[Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 11 (Thursday, January 15, 2026)]
[House]
[Pages H897-H907]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PROTECTING PRUDENT INVESTMENT OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS ACT
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 988, I call up
the bill (H.R. 2988) to amend the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 to specify requirements concerning the consideration of
pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors, and for other purposes, and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Smith of Nebraska). Pursuant to House
Resolution 988, the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended
by the Committee on Education and Workforce, printed in the bill, is
adopted and the bill, as amended, is considered read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:
H.R. 2988
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting
Prudent Investment of Retirement Savings Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
DIVISION A--INCREASE RETIREMENT EARNINGS
Sec. 1001. Short title.
Sec. 1002. Limitation on consideration of non-pecuniary factors by
fiduciaries.
DIVISION B--NO DISCRIMINATION IN MY BENEFITS
Sec. 2001. Short title.
Sec. 2002. Service provider selection.
DIVISION C--RETIREMENT PROXY PROTECTION
Sec. 3001. Short title.
Sec. 3002. Exercise of shareholder rights.
DIVISION D--PROVIDING COMPLETE INFORMATION TO RETIREMENT INVESTORS
Sec. 4001. Short title.
Sec. 4002. Brokerage window disclosures.
DIVISION A--INCREASE RETIREMENT EARNINGS
SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ``Increase Retirement
Earnings Act''.
SEC. 1002. LIMITATION ON CONSIDERATION OF NON-PECUNIARY
FACTORS BY FIDUCIARIES.
(a) In General.--Section 404(a) of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104(a)) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(3) Interest Based on Pecuniary Factors.--
``(A) In general.--For purposes of paragraph (1), a
fiduciary shall be considered to act solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries of the plan with
respect to an investment or investment course of action only
if the fiduciary's action with respect to such investment or
investment course of action is based solely on pecuniary
factors (except as provided in subparagraph (B)). The
fiduciary may not subordinate the interests of the
participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income or
financial benefits under the plan to other objectives and may
not sacrifice investment return or take on additional
investment risk to promote non-pecuniary benefits or goals.
The weight given to any pecuniary factor by a fiduciary shall
reflect a prudent assessment of the impact of such factor on
risk and return.
``(B) Use of non-pecuniary factors for investment
alternatives.--Notwithstanding paragraph (A), if a fiduciary
is unable to distinguish between or among investment
alternatives or investment courses of action on the basis of
pecuniary factors alone, the fiduciary may use non-pecuniary
factors as the deciding factor if the fiduciary documents--
``(i) why pecuniary factors were not sufficient to select a
plan investment or investment course of action;
``(ii) how the selected investment compares to the
alternative investments with regard to the composition of the
portfolio with regard to diversification, the liquidity and
current return of
[[Page H898]]
the portfolio relative to the anticipated cash flow
requirements of the plan, and the projected return of the
portfolio relative to the funding objectives of the plan; and
``(iii) how the selected non-pecuniary factor or factors
are consistent with the interests of the participants and
beneficiaries in their retirement income or financial
benefits under the plan.
``(C) Investment alternatives for participant-directed
individual account plans.--In selecting or retaining
investment options for a pension plan described in subsection
(c)(1)(A), a fiduciary is not prohibited from considering,
selecting, or retaining an investment option on the basis
that such investment option promotes, seeks, or supports one
or more non-pecuniary benefits or goals, if--
``(i) the fiduciary satisfies the requirements of paragraph
(1) and subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph in
selecting or retaining any such investment option; and
``(ii) such investment option is not added or retained as,
or included as a component of, a default investment under
subsection (c)(5) (or any other default investment
alternative) if its investment objectives or goals or its
principal investment strategies include, consider, or
indicate the use of one or more non-pecuniary factors.
``(D) Definitions.--For the purposes of this paragraph:
``(i) The term `pecuniary factor' means a factor that a
fiduciary prudently determines is expected to have a material
effect on the risk or return of an investment based on
appropriate investment horizons consistent with the plan's
investment objectives and the funding policy established
pursuant to section 402(b)(1).
``(ii) The term `investment course of action' means any
series or program of investments or actions related to a
fiduciary's performance of the fiduciary's investment duties,
and includes the selection of an investment fund as a plan
investment, or in the case of an individual account plan, a
designated investment alternative under the plan.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to actions taken by a fiduciary on or after the
date that is 12 months after the date of enactment of this
Act.
DIVISION B--NO DISCRIMINATION IN MY BENEFITS
SEC. 2001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ``No Discrimination in My
Benefits Act''.
SEC. 2002. SERVICE PROVIDER SELECTION.
Section 404(a)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``and'';
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(E) by selecting, monitoring, and retaining any
fiduciary, counsel, employee, or service provider of the
plan--
``(i) in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B); and
``(ii) without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.''.
DIVISION C--RETIREMENT PROXY PROTECTION
SEC. 3001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ``Retirement Proxy
Protection Act''.
SEC. 3002. EXERCISE OF SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS.
(a) In General.--Section 404 of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(f) Exercise of Shareholder Rights.--
``(1) Authority to exercise shareholder rights.--
``(A) In general.--The fiduciary duty to manage plan assets
that are shares of stock includes the management of
shareholder rights appurtenant to those shares, including the
right to vote proxies. When deciding whether to exercise a
shareholder right and in exercising such right, including the
voting of proxies, a fiduciary must act prudently and solely
in the interests of participants and beneficiaries and for
the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants
and beneficiaries and defraying the reasonable expenses of
administering the plan. The fiduciary duty to manage
shareholder rights appurtenant to shares of stock does not
require the voting of every proxy or the exercise of every
shareholder right.
``(B) Exception.--This subsection shall not apply to
voting, tender, and similar rights with respect to qualifying
employer securities or securities held in an investment
arrangement that is not a designated investment alternative
in the event such rights are passed through pursuant to the
terms of an individual account plan to participants and
beneficiaries with accounts holding such securities.
``(2) Requirements for exercise of shareholder rights.--A
fiduciary, when deciding whether to exercise a shareholder
right and when exercising a shareholder right--
``(A) shall--
``(i) act solely in accordance with the economic interest
of the plan and its participants and beneficiaries;
``(ii) consider any costs involved;
``(iii) evaluate material facts that form the basis for any
particular proxy vote or exercise of shareholder rights; and
``(iv) maintain a record of any proxy vote, proxy voting
activity, or other exercise of a shareholder right, including
any attempt to influence management; and
``(B) shall not subordinate the interests of participants
and beneficiaries in their retirement income or financial
benefits under the plan to any non-pecuniary objective, or
promote non-pecuniary benefits or goals unrelated to those
financial interests of the plan's participants and
beneficiaries.
``(3) Monitoring.--A fiduciary shall exercise prudence and
diligence in the selection and monitoring of a person, if
any, selected to advise or otherwise assist with the exercise
of shareholder rights, including by providing research and
analysis, recommendations on exercise of proxy voting or
other shareholder rights, administrative services with
respect to voting proxies, and recordkeeping and reporting
services.
``(4) Investment managers and proxy advisory firms.--Where
the authority to vote proxies or exercise other shareholder
rights has been delegated to an investment manager pursuant
to section 403(a), or a proxy voting advisory firm or other
person who performs advisory services as to the voting of
proxies or the exercise of other shareholder rights, a
responsible plan fiduciary shall prudently monitor the proxy
voting activities of such investment manager or advisory firm
and determine whether such activities are in compliance with
paragraphs (1) and (2).
``(5) Voting policies.--
``(A) In general.--In deciding whether to vote a proxy
pursuant to this subsection, the plan fiduciary may adopt a
proxy voting policy, including a safe harbor proxy voting
policy described in subparagraph (B), providing that the
authority to vote a proxy shall be exercised pursuant to
specific parameters designed to serve the economic interest
of the plan.
``(B) Safe harbor voting policy.--With respect to a
decision not to vote a proxy, a fiduciary shall satisfy the
fiduciary responsibilities under this subsection if such
fiduciary adopts and follows a safe harbor proxy voting
policy that--
``(i) limits voting resources to particular types of
proposals that the fiduciary has prudently determined are
substantially related to the business activities of the
issuer or are expected to have a material effect on the value
of the plan investment; or
``(ii) establishes that the fiduciary will refrain from
voting on proposals or particular types of proposals when the
assets of a plan invested in the issuer relative to the total
assets of such plan are below 5 percent (or, in the event
such assets are under management, when the assets under
management invested in the issuer are below 5 percent of the
total assets under management).
``(C) Exception.--No proxy voting policy adopted pursuant
to this paragraph shall preclude a fiduciary from submitting
a proxy vote when the fiduciary determines that the matter
being voted on is expected to have a material economic effect
on the investment performance of a plan's portfolio (or the
investment performance of assets under management in the case
of an investment manager); provided, however, that in all
cases compliance with a safe harbor voting policy shall be
presumed to satisfy fiduciary responsibilities with respect
to decisions not to vote.
