[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 139 (Monday, September 9, 2024)]
[House]
[Pages H5051-H5058]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
BIOSECURE ACT
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill
(H.R. 8333) to prohibit contracting with certain biotechnology
providers, and for other purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 8333
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``BIOSECURE Act''.
SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON CONTRACTING WITH CERTAIN BIOTECHNOLOGY
PROVIDERS.
(a) In General.--The head of an executive agency may not--
(1) procure or obtain any biotechnology equipment or
service produced or provided by a biotechnology company of
concern; or
(2) enter into a contract or extend or renew a contract
with any entity that--
(A) uses biotechnology equipment or services produced or
provided by a biotechnology company of concern and acquired
after the applicable effective date in subsection (c) in
performance of the contract with the executive agency; or
(B) enters into any contract the performance of which such
entity knows or has reason to believe will require, in
performance of the contract with the executive agency, the
use of biotechnology equipment or services produced or
provided by a biotechnology company of concern and acquired
after the applicable effective date in subsection (c).
(b) Prohibition on Loan and Grant Funds.--The head of an
executive agency may not obligate or expend loan or grant
funds to, and a loan or grant recipient may not use loan or
grant funds to--
(1) procure, obtain, or use any biotechnology equipment or
services produced or provided by a biotechnology company of
concern; or
(2) enter into a contract or extend or renew a contract
with an entity described in subsection (a)(2).
(c) Effective Dates.--
(1) Certain entities.--With respect to the biotechnology
companies of concern covered by subsection (f)(2)(A), the
prohibitions under subsections (a) and (b) shall take effect
60 days after the issuance of the regulation in subsection
(h).
(2) Other entities.--With respect to the biotechnology
companies of concern covered by subsection (f)(2)(B), the
prohibitions under subsections (a) and (b) shall take effect
180 days after the issuance of the regulation in subsection
(h).
(3) Rules of construction.--
(A) Certain entities.--Prior to January 1, 2032, with
respect to biotechnology companies of concern covered by
subsections (f)(2)(A), subsections (a)(2) and (b)(2) shall
not apply to biotechnology equipment or services produced or
provided under a contract or agreement, including previously
negotiated contract options, entered into before the
effective date under paragraph (1).
(B) Other entities.--Prior to the date that is five years
after the issuance of the regulation in subsection (h) that
identifies a biotechnology company of concern covered by
subsections (f)(2)(B), subsections (a)(2) and (b)(2) shall
not apply to biotechnology equipment or services produced or
provided under a contract or agreement, including previously
negotiated contract options, entered into before the
effective date under paragraph (2).
(C) Safe harbor.--The term ``biotechnology equipment or
services produced or provided by a biotechnology company of
concern'' shall not be construed to refer to any
biotechnology equipment or services that were formerly, but
are no longer, produced or provided by biotechnology
companies of concern.
(d) Waiver Authorities.--
(1) Specific biotechnology exception.--
(A) Waiver.--The head of the applicable executive agency
may waive the prohibition under subsections (a) and (b) on a
case-by-case basis--
(i) with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, in coordination with the Secretary of
Defense; and
(ii) if such head submits a notification and justification
to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 30
days after granting such waiver.
(B) Duration.--
(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii), a
waiver granted under subparagraph (A) shall last for a period
of not more than 365 days.
(ii) Extension.--The head of the applicable executive
agency, with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and in coordination with the Secretary
of Defense, may extend a waiver granted under subparagraph
(A) one time, for a period up to 180 days after the date on
which the waiver would otherwise expire, if such an extension
is in the national security interests of the United States
and if such head submits a notification and justification to
the appropriate congressional committees not later than 10
days after granting such waiver extension.
(2) Overseas health care services.--The head of an
executive agency may waive the prohibitions under subsections
(a) and (b) with respect to a contract, subcontract, or
transaction for the acquisition or provision of health care
services overseas on a case-by-case basis--
(A) if the head of such executive agency determines that
the waiver is--
(i) necessary to support the mission or activities of the
employees of such executive agency described in subsection
(e)(2)(A); and
(ii) in the interest of the United States;
(B) with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense; and
(C) if such head submits a notification and justification
to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 30
days after granting such waiver.
(e) Exceptions.--The prohibitions under subsections (a) and
(b) shall not apply to--
(1) any activity subject to the reporting requirements
under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of
the United States;
(2) the acquisition or provision of health care services
overseas for--
(A) employees of the United States, including members of
the uniformed services (as defined in section 101(a) of title
10, United States Code), whose official duty stations are
located overseas or are on permissive temporary duty travel
overseas; or
(B) employees of contractors or subcontractors of the
United States--
(i) who are performing under a contract that directly
supports the missions or activities of individuals described
in subparagraph (A); and
(ii) whose primary duty stations are located overseas or
are on permissive temporary duty travel overseas; or
(3) the acquisition, use, or distribution of human
multiomic data, lawfully compiled, that is commercially or
publicly available.
(f) Evaluation of Certain Biotechnology Entities.--
(1) Entity consideration.--Not later than 365 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget shall publish a list of the
entities that constitute biotechnology companies of concern
based on a list of suggested entities that shall be provided
by the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Attorney
General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the
Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State,
and the National Cyber Director.
(2) Biotechnology companies of concern defined.--The term
``biotechnology company of concern'' means--
(A) BGI, MGI, Complete Genomics, WuXi AppTec, and WuXi
Biologics;
(B) any entity that is determined by the process
established in paragraph (1) to meet the following criteria--
(i) is subject to the administrative governance structure,
direction, control, or operates on behalf of the government
of a foreign adversary;
(ii) is to any extent involved in the manufacturing,
distribution, provision, or procurement of a biotechnology
equipment or service; and
(iii) poses a risk to the national security of the United
States based on--
(I) engaging in joint research with, being supported by, or
being affiliated with a foreign adversary's military,
internal security forces, or intelligence agencies;
(II) providing multiomic data obtained via biotechnology
equipment or services to the government of a foreign
adversary; or
(III) obtaining human multiomic data via the biotechnology
equipment or services without express and informed consent;
and
(C) any subsidiary, parent, affiliate, or successor of
entities listed in subparagraphs (A) and (B), provided they
meet the criteria in subparagraph (B)(i).
