[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 188 (Wednesday, December 18, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7173-S7175]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2025
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, this explanation reflects the status of
negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence for the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2025.
The explanation shall have the same effect with respect to the
implementation of this Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement
of a conference committee.
I ask unanimous consent that the explanatory statement for the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Explanatory Statement on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2025
The following is the Explanatory Statement to accompany the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (``the
Act''), which has been included as Division F of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025. The
Explanatory Statement
[[Page S7174]]
reflects the result of negotiations between the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (together, ``the Committees''). The
Explanatory Statement shall have the same effect with respect
to the implementation of the Act as if it were a joint
explanatory statement of a conference committee.
The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities
prevents the Committees from publicly disclosing many details
concerning their final decisions regarding funding levels and
policy direction. Therefore, the Committees have prepared a
classified annex--referred to here and within the annex
itself as ``the Agreement''--that contains a classified
Schedule of Authorizations and describes in detail the scope
and intent of the Committees' actions.
The Agreement authorizes the Intelligence Community to
obligate and expend funds as requested in the President's
budget and as modified by the classified Schedule of
Authorizations, subject to applicable reprogramming
procedures.
The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated
into the Act pursuant to Section 6102 of the Act. It has the
status of law. The Agreement supplements and adds detail to
clarify the authorization levels found in the Act and in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations.
This Explanatory Statement incorporates by reference, and
the Executive Branch shall comply with, all direction
contained in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2025 (S. Rept. 118-181) and in the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Report to
accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2025 (H. Rept. 118-662). The Agreement supersedes all
classified direction in the classified annexes to accompany
S. Rept. 118-181 and H. Rept. 118-662 related to programs and
activities authorized by the Schedule of Authorization.
The Executive Branch is further directed as follows:
Study on Threats Posed by Citizenship-by-Investment Programs
The Committees are concerned with the threats to the United
States posed by citizenship-by-investment programs operated
by foreign governments. A recent Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) report highlighted the ease of identity
laundering, bribery and corruption that result from these
programs, as well as the freedom of movement offered to
malign actors, sanctioned individuals, weapons and human
traffickers, and terrorists. The FATF and OECD report noted
that these programs ``make it challenging for compliance
professionals at [financial institutions] or other businesses
to engage in accurate due diligence,'' undermine visa
controls and sanctions enforcement, and facilitate the
movement of individuals who have violated the law to other
jurisdictions to avoid arrest.
The Committees therefore direct the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), in coordination with the Assistant
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury and the heads of any other
elements of the Intelligence Community the Director considers
appropriate, not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, to submit to the Committees a study on
the threat posed to the United States by foreign citizenship-
by-investment programs and the investments allowed under such
programs; and provide to the committees a briefing on the
results of the study.
The study shall include the following:
1. A detailed description of the threats posed to the
national security of the United States by citizenship-by-
investment programs;
2. The types of investments or contributions which an
individual may make in exchange for citizenship under a
foreign government's citizenship-by-investment program,
including investments in, or donations or transfers to, the
government of a foreign country or any person, business, or
entity in such foreign country, or for the benefit of a
foreign country;
3. The use of such programs to evade sanctions or taxes,
facilitate or finance crimes related to national security,
including terrorism, weapons trafficking or proliferation,
cybercrime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and
espionage, or any other activity which furthers the interests
of a foreign adversary or undermines the integrity of the
immigration laws or security of the United States, or
undermines the United States and its interests through any
other means identified by the Director;
4. The foreign countries whose citizenship-by-investment
programs pose the greatest threat to the national security of
the United States;
5. Recommendations for any additional resources or
authorities necessary to counter such threats; and
6. A description of opportunities to counter such threats.
Study on Threat Posed by Foreign Investment in United States
Agricultural Land
The Committees note that foreign ownership and investment
in U.S. agricultural land--which includes farmland, pastures,
and forest land--has grown almost 50% since 2017, according
to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). While foreign
investors in U.S. agricultural land are required to submit
forms describing their transactions to USDA by the
Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 (7
U.S.C. Sec. 3501) (AFIDA), AFIDA was not designed to identify
potential national security concerns.
The Committees therefore direct the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, in coordination with the elements of
the Intelligence Community the Director considers
appropriate, not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, to (1) submit to the Committees a
study on the threat posed to the United States by foreign
investment in agricultural land in the United States, and (2)
provide to the committees a briefing on the results of the
study.
The study shall include the following:
1. Data and an analysis of agricultural land holdings,
including current and previous uses of the land disaggregated
by sector and industry, held by a foreign person from a
country identified as a country that poses a risk to the
national security of the United States in the most recent
annual report on worldwide threats issued by the Director
pursuant to section 108B of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. Sec. 3043b) (commonly known as the ``Annual Threat
Assessment''), a nonmarket economy country, or any other
country that the Director determines to be appropriate;
2. An analysis of the proximity of the agricultural land
holdings to critical infrastructure and military
installations;
3. An assessment of the threats posed to the national
security of the United States by malign actors that use
foreign investment in agricultural land in the United States;
4. An assessment of warning indicators and methods by which
to detect potential threats from the use by foreign
adversaries of agricultural products for nefarious ends; and
5. An assessment of additional resources or authorities
necessary to counter threats identified during the study.