``(6) Review.--A fiduciary shall periodically review any
policy adopted under this subsection.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
shall apply to an exercise of shareholder rights occurring on
or after January 1, 2026.
DIVISION D--PROVIDING COMPLETE INFORMATION TO RETIREMENT INVESTORS
SEC. 4001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ``Providing Complete
Information to Retirement Investors Act''.
SEC. 4002. BROKERAGE WINDOW DISCLOSURES.
(a) In General.--Section 404(c) of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104(c)) is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(7) Notice requirements for brokerage windows.--
``(A) In general.--In the case of a pension plan which
provides for individual accounts and which provides a
participant or beneficiary the opportunity to choose from
designated investment alternatives, a participant or
beneficiary shall not be treated as exercising control over
assets in the account of the participant or beneficiary
unless, with respect to any investment arrangement that is
not a designated investment alternative, each time before
such a participant or beneficiary directs an investment into,
out of, or within such investment arrangement, such
participant is notified of, and acknowledges, each element of
the notice described under paragraph (B).
``(B) Notice.--The notice described under this paragraph is
a four part information that is substantially similar to the
following information:
``1. Your retirement plan offers designated investment
alternatives prudently selected and monitored by fiduciaries
for the purpose of enabling you to construct an appropriate
retirement savings portfolio. In selecting and monitoring
designated investment alternatives, your plan's fiduciary
considers the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain (or
other return) compared with reasonably available investment
alternatives.
2. The investments available through this investment
arrangement are not designated investment alternatives, and
have not been prudently selected and are not monitored by a
plan fiduciary.
3. Depending on the investments you select through this
investment arrangement, you may experience diminished
returns, higher fees, and higher risk than if you select from
the plan's designated investment alternatives.
4. The following is a hypothetical illustration of the
impact of return at 4 percent, 6 percent, and 8 percent on
your account balance projected to age 67.
``(C) Illustration.--The notice described under paragraph
(B) shall also include a graph
[[Page H899]]
displaying the projected retirement balances of such
participant or beneficiary at age 67 if the account of such
individual were to achieve an annual return equal to each of
the following:
``(i) 4 percent.
``(ii) 6 percent.
``(iii) 8 percent.''.
(b) Designated Investment Alternative Defined.--Section 3
of such Act (29 U.S.C. 1002) is amended by adding at the end
the following new paragraph:
``(46) Designated investment alternative.--
``(A) In general.--The term `designated investment
alternative' means any investment alternative designated by a
responsible fiduciary of an individual account plan described
in subsection 404(c) into which participants and
beneficiaries may direct the investment of assets held in, or
contributed to, their individual accounts.
``(B) Exception.--The term `designated investment
alternative' does not include brokerage windows, self-
directed brokerage accounts, or similar plan arrangements
that enable participants and beneficiaries to select
investments beyond those designated by a responsible plan
fiduciary.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall take effect on January 1, 2027.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for
1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority
member of the Committee on Education and Workforce or their respective
designees.
After 1 hour of debate, it shall be in order to consider the further
amendment printed in part A of House Report 119-440, if offered by the
Member designated in the report, which shall be considered read, shall
be separately debatable for the time specified in the report equally
divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, and shall not
be subject to a demand for a division of the question.
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Walberg) and the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Scott) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Walberg).
General Leave
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks
and include extraneous material on H.R. 2988.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak in support of H.R. 2988, the
Protecting Prudent Investment of Retirement Savings Act, introduced by
Representative Rick Allen, chairman of the Subcommittee on Health,
Employment, Labor, and Pensions.
At its core, this legislation is about one simple principle:
Retirement savings should be managed to protect workers' futures and
not to advance political agendas.
Over the past several years, the Biden administration pushed a rule
that encouraged retirement plan fiduciaries to consider environmental,
social, and governance--ESG--factors, when making investment decisions.
That might sound harmless, but in practice, it shifts the focus away
from what retirement investing is supposed to be about: maximizing
returns and minimizing risk for workers and retirees.
Americans set aside money in their 401(k)'s and pension plans to
retire with dignity. They do it so that they can pay their bills, cover
medical costs, and support their families. They do not invest their
hard-earned savings so that Federal bureaucrats can push ideological
priorities.
That is exactly the concern here. ESG investing has become a tool for
advancing a broader political agenda. Instead of asking: Is this the
best investment for the worker, the ESG framework often asks: Does this
investment align with certain social or environmental goals?
Those goals are not what ERISA was created to promote. ERISA, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, was established to ensure that
fiduciaries act in the best interests of plan participants. It requires
loyalty, prudence, and a clear focus on financial outcomes that workers
rely on.
Mr. Speaker, the problem with the Biden-Harris rule is that it
created permission and, in many cases, pressure for fiduciaries to
prioritize ESG factors over the economic interests of participants.
When that happens, retirement security is placed at risk.
ESG funds are often more costly and less transparent. In many cases,
they underperform compared to traditional options. That means that
workers may be paying more and getting less--less growth, less
stability, and less certainty about their future.
This is not a theoretical issue. When a fiduciary chooses investments
based on nonfinancial criteria, the person paying the price is not the
bureaucrat in Washington or the corporate executive on a conference
call. The person paying the price is the worker who depends on that
retirement account to survive. That is why H.R. 2988 is needed.
Mr. Speaker, this bill restores the proper purpose of retirement
investing: financial security. It makes clear that retirement plan
decisions must be made based solely on economic factors--things like
risk, return, liquidity, and diversification. It also addresses how
fiduciaries use shareholder rights, like proxy voting.
Under current practices, some fiduciaries use the shares held in
retirement plans to push political policies through proxy votes,
whether or not those policies benefit the workers whose money is at
stake.
H.R. 2988 stops that. It makes clear that exercising shareholder
rights, including proxy votes, must be done in the economic interests
of plan participants, not to advance radical political initiatives, not
to appease advocacy groups, and not to satisfy trends in the corporate
boardrooms.
In addition, the bill strengthens fairness and nondiscrimination in
the selection of service providers. It states clearly that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin may not be considered when selecting
fiduciaries, counsel, employees, or service providers for ERISA plans.
Retirement plan service providers should be chosen on performance and
price, not on ideology or race-based preference.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 2988 increases transparency for workers.
It includes a notice requirement for defined contribution plans that
explains the difference between selecting investments chosen by ERISA
fiduciaries and selecting investments through a brokerage window.
{time} 0910
Why does that matter? It matters because many workers do not realize
that when they move money into a brokerage window, they may be stepping
outside the protections provided by plan fiduciaries. This bill ensures
workers are informed and can make decisions with clarity. In short,
H.R. 2988 is a course correction. It protects retirees from financial
experimentation. It protects workers from political interference, and
it reinforces the idea that retirement plans exist for one reason: to
help Americans retire with stability and security.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2988, the Protecting
Prudent Investment of Retirement Savings Act. This bill is premised on
the Republicans' mistaken belief that they know best when it comes to
investing workers' retirement savings.
Under the present law, the retirement plan fiduciary is required to
make prudent investment decisions in the best interests of plan
participants and beneficiaries. The bill codifies two rules from the
first Trump administration that impose first-of-their-kind restrictions
on plan fiduciaries' abilities to consider what are called
environmental, social, and governance, or ESG, factors when making
investment decisions and exercise shareholder rights.
The appropriate course of action is to permit fiduciaries to consider
ESG factors so long as they don't diminish investment returns. As we
know, such factors, whether it be sea level rise or poor corporate
governance, are relevant to a company's performance. Considering
whether a real estate investment will literally be underwater because
of sea level rise is not ideology. It is sensible for plan fiduciaries
to be permitted to consider such factors and to be able to adopt them
if they don't reduce investment returns. That is precisely what the
rule from the Biden administration permitted.
[[Page H900]]
Predictably, the Trump administration is walking away from that rule,
and now the House is continuing to go in the wrong direction. For
example, H.R. 2988 will impose unnecessary barriers to considering
things like sea level rise. The supporters are making up some risk,
suggesting that some of these funds may be worse than others. I think
the studies have shown that they are as good or better, in fact, than
others. Meanwhile, the Trump administration appears to be poised to
green light what are clearly consensus-held risky investments such as
cryptocurrency and put those in retirement plans. That makes no sense
at all.
Finally, H.R. 2988 would undermine the worthwhile efforts to increase
diversity among asset managers. There are about $82 trillion in
financial assets in retirement funds. Only 1.4 percent of those assets
are managed by women or minority firms. Women and minorities,
represented by two-thirds of the population, they are managing 1.4
percent of the assets.
Now, apparently that creates a problem, and the problem is: How did
they get the 1.4 percent? How did the good old boys lose 1.4 percent?
So they are going to change the rules to limit access to women- and
minority-owned firms. This bill would needlessly undermine what little
progress has been made and actually raise questions about what problem
we are trying to solve.
We should be trusting our professionals bound by law, not House
Republicans to make sound decisions about Americans' retirement
savings.
