[Congressional Record Volume 171, Number 84 (Monday, May 19, 2025)]
[House]
[Pages H2116-H2119]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STRATEGIC PORTS REPORTING ACT
Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the
bill (H.R. 1701) to require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary
of State to monitor efforts by the People's Republic of China to build
or buy strategic foreign ports, and for other purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 1701
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Strategic Ports Reporting
Act''.
SEC. 2. MAPPING AND STRATEGY REQUIRED.
(a) Mapping of Global Ports.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall--
(1) develop an updated, global mapping of foreign and
domestic ports identified to be of importance to the United
States, because of a capability to provide military,
diplomatic, economic, or resource exploration superiority;
and
(2) identify any efforts by the Government of the People's
Republic of China (PRC) or other PRC entities to build, buy,
or otherwise control, directly or indirectly, such ports.
(b) Submission of Map.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit the
mapping developed pursuant to subsection (a) to the
appropriate congressional committees. Such submission shall
be in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 3. DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STUDY
AND REPORT ON STRATEGIC PORTS.
(a) Study Required.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall conduct a
study of--
(1) strategic ports;
(2) the reasons such ports are of interest to the United
States;
(3) the activities and plans of the Government of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) to expand its control over
strategic ports outside of the People's Republic of China;
(4) the public and private actors, such as China Ocean
Shipping Company, that are executing and supporting the
activities and plans of the Government of the PRC to expand
its control over strategic ports outside of the PRC;
(5) the activities and plans of the Government of the PRC
to expand its control over
[[Page H2117]]
maritime logistics by promoting products, such as LOGINK, and
setting industry standards outside the PRC;
(6) how the control by the Government of the PRC over
strategic ports outside of the PRC could harm the national
security or economic interests of the United States and
allies and partners of the United States; and
(7) measures the United States Government could take to
ensure open access and security for strategic ports and offer
alternatives to PRC investments or stakes in strategic ports.
(b) Conduct of Study.--The Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense may enter into an arrangement with a
federally funded research and development center under which
the center shall conduct the study required under subsection
(a).
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report on the
findings of the study conducted under subsection (a).
(2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include--
(A) a detailed list of all known strategic ports operated,
controlled, or owned, directly or indirectly, by the PRC or
by a foreign person of the PRC, and an assessment of the
national security and economic interests relevant to each
such port;
(B) a detailed list of all known strategic ports operated,
controlled, or owned, directly or indirectly, by the United
States or United States persons and an assessment of the
national security and economic interests relevant to each
such port;
(C) an assessment of vulnerabilities of--
(i) ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or
indirectly, by the United States; and
(ii) strategic ports;
(D) an analysis of the activities and actions of the
Government of the PRC to gain control or ownership over
strategic ports, including promoting products, such as
LOGINK, and setting industry standards;
(E) an assessment of how the Government of the PRC plans to
expand its control over strategic ports outside of the PRC;
(F) a suggested strategy, developed in consultation with
the heads of the relevant United States Government offices,
that suggests courses of action to secure trusted investment
and ownership of strategic ports and maritime infrastructure,
protect such ports and infrastructure from PRC control, and
ensure open access and security for such ports, that
includes--
(i) a list of relevant existing authorities that can be
used to carry out the strategy;
(ii) a list of any additional authorities necessary to
carry out the strategy;
(iii) an assessment of products owned by the Government of
the PRC or by an entity headquartered in the PRC that are
used in connection with strategic ports or maritime
infrastructure;
(iv) an assessment of the costs to--
(I) secure such trusted investment and ownership;
(II) replace products owned by the Government of the PRC or
an entity headquartered in the PRC that are used in
connection with such ports; and
(III) enhance transparency around the negative impacts of
PRC control over strategic ports; and
(v) a list of funding sources to secure trusted investment
and ownership of strategic ports, which shall include--
(I) an identification of private funding sources; and
(II) an identification of public funding sources, including
loans, loan guarantees, and tax incentives; and
(G) a suggested strategy for Federal agencies to maintain
an up-to-date list of strategic ports.
(H) an assessment of any national security threat posed by
such investments or activities to United States diplomatic
and defense personnel and facilities in the vicinity of such
ports, including through cyber threats, electronically
enabled espionage, or other means.
(3) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) The term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate.
(2) The term ``relevant United States Government offices''
means--
(A) the Unified Combatant Commands;
(B) the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
(C) the Office of the Secretary of State;
(D) the United States International Development Finance
Corporation;
(E) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
and
(F) the Maritime Administration of the Department of
Transportation.
(3) The term ``strategic port'' means an international port
or waterway that the heads of the relevant United States
Government offices determine is critical to the national
security or economic prosperity of the United States.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Taylor). Pursuant to the rule, the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Huizenga) and the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Meeks) each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
General Leave
Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks
and include extraneous material on this measure.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of my bill, H.R. 1701,
the Strategic Ports Reporting Act, introduced alongside Representatives
Rob Wittman, Jake Auchincloss, and Johnny Olszewski, and cosponsored
by a bipartisan group of colleagues.
