in for a landing.
Mr. Speaker, this bill should be voted down, and frankly, given the
drafting errors, we shouldn't even be spending the time talking about
it.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Ohio (Ms. Kaptur), the co-chair of the Congressional Ukraine Caucus.
Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the fine ranking member from the
State of New York, who has worked so very hard on this for the time
this evening, and to all of our colleagues who support H.R. 2913, the
Ukraine Support Act.
Mr. Speaker, it is not a partisan bill. Democrats voted for it.
Republicans voted for it. Independents voted for it.
In 2014, without provocation, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin first
invaded the sovereign nation of Ukraine. Since 2022, he has been
killing its people with his full-scale invasion.
Our free world must stand tall against tyrants, not mollycoddle them.
Liberty is not negotiable. The war-torn people of Ukraine are not
asking us for charity. They are asking for our partnership, along with
our closest, time-tested allies in the European Union.
During the last century, in World Wars I and II, over 330,000
American soldiers' lives were sacrificed for liberty, for us. The
greatest gift the 20th century bequeathed to us was their victory.
{time} 1850
Liberty must not be squandered. It must be reaffirmed. For this
Congress, that time is now.
We must not turn our backs on Ukraine's long-suffering people,
especially over 20,000 children of Ukraine
[[Page H3892]]
maliciously abducted by Russia and being inhumanely reprogrammed on
Russian soil. That is a war crime.
Now, Iran, in cahoots with Putin's Russia, makes the drones killing
American soldiers in the Middle East. It is Iranian-made suicide drones
that Russia launches to murder thousands of Ukrainians in their homes
and its soldiers at the front.
Ukraine has come to America's defense with its cutting-edge
interceptor drones. Consider their noble commitment. Now, will we come
to Ukraine's aid?
The people of Ukraine fully know their fate is intertwined with our
own. A ``yes'' vote sanctions Putin's Russia, that dictatorship. A
``yes'' vote forestalls further Russian encroachment across the
European Union, our time-tested allies. A ``yes'' vote aids Ukraine.
If we fail to secure liberty's front in Europe, the next strategic
reality we will face is defending our interests against an emboldened,
nuclear-armed, expansionist Russia at a much, much higher cost.
Mr. Speaker, voting ``yes'' for liberty is an imperative, first,
last, and always.
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Mackenzie).
Mr. MACKENZIE. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman Mast for yielding time
to speak on our national security and this critically important issue
of supporting our partners and allies and deterring our adversaries.
As a member of both the Foreign Affairs Committee and Homeland
Security Committee, I have strong opinions on this topic. It is a fact
that Russia and its actions continue to threaten American allies,
innocent civilians, and the global economy.
This is an issue that demands serious conversations, bipartisan
dialogue, and a sincere interest in advancing our Nation's foreign
policy interests, including achieving peace in Ukraine.
What we are seeing, though, is that as we are working through this
legislative process and trying to find ways where we can reject
Russia's unprovoked aggressions and support Ukraine's right to freedom,
peace, and self-determination, what we are doing is looking at
legislation that is outdated and insufficient to achieve this goal.
Our Nation, since the beginning of this conflict, has supported
Ukraine with over $137 billion in total security assistance. We have
also won commitments from our European allies to finally step up their
defense contributions.
The goal should now be to achieve a final end to this conflict and
secure lasting, honorable peace for the Ukrainian people. This bill
falls far short of that.
What we are seeing is that this legislation makes a number of
mistakes. First, it cuts funding to the Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative. This bill states that it would extend security assistance
at $300 million for fiscal years `26 and `27. However, Congress already
passed funding in last year's NDAA that funds security assistance at a
level of roughly $800 million across the same fiscal years.
Potentially worse still, the bill calls for NATO allies to dedicate
at least 2 percent of their GDP to national defense. As I mentioned,
under this administration, we have made the historic achievement of
getting our NATO allies to commit to 5 percent. This bill literally
moves us backward, and a decrease in NATO defense member spending would
be the result.
Second, it also includes outdated and redundant provisions. Sections
of this bill attempt to authorize programs like foreign military
financing for allies and partners in the region. Again, Congress
already passed similar provisions in the NDAA through the Baltic
Security Initiative.
Finally, there are a number of drafting errors that are too numerous
to state, but again, this outdated approach is not what is needed at
this time.