For those reasons, I oppose the bill, and I encourage my colleagues
to do the same.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
H.R. 2988 codifies the principles in the Trump Department of Labor's
2020 rule on retirement plan ESG investing.
Under the bill, as with the 2020 Trump rule, if a fiduciary finds
that an ESG factor is a financial factor, then that factor can be
considered when investing and exercising shareholder rights.
Nothing in H.R. 2988 prevents a fiduciary from appropriately
considering any material risk of an investment. Like the 2020 Trump
rule, H.R. 2988 recognizes that ESG factors can present an economic
risk or opportunity, which qualified investment professionals would
appropriately treat as material economic considerations under generally
accepted investment principles.
H.R. 2988 neutrally applies these principles to all investment
decisions.
To suggest this bill bars a fiduciary from appropriately considering
any factor that may be material to investment is blatantly false.
Unlike the Biden-Harris rule, this legislation ensures neutrality and
prudent decisionmaking by fiduciaries.
My colleagues on the other side of the aisle have made many claims
about the supposed advantages of ESG investing.
Allow me to set the record straight. ESG funds have underperformed
for years. According to Morningstar, ESG funds lagged the U.S. Market
Index and the S&P 500 in 2023 and 2024. To make matters worse, ESG
products charge higher fees to participants than traditional investment
funds, which can significantly limit the growth of participants'
retirement savings over time.
Finally, according to researchers at George Mason University, ESG
funds expose workers and retirees to additional investment risk that
traditional investments typically do not face. Increased costs,
increased risk, and lackluster returns make for a bad cocktail.
Participants and beneficiaries of employer-sponsored retirement plans
rely on the expertise of fiduciaries, who are required by law to act
solely in the financial interests of participants. Weakening that
expectation to advance partisan ideological objectives is wrong and
hurts the safety and stability of Americans.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, in response to my friends on the other side,
many Democrats want to make race and sex the most important factors in
choosing ERISA retirement plan service providers. In so doing, they are
advocating for blatant race and sex discrimination, which we should all
strongly oppose.
Discrimination is never justified, and the use of quotas is
inherently discriminatory. ERISA plan service providers must be
selected using a prudent and nondiscriminatory process. That is what
H.R. 2988 requires.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Casten).
Mr. CASTEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2988.
I am going to be honest. I cannot believe we are still engaged in
this anticapitalist doublespeak; but if my Republican colleagues are
going to keep bringing bills to the floor to destroy the fabric of our
market-based economy, I am going to keep standing up for it.
Let's be clear: ERISA already requires fiduciaries to act solely in
the financial interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. H.R.
2988 does not strengthen that standard. It simply assumes that a
handful of paternalistic legislators know more about the interests of
America's businessowners than they do.
Before coming to Congress, I was a CEO of an energy company. We
raised a couple hundred million dollars to build that business, and I
was understandably accountable to a board appointed by those investors.
I am trying to imagine a world where I showed up at a board meeting
and told the owners of the company that I was leading that they were
not allowed to ask me certain questions because, in my judgment, I had
determined that their questions were nonpecuniary. That is not a world
where I would have been employed for very long.
It also wouldn't have been good for our business because different
investors have different time horizons. You have got short-term
investors who are concerned about next year's cash flows, but then you
can have long-term investors, like pension funds, endowments, and
family offices, who are going to be concerned about longer term risks
including, but not limited to, your governance, your environmental
exposures, who you hire, what kind of liabilities you are taking on,
and that is fine. That is how a functioning market works.
But H.R. 2988 prioritizes those short-term investors by creating an
arbitrary distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary risk factors.
That requires investors to ignore financially relevant information that
they, in their sole discretion, believe impact long-term performance.
{time} 0920
Why should we mandate ignorance? It is not the Federal Government's
job to tell fiduciaries what categories of risk they can consider.
Making investors dumber will only serve to drive capital out of U.S.
markets, and that is not just theoretical.
In Oklahoma, public pension officials estimated that complying with a
similar blacklist policy could cost them nearly $10 million. In
Arkansas, the State retirement system estimated comparable restrictions
could reduce returns by $30 million to $40 million a year. In Indiana,
an analysis found it could cost pension returns as much as $6.4 billion
over 10 years.
This legislation is not about protecting retirees. It is about
protecting mediocre businesses from the vibrancy of well-informed,
competitive capital markets. Maybe that satisfies some short-term,
partisan political purpose, but it ain't patriotic and certainly ain't
capitalism. All this will accomplish is to drive long-term investors
out of U.S. equity markets.
For the retirement savings of our police officers, teachers, and
firefighters, and for the preservation of U.S. capital markets and
capitalism that is free of the meddlesome government intervention that
Republicans seem to love, I urge a ``no'' vote and oppose this
legislation.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Allen), the chairman of the Health, Employment, Labor, and
Pensions Subcommittee and the sponsor of this good bill.
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding his time,
for his tireless work on behalf of American workers, and specifically
for his support of the legislation before us today.
[[Page H901]]
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2988, the Protecting Prudent
Investment of Retirement Savings Act, legislation I introduced earlier
this year to ensure hardworking Americans do not have their retirement
savings jeopardized by politically motivated mismanagement. What I am
hearing is that, I think, this bill fixes everything that the other
side has been talking about as far as free markets and capitalism.
For those listening at home, it is important to understand how we got
here. In 2022, the Biden administration heavy-handedly put the
retirement security of over 150 million Americans at risk by issuing a
deeply flawed rule to enable retirement plan fiduciaries to consider or
choose investments based on environmental, social, and governance, or
ESG, factors. That is not free market. That is not capitalism.
It is proven that ESG factors often charge steeper fees, carry higher
risks, have lower returns, and are well-known underperformers. That is
precisely why this rule garnered bipartisan, bicameral disapproval in
the form of a Congressional Review Act resolution that passed both the
House and Senate.
However, the Biden-Harris administration vetoed the resolution,
choosing to prioritize leftwing environmental and social issues ahead
of retirees' financial security.
As chairman of the HELP Subcommittee, I remain committed to
protecting the retirement savings of workers, retirees, and their
families. The Protecting Prudent Investment of Retirement Savings Act
would codify that retirement plan sponsors must make investment
decisions solely based on economic factors and financial returns.
Additionally, the bill states that the decision to exercise a
shareholder right is subject to the purchase and loyalty duties under
ERISA. It states that proxies held by ERISA plans must be voted in the
economic interests of the plan, not used to advance radical policies
and favors to crony capitalists.
The bill declares that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
may not be taken into consideration when selecting a fiduciary,
counsel, employee, or service provider of an ERISA plan.
Lastly, it implements a notice requirement on defined contribution
plans, explaining the difference between choosing from investments
selected by ERISA fiduciaries and choosing from investments through a
brokerage window.
Mr. Speaker, I think most would agree that advancing a political
agenda at the expense of retirement savings is wrong. Let's be clear:
Americans invest to secure a brighter future for themselves and their
families, not to bankroll Democrats' radical initiatives and pet
projects and take care of their crony capitalists.
Retirement plan sponsors have a duty to prioritize financial returns,
ensuring Americans' hard-earned savings are invested in a sensible
manner. The Protecting Prudent Investment of Retirement Savings Act
delivers a significant win to retirees across the Nation, and I
strongly urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support its
passage.
I thank my staff for their diligent work on this bill. I thank
Chairman Walberg for his support throughout the committee process and
Leader Scalise and Speaker Johnson for bringing H.R. 2988 to the House
floor.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Magaziner).
Mr. MAGAZINER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member for yielding.
I rise in opposition to this bill, which will only hurt the retirement
savings of millions of Americans.
Our Republican colleagues are once again prioritizing culture wars
over working people and threatening the retirement savings of nurses,
teachers, police officers, and healthcare workers, who are just trying
to save for their future with peace of mind.
The bill before us today injects politics into investment decisions
that should be guided by sound financial judgment.
Let me be clear. Environmental, social, and governance risks are
material and pecuniary, and companies that adopt thoughtful policies on
these risks outperform those that don't over the long term.
If an oil company is cutting corners, and it leads to a spill that is
expensive to the company, that hurts shareholders. That hurts people
who are saving for retirement. That is a failure to manage an
environmental risk.
If a company maintains a culture in the office that allows rampant
discrimination that causes lawsuits that are expensive to the company,
that is a social factor. That is a material risk.
If executive pay is structured in a way where it is not tied to
shareholder performance, that is a risk.
As a former State treasurer, I know that ignoring these risks does
not make them disappear.
By the way, the proxy voting process is an important way for
shareholders to tell executives at companies when they think that
something needs to change. They are nonbinding. What this bill would do
is make it harder for shareholders to vote to put even nonbinding items
in front of a board to consider.
I have heard the other side say that this bill does not preclude ESG
factors from being considered if they are material, but that is not
true in practice. What will happen in practice is that SEC bureaucrats
and political appointees will get to choose what is material and what
is not.
