[Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 75 (Wednesday, April 29, 2026)]
[House]
[Pages H3160-H3168]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
FALLEN SERVICEMEMBERS RELIGIOUS HERITAGE RESTORATION ACT
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1224, I call up
the bill (S. 1318) to direct the American Battle Monuments Commission
to establish a program to identify American-Jewish servicemembers
buried in United States military cemeteries overseas under markers that
incorrectly represent their religion and heritage, and for other
purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1224, an
amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of text of Rules
Committee Print 119-27, modified by the amendment printed in Part C of
House Report 119-628, is adopted, and the bill, as amended, is
considered read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:
S. 1318
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Foreign Intelligence
Accountability Act''.
SEC. 2. CIVIL LIBERTIES REVIEW OF FBI QUERIES.
(a) Requirement.--Subsection (f)(3) of section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1881a) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (D)--
(A) by redesignating clauses (iv) through (vi) as clauses
(v) through (vii), respectively;
(B) by inserting after clause (iii) the following new
clause:
``(iv) Monthly civil liberties review.--A requirement that
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on a monthly basis,
provides to the Civil Liberties Protection Officer within the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence the written
statements regarding each United States person query
submitted in the previous month under clause (iii).'';
(C) in clause (vi), as so redesignated, by striking
``(iv)'' and inserting ``(v)''; and
(D) by conforming the margin of clause (vii), as so
redesignated, to the margin of the other clauses; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(E) Civil liberties reviews and investigations.--
``(i) Civil liberties protection officer.--The Civil
Liberties Protection Officer within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence shall review each written
statement regarding a United States person query submitted
under subparagraph (D)(iv) to determine whether the query
meets the standards required by the procedures adopted under
paragraph (1). If the Civil Liberties Protection Officer
determines that the query did not meet such standards or
there exists possible abuses of civil liberties and privacy,
the Civil Liberties Protection Officer shall refer the query
to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
``(ii) Inspector general of the intelligence community.--
The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
determine whether each query referred under clause (i)
constitutes a violation of laws, rules, or regulations or an
abuse of authority.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--The National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 103D (50 U.S.C. 3029)--
(A) in subsection (b)--
(i) in paragraph (6), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(ii) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (8); and
(iii) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new
paragraph (7):
``(7) review each written statement submitted to the Civil
Liberties Protection Officer under section 702(f)(3) of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1881a(f)(3)); and''; and
(B) in subsection (c), by inserting before the period at
the end the following: ``, and, based on the reviews
specified in paragraph (7) of such subsection, shall make
referrals to the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community under section 702(f)(3) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(f)(3))''; and
(2) in section 103H(g)(3)(A) (50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)(A)), by
inserting after ``and safety'' the following: ``(including
with respect to referrals from the Civil Liberties Protection
Officer pursuant to section 702(f)(3) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1881a(f)(3))''.
SEC. 3. CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF PROHIBITION ON
QUERIES.
(a) In General.--Section 709 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881h) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``unauthorized disclosure''
and inserting ``unauthorized disclosure and other actions'';
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking ``if that person knowingly'' and inserting
the following: ``if that person--''
``(1) knowingly'';
(B) by striking ``party.'' and inserting ``party;''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) while serving as an employee or officer of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, knowingly and willfully
violates the querying procedures adopted under section
702(f)(1)(A) relating to United States person queries; or
``(3) knowingly and willfully falsifies or materially
misrepresents complying with the procedures or requirements
for querying information acquired under section 702(a).'';
and
(3) in subsection (b)--
(A) by striking ``offense in this section'' and inserting
the following: ``offense--
``(1) in paragraph (1) of subsection (a)'';
(B) by striking ``title 18'' and inserting ``title 18,
United States Code'';
(C) by striking ``both.'' and inserting ``both; and''; and
[[Page H3161]]
(D) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) in paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (a), shall be
fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not
more than 5 years, or both.''.
(b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents at
the beginning of such Act is amended by striking the item
relating to section 709 and inserting the following new item:
``Sec. 709. Penalties for unauthorized disclosure and other actions.''.
SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR TARGETING UNITED STATES PERSONS UNDER
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF
1978.
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(o) Fourth Amendment Requirement for Targeting United
States Persons.--
``(1) Prohibition on targeting united states persons.--In
accordance with subsection (b), no officer or employee of the
United States Government may intentionally target a United
States person for an acquisition under section 702.
``(2) Order requirements for targeting united states
persons.--In accordance with the other provisions of this Act
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, with respect to
a United States person, the United States Government may
seek--
``(A) an order authorizing electronic surveillance in
accordance with title I;
``(B) an order authorizing a physical search in accordance
with title III;
``(C) an order authorizing an acquisition in accordance
with section 703, 704, or 705; or
``(D) a warrant issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure by a court of competent jurisdiction.''.
SEC. 5. ATTENDANCE PROCEDURES FOR MEMBER ACCESS TO THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT AND
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT OF
REVIEW.
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Attorney General shall--
(1) revoke the procedures issued by the Attorney General on
or before December 31, 2025, pursuant to section 5(d) of the
Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (Public Law
118-49; 50 U.S.C. 1803 note); and
(2) issue new procedures that comply with such section and
ensure the access of the Members of Congress and staff
specified in such section to any proceeding of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court or any proceeding of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.
SEC. 6. REQUIREMENT FOR ATTORNEY APPROVAL OF FBI QUERIES
USING UNITED STATES PERSON QUERY TERM.
Section 702(f)(3)(A)(i) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(f)(3)(A)(i)) is
amended by striking ``supervisor (or employee of equivalent
or greater rank) or''.
SEC. 7. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AUDIT OF TARGETING
PROCEDURES UNDER SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
(a) Audit.--The Comptroller General of the United States
shall conduct an audit of the targeting procedures used for
acquisitions under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a), including the
technical mechanisms, implementation, and operations used by
the Federal Government for targeting capabilities.
