[Congressional Record Volume 171, Number 107 (Monday, June 23, 2025)]
[House]
[Pages H2847-H2848]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ASSESSMENT OF TRANS-ATLANTIC SUBMARINE FIBER OPTIC CABLE
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the
bill (H.R. 1737) to direct the Secretary of Commerce to submit to
Congress a report containing an assessment of the value, cost, and
feasibility of a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable connecting
the contiguous United States, the United States Virgin Islands, Ghana,
and Nigeria.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 1737
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. ASSESSMENT OF TRANS-ATLANTIC SUBMARINE FIBER OPTIC
CABLE.
(a) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with
the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as
necessary, shall submit to the Committee on Energy and
Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report
containing an assessment of the value, cost, and feasibility
of a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable connecting
the contiguous United States, the United States Virgin
Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria, to enhance the national security
of the United States.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include an assessment of--
(1) the digital security, national security, and economic
opportunities associated with a trans-Atlantic submarine
fiber optic cable described in subsection (a);
(2) the lifespan of submarine fiber optic cables currently
connecting the United States Virgin Islands to the contiguous
United States;
(3) the current security of telecommunications between the
contiguous United States and the United States Virgin
Islands;
(4) the readiness of telecommunications infrastructure in
the United States Virgin Islands to support a trans-Atlantic
submarine fiber optic cable described in subsection (a);
(5) the potential for engagement with trusted entities in
the deployment of a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic
cable described in subsection (a), and the associated
geopolitical and economic advantages;
(6) the potential connectivity opportunities to maximize
investments in the United States economy through the use of a
trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable described in
subsection (a);
(7) the value, cost, and feasibility of establishing a data
center and high-security cloud services facility, with
independent power generation, in the United States Virgin
Islands for communications of the United States Africa
Command, communications of the United States Special
Operations Command, and national security communications;
(8) the state of submarine fiber optic cables connected to
United States telecommunications infrastructure; and
(9) any other related matters the Secretary determines are
appropriate.
(c) No Mandatory Data Collection.--The Secretary may not
require any entity to provide data for purposes of preparing
the report required by subsection (a).
(d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form without any designation
relating to dissemination control, but may include a
classified annex.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Not trusted.--The term ``not trusted'' means, with
respect to an entity, that the entity is determined by the
Secretary to pose an unacceptable risk to the national
security of the United States, or the security and safety of
United States persons, based solely on one or more
determination described under paragraphs (1) through (4) of
section 2(c) of the Secure and Trusted Communications
Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601(c)).
(2) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Commerce, acting through the Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Communications and Information.
(3) Trusted.--The term ``trusted'' means, with respect to
an entity, that the Secretary has not determined that the
entity is not trusted.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Bilirakis) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone)
each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
General Leave
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which in which to revise and extend
their remarks and include extraneous material in the Record on the
bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today on behalf of H.R. 1737. I am advocating for
this particular bill. The bill would direct the Secretary of Commerce
to submit a report on the value, cost, and feasibility of developing a
transatlantic submarine cable connecting the United States, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria.
Submarine cables are critical components of communications
infrastructure, carrying data traffic across oceans. There are more
than 600 active and planned submarine cable systems that keep the world
connected, but there is no cable connecting the United States to the
continent of Africa.
Mr. Speaker, a transatlantic submarine cable could provide national
security benefits to the United States, given Africa's strategic
importance, and it is an important issue to study, in my opinion.
I thank Delegate Plaskett and Representative Fulcher for their
leadership on this particular bill, and I urge my colleagues to join me
in voting in favor of H.R. 1737.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
{time} 1430
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1737, a bill requiring
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, or
NTIA, to assess the value, cost, and feasibility of a transatlantic
submarine fiber optic cable connecting the United States, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria, and to submit a report to Congress
with its findings.
The bill also directs NTIA to report to Congress on the current state
of telecommunications connecting the U.S. Virgin Islands and the United
States, including an assessment of the lifespan and security of
telecommunications infrastructure linking the two.
This legislation will provide Congress with vital information on the
strength and resiliency of communications infrastructure in the U.S.
Virgin Islands. It will also help us determine whether American
interests can be served by connecting the U.S. and the African
Continent with undersea cable infrastructure by way of the U.S. Virgin
Islands.
This bill is an important step to enhance American communications
security and competitiveness around the world.
In recent years, Mr. Speaker, the United States and many allies have
recognized the threat posed by untrusted Chinese telecommunications
equipment to our national security. Thanks to the work of the Energy
and Commerce Committee and Congress, we have taken steps to remove
suspect equipment and software from American communications networks to
protect against sabotage and undue influence by our adversaries.
Much of this work has been done on a bipartisan basis. One noteworthy
example is the legislation Congress passed to force the divestment of
TikTok from ownership by companies controlled by the Chinese Communist
Party, which passed overwhelmingly with hundreds of Democratic and
Republican votes.
That is why I was frustrated to learn last week that President Trump
again unlawfully granted TikTok an extension, allowing China to
infiltrate American networks for another 90 days. President Trump's
disregard for the law is well known at this point, but I was more
disappointed that none of my Republican colleagues had the courage to
call on the President to enforce the law.
Trump's stall tactics are allowing China to continue to collect
massive amounts of information on Americans. There are American
companies that want to buy TikTok. It is long past time for Trump to
get this done.