Mr. Speaker, I encourage Members to do the right thing, to come
together in a bipartisan way. We can work in an honest fashion and a
serious way to get the achievements that we are actually looking for
for America's interests and also for our partners and allies around the
world.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Nebraska (Mr. Bacon).
Mr. BACON. Mr. Speaker, today's vote, are we going to stand with good
or are we going to stand with evil? That is what this is about tonight.
Ukraine is a democracy, a free market, and rule of law. It has been
invaded by a dictator who throws its enemies off of roofs, poisons his
adversaries, and attacked his neighbor, which is four times smaller
than Russia.
What is the goal? To eliminate their independence, culture, and
people because he wants to control those old borders of his that he has
had. We have to stand for the good side tonight.
What does this bill do? It provides $1.3 billion in direct military
aid, $8 billion in military sales, and tough sanctions on Russia. We
should have done this a year ago. We could have done this in a
bipartisan way a year ago, but we have not.
This decision is needed now. Russia is bombing Ukrainian cities every
night with ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles. We had better be
there to help them, or in the history books, it is going to say the
United States failed when it was most needed.
I know this: I want this House to stand on the right side. I want
Republicans to stand where Ronald Reagan would be if he were here right
now. Ronald Reagan would be voting ``yes'' tonight. He would be
standing up for Ukraine and opposing Russia. This is our Churchill
moment or our Chamberlain moment. By God, I am going to choose
Churchill, and this House better choose Churchill tonight.
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. Grothman).
Mr. GROTHMAN. Mr. Speaker, I think a point has to be made on the vote
that is going to take place in the next hour. I am a little bit afraid
that people are going to look at that vote and view it as a statement
of fact as to where this body stands on Ukraine.
I think something has to be pointed out that I think, unlike other
votes--and the gentleman from Maryland has told us there is an average
of over 300 people who voted similar to what he was trying to do in the
past.
This vote comes before us on a discharge petition. There are flaws
that have been pointed out in it. I think the flaws are going to
receive greater attention from me because, for certain reasons, bills
brought forth on discharge petitions are frowned upon in this
institution.
I want everybody to understand that when this bill passes, probably
passes with like 250, 260 votes, it doesn't mean that the commitment to
Ukraine has dropped that much from the past votes last year to now. It
is, I believe, because the bill came to the floor in a discharge
petition.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Fitzpatrick), the co-chair of the Ukraine Caucus.
Mr. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Ukraine
Support Act.
This vote transcends politics. This vote is about freedom. Just days
ago, Russia launched over 650 drones and 73 missiles at Ukrainian
cities. Families were murdered in their homes, and children were forced
into shelters.
Once again, Vladimir Putin showed the world that he has no interest
in peace. He is only interested in terror.
Five years into this illegal war, the Ukrainian people are defending
their country against Russia's brutal aggression. Against all odds,
they have transformed and modernized their military into one of the
strongest and most capable fighting forces in Europe. They have
pioneered technologies that are changing warfare itself, from advanced
drone operations to battlefield innovation that militaries around the
world are now studying.
Mr. Speaker, I have stood shoulder to shoulder with Ukrainian
soldiers on the front lines during this conflict. I have heard the
artillery fire. I have watched young men and women defend their country
with extraordinary courage. They remind me of another generation of
fighters: the Americans who defended democracy abroad during World War
II, our Greatest Generation. They are fighting for their freedom. They
are fighting for democracy. They are fighting for global peace and
global security.
[[Page H3893]]
Mr. Speaker, the Ukrainian people are not asking for Americans to
fight this war. They are asking for the tools to defend themselves and
for the partnership of a nation that has always stood for liberty.
The Ukraine Support Act strengthens Ukraine's ability to protect
civilians; extends lend-lease authority; provides critical military
assistance; sanctions Russia's war machine, its shadow fleet, and those
responsible for kidnapping innocent Ukrainian children by the tens of
thousands; and makes clear that aggression on this planet has
consequences.
{time} 1900
We must send a clear message not only to Russia but to every dictator
watching us tonight around the world: America will not stand by while
free nations are attacked.
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa
(Mr. Nunn).
Mr. NUNN of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, I thank Members on both sides of the
aisle.
I understand the passion behind this. As a still-serving combat
veteran--and also for the Chairman's combat service--I think we are
committed to making sure that aggressors are held accountable.
