[Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 5 (Thursday, January 8, 2026)]
[Senate]
[Pages S98-S99]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                               VENEZUELA

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I would like to make just a few brief 
observations ahead of the vote on Senator Kaine's War Powers 
Resolution.
  The War Powers Act is not the law I would have written, and there are 
reasonable questions about its constitutionality. But it has been the 
law now for over 50 years. And it is important to remember what it was 
designed to prevent--and, even more importantly, what it wasn't.
  Back in 1973, the goal was preventing another Vietnam. The idea was 
to impose guardrails against the large-scale, indefinite commitment of 
U.S. troops abroad. And in shutting that door, the law very 
intentionally reaffirmed our Founders' decision to leave another door 
open.
  The law grants presidents clear authority for the limited use of 
military force. And of the many occasions over the years when 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle have invoked the War Powers Act 
to condemn such limited use of military force--by Presidents of both 
parties--I can't recall a single one in which Congress managed to 
change the facts and artificially constrain the Commander in Chief's 
authority.
  This time is no different. The President was well within this 
authority in his decision to bring Nicolas Maduro to justice. How do we 
know? A number of ways:
  First, plain statute: Notification of Congress within 48? Check. 
Withdrawal within 60 days? Try 60 minutes.
  What is more, recent history provides clear precedent from Presidents 
of both parties. What authority did this operation exceed that 
President Obama or President Reagan did not exceed in operations in 
Libya? Or President Clinton in Kosovo? What makes this time different 
than President Biden's strikes in Syria or Yemen? Certainly, there is 
little daylight between the legality of this operation and the one 
President H.W. Bush undertook to apprehend Manuel Noriega in Panama.
  You don't have to agree with a President's approach to national 
security policy to acknowledge his compliance with the law and his 
constitutional authority for the use of force, which makes the 
invocation of the War Powers Act such a tired and blunt instrument. For 
my part, I have consistently opposed resolutions like these aimed at 
constraining Presidents' constitutional authority. And I have done it 
on behalf of Presidents of both parties.
  I am old enough to remember when, during President Obama's feckless 
dealings with Iran, no less than the future Democratic leader insisted 
that, ``We should never take the military option off the table''.
  But every one of our colleagues remembers last summer when the 
frequent fliers of the War Powers Resolution reached yet again for 
their favorite tool after the President's decision to degrade Iran's 
nuclear program without putting a single American boot on the ground.
  Of course, there are serious questions at hand to which the Senate 
and the American people should expect serious answers from the 
Commander in Chief.

[[Page S99]]

The President's authorities to conduct military operations may be wide 
and well-established, but they incur a responsibility to situate 
decisive actions in broader, longer-term strategy.
  Maduro is an authoritarian thug. He reduced a once-prosperous 
neighbor of America to an impoverished vassal of Cuba, Russia, Iran, 
and China. He profited from the flow of lethal drugs to America. He 
spat in the face of Venezuelan voters. And, until very recently, he 
slept in peace while they starved.
  A Western Hemisphere without him or his ilk in power serves America's 
interests. But clearly, Venezuela and the hemisphere have a ways to go.
  To the extent that our colleagues are concerned about the mechanisms 
and timeline of a transition to democratically elected Venezuelan 
leaders, I share their curiosity. If they want to know more about the 
President's longer-term strategy to stabilize Venezuela and the Western 
Hemisphere, so do I.
  Suffice it to say that whatever the objective, whatever the strategy, 
America is well-served when its Presidents secure enduring bipartisan 
support for their foreign policies. President Obama ignored Congress in 
pursuing a reckless and bad nuclear deal with Iran. Unsurprisingly, 
that deal did not endure.
  Successfully returning Venezuela to its role of stable, prosperous, 
democratic neighbor is a noble goal, but an ambitious one. It doesn't 
come without risk. And it is worth making the clear case to the 
country.
  I appreciate the administration's willingness to brief Senators on 
the sensitive details of a tactical victory. But they owe it to the 
American people--and, frankly, the long-suffering people of Venezuela--
to lay out the path to strategic success in much greater detail.
  If the aim is to reestablish American primacy in its near abroad, 
great. If the idea is to evict enemies who hate America from a valuable 
foothold in our region, onward.
  A stable Venezuela, led by duly elected Venezuelans, will leave 
Americans safer and more secure. The administration should explain how 
that end goal will be achieved.
  In the meantime, I will oppose the Kaine resolution and would urge my 
colleagues to do the same.

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