(3) Guidance.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act for the biotechnology companies of
concern named in paragraph (2)(A), and not later than 180
days after the development of the list pursuant to paragraph
(1) and any update to the list pursuant to paragraph (4), the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney
General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the
[[Page H5052]]
Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State,
and the National Cyber Director, shall establish guidance as
necessary to implement the requirements of this section.
(4) Updates.--The Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, in coordination with or based on a recommendation
provided by the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and
the National Cyber Director, shall periodically, though not
less than annually, review and, as appropriate, modify the
list of biotechnology companies of concern, and notify the
appropriate congressional committees of any such
modifications.
(5) Notice of a designation and review.--
(A) In general.--A notice of a designation as a
biotechnology company of concern under paragraph (2)(B) shall
be issued to any biotechnology company of concern named in
the designation--
(i) advising that a designation has been made;
(ii) identifying the criteria relied upon under such
subparagraph and, to the extent consistent with national
security and law enforcement interests, the information that
formed the basis for the designation;
(iii) advising that, within 90 days after receipt of
notice, the biotechnology company of concern may submit
information and argument in opposition to the designation;
(iv) describing the procedures governing the review and
possible issuance of a designation pursuant to paragraph (1);
and
(v) where practicable, identifying mitigation steps that
could be taken by the biotechnology company of concern that
may result in the rescission of the designation.
(B) Congressional notification requirements.--
(i) Notice of designation.--The Director of the Office of
Management and Budget shall submit the notice required under
subparagraph (A) to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Oversight and Accountability of the House of Representatives.
(ii) Information and argument in opposition to
designations.--Not later than 7 days after receiving any
information and argument in opposition to a designation
pursuant to subparagraph (A)(iii), the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget shall submit such information to the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of
the Senate and the Committee on Oversight and Accountability
of the House of Representatives.
(C) Exceptions.--The provisions under subparagraphs (A) and
(B) shall not apply to an entity listed under paragraph
(2)(A).
(6) No immediate public release.--Any designation made
under paragraph (1) or paragraph (4) shall not be made
publicly available until the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, in coordination with appropriate
agencies, reviews all information submitted under paragraph
(5)(A)(iii) and issues a final determination that a company
shall remain listed as a biotechnology company of concern.
(g) Evaluation of National Security Risks Posed by Foreign
Adversary Acquisition of American Multiomic Data.--
(1) Assessment.--Not later than 270 days after the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney
General of the United States, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the National
Cyber Director, shall complete an assessment of risks to
national security posed by human multiomic data from United
States citizens that is collected or stored by a foreign
adversary from the provision of biotechnology equipment or
services.
(2) Report requirement.--Not later than 30 days after the
completion of the assessment developed under paragraph (1),
the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a report
with such assessment to the appropriate congressional
committees.
(3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (2) shall be
in unclassified form accompanied by a classified annex.
(h) Regulations.--Not later than one year after the date of
establishment of guidance required under subsection (f)(3),
and as necessary for subsequent updates, the Federal
Acquisition Regulatory Council shall revise the Federal
Acquisition Regulation as necessary to implement the
requirements of this section.
(i) Reporting on Intelligence on Nefarious Activities of
Biotechnology Companies With Human Multiomic Data.--Not later
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
and annually thereafter, the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of executive
agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on any intelligence in possession of such
agencies related to nefarious activities conducted by
biotechnology companies with human multiomic data. The report
shall include information pertaining to potential threats to
national security or public safety from the selling,
reselling, licensing, trading, transferring, sharing, or
otherwise providing or making available to any foreign
country of any forms of multiomic data of a United States
citizen.
(j) No Additional Funds.--No additional funds are
authorized to be appropriated for the purpose of carrying out
this section.
(k) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee
on Intelligence, and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
the Committee on Oversight and Accountability, the Committee
on Energy and Commerce, and the Select Committee on Strategic
Competition between the United States and the Chinese
Communist Party of the House of Representatives.
(2) Biotechnology equipment or service.--The term
``biotechnology equipment or service'' means--
(A) equipment, including genetic sequencers, combined mass
spectrometry technologies, polymerase chain reaction
machines, or any other instrument, apparatus, machine, or
device, including components and accessories thereof, that is
designed for use in the research, development, production, or
analysis of biological materials as well as any software,
firmware, or other digital components that are specifically
designed for use in, and necessary for the operation of, such
equipment;
(B) any service for the research, development, production,
analysis, detection, or provision of information, including
data storage and transmission related to biological
materials, including--
(i) advising, consulting, or support services with respect
to the use or implementation of a instrument, apparatus,
machine, or device described in subparagraph (A); and
(ii) disease detection, genealogical information, and
related services; and
(C) any other service, instrument, apparatus, machine,
component, accessory, device, software, or firmware that is
designed for use in the research, development, production, or
analysis of biological materials that the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the
heads of Executive agencies, as determined appropriate by the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, determines
appropriate in the interest of national security.
(3) Contract.--Except as the term is used under subsection
(b)(2) and subsection (c)(3), the term ``contract'' means any
contract subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation issued
under section 1303(a)(1) of title 41, United States Code.
(4) Control.--The term ``control'' has the meaning given to
that term in section 800.208 of title 31, Code of Federal
Regulations, or any successor regulations.
(5) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has
the meaning given the term ``Executive agency'' in section
105 of title 5, United States Code.
(6) Foreign adversary.--The term ``foreign adversary'' has
the meaning given the term ``covered nation'' in section
4872(d) of title 10, United States Code.
(7) Multiomic.--The term ``multiomic'' means data types
that include genomics, epigenomics, transcriptomics,
proteomics, and metabolomics.