That is exactly why I authored the bipartisan PEACE Act--targeted
sanctions that truly stop the Russian war machine. Peace through
strength was mentioned tonight. Peace through the PEACE Act can be
delivered. My bill passed the Committee on Financial Services 53-1,
with great credit to Mr. Meeks. This is something we worked on together
and both support.
Challengingly, I would offer that the bill before us tonight takes us
on a different path. I would be remiss to not say this is a bill more
about politics than policy, and I am concerned that it is a tactical
error to move forward when it threatens real strategic deterrence of
what this body can deliver.
I understand our mutual aim is to hold Russian aggression
accountable, but, my friends, this is not the plan. We have a better
option, and we have a clear plan before us.
The PEACE Act moved through committee. It earned bipartisan support,
and it is ready for consideration now. And, yes, it has been months in
the making, but we have held it every single time. Challengingly, the
bill before us is now more than a year and a half outdated.
Our bill would cut off foreign financial assistance to Russia, and it
includes Chairman Hill's REPO Act, money that would be seized back so
that it can go back to help the Ukrainian people and pay for Russia's
aggression. It stops the shadow fleet. It ends Russia's illicit oil
sales, and it truly does what we want through targeted sanctions that
have been approved.
My friends, if we truly want to stand together, let's stop Russia.
Let's lead with a plan that truly restores peace to Europe. This is our
greatest strength. Let's enforce the penalties, enact a timeline,
incentivize a ceasefire, and let's make sure that peace can be achieved
with the PEACE Act.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Kiley).
Mr. KILEY of California. Mr. Speaker, I provided the decisive
signature for the Ukraine Support Act to bring it to the floor for a
vote because the time to act is now.
We have all been inspired by the enduring courage and resilience of
the Ukrainian people, encouraged by their recent battlefield gains, and
horrified by the latest Russian brutality.
Recent events make it all too clear this conflict will continue to
cause death and devastation on a tragic scale if the dynamic does not
change. We have the power to change the dynamic.
Today, we can provide potentially decisive leverage. We can make it
clear that the United States will continue to stand with the Ukrainian
people and provide the material support necessary for their self-
defense. We can make it equally clear that Russia will pay a severe
price for its unprovoked aggression and ongoing violence.
This is what is required for constructive negotiations to end this
conflict. This is what is required for peace. This is what is required
to vindicate the international norm against wars of conflict, without
which the world would revert to an era where bloodshed was a much more
common theme in human affairs.
This legislation will protect America's national interests, will
support our vital alliances, will uphold our highest values, and will
reassert the role of Congress in advancing all of these goals.
I thank Mr. Meeks for offering this legislation, as well as the
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), and the gentleman from Nebraska
(Mr. Bacon) for their leadership, their statesmanship in rallying
support for it. I encourage all Members to vote ``aye.''
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi), a woman of courage, who has traveled to
Ukraine many times and stands for the Ukrainian people, the
distinguished Speaker Emerita Nancy Pelosi.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished once and future
chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs for his steadfast leadership
and determination for the people of Ukraine.
I rise today in strong support of the Ukraine Support Act and thank
Leader Hoyer for his persistence and his determination to bring this
legislation to the floor and, of course, Marcy, who has been our
inspiration, Marcy Kaptur.
The Ukrainian people are not asking us to fight their war. That has
been said. They are asking for tools to defend their sovereignty, their
democracy, and their lives.
As President Zelenskyy wrote to Congress just days ago: ``We value
every human life, and that is exactly why we are seeking a real
peace.''
But supporting Ukraine is not only about Ukraine. It is about
deterring aggression everywhere. It is about standing up to
authoritarianism, and it is about reaffirming that the United States
does not abandon those who fight for freedom.
Let us also not forget that well over 70 percent of U.S. funding
allocated to Ukraine is spent in the United States, a direct investment
in our economy, American workers and industries.
While some have been unwilling to stand up to Vladimir Putin, this
Congress must. This bipartisan legislation sends a clear and
unmistakable message: The American people stand with Ukraine, and we
will stand against Russian aggression--Russian aggression which
includes kidnapping of tens of thousands of little children, which
includes raping of mothers in front of their children and in front of
their parents. It is about killing families. Their assaults on
civilians are sinful, in my view.
