[Congressional Record Volume 171, Number 30 (Thursday, February 13, 2025)]
[Senate]
[Page S982]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   SENATE RESOLUTION 81--CALLING ON THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND 
GERMANY (E3) TO INITIATE THE SNAPBACK OF SANCTIONS ON IRAN UNDER UNITED 
            NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2231 (2015)

  Mr. RICKETTS (for himself, Mr. Cornyn, Mr. Barrasso, Mrs. Capito, 
Mrs. Blackburn, Mr. Justice, Mr. Hagerty, Mr. Sheehy, Mr. Sullivan, Ms. 
Lummis, Mr. Crapo, Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Cruz, and Mr. Young) submitted the 
following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations:

                               S. Res. 81

       Whereas, on July 15, 2015, the P5+1 (the United States, the 
     United Kingdom, France, the People's Republic of China, the 
     Russian Federation, and Germany), the European Union, and the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran finalized the Joint Comprehensive 
     Plan of Action (JCPOA);
       Whereas the JCPOA required the Government of Iran to 
     implement constraints on its uranium enrichment and heavy 
     water nuclear reactor programs, as well as allow the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor 
     compliance with the agreement;
       Whereas, on July 20, 2015, the United Nations Security 
     Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 2231 (UNSCR 2231), which 
     endorsed the JCPOA and provided for the termination of all 
     previous UNSC resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program 
     (1696, 1737, 1747, 1803 1835, and 1929), while maintaining 
     United Nation's arms restrictions on Iran for 5 years and 
     United Nation's prohibitions on Iran's missile and drone 
     activity for 8 years;
       Whereas, pursuant to the JCPOA, Iran received significant 
     sanctions relief from the previous sanctions imposed by the 
     European Union, the United States, and previous UNSC 
     resolutions;
       Whereas Iran used this sanctions relief to fund its 
     terrorist proxies, regional aggression, and its expansion of 
     its ballistic missile program;
       Whereas, on May 8, 2018, President Donald J. Trump 
     announced the United States was ceasing its participation in 
     the JCPOA and reimposing sanctions against Iran that had been 
     previously waived;
       Whereas President Trump's successful maximum pressure 
     campaign imposed significant financial costs on Iran's regime 
     ``to alter its course of malign activities and ensure that 
     Iranian bad acts are no longer rewarded'';
       Whereas, Iran has repeatedly violated the terms of the 
     JCPOA and UNSCR 2231, including by--
           (1) lifting the cap on its stockpile of uranium;
           (2) increasing its enrichment activities to 60 percent 
     purity, expanding its enrichment capabilities;
           (3) resuming its activity at prohibited nuclear 
     facilities; and
           (4) preventing the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     (IAEA) from being able to effectively monitor its nuclear 
     activities;
       Whereas, Iran repeatedly violated UNSCR 2231's restrictions 
     on ballistic missile testing and development, as well as 
     United Nations-imposed and internationally binding arms 
     export and import embargoes;
       Whereas UNSCR 2231 includes a formal mechanism for a 
     participant state of the JCPOA, if it believes there has been 
     significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA by 
     Iran, to trigger a process that would require the UNSC to 
     ``snapback'' all United Nation sanctions on Iran that has 
     been lifted pursuant to UNSCR 2231;
       Whereas, on September 14, 2024, in a joint statement, the 
     United States and United Kingdom acknowledged publicly that 
     Iran's nuclear program ``has never been more advanced and 
     posed a clear threat to regional and global peace and 
     security'';
       Whereas, in June and November of 2024, in efforts led by 
     France, Germany, the United Kingdom (E3), and the United 
     States, the IAEA's Board of Governors voted to censure Iran 
     for non-compliance with its obligations under the Treaty on 
     the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, 
     London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (commonly referred to as the 
     ``Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty'' or ``NPT'');
       Whereas, on December 9, 2024, the E3 sent a letter to the 
     United Nations Security Council stating, ``We reiterate our 
     determination to use all diplomatic tools to prevent Iran 
     from acquiring a nuclear weapon, including using snapback if 
     necessary.'';
       Whereas, on January 6, 2025, President of France Emmanuel 
     Macron said the acceleration of Iran's nuclear program was 
     ``bringing us very close to the breaking point'' and said, 
     ``We will have to ask ourselves whether to use the mechanism 
     for re-establishing sanctions. We are ready to do so if the 
     question arises.'';
       Whereas, on January 23, 2025, the Director General of the 
     IAEA, Rafael Grossi, said that Iran has increased production 
     of 60 percent enriched uranium from 7 kilograms to over 30 
     kilograms per month, and currently possess about 200 
     kilograms, which if enriched to 90 percent would amount to at 
     least 5 nuclear weapons; and
       Whereas, under UNSCR 2231, the resolution, including the 
     ``snapback'' mechanism, terminates 10 years after Adoption 
     Day for the JCPOA, which will be October 18, 2025: Now, 
     therefore, be it
         Resolved, That the Senate--
         (1) recognizes that Iran's possession of a nuclear weapon 
     would threaten not only the security of the United States, 
     but global security at large, including United States allies 
     and partners in Europe and the Middle East;
         (2) condemns the Government of Iran's flagrant and 
     repeated violations of commitments it made under the JCPOA 
     and its international obligations under UNSCR 2231;
         (3) condemns the Russian Federation and the People's 
     Republic of China, who remain participants in the JCPOA, for 
     their role in supporting Iran's malign activities;
         (4) reaffirms that the United States Government maintains 
     the right to take any necessary measures to prevent the 
     Government of Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons;
         (5) supports the imposition and enforcement of robust 
     sanctions on Iran for it nuclear and missile programs and on 
     entities and individuals involved in these programs to deter 
     further proliferation efforts; and
         (6) urges the E3 to invoke the ``snapback'' of United 
     Nations sanctions against Iran under UNSCR 2231 as soon as 
     possible before the option expires on October 18, 2025.

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