[Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 65 (Tuesday, April 14, 2026)]
[House]
[Pages H2856-H2874]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
{time} 1630
AIRSPACE LOCATION AND ENHANCED RISK TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 2026
Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the
bill (H.R. 7613) to require certain aircraft to be equipped with
collision mitigation technology, to improve helicopter route safety and
separation around airports, to update air traffic control processes and
procedures, to address national airspace system safety in Department of
Defense activities, and for other purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 7613
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Airspace
Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency Act of 2026'' or the
``ALERT Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings; sense of Congress.
TITLE I--CIVIL AVIATION MATTERS
Sec. 101. Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xa inhibit altitude.
Sec. 102. Airborne Collision Avoidance System upgrades.
Sec. 103. Airborne collision avoidance systems for rotorcraft.
Sec. 104. Collision prevention systems.
Sec. 105. Prohibition on certain use of ADS-B data.
Sec. 106. Rulemaking accountability.
Sec. 107. Time-on-position limits.
Sec. 108. Controller threat and error management training.
Sec. 109. Controller visual separation training.
Sec. 110. Safety risk assessment tool.
Sec. 111. Operational rates at Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport.
Sec. 112. Time-based flow management.
Sec. 113. Air traffic control facility levels.
Sec. 114. Working group to evaluate shared frequency around Ronald
Reagan Washington National Airport.
Sec. 115. Anti-blocking technology.
Sec. 116. Task force to identify improvements to air traffic controller
conflict alert system.
Sec. 117. Postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing.
Sec. 118. Further modifications to Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport area helicopter routes.
Sec. 119. Requiring vertical separation near airports during critical
phases of flight.
Sec. 120. Helicopter Route Chart annual review.
Sec. 121. Visual charts.
Sec. 122. Close proximity encounters.
Sec. 123. Notification of close proximity encounters and analysis of
data.
Sec. 124. Safety culture and safety management review.
Sec. 125. Documentation of control position combinations.
Sec. 126. Review of miles-in-trail procedures or agreements.
Sec. 127. Closure of Helicopter Route 4.
TITLE II--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MATTERS
Sec. 201. Department of Defense matters relating to aviation safety.
Sec. 202. Repeal of prior provision of law on manned rotary wing
aircraft safety.
Sec. 203. Treatment of superseded memorandum of agreement and provision
of law.
Sec. 204. Report on communications degradation.
Sec. 205. Annual report on proficiency flights in National Capitol
Region.
Sec. 206. Briefing on virtual constructive training.
Sec. 207. Transparency regarding midair collision near Ronald Reagan
Washington National Airport on January 29, 2025.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) ADS-B in.--The term ``ADS-B In'' means technology that
receives and processes Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast transmissions that are broadcast in accordance with
part 91.225 and 91.227 of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations, and other aviation advisory information from
ground stations, including traffic information service-
broadcast (TIS-B) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Rebroadcast (ADS-R).
(2) Administrator.--The term ``Administrator'' means the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
(3) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate.
(4) Collision prevention technology.--The term ``collision
prevention technology'' means equipment, or a combination of
equipment, that--
(A) has ADS-B In;
(B) uses ADS-B data to provide the pilot and flight crew
with situational awareness of surrounding traffic and traffic
advisories; and
(C) provides, and is configured to provide, alerting that
is audible to the pilot and flight crew.
(5) FAA.--The term ``FAA'' means the Federal Aviation
Administration.
(6) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Transportation.
SEC. 3. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) On January 29, 2025, about 8:48 p.m. Eastern Standard
Time, a Sikorsky UH-60L operated by the United States Army
under the callsign PAT25 (Priority Air Transport 25) and an
MHI RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CRJ700 operated by PSA
Airlines as American Airlines flight 5342, collided in flight
about 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington
National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the
Potomac River in southwest Washington, D.C.
(2) The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers
onboard the airplane and 3 crewmembers onboard the helicopter
died.
(3) This tragedy represents the deadliest aviation disaster
in the United States since the crash of American Airlines
Flight 587 in 2001 and the first fatal major commercial
passenger flight accident in the United States since Colgan
Air Flight 3407 in 2009.
(4) Passengers aboard Flight 5342 included American
citizens from across the country and international travelers,
among them championship figure skaters and coaches returning
from competition, military servicemembers, and families
traveling for personal and professional reasons, each of whom
is mourned by loved ones.
[[Page H2857]]
(5) Crewmembers aboard Flight 5342 served their passengers
with professionalism and dedication and the three United
States Army soldiers aboard Priority Air Transport 25 gave
their lives in service to this Nation.
(6) Emergency responders from Alexandria City Fire
Department, Alexandria Police Department, Ann Arundel Fire
Department, Arlington County Fire & Rescue, Arlington County
Office of Emergency Management, Arlington Police Department,
Baltimore City Fire Department, Baltimore Police, Charles
County Fire and Rescue, DC Fire Department & EMS, DC
Metropolitan Police Department, Fairfax City Fire & Rescue,
Fairfax County Fire & Rescue Department, Federal Aviation
Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Maryland
Natural Resources Police, Maryland State Police, Metropolitan
Police Department, Montgomery County Fire and Rescue,
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA) Fire &
Rescue, MWAA Police, NCR-Incident Management Team, Office of
Chief Medical Examiner of the District of Columbia, Prince
George's County Fire & Rescue, Prince William Fire & Rescue,
U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S.
Coast Guard, U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage and Diving,
Virginia Department of Emergency Management, Virginia State
Police, and other local, state, and Federal agencies
conducted heroic rescue and recovery operations in frigid,
dangerous conditions--including near-freezing water
temperatures and strong winds--working tirelessly to recover
all 67 victims and reunite them with their loved ones.
(7) The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
immediately launched a full investigation and, on March 7,
2025, issued urgent safety recommendations to prohibit
operations on Helicopter Route 4 during simultaneous runway
operations, which the Department of Transportation and
Federal Aviation Administration promptly implemented.
(8) The NTSB held a public meeting on January 27, 2026,
where the NTSB determined that the probable cause of the
accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in
close proximity to a runway approach path; their failure to
regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available
data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate
the risk of a midair collision near DCA; as well as the air
traffic system's overreliance on visual separation in order
to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for
the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept.
(9) The NTSB determined that the lack of effective pilot-
applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, the tower
team's loss of situation awareness and degraded performance
due to the high workload of the combined helicopter and local
control positions and the absence of a risk assessment
process to identify and mitigate real-time operational risk
factors, and the Army's failure to ensure pilots were aware
of the effects of error tolerances on barometric altimeters
in their helicopters, were also causal to the collision.
(10) The NTSB further determined that contributing factors
included the limitations of the traffic awareness and
collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded
effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight
crews; an unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing
traffic volume with a changing fleet mix, and airline
scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strained the DCA
air traffic control tower workforce and degraded safety over
time; the Army's lack of a fully implemented safety
management system, which should have identified and addressed
hazards associated with altitude exceedances on the
Washington, DC, helicopter routes; the FAA's failure across
multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB
recommendations, including Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast In, and to follow and fully integrate its
established safety management system, which should have led
to several organizational and operational changes based on
previously identified risks that were known to management;
and the absence of effective data sharing and analysis among
the FAA, aircraft operators, and other relevant
organizations.
(11) The NTSB on January 27, 2026, adopted 74 findings and
issued 50 safety recommendations to the Department of
Transportation, the FAA, the United States Army, the
Department of Defense Policy Board on Federal Aviation, the
inspector general of the Department of Transportation, and
RTCA Program Management Committee to prevent similar
accidents in the future.
(12) The families of the victims have demonstrated
extraordinary courage and dignity in their grief, and have
called for accountability and systemic reform so that no
other family will endure such loss.
(13) Congress remains committed to ensuring that the
aviation system of the United States achieves the highest
possible standard of safety, and that the lessons of this
tragedy are fully learned and acted upon.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Congress mourns the loss of all 67 lives taken in the
midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport on January 29, 2025, and extends its deepest
condolences to the families, friends, and communities of all
those who perished;
(2) Congress honors the four crew members of American
Airlines Flight 5342 who served their passengers with
professionalism and dedication;
(3) Congress honors the three United States Army soldiers
aboard Priority Air Transport 25, who gave their lives in
service to this nation;
(4) Congress honors the passengers of Flight 5342,
including the figure skaters and coaches of the United States
figure skating community and all other individuals whose
lives, achievements, and contributions to their families and
communities are irreplaceable;
(5) Congress commends the first responders who worked with
valor and dedication under dangerous conditions to conduct
rescue and recovery operations in the Potomac River;
(6) Congress affirms its full support for the National
Transportation Safety Board, its mission of independent
accident investigation, and the integrity of its
investigative process, and herein the ALERT Act responds to
all of the 50 recommendations to prevent a similar tragedy
from reoccurring;
(7) Congress further commits to conducting rigorous
oversight to ensure accountability for implementing these
safety recommendations and ensuring the systemic failures
that contributed to this disaster are fully addressed; and
(8) Congress pledges, on behalf of the American people,
that the 67 lives lost on January 29, 2025, will not be
forgotten, and that their memory will be honored by this
Nation's commitment to an aviation system that is worthy of
the trust placed in it by every passenger who boards an
aircraft in the United States.
TITLE I--CIVIL AVIATION MATTERS
SEC. 101. AIRBORNE COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM XA INHIBIT
ALTITUDE.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall complete an
evaluation of the hazards and safety benefits of decreasing
the traffic advisory and resolution advisory inhibit
altitudes in Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xa
(hereinafter referred to as ``ACAS Xa'') to enable improved
alerting throughout more of the flight maneuvering envelope
of an aircraft than is required under the RTCA minimum
operational performance standards for the Airborne Collision
Avoidance System (DO-385A, issued June 22, 2023).
(b) Consultation.--In conducting the evaluation under
subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with
representatives of the following:
(1) Air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations, including regional air carriers and
air carriers with a low-cost or ultra-low-cost business
model.
(2) Air carriers operating under part 135 of title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations.
(3) Air carriers operating under part 91 of title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations.
(4) Cargo air carriers.
(5) Transport category aircraft manufacturers.
(6) General aviation aircraft manufactures.
(7) Avionics manufacturers.
(8) Exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic
controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United
States Code.
(9) Organizations representing certified collective
bargaining representatives of airline pilots.
(10) The certified bargaining representative of aviation
safety inspectors and engineers for the Federal Aviation
Administration.
(11) Aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of
human factors or human factors experts with specific
knowledge of aviation safety.
(12) Research institutions with relevant aviation safety or
human factors subject matter expertise.
(13) The National Transportation Safety Board.
(14) Any other stakeholders the Administrator determines
appropriate.
(c) Considerations.--In conducting the evaluation under
subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider, at a
minimum--
(1) safety benefits to the public, including reductions in
the probability of midair and near-midair collisions;
(2) the benefits and risks to the ability of pilots and air
traffic controllers to ensure operational safety;
(3) false, misleading, or potentially overlapping alerts or
resolution advisories;
(4) technological advances in software logic to limit
nuisance or false alerts;
(5) air traffic control procedures and the impact of such
procedures on pilots and air traffic controllers during
critical phases of flight;
(6) training requirements for pilots and air traffic
controllers;
(7) to the greatest extent practicable, human factors,
including products by working groups related to human factors
in aviation safety;
(8) research and simulations of reduced resolution advisory
inhibit altitudes conducted by the National Transportation
Safety Board pursuant to Aviation Investigation Report AIR-
26-02 adopted on January 27, 2026; and
(9) any other considerations the Administrator determines
appropriate.
SEC. 102. AIRBORNE COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM UPGRADES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 45 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall establish an
aviation rulemaking committee (in this section referred to as
the ``Committee'') to review and develop findings and
recommendations to require selected aircraft to be equipped
and operating with ACAS Xa that is--
[[Page H2858]]
(1) integrated and uses both ADS-B In and transponder
interrogations, as required under the RTCA minimum
operational performance standards for the Airborne Collision
Avoidance System (DO-385A, issued June 22, 2023); and
(2) is configured to provide visual and audible alerting to
the pilot and flight crew.
(b) Composition.--The Committee shall consist of members
appointed by the Administrator, including representatives
of--
(1) air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations, including regional air carriers and
air carriers with a low-cost or ultra-low-cost business
model;
(2) air carriers operating under part 135 of title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations;
(3) air carriers operating under subpart K of part 91 of
title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;
(4) business aviation operators;
(5) cargo air carriers;
(6) air ambulance operators;
(7) transport category aircraft manufacturers;
(8) general aviation aircraft manufactures;
(9) avionics manufacturers;
(10) supplemental type certificate holders;
(11) modification service providers;
(12) exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic
controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United
States Code;
(13) the certified bargaining representative of aviation
safety inspectors and engineers for the Federal Aviation
Administration;
(14) organizations representing certified collective
bargaining representatives of airline pilots;
(15) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of
human factors or human factors experts with specific
knowledge of aviation safety;
(16) research institutions with relevant aviation safety or
human factors subject matter expertise;
(17) a representative from the National Transportation
Safety Board with subject matter expertise as an observer;
and
(18) any other stakeholders the Administrator determines
appropriate.
(c) Considerations.--In developing the findings and
recommendations under subsection (a), the Committee shall
consider--
(1) the anticipated certification timeline for ACAS Xa
equipment given the technical complexity and requisite
procedures for approval;
(2) the feasibility of using the Line Replaceable Units of
existing collision avoidance systems in such aircraft;
(3) the feasibility of using existing antennas of existing
collisions avoidance systems in such aircraft;
(4) the commercial availability of all necessary components
associated with integrated ACAS Xa;
(5) actions the Administrator can take to prioritize the
certification and installation of integrated ACAS Xa;
(6) related changes that may be required for the operating
rules and training necessary for air traffic controllers,
pilots, and others;
(7) harmonization of global standards associated with
collision avoidance systems; and
(8) any other considerations the Committee or the
Administrator determines appropriate.
(d) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
establishment of the Committee, the Committee shall submit to
the Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress
a report containing the findings and recommendations of the
Committee.
(e) Rulemaking.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 18 months after the
submission of the report under subsection (d) or 32 months
after the date of enactment of this Act (whichever is
earlier), the Administrator shall issue a notice of proposed
rulemaking to prohibit persons from operating selected
aircraft unless such aircraft are equipped and operating with
ACAS Xa that--
(A) is integrated and uses both ADS-B In and transponder
interrogations, as required under the RTCA minimum
operational performance standards for the Airborne Collision
Avoidance System (DO-385A, issued June 22, 2023); and
(B) provides visual and audible alerting to the pilot and
flight crew.
(2) Contents.--The notice of proposed rulemaking described
in paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum--
(A) appropriate guidance for certification of ACAS Xa;
(B) a deadline, not to exceed December 31, 2031, for any
newly manufactured selected aircraft to be equipped with ACAS
Xa that reflects various aircraft types, appropriate
maintenance cycles, and required updates to appropriate
guidance after certification of ACAS Xa;
(C) a deadline, not to exceed December 31, 2031, for
existing selected aircraft to be retrofit with ACAS Xa that
reflects various aircraft types, appropriate maintenance
cycles, and required updates to appropriate guidance after
certification of ACAS Xa;
(D) if the new minimal operating performance standards
promulgated under subsection (f) require an upgrade of
software, an upgrade of hardware, or additional training, a
deadline for selected aircraft to be upgraded, not to exceed
December 31, 2033; and
(E) a process by which the Administrator may extend the
deadlines specified in subparagraphs (B) and (C), not to
exceed a period of 2 years, provided that the Administrator
provides a report to the appropriate committees of Congress
within 14 days of taking such action, with the reasons
justifying such action and an assurance that safety will not
be compromised by the delay.