There is also still work to be done because network security does not
end at the water's edge. For decades, China and other adversaries have
spent considerable time and money to deploy suspect telecommunications
equipment and infrastructure across the African Continent. The
assessment required in this bill is an important step to understand the
cost of securing the connection between the United States and our
African allies and how best to ensure a critical global communications
channel is protected from the prying eyes of our adversaries.
[[Page H2848]]
I thank Delegate Stacey Plaskett of the U.S. Virgin Islands for her
leadership on this bill, and I thank Representative Fulcher, as well,
for this effort.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to
support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Members are reminded to refrain from
engaging in personalities toward the President.
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the
gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands (Ms. Plaskett).
Ms. PLASKETT. Mr. Speaker, I thank Ranking Member Pallone, this body,
and my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for recognizing the
national security interest of this legislation, H.R. 1737, to direct
the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information
to submit to Congress a report containing an assessment of the value,
cost, and feasibility of developing this transatlantic submarine fiber
optic cable that has been discussed.
Today, hundreds of undersea fiber optic cables connect North America
to Europe, South America, and Asia, but not a single cable directly
links North America to the African Continent. This represents both a
strategic vulnerability and a missed economic opportunity.
The diaspora link act represents an opportunity to establish a high-
speed, secure telecommunications data connection to Africa from
American soil to facilitate deepened economic connections and aid
American regional security assistance. This link will allow America to
establish a direct digital presence on the African Continent, both to
capitalize on emerging economic opportunities and to protect our Nation
against cyber and military threats.
The study will examine Lagos, Nigeria, and Accra, Ghana, as potential
African landing points. Both cities serve as established
telecommunications hubs with existing undersea cable infrastructure
linking West Africa to Europe and South America. The presence of
American embassies in both locations offers critical security benefits
for cable operations.
Our adversarial nations are rapidly expanding their influence across
the African Continent, and a direct American telecommunications link to
the continent is a strategic necessity.
China has systematically expanded its telecommunications and military
presence across Africa. The Chinese multinational Huawei has
constructed roughly 70 percent of Africa's information
technology infrastructure. China is pursuing the same strategy in the
Caribbean, where at least 10 nations have signed Belt and Road
agreements that open their nations to Chinese investment and influence.
China's expansion into Africa and the Caribbean makes establishing
our own direct telecommunications link to these regions a strategic
necessity.
Russia, as well, has destabilized Africa through disinformation
campaigns and mercenary operations, positioning itself as an
alternative to Western partnerships while fueling antidemocratic
sentiment. This strategy has made Africa a flash point in the global
strategic competition between Russia and the West. Moscow's support for
authoritarian governments includes backing multiple coups in Nigeria,
Mali, Sudan, Guinea, and Burkina Faso that directly threaten democratic
progress.
Our adversaries are systematically exploiting Africa's vast mineral
wealth while we lack direct access. Russia and China are extracting
critical resources across the continent: uranium from Niger, the
world's seventh largest producer; gold and lithium from Mali's
extensive deposits; cobalt from the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
and bauxite and phosphate from Burkina Faso. These materials are
essential to technology as well as defense industries. We cannot afford
to remain on the sidelines.
Additionally, there are many African countries that want to engage
with us, that want to do business with us. Burkina Faso and Angola have
reached out to our country to engage more, and this is an additional
way for us to do that.
Additionally, let's look at the populations. Africa has almost a
billion individuals under the age of 30. The United States has only 100
million. The entire European Union has 140 million. These young people
represent a growing economic as well as potential allyship for the
United States, and we all know that social media and internet commerce
is the mechanism by which we are able to engage them.
An undersea cable linking the American East Coast to Africa via the
United States Virgin Islands would create both a critical national
security asset and a digital commerce expressway to strengthen
America's global political, economic, and military positions. Such
undersea cable development would leverage the Virgin Islands' already
existing telecommunications infrastructure, which already connects the
territory to South America and the mainland in the United States and
facilitates additional regional links.
The diaspora link act enables the United States to counter Chinese
influence and global telecommunications while leveraging our existing
strategic assets. The U.S. Virgin Islands not only hosts established
cable infrastructure but maintains a National Guard installation on St.
Croix with an adjacent military support airport, assets that could
directly support and secure these telecommunications operations.
The Virgin Islands, the most southern point of the United States,
sits at the crossroads of centuries-old transit routes, and we now have
a chance to transform this strategic location into a cornerstone of
American telecommunications infrastructure.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the Energy and Commerce Committee for its
unanimous support of this legislation through regular order. This bill
passed the House in the 118th Congress with bipartisan support and
identical text.
I thank my colleague, Congressman Fulcher, for his continued
partnership to advance America's telecommunications as well as military
and national security.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this critical measure.
Congress must protect American security interests in the Caribbean and
strengthen our partnership across the Atlantic with our African
partners.
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to close, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, obviously, from what you are hearing from the
gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands (Ms. Plaskett), this is an
important bill in terms of not only the Virgin Islands but
strengthening our links, communications, and economy with Africa, as
well.
For all those reasons, I urge that we support the bill.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentlewoman from the Virgin
Islands (Ms. Plaskett) for offering this very important bill, and I
encourage a ``yes'' vote on this particular bill.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bilirakis) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, H.R. 1737.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the
rules were suspended and the bill was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________