(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit
to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate a report containing the results
of the audit required by subsection (a), including an
analysis of whether the targeting procedures as implemented
are appropriately limiting targeting under section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1881a) to non-United States persons located outside of the
United States.
SEC. 8. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITIES OF TITLE VII OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
(a) Extension of Repeal Date of Title VII.--Section 403(b)
of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-261), as
most recently amended by Public Law 119-84, is further
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1) (50 U.S.C. 1881 note) by striking
``April 30, 2026'' and inserting ``April 30, 2029''; and
(2) in paragraph (2) (18 U.S.C. 2511 note), in the matter
preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``April 30, 2026''
and inserting ``April 30, 2029''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall take effect on the earlier of the date of the enactment
of this Act or April 29, 2026.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for
1 hour, equally divided among and controlled by the chair and the
ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary, or their
respective designees, and the chair and the ranking minority member of
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, or their respective
designees.
The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Jordan), the gentleman from Maryland
(Mr. Raskin), the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Crawford), and the
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Himes) each will control 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
General Leave
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and
to insert extraneous material on S. 1318.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Ohio?
There was no objection.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, it ain't the same FISA. When we were in this Chamber 2
years ago debating a reauthorization of FISA 702, the program was
significantly different than it is today.
In 2021, the FBI reported conducting nearly 3 million U.S. person
queries. An audit of those queries found that 278,000 times, they did
not comply with the rules, didn't follow the rules. FBI agents ran
queries on protesters, donors to congressional campaigns, public
officials, journalists, colleagues, and even ex-girlfriends.
In response to those abuses, Congress enacted the Reforming
Intelligence and Securing America Act. The House Judiciary Committee,
the House Intelligence Committee, all of Congress, put together that
law that contained 56 different reforms, things like new training and
approval requirements before a U.S. person query could even take place,
audit requirements, accountability measures for those who misused the
program, and enhanced reporting and transparency requirements such as
allowing certain Members of Congress and staff to attend FISA court
proceedings.
We are beginning to see the effect of those reforms. In the year
after RISAA was passed, the FBI reported conducting 9,089 U.S. person
queries. Of those roughly 9,000 queries, just 127 did not comply with
the rules.
Think about it: from 278,000 to 127. That is real improvement. That
is a different program. Most of those 127 were due to errors like
typos, clerical errors.
Due to the improved reporting and transparency required by RISAA,
Congress has more insight than ever into the program's operation.
Today, every single U.S. person query conducted by the FBI is audited
to ensure compliance with applicable requirements and legal standards.
The results of those audits and other information are provided to
Congress on an annual, semiannual, and quarterly basis.
The Foreign Intelligence Accountability Act would add to those
reforms. The legislation in front of us, for example, adds the Civil
Liberties Protection Officer within the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence who will conduct a monthly review of FBI U.S.
person queries.
I think this is the best thing we put in the reauthorization bill,
this 30-day look back on how the queries are going, are they following
the rules, and what took place in those actual searches.
Queries that violate the rules would be referred to the inspector
general of the intelligence community for further investigation. That
is, again, a couple more layers of accountability.
This bill would also impose criminal penalties for those who
knowingly conduct improper queries and those who lie about conducting
improper queries.
Finally, the bill would require that an FBI attorney, rather than
just some other agent or supervisor, approve any U.S. person search
before they are conducted.
The 702 program is incredibly important for protecting our national
security and advancing our interests abroad.
In light of the progress that has been made and the threats that we
face, we think the bill before us today makes sense right now.
That does not mean our job is over. The Judiciary Committee will
continue to conduct aggressive oversight of FISA, and we will continue
to work on some things that we think can be helpful in the future.
Again, today is not 2024. I urge my colleagues to support the bill,
and I reserve the balance of my time.
[[Page H3162]]
{time} 1600
Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I urge all of our colleagues, with constitutional
patriotism still beating in their hearts after this tortured and
demeaning and visibly transactional process we have seen today, to
oppose the legislation.
This bill is a 3-year permission slip and blessing for the Trump
administration and the next administration to keep abusing the sweeping
FISA section 702 surveillance authority to spy on American citizens'
private communications and to violate the privacy rights of the people.
I want every Member of this body to be clear on exactly what is in
this bill. It has no warrant requirement for queries of U.S. citizens.
It has no probable cause requirement. It provides for no judicial
oversight of these government queries.
It subjects U.S. citizens to completely subconstitutional standards,
avoiding the Fourth Amendment entirely. It is in a parallel universe
from the Constitution--or perhaps I should say a perpendicular universe
to the Constitution.
The Constitution interposes a judge--a neutral, independent
magistrate--between the government and a search of persons and their
things. This 3-year blank check to Trump, Patel, and company leaves the
executive branch free to conduct these searches with self-reporting and
self-policing as the sole protection against their abuse of the section
702 program.
Without any meaningful guardrails, this U.S. person information
collected under foreign intelligence standards that have nothing to do
with the Fourth Amendment is ripe for abuse. It has been systematically
abused to spy on American citizens in the past, and it will be used in
exactly the same way by Kash Patel and Todd Blanche in the future if we
pass this bill.
Last week, it came to light that FBI Director Kash Patel was unhappy
about a New York Times article, which focused on the fact that he had
used FBI SWAT teams and jets to chauffeur his girlfriend around the
country at taxpayer expense.
What did he do? He didn't decide to change his policy on how he uses
the people's resources. Instead, he had his agents query FBI databases
for dirt on the reporter.
Was the FISA section 702 program one of the databases he searched?
The FBI says no. He just searched every other database at the FBI. We
have no idea because they don't have to go to a judge before searching
an American citizen's information.
We depend now, in this system, on Kash Patel to be the check and
balance against Kash Patel. We only know about the fact that it even
happened because a reporter got the information. Otherwise, we wouldn't
even have known anything about it.
Let it be a warning to people vigilant about our civil rights and
privacy, about what actually goes on.
Even Republicans on the Rules Committee last night were registering
their displeasure with these reports.