(3) Final rule.--Not later than 1 year after the issuance
of the notice of proposed rulemaking required under paragraph
(1)(A), the Administrator shall issue a final rule to carry
out the requirements of this section.
(f) Modification of Minimal Operating Performance
Standards.--Not later than 30 days after the issuance of a
final rule under subsection (e), the Administrator shall work
with the appropriate standards-setting organization to update
the minimal operation standards for ACAS Xa to--
(1) if the evaluation conducted pursuant to section 101
determines that inhibit altitudes can be safely decreased,
safely decrease the inhibit altitude in accordance with the
results of such evaluation;
(2) update traffic advisory aural alert standards to
include clock position, relative altitude, range, and
vertical tendency; and
(3) integrate directional traffic symbols into visual
displays.
(g) Technical Assistance.--The Administrator shall provide
technical assistance for facilitating equipage across the
entire fleet of affected aircraft, including, as appropriate,
guidance under part 26 of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations, to provide support for affected aircraft
operators in complying with the requirements of this section.
(h) Selected Aircraft Defined.--In this section, the term
``selected aircraft'' means aircraft that are required to be
equipped with traffic alert and collision avoidance systems
as required in sections 121.356, 135.180, and 91.1045 of
title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
SEC. 103. AIRBORNE COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS FOR
ROTORCRAFT.
(a) In General.--Not later than December 31, 2026, the
Administrator shall take necessary action with the
appropriate standards-setting organization to finalize and
publish minimum operational performance standards for the
collision avoidance system known as ``Airborne Collision
Avoidance System Xr'' (in this section referred to as ``ACAS
Xr'') that uses both ADS-B In and a second independent source
of target aircraft data, such as transponder interrogations.
(b) ACAS Xr Aviation Rulemaking Committee.--
(1) Establishment.--Not later than 30 days after the date
on which the appropriate standards-setting organization
publishes minimal operational performance standards for ACAS
Xr under subsection (a), or January 31, 2027, (whichever is
earlier), the Administrator shall establish an aviation
rulemaking committee (in this section referred to as the
``Committee'') to review and develop findings and
recommendations to require selected rotorcraft and selected
powered-lift aircraft be equipped and operating with ACAS Xr
that has ADS-B In and is configured to provide visual and
audible alerting to the pilot and flight crew.
(2) Composition.--The Committee shall consist of members
appointed by the Administrator, including representatives
of--
(A) rotorcraft operating under part 135 of title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations;
(B) rotorcraft operating under part 91 of title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations;
(C) rotorcraft manufacturers;
(D) an organization representing rotorcraft operators and
pilots;
(E) an organization representing rotorcraft air medical
services;
(F) general aviation aircraft manufacturers;
(G) powered-lift aircraft operators and manufacturers;
(H) avionics manufacturers;
(I) supplemental type certificate holders;
(J) modification service providers;
(K) exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic
controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United
States Code;
(L) the certified bargaining representative of aviation
safety inspectors and engineers for the FAA;
(M) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of
human factors or human factors experts with specific
knowledge of aviation safety;
(N) a career representative from the National
Transportation Safety Board with subject matter expertise as
an observer; and
(O) any other stakeholders the Administrator determines
appropriate.
(3) Considerations.--In developing the findings and
recommendations required under paragraph (1), the Committee
shall consider--
(A) any anticipated modifications to the minimum
operational performance standards of ACAS Xr that are
required by subsection (c)(1)(B);
(B) the anticipated certification timeline for ACAS Xr
equipment given the technical complexity and requisite
procedures for approval;
(C) a projected deadline for equipping newly manufactured
selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft with
ACAS Xr that considers--
(i) the safety benefits of ACAS Xr;
(ii) the anticipated timeline needed for the FAA to approve
the installation of ACAS Xr on various rotorcraft and
powered-lift aircraft or for various operations;
(iii) the commercial availability of the necessary
components associated with ACAS Xr; and
(iv) the operational and technical considerations
associated with installing ACAS Xr on newly manufactured
selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft;
[[Page H2859]]
(D) a projected deadline to retrofit selected rotorcraft
and selected powered-lifted aircraft with ACAS Xr that
considers--
(i) the safety benefits of ACAS Xr;
(ii) the feasibility of using existing antennas of existing
collision prevention systems equipped in selected rotorcraft
and selected powered-lift aircraft;
(iii) the feasibility and cost associated with retrofitting
selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft not
equipped with existing collision avoidance systems;
(iv) the commercial availability of the necessary
components associated with ACAS Xr; and
(v) the operational and technical considerations associated
with retrofitting selected rotorcraft and selected powered-
lift aircraft;
(E) actions that the Administrator can take to prioritize
the certification and installation of ACAS Xr;
(F) the interaction of ACAS Xr with existing collision
prevention technologies;
(G) the efficacy of ACAS Xr in low-altitude and high-
density airspace environments;
(H) any available safety data assessing the effectiveness
of ACAS Xr in reducing midair collision risk;
(I) related training for air traffic controllers, pilots,
and others;
(J) National Transportation Safety Board Aviation
Investigation Report AIR-26-02 adopted on January 27, 2026;
and
(K) any other considerations the Committee determines
appropriate.
(4) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the establishment
of the Committee, the Committee shall submit to the
Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress a
report on the findings and the recommendations developed by
the Committee under this subsection.
(c) Rulemaking and Modification of Minimal Operating
Performance Standards.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 18 months after the
submission of the report required under subsection (b)(4), or
24 months after the date of enactment of this Act (whichever
is earlier), the Administrator shall--
(A) issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to prohibit
persons from operating selected rotorcraft and selected
powered-lift aircraft unless such rotorcraft or powered-lift
aircraft are equipped and operating with ACAS Xr that uses
both ADS-B In and transponder interrogations, as required
under the minimum operational performance standards as
required under subsection (a); and
(B) take necessary actions with the appropriate standards-
setting organization to modify the minimal operational
performance standards for ACAS Xr to--
(i) update traffic advisory aural alert standards to
include clock position, relative altitude, range and vertical
tendency; and
(ii) integrate directional traffic symbols into visual
displays.
(2) Contents.--The notice of proposed rulemaking required
under paragraph (1)(A) shall include, at a minimum--
(A) appropriate guidance for the certification of ACAS Xr
systems;
(B) defined standards for the modifications to such systems
described in paragraph (1)(B);
(C) a deadline for any newly manufactured selected
rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft to be equipped
with ACAS Xr, considering the findings and recommendations
developed pursuant to subsection (b);
(D) a deadline for selected rotorcraft and selected
powered-lift aircraft to be retrofit with ACAS Xr,
considering the findings and recommendations developed
pursuant to subsection (b); and
(E) a deadline for selected rotorcraft and selected
powered-lift aircraft to be equipped with collision
prevention technology pursuant to section 104, not to exceed
December 31, 2031.
(3) Final rule.--Not later than 18 months after the
issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking under paragraph
(1)(A), the Administrator shall issue a final rule associated
with such proposed rulemaking.
(d) Technical Assistance.--The Administrator shall provide
technical assistance to facilitating equipage across the
entire fleet of affected aircraft to provide support for
selected rotorcraft operators and selected powered-lift
aircraft operators in complying with the requirements of this
section.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Selected rotorcraft.--The term ``selected rotorcraft''
means a non-military rotorcraft operating in Class B
airspace.
(2) Powered-lift aircraft.--The term ``powered-lift
aircraft'' has the meaning given the term ``powered-lift'' in
section 1.1 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
(3) Selected powered-lift aircraft.--The term ``selected
powered-lift aircraft'' means a non-military powered-lift
aircraft operating in Class B airspace.
SEC. 104. COLLISION PREVENTION SYSTEMS.
(a) Final Rule.--Not later than 2 years after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall issue a final
rule with an effective date not later than December 31, 2031,
to require covered aircraft to be equipped and operating with
collision prevention technology.
(b) Consultation.--In developing the final rule under
subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with the
following:
(1) Air carriers operating under part 135 of title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations.
(2) Air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations.
(3) Air carriers operating under part 91 of title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations.
(4) Organizations representing helicopter aviation
operators and pilots.
(5) Organizations representing the general aviation
community.
(6) Organizations representing business aviation operators.
(7) Organizations representing experimental aircraft
operators.
(8) Transport category aircraft manufacturers.
(9) General aviation aircraft manufactures.
(10) Rotorcraft manufacturers.
(11) Avionics manufacturers.
(12) Powered-lifted aircraft manufacturers.
(13) Supplemental type certificate holders.
(14) Aircraft modification service providers.
(15) Exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic
controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United
States Code.
(16) Certified bargaining representative of aviation safety
inspectors and engineers for the FAA.
(17) Not fewer than 3 organizations representing certified
collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots
operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations.
(18) Aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of
human factors or human factors experts with specific
knowledge of aviation safety.
(19) The National Transportation Safety Board.
(20) Any other representative the Administrator determines
appropriate.
(c) Considerations.--In developing the final rule under
subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider--
(1) the safety benefits of collision prevention
technologies;
(2) relevant regulations, guidance, and policies for
traffic awareness and traffic advisory technology that uses
ADS-B In;
(3) ways in which ADS-B In software applications can be
used as of the date of enactment of this Act;
(4) software in existence on the date of enactment of this
Act, and reasonably projected thereafter, that can predict
aircraft movements, display surrounding traffic, and provide
visual and audible traffic advisories;
(5) the margin of error and accuracy of software described
in paragraph (4);
(6) the safety benefits of software described in paragraph
(4) in preventing conflicts with both aircraft and ground
vehicles on airport surfaces;
(7) the safety benefits of software described in paragraph
(4) in informing pilots or flight crews of operational risks,
including encounters with forecasted severe weather using
flight information services broadcast (FIS-B);
(8) the effort of the Administrator to modernize the air
traffic control system, including timelines, technologies
being incorporated, changes to operational rules, and
training requirements;
(9) the role of air traffic controllers in ensuring
aircraft separation, including the need for additional
training to air traffic controllers given the requirements of
this section;
(10) the necessity of certification for implementing
collision prevention technology based on type of aircraft and
operation;
(11) the capacity of the aerospace supply chain to
manufacture necessary equipment;
(12) the use of existing air traffic control deviation
authorization tools to implement the requirement in
subsection (g)(2);
(13) the requirements for the final rule as specified in
subsection (d);
(14) if available at the time of consideration, the results
of the studies on ADS-B Out equipage and development of low-
cost voluntary ADS-B as required by sections 808 and 810 of
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (Public Law 118-63); and
(15) any other considerations the Administrator determines
appropriate.
(d) Requirements for Final Rule.--In issuing the final rule
required under subsection (a), the Administrator shall--
(1) establish performance requirements for equipping
collision prevention technology that, as determined by the
Administrator, are appropriate for the covered aircraft and
the operations, including the operating environment;
(2) in establishing the performance requirements described
in paragraph (1)--
(A) require such technology be configured to provide visual
and audible alerting to the pilot and flight crew;
(B) consider the field of view of the pilots, human
factors, and, if applicable, mounting method of such
technology, to ensure that such technology can be readily
utilized and has minimal risk of unexpected detachment;
(C) consider the reliability and resiliency of alerts in
environments where inputs or signals, including GPS, can be
jammed or spoofed; and
(D) consider the utilization of existing antenna locations
or the placement of new antenna used to receive and, if
applicable, transmit, data used in collision prevention
technology;
(3) identify existing or issue additional relevant guidance
or technical standard orders to carry out the requirements of
this section; and
(4) establish an effective date not later than December 31,
2031, for equipping the covered aircraft with technology
described in subsection (a) that reflects various aircraft
types, appropriate maintenance cycles, and required updates
to appropriate guidance for such technology after
certification of such technologies.
[[Page H2860]]
(e) Equivalent Level of Safety.--In issuing the final rule
required under this section, the Administrator shall allow
for the use of any collision prevention technology (including
technology that uses portable ADS-B In receivers or other
equipment that displays on an existing or future portable
device, electronic flight bag, or panel mounted display)
available for use at the time of the effective date
established in subsection (d)(4), if the Administrator
determines it provides an equivalent level of safety as the
requirements of the final rule issued pursuant to subsection
(a).
(f) Technical Assistance.--The Administrator shall provide
technical assistance to facilitating equipage across the
entire fleet of affected aircraft to provide support for
affected aircraft operators in complying with the
requirements of this section.
(g) Covered Aircraft Defined.--In this section, the term
``covered aircraft''--
(1) means any non-military aircraft, except a selected
aircraft as defined in section 102, that is required to be
equipped with ADS-B Out under section 91.225 of title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations; and
(2) excludes aircraft that have a limited category special
airworthiness certificate or an experimental airworthiness
certificate, provided the pilot of such aircraft is
authorized to deviate from the requirements of this section
by air traffic control in the same manner ADS-B Out
deviations are approved under section 91.225(g) of title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations.
SEC. 105. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN USE OF ADS-B DATA.
(a) In General.--
(1) Limitation on use of data.--Data from Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast may not be used by any
person, governmental agency, or other entity to identify
aircraft for the purpose of obtaining revenue from the owner
or operator of such aircraft, without the consent of such
owner or operator.
(2) Use of data by air traffic controller.--Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast data may be used to assist
air traffic controllers in tracking aircraft and improving
air traffic safety and efficiency.
(b) Limit on Use of ADS-B Data.--Section 46101(c)(1) of
title 49, United States Code, is amended by striking ``the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may
not'' and inserting ``neither the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration nor any other Federal, State,
local, territorial, or Tribal official may''.
SEC. 106. RULEMAKING ACCOUNTABILITY.
(a) Public Dashboard.--The Secretary shall establish,
maintain, and make available, on a publicly available website
of the Department of Transportation, a dashboard that
displays, for the rulemakings required in sections 102, 103,
and 104--
(1) dates of publication and links to the minimum operating
performance standards referenced by and developed pursuant to
such sections;
(2) the date of establishment, membership roster, and
tasking memoranda (or similar document) for rulemaking
committees established pursuant to such sections;
(3) deadlines and actual dates for the submission for all
required rulemaking committee reports to the Administrator or
Congress;
(4) publication dates of and a link to any--
(A) advanced notice of proposed rulemakings published
pursuant to such sections;
(B) notice of proposed rulemakings published pursuant to
such sections; and
(C) revised notice of proposed rulemakings published
pursuant to rulemakings described in subparagraphs (A) and
(B);
(5) the opening and closing of public comment periods and a
link to public comments;
(6) the publication of and a link to any final rule issued
pursuant to such sections;
(7) all associated official correspondence with the
National Transportation Safety Board regarding related safety
recommendations; and
(8) any additional information the Secretary determines
will increase transparency without delaying the publication
of a final rule.
(b) Congressional and Family Briefing.--Not later than 180
days after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 180
days thereafter until the final rules required pursuant to
sections 102, 103, and 104 are issued, the Administrator
shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress and the
families of the victims of the midair collision referenced in
National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Investigation
Report AIR-26-02 adopted on January 27, 2026 on the progress
in issuing such final rules.
(c) Congressional Oversight in Case of Failure to Meet
Deadlines.--
(1) In general.--If the Administrator fails to meet any
rulemaking deadline established in sections 102, 103, and
104, the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees
of Congress in person not later than 4 weeks after the date
on which such deadline is not met.
(2) Deadline for initial outreach and coordination.--Not
later than 4 days after the date described in paragraph (1),
the Administrator shall begin initial outreach to and
coordination with the appropriate committees of Congress to
arrange and organize logistics of the briefing required under
paragraph (1).