Intelligence Assessment of Economic Coercion by the People's Republic
of China in the Indo-Pacific Region
The Committees direct that, not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research shall submit
a classified intelligence assessment to the Committees that
(1) outlines economic coercion efforts by the People's
Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific region, and (2)
describes measures that have been, or could be, taken to
enhance the resilience of countries in the region to such
coercion.
Classified Annex to Report on Mission Effect of Civilian Harm
Section 6323 of the Act requires the DNI, acting through
the National Intelligence Council, to submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report examining the
extent to which civilian harm that occurs during
counterterrorism operations informs analyses of the
Intelligence Community on the mission success of campaigns to
degrade, disrupt, or defeat foreign terrorist organizations.
The Committees direct that this report include a classified
annex, to be submitted to the Committees, that provides an
inventory of (1) collection gaps and challenges that may
affect the analysis of the success or failure of campaigns
against terrorist groups, and (2) actions taken by the DNI to
mitigate such gaps and challenges.
Report on Establishing a National Intelligence Center Dedicated to
Strategic Competition
Section 6307 of the Act, among other things, codifies the
National Intelligence Management Council and expresses the
sense of Congress that the DNI should create a role in the
Council for a National Intelligence Manager dedicated to the
People's Republic of China.
The Committees direct the DNI, not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and in
consultation with the heads of elements of the Intelligence
Community determined appropriate by the Director, to submit
to the Committees a report that examines the potential
effects of establishing a new national intelligence center
dedicated to strategic competition, which would:
1. Integrate all-source intelligence on the plans and
intentions of strategic competitors;
2. Synchronize intelligence collection efforts among the
elements of the Intelligence Community;
3. Optimize resource investments made by elements of the
Intelligence Community in support of strategic competition;
4. Integrate the work of other national intelligence
centers that is relevant to strategic competition; and
5. Inform the President, Congress, and other policymakers
as they craft and execute the United States' approach to
strategic competition.
The report shall seek to incorporate lessons learned from
previous Intelligence Community reorganizations, including
those undertaken pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). The report
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
National Reconnaissance Office Workforce
The Committees' find that--
1. From its inception, the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) has met joint warfighter requirements because of a
workforce that includes Intelligence Community
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and Department of Defense civilians and uniformed service
members;
2. The NRO has achieved success, in part, because the
Department of Defense has consistently fulfilled its
longstanding commitment to assign Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
and Guardians to positions at the NRO;
3. The NRO is negatively affected--and its ability to meet
warfighter requirements diminished--when the United States
Space Force does not assign Guardians to the NRO at a rate
that meets the NRO requirements;
4. The NRO and the Space Force jointly benefit from
Guardian assignments at the NRO; and
5. The NRO and Space Force are negatively affected by the
Space Force's uneven emphasis on developing space operators
without similar emphasis on developing Guardians with space
acquisition and engineering expertise.
Therefore, the Committees direct the DNI and the heads of
any other departments and agencies the Director deems
relevant to provide quarterly updates to the appropriate
congressional committees on the status of the Department of
Defense fulfilling its commitment to assign uniformed
personnel to the NRO.
Increased Effort and Resources in the Field of Geomatics
The Committees find that--
1. The Intelligence Community and the broader United States
Government require professionals with advanced training in
geomatics and geodesy, and the preservation of these
skillsets is crucial to advancing geospatial intelligence
tradecraft for the United States for national security and
military operations;
2. The Intelligence Community should use existing
authorities to engage in novel ways with academic and
industry partners to ensure the Intelligence Community's
demand signal for geomatics and geodesy professionals is
received by the largest possible number of United States
citizens while also seeking to foster a culture of academic
excellence and research to propel the field of geomatics
forward at the pace of innovation;
3. By engaging with academic and industry partners, the
Intelligence Community can help speed the reversal of the
current trend wherein the United States not only produces
fewer geomatics scientists and engineers compared to its
global competitors and potential adversaries, but such
competitors and adversaries also provide them with training
and expertise that could be used against the United States;
4. There is abundant opportunity for the Intelligence
Community to advance its growing need for geomatics and
geodesy professionals by partnering with American
universities and researchers with proven experience in
diverse fields who can lead the way to solving the United
States most vexing geomatics challenges; and
5. The Intelligence Community must balance the increasing
demand for recruiting the best geomatics and geodesy talent
while still ensuring a dedicated and patriotic workforce with
allegiance to the Constitution and the United States
Government.
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