Look, the FISA section 702 program has been misused and abused under
every section. Section 702 authorizes the government to collect
information from electronic communication companies in the U.S. about
non-U.S. persons who are physically outside the U.S. When the
government gets communications to and from these foreign targets, it
also incidentally collects large amounts of information about American
citizens.
In 2022, the FISC, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
detailed a historical pattern of noncompliant queries at the FBI.
Improper searches swept in elected officials, political campaign
donors, Black Lives Matter protesters, and many others.
At other agencies, analysts used section 702 to query their own
names, the names of their relatives, and even the names of former
romantic partners.
Just last month, Federal judges on the FISC issued an opinion to
sound the alarm about how the FBI is currently abusing FISA, violating
the law and flouting the safeguards Congress imposed 2 years ago to
snoop on Americans' private communications. The administration is
deliberately keeping this opinion totally classified in a basement SCIF
here at the House.
Reforms that we made during the last FISA section 702
reauthorization, which I strongly supported and voted for--unlike my
friend Chairman Jordan--those reforms relied on internal watchdogs and
required agencies to track and report the use of section 702 data to
spy on Americans.
I strongly supported that reform, but, 1 year and change into the
Trump administration, the watchdogs are all but gone. After returning
to the White House, President Trump quickly removed the internal
watchdogs charged with verifying FBI's representations that the reforms
are working; he illegally fired a majority of the members of the
independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; and his
Department of Justice reassigned other key compliance personnel. The
watchdogs have been removed from the scene of the crimes.
The administration repeatedly claims that FBI compliance exceeded 99
percent in 2024 and 2025. Even if those claims are true--and I
seriously doubt it--that is an admission that the FBI has illegally
accessed the data of thousands of American citizens.
More importantly, these numbers are based on the violations and
abuses that Kash Patel and Todd Blanche are willing to identify
themselves and self-report. How can we believe these numbers when the
administration has returned all the watchdogs to the pound? They are no
longer there.
The FISC judges warned us just last month that the FBI is abusing its
authorities to spy on Americans, so what makes us think that a 3-year
blank check renewal will lead to self-correction?
Proponents of the bill claim that it protects privacy, but asking
Kash Patel's FBI to self-report abuses of our civil liberties to Tulsi
Gabbard's DNI is like asking Donald Trump to self-report his collection
of millions of dollars from foreign governments directly to the U.S.
Congress. That is actually the law under Article I, Section 9 of the
Constitution, the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Yet, he has never once
come to ask for our permission for him to keep a foreign government
emolument, whether pocketed through the Trump Hotels, the Trump golf
courses, or the other Trump enterprises in crypto coins and scams, and
so on.
If you think self-reporting is working well under the foreign
government Emoluments Clause, go ahead and vote for self-reporting
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. For me, I am sticking
with the Fourth Amendment and the Constitution. Under our Constitution,
it is judges, not FBI agents or government lawyers, who must protect
our privacy and our civil liberties.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California
(Ms. Lofgren).
Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to reauthorizing FISA
section 702 without meaningful reform.
At a time when the Trump administration is building a sweeping
surveillance apparatus, trampling civil rights, and disregarding the
rule of law, Congress should be strengthening oversight, not
rubberstamping warrantless surveillance.
If the government wants to search an American's private
communications, it must get a warrant. That is what the Constitution
requires, and it is what the American people demand.
Once again, our Speaker is trying to block debate and deny a vote on
a warrant requirement. Instead, we are trying to jam through another
extension of warrantless surveillance without meaningful reforms.
I have opposed this abuse under both Republican and Democratic
administrations, and I oppose it today.
Congress should reject this bill and take up meaningful reform,
including my bipartisan Government Surveillance Reform Act, introduced
with Representative Davidson, along with Senator Wyden and Senator Lee
in the other body.
We do not have to choose between national security and constitutional
rights. That is a false choice. We can protect the country and protect
Americans' constitutional right to privacy. Congress should do both.
Mr. Speaker, oppose this bill so we can get meaningful reform.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
[[Page H3163]]
{time} 1610
Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, FISA section 702 can be a powerful tool
against foreign threats, but without significant guardrails against
abuse, it is also a massive threat to the privacy and civil liberties
of all Americans. That is why I must oppose this legislation.
I have worked for many years, in a bipartisan fashion, to include
major reforms to section 702, and I was looking forward to working with
my colleagues again to strengthen these protections during this
reauthorization.
However, the new provisions in this bill are simply a fig leaf and do
not represent real reform. In particular, the supposed new warrant
requirement is nothing more than a restatement of current law and
completely misses the point of reform.
It is already unlawful to target the communications of Americans
under section 702. That is not the problem. The problem is what to do
with the massive amounts of U.S. person information that is swept up
along with foreign communications.
The intelligence community is not supposed to search this data except
under strict protocols. Yet we know that these protocols are violated
all the time.
The only solution is to require a probable cause warrant if the
government wants to search the 702 database for U.S. person
information. That is what this debate is about, and that is the bare
minimum demanded by the Fourth Amendment.
The Trump administration's argument appears to be: Trust us. However,
that is not good enough for any administration, and especially not for
this administration, which has already shown a shocking disregard for
Americans' civil liberties.
Mr. Speaker, we should get this right. We should work together, as we
have in the past, to strike the right balance between security and
liberty. We should put in a probable cause warrant requirement. Until
then, vote ``no'' on this legislation.
Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Washington (Ms. Jayapal).
Ms. JAYAPAL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this bill to
reauthorize FISA with no reforms. I have long worked on bipartisan
reforms that protect the privacy of Americans, and, frankly, I am sad
that some of my colleagues across the aisle who were part of that
struggle have caved to Donald Trump.
However, the reality is that Americans across the political spectrum
out there, outside of Congress, want us to reform FISA so that the
government does not spy on them. That has never been more necessary
than right now as Donald Trump and Stephen Miller openly use domestic
surveillance to suppress our rights.