(3) Format and time of briefing.--The briefing required
under paragraph (1) shall be in a format and at a time to be
determined by the appropriate committees of Congress.
SEC. 107. TIME-ON-POSITION LIMITS.
(a) Time-on-position Limits.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in coordination
with organizations representing air traffic controller
managers and supervisors, shall establish time-on-position
limits for operations supervisory personnel.
(2) Considerations.--In developing the limits described in
paragraph (1), the Administrator shall--
(A) evaluate appropriate time-on-position limits for
operations supervisory personnel, prioritizing the evaluation
of such limits at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport
and other air traffic facilities with high volumes of mixed
rotorcraft and airplane traffic;
(B) establish such limits for Air Traffic Organization
operations supervisory personnel at Ronald Reagan Washington
National Airport and other air traffic facilities with high
volumes of mixed helicopter and airplane traffic;
(C) develop guidance for district and facility-level
management to adapt such limits to account for their own
staffing and local standard operating procedures;
(D) consider the operational needs and staffing levels of
the air traffic facilities described in the previous
subparagraphs to ensure effective oversight and monitoring of
safety critical operations;
(E) consider air traffic control specialists performing
watch supervision in the controller-in-charge position;
(F) consider requirements of FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled
``Facility Operation and Administration'', issued on February
20, 2025, or any successor document, and FAA Order JO
7110.65BB, titled ``Air Traffic Control'', issued on February
20, 2025, or any successor document;
(G) consider data, reports, and best practices pertaining
to human factors; and
(H) consider any other items determined appropriate by the
Administrator.
(3) Consultation.--The Administrator may consult with the
exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic
controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United
States Code.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to interfere with any agreement between a
governmental agency and the exclusive bargaining
representative of air traffic controllers certified under
section 7111 of title 5, United States Code, section 7106(a)
of title 5, United States Code, or section 40122 of title 49,
United States Code.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Controller-in-charge.--The term ``controller-in-
charge'' means the bargaining unit air traffic control
specialist responsible for providing watch supervision for
the continuous operation of an air traffic control facility
or area in any case in which operations supervisory personnel
are not available.
(2) Operational oversight.--The term ``operational
oversight'' means the duty of the individual in charge of the
operation to effectively lead and manage the delivery of air
traffic services by maintaining intentional engagement,
situational awareness, and accountability within the area of
supervision.
(3) Operations supervisory personnel.--The term
``operations supervisory personnel'' means managerial
personnel responsible for the direct supervision of air
traffic control operational personnel.
SEC. 108. CONTROLLER THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT TRAINING.
(a) In General.--Not later than 9 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall, in
coordination with the exclusive bargaining representative of
air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title
5, United States Code, develop and implement initial,
recurrent, and refresher training for air traffic controllers
on threat and error management that is instructor-led and
scenario-based.
(b) Consultation.--In developing the training under
subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with
representatives of--
(1) organizations representing air traffic control managers
and operations supervisors;
(2) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of--
(A) human factors and human decision making in realistic
operational settings; and
(B) threat and error management best practices and
policies; and
(3) a career representative from the National
Transportation Safety Board with subject matter expertise as
an observer.
(c) Considerations.--In developing the training described
in subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider, at a
minimum--
(1) the findings and recommendations of the National
Transportation Safety Board, including as contained in the
final aviation investigation report, AIR-26-02, adopted on
January 27, 2026, such as--
(A) training controllers to continuously monitor their
environment to more quickly and accurately identify threats;
(B) promoting team communication to ensure that
communications are clear, timely, and assertive;
(C) emphasizing effective scanning habits;
(D) recognizing patterns in the development of adverse
events; and
[[Page H2861]]
(E) enhanced decision making under stress by developing
habits that balance procedural compliance with problem-
solving;
(2) the requirements of--
(A) FAA Order JO 3120.4S, titled ``Air Traffic Technical
Training'', issued on August 28, 2024;
(B) FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled ``Facility Operation and
Administration'', issued on February 20, 2025;
(C) FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled ``Air Traffic Control'',
issued on February 20, 2025; and
(D) other relevant air traffic control standards, guidance,
and policies;
(3) the frequency of the recurrent and refresher training
described in subsection (a) and whether frequency should be
increased for air traffic controllers in facilities managing
high-complexity or high-volume airspace;
(4) data, reports, and peer-reviewed studies on human
factors and threat and error management best practices;
(5) the appropriate use of tower simulator systems and
other advanced training technologies to supplement the
recurrent training described in subsection (a), including the
use of data analytics from such systems and technologies to
individualize instruction;
(6) the use of data analytics to identify systemic gaps in
the recurrent and refresher training described in subsection
(a) and to dynamically enhance training curriculum and
techniques;
(7) data gathered from aviation safety reporting programs;
and
(8) any other item determined appropriate by the
Administrator.
(d) Implementation.--Not later than 90 days after the
development of the training under subsection (a), the
Administrator shall revise the orders of the FAA described in
subsection (c)(2), or any successor documents, and any
corresponding policy or guidance materials, to reflect the
requirements of this section.
(e) Briefing to Congress.--Not later than 1 year after the
training requirements under this section and section 109 are
established, the Administrator shall brief the appropriate
committees of Congress on the implementation of such training
and any potential recommendations for improvements.
(f) Threat and Error Management Defined.--In this section,
the term ``threat and error management'' has the meaning
described in chapter 6 of the Risk Management Handbook (FAA
H-8083-2A) or any successor document.
SEC. 109. CONTROLLER VISUAL SEPARATION TRAINING.
(a) In General.--Not later than 270 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall, in
coordination with the exclusive bargaining representative of
air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title
5, United States Code, develop and implement initial,
recurrent, and refresher training for air traffic controllers
on tower-applied and pilot-applied visual separation
procedures that is instructor-led and scenario-based.
(b) Consultation.--In developing and implementing the
training required under subsection (a), the Administrator
shall consult with representatives of--
(1) the certified bargaining representative of aviation
safety inspectors and engineers for the FAA;
(2) organizations representing certified collective
bargaining representatives of airline pilots;
(3) organizations representing air traffic control managers
and supervisors;
(4) organizations representing general aviation pilots; and
(5) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of--
(A) human factors and human decision making in realistic
operational settings; and
(B) tower-applied and pilot-applied visual separation
procedures and regulations.
(c) Considerations.--In developing the training under
subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider, at a
minimum--
(1) the findings and recommendations made by the National
Transportation Safety Board, including as contained in the
final aviation investigation report, AIR-26-02, adopted on
January 27, 2026;
(2) the requirements of--
(A) FAA Order JO 3120.4S, titled ``Air Traffic Technical
Training'', issued on August 28, 2024;
(B) FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled ``Facility Operation and
Administration'', issued on February 20, 2025;
(C) FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled ``Air Traffic Control'',
issued on February 20, 2025; and
(D) other relevant air traffic control standards, guidance,
and policies;
(3) the frequency of the recurrent and refresher training
described in subsection (a), including--
(A) whether such frequency should be increased for air
traffic controllers in facilities managing high-complexity or
high-volume airspace; and
(B) the need for advance training and guidance ahead of any
changes to FAA visual separation policies;
(4) the appropriate use of tower simulator systems and
other advanced training technologies to supplement the
recurrent and refresher training described in subsection (a),
including the use of data analytics from such systems and
technologies to individualize instruction;
(5) the use of data analytics to identify systemic gaps in
the recurrent and refresher training described in subsection
(a) and to dynamically enhance training curriculum and
techniques;
(6) data gathered from aviation safety reporting programs;
and
(7) any other item determined appropriate by the
Administrator.
(d) Implementation.--Not later than 90 days after the
development of the training under subsection (a), the
Administrator shall revise the orders of the FAA described in
subparagraph (c)(2), or any successor documents, and any
corresponding policy or guidance materials, to reflect the
requirements of this section.
SEC. 110. SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall develop a
safety risk assessment tool for use by air traffic
controllers, including by supervisory air traffic control
personnel, to assist in airspace risk identification,
mitigation, and operational decision making.
(b) Considerations.--In carrying out subsection (a), the
Administrator shall consider, at a minimum--
(1) the development of a safety risk assessment tool
capable of supporting air traffic controllers in--
(A) identifying safety risks;
(B) analyzing the impact of and prioritizing such risks;
and
(C) developing strategies to reduce or eliminate such risks
in real time;
(2) data, reports, studies, and best practices on threat
and error management;
(3) findings and recommendations of the--
(A) National Transportation Safety Board, including as
contained in the final aviation investigation report, AIR-26-
02, adopted on January 27, 2026;
(B) National Airspace System Safety Review Team as
contained in the final report titled ``Discussion and
Recommendations to Address Risk in the National Airspace
System'', issued on November 15, 2023; and
(C) frontline manager workload study authorized under
section 412 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (Public
Law 118-63);
(4) air traffic facility type and staffing level;
(5) risk assessment guidance, policies, and regulations of
the Administration in place prior to the date of enactment of
this Act;
(6) data gathered from aviation safety reporting programs;
(7) best practices or similar relevant risk assessment
tools and methods used by foreign civil aviation authorities;
(8) the feasibility of leveraging commercially available
products or technologies that may be utilized to develop such
tool;
(9) benefits of incorporating such tool into a Common
Automation Platform; and
(10) any other factors determined relevant by the
Administrator.
(c) Coordination.--In developing the safety risk assessment
tool under subsection (a), the Administrator shall coordinate
with--
(1) organizations representing air traffic control
supervisors and managers;
(2) the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic
controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United
States Code;
(3) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of
threat and error management;
(4) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of
human factors and human decision making in realistic
operational settings;
(5) organizations representing operators of Federal
contract towers pursuant to section 47124 of title 49, United
States Code; and
(6) any other stakeholders determined relevant by the
Administrator.
(d) Briefing to Congress.--Not later than 18 months after
the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall
brief the appropriate committees of Congress on--
(1) the development of the safety risk assessment tool
required under this section and recommendations for
implementation;
(2) the progress of implementation described in subsection
(e); and
(3) any recommendations to improve the deployment of the
safety risk assessment tool.
(e) Implementation.--The Administrator shall deploy the
safety risk assessment tool developed under this section at--
(1) the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport air
traffic control tower, not later than 1 year after the
development of the safety risk assessment tool;
(2) air traffic control facilities with high volumes of
mixed rotorcraft and airplane traffic not later than 18
months after the development of the safety risk assessment
tool; and
(3) any remaining air traffic control facilities not later
than 2 years after the development of the safety risk
assessment tool.
(f) Threat and Error Management Defined.--In this section,
the term ``threat and error management'' has the meaning
described in chapter 6 of the Risk Management Handbook (FAA
H-8083-2A) or any successor document.
SEC. 111. OPERATIONAL RATES AT RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON
NATIONAL AIRPORT.
(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall initiate an
assessment of the aircraft arrival rate at Ronald Reagan
Washington National Airport.
(b) Considerations.--In conducting the assessment described
in subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider--
(1) airspace complexity;
(2) airfield limitations;
[[Page H2862]]
(3) mixed-fleet operations;
(4) traffic volume;
(5) air carrier scheduling practices;
(6) the operational capacity of such airport;
(7) the current hourly instrument flight rules allocation
practice at such airport;
(8) expertise provided by the Air Traffic Organization; and
(9) any other considerations the Administrator determines
appropriate.
(c) Completion of Assessment.--Not later than 180 days
after the Administrator initiates the assessment under
subsection (a), the Administrator shall complete and submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress such assessment,
including any related findings and recommendations.
(d) Rulemaking.--Not later than 30 days after completing
the assessment pursuant to subsection (c), and taking such
assessment into account, the Administrator shall initiate a
rulemaking proceeding to update subpart K of part 93 of title
14, Code of Federal Regulations, to require allocated
instrument flight rules operations at Ronald Reagan
Washington National Airport to be prescribed in periods not
greater than 30 minutes to ensure such airport does not
exceed safe capacity.
(e) Consultation.--In conducting the rulemaking required
under subsection (d), the Administrator shall consult with
the following:
(1) Any air carrier operating under part 121 of title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations, with scheduled operations at
Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, including regional
air carriers and low-cost and ultra-low-cost air carriers.
(2) Air carriers operating under parts 91, including
subpart K, and 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations,
authorized to conduct non-scheduled operations at Ronald
Reagan Washington National Airport.
(3) The exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic
controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United
Sates Code.
(4) The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority.
(5) Any other stakeholders the Administrator determines
appropriate.
SEC. 112. TIME-BASED FLOW MANAGEMENT.
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Administrator shall implement operational use of the
time-based flow management system at Potomac Consolidated
Terminal Radar Approach Control and associated air traffic
control towers.
SEC. 113. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITY LEVELS.
(a) Review of Air Traffic Control Facility Level
Criteria.--
(1) In general.--The Administrator and the exclusive
bargaining representative of air traffic controllers
certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code,
(in this section referred to as the ``Parties'') may, at
their joint election, review and advise, as agreed to, the
criteria and procedures used to assess, determine, and
validate the facility pay levels of air traffic control
facilities.
(2) Considerations.--In conducting a review under paragraph
(1), the Parties may consider--
(A) the many variables that may affect the difficulty and
complexity of air traffic control work, including
technological advancements, aviation industry trends, and the
modification or extension of air traffic control services;
(B) weights and add-ons used to calculate the traffic count
index and other related formulas for air traffic control
facilities; and
(C) whether new weights and add-ons should be incorporated
into such formulas to more accurately reflect the air traffic
density and complexity of the facility operations.
(b) Reassessment of Air Traffic Control Facility Levels.--
(1) Limitation.--No changes to facility pay levels due to
data source changes may be implemented until negotiations
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement of the
Parties and title 49, United States Code, have been
completed.
(2) Application of standard.--Upon completion of a review
conducted under subsection (a) and related negotiations
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement of the
Parties and title 49, United States Code, the Parties shall
apply the standard in accordance with any agreements made
pursuant to this section at--
(A) the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport; and
(B) all other air traffic control facilities, prioritizing
facilities with high volumes of mixed rotorcraft and airplane
traffic.
(c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section may be
construed to interfere with any agreement between a
governmental agency and the exclusive bargaining
representative of air traffic controllers certified under
section 7111 of title 5, United States Code, or section 40122
of title 49, United States Code.
SEC. 114. WORKING GROUP TO EVALUATE SHARED FREQUENCY AROUND
RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT.
(a) In General.--Not later than 3 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall convene a
working group (in this section referred to as the ``Working
Group'') to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the safety
benefits and risks of requiring all aircraft to use the same
communications frequency during any period in which
helicopter and local air traffic control positions are
combined in the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport air
traffic control tower.
(b) Members.--The Working Group convened under subsection
(a) shall be comprised of representatives of--
(1) the exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic
controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United
States Code;
(2) the organization representing air traffic control
operational supervisors and managers;
(3) not fewer than 3 separate organizations representing
the certified collective bargaining representatives of pilots
operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations;
(4) air medical services;
(5) an organization representing helicopter aviation
operators and pilots;
(6) an organization representing business aviation
operators and pilots;
(7) air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14,
United States Code;
(8) an individual that has expertise in an operational or
academic discipline that is relevant to the analysis of human
factors in aviation, which may include air carrier
operations, line pilot expertise, air traffic control,
linguistics, human-machine integration, general aviation
operations, and organizational behavior and culture;
(9) the FAA, provided the representative has expertise on
flight operations in the area described in subsection (a);
(10) the Department of Defense, provided the representative
has expertise on Department of Defense flight operations in
the area described in subsection (a);
(11) the Coast Guard, provided the representative has
expertise on Coast Guard flight operations in the area
described in subsection (a);
(12) the National Transportation Safety Board; and
(13) other organizations or agencies as determined
necessary by the Administrator.
