[Congressional Record Volume 171, Number 133 (Friday, August 1, 2025)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5236-S5237]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 3461. Ms. ROSEN (for herself and Mr. Curtis) submitted an
amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 2296, to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2026 for military activities
of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for
defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which
was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of title XII, add the following:
Subtitle F--Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative Act
SEC. 1271. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Taiwan Undersea Cable
Resilience Initiative Act''.
SEC. 1272. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Undersea communication cables (in this subtitle
referred to as ``undersea cables'') are critical
infrastructure essential for global communication, commerce,
and national security, particularly for Taiwan, whose
economic and security stability relies heavily on undersea
cable connectivity.
(2) The Government of the People's Republic of China has
increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the security
and sovereignty of Taiwan, including suspected sabotage of
undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the incidents
involving the severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of
Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025.
(3) Undersea cables are a primary target in the strategy of
the Government of the People's Republic of China to cripple
the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a
military conflict, as part of broader hybrid warfare tactics.
Disruption of undersea cables would significantly impact the
ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and
internationally, leading to a breakdown in military,
economic, and social functions.
(4) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on undersea
cables has been compounded by an increasing number of foreign
vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including
Chinese-linked vessels, which are perceived as direct threats
to Taiwan's critical infrastructure.
(5) The ability of the Government of the People's Republic
of China to disrupt or sever undersea cables is a critical
element of its military strategy aimed at softening Taiwan's
defenses and isolating Taiwan from international support in
the event of an invasion or military confrontation.
(6) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly
the People's Republic of China, have increased the risk of
sabotage and disruption to undersea cables serving Taiwan and
other nations. Notably, in February 2023, the Matsu Islands
of Taiwan experienced major internet disruptions due to two
undersea cables being severed, with suspicions pointing
toward deliberate external interference. Furthermore, in
January 2025, Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an
international undersea cable and identified a ``suspicious
vessel''--the Chinese-linked cargo ship Shunxin39--near the
affected area. The Coast Guard of Taiwan has indicated
concerns that that vessel may have been involved in
deliberately cutting the cable. In a subsequent incident,
Taiwan seized the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58, suspected of
deliberately severing an undersea cable. The Coast Guard of
Taiwan acknowledged the possibility of China's involvement as
part of a ``grey area intrusion''.
(7) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage
to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the
Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting
Chinese and Russian involvement in several incidents,
although some damages have been attributed to natural causes.
Those incidents highlight the vulnerability of those critical
systems to gray zone tactics and the difficulty of proving
sabotage or holding perpetrators accountable.
(8) The sabotage of undersea cables constitutes gray zone
tactics designed to destabilize and undermine international
security without direct military confrontation.
(9) Several regional mechanisms have been established to
bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic
Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad
Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at
enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in
the Indo-Pacific.
(10) To counter the threats described in this section and
safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the
United States and its allies to take decisive action to
bolster Taiwan's defenses for undersea cables and foster
international cooperation to protect those critical assets.
SEC. 1273. TAIWAN UNDERSEA CABLE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and
such other heads of agencies as the Secretary of State
considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to be known
as the ``Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative'' (in
this section referred to as the ``Initiative'').
(b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the
protection and resilience of undersea cables near Taiwan,
with a focus on countering threats from the People's Republic
of China to the critical infrastructure of Taiwan.
(c) Key Focus Areas.--
(1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.--In
carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced
undersea cable monitoring systems for Taiwan capable of
detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time,
including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early
warnings from global intelligence networks.
(2) Rapid response protocols.--In carrying out the
Initiative, the Secretary of State shall--
(A) establish rapid response protocols for repairing
severed undersea cables or mitigating disruptions; and
(B) work with allies of the United States to help Taiwan
develop the logistical capacity to respond quickly to attacks
on undersea cables and minimize downtime.
(3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out
the Initiative--
[[Page S5237]]
(A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the
Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard of Taiwan
and regional allies, shall enhance maritime domain awareness
around Taiwan, focusing on the detection of suspicious
vessels or activities near critical undersea cable routes;
and
(B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist in joint
patrols and surveillance, particularly in the Taiwan Strait
and surrounding maritime zones, to monitor potential threats
and prevent sabotage.
(4) International frameworks for protection.--
(A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the
Secretary of State shall seek to establish cooperative
frameworks with regional allies and global partners to
protect the undersea cable networks near Taiwan.
(B) Elements.--The frameworks established under
subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the
United States in joint drills, intelligence-sharing
platforms, and collaborative surveillance operations to
enhance collective security against sabotage.
(5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying out the
Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and
support the hardening of critical undersea cables near
Taiwan, including reinforcing cables, improving burial
depths, and using more resilient materials to reduce
vulnerability to natural disasters and deliberate
interference.
SEC. 1274. COUNTERING CHINA'S GRAY ZONE TACTICS.
(a) Working With Partners To Counter Chinese Sabotage.--The
President shall work with Taiwan and like-minded
international partners to implement strategies that directly
counter the use by the Government of the People's Republic of
China of undersea cable sabotage as part of its gray zone
warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on that
Government to adhere to international norms regarding the
protection of undersea infrastructure.
(b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with
Taiwan to raise global awareness of the risks posed by
interference by the Government of the People's Republic of
China in undersea cables, including through public diplomacy
efforts, information sharing, and international forums that
address gray zone tactics and the protection of critical
infrastructure.
SEC. 1275. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SABOTAGE
OF UNDERSEA CABLES.
(a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions
described in subsection (b) with respect to any person of the
People's Republic of China that the President determines is
responsible for or complicit in damaging undersea cables
critical to the national security of Taiwan.
(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all
of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary
to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
interests in property of a person described in subsection
(a), if such property and interests in property are in the
United States, come within the United States, or are or come
within the possession or control of a United States person.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien described in
subsection (a) shall be--
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to
enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into
the United States or to receive any other benefit under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--The visa or other entry documentation of
an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked,
regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is
or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under clause (i)
shall--
(I) take effect immediately; and
(II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry
documentation that is in the possession of the alien.
(c) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702
and 1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry
out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth
in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705)
to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act
described in subsection (a) of that section.
(d) Exceptions.--
(1) Exception for intelligence activities.--This section
shall not apply with respect to activities subject to the
reporting requirements under title V of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized
intelligence activities of the United States.
(2) Exception to comply with international agreements.--
Sanctions under subsection (b)(2) shall not apply with
respect to the admission of an alien to the United States if
such admission is necessary to comply with the obligations of
the United States under the Agreement regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success on
June 26, 1947, and entered into force on November 21, 1947,
between the United Nations and the United States, or the
Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna on April 24,
1963, and entered into force on March 19, 1967, or other
international obligations of the United States.
(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--The authorities and requirements to impose
sanctions under this section shall not include the authority
or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of
goods.
(B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term ``good''
means any article, natural or manmade substance, material,
supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test
equipment, and excluding technical data.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms ``admission'',
``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings given those
terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C. 1101).
(2) Person of the people's republic of china.--The term
``person of the People's Republic of China'' means--
(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of the
People's Republic of China; and
(B) an entity owned or controlled by the Government of the
People's Republic of China, organized under the laws of the
People's Republic of China, or otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of the Government of the People's Republic of
China.
(3) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States
or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including
any foreign branch of such an entity; or
(C) any person in the United States.
SEC. 1276. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall
submit to Congress a report detailing--
(1) any incidents of interference in undersea cables near
Taiwan; and
(2) any actions taken in response to such incidents.
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