Trump blacklisted Anthropic for refusing to drop its condition that
their AI technology never be used to facilitate domestic mass
surveillance targeting Americans. Law enforcement has used Americans'
sensitive data to punish women seeking reproductive care, and ICE has
deliberately used data to suppress First Amendment activity.
Why is it so hard for the majority to just assure Americans that the
FBI will get a damn warrant to access their sensitive data?
Americans don't want to be spied on, and I have been consistent on
this, pushing Democratic Presidents and Republican Presidents.
Mr. Speaker, this bill continues to allow the FBI to spy on you and
offers zero reforms. Vote ``no.''
Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, the key point is this: Under this bill, FBI agents can
still collect, search, and review Americans' communications without any
review from a judge. It is the heart of the Fourth Amendment, Mr.
Speaker, that search warrants have to be based upon probable cause, and
you have to go to a judge to get a search warrant before you can invade
the private expectations of the people in their places and in their
things.
This bill leaves intelligence agencies in charge of policing their
own compliance with the law. Asking Kash Patel to self-report his
abuses to Tulsi Gabbard does nothing to protect the civil liberties of
Americans.
That is not how our Constitution was designed. The whole reason we
have the courts involved is to make sure that the executive branch
doesn't get to be its own check and balance against itself.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I would just point out that I think one of the reasons
they attack Mr. Patel so darned much is because crime is down in the
country. He is actually doing his job.
I think another reason they like to attack the Director of the FBI is
because he is the guy who uncovered what they were doing 10 years ago
when he was a staffer here on the House Intelligence Committee. It was
Kash Patel who told us that the dossier, paid for by the Clinton
campaign, was a bunch of garbage. Yet that is exactly what Mr. Comey
used for the other part of FISA, title 1, to go get a warrant to spy on
the other party's campaign.
Maybe that is why they like to attack Director Patel so much. But I
think he is bringing down crime in our country, and I applaud him for
that.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, Kash Patel has been using government resources to
chauffeur his girlfriend all over the country. Then when it was learned
by the press that he was doing that, there was an article about it.
When he got mad about it, rather than say: Well, yeah, maybe there is
a problem using an FBI SWAT team to shepherd my girlfriend around the
country. Instead of changing the policy, he decided to go after the
reporter and search the databases on the FBI.
This is while we are debating FISA.
If you need any more vivid demonstration, Mr. Speaker, of the danger
of allowing law enforcement officials to govern themselves and to
regulate whether or not they are violating the Constitution, check that
out. We may disagree a lot about this FBI director's record. That is
not directly relevant to this point.
Say you trust him, we don't, but we know you haven't trusted other
people in the office before, Mr. Speaker. Let's legislate in a way that
is consistent with the Constitution of the United States.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, the reason why we have to hold fast to the
Constitution is precisely because we are all imperfect beings. I stood
strongly for FISA 702 last time without the necessity of a search
warrant because of all the reforms that I believed that the Biden
administration would engage in, and they basically engaged in them.
Now the Trump administration is in, and President Trump came in and
dismantled all of the safeguards we put in and just chased the
watchdogs out of the FBI. That is why we must stick very closely to the
Constitution, as my good friend, the chairman of the committee, argued
the last time we debated this. He has convinced a lot of people that we
need to stick to the Constitution. I am sorry we are not on the same
side today.
The key point is that we do not trust government officials to
regulate themselves. That is why law enforcement officers across the
country, FBI, have to go to a judge to get a Fourth Amendment search
warrant before they invade somebody's privacy unless there is exigency,
unless there is an emergency, and we have accounted for that. We can
deal with that problem.
Let's stick with the Constitution.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, FISA, as we all know, is a critical program. It is
important for our government to understand what bad guys are planning
to do to our citizens and to our Nation and to have this program in
place. That is why it is critical we reauthorize it.
We have made major changes over the last several years, not just 2
years ago, but over the last several years. The Judiciary Committee has
been involved in the oversight in making sure this program is done the
way it should be done and protecting Americans' liberties. There are 56
different reforms
[[Page H3164]]
we have put in the last reauthorization bill that, as I said in my
opening statement, we know have made a difference.
Today's program is different. It is different. We should reauthorize
it because FISA is critical. Today, there is training and checks on the
front end before a search can be done of a U.S. person. There is
transparency for the whole process in how it all works. There is
accountability on the back end if you don't do it right. Mr. Speaker,
this bill now says that accountability includes criminal penalties if
you don't do it right.
So this is the kind of legislation we need to pass, and we need to
pass it soon because they have been shutting down the government, the
Department of Homeland Security, for what, 74 days now?
By the way, we do also happen to be in the middle of a military
operation in Iran.
Let's get this done.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Meuser). The gentleman from Arkansas
(Mr. Crawford) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Himes) each will
control 15 minutes.
{time} 1620
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 1318, the Foreign Intelligence
Accountability Act. This legislation makes further reforms to section
702, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and reauthorizes the
authority for 3 years.
Originally authorized in 2008, section 702 allows the intelligence
community to gather foreign intelligence on foreign targets based
overseas. Targets of 702 are terrorists, hackers, and spies living
abroad. No U.S. citizen anywhere in the world can be targeted under
section 702.
I want to be very clear on this point. Section 702 is not a backdoor
surveillance tool that allows the government to collect and review an
American's emails or other electronic communications. The only U.S.
person data collected is if the terrorist, spy, or hacker targeted
under 702 is talking to an American or about an American. In that case,
only the communications held in the foreign target's accounts are
collected.
For the government to collect that American's communications, current
law already requires the government to get a warrant under different
FISA authorities.
Section 702 is one of our country's most important foreign
intelligence authorities.
In 2025, 100 percent of the President's intelligence priorities
reported on by the NSA were supported by section 702, and more than
one-quarter of all NSA reporting contains 702 information; 90 percent
of synthetic drug disruptions enabled by the CIA were supported by
section 702; and 63 percent of the intelligence products in the
President's daily brief contained section 702 information.