{time} 1545
Mr. Speaker, this bill is simple, yet it is very necessary to expose
the risks, the threats, and the vulnerabilities presented by overt
Chinese-controlled global ports.
Specifically, the Strategic Ports Reporting Act requires the State
Department, in coordination with the Defense Department, to develop a
global mapping of foreign and domestic ports of strategic importance to
the United States due to their capacity of providing military,
diplomatic, economic, or resource exploration superiority. In other
words, these are ports that are most important to the interests of the
United States, both domestically and abroad.
Additionally, this bill requires a study analyzing the activities and
plans of the PRC to expand its web of control over global strategic
ports, while recognizing the U.S. national security and economic
implications for such ownership.
China's malign influence abroad continues to reach new corners of the
global economy. Emerging from the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese
President Xi Jinping's companion initiative, known as the Maritime Silk
Road, ratifies a dominating stake in various countries by making
critical investment in their strategic ports, some of which exist right
here in the United States.
Something that should resonate with all of our constituencies, as we
saw during the COVID-19 pandemic, is that vulnerabilities in supply
chains have a significant, real-world effect on our supply, on pricing,
and access to essential goods.
Moreover, the likelihood of the PRC leveraging its port
infrastructure to exert economic leverage in the future remains a
significant challenge to the United States and our allies.
While many of these investments and port projects are portrayed as
commercial relationships, the PRC's global reach is cause for concern,
given that many of these ports pose significant dual-use military
risks. The fact remains that Chinese investments in strategic ports
offer the CCP a launchpad to engage in a campaign of modern-day
espionage.
Let's look at a couple of examples, Mr. Speaker. In the Western
Hemisphere, the PRC opened its crown jewel, a gateway connecting South
America to Asia in Chancay, Peru. This multibillion-dollar, deepwater
megaport is owned by a Chinese state-owned entity, COSCO Shipping,
which has ties to the People's Liberation Army.
Additionally, Chinese-tied entities manage ports at both ends of the
Panama Canal. Here, the CCP coordinates private companies in pursuit of
its communist agendas and wields the power to garner more political
influence in a volatile region.
I commend President Trump and his administration for its leadership
and persistence to work with the Panamanians and BlackRock to change
this reality.
In the United States, two Chinese-owned entities, COSCO Shipping and
China Merchants Group, a major participant and proponent in China BRI,
[[Page H2118]]
controls significant portions of the Ports of Long Beach, Seattle, Los
Angeles, Houston, and Miami.
The opportunity we created, exposing our critical infrastructure to
cybersecurity risks, foreign intelligence threats, and supply chain
vulnerabilities, cannot be understated in my opinion.
Outside of our hemisphere, China casts a wide geostrategic footprint
of malign influence at other critical chokepoints, including a
multitude of Chinese-financed, developed, or managed ports across
Africa. These ambitions provide access to critical minerals, naval
launchpads, and consequential state power projections.
Additionally, the deep-sea port in the city of Anaklia on Georgia's
Black Sea coast recently granted the tender for construction to a
Chinese consortium sanctioned by the U.S. in 2020 for promoting
militarization in the South China Sea. The strategic location of this
port in the Middle Corridor, the trade route between China and Europe,
would make this a crucial project for President Xi.
Unfortunately, I believe many of these projects are just another
example of emerging economies lured in by China's debt-trap diplomacy.
To combat these efforts, the heads of relevant U.S. Government
agencies must work collaboratively and creatively to ensure open access
and security for strategic ports and offer alternatives to PRC
investments in these ports. The Strategic Ports Reporting Act helps
accomplish that goal.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, May 19, 2025.
Hon. Brian Mast,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Mast: I write concerning H.R. 1701, the
Strategic Ports Reporting Act, introduced by Representative
Huizenga. As a result of your having consulted with us on
provisions within H.R. 1701 that fall within the Rule X
jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services, I agree to
forego any further consideration of this resolution so that
it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor for
consideration.
The Committee on Armed Services takes this action with our
mutual understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R.
1701 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over
subject matter contained in this or similar legislation and
that our committee will be appropriately consulted and
involved as this resolution or similar legislation moves
forward so that we may address any remaining issues in our
jurisdiction.
Finally, I ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on
this matter be included by House Committee on Foreign Affairs
in the Congressional Record during floor consideration, to
memorialize our understanding. Thank you for the cooperative
spirit in which you have worked regarding this matter and
others between our respective committees.
Sincerely,
Michael D. Rogers,
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, May 19, 2025.
Hon. Mike Rogers,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rogers: Thank you for consulting with the
Committee on Foreign Affairs and agreeing to be discharged
from further consideration of H.R. 1701, Strategic Ports
Reporting Act, so that the measure may proceed expeditiously
to the House floor.
I agree that your forgoing farther action on this measure
does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of
your committee or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives
on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would
support your effort to seek appointments of any appropriate
number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate
conference of this legislation.
I will submit the exchange of letters to be published in
the Congressional Record. I appreciate your cooperation
regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to
work together on matters of shared jurisdiction during this
Congress.
Sincerely,
Brian J. Mast,
Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1701. When President Xi
started the Belt and Road Initiative and the Maritime Silk Road
Initiative, Beijing embarked on a coordinated state mandate to finance,
acquire, access, enhance, and build ports around the world.
