[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 139 (Monday, September 9, 2024)]
[House]
[Pages H5062-H5064]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       DECOUPLING FROM FOREIGN ADVERSARIAL BATTERY DEPENDENCE ACT

  Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 8631) to prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security from 
procuring certain foreign-made batteries, and for other purposes, as 
amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 8631

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Decoupling from Foreign 
     Adversarial Battery Dependence Act''.

     SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PROCUREMENT 
                   OF CERTAIN BATTERIES.

       (a) In General.--Beginning on October 1, 2027, none of the 
     funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
     available for the Department of Homeland Security may be 
     obligated to procure a battery produced by an entity 
     specified in subsection (b).
       (b) Entities Specified.--The entities specified in this 
     subsection are the following:
       (1) Contemporary Amperex Technology Company, Limited (also 
     known as ``CATL'').
       (2) BYD Company, Limited.
       (3) Envision Energy, Limited.
       (4) EVE Energy Company, Limited.
       (5) Gotion High tech Company, Limited.
       (6) Hithium Energy Storage Technology company, Limited.
       (7) Any entity on any list required under clauses (i), 
     (ii), (iv), or (v) of section 2(d)(2)(B) of Public Law 117-78 
     (commonly referred to as the ``Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention 
     Act'').
       (8) Any entity identified by the Secretary of Defense as a 
     Chinese military company pursuant to section 1260H of the 
     William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note).
       (9) Any entity included in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of 
     title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor 
     regulation.
       (10) Any subsidiary or successor to an entity specified in 
     paragraphs (1) through (9).
       (c) Treatment of Production.--For purposes of this section, 
     a battery shall be treated as produced by an entity specified 
     in subsection (b) if such entity--
       (1) assembles or manufactures the final product that uses 
     such battery; or
       (2) creates or otherwise provides a majority of the 
     components used in such battery.
       (d) Waivers.--
       (1) Relating to assessment.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security may waive the limitation under subsection (a) if the 
     Secretary assesses in the affirmative all of the following:
       (A) The batteries to be procured do not pose a national 
     security, data, or infrastructure risk to the United States.
       (B) There is no available alternative to procure batteries 
     that are--
       (i) of similar or better cost and quality; and
       (ii) produced by an entity not specified in subsection (b).
       (2) Relating to research.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security may waive the limitation under subsection (a) if the 
     Secretary determines that the batteries to be procured are 
     for the sole purpose of research, evaluation, training, 
     testing, or analysis
       (3) Congressional notification.--Not later than 15 days 
     after granting a waiver under this subsection, the Secretary 
     of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of 
     the Senate a notification relating thereto.
       (e) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on 
     the anticipated impacts on mission and costs on the 
     Department of Homeland Security associated with carrying out 
     this section, including with respect to following components 
     of the Department:
       (1) U.S. Customs and Border Protection, including the U.S. 
     Border Patrol.
       (2) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, including 
     Homeland Security Investigations.
       (3) The United States Secret Service.
       (4) The Transportation Security Administration.
       (5) The United States Coast Guard.
       (6) The Federal Protective Service.
       (7) The Federal Emergency Management Agency.
       (8) The Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers.
       (9) The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Gimenez) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ivey) each 
will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.


                             General Leave

  Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks 
and include extraneous material on H.R. 8631, the bill now under 
consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill, H.R. 8631, the 
Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act.

[[Page H5063]]