Any time an executive, a corporate executive, doesn't like what a
shareholder proposal is about, they can go to the SEC and say: ``Keep
this off the ballot. I don't want to see it.'' It will be up to those
bureaucrats and political appointees to decide what is material and
what is not.
How about we trust the investors? How about we trust the people who
are actually doing the work? How about we trust the plan participants,
the workers, and the retirees? Anyone who has a 401(k) or an IRA will
tell you that they can go on the website and pick from a range of
different plans based on what they think is a good idea for them. Why
don't we trust them instead of trusting bureaucrats and political
appointees to make decisions for everybody else?
Understand why we are here and who this bill helps. This bill helps
corporate executives who do not want to be held accountable by their
own shareholders.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to
the gentleman from Rhode Island.
Mr. MAGAZINER. Mr. Speaker, this bill helps executives who do not
want to be held accountable by their own shareholders for material ESG
risks.
It all comes down to time horizons, as Mr. Casten said. When I was
State treasurer, I had 60,000 people who were relying on me for their
retirement. I had people who were 90- or 100-year-old retirees, and I
had first-year teachers who were 23 years old. I owed just as much of a
fiduciary duty to those 23-year-olds as the 90-year-olds.
{time} 0930
So long-term factors and ESG factors matter even when corporate
executives who are focused on the short term don't care about them.
This bill claims to be about free markets. It is the opposite. It is
taking choice away from investors and away from retirees and plan
participants and putting it in the hands of bureaucrats and political
appointees.
Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``no'' vote.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Huizenga), who is vice chair of the Financial Services
Committee and extremely well-versed in being able to deal with this
issue.
Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my colleague from Michigan
granting me a little time here. I was not planning on speaking on this.
I am actually down here for an amendment, but let me clean it up.
Mr. Speaker, the hot garbage that we are hearing right now from the
other side prompts me to address this. I am vice chair of the Financial
Services Committee. One of our speakers earlier serves on that
committee where we regularly cross swords philosophically about what
the role of ESG is. Environmental, social, and governance has been a
hot topic, Mr. Speaker. I can tell you that.
When he is trying to compare what we are talking about today,
regarding what we are dealing with with some of the other retirement
plans and publicly traded companies and what the SEC
[[Page H902]]
has been doing, we are not talking apples and oranges. We are talking
apples and pinecones. They might both grow on trees, but they are not
anything like what the reality is.
He is talking about being a CEO. One of our colleagues was talking
about being a CEO of a wind company. Mr. Speaker, that is, by
definition, one of those ESG companies. When he is talking about
pecuniary questions not being allowed to be asked, that is completely
false. Materiality is the watchword.
What we saw under the last administration, by the way, is they blew
through that legal definition which was from 1976. Thurgood Marshall is
the one who developed the materiality definition by law.
They blew through that and said: Do you know what, these issues are
so important to us that we are going to just set the law aside and say:
No, you must have an environmental or social or governance lens with
which to drive this through.
That has nothing to do with return. It has nothing to do with return.
What we have seen is that the activist investors who have gotten
involved, who have driven these, who have put these shareholder
proposals in place and have put these requests in place, don't care
about return. That isn't their goal. Their goal is social change.
What we have seen, Mr. Speaker, is over the years we have seen time
and time again the cudgel of government and the cudgel of regulators
being used to pound business and investment into what they think is the
right place. What it has done is actually cheated those who are
dependent upon the return, whether it is a firefighter or a teacher.
By the way, in CalPERS, they have actually extracted themselves from
a number of these ESG programs and portfolios.
Why is that?
It is because they were having lawsuits from their own members
demanding more return and less concern.
What I would just say is that the Financial Services Committee put
together an ESG work group that I had the pleasure of chairing, and we
came up with a report.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the
gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. HUIZENGA. I will wrap this up.
Mr. Speaker, what that report identified was that what we are seeing
is materiality. By the way, material issues are legally required to be
disclosed for a publicly traded company or for any of these investment
folks. So nobody is trying to hide things. In fact, they are legally
required to disclose any of those material issues that may affect stock
price.
What we are seeing here is that the gentleman from Illinois and
others have argued that all questions regarding the environment or
social issues are somehow material.
Mr. Speaker, it simply isn't true. We have to put the investor--that
retiree, that person who is desperate for returns so that they can
retire--first, not second, behind social issues that bureaucrats have
decided is the primary goal.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. DeSaulnier), who is the ranking member
of the Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions.
Mr. DeSAULNIER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member for yielding
and for his leadership in opposition to this bill.
Environmental, social, and governance are factors that retirement
plan fiduciaries may consider when making investments on behalf of
retirement plans covered by ERISA. Factors that may fall within ESG
include impact of the company's actions on climate change, working
conditions, and employee safety at the company, and its management
structure.
Weighing ESG factors when making investment decisions is not only
more socially responsible, it is also more fiscally responsible for the
type of long-term investments managed by retirement plan fiduciaries.
Factors like sea level rise due to climate change, child labor
violations, or track records for mistreating workers could cause
unnecessary investment risks over time. Investors should be protected
from those kinds of unethical management practices. That is why it
should be considered a best practice for retirement plan professionals
to appropriately weigh ESG factors--just weigh them.
Unfortunately, this bill would establish unnecessary barriers to
retirement plan fiduciaries who want to consider these factors. This is
despite the fact that even those fiduciaries who consider ESG factors
are still required under ERISA to run plans solely in the best interest
of participants and fiduciaries.
I filed an amendment to this bill that would permit plan fiduciaries
to consider ESG factors when they make investment decisions, which
aligns with the Biden administration's ESG rule that was upheld twice
by Federal district courts before being abandoned by the Trump
administration.
Crucially, my amendment would have also upheld core ERISA protections
and explicitly ensured that fiduciaries do not sacrifice investment
returns when they consider ESG factors. Unfortunately, House
Republicans and House Republican leadership prevented the amendment
from being approved in the committee.
Mr. Speaker, we should trust the professionals who are legally
obligated to make prudent decisions on behalf of retirement plan
participants, not undermine their ability to make sound investment
decisions.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose H.R. 2988. Once again, I
thank the ranking member for his leadership.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, we are getting to a point, I think, that
the old adage that everything has been said, just not everyone has said
it yet. But with fear of offending that specific adage, I must
respectfully, again, address the fact of the misconception that is
being put forward about the Biden ESG rule as being neutral. That was,
is, and always will be patently false.
The Biden-Harris ESG rule was explicitly intended to advance the
left's radical climate and social agenda that harms Americans'
retirement and long-term financial well-being. Even though the debate
can be made about ESG issues, that is not what we want to see taking
place for the best benefit of retirees.
This legislation is needed to combat the Biden rule which was issued
in response to not one but two executive orders on climate change. The
Biden Labor Department expressly stated that the intended effect of the
rule is to loosen restrictions on fiduciaries and encourage them to
consider ESG factors in their decisionmaking; to encourage them, not
simply allow it, but to encourage them.
The Biden Labor Department's explanation of the rule lists ESG
factors that it believes are relevant to investment performance,
including impacts to climate change, corporate board composition, and
workplace diversity and inclusion.
H.R. 2988 is essential to restore the neutrality of financial factor-
only evaluation when investing to protect America's retirement savers.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
{time} 0940
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the
gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur).
Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, this bill unnecessarily restricts the free
market. It dictates what private sector fiduciaries can and cannot
consider when making investment decisions that directly affect the
savings and retirement savings of hardworking Americans.
For this reason and at the appropriate time, I will offer a motion to
recommit this bill back to committee.
If House rules permitted, I would have offered the motion with an
important amendment to this bill. My amendment would have been the text
of H.R. 1357, the Susan Muffley Act.
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert the text of my
amendment into the Record immediately prior to the motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Ohio?
There was no objection.
Ms. KAPTUR. H.R. 1357 is a bill that addresses a true injustice to
thousands
[[Page H903]]
of workers and retirees across this country, a bill to restore the
Delphi salaried retirees' pensions.
For decades, the men and women who built Delphi--and they worked
hard--were told that if they worked hard and kept their end of the
deal, their retirement benefits would be there for them.
However, that promise was broken through no fault of their own when
Delphi collapsed, leaving more than 23,000 salaried workers, including
over 5,000 in Ohio, with sharply reduced or eliminated pensions. Those
are the folks that I mean. This is simply wrong. It is un-American.
Mr. Turner, Ms. Tenney, Ms. Moore, and I have a bipartisan bill to
restore dignity, fairness, and economic security to people who earned
it the hard way. They worked hard.
For too long, Delphi retirees have been asked to wait, to be patient,
and to accept less than what they were promised and worked for and
earned. Many are now well into their retirement years. It almost seems
like a conspiracy to keep their retirement benefits away from them.
They face rising healthcare costs, higher prices at the grocery store,
and fixed incomes that were unjustly cut.
These are not abstract numbers. These are real people who planned
their lives around commitments and promises that were made to them and
then broken.