(c) Local Operator Preference.--The members described in
paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of subsection (b)
shall be, or represent, individuals who operate in the
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area,
as defined in subpart V of part 93 of title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations.
(d) Government Representatives.--The members described in
paragraphs (11), (12), (13), (14), and, in the case of a
representative chosen by the Administrator that is from a
governmental agency, (15) of subsection (b)--
(1) may not be political appointees; and
(2) shall be nonvoting members of the Working Group.
(e) Duration.--
(1) In general.--Members of the Working Group shall be
appointed for the duration of the Working Group.
(2) Length of existence.--
(A) In general.--The Working Group shall have an initial
duration of 1 year.
(B) Optional extension.--The Administrator may extend the
duration of the Working Group for an additional period of up
to 1 year.
(f) Considerations.--In conducting the comprehensive
evaluation under subsection (a), the Working Group shall, at
minimum, consider--
(1) the benefits or detriments to pilot and air traffic
controller situation awareness;
(2) to the greatest extent possible, the human factors that
would impact pilot and air traffic controller situation
awareness;
(3) to the greatest extent possible, the human factors that
would impact pilot and air traffic controllers during
critical phases of flight;
(4) existing products by other working groups related to
human factors in aviation safety;
(5) pilot training requirements;
(6) air traffic controller training requirements;
(7) if any, technological limitations or challenges that
would impede aircraft from using the same communications
frequency;
(8) the potential for overlapping, conflicting, and
simultaneous communication transmissions, prior to and after
any improvements made as a result of the assessment conducted
pursuant to section 115;
(9) the potential for misdirected, missed, or stepped on
communications if requiring all aircraft to use the same
communication frequency;
(10) National Transportation Safety Board recommendations
pertaining to miscommunications on crowded frequencies,
including relevant recommendations included in the National
Transportation Safety Board Aviation Investigation Report
AIR-26-02 adopted on January 27, 2026; and
(11) solicited feedback from air carriers operating under
part 121 and part 135 of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations, and general aviation operators under part 91 of
title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
(g) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the conclusion
of the Working Group, the Working Group shall submit to the
Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress a
report on the findings and recommendations resulting from the
activities carried out under this section.
(h) Implementation.--Not later than 6 months after
receiving recommendations outlined in the report under
subsection (g), the Administrator shall operationally
validate such recommendations and may take such action, as
appropriate, to implement such recommendations.
SEC. 115. ANTI-BLOCKING TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Assessment.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the
[[Page H2863]]
Administrator shall initiate an assessment on the
feasibility, maturity, hazards, and safety benefits of
technology that serves to alert air traffic controllers or
flight crews to instances of potentially blocked
transmissions when simultaneous broadcasting occurs.
(b) Considerations.--In conducting the assessment under
subsection (a), the Administrator shall, at minimum,
consider--
(1) technologies currently in use domestically and
internationally that alert an air traffic controller or
flight crew to instances in which radio transmissions may
have been blocked;
(2) the technical standards written for, and associated
with, the use of such technologies identified under paragraph
(1);
(3) existing and proposed technologies not in use that
could alert an air traffic controller or flight crew to
instances in which radio transmissions may have been blocked;
(4) the technical standards that would be needed to
implement the technologies identified under paragraph (3);
(5) the potential benefits and enhanced awareness that the
adoption of such technologies would provide;
(6) the technological limitations associated with such
technologies;
(7) air traffic controller training requirements;
(8) the effort of the FAA to modernize the air traffic
control system, including timelines, the incorporation of new
technologies, and planned training; and
(9) any benefits and detriments to air traffic controller
situational awareness, including availability of information,
nuisance alerts, and human factors.
(c) Consultation.--In conducting the assessment under
subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with
stakeholders or standards organizations, including--
(1) the exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic
controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United
States Code;
(2) the organization representing air traffic control
operational supervisors and managers;
(3) the certified bargaining representative of aviation
safety inspectors and engineers for the FAA;
(4) an organization representing manufacturers of air
traffic management systems, equipment and technologies;
(5) an organization representing helicopter aviation
operators and pilots;
(6) an organization representing general aviation operators
and pilots; and
(7) any other organization or agency the Administrator
determines appropriate.
(d) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the results of
the assessment under subsection (a) that includes--
(1) a list of technologies identified by the Administrator
serving the purpose described in subsection (a);
(2) a list of technologies the Administrator proposes that
could serve the purpose described in subsection (a);
(3) results of simulations and testing; and
(4) a plan to implement the technologies listed under
paragraphs (1) and (2) if the assessment under subsection (a)
finds such technology can be safely implemented, including--
(A) the scope of potential upgrades;
(B) predicted costs;
(C) a projected timeline; and
(D) how the potential upgrades to facilities and equipment
within the scope of subparagraph (A) would be prioritized.
SEC. 116. TASK FORCE TO IDENTIFY IMPROVEMENTS TO AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER CONFLICT ALERT SYSTEM.
(a) In General.--Not later than 3 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall convene a task
force (in this section referred to as the ``Task Force'') to
develop a framework detailing the priorities, goals,
timeline, and recommendations to implement improvements to
the conflict alert system to provide more salient and
meaningful alerts to air traffic controllers based on the
severity of the conflict triggering the alert.
(b) Members.--The Task Force convened under subsection (a)
shall be comprised of representatives of--
(1) the exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic
controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United
States Code;
(2) the organization representing air traffic control
operational supervisors and managers;
(3) the organization representing operators under the
Contract Tower Program established under section 47124 of
title 49, United States Code;
(4) the certified bargaining representative of aviation
safety inspectors and engineers for the FAA;
(5) individuals with expertise in the human factors of
alert design and related impacts on human performance;
(6) individuals with expertise in an operational or
academic discipline that is relevant to the analysis of human
factors in aviation, which may include air carrier
operations, line pilot expertise, air traffic control,
linguistics, human-machine integration, general aviation
operations, and organizational behavior and culture;
(7) the FAA, including the Air Traffic Organization and the
Office of Finance and Management, provided such
representative has expertise on equipment procurement; and
(8) other organizations or agencies as determined necessary
by the Administrator.
(c) Voting.--The members described in paragraphs (3), (6),
and, in the case of a representative chosen by the
Administrator that is from a governmental agency, (7) of
subsection (b) shall be nonvoting members of the Task Force.
(d) Duration.--
(1) In general.--Members of the Task Force shall be
appointed for the duration of the Task Force.
(2) Length of existence.--
(A) In general.--The Task Force shall have an initial
duration of 1 year.
(B) Optional extension.--The Administrator may extend the
duration of the Task Force for an additional period of up to
6 months.
(e) Considerations.--In developing the framework under
subsection (a), the Task Force shall, at minimum, consider--
(1) the benefits and detriments to air traffic controller
situational awareness, including availability of information,
nuisance and false alerts, and human factors;
(2) opportunities and challenges of consolidating numerous
systems and underlying data sources into a single display,
including through the deployment of the Enterprise-
Information Display System;
(3) existing products by other working groups related to
human factors in aviation safety;
(4) air traffic controller training requirements;
(5) advances in available technology not being utilized as
of the date on which the Task Force is convened;
(6) technological limitations;
(7) National Transportation Safety Board recommendations
pertaining to air traffic controller alerts, distractions,
and loss of focus;
(8) the effort of the FAA to modernize the air traffic
control system, including timelines, new technologies being
incorporated, and planned training; and
(9) solicited feedback from equipment manufacturers and
entities involved with the air traffic control modernization
effort of the Administrator.
(f) Report.--Not later than 4 months after the conclusion
of the Task Force, the Task Force shall submit to the
Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress a
report that includes the framework developed as a result of
the activities carried out under subsection (a).
(g) Implementation Plan.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 8 months after receiving
the framework outlined in the report under subsection (f),
the Administrator shall finalize and submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a plan (in this section
referred to as the ``Plan'') to implement such framework.
(2) Contents.--Such Plan shall include, as appropriate--
(A) specific training requirements for air traffic
controllers, as detailed in--
(i) FAA Order JO 3120.4S, titled ``Air Traffic Technical
Training'', issued on August 28, 2024;
(ii) FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled ``Facility Operation and
Administration'', issued on February 20, 2025; and
(iii) any successor or other relevant documents or
guidance; and
(B) a publicly available prioritized list of airports
enumerating the order in which they will receive such
upgrades.
(3) Time limit.--The Plan may not contain a timeline of
implementation that exceeds 2 years.
(h) Implementation.--The Administrator shall immediately
begin implementing the Plan upon the submission of such Plan
under subsection (g)(1) to the appropriate committees of
Congress.
(i) Briefings to Congress.--Not later than 6 months after
the submission of the Plan to the appropriate committees of
Congress under subsection (g)(1), and every 6 months
thereafter until the full implementation of the Plan, the
Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of
Congress on the progress of implementation.
SEC. 117. POSTACCIDENT AND POSTINCIDENT DRUG AND ALCOHOL
TESTING.
(a) Sense of Congress.--The Administrator shall abide by
DOT Order 3910.1D, titled ``Drug and Alcohol-Free
Departmental Workplace Program'' (or any successor document)
to ensure appropriate postaccident and postincident drug and
alcohol testing.
(b) Revision of Procedures.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall
revise procedures of the Air Traffic Organization to ensure
an appropriate on-site supervisor makes each postaccident and
postincident drug and alcohol testing determination in a
timely manner based on an assessment of such supervisor of
whether the event meets testing criteria and which
controllers had duties pertaining to the involved aircraft
without need to wait for investigation or approval.
(c) Training.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall incorporate
training on the revised postaccident and postincident drug
and alcohol testing determination procedure described in
subsection (b) for all staff of the Air Traffic Organization
who have responsibilities under such procedure.
(2) Requirements.--The training described under this
subsection shall, at a minimum--
(A) be administered during initial training, and annually
thereafter; and
[[Page H2864]]
(B) include a postlearning knowledge assessment.
(d) Review.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary
shall conduct a review of the ability of each FAA-operated
air traffic control facility to routinely accomplish the
required postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol
testing within the Secretary's specified timeframes of within
2 hours for alcohol testing and within 4 hours for drug
testing.
(2) Requirements.--The review described under this
subsection shall, at a minimum, require each FAA-operated air
traffic control facility to conduct a demonstration to
establish the time that would be required for urine and
breath evidence collection to begin if testing were
unexpectedly needed during a time with the lowest routinely
anticipated level of resource availability for testing.
(3) Remediation.--After each review under paragraph (1),
the Administrator shall work with the Secretary to mitigate
identified barriers to timely postaccident and postincident
drug and alcohol testing, and to remediate the performance of
each facility for which the demonstration under paragraph (2)
indicated inability to meet required timeframes for
postaccident drug or alcohol testing.
(4) Report.--Not later than 3 months after each review
under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing the
results of the review, including facilities in need of
remediation, progress at facilities previously identified for
remediation, and planned approaches to remediation.
SEC. 118. FURTHER MODIFICATIONS TO RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON
NATIONAL AIRPORT AREA HELICOPTER ROUTES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall evaluate, via
the safety risk management process in accordance with FAA
Order JO 8040.4C, titled ``Safety Risk Management Policy''
(or any successor document), charted helicopter routes in the
vicinity of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
(b) Revisions to Deconflict Traffic.--Upon the completion
of each route evaluation under subsection (a), the
Administrator shall immediately, as necessary, revise such
route to ensure that the route and routes utilized by fixed-
wing aircraft--
(1) are safely deconflicted physically at all times; or
(2) have operating procedures that require positive control
from the controller to ensure safe deconfliction during
operations.
(c) Safety Review Requirements.--In carrying out the route
revisions required under subsection (b), the Administrator
shall conduct a safety risk management review, as necessary,
for any helicopter route changes, in accordance with FAA
Order 8040.4C, titled ``Safety Risk Management Policy'' (or
any successor document).
(d) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the
Administrator completes all the evaluations and subsequent
route revisions required under this section, the
Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report containing--
(1) the results of the evaluations required under
subsection (a);
(2) the route revisions required under subsection (b),
including an explanation for such revisions; and
(3) the safety risk management review documentation
developed as a result of the review conducted under
subsection (c).
SEC. 119. REQUIRING VERTICAL SEPARATION NEAR AIRPORTS DURING
CRITICAL PHASES OF FLIGHT.
(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the
Administrator shall ensure that each segment of a helicopter
route contains, in the appropriate helicopter route chart,
recommended flight altitudes, including altitude ceilings and
floors, in a manner consistent with FAA Order JO 7210.3EE,
titled ``Facility Operation and Administration'' (or any
successor document).
(b) Consideration of Vertical Separation in Route
Criteria.--Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment
of this Act, the Administrator shall amend FAA Order JO
7210.3EE, titled ``Facility Operation and Administration''
(or any successor document), to add minimum vertical
separation requirements to the criteria for the helicopter
route chart program.
(c) Charting Minimum Separation Near Airports.--
(1) In general.--The Administrator shall ensure that any
helicopter chart that represents an area near an airport
clearly conveys to an operator the segments of such
helicopter routes in the vicinity of such airport.
(2) Content requirements.--At minimum, each such chart
shall clearly convey for each of the segments, the
recommended flight altitudes, including altitude ceilings and
floors, and any necessary instructions, to convey minimum
separation, in accordance with FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled
``Air Traffic Control'' (or any successor document),
between--
(A) a helicopter or powered-lift aircraft utilizing such
segment; and
(B) a fixed-wing aircraft operating at or near such airport
during critical phases of flight.
(d) Update Policy.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall update FAA
Order JO 7210.3EE, titled ``Facility Operation and
Administration'' (or any successor document), to account for
any additional changes made by this section.
(e) Annual Review.--The Administrator shall ensure that any
changes made to Helicopter Route Charts as a result of this
section are assessed on an annual basis as part of the annual
review described in section 120.
SEC. 120. HELICOPTER ROUTE CHART ANNUAL REVIEW.
(a) Criteria Review.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Administrator shall initiate a review of the criteria for
annual reviews of helicopter routes as required pursuant to
FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled ``Facility Operation and
Administration'' (or any successor document).
(2) Update of criteria.--After each annual criteria review
under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall update the
criteria based on such review and publish the updated
criteria on a publicly available website of the FAA.
(3) Changes to route reviews.--After any change is made to
FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled ``Facility Operation and
Administration'' (or any successor document) pursuant to
section 119(d), the Administrator shall update the criteria
for annual reviews of helicopter routes to reflect such
change.
(b) Publication.--The Administrator shall publish, on a
publicly available website of the FAA, the date on which the
annual review for each Helicopter Route Chart has been most
recently completed, as required pursuant to FAA Order JO
7210.3EE, titled ``Facility Operation and Administration''
(or any successor document).
(c) Report.--Not later than December 31, 2026, and December
31 of each year thereafter, the Administrator shall submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing,
at a minimum, the following information:
(1) A summary of changes, if applicable, made to each
Helicopter Route Chart, including--
(A) changes, additions, or deletions to designated
helicopter routes;
(B) changes in instrument flight rules routes;
(C) additions or deletions of visual checkpoints; and
(D) rationale or safety data to justify any changes
described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).
(2) The safety risk management documentation completed in
accordance with FAA Order JO 8040.4C, titled ``Safety Risk
Management Policy'' (or any successor document).