Reauthorizing FISA 702 is essential. In 2024, Congress reauthorized
section 702 through legislation known as RISAA. This legislation
included 56 reform measures that restricted FBI U.S. person queries,
implemented greater FBI accountability for any noncompliance, mandated
greater transparency across the IC and FISC, and included key reforms
to address abuses related to traditional FISA like we all witnessed in
the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane investigation.
The RISAA reforms resulted in a 94 percent drop in the number of FBI
U.S. person queries from 2022 to 2025, 119,300 down to 7,400. At the
same time, the FBI's compliance rate increased to 99 percent,
equivalent to other IC agencies.
Despite the efforts of FBI Director Patel to implement the reforms
and accountability, rebuilding trust will not happen quickly. For that
reason, working with Chairman Jordan and House leadership, I have met
with all unique groups across the Republican Conference over the past
several months to identify additional key reforms and to develop a
consensus product.
The reality is that no reauthorization effort would be likely to be
perfect in everyone's eyes, but this bill makes measurable reforms to
strengthen accountability and safeguards while maintaining the
criticality of the foreign intelligence tool.
Specifically, the bill before us: clarifies that no U.S. person can
be a target of 702 collection, and any targeting of a U.S. person
requires a warrant; establishes criminal penalties for intentional
abuse of FISA 702 queries and any false statements to the FISC;
mandates new procedures to allow Members to observe FISC hearings;
requires an FBI attorney review all FBI U.S. person queries; orders an
independent audit by the Government Accountability Office on 702
targeting procedures; and establishes an outside review and
authentication process of all FBI U.S. person queries by mandating the
ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer review FBI query
justifications.
With these important reforms, the bill includes a 3-year
reauthorization for FISA 702. The bottom line is that the importance of
this tool to U.S. national security cannot be overstated, and for that
reason, it is essential for Congress to reauthorize this authority.
On a 24/7 basis, we face the threat of cyberattacks from our
adversaries. We have U.S. military personnel and citizens being
targeted overseas. We have foreign terrorist organizations recruiting
Americans and plotting attacks on the homeland.
FISA 702 is a vital national security authority that enables the
intelligence community and military to mitigate and defeat these
threats. In fact, if the 702 tool had existed prior to 2001, we may
have been able to prevent September 11 from happening.
I urge all my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on S. 1318. Mr. Speaker, I
reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise in support of S. 1318, the Foreign Intelligence Accountability
Act.
I do so with some reluctance because the process that brought us here
has been indefensible. Two weeks ago, when we walked off the floor
after legislation to reauthorize 702 failed, Democrats made clear there
was an open door to negotiate a bipartisan package of real reforms,
perhaps one that would even pass on suspension in this Chamber. I have
been discussing this issue for months now with the ranking member of
the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Raskin, and it is clear to me that there
is a path to a bill that could do more than squeak through and only by
attaching unrelated legislation that may not pass the Senate.
However, we are where we are, and I am going to support this
legislation because in my decade on the House Intelligence Committee, I
have seen countless, countless instances where the intelligence
obtained through section 702 quite literally saved lives. Section 702
is the single most important foreign intelligence collection authority
we have, and every day it is used by apolitical professionals
throughout the IC and apolitical professionals at the FBI to keep
Americans safe here and abroad. There is no way to replace the value
that section 702 provides, and the loss of this authority would be
devastating.
Given the binary choice between reauthorization and expiration, the
responsible choice is reauthorization. As President Biden's
Intelligence Advisory Board put it: ``If Congress fails to reauthorize
section 702, history may judge the lapse of section 702 authorities as
one of the worst intelligence failures of our time.''
As I said at the outset, we should be considering a much broader
array of reforms than those in this package. For example, 2 weeks ago,
I proposed an amendment to the base bill in the Rules Committee that
would have created a judicial process for U.S. person queries conducted
by the FBI in the 702 database. I want to be clear that we have seen no
evidence--let me say that again, we have seen no evidence that this
administration is misusing section 702, but nonetheless, we must remain
hypervigilant, given the other abuses that we have seen from this
administration.
My amendment to Rules would have required a Federal court approval
before the FBI could access the results of a query it conducted
involving a U.S. person. I regret that my amendment as well as a range
of other ideas from Members on both sides of the aisle were not
considered as part of this process.
However, as I said, we now have a binary choice, and the reality is
that 2
[[Page H3165]]
years ago, Congress, on a bipartisan basis, with the support of more
than 70 percent of the Democratic Caucus, passed the Reforming
Intelligence and Securing America Act. That bill 2 years ago contained
over 50 major reforms, the bulk of which were intended to address the
longstanding and unacceptable issues of compliance at the FBI. Since
enactment, the evidence shows that those reforms have been highly
successful, with far fewer U.S. person queries conducted and with a
compliance rate at the FBI of 99 percent.
It is easy to dismiss those numbers, given the political leadership
of the FBI and the DOJ. I don't trust Director Patel any more than my
Democratic colleagues do.
On January 6, 5 years ago, I was in this Chamber when it was attacked
by the shock troops sent here to stop the peaceful transfer of power. I
sat there for half an hour as police officers with guns drawn tried to
defend our democracy, so I take a back seat to no one in my concern
about the abuses of this administration.
However, the data we have on FISA is based on oversight of the
professional and apolitical staff, not Kash Patel, the professional and
apolitical staff, who are there at the Department of Justice Office of
Intelligence, largely the same group of public servants who performed
this work under President Biden, and their findings are validated not
just by the Attorney General or Tulsi Gabbard or Kash Patel, but by
independent oversight, the DOJ's inspector general, the staff of the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court on an annual basis, and the Intelligence and
Judiciary Committees of both Chambers.
We are not trusting this administration. We are verifying in all
three branches of government. If we saw the slightest hint that these
authorities were being abused, I wouldn't be standing here today to
support this bill.