Let me remind you that when the auto rescue moved forward, corporate
interests were stabilized, made whole, but working people were left
behind, and that imbalance has lingered for two decades. Shame on us as
a country. Shame on us and the people who allowed that to happen.
The Susan Muffley Act corrects that injustice. It directs the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation to recalculate benefits without arbitrary
gaps that punished Delphi retirees alone. It is a narrowly tailored
fix, but one that delivers profound relief and long-overdue justice.
This legislation is also about reaffirming a core American value: If
you work hard, play by the rules, and keep your word, your company and
country should keep its word to you.
These retirees did not speculate. They did not gamble. They paid into
a system that was supposed to protect them. Congress has a moral
obligation to fix what was broken. Too bad the market can't do it
alone.
Every year of delay compounds the harm. The Susan Muffley Act will
finally make these workers whole. I hope my colleagues will join me in
voting for the motion to recommit.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to close, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my
time.
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record links to letters in opposition
to H.R. 2988: One led by the Americans for Financial Reform and signed
by dozens of organizations representing labor, civil rights,
environmental, and other relevant policy issues; another from the AFL-
CIO; a letter from SIRES; another letter signed by the National
Employment Law Project, the Economic Policy Institute, and the National
Partnership for Women and Families; one letter from SEIU; and one
letter from the U.S. Sustainable Investment Forum. The link is: https:/
/house.app.box.com/s/xpixugm5qpckl4kxrc4h4u55i3to8roy
Mr. Speaker, right now across the country, workers are struggling to
pay their bills and meet basic needs, let alone save for retirement. It
is incredibly hard for workers to do much on their own for retirement
when, according to the Federal Reserve, many would struggle to come up
with the money to finance an unexpected $400 expense, such as a car
repair or medical bill.
That being the case, it should not be controversial for retirement
plan professionals to appropriately weigh environmental, social, and
governance factors in their clients' best interests. H.R. 2988 would
restrict the fiduciary's ability to consider all relevant factors that
might affect investment decisions to the detriment of retirees.
Of course, it has been pointed out that some ESG funds do better,
some do worse, just like all other categories of funds. The committee
chair's opening statement suggested that ESG funds don't do as well as
the S&P 500. The fact is, most funds don't do as well as the S&P 500
index funds, but the other funds are not restricted. A consideration,
not a mandate, of ESG factors ought to be allowed.
They said the present law is not neutral. This law is not neutral
because if you want to consider environmental possibilities and
concerns or governance or other factors like that, extra paperwork is
needed, and it is much more difficult to have those considered.
Mr. Speaker, the professionals ought to be able to decide what are
the best investments for the retirees, not politicians. For that
reason, I oppose the bill and urge my colleagues to do the same.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Let me close with this: H.R. 2988 is about keeping retirement
investing focused on what matters--protecting workers and retirees.
The Biden-Harris ESG rule encouraged fiduciaries to consider
political and ideological factors in retirement plans, even when that
could increase risk and reduce returns. That is unacceptable.
Representative Rick Allen's bill restores the ERISA standard by
requiring that investment decisions be based only on economic factors.
It ensures proxy voting and shareholder rights are exercised solely in
the financial interest of plan participants, not to push radical
policies. It bans discrimination in selecting plan fiduciaries and
service providers based on race, religion, sex, or national origin. It
almost sounds American in its idea. It improves transparency by
requiring plans to explain the difference between fiduciary-selected
investments and brokerage windows.
This bill puts retirement savers first, and I urge my colleagues to
vote ``yes'' on this bill.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate on the bill has expired.
Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Huizenga
The SPEAKER pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment No.
1 printed in part A of House Report 119-440.
Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I have an amendment at the desk.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Add at the end the following:
SEC. 4003. GAO STUDY OF BROKERAGE ACCOUNTS.
Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Comptroller General shall submit a report to
Congress comparing the returns generated by any investment
arrangement that--
(1) is not a designated investment alternative (as defined
in section 2(46) of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002(46));
(2) is subject to section 404(c)(7) of such Act (29 U.S.C
1104(c)(7)); and
(3) is available in defined contribution plans (as defined
in section 3(34) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 1002(34))
with the returns generated by other investment options
available in such plans.
Page 3, line 7, insert after the item relating to section
4002 the following:
Sec. 4003. GAO study of brokerage accounts.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 988, the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Huizenga) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
This amendment requires the Government Accountability Office, the
GAO, to submit a report to Congress comparing brokerage window
investments in the context of defined contribution plans.
The GAO report will compare investment returns generated through
participant-controlled brokerage windows and similar arrangements with
the investment returns generated by investments selected and monitored
by plan fiduciaries.
What does that mean in plain English? It means basically, do you want
to be involved in the decisions surrounding your investments?
Most defined contribution plans, like 401(k) plans allow participants
to direct their investments from a menu of options selected by
investment fiduciaries, who are the experts. Those are
[[Page H904]]
the professionals who have a legal obligation to maximize return for
the investor.
{time} 0950
Plan fiduciaries go through an extensive selection and monitoring
process, evaluating fees, risks, performance, and how each option
compares to available alternatives.
If the plan fiduciary places pooled asset funds, like mutual funds,
on the investment menu, the fees are almost always lower, which
bolsters the fund's net return, meaning more money in the pockets of
the investor.
Brokerage window participants are bypassing the investments selected
by the plan's investment fiduciaries and self-selecting investments for
their retirement savings.
Again, Mr. Speaker, this is about whether you want to be involved in
your own retirement savings decisions. I do, by the way.
If the participant purchases a mutual fund through a brokerage
window, the participant would likely be subject to the highest retail
share class fee for that mutual fund. This amendment calls for the GAO
to study whether the net returns generated through brokerage windows
are comparable to those generated by the investments selected by plan
fiduciaries.
We have had, Mr. Speaker, quite a discussion about ESG and the
overarching bill. The point that I had been trying to make earlier was
that materiality and return should be the watchword. It is the legal
requirement, by the way, but we have seen a warping of government and
the regulations surrounding it to try to pound these investments into a
social circle that some, not all of us, believe is the right direction
to go.
Here is what I want to do, Mr. Speaker. I want to maximize return for
that firefighter, that teacher, that police officer. I want to make
sure that those who traditionally have not had choice in how they are
going to invest their retirement savings get some selection in that
through approved funds, through fiduciary responsibilities of
professionals. This is the right thing to do and the right direction to
go.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to
the amendment, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, this amendment appears to require
GAO to submit a report to Congress that compares the returns generated
through the brokerage windows with those of other investments available
through retirement plans.
Brokerage windows allow plan participants to invest outside the menu
of designated investment alternatives available under their plan. Such
investments can include mutual funds and, in some cases, individual
stocks and bonds.
Of the amendments that were filed at Rules Committee, my Democratic
colleagues and I would have preferred one from the ranking member of
the Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions Subcommittee, Mr.
DeSaulnier of California, to be made in order. His amendment would have
fixed the fundamental flaw of division A of the bill, which simply
would have ensured that plan fiduciaries would be permitted to consider
ESG investments if they can be done without sacrificing investment
returns.
Although I do not oppose the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Michigan, I do have a couple of observations about it.
First, the effect of this amendment could be accomplished by just
writing a letter to GAO, along with the chair of the Education and
Workforce Committee. That would be faster than sticking it on this bill
and hoping the bill passes.
We may draw the conclusion that this amendment was made in order so
that the Republican majority could say they have an open process on
this flawed bill and avoid yet another criticism of all of their closed
rules.
With respect to the substance of the amendment, I am concerned that
it needlessly pits two things that are not in conflict, that is,
brokerage windows and the plan's designated investments.
My colleagues know, in 2021, the ERISA Advisory Council examined
brokerage windows. They noted that fewer than one-third of the
retirement plans even offer a brokerage window, and roughly 2 percent
of plan participants with access to one actually choose it. When you
look at the average brokerage window account, it exceeded over
$300,000, which is far greater than what many Americans have in their
total retirement funds.
While few people are using the brokerage windows, the ones that do
may be interested in exploring funds or stocks that are not affected by
their plan. Of those mutual funds that are offered, some may be ESG-
themed.
If that is the concern of my colleagues, and if they are banking on
the GAO to produce a report that shows ESG-themed funds offered in a
brokerage account will underperform, they may be disappointed because
researchers at New York University noted that ``empirical studies and
meta-analyses consistently demonstrate a positive relationship between
ESG integration and financial performance.''
GAO itself has already examined this issue in the past and stated:
``The vast majority, 88 percent, of the scenarios in studies we
reviewed . . . reported finding a neutral or positive relationship
between the use of ESG information in investment management and
financial returns.''
Finally, the gentleman's amendment must be considered alongside the
House Republicans' efforts to decimate GAO's budget. Last summer, House
Republicans proposed cutting the GAO budget by 50 percent. Fortunately,
that was restored in the final version, but it is curious that the
House Republicans now want to give the GAO more work after they were so
intent on cutting its budget.