(3) A summary of any advanced consultation between the
Administrator and impacted helicopter and fixed-wing
operators in planning the safety risk management process.
(4) A certification that the designated recommended route
altitudes and flight ceilings and floors ensure helicopters
maintain minimum separation, in accordance with FAA Order
7110.65BB, titled ``Air Traffic Control'' (or any successor
document), with fixed-wing aircraft operating along airport
approach and departure paths.
(d) Failure To Submit.--
(1) In general.--If the Administrator fails to submit an
annual report required under subsection (b) on or before the
date on which such report is required to be submitted, the
Chief Operating Officer of the Air Traffic Organization shall
brief the appropriate committees of Congress in person not
later than 4 weeks after such date.
(2) Deadline for initial outreach and coordination.--Not
later than 4 days after such date, the FAA shall begin
initial outreach to and coordination with the appropriate
committees of Congress to arrange and organize logistics of
the briefing required under paragraph (1).
(3) Format and time of briefing.--The briefing required
under paragraph (1) shall be in a format and at a time to be
determined by such committees.
SEC. 121. VISUAL CHARTS.
(a) Study.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall initiate a
study on incorporating the lateral location and published
altitudes of helicopter routes into all instrument and visual
approach and departure procedures for airports to provide
situation awareness to fixed-wing operators of the risk of
helicopter traffic operating in the vicinity of such
operators.
(b) Consultation.--In carrying out subsection (a), the
Administrator shall consult with relevant stakeholders,
including--
(1) air carriers;
(2) an organization representing helicopter operators and
pilots;
(3) an organization representing general aviation operators
and pilots;
(4) an organization representing business aviation
operators and pilots;
(5) an organization representing emergency air medical
services;
(6) representatives of the Department of Defense and United
States Coast Guard who are not political appointees;
(7) not fewer than 3 separate organizations representing
certified collective bargaining representatives of airline
pilots operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations;
[[Page H2865]]
(8) the certified exclusive bargaining representatives of
air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title
5, United States Code; and
(9) an individual that has expertise in an operational or
academic discipline that is relevant to the analysis of human
factors in aviation, including air carrier operations, line
pilot expertise, air traffic control, linguistics, human-
machine integration, general aviation operations, and
organizational behavior and culture.
(c) Considerations.--In carrying out subsection (a), the
Administrator shall consider the--
(1) spacing and legibility of information on charts;
(2) workload of flight crews at lower altitudes and during
critical phases of flight;
(3) feasibility and decipherability of layered information
on digital charts;
(4) current best practices for pilots when landing at or
departing from airports with high volume helicopter traffic
but that do not have charted helicopter routes; and
(5) human factors involved with approach and departure
procedures.
(d) Implementation.--Not later than 1 year after initiating
the study under subsection (a), the Administrator shall make
any revisions necessary to--
(1) Terminal Procedures Publications to include charted
helicopter routes to provide appropriate situational
awareness to fixed-wing operators; and
(2) Helicopter Route Charts to include airport approach and
departure paths to provide appropriate situational awareness
to helicopter operators.
(e) Congressional Briefing.--If the Administrator makes
revisions under subsection (d), the Administrator shall brief
the appropriate committees of Congress on such revisions not
later than 60 days after making such revisions.
SEC. 122. CLOSE PROXIMITY ENCOUNTERS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall establish a
working group to make recommendations on--
(1) an objective definition of close proximity encounters;
(2) associated parameters that can be used to monitor the
prevalence of such encounters and identify areas of potential
traffic conflict for safety assurance and safety risk
management for such encounters; and
(3) making publicly available aggregated information about
all such encounters, including date and location.
(b) Considerations.--In carrying out subsection (a), the
working group shall consider--
(1) existing airborne separation rules and required loss of
airborne separation reporting requirements;
(2) the development of a definition of, and associated
parameters for, close proximity encounter events;
(3) data gathered from aviation safety reporting systems
and reports, including the Aviation Safety Information
Analysis and Sharing Program, the Aviation Safety Action
Program, the Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System,
the Aviation Risk Identification and Assessment (``ARIA'')
system, preliminary ARIA reports, the Air Traffic Safety
Action Program, the Aviation Safety Reporting System, the
Near Midair Collision System, mandatory occurrence reports,
and other relevant systems and reports;
(4) National Transportation Safety Board aviation
investigation report AIR-26-02, adopted on January 27, 2026;
(5) FAA risk assessment guidance, policies, and regulations
in place prior to the date of enactment of this Act;
(6) best practices or similar relevant risk assessment
tools and methods used by foreign civil aviation authorities;
and
(7) any other factors determined relevant by the working
group.
(c) Membership.--The working group shall consist of the
following:
(1) Appointed members.--The following members appointed by
the Administrator:
(A) 2 representatives of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration with expertise in safety data.
(B) 5 appropriately qualified representatives of aviation
labor organizations (designated by the applicable represented
organization), including--
(i) organizations representing certified collective
bargaining representatives of airline pilots;
(ii) the exclusive bargaining representatives of FAA air
traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5,
United States Code;
(iii) organizations representing helicopter operators and
pilots, including law enforcement and air ambulance
operators; and
(iv) organizations representing general aviation operators
and pilots.
(C) Not fewer than 5 independent subject matter experts in
safety management systems and safety data who--
(i) have not served as a political appointee in the
Administration; and
(ii) have a minimum of 10 years of relevant applied
experience.
(D) 2 air carrier employees whose job responsibilities
include administration of a safety management system.
(E) 2 individuals representing holders of a certificate
issued under part 21 of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations, whose job responsibilities include
administration of a safety management system.
(F) 2 other representatives from the aerospace industry
that do not meet the criteria described in subparagraph (D)
or (E) and who have expertise in safety assurance or safety
risk or whose job responsibilities include administration of
a safety management system.
(G) A career representative from the National
Transportation Safety Board with subject matter expertise, as
a nonvoting member.
(2) Advisory members.--In addition to the appointed members
described in paragraph (1), the working group shall be
advised by up to 5 employees of the Administration, at least
3 of whom shall be subject matter experts in implementing
safety assurance and safety risk management.
(d) Implementation.--Not later than 30 days after the
working group develops recommendations under subsection (a),
the Administrator shall make publicly available a report
containing the recommendations and describing how the
Administrator will implement such recommendations.
SEC. 123. NOTIFICATION OF CLOSE PROXIMITY ENCOUNTERS AND
ANALYSIS OF DATA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in accordance with
the mandatory occurrence reporting requirements in FAA Order
JO 7210.632A, titled ``Air Traffic Organization Occurrence
Reporting'' (or any successor document), FAA Order 8020.11D,
titled ``Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification,
Investigation, and Reporting'' (or any successor document),
and FAA Advisory Circular AC 90-120, titled ``Operational Use
of Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems'' (or any successor
document), shall establish a process to--
(1) notify, with respect to each event, parties involved
with--
(A) a near midair collision event;
(B) a traffic collision avoidance system resolution
advisory event;
(C) a close proximity encounter, as defined pursuant to
section 122; and
(D) any other events, as determined by the Administrator;
and
(2) provide deidentified event data to the Aviation Safety
Information Analysis and Sharing program.
(b) Requirements.--In establishing the process under
subsection (a), the Administrator shall--
(1) establish a database that tracks the details of events
described in subsection (a)(1);
(2) continuously monitor and review such database to
identify areas of potential traffic conflict for safety
assurance and safety risk management;
(3) ensure timeliness of notifications to the parties
described in subsection (a)(1) so that relevant data remains
available before meaningful safety analysis, reporting, or
corrective action is no longer practicable;
(4) consider informing, with deidentified or aggregated
data, other frequent operators of events described in
subsection (a)(1); and
(5) consider the practicality and usefulness of
notification requirements for--
(A) airport surface loss of separation;
(B) loss of separation with terrain or obstacles;
(C) airborne loss of separation; and
(D) any other close proximity encounters as determined by
the Administrator.
(c) Consultation.--In establishing the process under
subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with--
(1) air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations;
(2) air carriers operating under part 135 of title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations;
(3) air carriers operating under part 91 of title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations;
(4) organizations representing helicopter aviation
operators and pilots;
(5) organizations representing the general aviation
community;
(6) organizations representing business aviation operators;
(7) organizations representing experimental aircraft
operators;
(8) organizations representing powered-lift operators;
(9) organizations representing certified collective
bargaining representatives of airline pilots;
(10) the certified exclusive bargaining representatives of
air traffic controllers of the Administration certified under
section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;
(11) FAA subject matter experts, including aviation safety
inspectors; and
(12) other aviation safety experts determined appropriate
by the Administrator.
(d) Briefing.--Not later than 30 days after establishing
the process required under subsection (a), the Administrator
shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the
implementation of this section.
(e) Report.--Not later than 1 year after establishing the
process required under subsection (a), and annually
thereafter, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report containing--
(1) data on number and location of--
(A) near midair collision events;
(B) traffic collision avoidance system resolution advisory
events; and
(C) close proximity encounters, as defined pursuant to
section 122;
(2) the average time of notification to parties involved in
such events;
(3) identified locations of concern or other trends; and
(4) actions taken to mitigate identified risks and reduce
such events.
(f) Protection of Data.--
[[Page H2866]]
(1) In general.--Data collected in response to subsection
(a) shall be used solely for safety assurance and safety risk
management.
(2) Consistency with existing safety programs.--The
Administrator shall ensure consistency with existing
voluntary safety programs, including the Aviation Safety
Action Program, the Aviation Safety Reporting System, the Air
Traffic Safety Action Plan, and flight operational quality
assurance programs.
SEC. 124. SAFETY CULTURE AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT REVIEW.
(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the inspector general of the
Department of Transportation shall initiate an audit of the
safety culture and the safety management system of the Air
Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management
Organization.
(b) Considerations.--In conducting the audit under
subsection (a), the inspector general shall, at a minimum,
evaluate--
(1) the safety management system of the Air Traffic
Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization,
including the functions and data sharing activities of such
system at all air traffic control facilities;
(2) whether such system effectively coordinates safety
assurance and safety risk management activities with external
stakeholders consistent with FAA requirements for operators
under section 5.57 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;
(3) which data analysis, safety assurance, and risk
assessment processes failed to identify and mitigate the risk
of potential midair collisions near Ronald Reagan Washington
National Airport before January 29, 2025;
(4) the failure of the Air Traffic Organization and the
Aviation Safety Management Organization to recognize external
compliance verification results as indicators of systemic
traffic management, volume, and flow issues at Ronald Reagan
Washington National Airport for which air traffic controllers
were required to compensate to mitigate such issues;
(5) the failure of the Air Traffic Organization and the
Aviation Safety Management Organization to conduct annual
reviews of helicopter route charts as required by FAA Order
JO 7210.3EE, titled ``Facility Operation and
Administration'';
(6) the failure of the Air Traffic Organization and the
Aviation Safety Management Organization to understand and
implement post-accident and post-incident drug and alcohol
testing as required by Department of Transportation Order
3910.1D, titled ``Drug and Alcohol-Free Departmental
Workplace Program'';
(7) whether there are fears of retaliation against persons
identifying or reporting risks in accordance with the safety
management system; and
(8) how the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation
Safety Management Organization have addressed the findings
and utilized the Safety Risk Management process in accordance
with FAA Order 8040.4C, titled ``Safety Risk Management
Policy'' (or any successor document) in the National Airspace
System Helicopter Operations Helicopter Route Analysis of the
FAA issued in April 2025.
(c) Report of the Inspector General.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the inspector general shall submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the audit
conducted under subsection (a).
(2) Recommendations.--The inspector general shall include
in the report submitted under paragraph (1)--
(A) recommendations for actions the Secretary should take
with respect to the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation
Safety Management Organization to--
(i) strengthen and adhere to the tenets of the safety
management system;
(ii) increase transparency in the safety management system
process, including by adopting policies that provide
assurances to FAA employees that the Air Traffic Organization
is addressing any identified safety issues;
(iii) increase data sharing and collaboration with external
stakeholders;
(iv) protect against retaliation;
(v) encourage open, nonpunitive communication; and
(vi) foster a just culture across the Air Traffic
Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization;
(B) recommendations for actions the Secretary may take to
ensure adequate oversight over the safety management system
of the Air Traffic Organization; and
(C) any other recommendations the inspector general
determines appropriate.
(d) Response to Recommendations.--Not later than 120 days
after submission of the report required under subsection
(c)--
(1) the Secretary shall respond to any recommendations in
such report that are directed at the Department of
Transportation or FAA, respectively; and
(2) the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report describing how the Secretary
intends to implement such recommendations.
SEC. 125. DOCUMENTATION OF CONTROL POSITION COMBINATIONS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall review and
revise, as appropriate, procedures regarding the
documentation of the combination of air traffic control
position responsibilities, including each occurrence in which
any air traffic control position is combined with any other
position, including a local control position, operations
supervisor, or controller-in-charge.
(b) Requirements.--In reviewing and revising the procedures
described in subsection (a), the Administrator shall--
(1) evaluate procedures and guidance regarding the
combination of controller position responsibilities described
in subsection (a) that are in effect prior to the date of
enactment of this Act;
(2) examine the feasibility of digitizing, or providing an
electronic means of, the documentation described in
subsection (a);
(3) require the operations supervisor to periodically
review documentation of occurrences of combined control
position responsibilities described in subsection (a) and
report on deviations from the standard operating procedures
to the facility air traffic manager;
(4) consider air traffic facility type and staffing level;
and
(5) consult with representatives of--
(A) the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic
controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United
States Code;
(B) organizations representing air traffic control managers
and operational supervisors; and
(C) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge in
information technology.
(c) Briefing to Congress.--Not later than 1 year after the
completion of the review required under subsection (a), the
Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of
Congress on implementation of this section.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section may be
construed to interfere with any agreement between a
governmental agency and the exclusive bargaining
representative of air traffic controllers certified under
section 7111 of title 5, United States Code or section
7106(a) of title 5, United States Code.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Controller-in-charge.--The term ``controller-in-
charge'' means an air traffic control specialist performing
duties of a shift supervisor in accordance with--
(A) FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled ``Facility Operation and
Administration'', issued on February 20, 2025; and
(B) FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled ``Air Traffic Control'',
issued on February 20, 2025.
(2) Operations supervisor.--The term ``operations
supervisor'' means managerial personnel responsible for the
direct supervision of air traffic control operational
personnel.
SEC. 126. REVIEW OF MILES-IN-TRAIL PROCEDURES OR AGREEMENTS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall complete a
review of the miles-in-trail standards and procedures to
determine if such standards provide for a separation of
traffic that is appropriate for operational safety.
(b) Considerations.--In conducting the review under
subsection (a), the Administrator may consider--
(1) the accuracy of the criteria used to determine the
miles-in-trail procedures for air traffic control facilities;
(2) whether additional criteria should be incorporated to
more appropriately reflect the traffic volume and operational
complexity of air traffic control facilities; and
(3) the findings and recommendations of the National
Transportation Safety Board.
(c) Standards Update.--Upon completion of the review
conducted under subsection (a), the Administrator shall
update the miles-in-trail standards and procedures to ensure
such standards and procedures are appropriate for operational
safety.
(d) Review of Certain Facilities.--Not later than 90 days
after the completion of the review under subsection (a), the
Administrator shall initiate a review of the miles-in-trail
procedures or agreements at all air traffic control
facilities located within Class B or Class C airspace to
ensure such procedures or agreements provide for a separation
of traffic that is appropriate for operational safety.