(8) Overseas.--The term ``overseas'' means any area outside
of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a
territory or possession of the United States.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Kentucky (Mr. Comer) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
Krishnamoorthi) each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from Illinois oppose the
bill?
Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Mr. Speaker, no, I support the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
McGovern) will control 20 minutes in opposition.
General Leave
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have
5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and
include extraneous material on this measure.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Kentucky?
There was no objection.
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I am happy to support H.R. 8333, the BIOSECURE Act.
This bipartisan, bicameral bill prevents U.S. tax dollars from
flowing to biotechnology companies that are owned, operated, and
controlled by China or other foreign adversaries.
Specifically, this bill names five genomic companies with direct ties
to the Chinese Communist Party as biotechnology companies of concern.
[[Page H5053]]
The bill then prohibits a Federal agency from procuring any
biotechnology equipment or service from such companies. The bill also
prohibits Federal loan or grant dollars from being used to procure,
obtain, or use biotechnology equipment or services from such companies.
The companies named in this legislation create significant risks to
U.S. national security.
BGI, one of the named entities, is a CCP biotechnology company and is
the world's largest collector of genetic data. BGI, alongside its
subsidiaries, which are also named in the bill, have been found to
conduct research alongside the Chinese military.
WuXi, through its two subsidiaries named in the bill, operates
genetic testing centers established in coordination with the CCP, helps
carry out research to promote the Chinese military, and has reportedly
stolen U.S. firms' intellectual property.
The House Oversight Committee has worked hard with outside
stakeholders and other committees of jurisdiction to ensure these
national security risks are meaningfully addressed without disrupting
medical and pharmaceutical supply chains.
Existing contracts are exempt from the prohibitions in the bill until
January 2032, and the bill includes a targeted waiver and exception
process.
The bill also exempts biotechnology equipment and services from the
bill's prohibitions that were, but are no longer, produced or provided
by a company of concern.
This bill is a necessary step toward protecting Americans' sensitive
healthcare data from the CCP before these companies become more
embedded in the U.S. economy, university, and Federal contracting base.
I thank the bill's sponsor, Representative Brad Wenstrup, chairman of
the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic, for his efforts in
ensuring this bill continues to advance.
I also thank the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party
chairman, John Moolenaar, and ranking member, Raja Krishnamoorthi,
both original cosponsors, as well as the House Oversight's ranking
member, Jamie Raskin, and the Senate Homeland Security Committee
chairman, Gary Peters, and their staff for their hard work on this
legislation over the past year.
I urge all my House Oversight colleagues to support this critical
national security bill. I encourage everyone to support this bill.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I deeply regret having to rise in opposition to this
bill, but I feel that I need to, and I want to be clear as to why.
I think this bill as it is currently written, quite frankly, is not
ready for prime time, and I am urging my colleagues, particularly those
who care about effectively taking on China to vote ``no.''
Mr. Speaker, for the record, I am not new to this issue. In fact, I
welcome the fact that we are finally here on the House floor talking
about not only the abysmal human rights violations committed by the
People's Republic of China but their unsavory and unscrupulous business
practices that could threaten patient privacy and even our national
security.
Frankly, it is about damn time.
I have been sounding the alarm for years now asking Democrats and
Republicans to hold China accountable.
I have worked with Presidents of both parties on this issue,
including Joe Biden and Donald Trump.
Along with our colleagues, Representative Chris Smith and Senator
Marco Rubio, I wrote, and President Biden signed into law the
bipartisan Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act to hold the PRC
accountable for their genocide in Xinjiang and to prevent the import of
goods made with forced labor into the United States.
Together, Chairman McCaul and I wrote the Resolve Tibet Act to hold
the PRC accountable for their misinformation on Tibet, which was also
just signed into law by President Biden a few months ago.
I passed into law the bipartisan Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act to
deny PRC officials entry into the United States if they are responsible
for the oppression of the people of Tibet. In 2019, I also authored
legislation to prevent the export of crowd control equipment that was
being used to go after peaceful protestors in Hong Kong, and President
Trump signed that into law.
I am one of the few Members of Congress who was actually sanctioned
by China. I am banned from going to China by the PRC. I can't meet with
any Chinese Government officials because of my vocal advocacy for human
rights and human dignity in that country. They clearly do not like me,
but I wear their sanctions as a badge of honor.
All of this is to say that my record on this issue takes a back seat
to nobody. That is why I deeply regret that we are bringing this
particular bill to the floor. This is a lost opportunity to do
something meaningful about an important and serious issue, an issue
that frankly deserves a lot more thought and attention than this.
{time} 1545
First of all, this bill lists out specific companies that it claims
are exploiting the U.S. biopharmaceutical industry on behalf of the
Chinese Government.
To be totally frank, some of them might be, but to be also totally
frank, some of them might not be, and I can't get a clear answer from
anyone on how the Select Committee came up with these names.
What was the process?
Were these companies brought in for questioning?
Again, no solid answers to why these companies and not others.
If we are going to name companies, then there ought to be a clear,
transparent process that is implemented the same for all companies.
I am even told this by our regulatory agencies who, by the way, do
not like the idea of naming companies by name in legislation because
they think it gives the heads-up to bad companies who will try to evade
this legislation as written by changing their name and reincorporating
as something else in the Cayman Islands.
So I think we need to give some thought as to whether this is the
best way to hold these companies to account.
The most ironic thing about this approach is this is how they do
things in China: The PRC politicians decide they don't like you, so
they blackball you.
Guess what, Mr. Speaker? That is not how we do things in the United
States of America.
We ought to have due process of law here. We ought to have a
transparent, inclusive process that involves all the relevant agencies
that applies to all companies. We have an intelligence community, we
have law enforcement agencies, we have an interagency entity list, and
we have a Department of Defense 1260H list to determine what companies
are engaged in bad behavior on behalf of the PRC.
Some of the companies listed in this bill are not on any lists at
all, so it is up to us to guess why they are on here.
