[Congressional Record Volume 171, Number 123 (Thursday, July 17, 2025)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4469-S4471]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 2925. Mr. COONS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill S. 2296, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2026 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of title XII, add the following::
Subtitle F--Defending International Security by Restricting
Unacceptable Partnerships and Tactics
SEC. 1271. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Defending International
Security by Restricting Unacceptable Partnerships and Tactics
Act'' or ``DISRUPT Act''.
SEC. 1272. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation,
the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea are each considered--
(A) a foreign adversary (as defined in section 825(d) of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024
(Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 322; 46 U.S.C. 50309 note));
(B) a country of risk (as defined in section 6432(a) of the
Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law
118-159; 138 Stat. 2488; 42 U.S.C. 7144b note)) for purposes
of assessing counterintelligence risks posed by certain
visitors to National Laboratories;
(C) a foreign country of concern (as defined in section
10612(a) of the Research and Development, Competition, and
Innovation Act (Public Law 117-167; 136 Stat. 1635; 42 U.S.C.
19221 note));
(D) a covered foreign country (as defined in section 164 of
the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law
118-159; 138 Stat. 1818; 10 U.S.C. 4651 note prec.)) for
purposes of a prohibition on operation, procurement, and
contracting relating to foreign-made light detection and
ranging technology; and
(E) a covered foreign country (as defined in section 1622
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022 (Public Law 117-81; 135 Stat. 2086; 10 U.S.C. 421 note
prec.)) for purposes of a strategy and plan to implement
certain defense intelligence reforms.
(2) According to the 2025 Intelligence Community Annual
Threat Assessment, the United States faces an increasingly
contested and dangerous global landscape as the four
adversaries named in paragraph (1) deepen cooperation in a
manner that--
(A) reinforces threats posed by each such adversary
individually; and
(B) poses new challenges to the strength and power of the
United States globally.
(3) Much of the cooperation referred to in paragraph (2) is
occurring bilaterally, as the People's Republic of China, the
Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea strengthen diplomatic,
economic, and military ties in accordance with bilateral
agreements, which include--
(A) the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance between China and the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, signed at Beijing July 11, 1961;
(B) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the
People's Republic of China, issued on March 27, 2021;
(C) the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the
People's Republic of China on International Relations
Entering a New Era and Global Sustainable Development, issued
on February 4, 2022;
(D) the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, signed at Pyongyang June 18, 2024;
(E) the Iranian-Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership, signed at Moscow January 17, 2025; and
(F) traditional relations of friendship and cooperation
between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea.
(4) The most concerning forms of such cooperation with
respect to the interests of the United States occur
bilaterally in the realm of defense cooperation. Examples
include the following:
(A) The transfer and sharing of weapons and munitions.
Since 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran has supplied the
Russian Federation with drones and ballistic missiles, and
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has provided
artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles. Likewise, the
Russian Federation has agreed to provide the Islamic Republic
of Iran with Su-35 fighter jets and air defense assistance.
(B) The transfer and sharing of dual-use technologies and
capabilities. Dual-use goods supplied by the People's
Republic of China have enabled the Russian Federation to
continue defense production in the face of wide-ranging
sanctions and export controls intended to prevent the Russian
Federation from accessing the necessary components to fuel
its defense industry. In turn, reporting indicates that the
Russian Federation has provided technical expertise on
satellite technology to the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea and is working closely with the People's Republic of
China on air defense and submarine technology.
(C) Joint military activities and exercises. The military
forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are
actively participating in the Russian Federation's invasion
of Ukraine, and joint military exercises between the People's
Republic of China and the Russian Federation are expanding in
scope, scale, and geographic reach, including in close
proximity to territory of the United States.
(D) Coordination on disinformation and cyber operations,
including coordinated messaging aimed at denigrating and
isolating the United States internationally.
(5) Adversaries of the United States are also cooperating
in a manner that may circumvent United States and
multilateral economic tools. Examples include the following:
(A) The continued purchase by the People's Republic of
China of oil from the Islamic Republic of Iran despite
sanctions imposed by the Treasury of the United States on oil
from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(B) The veto by the Russian Federation of, and abstention
by the People's Republic of China in a vote on, a United
Nations Security Council resolution relating to monitoring
United Nations Security Council-levied sanctions on the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(6) Adversaries of the United States are cooperating
multilaterally in international institutions such as the
United Nations and through expanded multilateral groupings,
such as the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa group
(commonly known as ``BRICS''), to isolate and erode the
influence of the United States.
(7) Such increased cooperation and alignment among the
People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, to an unprecedented extent, poses a
significant threat to United States interests and national
security.
(8) Such increasing alignment--
(A) allows each such adversary to modernize its military
more quickly than previously anticipated;
(B) enables unforeseen breakthroughs in capabilities
through the sharing among such adversaries of critical
military technologies, which could erode the technological
edge of the United States Armed Forces;
(C) presents increasing challenges to strategies of
isolation or containment against
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such individual adversaries, since the People's Republic of
China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran,
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea now provide
critical lifelines to each other;
(D) threatens the effectiveness of United States economic
tools, as such adversaries cooperate to evade United States
sanctions and export controls and seek to establish
alternative payment mechanisms that do not require
transactions in United States dollars; and
(E) increases the chances of United States conflict or
tensions with any one of such adversaries drawing in another,
thereby posing a greater risk that the United States will
have to contend with simultaneous threats from such
adversaries in one or more theaters.