(e) Consultation.--In carrying out the review under
subsection (d), the Administrator shall consult with, at
minimum--
(1) the exclusive bargaining representatives of the air
traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5,
United States Code;
(2) organizations representing air traffic control managers
and operations supervisors;
(3) sponsors and operators of airports with air traffic
control facilities described in subsection (d);
(4) organizations representing the certified collective
bargaining representatives of pilots operating under part 121
of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations; and
(5) air carriers, business aviation, and general aviation
operators with operations at airports with air traffic
control facilities described in subsection (d).
(f) Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report that includes--
(1) a list of air traffic control facilities identified
under subsection (d) as having miles-in-trail procedures or
agreements that did not provide for a separation of aircraft
traffic appropriate for operational safety; and
[[Page H2867]]
(2) steps that the Administrator has taken, or plans to
take, to modify the miles-in-trail procedures or agreements
at each facility listed under paragraph (1) to ensure such
procedures or agreements provide for a separation of traffic
that is appropriate for operational safety.
SEC. 127. CLOSURE OF HELICOPTER ROUTE 4.
(a) In General.--Operations on Helicopter Route 4, as such
Route existed on January 29, 2025, on the segment located
between Hains Point and the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge in
the District of Columbia shall be prohibited.
(b) Segment Elimination.--The segment of Helicopter Route 4
described in subsection (a) shall remain eliminated from
helicopter charts.
TITLE II--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MATTERS
SEC. 201. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MATTERS RELATING TO AVIATION
SAFETY.
Title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after
chapter 157 the following new chapter:
``CHAPTER 158--AVIATION SAFETY
``Sec.
``2655. Definitions.
``2656. Memorandum of agreement.
``2657. Required risk assessment and mitigation for special missions.
``2658. Manned rotary wing aviation safety management system.
``2659. Initial and recurring training on highly congested airspace.
``2660. Flight data monitoring improvements.
``2660a. Barometric altimeters.
``2660b. Transponder maintenance.
``2660c. Notifications and reports on certain near-miss events in
National Capital Region.
``2660d. Reports on individuals designated for purposes of special
mission exclusion.
``2660e. Rule of construction.
``Sec. 2655. Definitions
``In this chapter:
``(1) The term `ADS-B In' means technology that receives
and processes Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B) transmissions that are broadcast in accordance with
parts 91.225 and 91.227 of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations, and other aviation advisory information from
ground stations, including Traffic Information Service-
Broadcast (TIS-B) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Rebroadcast (ADS-R).
``(2) The term `ADS-B Out' has the meaning given such term
in part 91.227 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
``(3) The term `air traffic control services' means
services used for the monitoring, directing, control, and
guidance of aircraft or flows of aircraft and for the safe
conduct of flight, including communications, navigation, and
surveillance services and the provision of aeronautical
information.
``(4) The term `appropriate congressional committees' means
the congressional defense committees, the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate.
``(5) The term `Class B Mode C veil' means any location
described in part 91.225(d)(2) of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations.
``(6) The term `collision prevention technology' means
technology that--
``(A) has ADS-B In;
``(B) uses ADS-B data; and
``(C) provides, and is configured to provide, alerting that
is audible to the pilot and flight crew.
``(7) The term `Department of Defense aircraft' means any
aircraft, either manned or unmanned, that is owned, operated,
or controlled by the Department of Defense or operated
pursuant to a contract entered into by the Department of
Defense.
``(8) The term `historical flight data'--
``(A) means data derived from Department of Defense or
external sources regarding the actual flights taken by
relevant Department of Defense aircraft, such as flight
paths, altitudes, and other flight characteristics, that
would provide a point of comparison to evaluate planned
flights or review prior flights for adherence to published
flight routes or flight plans; and
``(B) does not include notional data generated for planning
or training purposes.
``(9) The term `manned rotary wing aviation safety
management system'--
``(A) means training, policies and practices related to
rotary wing aviation safety; and
``(B) does not refer to equipment installed or carried on
aircraft for flight operations.
``(10) The term `National Capital Region' means--
``(A) the geographic area located within the boundaries
of--
``(i) the District of Columbia;
``(ii) Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties in the State
of Maryland;
``(iii) Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William
Counties and the City of Alexandria in the Commonwealth of
Virginia; and
``(iv) all cities and other units of government within the
geographic areas described in clauses (i) through (iii); or
``(B) the geographic area prescribed for such region in the
memorandum of agreement required by section 2656 of this
title, except that such geographic area may not exceed the
boundaries described in clauses (i) through (iv) of
subparagraph (A).
``(11) The term `sensitive aircraft data' means--
``(A) Department of Defense aircraft information relating
to classified aircraft, aircraft involved in continuity of
government operations or nuclear command and control, fighter
aircraft, bomber aircraft, special mission aircraft, or
unmanned aircraft systems; and
``(B) other information which, if publicly disclosed or
aggregated, would reveal the capabilities of Department of
Defense aircraft and could reasonably be expected to cause
serious damage to national security.
``(12) The term `special mission'--
``(A) means any mission of the Department of Defense
relating to activities which, if publicly disclosed, could
reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national
security; and
``(B) does not include--
``(i) unclassified flights;
``(ii) flight crew proficiency flights; or
``(iii) the transportation of any Government official other
than a head of an executive department (as such term is
defined in section 101 of title 5), a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, a commander of a combatant command, or any
other individual designated by the President for purposes of
this paragraph.
``(13) The term `special mission aircraft' means a
Department of Defense aircraft performing a special mission,
either permanently or temporarily.
``(14) The term `unmanned aircraft system' has the meaning
given such term in section 44801 of title 49.
``Sec. 2656. Memorandum of agreement
``(a) Memorandum Required.--(1) Not later than September
30, 2026, the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary
of Defense shall enter into, and jointly submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a copy of, a memorandum
of agreement that--
``(A) provides that fighter aircraft, bomber aircraft,
unmanned aircraft systems, and other special mission aircraft
that are not equipped or not yet equipped with collision
prevention technologies or ADS-B Out, or successor
technologies, will be reasonably accommodated for safe
operations in the national airspace system and provided with
necessary air traffic control services; and
``(B) establishes policies governing the operation of
collision prevention technologies and ADS-B Out, or successor
technologies, including proper maintenance and routine
verification practices for such systems, on Department of
Defense aircraft, consistent with this chapter.
``(2) The Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of
Defense, or the designees thereof, shall consult not less
frequently than semiannually on any appropriate updates to
the memorandum required by this subsection to reflect safe,
effective, and modern air traffic identification, air space
management, and related equipment.
``(b) Collision Avoidance Matters.--(1) The Secretary of
Defense shall ensure that the memorandum of agreement
required by subsection (a) includes, at a minimum--
``(A) a requirement that, beginning on a date agreed to and
set forth in such memorandum or the date that is one year
after the date of the enactment of this section, whichever
occurs first, the Secretary of a military department may not
authorize any Department of Defense manned rotary wing
aircraft to operate a mission in the National Capital Region
unless such aircraft is actively transmitting an ADS-B Out
broadcast, or successor technology, unless--
``(i) the Secretary of the military department, in
coordination with the Secretary of Transportation, has
conducted a safety risk assessment and implemented
mitigations, as appropriate, to ensure safety in the National
Capital Region; and
``(ii) such aircraft is carrying out a special mission;
``(B) procedures requiring the use of ADS-B Out as the
default practice by Department of Defense manned rotary wing
aircraft when operating in the national airspace system,
unless such use would affect the operational security of
Department of Defense aircraft or special missions;
``(C) consistent with section 2660b of this title,
procedures for ensuring the correct configuration of ADS-B
Out and other transponders, including routine intervals for
verifying transponder settings and proper operation;
``(D) operational procedures to allow flight crews to
enable ADS-B Out transmission while in flight in the national
airspace system, including in response to air traffic or
weather conditions; and
``(E) provisions to protect sensitive aircraft data from
unnecessary disclosure, including by mitigating risks
regarding the inadvertent disclosure of such data or
information regarding special missions.
``(2)(A) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that--
``(i) by not later than 180 days after the date on which
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a copy of
the memorandum of agreement required by subsection (a),
Department of Defense aircraft that are not fighter aircraft,
bomber aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, or other special
mission aircraft, are equipped and operating with an
integrated system, federated system, or standalone device
that displays traffic information to the pilot and flight
crew; and
[[Page H2868]]
``(ii) by not later than December 31, 2031, such Department
of Defense aircraft are equipped and operating with an
integrated collision prevention technology system.
``(B) In carrying out subparagraph (A), the Secretary of
Defense shall take into consideration--
``(i) any need to protect the technology or systems
described in such subparagraph against man-made electronic
interference;
``(ii) appropriate mitigations to known security
vulnerabilities associated with such technology or systems;
``(iii) appropriate safeguards for sensitive aircraft data,
classified material, equipment, or special missions when
aircraft described in such subparagraph are equipped and
operating with collision prevention technology;
``(iv) updated guidance, tactics, techniques, procedures,
or training with respect to electromagnetic emissions related
to such technology and systems; and
``(v) placement in flight deck, field of view of pilots,
and human factors, to ensure such technology is effective,
may be readily used, and has minimal risk of unexpected
detachment.
``(3) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the
Secretary of Transportation receives accurate information
regarding the configurations recommended by each military
department for each relevant aircraft type while such
aircraft operate in the national airspace system.
``(4) In implementing the memorandum of agreement required
by subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary
of a military department, may exempt from relevant portions
of such memorandum an individual aircraft on a case-by-case
basis if such Secretary determines that the aircraft--
``(A) is not airworthy, is otherwise unrepairable, or is
not reasonably expected to return to service;
``(B) is an aircraft for which depot-level maintenance or a
substantial overhaul of avionics-related equipment, including
the installation of collision prevention technology, is
scheduled to occur prior to December 31, 2030;
``(C) is scheduled to be retired from service prior to
September 30, 2028; or
``(D) is an unpowered aircraft not suitable for collision
prevention technology due to airframe limitations, including
gliders used for pilot instruction.
``(c) Notification Requirement.--The Secretary of Defense
shall provide to the Secretary of Transportation notification
of any aircraft the Secretary of Defense designates as a
special mission aircraft operating within the United States
(as such term is defined in section 1.1 of title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations), for purposes of this chapter. Such
notification may identify such aircraft by type, model,
series, or another means agreed to in the memorandum of
agreement required by subsection (a).
``(d) Collision Prevention Technology Equipage.--In
implementing a memorandum of agreement pursuant to this
section or any other provision of law, to protect the
operational security of Department of Defense aircraft, the
Secretary of Defense shall retain the sole control over the
determination of which specific collision prevention
technology is appropriate for installation and operation in
any such aircraft.
``Sec. 2657. Required risk assessment and mitigation for
special missions
``(a) Risk Assessment.--The Secretary of each military
department, in coordination with the Secretary of
Transportation, shall conduct a risk assessment, and
recommend and implement, as appropriate, mitigations as a
result of such assessment, to ensure safety in the national
airspace system for each type of planned or anticipated
special mission of a manned rotary wing aircraft of such
military department that would involve operations occurring
in whole or in part within a Class B Mode C veil airspace.
``(b) Implementation.--The requirement under subsection (a)
shall be carried out in a manner mutually agreed to by the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation in
the memorandum of agreement required by section 2656 of this
title.
``(c) Initial Report.--(1) Not later than one year after
the date on which the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary
of Transportation submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a copy of the memorandum of agreement required by
section 2656 of this title, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on
the types of special mission activities assessed, and any
mitigation recommended or implemented, pursuant to subsection
(a). Such report shall include, for each month during the 12-
month period preceding the date of the submission of the
report, the actual number of special mission flights flown
with ADS-B Out turned off, in whole or in part, within a
Class B Mode C veil airspace, disaggregated by special
mission activity.
``(2) The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
``(d) Subsequent Report.--(1) Not later than one year after
the date of the submission of the report under subsection
(c), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report that includes, for
each month during the 12-month period preceding the date of
the submission of the report, the actual number of special
mission flights that the Secretary of Defense has flown with
ADS-B Out turned off, in whole or in part, within a Class B
Mode C veil airspace, disaggregated by special mission
activity.
``(2) The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
``Sec. 2658. Manned rotary wing aviation safety management
system
``(a) Requirement.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure
that, by not later than March 1, 2027, the Secretary of each
military department has established a robust manned rotary
wing aviation safety management system, or updated an
existing such system, to provide for--
``(1) responsibilities with respect to such system that are
clearly delineated from other occupational safety
responsibilities;
``(2) staffing and other resources required for the
operation of such system; and
``(3) the implementation of such system in a manner that is
functionally integrated with relevant units.
``(b) Qualification Protections.--The Secretary shall
ensure that the implementation of a manned rotary wing
aviation safety management system required under subsection
(a) does not preclude an individual assigned manned rotary
wing aviation safety management system duties from
maintaining appropriate qualifications, flying hours,
professional military education, or other activities required
for career advancement on the basis of being assigned such
duties.
``(c) Aviator Survey.--Not later than one year after the
date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary shall
carry out a survey of rotary aircraft flight crews across the
Department of Defense to identify operationally relevant and
responsive flight safety reporting systems. Such survey shall
include the collection of information regarding--
``(1) barriers to the use of such systems perceived by
pilots;
``(2) responsive reporting methods for identifying and
collecting important safety reporting;
``(3) systems for collecting relevant safety reporting that
may be used in conjunction with historical flight data to
provide insights that may be used in carrying out section
2660 of this title;
``(4) options for reporting safety incidents, including
encounters with civil air traffic operating in the national
airspace system, without retaliation, judgment, or undue
consequence;
``(5) preserving reports of persistent issues with
communications, either incoming or outgoing, with air traffic
controllers or other aircraft in controlled airspace; and
``(6) integrating improved flight safety reporting into
current operations.
``(d) Reports.--Not later than 90 days after the date on
which the survey under subsection (c) is completed, and on a
semiannual basis thereafter until December 31, 2031, the
Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report containing--
``(1) an outline of the funding and personnel resources
necessary to implement the requirements under subsection (a),
and appropriate findings from the survey under subsection
(c), with respect to each military department;
``(2) an outline of the safety functions, practices,
training, and reporting required under each manned rotary
wing aviation safety management system established or updated
under subsection (a);
``(3) an assessment of which military department practices
most closely align to the best practicable solutions
identified pursuant to the findings from the survey under
subsection (c);
``(4) a plan to implement the requirements under subsection
(a) and appropriate findings from the survey under subsection
(c); and
``(5) a plan to ensure active duty units and National Guard
units receive the same benefits from an improved manned
rotary wing aviation safety management system.
``(e) Comptroller General Review.--(1) The Comptroller
General of the United States shall conduct a review of the
efficacy of the manned rotary wing aviation safety management
systems established or updated pursuant to subsection (a).
Such review shall include--
``(A) an assessment of the extent to which the Secretary
has implemented the requirements under subsection (a);
``(B) an assessment of the extent to which the Secretary
has developed an approach to identify and mitigate any risks
in implementing subsection (a); and
``(C) any other matters the Comptroller General determines
are relevant.
``(2) Not later than September 1, 2027, the Comptroller
General shall provide to the congressional defense committees
a briefing on the preliminary findings of the review required
under paragraph (1). The Comptroller General shall provide to
such committees the final results of such review in a
mutually agreed upon format and timeframe.
``Sec. 2659. Initial and recurring training on highly
congested airspace
``(a) Required Training.--The Secretary of Defense shall
ensure that, by not later than March 1, 2027, flight crews
for Department of Defense manned rotary wing aircraft
operating in the national airspace system receive appropriate
initial and recurring training regarding fixed-wing
operations within Class B Mode C veil airspace routinely
encountered in the course of operations from the assigned
duty station of the flight crew. Such training shall include
training on approach and departure paths, runway
configurations, and
[[Page H2869]]
the interaction of those traffic flows with published
helicopter routes.
