[Congressional Record Volume 171, Number 84 (Monday, May 19, 2025)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2967-S2968]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NOMINATIONS FOR THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

  Mr. PADILLA. Mr. President, I must object to the Senate proceeding to 
any of the four nominations pending on the Senate's Executive Calendar 
for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
  This objection is a direct result of the Agency's cynical attempt to 
weaponize the Congressional Review Act (CRA) by attempting to submit as 
``rules'' three waivers issued to the State of California under the 
Clean Air Act (CAA). If this attempt is successful, the consequences 
will be far-reaching, not only for our clean energy economy, the air 
our children breathe, and for our climate, but for the future of the 
CRA and for the Senate as an institution.
  The EPA has issued over 100 individual waivers or waiver-related 
decisions to California pursuant to the waiver authority that Congress 
passed with overwhelming bipartisan support in 1967. During 
administrations of both parties, for over 50 years, the EPA has never 
once submitted these waivers to the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) or Congress as ``rules'' because the Agency knew that they were 
not rules. Even as EPA Administrators denied or attempted to withdraw a 
previously granted waiver, as under the George W. Bush and prior Trump 
administration, the EPA explicitly stated that their actions denying or 
withdrawing a waiver did not qualify as a rule.
  During the first Trump administration, in 2019, the EPA attempted to 
use administrative procedures to rescind a waiver. The current Trump 
administration could pursue its own strategy from 2019 and again 
attempt to rescind these waivers administratively. Instead, it is 
choosing a much more reckless track, with far-reaching consequences for 
future Senate procedures. Perhaps because the EPA is firing so many of 
its own staff experts, they worry the Agency does not have the capacity 
to take an administrative route, so they must seek a made-up shortcut.
  In 2022, a U.S. Senator sought GAO's legal opinion as to whether 
EPA's restoration of a prior waiver was a rule for the purposes of the 
CRA. GAO's legal opinion was clear: No, California's waivers are not 
rules. Further, GAO found that even if the waivers were somehow rules, 
they would still not be covered by the CRA because they would be rules 
of particular applicability which are not covered under the CRA.

[[Page S2968]]

  Only now, in 2025, the EPA clumsily attempted--multiple times--to 
submit three of California's waivers to Congress. One might ask why 
they only submitted three of the six waivers issued under the prior 
administration if the Agency's viewpoint is suddenly that the 
California waivers are rules. EPA's press release announcing their 
intent to transmit the three California waivers to Congress makes clear 
that their intent is to have Congress overturn these three waiver 
decisions. And by attempting to use the CRA, they seek expedited 
procedures and a majority vote, instead of the Senate's usual cloture 
procedure and 60-vote threshold.
  Thankfully, political appointees at executive branch Agencies do not 
have the ability to determine questions of privilege on the floor of 
the Senate, or the Senate floor would become a mockery. That role 
belongs to the nonpartisan, expert Senate Parliamentarian. In this 
case, the Senate Parliamentarian has made a very clear determination 
that resolutions related to California's CAA waivers are not privileged 
under the CRA and can only be considered under regular order, and thus 
subject to cloture.
  Importantly, the Parliamentarian's determination stands on the same 
foundation that has governed similar CRA determinations for nearly 20 
years. It has long been established and respected by both parties that 
if an agency fails to submit a matter that is a ``rule'' under the 
CRA--whether by mistake or by an attempt to avoid congressional 
authority--that rule does not automatically escape scrutiny under the 
CRA. The Federal Agency doesn't get to be the final arbiter of what 
counts as a rule. Instead, any Member may go to GAO and ask for a legal 
opinion. If the GAO finds that the matter is a rule under the CRA's 
definition, then the Parliamentarian determines if the relevant 
resolutions can be considered under the CRA's expedited procedures if 
they meet the rest of the criteria.
  Here, for the first time in the history of the CRA, an Agency 
submitted matters that they knew were not rules. Some of my Republican 
colleagues are now arguing that the Parliamentarian should have no role 
to limit this partisan gamesmanship, and the Senate should throw out 
the rulebook and overturn the Parliamentarian.
  Why would we only look to the GAO and the Parliamentarian when an 
Agency refuses to submit something to dodge the CRA and not also when 
an Agency submits something in order to exploit the CRA? Just as the 
Parliamentarian determined that there should be a check against an 
Agency that tries to dodge the CRA by withholding a rule, the 
Parliamentarian has determined there should be a check when an Agency 
tries to exploit the CRA by submitting something that isn't actually a 
rule. This ensure the CRA process can't be abused in either direction, 
and the Parliamentarian's decision protects the legislative branch from 
executive overreach.
  But if the Trump EPA and Senate Republicans are successful at this 
ploy, the Senate will have no choice but to accept this as status quo 
in the future. This would grant Agencies unchecked control over the 
Senate floor, an unprecedented encroachment by the executive branch 
into the Senate's internal operations.
  The current administration could submit any type of Agency action 
from prior administrations going back to 1996 to Congress and trigger 
the CRA's expedited procedures for related resolutions of disapproval. 
The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission could submit 
broadcast licenses and other approvals for media outlets when he 
disapproves of their news coverage. The Secretary of Health and Human 
Services could submit approvals by the Food and Drug Administration 
that he disagrees with, such as vaccines, birth control, or 
mifepristone. Numerous Agencies could submit decisions related to 
specific organizations that are targets of the President's political 
retribution campaigns.
  None of these actions are rules, which is why they have never been 
submitted to Congress as rules. But if my Republican colleagues open 
this door and overturn the Parliamentarian's wise safeguards on this 
type of abuse, there would be no practical limit, and the Senate could 
be forced to vote repeatedly on such matters that are clearly not 
``rules'' notwithstanding the plain language of the CRA.
  Further, a future Democratic administration could respond in kind. 
When it comes to the environment and climate issues, future Agency 
heads could submit individual fossil fuel project leases, loan 
agreements, or permitting approvals for congressional review, arguing 
that these are clearly highly significant Agency actions with wide-
ranging impacts. LNG export terminals and major interstate and cross-
border pipelines would be fair game. In other areas, there are many 
Trump administration actions--from immigration to foreign policy to 
unilateral budget and staff cuts by DOGE--for which a future 
administration and Congress could use the CRA.
  Since this cynical attempt to weaponize the CRA was triggered by the 
administration's political leadership at the EPA, at the urging of 
their Big Oil allies, I must object to proceeding to any nominations 
for the EPA pending on the Senate's executive calendar. I will continue 
to object until the Agency withdraws its false submissions to Congress 
or the majority leader commits not to overturn the Parliamentarian's 
determination on this matter.

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