Let us pass this bill to strengthen Ukraine's hand to hasten a just
and lasting peace, and to uphold the values that make America a beacon
of hope to the world. ``Glory to Ukraine''; ``Slava Ukraini.''
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Himes), the ranking member of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. Meeks for yielding me the time.
Five days ago, I was in Ukraine, and I saw what so many of us have
seen: truly remarkable courage, absolute commitment to fighting for
their freedom, innovation like you would not believe, and,
interestingly, something I had not seen before in my previous trips to
Ukraine, which was the optimism and joy in the face of missiles and
destruction that the Ukrainians are winning.
They are winning because they are executing deep strikes into Russia,
which have resulted in 30 percent of Russia's refining capacity being
eliminated. They are winning because they are retaking territory, and
they are winning because they are inflicting a staggering and horrible
number of casualties, 30,000 a month, on the Russians.
The Russians are responding to the fact that they are losing by
lashing out in desperate fashion, saying diplomats should leave Kyiv,
attacking Romania with a drone, because they know they are losing. This
is an inflection point.
We could debate for 6 months or 12 months. We have done that before,
and the Ukrainians paid with their lives for
[[Page H3894]]
that delay, or we could join the fight at the moment that it is being
won.
The Ukrainians that I spoke to are the bravest people I have ever
seen fighting for their freedom. They want to know one thing. They are
wondering whether the people here, in the home of the free and the land
of the brave, will be side by side with them. That is all they are
wondering. They just want a little help. They don't want our people.
They want our technology, and they want to know that we are there with
them.
Look around this Chamber. This is the Chamber in which we made the
sacrifices to defeat communism. This is the Chamber in which we made
the decisions to defeat Nazism. Since 1857, when we have been meeting
in this Chamber, we have stood for freedom and liberty. Those who
opposed it with buts and conditions, history was not kind to their
memory.
{time} 1910
Let's do what we have always done and support the brave Ukrainians in
their desire for freedom.
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I would just remind the ranking member of the
Intelligence Committee that he said that we should give Ukraine--they
just want a little bit of help. The United States of America, to this
moment, is giving them far more than just a little bit of help, and
that should not be ignored.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Quigley), who is the co-chair of the Congressional
Ukraine Caucus and who has traveled to that war zone over five times.
Mr. QUIGLEY. Mr. Speaker, I have some questions.
My first question is: If my friends across the aisle don't like this
bill, why don't they draft their own? Why did this bill have to be
forced on them? Why was it necessary to do a discharge petition? Where
was their excitement about doing anything?
My second question is: Why hasn't the President of the United States
said who he wants to win this war? He still has not said who he favors.
My next question is: When my friends talk about peace and they say
that we need to be flexible, I want to know details. Does that mean we
are going to give Putin a reward for raping and pillaging the Ukrainian
people and that we are going to reward them with the land that they
took in this aggressive nature?
This is the time to make those decisions.
We are now about to celebrate our 250th anniversary of independence,
and we are reminded that our Nation was born in defiance of tyranny.
Ukraine is fighting that same fight today, and this fight is the same
reason we fought the Second World War.
Putin's goal stretches well beyond Ukraine. He seeks to erase a
democracy, to replace freedom with fear, and to prove that brute force
can triumph over the rule of law.
We cannot allow that to stand.
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Doggett), the original cosponsor on this important measure.
Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, for over a year, the House Republican
leadership has yielded to Donald Trump's peculiar friendship with
Vladimir Putin and blocked action on this measure.
Every day that Republicans look the other way, Ukrainians die. Over
55,000 of them have perished. Over 20,000 children have been kidnapped.
The war that Trump promised to end in a single day is now in its fifth
murderous year.
Trump has continued to send signals to Vladimir Putin that his brutal
aggression is okay. He has reduced U.S. direct support for Ukraine by
99 percent. He has withheld even the modest funds that this Congress
approved last year. He has removed American troops from Europe,
diverted essential defensive weapons that would protect Ukrainians
elsewhere, and remained silent while Putin destroyed American
businesses in Ukraine and provided intelligence to Iran to target
Americans. Most recently, he has indicated to NATO that when Putin
creates a further crisis, the U.S. will offer less, if any, help.
As Putin tests the resolve of the civilized world, Trump has shown
that he has no resolve. He is too weak to lead and too reckless to be
followed.