Mr. Speaker, I don't know whether it makes much difference whether it
passes or not, but I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I will close with this. I appreciate where
the gentleman is coming from. This has been a long debate regarding
some of these issues surrounding what I believe is the core issue. I
believe the core issue, Mr. Speaker, is that it is time for us to put
retirees first, not second, in investment decisions.
The gentleman was talking about it in ESG funds. I have no problem
with the existence of an ESG fund. If someone, for whatever personal
reason, decides that they want to invest in a fund that does not have
holdings in oil or in pharmaceuticals or something along those lines,
that is quite all right, but, Mr. Speaker, it has to be voluntary. It
has to be voluntary.
It is okay to invest in that ESG fund, but it is not okay, Mr.
Speaker, to force someone into that ESG fund who is then going to
suffer for that decision because of a lack of return.
The gentleman cited one study, and I am actually familiar with the
study. I can show you five studies for every one that is opposed to
this notion that ESG funds are more expensive and have a lower return.
At the end of the day, it needs to be about choice for those retirees
and their opportunity.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the previous question
is ordered on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Huizenga).
The question is on the amendment.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, this 15-
minute vote on the amendment will be followed by 5-minute votes on:
Motion to recommit H.R. 2988, if offered; and
Passage of H.R. 2988, if ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 395,
nays 22, not voting 14, as follows:
[Roll No. 29]
YEAS--395
Adams
Aderholt
Aguilar
Alford
Allen
Amo
Amodei (NV)
Ansari
Arrington
Auchincloss
Babin
Bacon
Balderson
Balint
Barr
Barragan
Barrett
Baumgartner
Bean (FL)
Beatty
Begich
Bell
Bentz
Bera
Bergman
Beyer
Bice
[[Page H905]]
Biggs (AZ)
Biggs (SC)
Bilirakis
Bishop
Boebert
Bonamici
Bost
Boyle (PA)
Brecheen
Bresnahan
Brown
Brownley
Buchanan
Budzinski
Burchett
Burlison
Bynum
Calvert
Cammack
Carbajal
Carey
Carson
Carter (GA)
Carter (LA)
Carter (TX)
Case
Cherfilus-McCormick
Chu
Ciscomani
Cisneros
Clarke (NY)
Cleaver
Cline
Cloud
Clyburn
Clyde
Cohen
Cole
Collins
Comer
Conaway
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Craig
Crane
Crank
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crockett
Crow
Cuellar
Davids (KS)
Davidson
Davis (IL)
Davis (NC)
De La Cruz
Dean (PA)
DeGette
DeLauro
DelBene
Deluzio
DeSaulnier
DesJarlais
Dexter
Diaz-Balart
Dingell
Doggett
Donalds
Downing
Dunn (FL)
Edwards
Ellzey
Emmer
Espaillat
Estes
Evans (CO)
Evans (PA)
Ezell
Fallon
Fedorchak
Feenstra
Fields
Figures
Fine
Finstad
Fischbach
Fitzgerald
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Flood
Fong
Foster
Foushee
Foxx
Frankel, Lois
Franklin, Scott
Friedman
Frost
Fry
Fulcher
Garamendi
Garbarino
Garcia (CA)
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Gill (TX)
Gillen
Gimenez
Golden (ME)
Goldman (TX)
Gonzales, Tony
Gonzalez, V.
Gooden
Goodlander
Gosar
Gottheimer
Graves
Gray
Green, Al (TX)
Griffith
Grijalva
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Hageman
Hamadeh (AZ)
Harder (CA)
Haridopolos
Harrigan
Harris (MD)
Harris (NC)
Harshbarger
Hayes
Hern (OK)
Higgins (LA)
Hill (AR)
Himes
Hinson
Horsford
Houchin
Houlahan
Hoyer
Hudson
Huizenga
Hurd (CO)
Issa
Ivey
Jack
Jackson (TX)
Jacobs
James
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson (TX)
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Joyce (PA)
Kamlager-Dove
Kaptur
Kean
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kennedy (NY)
Kennedy (UT)
Khanna
Kiggans (VA)
Kiley (CA)
Kim
Knott
Krishnamoorthi
Kustoff
LaHood
LaLota
Landsman
Langworthy
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latimer
Latta
Lawler
Lee (FL)
Lee (NV)
Leger Fernandez
Letlow
Levin
Liccardo
Lieu
Lofgren
Loudermilk
Lucas
Luna
Luttrell
Lynch
Mackenzie
Magaziner
Malliotakis
Maloy
Mann
Mannion
Massie
Mast
Matsui
McBath
McCaul
McClain
McClain Delaney
McClellan
McClintock
McCollum
McCormick
McDonald Rivet
McDowell
McGuire
McIver
Meeks
Menendez
Meng
Messmer
Meuser
Mfume
Miller (IL)
Miller (OH)
Miller (WV)
Miller-Meeks
Mills
Min
Moolenaar
Moore (AL)
Moore (NC)
Moore (UT)
Moore (WI)
Moore (WV)
Moran
Morelle
Morrison
Moskowitz
Mrvan
Mullin
Nadler
Neal
Neguse
Newhouse
Nunn (IA)
Obernolte
Ogles
Olszewski
Onder
Owens
Pallone
Palmer
Panetta
Pappas
Patronis
Pelosi
Perez
Perry
Peters
Pettersen
Pfluger
Pingree
Pocan
Pou
Pressley
Quigley
Raskin
Reschenthaler
Riley (NY)
Rivas
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rose
Ross
Rouzer
Roy
Ruiz
Rulli
Rutherford
Ryan
Salazar
Salinas
Sanchez
Scalise
Schakowsky
Schmidt
Schneider
Scholten
Schrier
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Self
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Shreve
Simon
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Smucker
Sorensen
Soto
Spartz
Stansbury
Stanton
Stauber
Stefanik
Steil
Stevens
Strickland
Strong
Stutzman
Subramanyam
Suozzi
Sykes
Takano
Taylor
Tenney
Thanedar
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Tiffany
Timmons
Titus
Tokuda
Tonko
Torres (CA)
Torres (NY)
Trahan
Tran
Turner (OH)
Underwood
Valadao
Van Drew
Van Duyne
Van Epps
Vasquez
Veasey
Velazquez
Vindman
Wagner
Walberg
Walkinshaw
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson Coleman
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Westerman
Whitesides
Wied
Williams (GA)
Williams (TX)
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Yakym
Zinke
NAYS--22
Casten
Castro (TX)
Clark (MA)
Elfreth
Escobar
Fletcher
Goldman (NY)
Gomez
Hoyle (OR)
Huffman
Jackson (IL)
Lee (PA)
McBride
McGarvey
McGovern
Ocasio-Cortez
Omar
Ramirez
Randall
Scanlon
Tlaib
Vargas
NOT VOTING--14
Baird
Casar
Castor (FL)
Hunt
Mace
Moulton
Murphy
Nehls
Norcross
Norman
Steube
Swalwell
Van Orden
Womack
{time} 1029
Mr. HUFFMAN, Mses. ELFRETH, RANDALL, and OCASIO-CORTEZ changed their
vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Mses. DelBENE, BUDZINSKI, Mr. COHEN, Mses. LOFGREN, LEGER FERNANDEZ,
Mr. GOTTHEIMER, Mses. DeGETTE, BALINT, Mr. DOGGETT, Ms. JAYAPAL, Mr.
AMO, Ms. PRESSLEY, Mr. MRVAN and Ms. STANSBURY, changed their vote from
``nay'' to ``yea.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
Motion to Recommit
Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the desk.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Ms. Kaptur of Ohio moves to recommit the bill H.R. 2988 to
the Committee on Education and Workforce.
The material previously referred to by Ms. Kaptur is as follows:
- Ms. Kaptur moves to recommit the bill H.R. 2988 to the
Committee on Education and the Workforce with instructions to
report the same back to the House forthwith, with the
following amendment:
Add at the end the following:
DIVISION E--SUSAN MUFFLEY ACT
SEC. 5001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ``Susan Muffley Act of
2025''.
SEC. 5002. GUARANTEED BENEFIT CALCULATION FOR CERTAIN PLANS.
(a) In General.--
(1) Increase to full vested plan benefit.--
(A) In general.--For purposes of determining what benefits
are guaranteed under section 4022 of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (in this section referred to as
``ERISA'') with respect to an eligible participant or
beneficiary under a covered plan specified in paragraph (4)
in connection with the termination of such plan, the amount
of monthly benefits shall be equal to the full vested plan
benefit with respect to the participant.
(B) No effect on previous determinations.--Nothing in this
Act shall be construed to change the allocation of assets and
recoveries under sections 4044(a) and 4022(c) of ERISA as
previously determined by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (in the section referred to as the
``corporation'') for the covered plans specified in paragraph
(4), and the corporation's applicable rules, practices, and
policies on benefits payable in terminated single-employer
plans shall, except as otherwise provided in this section,
continue to apply with respect to such covered plans.