Today, the PRC is actively engaged in 115 port projects in at least
68 countries with more than $65 billion invested or promised. At least
89 port projects have characteristics that could support military
applications. With the largest Navy in the world, the PRC's ambitions
are clear. It seeks global basing locations for an aspirational blue
water Navy.
Representative Huizenga's Strategic Ports Reporting Act will allow us
to better track Beijing's attempts to grow its global maritime
influence through its investments in foreign ports.
The United States Government needs ready access to all available
information about the nature, extent, and intent of the PRC's
involvement in port projects and maritime infrastructure around the
world. We need a strategy to drive diplomatic, development, and defense
engagements to mitigate threats from the PRC's activities at critical
ports.
While several think tanks and research groups already map and report
on PRC port activities, this bill's reporting requirements can shed
light on the impact of these ports on U.S. interests and national
security.
It is critical that the United States Government continue to monitor
the nature, the extent, and the intent of the PRC's involvement in port
projects and maritime infrastructure around the world and analyze the
impact on U.S. strategic interests and on our partners and allies.
Mr. Speaker, I encourage all of my colleagues to join in supporting
this measure.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr.
Olszewski).
Mr. OLSZEWSKI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member, and I thank
my colleague, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Huizenga), for his
leadership on this bipartisan and bicameral bill. I am proud to join
his efforts and co-lead on legislation that will help safeguard our
ports and boost our economy.
I have seen firsthand how critical our ports are to our national
security, to our economic strength, and to the resilience of our supply
chains. In my home State of Maryland, the Port of Baltimore is an
anchor. It provides more than 15,000 direct jobs, supports another
140,000 connected jobs and services, and it is a critical gateway for
commerce.
It is one of the largest ports in the country for automobiles and
ranks in the top 10 nationally for total cargo. The Port of Baltimore,
like so many ports across the country, is an economic lifeline for our
communities.
Today, however, these lifelines face a growing challenge. Namely,
China is aggressively expanding its influence over strategic ports
around the world. China is building, buying, and controlling maritime
infrastructure critical to U.S. interests.
They now control or have stakes in critical ports across Europe,
Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas, providing Beijing with
unprecedented leverage over key maritime chokepoints and global trade
routes.
In the Western Hemisphere alone, Chinese companies have established
ownership or operational control in ports spanning seven countries,
including major terminals here in the U.S.
Last year, the House select committee on China and the House Homeland
Security Committee conducted a joint investigation into the operation
of ZPMC at U.S. ports. ZPMC is a Chinese state-owned company and the
world's largest manufacturer of cranes.
At the Port of Baltimore, the FBI discovered intelligence-gathering
equipment on board a vessel delivering ZPMC cranes to the Port of
Baltimore. This allows China not only to advance its own economic
interests but also to potentially disrupt shipping access and gather
intelligence on U.S. military movements.
The Strategic Ports Reporting Act is a necessary and timely response
to this threat. It is not just about commercial competition. It is
about transparency, preparedness, and safeguarding our national
security so we can continue to project power, protect our economy, and
secure our supply chains.
This is a bipartisan and commonsense step to protect the American
people. I urge my colleagues to support this bill and send a clear
message. The U.S. will not cede control of our critical infrastructure
to our adversaries.
Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the bipartisan involvement of
[[Page H2119]]
the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Olszewski).
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, the United States needs a strategy to effectively
mitigate threats from the PRC's growing maritime influence through its
investments in foreign ports.
The report required under this bill will shine a light on the nature,
the extent, and the intent of Beijing's involvement in port projects
and maritime infrastructure around the world and will inform efforts by
the United States Government to analyze the impact of these ports on
U.S. interests and our national security.
Mr. Speaker, I hope that all of my colleagues will join me in support
of this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague, Mr. Wittman, on my side of the
aisle. I especially thank those on the other side of the aisle, Mr.
Olszewski and Mr. Auchincloss, and my good friend, the ranking
member, Mr. Meeks, for working through this.
Mr. Speaker, peace through strength is a theme of the United States
that we have had for a long time, and it is something that is
imperative right now. Without stalwart diplomacy from the United States
and its allies and economic partners, Communist China's global reach
will only mature, sowing instability and insecurity and, frankly, as I
talked about, some economic challenges abroad.
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the fact that the gentleman was talking a
little bit about the private sector. I welcome and appreciate their
involvement and their attempts to track and to analyze what is going
on.
These other attempts at offering that strategy and the mapping of the
critical assets oftentimes lack up-to-date information and do not take
into account the warfighter perspectives that President Trump's DOD
brings nor do they really use the lens of the U.S. national priorities.
Mr. Speaker, that is why I believe that this legislation is so
important. The Strategic Ports Reporting Act was deliberated and
negotiated within the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and a bipartisan
consensus on the text was reached. That is where we are today.
It remains imperative that the U.S. use all of its tools available to
thwart malign Chinese influence and protect America's national
security, our economic interests, and even our warfighters. That time
is now, and I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Huizenga) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, H.R. 1701.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this question will be postponed.
The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.
____________________