The legislation now before the House contains several reform
proposals. These proposals are modest and well short of what I would
like, but they are meaningful. Most importantly, the legislation
requires that all U.S. person queries of the 702 database by FBI be
reviewed by ODNI's Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer, and that any
improper queries be referred from there to the IG of the intelligence
community. This adds yet another layer of oversight of FBI on top of
internal oversight, DOJ oversight, which I may not trust, court
oversight, which I do trust, and congressional oversight which, yes, I
do trust, since I am involved in that. The legislation also adds new
criminal penalties for FBI employees who intentionally improperly use
section 702.
Finally, the legislation requires that only an FBI attorney can
approve a U.S. person query, building on a reform we made in 2024,
which required preapproval from either an FBI lawyer or an FBI
supervisor. Now, a lawyer is likely to be compliance focused rather
than operations focused the way a supervisor would be, and will be
especially careful and cautious before approving a proposed U.S. person
query.
{time} 1630
These are modest reforms, but they are not nothing. When viewed in
combination with the 50-plus reforms of 2024, Congress will have built
a substantial oversight structure around 702 to prevent abuse.
Section 702 is not a dragnet. It is not an authority that can be used
to surveil Americans. It does not contain any commercially acquired
information. It does not use artificial intelligence to analyze
collected data. Despite the fact that we have heard this word a lot
today, it is not unconstitutional. A Federal court certifies this
program every single year.
If this were deemed by the judiciary, the branch of government which
determines constitutionality, to be unconstitutional, we might have
heard that from the courts at some point in the last 18 years in which
they have been certifying this authority.
What it does have is an extremely robust set of oversight guardrails
in all three branches of government, and this bill makes those
guardrails marginally and modestly stronger. It is without question the
most important foreign intelligence tool we have.
Mr. Speaker, for those reasons, despite my frustration with the
process that has led us here, I will vote ``yes,'' and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. LaHood).
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of S. 1318,
the Foreign Intelligence Accountability Act, and I thank Chairman
Crawford for his leadership and steadfast support for reauthorization
of FISA 702.
During the last reauthorization in 2024, I and many other Members led
the committee's task force on FISA reforms, and I think it is important
to clarify what FISA 702 is and what it isn't.
FISA 702 cannot be used to target U.S. persons, period. Under current
Federal law, it is illegal to target U.S. persons under this authority.
Section 702 only allows for the collection on foreigners located
overseas and who are reasonably believed to possess certain types of
foreign intelligence information.
Throughout our reform process in 2024, we worked with our Judiciary
Committee colleagues and spent over a year working to address
unacceptable section 702 abuses by the FBI with the goal of preserving
constitutional liberties afforded to all U.S. persons, ensuring events
like Crossfire Hurricane never happen again, and holding the FBI
accountable.
The last reauthorization, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing
America Act, RISAA, targeted 56 reforms and meaningful changes to the
FBI. It is the largest reform to the FBI in a generation. The
Department of Justice Inspector General's Office has confirmed today
that the FBI has implemented all 56 of these requirements.
These requirements over the last 2 years have worked, by everybody's
account, holding the FBI accountable; increasing criminal penalties on
agents and analysts, making the FBI more compliant with what they have
to do; reforming the FISC, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court;
and a number of other reforms that are working.
I strongly believe the unintended consequences of letting FISA 702
expire would result in risking national security and making the United
States less safe for American families.
If we just look over the last year here, the strategic strike in
Venezuela, the Israeli hostages who were recovered from the tunnels in
Hamas, taking out Iran's nuclear capabilities and the success we have
had there, the taking out of drug cartel bosses in Mexico, going back
to the first administration and what happened with Soleimani and al-
Baghdadi, and many other instances that we can't talk about here, all
of it derived from FISA 702.
Prior to coming to Congress, I spent time as a Federal prosecutor and
the chief terrorism prosecutor in the U.S. Department of Justice. I
know firsthand how FISA can be used for the proper prosecution of
terrorists and non-U.S. citizens who want to harm America. Putting
people in jail who want to hurt America would not happen but for FISA
and section 702.
Today, FISA 702 delivers unique foreign intelligence that allows the
U.S. Government to better protect U.S. military forces abroad, disrupt
malicious hackers targeting U.S. infrastructure like emergency medical
services and transportation services, and thwart potential efforts by
terrorist groups that may be plotting attacks on our homeland.
Mr. Speaker, the bottom line is that FISA is an indispensable
national security tool. We ought to support this bill to protect
America and our citizens, and I urge its adoption.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the time remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Connecticut has 8 minutes
remaining.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the former majority leader of the House of
Representatives.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, when I was majority leader in 2008, Mr. Blunt, who was
then in the leadership of the Republican Party, Senator Kit Bond, and
Senator Jay Rockefeller, who co-chaired the Intel Committee in the
United States Senate, and I worked together in a very difficult
context.
That context was that the Bush administration had asked for
information
[[Page H3166]]
from the telecoms. The telecoms had given them information, and there
were really no firewalls as to what that information was.
The four of us worked with the Intelligence Committee of the House to
come up with legislation which would solve the problem of making sure
that we were secure as a country and that the privacy of our citizens
was secure. We think we accomplished that objective.
In fact, the leadership in the Senate voted for it. President Obama,
then a Member of the Senate, voted for it. Ms. Pelosi, Mr. Clyburn, and
I voted for it, along with others. The Republicans were overwhelmingly
for it.
In September 2012, we did it again. Ms. Pelosi, Mr. Hoyer, and Mr.
Clyburn voted for it. We did it again in January 2018, and Pelosi,
Hoyer, Clyburn, Ryan, McCarthy, and Scalise all voted for it.
The point I will make is, this has been a bipartisan process with
bipartisan Presidential buy-in to the necessity to have this
legislation adopted to keep Americans safe while also adopting
significant reforms in 2008 and some reforms thereafter to provide for
the privacy protections to the American people.
It is a balance, but it is a balance that I think we have achieved. I
think we ought to pass this legislation. I urge my colleagues to do so.
Our FISA reauthorization bills are how Congress ensures that our
Nation is protected in the first instance against threats from
terrorist groups and foreign adversaries. Our intelligence services
have the difficult task of catching threats before they materialize and
are providing critical information to national security leaders.