``(b) Use of Historical Flight Data.--In developing the
training described in subsection (a), the Secretary shall
consider historical flight data from Department of Defense
manned rotary wing aircraft operating in the associated
airspace.
``(c) Report.--Not later than March 1, 2027, the Secretary
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report
containing a description of how each military department has
implemented the training requirements under subsection (a)
and how the Secretary has ensured consistency with respect to
such implementation across the military departments.
``Sec. 2660. Flight data monitoring improvements
``(a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date
of enactment of this section, the Secretary of Defense shall
develop and implement standards across the military
departments to ensure that Department of Defense manned
rotary wing aircraft operations in the national airspace
system, and associated training, routes, and activities, are
informed by accurate recorded flight data to--
``(1) monitor operational patterns;
``(2) identify operational safety risks; and
``(3) support the development and implementation of
effective risk controls for missions in the national airspace
system.
``(b) Data Use.--In carrying out subsection (a), the
Secretary shall--
``(1) seek to use--
``(A) existing data sets and tools to allow for convenient
and expeditious use of such data at the lowest possible
level; and
``(B) systems that allow for flight data to be evaluated
for accuracy on a recurrent basis; and
``(2) conduct a review, and establish procedures based on
the results of such review, to ensure flight data is
evaluated for accuracy at an appropriate organizational level
and on a recurrent basis.
``(c) Implementation Updates.--The Secretary shall provide
to the congressional defense committees updates on--
``(1) the implementation of this section; and
``(2) the incorporation of the standards developed and data
collected pursuant to this section into the manned rotary
wing aviation safety management systems required under
section 2658 of this title.
``(d) Data Sharing.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall--
``(A) conduct a review across the military departments to
identify flight data that may be readily shared with the
Secretary of Transportation; and
``(B) implement a process to share safety data with the
Secretary of Transportation.
``(2) To the extent the Secretary of Defense determines
necessary, data shared pursuant to paragraph (1) may be de-
identified.
``Sec. 2660a. Barometric altimeters
``(a) Manuals.--The Secretary of Defense shall promptly
update, and maintain, appropriate manuals of the Department
of Defense for manned rotary wing aircraft, to provide clear
guidance regarding--
``(1) the expected standard margin of error for barometric
altimeters for each class of such aircraft; and
``(2) the total potential error resulting from additional
aircraft equipment with respect to an otherwise airworthy
barometric altimeter, including increased position error
associated with external stores support system
configurations.
``(b) Incorporation of Data.--In updating the manuals under
subsection (a), the Secretary shall incorporate observations
derived from external data sources, including historical
flight data monitoring from external sources, to better
understand the total potential error of barometric altimeters
in various aircraft configurations.
``(c) Training.--Not later than 30 days after the date on
which the Secretary updates the manuals under subsection (a),
the Secretary shall require appropriate refresher training
for the crew of any aircraft subject to such an updated
manual.
``Sec. 2660b. Transponder maintenance
``(a) Required Intervals.--The Secretary of each military
department shall establish routine intervals for verifying
the correct configuration and function of ADS-B Out
transponders, and related equipment, for aircraft of such
military department required to use such transponders. Such
intervals may not be less frequent than once every 90 days.
``(b) Reports.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the submission of the budget of the President under section
1105(a) of title 31 for fiscal years 2028 through 2033, the
Secretary of each military department shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report that details the
following:
``(1) Compliance across such military department with
respect to the required maintenance intervals established
under subsection (a).
``(2) The total number of instances, disaggregated by
military installation, in which an ADS-B Out transponder was
not serviced in accordance with the applicable maintenance
interval established under subsection (a).
``(3) Any additional personnel, resources, or equipment
required to simplify or otherwise improve maintenance
requirements associated with carrying out this section.
``Sec. 2660c. Notifications and reports on certain near-miss
events in National Capital Region
``(a) Notifications.--Not later than one week after the
date on which a covered near-miss event occurs, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services
of the House of Representatives and the Senate a notification
of such event.
``(b) Establishment of Associated Definition.--Not later
than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this section,
the Secretary, in coordination with a working group
determined appropriate by the Secretary, shall establish a
definition of the term `close proximity encounter' for
purposes of this section.
``(c) Reports.--Not later than 180 days after the date on
which the definition under subsection (b) is established, on
a biannual basis thereafter for the following two-year
period, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed
Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a
report containing, with respect to the period covered by the
report--
``(1) an identification of the number of covered near-miss
events that occurred during such period;
``(2) for each such event, an identification of any cause
of such event;
``(3) a description any modification to relevant standard
operating procedures or other policies of the Department of
Defense issued, or planned to be issued, to address such
events; and
``(4) a description of the status of implementation of any
such modification.
``(d) Covered Near-miss Event Defined.--In this section,
the term `covered near-miss event' means a close proximity
encounter (as such term is defined pursuant to subsection
(b)) that--
``(1) involves at least one Department of Defense aircraft;
and
``(2) occurs in the National Capital Region.
``Sec. 2660d. Reports on individuals designated for purposes
of special mission exclusion
``(a) Reports.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this section, and on an annual basis
thereafter, the President shall submit to the Committees on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate
a report containing, with respect to the preceding year--
``(1) an identification of any individual designated by the
President for purposes of section 2655(12)(B)(iii) of this
title; and
``(2) a description of how often individuals so designated
were transported in connection with a mission that, but for
such designation, would be considered a special mission.
``(b) Form.--Each report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.
``Sec. 2660e. Rule of construction
``Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to--
``(1) vest in the Secretary of Defense any authority of the
Secretary of Transportation or the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration under title 49 or any other
provision of law;
``(2) vest in the Secretary of Transportation or the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration any
authority of the Secretary of Defense under this title or any
other provision of law;
``(3) limit the authority or discretion of the Secretary of
Transportation or the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration to operate air traffic control services to
ensure the safe minimum separation of aircraft in flight and
the efficient use of airspace;
``(4) apply a rule, guidance, plan, carriage requirement,
or memorandum established, modified, or reissued pursuant to
any other provision of law to any Department of Defense
aircraft except through a process established in the
memorandum of agreement required by section 2656 of this
title; or
``(5) require a Department of Defense aircraft to
compromise operational security during a combat operation.''.
SEC. 202. REPEAL OF PRIOR PROVISION OF LAW ON MANNED ROTARY
WING AIRCRAFT SAFETY.
Section 2654 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.
SEC. 203. TREATMENT OF SUPERSEDED MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT AND
PROVISION OF LAW.
Effective on the date on which the memorandum of agreement
required by section 2656 of title 10, United States Code, as
added by section 201 of this title, is submitted to the
congressional defense committees, the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate, the following shall have no
further force or effect:
(1) Section 1046 of the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232;
49 U.S.C. 40101 note).
(2) The memorandum of agreement between the Department of
Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration entered into
on May 10, 2024.
SEC. 204. REPORT ON COMMUNICATIONS DEGRADATION.
(a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
to the congressional defense committees a report containing--
(1) an assessment on the degradation of radio transmission
or reception between Department of Defense aircraft and air
traffic controllers or other aircraft operating in the
national airspace system;
[[Page H2870]]
(2) an identification of factors that may contribute to
such degradation; and
(3) an assessment of potential actions to remediate such
degradation.
(b) Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date on which
the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees
a copy of the memorandum under section 2656 of title 10,
United States Code, as added by section 201 of this title,
the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a plan to leverage major avionics upgrades or
depot-level maintenance associated with the installation or
provision of collision prevention technology to upgrade
communications systems in Department of Defense aircraft
(particularly with respect to manned rotary wing aircraft),
for the purpose of improving the clarity and reliability of
transmissions to and from such aircraft.
(c) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``collision
prevention technology'' and ``Department of Defense
aircraft'' have the meanings given such terms in section 2655
of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 201 of
this title.
SEC. 205. ANNUAL REPORT ON PROFICIENCY FLIGHTS IN NATIONAL
CAPITOL REGION.
(a) Annual Report.--Not later than one year after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
each of the two subsequent years, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to Congress a report on the number of Department
of Defense proficiency flights that occurred in the National
Capitol Region during the 12-month period preceding the date
of the submission of the report.
(b) National Capitol Region.--In this section, the term
``National Capitol Region'' has the meaning given such term
in section 2655(10) of title 10, United States Code, as added
by section 201.
SEC. 206. BRIEFING ON VIRTUAL CONSTRUCTIVE TRAINING.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the
congressional defense committees (as such term is defined in
section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code) a
briefing on the feasibility of using virtual constructive
training to optimize the amount of in-air training used by
the Armed Forces.
SEC. 207. TRANSPARENCY REGARDING MIDAIR COLLISION NEAR RONALD
REAGAN WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT ON JANUARY
29, 2025.
(a) Submissions to Congress.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the
Army shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives and the Senate--
(1) a copy of the command investigation of the midair
collision that occurred near Ronald Reagan Washington
National Airport on January 29, 2025, with redactions limited
to those necessary to protect the privacy of the flight crew
involved; and
(2) an implementation plan for the recommendations
contained therein.
(b) Inspector General of the Army Assessment.--
(1) Assessment.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Army
shall commence an assessment of the sufficiency of the
recommendations and implementation plan specified in
subsection (a)(2).
(2) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Army
shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the House
of Representatives and the Senate a report containing--
(A) the results of the assessment under paragraph (1); and
(B) any additional recommendations by the Inspector General
relating to the matters so assessed, as applicable.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. Graves) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Larsen)
each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri.
General Leave
Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and
include extraneous material into the Record on H.R. 7613.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Missouri?
There was no objection.
Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, on January 29, 2025, tragedy struck just a few miles
from where we stand today, when an Army Black Hawk helicopter collided
with American Airlines Flight 5342 as it approached Ronald Reagan
Washington National Airport. Sixty-seven people lost their lives that
night, all of the passengers and all of the crew on both aircraft.
Accidents of this magnitude demand careful, deliberate, and
thoughtful consideration. Aviation incidents are rarely the result of a
single failure. They are usually complex, with multiple contributing
factors. Therefore, it is essential that we understand all the facts
before legislating.
That is why we have the National Transportation Safety Board. Their
job is to conduct an independent investigation, leaving no stone
unturned, establish findings, determine the probable cause and
contributing factors, and issue evidence-based safety recommendations.
If we act without that complete picture, we risk misdiagnosis and
Congress missing the mark. After the NTSB issued its final report on
February 17, I joined Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
Ranking Member Rick Larsen, Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike
Rogers, and Ranking Member Adam Smith to introduce the ALERT Act.
This is a bipartisan and comprehensive aviation safety reform bill.
It addresses the probable cause, the contributing factors, and the
NTSB's safety recommendations. In fact, the NTSB has stated that the
bill that we are considering today addresses all 50 of the board's
recommendations.
At its core, this legislation is about making our aviation system
safer in a practical, straightforward, and meaningful way. It requires
airliners to upgrade their collision avoidance technology by 2031 to a
more advanced system, a system that is integrated, using ADS-B In, and
that provides aural alerts with nearby traffic's clock position,
relative altitude, range, and vertical tendency, and incorporates
directional traffic symbols on visual displays.
For other aircraft required to have ADS-B Out, the bill requires ADS-
B In-based collision prevention technology by 2031.
Further, the bill permanently closes the route being flown by the
helicopter in this accident, helicopter route 4 along on the Potomac
River, and updates helicopter route design requirements. This was what
the NTSB identified as the root cause of this tragedy.
It also takes a hard look at the FAA's safety culture by requiring an
independent audit by the Inspector General.
In addition, the legislation improves how data is collected and
shared within and between the FAA and the Pentagon, so we can identify
risks earlier and act on them.
We did not put this bill together in a vacuum. We worked closely with
the NTSB, with stakeholders, and with the victims' families to make
sure we got this right.
To those families, especially those who are here with us today: I
know this has not been an easy process by any stretch of the
imagination, but your strong advocacy for safety is why we continue to
push for America to still remain the gold standard in aviation.
This bill now has 87 cosponsors. Both the T&I and Armed Services
Committees marked up their respective titles, and each passed those
titles unanimously, a strong, bipartisan signal that Congress is united
and serious about strengthening aviation safety. H.R. 7613, as amended,
that we are considering on the floor today combines the work of both
committees.
At its core, this is about doing our job: ensuring our aviation
system is as safe as it can possibly be and taking meaningful steps to
help prevent a tragedy like this from ever happening again.
Madam Speaker, I urge support for the ALERT Act, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as
I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 7613, the Airspace
Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency Act, or the ALERT Act, as
amended, bipartisan legislation introduced by T&I Committee Chair Sam
Graves, House Armed Services Committee Chair Mike Rogers, Ranking
Member Adam Smith of the Armed Services Committee, and myself, as the
ranking member of the T&I Committee.
This bill responds to all the probable causes of the tragic midair
collision near Washington National Airport, DCA, on January 29, 2025.
On that evening, American Airlines Flight 5342 arriving to DCA from
Wichita, Kansas, and an Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter flying a
routine training mission collided above the Potomac River, resulting in
67 tragic
[[Page H2871]]
deaths, representing the deadliest U.S. aviation accident since 2001.
To the families and loved ones of those lost in this tragedy: You
certainly have my deepest condolences. What you have gone through is
unimaginable, and you have my sincere gratitude for your advocacy. Your
tireless efforts to effect real change and improve aviation safety have
made this bill better.
I also thank the chair of the NTSB, Chair Jennifer Homendy, her
investigators, and the staff for their diligent work to uncover the
cause and contributing factors of this accident, as well as their
valuable input as our committee developed and refined this legislation.
After the accident, the NTSB was on the scene and initiated its
thorough investigation into determining the probable cause, identifying
factors and findings, and issuing recommendations to the appropriate
Federal agencies.
The NTSB published its final report in February that contained the
probable cause of the collision, its findings, and 50 new safety
recommendations directed to the Department of Transportation and the
Department of Defense. Today, we are considering legislation that
responds to all the NTSB's safety recommendations.
The ALERT Act has been bipartisan from its inception and is the
result of productive, good-faith collaboration between the T&I and
Armed Services Committees and the impacted agencies. Since the D.C.
midair tragedy involved both the FAA and the DOD, the solution has to
involve both committees to make lasting changes.
{time} 1640
This bill we are considering today--as I like to call it, the ALERT
Act version 7.0--looks vastly different from the legislation introduced
in February, version 1.0.
It incorporates feedback from the families of the victims, the NTSB,
and other stakeholders who have helped make the ALERT Act a truly
comprehensive safety bill that works to address all 50 NTSB safety
recommendations.
The legislation contains a sense of Congress and 23 provisions
requiring the FAA and the DOT to act on safety recommendations issued
in the NTSB's final report.
These provisions require ADS-B In and collision prevention technology
on virtually all aircraft, enhance air traffic control training and
traffic management procedures, modernize ATC facilities and technology,
address deficiencies in DOT and FAA's safety culture, and strengthen
the safety of the national airspace system and safety in the airspace
around DCA.
A key provision of the ALERT Act is its equipage requirement for
collision prevention technologies, including what we call ADS-B In.
The important thing to know about ADS-B In is it is only one part of
a collision prevention equation in the ALERT Act. While useful, ADS-B
In must be paired with the right system in the cockpit--the right
displays, the right audible alarms, the right software--to effectively
increase a pilot's situational awareness.
As a result, the ALERT Act not only requires ADS-B In but also
requires each aircraft to have collision prevention technology. For all
mainline air carriers, this ADS-B In enabled ACAS Xa is what we call
the next-generation collision avoidance system.