(2) Recalculation of certain benefits.--
(A) In general.--In any case in which the amount of monthly
benefits with respect to an eligible participant or
beneficiary described in paragraph (1) was calculated prior
to the date of enactment of this Act, the corporation shall
recalculate such amount pursuant to paragraph (1), and shall
adjust any subsequent payments of such monthly benefits
accordingly, as soon as practicable after such date.
(B) Lump-sum payments of past-due benefits.--Not later than
180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
corporation, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of Labor, shall make a lump-sum
payment to each eligible participant or beneficiary whose
guaranteed benefits are recalculated under subparagraph (A)
in an amount equal to--
(i) in the case of an eligible participant, the excess of--
(I) the total of the full vested plan benefits of the
participant for all months for which such guaranteed benefits
were paid prior to such recalculation, over
(II) the sum of any applicable payments made to the
eligible participant; and
(ii) in the case of an eligible beneficiary, the sum of--
(I) the amount that would be determined under clause (i)
with respect to the participant of which the eligible
beneficiary is a beneficiary if such participant were still
in pay status; plus
(II) the excess of--
(aa) the total of the full vested plan benefits of the
eligible beneficiary for all months for which such guaranteed
benefits were paid prior to such recalculation, over
(bb) the sum of any applicable payments made to the
eligible beneficiary.
Notwithstanding the previous sentence, the corporation shall
increase each lump-sum payment made under this subparagraph
to account for foregone interest in an amount determined by
the corporation designed to reflect a 6 percent annual
interest rate on each past-due amount attributable to the
underpayment of guaranteed benefits for each month prior to
such recalculation.
(C) Eligible participants and beneficiaries.--
(i) In general.--For purposes of this section, an eligible
participant or beneficiary is a participant or beneficiary
who--
(I) as of the date of the enactment of this Act, is in pay
status under a covered plan or
[[Page H906]]
is eligible for future payments under such plan;
(II) has received or will receive applicable payments in
connection with such plan (within the meaning of clause (ii))
that does not exceed the full vested plan benefits of such
participant or beneficiary; and
(III) is not covered by the 1999 agreements between General
Motors and various unions providing a top-up benefit to
certain hourly employees who were transferred from the
General Motors Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan to the
Delphi Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan.
(ii) Applicable payments.--For purposes of this paragraph,
applicable payments to a participant or beneficiary in
connection with a plan consist of the following:
(I) Payments under the plan equal to the normal benefit
guarantee of the participant or beneficiary.
(II) Payments to the participant or beneficiary made
pursuant to section 4022(c) or otherwise received from the
corporation in connection with the termination of the plan.
(3) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection--
(A) Full vested plan benefit.--The term ``full vested plan
benefit'' means the amount of monthly benefits that would be
guaranteed under section 4022 of ERISA as of the date of plan
termination with respect to an eligible participant or
beneficiary if such section were applied without regard to
the phase-in limit in subsection (b)(1) of such Act and the
maximum guaranteed benefit limitation in subsection (b)(3) of
such Act (including the accrued-at-normal limitation).
(B) Normal benefit guarantee.--The term ``normal benefit
guarantee'' means the amount of monthly benefits guaranteed
under such section with respect to an eligible participant or
beneficiary without regard to this Act.
(4) Covered plans.--The covered plans specified in this
paragraph are the following:
(A) The Delphi Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan.
(B) The Delphi Retirement Program for Salaried Employees.
(C) The PHI Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan.
(D) The ASEC Manufacturing Retirement Program.
(E) The PHI Bargaining Retirement Plan.
(F) The Delphi Mechatronic Systems Retirement Program.
(5) Treatment of pbgc determinations.--Any determination
made by the corporation under this section concerning a
recalculation of benefits or lump-sum payment of past-due
benefits shall be subject to administrative review by the
corporation. Any new determination made by the corporation
under this section shall be governed by the same
administrative review process as any other benefit
determination by the corporation.
(b) Trust Fund for Payment of Increased Benefits.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established in the Treasury of
the United States a trust fund to be known as the ``Delphi
Full Vested Plan Benefit Trust Fund'' (hereafter in this
subsection referred to as the ``Fund''), consisting of such
amounts as may be appropriated or credited to the Fund as
provided in this section.
(2) Funding.--There is appropriated from the general fund
such amounts as are necessary for the costs of the payment of
the portion of monthly benefits guaranteed to a participant
or beneficiary pursuant to subsection (a) and for necessary
administrative and operating expenses of the corporation
relating to such payment. The Fund shall be credited with
amounts from time to time as the Secretary of the Treasury,
in conjunction with the Director of the corporation,
determines appropriate, from the general fund of the
Treasury.
(3) Expenditures from fund.--Amounts in the Fund shall be
available for the payment of the portion of monthly benefits
guaranteed to a participant or beneficiary pursuant to
subsection (a) and for necessary administrative and operating
expenses of the corporation relating to such payment.
(c) Regulations.--The corporation, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor, may
issue such regulations as necessary to carry out this
section.
(d) Tax Treatment of Lump-Sum Payments.--
(1) In general.--Unless the taxpayer elects (at such time
and in such manner as the Secretary may provide) to have this
paragraph not apply with respect to any lump-sum payment
under subsection (a)(2)(B), the amount of such payment shall
be included in the taxpayer's gross income ratably over the
3-taxable-year period beginning with the taxable year in
which such payment is received.
(2) Special rules related to death.--
(A) In general.--If the taxpayer dies before the end of the
3-taxable-year period described in paragraph (1), any amount
to which paragraph (1) applies which has not been included in
gross income for a taxable year ending before the taxable
year in which such death occurs shall be included in gross
income for such taxable year.
(B) Special election for surviving spouses of eligible
participants.--If--
(i) a taxpayer with respect to whom paragraph (1) applies
dies,
(ii) such taxpayer is an eligible participant,
(iii) the surviving spouse of such eligible participant is
entitled to a survivor benefit from the corporation with
respect to such eligible participant, and
(iv) such surviving spouse elects (at such time and in such
manner as the Secretary may provide) the application of this
subparagraph, subparagraph (A) shall not apply and any amount
which would have (but for such taxpayer's death) been
included in the gross income of such taxpayer under paragraph
(1) for any taxable year beginning after the date of such
death shall be included in the gross income of such surviving
spouse for the taxable year of such surviving spouse ending
with or within such taxable year of the taxpayer.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule XIX, the
previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit.
The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 206,
nays 210, not voting 15, as follows:
[Roll No. 30]
YEAS--206
Adams
Aguilar
Amo
Ansari
Auchincloss
Balint
Barragan
Beatty
Bell
Bera
Beyer
Bishop
Bonamici
Boyle (PA)
Brown
Brownley
Budzinski
Bynum
Carbajal
Carson
Carter (LA)
Case
Casten
Castro (TX)
Cherfilus-McCormick
Chu
Cisneros
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Conaway
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Craig
Crockett
Crow
Cuellar
Davids (KS)
Davis (IL)
Davis (NC)
Dean (PA)
DeGette
DeLauro
DelBene
Deluzio
DeSaulnier
Dexter
Dingell
Doggett
Elfreth
Escobar
Espaillat
Evans (PA)
Fields
Figures
Fletcher
Foster
Foushee
Frankel, Lois
Friedman
Frost
Garamendi
Garcia (CA)
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Gillen
Golden (ME)
Goldman (NY)
Gomez
Gonzalez, V.