  Our world is increasingly reliant on battery technology, from the 
smartphones in our pockets to the energy storage systems that power our 
homes and businesses.
  This dependence underscores a larger issue: Our Nation is becoming 
increasingly reliant on foreign adversarial entities for the materials 
and technologies that power these devices, which poses grave risk to 
our Nation's security and economic stability.
  As it stands, Communist China produces approximately 80 percent of 
the world's batteries and roughly 70 percent of the world's lithium-ion 
batteries. These staggering numbers leave U.S. supply chains vulnerable 
and our Nation's security at risk.
  Recently, the United States House Select Committee on Strategic 
Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, 
a committee that I am a member of, uncovered information that revealed 
that at least two of the world's top battery manufacturers, CATL and 
Gotion High-Tech, are affiliated with Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corporation, a paramilitary and CCP-owned entity that is 
expressly named in the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act statute due 
to its egregious forced labor practices.
  Specifically, XPCC has been accused of assisting the CCP's policy in 
Xinjiang that implemented comprehensive surveillance, detention, and 
indoctrination that targeted Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minority 
groups that the CCP is attempting to eradicate. Furthermore, XPCC 
utilizes forced labor practices to manufacture their wide range of 
products.
  In addition, dependence on batteries that are manufactured in the PRC 
presents incredible risks to our national security. There are 
legitimate concerns that PRC-aligned battery companies and other 
similar Chinese entities could install malware and other intelligence-
gathering sensors on these products, which could result in gathering 
sensitive information or execute a shutdown on EV charging networks and 
battery-energy storage systems or even disable targeted vehicles 
through hardware infiltration.
  Last year, reports indicated that the PRC-aligned CATL installed its 
batteries at facilities in Florida, Virginia, Nevada, and California, 
as well as a solar farm on leased land inside the U.S. Marine Corps 
Base Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. Energy-storage batteries produced 
by the PRC-aligned CATL at Camp Lejeune have been decommissioned, 
following increased pressure from Congress.
  The Pentagon's decision to not only remove the PRC-aligned CATL 
batteries from Camp Lejeune but also to make it clear it will not buy 
CATL batteries because of concerns is more than adequate to demonstrate 
why we should not have these batteries in other parts of our critical 
infrastructure.
  Our government should not be spending tax dollars to procure 
batteries from companies that profit from slave labor or provide 
another avenue for the CCP to expand their surveillance apparatus here 
in the United States homeland.
  My legislation, H.R. 8631, the Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial 
Battery Dependence Act, is a critical first step in addressing this 
issue. Modeled after previous provisions included in the fiscal year 
2024 NDAA, my legislation builds off these efforts and prohibits the 
Department of Homeland Security from procuring battery technology 
companies that have deep ties to the CCP and engage in human rights 
abuses. In doing so, this bill helps our Nation take a step to advance 
efforts to decouple from the PRC and safeguard critical supply chains 
from exploitation.
  I am proud to see this bill pass out of committee in a bipartisan 
nature and look forward to seeing it pass the full House with a 
bipartisan vote.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. IVEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, my fellow Democrats and I strongly support the intent of 
this bill, which is to reduce our reliance on global adversaries and 
build up an industrial manufacturing base in the United States by 
prohibiting DHS from procuring batteries from certain Chinese 
companies.
  I am grateful the committee included Ranking Member Thompson's 
amendment to the original bill, which expands the number of companies 
subject to the prohibition. In addition to the six Chinese companies 
named in the original bill, Ranking Member Thompson's amendment expands 
the prohibition to include any companies using Uyghur forced labor 
identified by the Secretary of Defense as Chinese military companies 
and engaging in activities contrary to U.S. national security or 
foreign policy interests, according to the Department of Commerce.
  I also thank the committee for including Representative Suozzi's 
amendment, which requires DHS to produce a report on the potential 
impacts and costs associated with carrying out this bill before the 
prohibition goes into effect. The report will help DHS and Congress 
manage any unanticipated negative consequences from this bill.
  While these amendments have made the bill better, there are lingering 
concerns, including how a ban on Chinese-made batteries will impact 
DHS' ability to buy American-made electric vehicles, since most 
American EV producers use Chinese-sourced batteries.
  The bill could also further be improved by requiring DHS to identify 
ways to foster job creation and economic growth here at home and ensure 
the inclusion of economically disadvantaged individuals and small 
businesses when purchasing batteries.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1700

  Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Moolenaar).
  Mr. MOOLENAAR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support Representative 
Gimenez' Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act to protect taxpayer 
dollars from growing our dependence on CCP-controlled battery 
technology.
  As Representative Gimenez noted, the House Select Committee on China 
has investigated the world's cutting-edge battery manufacturers in 
China. There is indisputable evidence that two CCP-aligned battery 
makers, Gotion and CATL, are deeply connected to forced labor and the 
ongoing genocide in China. Gotion and CATL plan to build factories in 
the United States and thereby grow our dependence on their slave labor-
tainted supply chains.
  For my colleagues who care deeply about embracing next-generation 
energy technologies, I would just say this: We need America to lead 
when it comes to new energy sources, not China. We cannot lead by 
following. Buying Chinese technology will only dig ourselves further 
into dependence on the CCP.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to vote in favor of this 
important legislation and to protect our critical supply chains.
  Mr. IVEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Republicans and Democrats alike recognize the threat posed by China 
and stand unified in defense of our national and homeland security.
  H.R. 8631 is imperfect, but it is a step in the right direction, and 
I urge my colleagues to support it. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, we cannot continue to surrender dominance over our 
critical supply chains to our geopolitical rivals. Communist China will 
exploit any economic or security vulnerabilities that could be created 
from the Department of Homeland Security's reliance on lithium-ion 
batteries.
  To put an end to this dependence and to take important steps in 
decoupling from the CCP, I urge a ``yes'' vote on H.R. 8631.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Gimenez) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 8631, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the 
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

[[Page H5064]]

  

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