For everyone else who is currently required to have ADS-B Out, they
will be required to have any of the ADS-B In-enabled collision
prevention technologies that also meet a strict set of minimum
requirements.
These ADS-B In capabilities, fed into the right collision prevention
technologies, provide pilots with an unprecedented level of situational
awareness and will increase the safety of the airspace across the
country.
The time to act is now. House passage of the ALERT Act is the next
step in delivering on Congress' safety commitment to the flying public
and addressing all 50 NTSB recommendations.
Moreover, passage of the ALERT Act in the House will allow us to
begin critical discussions with the Senate on a final legislative
response to the DCA midair tragedy.
I urge all my colleagues to support the ALERT Act, as amended. I
reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Alabama (Mr. Rogers), the chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee.
Mr. ROGERS of Alabama. Madam Speaker, I thank the chairman for
yielding.
Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of the ALERT Act. This is
critically needed legislation that will go a long way to improve
aviation safety.
Last year's midair collision between an Army helicopter and a
passenger jet on approach to Reagan National should have never
happened.
The NTSB completed their investigation earlier this year, and their
report included 13 recommendations to the Army and the Pentagon to
ensure another tragedy like this doesn't happen again. Title II of the
ALERT Act carries out all 13 of those recommendations.
In fact, the NTSB states that this bill not only meets their
recommendations but in most cases exceeds them. For instance, the NTSB
made several recommendations to the Army to improve its training and
safety management system. The ALERT Act requires all military services
to make these safety modifications, not just the Army.
The ALERT Act also addresses concerns raised by the Department of War
with the bill as it passed the Senate. The bill before us ensures our
bombers, fighters, and other classified aircraft can continue to
execute their critical national security missions without revealing
their location to our enemies.
We ultimately got a product that improves aviation safety without
undermining our national security. This is a strong bipartisan bill
that passed the Armed Services Committee by a vote of 53-0.
I thank the NTSB and the Pentagon for working with us throughout this
process. I also thank Chairman Graves and Ranking Members Larsen and
Smith, as well as our staff on both committees for their hard work.
Finally, I express my deepest condolences to the families, friends,
and loved ones of those who lost their lives in this terrible accident.
I thank the PAT 25 and the Flight 5342 families for their tireless
efforts to ensure a tragedy like this never occurs again.
Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Carson).
Mr. CARSON. Madam Speaker, I thank Chairman Graves, my friend Ranking
Member Larsen, and the wonderful staff for their leadership and their
partnership, which has allowed our committee to mark up our bill, the
ALERT Act, and bring it to the floor today.
The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee worked together in a
bipartisan way with our Armed Services Committee colleagues to
collaborate and produce a comprehensive bill that addresses and
implements all of NTSB's 50 recommendations in the DCA collision
report, not just a few.
The terrible midair collision at DCA on January 29 last year still
haunts all of us. I also want to take a moment to recognize the family
members who lost their loved ones. I continue to mourn the loss of the
67 people who died that day, including Asra Hussain from Carmel,
Indiana.
Family members have turned their pain into great power and advocacy,
and they have helped us to keep working on a bill that is comprehensive
and will make long overdue changes to improve safety.
Today's bill will save lives, and it addresses all of NTSB's
recommendations to fix problems that have been ignored for far too
long. It requires ADS-B In and collision prevention technology with a
hard deadline. It enhances air traffic control training and
procedures, including time-on position limits. It modernizes ATC
facilities and technology. It addresses deficiencies in the safety
cultures at DOT, FAA, and DOD. It strengthens the traffic management
and safety of the national airspace and the DCA area, including
assessing volume, aircraft arrival rates, and regular review of
helicopter routes in the area.
Madam Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to join us in passing this
remarkable bill that we have all worked so hard to improve and to bring
to a vote. I would also like to thank the Subcommittee on Aviation
staff, both Democratic and Republican, for their
[[Page H2872]]
hard work, late nights, and long weekends to help us bring this to the
floor today. Let's pass this bill.
Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Barrett).
Mr. BARRETT. Madam Speaker, I thank the chairman and the ranking
member, as well.
I rise today in support of the ALERT Act, the bill before us today.
This bill will strengthen aviation safety and includes key provisions
from several of my bills focused on the ADS-B signaling system,
technology that could have prevented the deadly collision between the
commercial airline flight and a military helicopter over the Potomac
River last January, which claimed the lives of 67 individuals.
This tragedy was a breakdown across multiple different systems. For
example, the commercial aircraft was transmitting ADS-B Out, signaling
their position to other aircraft, but it lacked ADS-B In, the ability
to see what was going on around them. The helicopter, the Army Black
Hawk, had ADS-B In but was not transmitting ADS-B Out to alert others
of their position. The American Airlines flight had TCAS, the collision
avoidance system that sends an alert to pilots in the cockpit, but the
helicopter did not.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield an additional 10 seconds to the
gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. BARRETT. Madam Speaker, I am grateful to Chairman Graves and
Chairman Rogers, as well as the entire Armed Services Committee and
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee for addressing these gaps,
including provisions from my Safety in Shared Skies Act, Military ADS-B
Out Loophole Act, and Next-Gen Collision Avoidance Assistance Act.
We are making real progress with these provisions today to improve
safety and accountability across the airspace. I urge my colleagues to
support this legislation, and we give our prayers to the families.
Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentlewoman from Oregon (Ms. Hoyle).
Ms. HOYLE of Oregon. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the ALERT
Act, and I thank Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, Air Line
Pilots Association, International, the Association of Flight
Attendants, Jennifer Homendy and the NTSB staff, T&I members, and
mostly the families who put such passion and advocacy into getting this
bill right.
It was not easy, but it is so very important that we made progress to
align the bill with the NTSB's recommendation. Again, I just
acknowledge that without the family members advocating on behalf of the
loved ones they lost on January 29, we wouldn't be here today.
{time} 1650
They should not have to keep coming back into this room. They should
not have to listen to Member after Member say what everyone knows, that
this was preventable.
The NTSB found that the ADS-B In system could have provided up to 59
seconds of warning. That is what makes it so hard to hear that the
Board has been ambiguous about this. It has been recommending this kind
of requirement for years, 17 times since 2006.
The requirements here should be clear: ensure all aircraft equipped
with ADS-B Out carry ADS-B In with cockpit display of traffic
information, and ensure that happens on a firm, enforceable timeline
without any carve-outs. We should write that into law and not leave it
to some later process, delay, or direction.
Members on both sides of the aisle recognize we have a duty to all
Americans to put aside our differences and keep them safe. That means
the House and Senate need to work together to enact the strongest
possible safety requirements. This bill is an important step, and I
want to acknowledge how hard everyone worked to get here. Again, it
wasn't easy, and everyone worked to get us to where we are.
Madam Speaker, we owe it to every victim, every family, and the
American people to finish that work so these families don't have to
keep coming back.
Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Obernolte).
Mr. OBERNOLTE. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of the ALERT
Act. The collision last year at DCA was a terrible tragedy, and like
most aviation tragedies, it was 100 percent preventable.
The NTSB earlier this year released a comprehensive report analyzing
the accident. What it discovered, like most aviation accidents, is that
there was a whole chain of events that occurred. Any one of those links
could have been interrupted and prevented the accident.
The NTSB made a number of different recommendations on what can be
done to improve the situation, and this bill implements those
recommendations. This is far beyond just the paths that helicopters and
aircraft take, which need to be separated. It goes to things like the
staffing of air traffic control towers, the technology behind collision
avoidance systems, military training routes and the ways that those are
communicated, and a host of different things that, implemented
together, will ensure that these types of accidents do not happen in
the future.
Madam Speaker, I am so proud to be a cosponsor of this bill. I thank
my friend and fellow pilot, Chairman Graves, for his tireless advocacy
in seeing this through to fruition. I urge my colleagues to support
this bill.
Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Beyer).
Mr. BEYER. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 7613, the
ALERT Act. I thank the committees of jurisdiction for their tireless
work on this bill and for adopting significant feedback from the
stakeholders, including the families of Flight 5342 and the National
Transportation Safety Board.
I extend a personal thank-you to Ranking Member Larsen for his
collaboration and support. He and his team have been wonderful to work
with through a difficult process.
This bill provides a meaningful and comprehensive response to last
year's January 29 collision at the National Airport, which tragically
took 67 lives. We must do everything we can to keep this tragedy from
happening again.
This bill would implement all 50 recommendations from the NTSB's
final report on the collision. It would reevaluate the arrival rate at
National Airport, which is too high. It would establish a time-based
flow management system to make our air traffic controllers' workload
more manageable.
This bill would reevaluate our air traffic control tower facility
level to hopefully bring more resources and staffing to the tower.
This bill would improve our helicopter route charts and aims to put
guardrails on military helicopter flights in this very congested
region.
This bill is an incredible step forward for National Airport, for our
region, and for our country, and I hope to see it passed this evening.
However, the ALERT Act is not perfect. It includes ADS-B carve-outs
for some general aviation aircraft, and there are still concerns about
military helicopter flights in this region not being adequately
addressed.
The families of Flight 5342 still have legitimate concerns and put
out a statement today on their hopes for improvements to the bill in
the Senate before it becomes law, which I support.
I am disappointed to see the ROTOR Act, which had strong ADS-B
requirements, fail on the House floor earlier this year.
Madam Speaker, our goal is to adopt the strongest aviation
requirements possible. I firmly believe that the ALERT Act accomplishes
much of this goal, but that we can and should make this bill stronger.
I look forward to voting in support of the ALERT Act today, as I did
with the ROTOR Act earlier this year, with the understanding that more
work is needed.
Madam Speaker, as this bill advances, I urge my colleagues in the
committees of jurisdiction to make improvements, to close any
loopholes, and to prioritize safety for all over the convenience of a
few. I thank the committee leaders for their work on this bill.
Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Bresnahan).
Mr. BRESNAHAN. Madam Speaker, I rise today encouraged by the progress
[[Page H2873]]
we are making in delivering an aviation safety package that makes our
skies safer.
I appreciate the hard work we did as a committee to get this bill to
the floor today. After what I anticipate will be a strong bipartisan
passage on the floor this evening, we must continue working with our
Senate counterparts to create a final package.
This is an opportunity that we cannot afford to miss because it is
not just about policy being at stake. It is people's lives.
I strongly believe that any final bill we send to the President's
desk must include requirements for ADS-B In. As a pilot myself, I rely
on ADS-B every time I fly. It helps me see traffic, avoid conflicts,
and, frankly, helps keep me alive.
ADS-B provides real-time situational awareness, giving pilots visual
and audible alerts about nearby aircraft and their position, speed,
direction, and altitude. That early warning allows pilots to take
action and prevent a collision. This is not new technology. It is
widely available and already being used to train the next generation of
pilots.
Madam Speaker, we also have to remember why we are here today. The
families across the country, including those impacted by Flight 5342
and the tragedy, are counting on us to do everything we can to prevent
something like this from ever happening again. We owe it to them and to
the American people to pass a bill that delivers the highest level of
safety possible while flying.
Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Subramanyam).
Mr. SUBRAMANYAM. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the ALERT Act as
well. I am proud to be a cosponsor of this bill.
A big reason why we are here is that, on January 29, 2025, a U.S.
Army Black Hawk helicopter and American Airlines Flight 5342 collided
in midair outside of DCA. Sixty-seven lives were lost, many of them
parents and children from my community in Virginia.
After the crash, many of us said that we would do all we can do to
prevent such a tragedy from ever happening again. The ALERT Act is part
of the solution.
The bill addresses all 50 of the safety recommendations by the NTSB
following their investigation into this crash. We need to address them
all because it wasn't just one issue that led to this tragedy. It was a
combination of systemic problems that made our national airspace
unsafe.
I want to stress that there is more work to do. First, we must ensure
there are no delays in implementing collision-prevention technology for
every type of aircraft. We must also ensure that exemptions from new
safety equipment requirements are granted only when absolutely
necessary.
Finally, the ROTOR Act is a part of the solution, too. It passed the
Senate resoundingly and has the support of families, and it even went
through this body, where the majority supported it.
We must restore trust in our airspace and make sure nothing like this
ever happens again.
Madam Speaker, I really want to thank the families and loved ones of
Flight 5342. Without their advocacy and persistence, neither the ALERT
Act nor the ROTOR Act would have made it this far. I look forward to
continuing our work with them.
Madam Speaker, I thank the ranking member as well as the committee
for all of their hard work on this bill. I ask my colleagues to join me
in supporting this bill.
Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Kansas (Mr. Mann).
{time} 1700
Mr. MANN. Madam Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the ALERT
Act, which I am proud to cosponsor.
For Kansans, this bill is deeply personal.
On January 29, 2025, the world stood in disbelief as we watched
tragedy unfold over the Potomac River in the collision between American
Airlines Flight 5342 out of Wichita and the U.S. Army helicopter.
Kansans will never forget the lives lost, the families forever changed,
or the grief felt across Wichita and communities across our State.
What happened on that day demands a serious and thoughtful response
from Congress to ensure that this tragedy is never repeated. We owe it
to the families and to every American who steps onto a plane to make
sure our national airspace is as safe as it possibly can be.
That is exactly why we must pass the ALERT Act.
This is the most significant, comprehensive reform to aviation safety
in years. It reflects serious, bipartisan work to strengthen our
aviation system, improve accountability, and ensure safety remains the
top priority in our airspace, which is demonstrated by the fact that
the legislation passed out of both the Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee and the Armed Services Committee unanimously.
The ALERT Act addresses all 50 safety recommendations from the NTSB
and takes meaningful steps to improve transparency, coordination,
training, and oversight. It strengthens pilot and air traffic control
awareness through modern technology, requires advanced collision
avoidance systems on aircrafts, improves helicopter route safety, and
enhances air traffic control procedures.
Meaningful, lasting improvements to the safety of our airspace
require Congress to work closely with victims' families, the aviation
industry, and the administration, and the ALERT Act does just that.
Congress must enact solutions to address the root causes that stand the
test of time.
Kansas is home to the Air Capital of the World, and aviation is not
just part of our economy. It is part of who we are. We will never
forget what happened on January 29, and I am committed to ensuring that
it will never happen again.
Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance
of my time.
Madam Speaker, we must do everything that we can to prevent another
midair collision and to improve aviation safety. That is why I support
H.R. 7613, as amended, and urge my colleagues to do the same.
Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, in closing, I thank Ranking Member Larsen, Chairman
Rogers, and Ranking Member Smith for their work on this critical piece
of aviation safety legislation.
I also thank the staff on both the T&I and Armed Services Committees
that worked tirelessly on this bill to make sure that we got it right.
Specifically, I thank my front office staff, T&I Majority Staff
Director Nick Christensen; Deputy Staff Director Abby Wenk; General
Counsel Meghan Holland, as well as my subcommittee staff, former
Aviation Subcommittee Staff Director Julie Devine, who has departed
Congress after a decade of service; and Joseph Schmoll, Will Moore, and
Archie Miller.
We needed to get this right. The American people and the flying
public count on us to ensure that the National Airspace System, or the
NAS, is the safest system in the world. I am proud to say that NTSB has
confirmed that the ALERT Act, as amended, addresses all 50
recommendations issued by the National Transportation Safety Board.
On the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, aviation safety
remains our highest priority, and this bill upholds that commitment. We
will continue to work with our colleagues in the Senate and ensure that
we are sending a comprehensive safety bill to the President, and
anything short of that would be a disservice to the flying public. I
ask my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to come together and
support this critical piece of safety legislation.
Madam Speaker, I urge support of the bill, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Graves) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, H.R. 7613, as amended.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
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The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.
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