As many here will remember, the attacks of September 11, 2001,
occurred after our national security agencies failed to identify,
track, and coordinate known threats. Twenty-five years later, we have
learned these lessons, and we continue to grapple with essential
questions about how to balance the needs of our national security with
protecting Americans' liberties.
That is an ongoing process, of course, and I know Democrats on the
committee, led by Ranking Member Himes, were diligent in pushing for
reforms to section 702 that would make those protections stronger for
Americans while still delivering the tools needed. This bill does not
include all the reforms.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the
gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. HOYER. None of the bills that we consider have all the things we
would like to have in them, but in testimony from Avril Haines, who
headed up the DNI under the Biden administration, she believes this is
absolutely essential. Other members of the Obama administration and the
Biden administration believe this legislation is essential.
I believe this legislation is essential, and I urge my colleagues,
having worked on this since 2008, to adopt this legislation and make
America as safe as we possibly can.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the time remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Arkansas has 8 minutes
remaining.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Arkansas (Mr. Hill), the distinguished chairman of the Financial
Services Committee and member of HPSCI.
Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman and Mr.
Himes, too, for their joint leadership on this important task that we
have before us today.
Mr. Speaker, here on the eve of 25 years since September 11, we come
to this House floor to, once again, ensure that we have the tools in
place to protect the homeland from foreign attacks.
Section 702 sets out these very specific boundaries and process where
the United States Government collects the electronic communications
from foreign nationals outside the U.S. It allows the U.S. to collect
that intelligence on bad actors to prevent the reoccurrence of 9/11,
but there is a lot of misinformation about section 702, Mr. Speaker.
{time} 1640
First, it is used to surveil foreign nationals abroad. It is not
targeted at Americans.
Secondly, it is not warrantless surveillance. There is a fundamental
misunderstanding of this program.
Warrant requirements are created under the Fourth Amendment. They
apply inside the United States. This is not a program that operates
within the boundaries of the United States. It targets foreign
nationals outside of the United States.
This is so important, as demonstrated by Mr. Hoyer, that we have
clear, active protections on how this program is used to target foreign
nationals with those protections to protect Americans' privacy under
the Fourth Amendment. This bill is that balance, as described by the
gentleman from Connecticut and my colleague from Arkansas.
Mr. Speaker, let's put America's safety first. Let's keep the
homeland security paramount. It is critical. Let's support and pass S.
1318. I urge my colleagues to join me in that effort.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Raskin), my good friend and the ranking member of the
Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, yes, it is foreign intelligence, which is why when it
comes to U.S. persons--U.S. citizens--the Fourth Amendment has to
apply. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), my distinguished
colleague, said that the legislation is bipartisan.
I tell you what else was bipartisan--in fact, unanimous: the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution. Everybody got behind that. We are
assured that there is reporting, but it is self-reporting. The
distinguished ranking member says that it is by nonpolitical staff.
Yes, the nonpolitical staff left over after Kash Patel fired
everybody at the FBI who they considered insufficiently loyal to MAGA
and to Donald Trump and for those who worked on the January 6 case.
Then, we are told that the courts still can get involved at some
point. Well, the courts are telling us right now that the FBI has been
secretly breaking the law. Last month, the FISC court found that many
of the government's 702 searches violated Federal law. We should be
paying close attention to that as we move forward.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Fitzpatrick), the distinguished chair of the CIA
Subcommittee on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Speaker, of all of the debates that we have had
on this House floor, I have yet to be so perplexed as I am with this
one. There is so much conflation going on between title I, traditional
FISA, and title VII, section 702. There is so much conflation over the
collection of evidence versus the querying of already lawfully
collected data. Everybody in this Chamber has been talking past each
other for years on this issue.
The Fourth Amendment applies to the collection of evidence. That has
been the case from the very founding of our country. This so-called
warrant requirement, Mr. Speaker, what they are asking for is a double
warrant requirement. A warrant requirement is on the collection of
evidence.
They are seeking to attach a warrant requirement to the querying of
already lawfully collected data. That is a secondary warrant
requirement, the first time in American history that we would ever be
doing such a thing. That would shut down the law enforcement system.
You would have to expand the Federal judiciary by a factor of 100 to
keep up with that work, and it would put us on pre-9/11 footing. We
cannot do that.
By the way, after we passed RISAA--56 reforms, by the way--the 2-year
report card is in. There are zero abuses. Even though that is the case,
we still went further in this bill before the House today and
reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment protections will always apply to
702 queries, in addition to all of the other reforms.
I cannot, for the life of me, understand what is left to object to on
this tool because I can promise you that if we were having this debate
a week after 9/11, there wouldn't be a single soul on this floor voting
against this bill.
[[Page H3167]]
Let us not drop our guard just because we are several decades past 9/
11 because we never ever want to see that happen again.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to take just a minute here to address the
question of the Fourth Amendment. Every Member in this Chamber swears
an oath to support the Constitution, and it is important in this debate
to remember that all of us care profoundly about the Fourth Amendment.
I think it is wrong to suggest that the opposite is the case.
I want to draw an analogy for people who may be watching. In the law
enforcement context, which is more familiar to most Americans than 702
is, a probable cause Fourth Amendment warrant is required. You have to
get from the judge a Fourth Amendment warrant to take, for example, a
wiretap on somebody that you suspect of selling fentanyl.
Let's just imagine under my example that Bill Smith is suspected of
selling fentanyl, and law enforcement goes in front of a judge and gets
a warrant to wiretap Bill Smith.
Now, Bill Smith, as the police listen, is talking to his brother, Joe
Smith, and Joe Smith says, I will help you sell that fentanyl.
The police don't need another warrant on Joe Smith. That has been
incidentally collected, and no court has ever held that Joe Smith's
admission and incidental collection requires the Fourth Amendment for
that to be used as evidence in court, which is the argument that the
opponents of U.S. person queries are making.
