[Congressional Record Volume 171, Number 123 (Thursday, July 17, 2025)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4477-S4478]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 2940. Mr. COONS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill S. 2296, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2026 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
[[Page S4478]]
At the end of subtitle D of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1248. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO THE PRC'S GLOBAL BASING
INTENTIONS.
(a) Short Titles.--This section may be cited as the
``Combating PRC Overseas and Unlawful Networked Threats
through Enhanced Resilience Act of 2025'' or the ``COUNTER
Act of 2025''.
(b) Findings.--According to multiple sources, including the
2024 annual report to Congress, titled ``Military and
Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of
China'' and known informally as the ``China Military Power
Report''--
(1) the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and
basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain
military power at greater distances;
(2) a global PLA logistics network could give the PRC
increased capabilities to surveil or disrupt United States
military operations;
(3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened the first
overseas PLA military base near the commercial port of
Doraleh in Djibouti;
(4) in 2019, the PRC also attempted to acquire
strategically important port infrastructure at Subic Bay in
the Philippines, but was stopped by the Governments of the
United States, the Philippines, and Japan, and by private
investors;
(5) in April 2025, officials from the PRC and Cambodia
officially inaugurated the China-Cambodia Ream Naval Base
Joint Support and Training Center and celebrated the
expansion of port facilities at Ream Naval Base, some of
which appear to have been reserved for the use of PRC ships
that have been continuously stationed at Ream Naval Base
since December 2023; and
(6) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the PRC's
access to the port at the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, the
PRC is likely pursuing access to additional military
facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces
projection in many countries.
(c) Sense of Congress.--While the executive branch has
undertaken case-by-case efforts to forestall the
establishment of new PRC permanent military presence in
several countries, it is the sense of Congress that future
efforts to counter the PRC's global basing intentions must--
(1) proceed with the urgency required to address the
strategic implications of the PRC's actions;
(2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination with
respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-of-government
approach;
(3) ensure that the United States Government maintains a
proactive posture rather than a reactive posture in order to
maximize strategic decision space;
(4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions that would be
influential in shaping a partner's decision making regarding
giving the PRC military access to its sovereign territory;
(5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the PRC's
global basing intentions within the context of the overall
United States strategic competition with the PRC;
(6) consider how the PRC uses commercial and scientific
cooperation as a guise for establishing access for the PLA
and other PRC security forces in foreign countries;
(7) factor in the potential contributions of key allies and
partners to help respond to the PRC's pursuit of global
basing, many of which--
(A) have historic ties and influence in many of the
geographic areas the PRC is targeting for potential future
bases; and
(B) rely on the same basic intelligence picture to form our
baseline understanding of the PRC's global intentions;
(8) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing for enduring
organizational structures and security and foreign assistance
and cooperation efforts to effectively address the issue of
PRC global basing intentions; and
(9) ensure that future force posture, freedom of movement,
and other interests of the United States and our allies are
not jeopardized by the continued expansion of PRC bases.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(F) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives;
(G) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
(H) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) PLA.--The term ``PLA'' means the People's Liberation
Army of the PRC.
(3) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of
China.
(4) PRC global basing.--The term ``PRC global basing''
means the establishment of physical locations outside the
geographic boundaries of the PRC where the PRC maintains some
element of the People's Liberation Army, PRC intelligence or
security forces, or infrastructure designed to support the
presence of PRC military, intelligence, or security forces,
for the purposes of potential power projection.
(e) Assessment of Executive Branch's C-PRC Global Basing
Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit an intelligence assessment, in classified form,
if needed, to the appropriate congressional committees. The
assessment shall analyze the risk posed by PRC global basing
to the United States or to any United States allies with
respect to their ability to project power, maintain freedom
of movement, and protect other interests as a function of the
PRC's current or potential locations identified pursuant to
subsection (f)(2)(A).
(f) Strategy.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other
appropriate senior Federal officials, shall submit a strategy
to the appropriate congressional committees that contains the
information described in paragraph (2).
(2) Contents.--The strategy required under paragraph (1)
shall--
(A) identify not fewer than 5 locations that pose the
greatest potential risks, as identified in the assessment
required under subsection (e), where the PRC maintains a
physical presence, or is suspected to be seeking a physical
presence, which could ultimately transition into a PRC global
base;
(B) include a comprehensive listing of executive branch
entities currently involved in addressing aspects of PRC
global basing, including estimated programmatic and personal
resource requirements on an agency-by-agency basis to
effectively address the issue of PRC global basing
intentions, and any relevant resource constraints;
(C) describe in detail all executive branch efforts to
mitigate the impacts to the national interests of the United
States and partner countries of the locations referred to in
subparagraph (A) and prevent the PRC from establishing new
global bases, including with resources described in
subparagraph (B); and
(D) for each of the locations referred to in subparagraph
(A), identify the actions by the United States or its allies
that would be most effective in ensuring the respective
foreign governments terminate plans for hosting a PRC base.
(g) Task Force.--Not later than 90 days after submitting
the strategy described in subsection (f), the Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and
other appropriate senior Federal officials, shall establish
an interagency task force--
(1) to implement such strategy to counter the PRC's efforts
at the locations of chief concern; and
(2) to identify mitigation measures that would prevent the
PRC from establishing new bases in locations beyond the
locations of chief concern identified pursuant to subsection
(f)(2)(A).
(h) Quadrennial Reviews and Reports.--Not later than 4
years after the submission of the strategy required under
subsection (f), and not less frequently than once every 4
years thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination
with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National
Intelligence, and other appropriate senior Federal officials,
shall--
(1) conduct a review of the Executive Branch's strategy and
overall approach in response to the PRC global basing
intentions; and
(2) submit the results of such review, including the
information described in subsection (f)(2), to the
appropriate congressional committees.
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