[Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 75 (Wednesday, April 29, 2026)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2093-S2095]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT

  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I have come to the floor to talk about a 
law that most people will have never heard of, but it is very, very 
important to our national security. That is the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act or FISA as we sometimes refer to it.
  We are approaching the expiration of this section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act later this week, and time's a-wastin' for 
us to get this actually done.
  I know it is important for us to have debates and offer constructive 
suggestions about changes in these laws, but we cannot risk going dark 
on this essential intelligence-gathering law, which actually has 
empowered President Trump to help keep the country safe.
  Without getting into the merits of one of these proposals or another, 
let me just take a step back and talk about the importance of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and national security.
  One of the major misconceptions about this is it is a law enforcement 
tool, but it is not. It is not primarily a law enforcement tool. Now, 
it is illegal to commit espionage in this country, but the main reason 
this is used is to collect information from people overseas on national 
security threats to the United States. And it allows the intelligence 
community to connect the dots to understand what our adversaries are up 
to.
  FISA was enacted in 1978 in order to provide more transparency and 
avoid overreach of surveillance of domestic actors. If you read the 
history of the FBI going back to the J. Edgar Hoover days, there was a 
lot of things that the FBI was doing under J. Edger Hoover that today 
we would blanch at and certainly consider illegal when it regards 
surveillance of U.S. persons.
  So FISA was enacted to make sure that we did not allow any 
unconstitutional surveillance of American citizens, but we did preserve 
the ability to gain information about foreign actors overseas on 
potential national security threats to the United States.
  Section 702, which is the provision that expires in a very short time 
now, was first enacted in 2008, and as I said, authorizes the U.S. 
Government to target foreign--hence, the name--the word ``foreign'' in 
the FISA--foreign intelligence collection of non-U.S. persons.
  Now, that is a bureaucratic way of just saying: American citizens 
are--you cannot surveil American citizens no matter where they are, 
even if they are overseas. It only authorizes surveillance of foreign 
intelligence collection for non-U.S. persons overseas outside of the 
United States.
  Unlike traditional criminal investigations where warrants are issued 
based on probable cause--that is, showing a probable cause to a judge 
that a crime has been committed, thus justifying issuance of a warrant 
to then search or collect information here in America--unlike that, 
intelligence

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gathering is significantly different because it involves the monitoring 
of foreign intelligence to detect and prevent threats before they 
happen.
  So our criminal justice system is designed to investigate and 
prosecute crimes that occur after they happen. But the intelligence 
community needs these tools like FISA to be able to prevent bad things 
from happening. So it is forward-leaning rather than retrospective.
  President Trump has asked Congress to reauthorize this essential 
authority, as the current law properly balances intelligence needs with 
privacy protections of U.S. citizens.
  Let me just put a finer point on that. To allow this to expire would 
be an affront to the President; but also, it would essentially blind 
the President to this essential intelligence that he uses on a daily 
basis in his President's Daily Brief.