Now, I have no idea who wrote this text or why these companies and
not others, but this is not the right way to legislate. This is being
jammed through because I guess it is China week and God forbid we wait
a couple of more weeks and get this right, but we want to get this
thing done.
However, this is not the way we should be doing things around here.
What is even worse is that this bill is being brought up under
suspension. People know that there are genuine concerns about this
bill, and yet it is being brought up under suspension. We have no
opportunity to amend it or to make improvements. There is no process
through the Rules Committee, no amendments, nothing.
Believe me, Mr. Speaker, when I say that I really, really believe we
can get to ``yes'' on a bill to hold bad companies accountable and to
protect the American people. I think we could get ``yes'' to a bill
that would not only have my support but the support of everybody in
this Chamber. This is just take it or leave it, and I think the best
thing for all of us to do is to leave it and go back to the drawing
board and to come up with something better that we can get to the floor
in the next several days or in the next couple of weeks.
I have spent my entire career standing up to the Chinese Communist
[[Page H5054]]
Party and to the PRC, and I have the battle scars to prove it. Yes, I
do have a company in my district that is actually named in this bill,
but that is not the only reason why I am here.
I am here because I care about these issues. I have cared about these
issues for a long time. Yes, I did my due diligence on the company in
my district and asked why they were included. That is not a radical
question, it is not a tough question, and nobody can really tell me. I
got a different answer every time I asked. Not in a classified setting
and not in an unclassified setting can anybody still give me a straight
answer. In fact, I have been given multiple conflicting reasons.
This should be easy. This company is on a list because they are doing
X, Y, and Z, and we have the proof.
I have never heard that.
Maybe some of the concerns apply to some of these companies. I have
no idea, and nobody, including the people who wrote this bill, could
give me a clear answer on the basic question of why some entities are
named and others are not.
Then, once they are named in this bill, the five companies that are
named, I am told that it is literally impossible for them to get off
the list. If one of these five companies does not belong on the list,
then too bad, Congress doesn't like you, and that is that.
Let me be crystal clear. If a thorough interagency review concludes
that any of these named companies, including the one in my district,
are engaged in behavior that endangers our national security or
violates people's privacy, then I will be the first in line to say:
Shut them down.
However, without that process, again, this is how they do things in
China. It shouldn't be how we do things in the United States.
I strongly urge a ``no'' vote, and I pledge that if this bill is
defeated or if my friends pull it, I will proudly work to come up with
a better bill that will actually get the job done and not create a
slippery slope that we should not be going down.
We have other standing committees that should have been involved in
drafting this bill, quite frankly, that have expertise on these
matters: Foreign Affairs, Energy and Commerce, Ways and Means, Homeland
Security, and Intelligence. They should have been consulted and at the
table here. It should have been more than the Select Committee and the
Oversight and Accountability Committee.
Let's do this in a better way. Let's create a fully vetted list that
goes through an interagency process, not a flawed bill that has major
enforcement problems that I believe will actually hurt us in opposing
PRC's activities.
Let's pull this bill or defeat this bill, and let's get this right.
We have an opportunity to get it right. Let's get it right, and we will
get it to the floor in a matter of days.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Krishnamoorthi).
Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the
bipartisan H.R. 8333, BIOSECURE Act.
Simply put, this bill prevents American taxpayer dollars from flowing
to foreign adversary biotech companies of concern.
The bill creates a process by which the executive branch will develop
a list of entities, review and modify this list at least annually, and
formulate implementation guidance for all Federal agencies. Further,
the bill has an even number of Democratic and Republican cosponsors and
received a thumping 40-1 markup in the Oversight and Accountability
Committee. Human rights groups strongly support this bill, as well.
Fundamentally, this bill is about protecting Americans' genomic data,
their healthcare data, and sensitive IP on America's most innovative
and cutting-edge medicines.
The intelligence community has warned that the PRC illegally obtains
large healthcare data sets to help carry out human rights abuses
against minority groups in China. The IC has also warned of the high
threat of the CCP stealing American IP. It is our responsibility to
ensure that taxpayer dollars do not flow to any companies supporting
any of these efforts.
This bill does not stop these companies from doing business in the
U.S.; however, it does stop them from receiving Federal dollars funding
their operations.
I would like to respectfully make three key points:
First, BGI Group is run by bad actors. For example, BGI, which is on
the Defense Department's Chinese military companies list, has harvested
data from 8 million pregnant women's DNA without their consent,
including Americans. BGI then used that data to publish at least a
dozen joint studies with the People's Liberation Army, also known as
the PLA, which, in turn, has used this information to suppress Uyghurs.
BGI controls MGI and Complete Genomics, which are also named entities.
Second, the WuXi AppTec Group is also run by bad actors. U.S.
intelligence has shown that WuXi AppTec has secretly transferred U.S.
IP to Chinese authorities in Beijing.
Third, the founding CEO of WuXi AppTec is also the chairman of WuXi
Biologics. Not only that, but the CEO of WuXi Biologics, this gentleman
over here on the far left, has been a guest lecturer at the PLA's
Academy of Military Sciences, an institution on the Commerce
Department's red flag list.
In addition, here is the CEO of WuXi Biologics co-teaching a class
with Chinese General Chen Wei, director of the Chinese military's
biological research institute.
Here is a picture of the CCP Party cell embedded at WuXi AppTec.
As Congress, we need to ask ourselves: Are we comfortable sending
taxpayer dollars to companies that are run by bad actors and that work
so closely with the Chinese Communist Party, the CCP?
The answer is, of course, no. No.
We need to act now. I understand legitimate concerns have been raised
about making further changes. Our preference is to give maximum
discretion to the executive branch. It is Congress' decision that these
companies must be included in this bill. There is no doubt that this is
a valid approach.
I support further changes being made. I am voting ``yes'' to move
this process along because, on balance, a ``yes'' vote is the right
vote.
Mr. Speaker, I urge the passage of this legislation, the BIOSECURE
Act, to protect American genetic data and to protect American drug
supply chains.