I am not here to say that this is uncontroversial. We have to be
obsessed with the protection of Americans' data, but let's not suggest
that this is unconstitutional because it has had annual reviews by a
Federal court. You might have thought that in 18 years, if a Federal
court had thought that this was unconstitutional, they might not have
certified. Let us not say that this authority should be subject to a
radically different standard than a typical law enforcement warrant
would be.
Lastly, I want to make this point. One of the reasons that we are
hesitant to rush into a warrant is because many U.S. person queries are
not done because we believe that an individual is complicit in a crime.
If we hear ISIS talking about Jim Himes, it is unlikely that I am
complicit in terrorism. It is quite likely that I may be a victim, and
the FBI and Jim Himes would like to know that if that is the case.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time is
remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Arkansas has 5 minutes
remaining.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Jackson), the chair of the Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee on the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.
Mr. JACKSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act is a unique and critical tool that
enables our intelligence community to gather vital intelligence,
protect our national security, and safeguard Americans from terrorist
attacks. No other foreign intelligence authority or any other means of
collection can replace the speed and agility of section 702.
If this authority expires, we will substantially degrade U.S.
national security and our intelligence officers' ability to identify
foreign threats in real time.
Last Congress, House Republicans delivered critical reforms, as we
referred to, in section 702--56, in fact--and this bill builds on that
progress by strengthening privacy protections for Americans, while
ensuring the tool precisely targets foreign persons and only foreign
persons who pose a threat to the United States.
As President Trump, Chairman Dan Caine, Director Ratcliffe, and many
other national security leaders, including Ranking Member Himes, have
stated, this 3-year extension is essential to protect our homeland, our
warfighters, and U.S. personnel stationed abroad, especially in today's
volatile global threat environment.
Mr. Speaker, we must pass this bill. If we do not, we will get
something from our colleagues in the Senate that will be far, far
inferior, and those who truly care about national security in this body
on both sides of the aisle who may be contemplating a ``no'' vote will
regret such a vote.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues on both sides to vote for this
bill.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time is
remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Connecticut has 1 minute
remaining.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentlewoman from New York (Ms. Tenney).
Ms. TENNEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 1318, the Foreign Intelligence
Accountability Act. This legislation will extend FISA section 702 for
another 3 years.
This law is an essential national security tool. You don't need any
more evidence. Mr. Speaker, the President of the United States, our
Commander in Chief, both of us who hail from New York, understand that
FISA section 702 is a vital tool that allows the U.S. to gather
intelligence on dangerous foreign adversaries.
After speaking with our military leaders, President Trump recently
commented: Not one said, even tacitly, that they can do without FISA
section 702.
President Trump also said that FISA section 702 is one of the reasons
we have had such tremendous success on the battlefield as we pursue
this war in the Middle East.
Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support our military,
protect our national security, and vote ``yes'' on this critically
important section.
{time} 1650
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers. I am prepared
to close, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the Intelligence Committee for
his friendship and partnership, which I value.
This program is controversial for all the right reasons, and what we
are doing here is what we have been doing for almost 20 years, which is
finding the balance between an authority that keeps not just us but the
world safe and protecting the civil liberties of Americans whose
information is incidentally collected just as it is collected when
there is a traditional police wiretap.
I wish we had had a more fulsome process. I wish I had been able to
work with Ranking Member Raskin to have a more robust package of
safeguards, particularly in the context of an administration that has
demonstrated day in and day out their lawlessness, but we are where we
are, and it is a binary choice. Allowing this authority to expire,
which I think we are close to, is not an option.
Let's acknowledge to each other that this is not an unconstitutional
authority but that we have work to do to continue to protect the civil
liberties of Americans and move forward passing this bill with an eye
toward what we can do in the coming years to make sure this is a better
balanced authority.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. I
thank the ranking member, my friend from Connecticut, for his comments.
FISA 702 is a critical foreign intelligence tool. There is no other
authority that can replicate the value, speed, and agility of this
authority.
Two years ago, Congress enacted 56 reform measures focused on section
702, U.S. person queries and other FISA transparency and accountability
measures. These measures have forced meaningful change at the FBI. The
bill before us continues the 2024 reforms and includes additional
privacy and civil liberty protections and transparency measures.
Before closing, I want to express my appreciation to Chairman Jordan
for
[[Page H3168]]
working with me on this effort over the last several months. I thank
the members of the House Intelligence Committee, many of whom have
spoken today on behalf of this bill, for their oversight on section 702
and other foreign intelligence authorities.
I also thank the fantastic staff in the Office of House Legislative
Counsel, especially Philip Bayer, Toby Dorsey, and Tony Sciascia.
I thank the HPSCI majority staff, including Griffin Decker, Ryan
Breitenbach, Jonah Shumate, Laura Casulli, and Mandy Bowers.
I thank the Members who dedicated countless hours to the process of
hammering this out who attended the meetings, whose input we heard and
whose input we value. I thank them, and I urge a ``yes'' vote on S.
1318.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 1224, the previous question is ordered
on the bill, as amended.
The question is on the third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be read a third time, and was read the third
time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, this 15-
minute vote on passage of S. 1318 will be followed by a 5-minute vote
on adoption of S. Con. Res. 33.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 235,
nays 191, not voting 4, as follows:
[Roll No. 142]
YEAS--235
Aderholt
Aguilar
Alford
Allen
Amodei (NV)
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Baird
Balderson
Barr
Baumgartner
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NAYS--191
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NOT VOTING--4
Kean
Langworthy
Loudermilk
Wilson (FL)
{time} 1725
Ms. WILLIAMS of Georgia and Mr. DOWNING changed their vote from
``yea'' to ``nay.''
Messrs. SOTO and VICENTE GONZALEZ of Texas, Ms. LOIS FRANKEL of
Florida, and Mr. WHITESIDES changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated for:
Mr. LANGWORTHY. Mr. Speaker, had I been present, I would have voted
YEA on Roll Call No. 142.
____________________