SEC. 1273. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to disrupt or frustrate the most dangerous aspects of
cooperation between and among the People's Republic of China,
the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including by using the
threat of sanctions and export controls, bringing such
cooperation to light, and sharing information with United
States allies and partners who may--
(A) share the concerns and objectives of the United States;
and
(B) have influence over such adversaries;
(2) to constrain such grouping from expanding its footprint
or capabilities across the world; and
(3) to prepare for the increasing likelihood that the
United States could face simultaneous challenges or conflict
with multiple such adversaries in multiple theaters,
including by bolstering deterrence across all priority
theaters.
SEC. 1274. TASK FORCES AND REPORTS.
(a) Task Forces on Adversary Alignment.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence,
and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall
each--
(A) establish a task force on adversary alignment; and
(B) designate a point of contact on adversary alignment,
who shall serve as the head of the task force for the
applicable department, office, or agency.
(2) Requirements.--Each task force established pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) comprise--
(i) subject matter experts covering each of--
(I) the People's Republic of China;
(II) the Russian Federation;
(III) the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
(IV) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
(ii) representatives covering all core functions of the
department, office, or agency of the Secretary or Director
establishing the task force; and
(iii) a mix of analysts, operators, and senior management;
(B) ensure that the task force members have the requisite
security clearances and access to critical compartmented
information streams necessary to assess and understand the
full scope of adversary cooperation, including how events in
one theater might trigger actions in another; and
(C) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, submit to the Secretary or Director who
established the task force, and to the appropriate committees
of Congress, a report--
(i) evaluating the impact of adversary alignment on the
relevant operations carried out by the individual department,
office, or agency of the task force; and
(ii) putting forth recommendations for such organizational
changes as the task force considers necessary to ensure the
department, office, or agency of the task force is well
positioned to routinely evaluate and respond to the rapidly
evolving nature of adversary cooperation and the attendant
risks.
(3) Quarterly interagency meeting.--Not less frequently
than quarterly, the heads of the task forces established
under this section shall meet to discuss findings, problems,
and next steps with respect to adversary alignment.
(b) Report on Nature, Trajectory, and Risks of Bilateral
Cooperation Between, and Multilateral Cooperation Among,
Adversaries of the United States.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the head of any Federal
agency the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to
the President, any Federal officer of Cabinet-level rank the
Director considers appropriate, and the appropriate
committees of Congress, a report on bilateral and
multilateral cooperation among adversaries of the United
States and the resulting risks of such cooperation.
(2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A description of the current nature and extent of
bilateral or multilateral cooperation among the People's
Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic
Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea across the diplomatic, information, military, and
economic spheres, and an assessment of the advantages that
accrue to each adversary from such cooperation.
(B) An assessment of the trajectory for cooperation among
the adversaries described in subparagraph (A) during the 5-
year period beginning on the date on which the report is
submitted.
(C) An outline of the risks to the United States and allied
diplomatic, military, intelligence, and economic operations,
and broader security interests around the world, including
the following:
(i) The risk of technology transfers dramatically
increasing the military capabilities of adversaries of the
United States and the impact on the relative balance of
United States and allied capabilities as compared to that of
the adversary.
(ii) The risk posed to the United States by efforts made by
adversaries to establish alternate payment systems, in
particular with respect to the dominance of the United States
dollar and the effectiveness of United States sanctions and
export control tools.
(iii) The risk that an adversary of the United States might
assist or otherwise enable another adversary of the United
States in the event that one or more adversaries become party
to a conflict with the United States.
(iv) The risk that adversary cooperation poses a growing
threat to United States intelligence collection efforts.
(D) An evaluation of the vulnerabilities and tension points
within such adversary bilateral or multilateral
relationships, and an assessment of the likely effect of
efforts by the United States to separate adversaries.
(3) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in classified form.
(c) Report on Strategic Approach.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of
National Intelligence, and the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report outlining the strategic
approach of the United States to adversary alignment and the
necessary steps to disrupt, frustrate, constrain, and prepare
for adversary cooperation during the two-year period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A detailed description of the methods and tools
available to the United States to disrupt the most dangerous
elements of adversary cooperation, including the growing
connectivity between the defense industrial bases of each
adversary.
(B) A timeline for using diplomatic engagement,
intelligence diplomacy, security cooperation, and foreign
assistance, as appropriate--
(i) to educate allies and partners about the increasing
risk of adversary alignment;
(ii) to secure the support of allies and partners in
combating adversary alignment; and
(iii) to assess and help address, as appropriate, the
vulnerabilities and capability gaps of allies and partners to
counter threats from adversary alignment.
(C) A plan for ensuring the integrity of United States
methods of economic statecraft, including an assessment of
the efficiency of the United States sanctions and export
control enforcement apparatus and any accompanying resourcing
requirements.
(D) A clear plan to bolster deterrence within the priority
theaters of the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, and the Middle
East by--
(i) increasing United States and allied munitions
stockpiles, particularly such stockpiles that are most
critical for supporting frontline partners such as Israel,
Taiwan, and Ukraine in the event of aggression by a United
States adversary;
(ii) facilitating collaborative efforts with allies for the
co-production, co-maintenance, and co-sustainment of critical
munitions and platforms required by the United States and
allies and partners of the United States in the event of a
future conflict with the People's Republic of China, the
Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
(iii) more effectively using funding through the United
States Foreign Military Financing program to support allied
and partner domestic defense production that can contribute
to deterrence in each such priority theater.
(E) A plan for digitizing and updating war-planning tools
of the Department of Defense not later than 1 year after the
date on which the report is submitted to ensure that United
States war planners are better equipped to update and modify
war plans in the face of rapidly evolving information on
adversary cooperation.
(F) An assessment of the capability gaps and
vulnerabilities the United States would face in deterring an
adversary in the event that the United States is engaged in a
conflict with another adversary, and a plan to work with
allies and partners to address such gaps and vulnerabilities.
(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in classified form.
(d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee
on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the
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Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Financial
Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the
House of Representatives.
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