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McGOVERN. First of all, WuXi AppTec and WuXi Biologics are two
separate entities. Again, I was hoping to get some more clarity, and
this is what puzzles me as to why WuXi Biologics is on this list. I was
told at one point that they were on the list because the Department of
Commerce had them on the unverified list.
I actually had a conversation with the Department of Commerce to try
to understand all these different lists, and they told me that it is
not uncommon for companies to be on the unverified list, especially in
the aftermath of COVID because it was hard to do the investigations.
However, then they sent me a statement in which WuXi Biologics was
removed from the unverified list.
Then I said: Well, they must be on another list.
They said that they had this thing called the entity list.
I asked them, I said that they must be on the entity list if they are
named in this bill. The entity list is made up of foreign individuals,
companies, and organizations deemed a national security concern
subjecting them to export restrictions and licensing requirements for
certain technologies and goods, so they must be on that list.
The Commerce Department said: No, they are not on that list.
I said: Okay, they are not on the unverified list, and they are not
on the entity list.
Is there any other list out there?
Well, there is another one out there. It is the DOD section 1260H
list.
Are they on that list?
I am told: No, they are not on that list either.
The section 1260H list is made up of Chinese military companies
operating directly or indirectly in the United States in accordance
with the statutory requirement of section 1260H of the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2021.
They are not on any of those lists. They are not on any of those
lists.
[[Page H5055]]
Then here is the deal: If they don't belong in the underlying
legislation, then there is no way to get off the list. There is no way
for them to get off the list. I was told, with all due respect by the
ranking member, and I have checked with our Senate colleagues and with
Commerce, that those that are named cannot get off the list.
All I am simply saying is that--maybe I am missing something here--we
ought to have an interagency review and thorough investigation before
we start implementing these kinds of sanctions.
Again, this is what they do in China. This is not what we are
supposed to do in the United States. Due process actually matters here.
The truth should matter here.
Again, some of these companies absolutely may belong on this list,
but I am just simply saying that I have questions that have not been
answered either in a classified or unclassified setting, and they have
certainly not been satisfied by members of the committee.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Wenstrup), who is the sponsor of the bill.
Mr. WENSTRUP. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill with
Mr. Krishnamoorthi, my friend, the BIOSECURE Act which passed the
Oversight and Reform Committee by an overwhelming bipartisan support
vote of 40-1.
This legislation is a critical piece in our broader efforts this week
to protect Americans, in this case, their personal health data, from
the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party does not get
due process in America.
The BIOSECURE Act will help protect the biologic data of American
patients and make sure that their data does not fall into the hands of
our adversaries. We do this by prohibiting Federal contracting with
biotechnology companies of concern, companies and their subsidiaries
that have overt and enduring ties with the CCP, or even using the
equipment and services of these very companies.
Our government has acted to keep the CCP out of our telecommunication
networks and communication platforms. Now we must act to keep them away
from our genomic and health data.
China has publicly stated their desire to dominate the global
biotechnology market by 2035. This is incredibly concerning given the
Chinese Communist Party's national intelligence laws which require
Chinese firms to share any requested data with the CCP. The existence
of that law is enough to drive us forward with this bill because that
law includes biotech companies that collect, test, and store American
genomic data.
That is why they are named. It is because that is the risk to the
American people and our national security.
This legislation affects companies like the Beijing Genomics
Institute, known as BGI, a Chinese company that has collected DNA from
millions around the world and used that data without consent for
genomic projects conducted by the Chinese military.
{time} 1600
A 2021 Reuters report found DNA data collected from BGI's prenatal
test on women outside China has also been stored in China's government-
funded gene database.
Another Chinese company, WuXi AppTec, has sponsored events with
China's military, with IP reportedly stolen from the U.S., and jointly
operated genetic collection sites with Chinese military.
Further, as was mentioned before, the chairman of WuXi AppTec is a
board member of WuXi Biologics and a known member of the CCP. He has
publicly mentioned many times about the central role of the CCP in WuXi
group activities.
We have worked to ensure this bill provides an appropriate and
workable offering for American companies and our government to decouple
with CCP-aligned biotech firms. This is about protecting Americans from
an adversary that will leave no stone unturned to get an upper hand
over the United States of America and our people.
Time and time again, these biotech companies have proven they are
more than willing to do the bidding of the CCP. It is a proven
relationship. We can't at the same time allow them to collect the
private health information of millions of Americans.
I spent 25 years as an Army physician and combat surgeon. I spent 10
years now on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Guess what? We don't bring our adversaries in for questioning. It
doesn't work that way. As a matter of fact, I tried to do that, Mr.
Speaker, on the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic. I
asked the Chinese Ambassador about certain scientists in China we would
like to speak to. They didn't respond.
It is time for Congress to take this step toward securing our
national health security for every person in America, in every district
of America.
This is no joke, and it is just the start. It really needs to be just
the start.
My colleague said that he is not against this bill only because he
has a company that wants to build in his district. I guess it must be
one of his reasons. He said it is not the only reason.
I applaud the bipartisan work of the Select Committee on the
Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese
Communist Party for their serious efforts, and I strongly urge my
colleagues to support this bipartisan legislation.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
This is a very strange debate. Again, are we all comfortable moving
forward in a way that doesn't require any thoughtful or interagency
investigation or process? You know, a process with integrity, by the
way, will result in any of the bad actors getting on the list. That is
what an interagency process is supposed to be about.
Our friends still haven't really told me the criteria they use to get
people on their blacklist, except the gentleman from Ohio just said if
I want to say that you are bad, then you are on the list. That is not
the way we do things in the United States. I hope we never will do that
in the United States. That is the way they do things in China.
Again, as I stated before, WuXi Biologics is distinct from WuXi
AppTec, but during China week, anything with a Chinese name is somehow
suspect and somehow bad.
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record an article from
InsideHealthPolicy, ``Cutting Foreign Ties Could Lead To Drug Supply
Chain Disruptions, Industry Warns.''
