[Congressional Record Volume 171, Number 123 (Thursday, July 17, 2025)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4477-S4478]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 2940. Mr. COONS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by 
him to the bill S. 2296, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2026 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:


[[Page S4478]]


  

       At the end of subtitle D of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1248. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO THE PRC'S GLOBAL BASING 
                   INTENTIONS.

       (a) Short Titles.--This section may be cited as the 
     ``Combating PRC Overseas and Unlawful Networked Threats 
     through Enhanced Resilience Act of 2025'' or the ``COUNTER 
     Act of 2025''.
       (b) Findings.--According to multiple sources, including the 
     2024 annual report to Congress, titled ``Military and 
     Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of 
     China'' and known informally as the ``China Military Power 
     Report''--
       (1) the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and 
     basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain 
     military power at greater distances;
       (2) a global PLA logistics network could give the PRC 
     increased capabilities to surveil or disrupt United States 
     military operations;
       (3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened the first 
     overseas PLA military base near the commercial port of 
     Doraleh in Djibouti;
       (4) in 2019, the PRC also attempted to acquire 
     strategically important port infrastructure at Subic Bay in 
     the Philippines, but was stopped by the Governments of the 
     United States, the Philippines, and Japan, and by private 
     investors;
       (5) in April 2025, officials from the PRC and Cambodia 
     officially inaugurated the China-Cambodia Ream Naval Base 
     Joint Support and Training Center and celebrated the 
     expansion of port facilities at Ream Naval Base, some of 
     which appear to have been reserved for the use of PRC ships 
     that have been continuously stationed at Ream Naval Base 
     since December 2023; and
       (6) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the PRC's 
     access to the port at the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, the 
     PRC is likely pursuing access to additional military 
     facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces 
     projection in many countries.
       (c) Sense of Congress.--While the executive branch has 
     undertaken case-by-case efforts to forestall the 
     establishment of new PRC permanent military presence in 
     several countries, it is the sense of Congress that future 
     efforts to counter the PRC's global basing intentions must--
       (1) proceed with the urgency required to address the 
     strategic implications of the PRC's actions;
       (2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination with 
     respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-of-government 
     approach;
       (3) ensure that the United States Government maintains a 
     proactive posture rather than a reactive posture in order to 
     maximize strategic decision space;
       (4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions that would be 
     influential in shaping a partner's decision making regarding 
     giving the PRC military access to its sovereign territory;
       (5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the PRC's 
     global basing intentions within the context of the overall 
     United States strategic competition with the PRC;
       (6) consider how the PRC uses commercial and scientific 
     cooperation as a guise for establishing access for the PLA 
     and other PRC security forces in foreign countries;
       (7) factor in the potential contributions of key allies and 
     partners to help respond to the PRC's pursuit of global 
     basing, many of which--
       (A) have historic ties and influence in many of the 
     geographic areas the PRC is targeting for potential future 
     bases; and
       (B) rely on the same basic intelligence picture to form our 
     baseline understanding of the PRC's global intentions;
       (8) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing for enduring 
     organizational structures and security and foreign assistance 
     and cooperation efforts to effectively address the issue of 
     PRC global basing intentions; and
       (9) ensure that future force posture, freedom of movement, 
     and other interests of the United States and our allies are 
     not jeopardized by the continued expansion of PRC bases.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
       (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
       (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
       (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
       (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (F) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (G) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives; and
       (H) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) PLA.--The term ``PLA'' means the People's Liberation 
     Army of the PRC.
       (3) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of 
     China.
       (4) PRC global basing.--The term ``PRC global basing'' 
     means the establishment of physical locations outside the 
     geographic boundaries of the PRC where the PRC maintains some 
     element of the People's Liberation Army, PRC intelligence or 
     security forces, or infrastructure designed to support the 
     presence of PRC military, intelligence, or security forces, 
     for the purposes of potential power projection.
       (e) Assessment of Executive Branch's C-PRC Global Basing 
     Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit an intelligence assessment, in classified form, 
     if needed, to the appropriate congressional committees. The 
     assessment shall analyze the risk posed by PRC global basing 
     to the United States or to any United States allies with 
     respect to their ability to project power, maintain freedom 
     of movement, and protect other interests as a function of the 
     PRC's current or potential locations identified pursuant to 
     subsection (f)(2)(A).
       (f) Strategy.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
     coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other 
     appropriate senior Federal officials, shall submit a strategy 
     to the appropriate congressional committees that contains the 
     information described in paragraph (2).
       (2) Contents.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) 
     shall--
       (A) identify not fewer than 5 locations that pose the 
     greatest potential risks, as identified in the assessment 
     required under subsection (e), where the PRC maintains a 
     physical presence, or is suspected to be seeking a physical 
     presence, which could ultimately transition into a PRC global 
     base;
       (B) include a comprehensive listing of executive branch 
     entities currently involved in addressing aspects of PRC 
     global basing, including estimated programmatic and personal 
     resource requirements on an agency-by-agency basis to 
     effectively address the issue of PRC global basing 
     intentions, and any relevant resource constraints;
       (C) describe in detail all executive branch efforts to 
     mitigate the impacts to the national interests of the United 
     States and partner countries of the locations referred to in 
     subparagraph (A) and prevent the PRC from establishing new 
     global bases, including with resources described in 
     subparagraph (B); and
       (D) for each of the locations referred to in subparagraph 
     (A), identify the actions by the United States or its allies 
     that would be most effective in ensuring the respective 
     foreign governments terminate plans for hosting a PRC base.
       (g) Task Force.--Not later than 90 days after submitting 
     the strategy described in subsection (f), the Secretary of 
     State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and 
     other appropriate senior Federal officials, shall establish 
     an interagency task force--
       (1) to implement such strategy to counter the PRC's efforts 
     at the locations of chief concern; and
       (2) to identify mitigation measures that would prevent the 
     PRC from establishing new bases in locations beyond the 
     locations of chief concern identified pursuant to subsection 
     (f)(2)(A).
       (h) Quadrennial Reviews and Reports.--Not later than 4 
     years after the submission of the strategy required under 
     subsection (f), and not less frequently than once every 4 
     years thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination 
     with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and other appropriate senior Federal officials, 
     shall--
       (1) conduct a review of the Executive Branch's strategy and 
     overall approach in response to the PRC global basing 
     intentions; and
       (2) submit the results of such review, including the 
     information described in subsection (f)(2), to the 
     appropriate congressional committees.
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