With my own name on some of the first sanctions legislation that this
Congress approved against Russia and with two of the measures that I
have authored since then incorporated in this measure, I am glad to see
that we finally get some action.
Since March, thanks to Trump's incredible lifting of sanctions,
Vladimir Putin is getting about $200 million a day, including today, in
revenue to oil his war machine.
Tonight, let's unite to resist the appeasers and seek a victory for
everyone in this world who values self-determination, democracy, and
freedom.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Tennessee (Mr. Cohen).
Mr. COHEN. Mr. Speaker, much has been said which I agree with on the
Democratic side. This is a fight for supporting a country that is
standing up to aggression from Russia; lies from Russia that they
weren't going to invade Ukraine when they did it; and people who have
killed innocent children, women, and civilians on a regular basis with
missile attacks and drone attacks.
We need to stand with democracy, with freedom, and with courage and
against authoritarianism and against Putin. I support this resolution,
am proud to do it, and thank the Ukrainian people for their sacrifices
and their valor.
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, the camera of history is rolling, and history will show
where each Member stands at this time as Ukraine's war rages on. It
will show who stood with Ukraine and with democracy and who stood with
Vladimir Putin and his evil regime.
Putin believes he can outlast American resolve. I don't believe he
can. Today, we have the chance to prove him wrong.
Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues, Democrats and Republicans
alike, to stand with the people of Ukraine and pass this bill.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I am going to just begin with the final comments of the
ranking member. He said that it is a chance to prove you stand with
Ukraine.
We could do absolutely nothing in this Chamber today, and all of us
would still be standing with Ukraine. We have been standing with
Ukraine since the onset of this war, which began under President Joe
Biden. We have been standing with Ukraine.
A vote for this bill doesn't prove that you are pro-Ukraine. I
believe that analysis of this bill proves that you didn't take a look
very well about how it does affect citizens of the United States of
America.
As Secretary Rubio said and as I mentioned already, we are not a
neutral arbiter in the war between Russia and Ukraine. We have sent
tens of billions of dollars in security assistance to Ukraine since the
start of the war. We continue to share intelligence to this very
moment. We continue to send arms. We have levied countless sanctions
against Russia that are still in place today.
I could tell you that I personally cheer every single time Ukraine
hits a Russian target.
This bill is not about helping Ukraine defeat Russia. This bill is
about trying to stop President Trump and trying to tie his hands and
limit his ability to negotiate.
President Trump has successfully ended longstanding conflicts around
the globe. In just the last 18 months, he has ended the October 7 war
between Israel and Hamas; the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which
had been a 30-year-long conflict; between Egypt and Ethiopia, a
longstanding diplomatic crisis that risked all-out war; between
Pakistan and India, who were on the verge of all-out war, which could
have turned nuclear if not stopped; war between the DRC and Rwanda;
between Kosovo and Serbia; and between Cambodia and Thailand.
President Trump has been working on conflicts successfully across the
globe. Those are just some of the successes that he has been able to
accomplish in the last 18 months, despite
[[Page H3895]]
Democrats really fighting him every step of the way.
I think the reality is that in order to end this war, we have to
bring Russia to the table. I think we all know that.
I personally would much rather prefer that our coalition--and it is a
strong coalition that includes the United States of America--bring
Vladimir Putin to his knees, but as long as Vladimir Putin has nukes,
the coalition is not going to do that.
{time} 1920
Why? Let's explain it very clearly. The only reason that there is not
more being done militarily in response to Russia's illegal invasion of
Ukraine is because they have nuclear weapons. The only reason that
there is not a United States of America bunker buster through the
ceiling of the Kremlin is because Russia has nukes. It is the only
reason that Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia--take your pick--don't
have heavy armor rolling all the way to Siberia: It is because Russia
has nukes.
In fact, this is why Iran absolutely should not have a nuclear
weapon. This is something that has been apparently forgotten by my
colleagues. We do not want to have to negotiate with a terrorist state
that proves to be an imminent threat to the United States of America
every single day and have them be armed with a nuclear weapon.
That is why I find it so interesting that Democrats want to pull out
all the stops against Russia while doing absolutely nothing to stop
Iran, which, in the 30 months prior to Epic Fury beginning, attacked
the United States of America over 350 times. That, to me, is amazing.