[From InsideHealthPolicy, May 21, 2024]
Cutting Foreign Ties Could Lead to Drug Supply Chain Disruptions,
Industry Warns
(By Maaisha Osman)
As House committees advance bills that would bar American
companies from working with some foreign-owned biotechnology
companies in the future, industry experts warn ending
pharmaceutical relationships with China could lead to drug
shortages and supply chain disruptions.
Darius Lakdawalla, director of research at University of
Southern California Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and
Economics, said at the U.S. Pharma and Biotech Summit
Thursday (May 16) that cutting ties with foreign companies
could worsen supply chain issues in the United States.
``I think the Chinese issue, there's no question that
that's going to increase the risk of shortages and supply
chain disruption, how could it not do those things?''
Lakdawalla said. ``And that's a particularly problematic
issue in a moment when there's a lot of political pressure
against the pharmaceutical industry (and) the last thing we
need to see now is consumers (being) unable to fill their
prescriptions at the pharmacy because of shortages.''
Biogen's CEO, Chris Viehbacher, highlighted during the
Thursday summit that drug company CEOs traditionally did not
need to consider geopolitical issues, but this is now
beginning to change.
``You know, amongst the CEOs we are suddenly saying, `Hey,
we haven't needed to think about geopolitics in years,' ''
Viehbacher said. ``When I was CEO of Sanofi, those were the
peak years of globalization, we could move products and
people and capital all around the world and not even think
about borders, and that's clearly changing.''
Other executives also expressed discomfort with thinking
about their business in national security terms.
``When we think about the BIOSECURE Act, I think Chris
Viehbacher said it best which is, if it's in the form of a
national security threat, that is one place that industry
does not want to get in into,'' Harmeet Dhillon, head of
public policy at Glaxo Smith Kline, said, referring to the
legislation moving forward in the House. ``We want to let
that be handled by the appropriate experts from a policy and
political perspective.''
[[Page H5056]]
Viehbacher also noted that national security concerns are
driven by mistrust between the East and West and the
bipartisan support for the bill underscores the seriousness
of these concerns.
``East-West divide has created a mistrust and that is
driving a number of the national security concerns,'' he
said. ``This is a bill that has extremely strong bipartisan
support and if you can get Democrats and Republicans to agree
on anything, that something must be serious.''
If passed by the House and Senate and signed into law, the
BIOSECURE Act would prohibit federal agencies from
contracting or procuring equipment or services from
``biotechnology companies of concern.'' This includes any
company that is ``subject to the jurisdiction, direction,
control, or operates on behalf of the government of a foreign
adversary'' and poses a biotechnology security risk.
Adversaries include China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran.
The most recent version of the bill in the House extends
the deadline for U.S. companies to terminate their
collaborations with specific Chinese entities until 2032.
Additionally, it includes WuXi Biologics, a subsidiary of the
targeted pharmaceutical company WuXi Apptec, on the list of
companies of concerns.
The New York Times reported that WuXi is involved in
manufacturing about 25% of drugs sold in the United States.
The leukemia treatment Imbruvica, for example, is sold by
Janssen Biotech and AbbVie, but WuXi makes its active
pharmaceutical ingredient (API).
``The reality is that a company like WuXi has been an
extremely cost-effective and capable supplier to our
industry,'' Viehbacher said at the Thursday summit. ``It's
not even going to be that easy to replace that capability
either in the United States or in other countries.''
``It is a big market, but I think we're going to have to
imagine a border there that we haven't had to think about in
the past,'' Viehbacher added.
At a STAT event in November, industry experts said that
domestic manufacturing can very easily become ``a feel-good
strategy,'' but onshoring a drug's API wouldn't solve the
drug shortage crisis.
``We need to be very strategic on what we onshore,'' Marta
Wosinska, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution's Center
on Health Policy, said. For example, Wosinska cautioned that
the United States shouldn't onshore an API manufacturer for a
drug where all the upstream manufacturing still comes from
China.
``That wouldn't solve the problem,'' she said.
Wosinska also noted that domestic drug manufacturing does
not necessarily mean higher quality. She pointed out that
historically drug shortages were primarily caused by
manufacturing quality problem in U.S.-based facilities.
Meanwhile, FDA drug center chief Patrizia Cavazzoni said at
an Alliance for Stronger FDA webinar May 6 the agency is
focused on enhancing the resilience of the manufacturing
supply chain and does not want manufacturers to stop
production because of issues identified during inspections.
``When investigators understand the context of a facility
and what is being manufactured there, we strongly encourage
manufacturers not to stop manufacturing or halt operations as
a result of inspections,'' Cavazzoni said. ``Even during
inspections, we sometimes see manufacturers say they will
hold off and shut down a line because of what they are
hearing during the inspections.''
As a part of FDA's initiative to modernize inspections, the
agency is testing a program aimed at improving communication
among investigators, the drug shortage team and the
compliance team. This enhanced communication would occur
continuously, spanning before, during, and after inspections.
The goal is to provide investigators with contextual
understanding of the facility's manufacturing activities.
``We really want manufacturers to call our drug shortage
surveillance team immediately because we want to start
problem-solving with manufacturers as soon as possible during
the inspection to put in place mitigation approaches that
will prevent outright stoppages of manufacturing essential
drugs, as we have witnessed over the past year,'' Cavazzoni
said.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I point that out because we have to be
very careful on how we proceed, to make sure we are going after truly
bad actors so we don't disrupt the supply chain in which we see a
disruption in pharmaceuticals, which means higher prices and less
availability. That is something that ought to be talked about. It would
be nice if the Energy and Commerce Committee were part of this
discussion because I think that is relevant.
Again, I have no problem with holding anybody accountable. I would
just like a process that has integrity.
With due respect to the gentleman who just spoke, your word doesn't
cut it. I want a little bit more verification that, in fact, what we
are doing is right. If the verification is there, I am with you.
We can get there. We can do this in a better way, one that upholds
our values and one that holds these companies accountable, and we can
go in a way that would have broad bipartisan support.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the time remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Kentucky has 7\1/2\
minutes remaining.