  Many folks are familiar with the fact that the President gets 
intelligence briefings on a daily basis, and it is called the PDR, 
President's Daily--PDB, excuse me, the President's Daily Brief.
  So the intelligence Agencies--notably the CIA or the Director of 
National Intelligence--will brief the President on national security 
threats.
  Mr. President, 60 percent--60 percent--of the information contained 
in the President's Daily Brief is a product of section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. So to allow that to expire would 
basically handicap the President in terms of getting access to the 
information he needs in order to work within and U.S. Government to 
keep the public and our Nation safe. So 60 percent of the President's 
Daily Brief is a product of 702 of FISA.
  In 2025, a quarter--25 percent--of the national security Agencies--
that is our Signals Intelligence Agency--25 percent of their reports 
were comprised of information gathered under section 702.
  This information, of course, has allowed the U.S. Government to 
thwart terrorist attacks and to make sure that we protect the public at 
large. It has also helped us find and rescue American hostages and much 
more.
  In April of 2024, Congress responded to the concerns that some had 
raised about privacy of U.S. citizens by passing the Reforming 
Intelligence and Securing America Act, the RISAA. RISAA, I guess. I am 
not sure how to pronounce it, but that is the acronym; RISAA, Reforming 
Intelligence and Securing America Act.
  So these concerns which led to these reforms included incidents such 
as unlawful targeting of Carter Page, a Trump campaign aide, during the 
run-up to the President's election in 2016. But that is a different 
section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
  Obviously, Carter Page was an American citizen, and based on what I 
have said--you have heard me say--you can't surveil American citizens, 
whether they are at home or abroad without a warrant.
  So this would not apply to the Carter Page case; although, I agree it 
was an abomination where an FBI lawyer basically misrepresented the 
facts to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court who then issued a 
warrant on Carter Page.
  And the Justice Department has since admitted that it did not have 
probable cause to surveil him.
  So a different section--section 702 is different from the Carter Page 
example. So the R-I-S-A-A--RISAA--was crafted to address past abuses of 
the foreign intelligence surveillance authorities and privacy and civil 
liberty concerns while ensuring that the government had the capability 
in order to protect Americans from foreign threats.
  The provisions enacted into law have gone a long way to curb the 
likelihood of abuses that were happening under FISA authorities during 
the Obama and the Biden administrations.
  According to a recent report from the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board, the reforms that Congress passed under RISAA have had 
positive effects regarding the safeguarding of privacy and civil 
liberty. These included significant reforms to the way that the FBI can 
conduct U.S. person queries.
  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act section 702 is authorized 
overseas on a noncitizen, but if they communicate with an American 
citizen here in the United States, that information is maintained in a 
database by the intelligence Agencies. It is lawfully collected 
information, not for the purposes of a criminal investigation, but for 
purposes of collecting intelligence to be able to connect the dots and 
protect the Nation.
  Targeting refers to the actual collection of data on non-U.S. persons 
abroad who may be potential threats. While querying--or looking into--
the data that is collected in that process is different. It is worth 
repeating again. Only non-U.S. persons abroad may be targeted under 
702.
  But RISAA, the reforms, include stronger oversight measures and 
consequences for violations of these new requirements, which is 
entirely appropriate. Part of this is not only to address potential 
violations but also to build the public's confidence that their own 
government is not spying on them as I have heard some people suggest.
  But perhaps the most significant reforms in RISAA were how these 
queries of lawfully collected information were conducted. Due to new 
requirements from RISAA, queries of U.S. persons already collected--
lawfully collected--information are now even further restricted and 
subject to three reviews. That is sort of a belt-and-suspenders 
approach to making sure we protect American citizens.
  Since 2023, the total number of queries of U.S. persons has dropped 
by 87 percent. According to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board, within the first year after the enactment of these reforms, more 
than 98 percent of the FBI's queries of already lawfully collected 
information weren't compliant with these new requirements.
  The report concludes that, while the implementation of these reforms 
are still being studied, it is clear they are having a positive effect 
on the privacy of American citizens.
  Furthermore, FISA remains a very important tool that the U.S. 
Government uses in order to support our national security, which is why 
President Trump has been so adamant that we need to get this law 
reauthorized and not let it go dark.
  Last March, CIA Director John Ratcliffe testified that 70 percent of 
his Agency's success in countering advanced weapons proliferation and 
90 percent of their success in interdicting synthetic drugs like 
fentanyl were the result of information acquired by using section 702 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
  Section 702 allows the U.S. Government to vet foreign persons seeking 
to enter the United States for connections to terrorism and 
international drug trafficking operations. It is also a critical tool 
for combatting cyber threats. Section 702 proved particularly useful 
for the U.S. Government's efforts to crack down on illicit drug 
trafficking into the country.
  This intelligence has helped the United States, together with our 
friends, to identify the supply chain for precursor chemicals coming 
from China and used to make synthetic drugs like fentanyl in Mexico. 
And it also has allowed the intelligence Agencies to seize machinery in 
China that would have been able to produce millions of pills per hour--
these pill pressers, these automated pill pressers. Section 702 also 
allows our Border Patrol to seize these pill pressers at the border.
  Reports indicate that 90 percent of the CIA's successful interdiction 
of synthetic drugs like fentanyl is attributable to section 702.
  So some people are suggesting it ought to go dark; we ought not to 
extend it. It makes no sense when you begin to look at how effective it 
has been in keeping the country safe.
  Section 702 is also important in counterterrorism. Information 
acquired under that section has allowed the FBI to identify a potential 
terrorist threat, in October of 2023, related to the Israel-Gaza 
conflict. The FBI was able to warn the Department of Defense and the 
relevant host nations about this threat against American troops.
  In another instance, section 702 allowed the United States to 
discover and thwart a planned terrorist attack against a high-profile 
concert in Europe.
  These are just a couple of examples--of numerous examples--of ways 
section 702 has helped the United States protect our citizens against 
foreign threats.

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  And no one knows that better than President Trump, who is the daily 
consumer of this information. Again, 60 percent of his daily 
intelligence brief is composed of section 702 intelligence. And, of 
course, the President is responsible for the protection of all of our 
citizens and U.S. interests, and that is why he has asked us to 
reauthorize this critical authority.
  President Trump recently wrote on Truth Social to say:

       With the ongoing successful military activities against the 
     Terrorist Iranian Regime, it is more important than ever that 
     we remain vigilant, PROTECT our Homeland, Troops, and 
     Diplomats stationed abroad, and maintain our ability to 
     quickly stop bad actors seeking to cause harm to our People 
     and our Country.

  After 4 years of weakness under President Biden, President Trump is 
showing the world that the United States is, once again, a power to be 
dealt with. It is imperative we equip the President and the entire 
administration, working with Congress in an oversight capacity, like on 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on which I serve. It is 
important that we equip the Trump administration with the tools and 
authorities they need to maintain deterrence and, hopefully, peace 
through strength.
  We cannot allow this authority to expire. It would be foolhardy and 
reckless to do so.
  So President Trump has asked us to reauthorize FISA section 702, and 
I hope all of our colleagues in both Chambers will not tie the 
President's hands behind his back while we have Americans in active 
combat overseas.
  And we need this essential intelligence in order to protect our 
people and our homeland.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Banks). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

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