What this bill would do is tie the President's hands. I have
mentioned that already. It would prevent him from negotiating an end to
the war. The President has tried his best to get my colleagues to read
between the lines about how they would be affecting the United States
of America domestically by pushing this policy. He laid it out
yesterday in his Statement of Administration Policy, which speaks very
specifically about the far-reaching provisions, like the sanctions on
SWIFT and the imposition of mandatory sanctions without the appropriate
waivers for their limits.
To bring this back domestically and what that memo was about in part
is this: Sanctions on this bill would be a kill switch on American
nuclear power. Under President Trump, we are finally weaning off
nuclear fuel, but that does take time. The truth is, Russia has a
stronghold on global enriched uranium supplies, and Russian suppliers
are intertwined in our nuclear energy supply chain as well as that of
Europe's.
Recently, Russia accounted for nearly 30 percent of enriched uranium
purchased by United States reactor operators, underscoring both the
continued dependence on foreign-controlled enrichment capacity and the
need for an orderly transition to secure domestic supply chains. That
number is now lower than it was, thanks to President Trump, but the
sanctions in this bill would strain an already vulnerable U.S. nuclear
supply chain overnight.
These sanctions don't just impact us here at home, as I mentioned
already. They would have devastating consequences to European energy.
As Europe realized through oil and gas, they are highly dependent on
Russia. They have been working to wean themselves off, which President
Trump warned them about in his 45 administration, saying why is the
United States of America paying all this time, troops, and treasure to
protect Europe through NATO when they are so intertwined with Russia,
and they are highly dependent in Europe on Russian enriched uranium.
In addition--this has been mentioned numerous times--the bill is
filled with outdated measures and basic errors. To give a few of those
examples that have already been mentioned, the bill includes funding
for Ukraine security assistance that was already passed as a part of
this year's NDAA. In fact, the bill would provide $100 million less per
year than what was passed in the NDAA. That is a pretty important
oversight.
It has been mentioned that the bill calls for 2 percent of GDP
military spending from NATO. It was already congratulated by some of my
colleagues that the President has worked to make sure that NATO spends
5 percent of their GDP in terms of military spending, and he has been
wildly successful in making sure that that takes place.
This bill, in my opinion, is an unserious bill to attack President
Trump that was crafted basically a year and a half ago, while he was
actively engaged in the high-stakes negotiation to end this war since
it started.
I do believe that people on both sides of this bill want to help
Ukraine, but supporting this bill does not somehow say you are stepping
away from Ukraine or that you all of a sudden stand beside them.
Again, we could do nothing here today, and the status quo that we
have been supporting Ukraine since the onset of this war would
continue. I believe that this is about a cudgel to fight against
President Trump and tie his hands, as I have said already.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 518, the previous question is ordered on
the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 226,
nays 195, not voting 9, as follows:
[Roll No. 207]
YEAS--226
Adams
Aguilar
Amo
Ansari
Auchincloss
Bacon
Balint
Barragan
Beatty
Bell
Bera
Beyer
Bishop
Bonamici
Boyle (PA)
Bresnahan
Brown
Brownley
Budzinski
Bynum
Carbajal
Carey
Carson
Carter (LA)
Casar
Case
Casten
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chu
Cisneros
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Conaway
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Craig
Crockett
Crow
Cuellar
Davids (KS)
Davis (IL)
Davis (NC)
Dean (PA)
DeGette
DeLauro
DelBene
Deluzio
DeSaulnier
Dexter
Dingell
Doggett
Elfreth
Escobar
Espaillat
Evans (PA)
Fields
Figures
Fitzpatrick
Fletcher
Foster
Foushee
Frankel, Lois
Friedman
Frost
Garamendi
Garbarino
Garcia (CA)
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Gillen
Gimenez
Golden (ME)
Goldman (NY)
Gomez
Gonzalez, V.