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Moolenaar).
Mr. MOOLENAAR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the bipartisan
BIOSECURE Act.
I know that some of my colleagues may have questions about naming
specific Chinese companies in this legislation, so let me be clear. It
is Congress' constitutional duty to write national security laws, and
that includes the authority to investigate and name foreign-adversary-
controlled companies in law because of the threat they pose to national
security.
Make no mistake: BGI, WuXi AppTec, and WuXi Biologics all pose
unacceptable threats to national security. The evidence is clear and
available to all Members.
I have tremendous respect for my colleague from Massachusetts, who
said that he did due diligence that there is complete separation
between WuXi AppTec and WuXi Biologics when the CEO of one is the board
chair or on the board of the other. To me, it just seems like there
might be a little ignoring of some of the evidence.
Courts have upheld laws in which Congress named Huawei and Kaspersky
as national security threats and imposed prohibitions on their
activities. I am confident that they will do the same for TikTok.
When the evidence in front of Congress shows that foreign adversary
companies are a particularly important or especially urgent threat to
national security, it is Congress' job to act. Congress now has a duty
to do exactly that. Please join me in supporting this vital
legislation.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Just to respond to the gentleman from Michigan, I didn't say I had
done my due diligence and that there is no connection. I said they are
two separate entities. I said we should have a process in place that
has integrity that everyone has confidence in to do the due diligence
to make sure, in fact, that the companies that are being named do, in
fact, deserve to be named.
Experts, by the way, in my State tell me that we do not have enough
domestic capacity to pick up the slack if the named companies were
barred from doing business with the U.S. today.
Clearly, we need to increase our domestic drug production capacity
and quality. The Federal Government should incentivize domestic biotech
companies to manufacture products like active pharmaceutical
ingredients and key starting materials to help ensure the security of
our supply chains. We could better support workforce development by
providing funding for regional training centers and efforts to
diversify the workforce.
These are just some suggestions based on the feedback that I have
received. The bottom line is we need to make some changes to improve
capacity at home.
As we are going after the bad actors, let's also figure out how to
increase capacity at home. All I am saying is--let me repeat--if any or
all of these companies deserve to be sanctioned, I am there. I just
want a process that has integrity and that is worthy of this
institution.
It seems to me it is not that difficult to get there, but I guess in
the effort to try to comply with China week and to get a press release
out, we are naming companies without really any thorough and thoughtful
process. I have to say, I object to that. I worry that it is a slippery
slope that will be replicated in other instances.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Dunn).
Mr. DUNN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to urge my colleagues
to join me in supporting H.R. 8333, the BIOSECURE Act.
Mr. Speaker, this bill ensures that biotech companies linked to
foreign adversaries do not gain access to precious
[[Page H5057]]
U.S. taxpayer dollars via biotechnology contracts. We cannot allow the
CCP-affiliated firms to gain access to U.S. genetic data. We cannot
allow ourselves to be dependent on and vulnerable to the CCP for
healthcare technologies, products, and services. Otherwise, we risk
China using our own health data as leverage against us.
We recognize that our biotechnology companies did not arrive at this
juncture on their own. Decades of failed policy, unreasonable,
burdensome red tape, and a lack of oversight led to this precarious
situation of overinvestment in and industrial partnerships with China.
We must act in coordination with the biotech sector to correct this
imbalance. The BIOSECURE Act accomplishes this. I urge support of this
bill.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, may I ask the gentleman how many more
speakers he has.
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I have two speakers left.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Oklahoma (Mrs. Bice).
Mrs. BICE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the
bipartisan BIOSECURE Act, which I am proud to cosponsor.
I reiterate the bipartisan piece of this because I think the
integrity of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission is
being questioned here, and it shouldn't be. It is a bipartisan bill.
As a member of the National Security Commission on Emerging
Biotechnology, we looked at ways to strengthen America's bioeconomy
while countering malign foreign influence, which this bill seeks to do.
It is no secret that China is attempting to dominate the global
biotech market. While this is concerning, even more so is the fact that
the Chinese Communist Party utilizes laws which require Chinese firms
to share data requested by the CCP, including those of biotech
companies which collect, test, and store American genomic data. It is
unacceptable for U.S. taxpayer dollars to ever subsidize biotech
companies of our foreign adversaries.
This act is a necessary step in protecting the privacy rights of
Americans and our national security interests. Moving forward, we must
take steps to promote growth, stability, and innovation in the biotech
industry. America can and should lead in this sector.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I should point out for the record that WuXi Biologics
did a third-party audit, which indicates that they don't contain any
biogenetic information.
Again, all I am asking for here is a process that is above question.
I do think there is something to be said to make sure that we get it
right.
This idea that we may not get it right and it is too bad for a
company, it is too bad for the people who work there, it is too bad for
the supply chain, and we will see prescription drugs go up for no
reason just because we are lazy and we don't want to do a full audit, I
am sorry. Democrats and Republicans should agree that process matters.
Again, we are not China. We are the United States of America. We do
things in a transparent and open way. I don't think it is unreasonable
to be here saying we ought to have a thorough process that these
companies are subjected to and that all others are. If any of these
companies or any others are deemed to be in collaboration with the
Chinese Communist Party or PRC or whoever else you don't like, and
there is sharing of sensitive information or behaving in a way that is
unscrupulous and in violation of our laws, then we should hold them
accountable. There is no question about that.
It is about this bill and about the lack of process and the lack of
transparency.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 45 seconds to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Krishnamoorthi).
Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Mr. Speaker, with regard to the process issue, on
page 10 of the bill, there is actually a process where the Office of
Management and Budget decides on no less than an annual basis to review
the list and modify as appropriate.
OMB is given authority to promulgate regulations, and we think there
should be additional details provided. I would like to work with the
distinguished ranking member of the Rules Committee to further refine
that process because I agree that it could use more detail.