Goodlander
Gottheimer
Gray
Green, Al (TX)
Grijalva
Harder (CA)
Hayes
Himes
Horsford
Houlahan
Hoyer
Hoyle (OR)
Huffman
Ivey
Jackson (IL)
Jacobs
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (TX)
Kamlager-Dove
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy (NY)
Khanna
Krishnamoorthi
Landsman
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latimer
Lee (NV)
Lee (PA)
Leger Fernandez
Levin
Liccardo
Lieu
Lofgren
Lynch
Magaziner
Mannion
Matsui
McBath
McBride
McClain Delaney
McClellan
McCollum
McDonald Rivet
McGarvey
McGovern
McIver
Meeks
Menendez
Meng
Mfume
Min
Moore (WI)
Morelle
Morrison
Mrvan
Mullin
Nadler
Neal
Neguse
Ocasio-Cortez
Olszewski
Omar
Pallone
Panetta
Pappas
Pelosi
Perez
Peters
Pettersen
Pingree
Pocan
Pou
Pressley
Quigley
Ramirez
Randall
Raskin
Riley (NY)
Rivas
Ross
Ruiz
Ryan
Salinas
Sanchez
Scanlon
Schakowsky
Schneider
Scholten
Schrier
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Sewell
Sherman
Simon
Smith (WA)
Sorensen
Soto
Stansbury
Stanton
Stevens
Strickland
Subramanyam
Suozzi
Sykes
Takano
Thanedar
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Titus
Tlaib
Tokuda
Tonko
Torres (CA)
Torres (NY)
Trahan
Tran
Underwood
Vargas
Vasquez
Velazquez
Vindman
Walkinshaw
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson Coleman
Whitesides
Williams (GA)
Wilson (FL)
NAYS--210
Aderholt
Alford
Allen
Amodei (NV)
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Balderson
Barr
Barrett
Baumgartner
Bean (FL)
Begich
Bentz
Bergman
Bice
Biggs (AZ)
Biggs (SC)
Bilirakis
Boebert
Bost
Brecheen
Bresnahan
Buchanan
Burchett
Burlison
Calvert
Cammack
Carey
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Ciscomani
Cline
Cloud
Clyde
Cole
Collins
Comer
Crane
Crank
Crawford
Crenshaw
Davidson
De La Cruz
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Donalds
Downing
Dunn (FL)
Edwards
Ellzey
Emmer
Estes
Evans (CO)
Ezell
Fallon
Fedorchak
Feenstra
Fine
Finstad
Fischbach
Fitzgerald
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Flood
Fong
Foxx
Franklin, Scott
Fry
Fulcher
Garbarino
Gill (TX)
Gimenez
Goldman (TX)
Gonzales, Tony
Gooden
Gosar
Graves
Griffith
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Hageman
Hamadeh (AZ)
Haridopolos
Harrigan
Harris (MD)
Harris (NC)
Harshbarger
Hern (OK)
Higgins (LA)
Hill (AR)
Hinson
Houchin
Hudson
Huizenga
[[Page H907]]
Hurd (CO)
Issa
Jack
Jackson (TX)
James
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (SD)
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Joyce (PA)
Kean
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kennedy (UT)
Kiggans (VA)
Kiley (CA)
Kim
Knott
Kustoff
LaHood
LaLota
Langworthy
Latta
Lawler
Lee (FL)
Letlow
Loudermilk
Lucas
Luna
Luttrell
Mackenzie
Malliotakis
Maloy
Mann
Massie
Mast
McCaul
McClain
McClintock
McCormick
McDowell
McGuire
Messmer
Meuser
Miller (IL)
Miller (OH)
Miller (WV)
Miller-Meeks
Mills
Moolenaar
Moore (AL)
Moore (NC)
Moore (UT)
Moore (WV)
Moran
Moskowitz
Newhouse
Nunn (IA)
Obernolte
Ogles
Onder
Owens
Palmer
Patronis
Perry
Pfluger
Reschenthaler
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rose
Rouzer
Roy
Rulli
Rutherford
Salazar
Scalise
Schmidt
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Self
Sessions
Shreve
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smucker
Spartz
Stauber
Stefanik
Steil
Strong
Stutzman
Taylor
Tenney
Thompson (PA)
Tiffany
Timmons
Turner (OH)
Valadao
Van Drew
Van Duyne
Van Epps
Wagner
Walberg
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Westerman
Wied
Williams (TX)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Yakym
Zinke
NOT VOTING--15
Baird
Casar
Castor (FL)
Hunt
Mace
Moulton
Murphy
Nehls
Norcross
Norman
Steube
Swalwell
Van Orden
Veasey
Womack
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There are 2 minutes
remaining.
{time} 1036
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 213,
nays 205, not voting 13, as follows:
[Roll No. 31]
YEAS--213
Aderholt
Alford
Allen
Amodei (NV)
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Balderson
Barr
Barrett
Baumgartner
Bean (FL)
Begich
Bentz
Bergman
Bice
Biggs (AZ)
Biggs (SC)
Bilirakis
Boebert
Bost
Brecheen
Bresnahan
Buchanan
Burchett
Burlison
Calvert
Cammack
Carey
Carson
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Ciscomani
Cline
Cloud
Clyde
Cole
Collins
Comer
Crane
Crank
Crawford
Crenshaw
Cuellar
Davidson
De La Cruz
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Donalds
Downing
Dunn (FL)
Edwards
Ellzey
Emmer
Estes
Evans (CO)
Ezell
Fallon
Fedorchak
Feenstra
Fine
Finstad
Fischbach
Fitzgerald
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Flood
Fong
Foxx
Franklin, Scott
Fry
Fulcher
Garbarino
Gill (TX)
Gimenez
Goldman (TX)
Gonzales, Tony
Gooden
Gosar
Graves
Gray
Griffith
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Hageman
Hamadeh (AZ)
Haridopolos
Harrigan
Harris (MD)
Harris (NC)
Harshbarger
Hern (OK)
Higgins (LA)
Hill (AR)
Hinson
Houchin
Hudson
Huizenga
Hurd (CO)
Issa
Jack
Jackson (TX)
James
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (SD)
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Joyce (PA)
Kean
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kennedy (UT)
Kiggans (VA)
Kiley (CA)
Kim
Knott
Kustoff
LaHood
LaLota
Langworthy
Latta
Lawler
Lee (FL)
Letlow
Loudermilk
Lucas
Luna
Luttrell
Mackenzie
Malliotakis
Maloy
Mann
Massie
Mast
McCaul
McClain
McClintock
McCormick
McDowell
McGuire
Messmer
Meuser
Miller (IL)
Miller (OH)
Miller (WV)
Miller-Meeks
Mills
Moolenaar
Moore (AL)
Moore (NC)
Moore (UT)
Moore (WV)
Moran
Newhouse
Nunn (IA)
Obernolte
Ogles
Onder
Owens
Palmer
Patronis
Perry
Pfluger
Reschenthaler
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rose
Rouzer
Roy
Rulli
Rutherford
Salazar
Scalise
Schmidt
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Self
Sessions
Shreve
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smucker
Spartz
Stauber
Stefanik
Steil
Steube
Strong
Stutzman
Taylor
Tenney
Thompson (PA)
Tiffany
Timmons
Turner (OH)
Valadao
Van Drew
Van Duyne
Van Epps
Wagner
Walberg
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Westerman
Wied
Williams (TX)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Yakym
Zinke
NAYS--205
Adams
Aguilar
Amo
Ansari
Auchincloss
Balint
Barragan
Beatty
Bell
Bera
Beyer
Bishop
Bonamici
Boyle (PA)
Brown
Brownley
Budzinski
Bynum
Carbajal
Carter (LA)
Case
Casten
Castro (TX)
Cherfilus-McCormick
Chu
Cisneros
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Conaway
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Craig
Crockett
Crow
Davids (KS)
Davis (IL)
Davis (NC)
Dean (PA)
DeGette
DeLauro
DelBene
Deluzio
DeSaulnier
Dexter
Dingell
Doggett
Elfreth
Escobar
Espaillat
Evans (PA)
Fields
Figures
Fletcher
Foster
Foushee
Frankel, Lois
Friedman
Frost
Garamendi
Garcia (CA)
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Gillen
Golden (ME)
Goldman (NY)
Gomez
Gonzalez, V.
Goodlander
Gottheimer
Green, Al (TX)
Grijalva
Harder (CA)
Hayes
Himes
Horsford
Houlahan
Hoyer
Hoyle (OR)
Huffman
Ivey
Jackson (IL)
Jacobs
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (TX)
Kamlager-Dove
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy (NY)
Khanna
Krishnamoorthi
Landsman
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latimer
Lee (NV)
Lee (PA)
Leger Fernandez
Levin
Liccardo
Lieu
Lofgren
Lynch
Magaziner
Mannion
Matsui
McBath
McBride
McClain Delaney
McClellan
McCollum
McDonald Rivet
McGarvey
McGovern
McIver
Meeks
Menendez
Meng
Mfume
Min
Moore (WI)
Morelle
Morrison
Moskowitz
Mrvan
Mullin
Nadler
Neal
Neguse
Ocasio-Cortez
Olszewski
Omar
Pallone
Panetta
Pappas
Pelosi
Perez
Peters
Pettersen
Pingree
Pocan
Pou
Pressley
Quigley
Ramirez
Randall
Raskin
Riley (NY)
Rivas
Ross
Ruiz
Ryan
Salinas
Sanchez
Scanlon
Schakowsky
Schneider
Scholten
Schrier
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Sewell
Sherman
Simon
Smith (WA)
Sorensen
Soto
Stansbury
Stanton
Stevens
Strickland
Subramanyam
Suozzi
Sykes
Takano
Thanedar
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Titus
Tlaib
Tokuda
Tonko
Torres (CA)
Torres (NY)
Trahan
Tran
Underwood
Vargas
Vasquez
Veasey
Velazquez
Vindman
Walkinshaw
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson Coleman
Whitesides
Williams (GA)
Wilson (FL)
NOT VOTING--13
Baird
Casar
Castor (FL)
Hunt
Mace
Moulton
Murphy
Nehls
Norcross
Norman
Swalwell
Van Orden
Womack
{time} 1043
Mr. MRVAN changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
Mr. WOMACK. Mr. Speaker, I was unavoidably absent and unable to vote.
Had I been present, I would have voted YEA on Roll Call No. 29, NAY on
Roll Call No. 30, and YEA on Roll Call No. 31.
____________________