Goodlander
Gottheimer
Gray
Green, Al (TX)
Grijalva
Harder (CA)
Hayes
Himes
Horsford
Houlahan
Hoyer
Hoyle (OR)
Huffman
Hurd (CO)
Ivey
Jackson (IL)
Jacobs
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (TX)
Joyce (OH)
Kamlager-Dove
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy (NY)
Khanna
Kiggans (VA)
Kiley (CA)
Krishnamoorthi
LaLota
Landsman
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latimer
Lawler
Lee (NV)
Lee (PA)
Leger Fernandez
Levin
Liccardo
Lieu
Lofgren
Lynch
Magaziner
Mannion
Matsui
McBath
McBride
McCaul
McClain Delaney
McClellan
McCollum
McDonald Rivet
McGarvey
McGovern
McIver
Meeks
Mejia
Menefee
Menendez
Meng
Mfume
Miller (OH)
Min
Moore (WI)
Morelle
Morrison
Moskowitz
Moulton
Mrvan
Mullin
Murphy
Nadler
Neal
Neguse
Newhouse
Norcross
Ocasio-Cortez
Olszewski
Pallone
Panetta
Pappas
Pelosi
Perez
Peters
Pettersen
Pingree
Pocan
Pou
Quigley
Ramirez
Randall
Raskin
Riley (NY)
Rivas
Ross
Ruiz
Ryan
Salinas
Sanchez
Scanlon
Schakowsky
Schneider
Scholten
Schrier
Scott (VA)
Sewell
Sherman
Simon
Smith (WA)
Sorensen
Soto
Stansbury
Stanton
Stevens
Strickland
Subramanyam
Suozzi
Sykes
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (PA)
Titus
Tlaib
Tokuda
Tonko
Torres (CA)
Torres (NY)
Trahan
Tran
Turner (OH)
Underwood
Vargas
Vasquez
Veasey
Velazquez
Vindman
Walkinshaw
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson Coleman
Whitesides
Williams (GA)
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
NAYS--195
Aderholt
Alford
Allen
Amodei (NV)
Arrington
Babin
Baird
Balderson
Barr
Barrett
Baumgartner
Bean (FL)
Begich
Bentz
Bergman
Bice
Biggs (AZ)
Biggs (SC)
[[Page H3896]]
Bilirakis
Boebert
Bost
Brecheen
Buchanan
Burchett
Burlison
Calvert
Cammack
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Ciscomani
Cline
Cloud
Clyde
Cole
Collins
Comer
Crane
Crank
Crawford
Crenshaw
Davidson
De La Cruz
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Donalds
Downing
Dunn (FL)
Edwards
Ellzey
Emmer
Estes
Evans (CO)
Ezell
Fallon
Fedorchak
Feenstra
Fine
Finstad
Fischbach
Fitzgerald
Fleischmann
Flood
Fong
Foxx
Franklin, Scott
Fry
Fulcher
Fuller
Gill (TX)
Goldman (TX)
Gooden
Gosar
Graves
Griffith
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Hageman
Hamadeh (AZ)
Haridopolos
Harrigan
Harris (MD)
Harris (NC)
Harshbarger
Hern (OK)
Higgins (LA)
Hill (AR)
Hinson
Houchin
Hudson
Huizenga
Hunt
Issa
Jack
Jackson (TX)
James
Johnson (LA)
Jordan
Joyce (PA)
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kennedy (UT)
Kim
Knott
Kustoff
LaHood
Langworthy
Latta
Lee (FL)
Letlow
Loudermilk
Lucas
Luna
Luttrell
Mackenzie
Malliotakis
Maloy
Mann
Massie
Mast
McClain
McClintock
McCormick
McDowell
McGuire
Messmer
Meuser
Miller (IL)
Miller-Meeks
Mills
Moolenaar
Moore (AL)
Moore (NC)
Moore (UT)
Moore (WV)
Moran
Nehls
Nunn (IA)
Obernolte
Ogles
Omar
Onder
Owens
Palmer
Patronis
Perry
Pfluger
Reschenthaler
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rose
Rouzer
Roy
Rulli
Rutherford
Salazar
Scalise
Schmidt
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Self
Sessions
Shreve
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smucker
Spartz
Stauber
Stefanik
Steil
Steube
Strong
Stutzman
Taylor
Tenney
Tiffany
Timmons
Valadao
Van Drew
Van Duyne
Van Epps
Van Orden
Wagner
Walberg
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Westerman
Wied
Williams (TX)
Wittman
Womack
Yakym
Zinke
NOT VOTING--9
Jayapal
Johnson (SD)
Kean
Mace
Miller (WV)
Norman
Pressley
Thanedar
Thompson (MS)
{time} 2008
Messrs. WESTERMAN, WITTMAN, MOORE of North Carolina, MEUSER, and
SMITH of Nebraska changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Mr. CLEAVER changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________