Secondly, I point out again on WuXi Biologics, the chair of WuXi
AppTec is the chair of WuXi Biologics.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 15 seconds to the
gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Mr. Speaker, that is why it is so disturbing to
so many to see the CEO, the current CEO, of WuXi Biologics co-teaching
a class with a Chinese general at the Biological Engineering Research
Institute, the current CEO of WuXi Biologics actually being on the
faculty of a PLA-affiliated institution. That is why the International
Campaign for Tibet and Uyghur human rights groups strongly, strongly
support this bill.
{time} 1615
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers and am prepared to
close.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time is
remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Massachusetts has 4
minutes remaining.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to
close.
Mr. Speaker, it is so disappointing that we are here having this
debate. With all due respect to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
Krishnamoorthi), the idea that we are blacklisting a company that is
not on any list in the Commerce Department or in the Defense Department
and we are just doing it because Members don't like who they have been
affiliated with over the years is really quite irresponsible.
Companies ought to be sanctioned that have done something wrong. WuXi
Biologics did a third-party audit, and, again, they contained no
biogenetic information. That is what the audit revealed. It doesn't
really make any difference.
By the way, they can't get off the list. They can't get off the list
because of how this bill is written. There is no remedy for them if my
colleagues are wrong. Is that what we do in Congress? My colleagues
don't like the name of a company. It is a Chinese name, and so
automatically they have to be guilty of all the worst things that can
be thought of.
Some of these companies might, but some of them might not be. That is
why process matters. All of us, Democrats and Republicans, should want
a thorough process, so that when we come here, we are speaking with one
voice.
Again, some of these companies that the gentleman has put in his bill
may, in fact, be justified, but let's do the process. Let's get this
right. Why is that such a controversial thing?
The only thing I can think of is because Members are trying to rush
to comply with China week and not trying to get legislation right.
Committees of jurisdiction, the Intelligence Committee, the Foreign
Affairs Committee, the Ways and Means Committee, the Energy and
Commerce Committee, all of them, should be at the table working with my
colleagues on this legislation, but they weren't. They weren't.
This is not the way we should address this very serious matter. I
have been talking about the issue of China's unscrupulous business
activities for years and years. I want to get this right. I want to get
this right. I want to get it right in a way where we can't be accused
of just blacklisting companies because we don't like their last name.
There is a better way to do this. Quite frankly, we tried to work
with Members on a better way, but my colleagues had no interest in
working with us on a better way. I regret that because I wouldn't be
here today, and I think you would have a unanimous vote.
I think people are concerned about the process, and process matters.
We are not China. We are the United States of America. We are better.
We are transparent. We employ and embrace open processes for the world
to see.
[[Page H5058]]
If any of these companies are engaged in activities that are
objectionable, let's hold them accountable, but it should be as the
result of a thorough process.
Again, I will close by saying I am one of the few persons here who is
sanctioned by China, who cannot travel there. My family can't travel
there according to their press release. They don't like me at all. The
reason why they don't is because we have passed legislation that has
been effective and that has worked.
We have an opportunity to do that here. There are no amendments. This
bill has been brought to the floor that really has all these incredible
consequences. There are no amendments allowed. There has been no input
from other committees. Here, take it or leave it.
We ought to leave it and go back to the drawing board and get this
right. We could figure this out in a matter of days. We can get this
right. Let's do it. Let's do it, and let's do it in a way that holds
China to account.
The final thing I will say is what we have been hearing from the
regulatory agencies, that by naming these companies in a bill, you are
giving them the heads up. They can change their name and reincorporate
in the Cayman Islands and come back, and we are playing whack-a-mole
with them. There is a better way to do this. Let us work together and
get there.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, in closing, we have heard here today broad
consensus among my House colleagues that U.S. taxpayer dollars should
not go to foreign biotechnology entities that steal Americans' genetic
data, contribute to a foreign adversary's military, or support the
violation of human rights.
The BIOSECURE Act addresses this national security problem by clearly
prohibiting a Federal agency from procuring any biotechnology equipment
or service from a company controlled by a foreign adversary, such as
the CCP.
Americans saw firsthand during the COVID pandemic what happens when a
foreign adversary acts irresponsibly in the biotechnology sector. China
restricted the export of vital medical equipment to the United States,
refused to tell the world about COVID when it first emerged, and
covered up evidence related to the origins of COVID-19.
This bill is a necessary step toward protecting Americans' sensitive
healthcare data from a foreign adversary like the CCP before the U.S.
biomedical and healthcare sector becomes even more dependent upon
Chinese-influenced organizations. It is critical that we pass the
BIOSECURE Act before more harm is done.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote in support of this national
security bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 8333, the BIOSECURE
Act which is critical legislation to prohibit federal contracts with
biotechnology companies connected to foreign nations of concern to
protect the U.S. national security, economic security and privacy.
Companies with ties to foreign adversaries, in particular the
People's Republic of China, pose threats to the privacy and security of
Americans. Under PRC law, any entity owned by or affiliated with
Chinese companies could be compelled by the Chinese government to
provide data on Americans.
The legislation addresses concerns about foreign nations' access to
sensitive data on Americans by prohibiting federal contracts with
biotechnology providers connected to foreign adversaries such as BGI, a
PRC-affiliated company, its subsidiary MGI Americas, Complete Genomics,
WuXi AppTec, and WuXi Biologics.
The legislation prevents funding from federal agencies to be spent on
equipment or services provided by biotechnology companies of concern,
including (1) entities subject to the jurisdiction, direction, control,
or operated on behalf of the government of a foreign adversary, (2)
entities involved in the manufacturing, distribution, provision, or
procurement of a biotechnology equipment or service, and (3) entities
which pose a risk to U.S. national security based on specified
activities.
This legislation is an important step to protect American patients,
our nation's biotechnology industry, and our national security from
exploitation by hostile foreign entities, and I urge all my colleagues
to support this bill and vote yes so we can pass this bill today.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Comer) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, H.R. 8333, as amended.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.
____________________