[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 126 (Thursday, August 1, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5781-S5782]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
By Mr. SCHUMER (for himself, Ms. Hirono, Mr. Schatz, Mr. Lujan,
Mr. Reed, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Carper, Mr. Welch, Mr.
Hickenlooper, Mr. Casey, Mr. Coons, Mrs. Shaheen, Ms. Baldwin,
Mr. Merkley, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Durbin, Ms. Warren, Mrs. Murray,
Mr. Van Hollen, Mr. Markey, Ms. Duckworth, Ms. Klobuchar, Ms.
Butler, Mr. Whitehouse, Mr. Sanders, Mr. Booker, Mrs.
Gillibrand, Mr. Wyden, Mr. King, Mr. Heinrich, Ms. Stabenow,
Mr. Padilla, Mr. Peters, Mr. Warnock, Ms. Smith, Mr. Kelly, and
Ms. Cantwell):
S. 4973. A bill to reassert the constitutional authority of Congress
to determine the general applicability of the criminal laws of the
United States, and for other purposes; read the first time.
Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the text
of the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
S. 4973
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``No Kings Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) no person, including any President, is above the law;
(2) Congress, under the Necessary and Proper Clause of
section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United
States, has the authority to determine to which persons the
criminal laws of the United States shall apply, including any
President;
(3) the Constitution of the United States does not grant to
any President any form of immunity (whether absolute,
presumptive, or otherwise) from criminal prosecution,
including for actions committed while serving as President;
(4) in The Federalist No. 69, Alexander Hamilton wrote that
there must be a difference between the ``sacred and
inviolable'' king of Great Britain and the President of the
United States, who ``would be amenable to personal punishment
and disgrace'' should his actions violate the laws of the
United States;
(5) the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia correctly concluded in United States v. Trump, No.
23-257 (TSC), 2023 WL 8359833 (D.D.C. December 1, 2023) that
``former Presidents do not possess absolute federal criminal
immunity for any acts committed while in office'', that
former Presidents ``may be subject to federal investigation,
indictment, prosecution, conviction, and punishment for any
criminal acts undertaken while in office'', and that a
``four-year service as Commander in Chief [does] not bestow
on [a President] the divine right of kings to evade the
criminal accountability that governs his fellow citizens'';
(6) similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit correctly affirmed in United
States v. Trump, 91 F.4th 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2024) that
``separation of powers doctrine does not immunize former
Presidents from federal criminal liability'' for their
official actions that ``allegedly violated generally
applicable criminal laws'' and acknowledged that the Founding
Fathers ``stresse[d] that the President must be unlike the
`king of Great Britain,' who was `sacred and inviolable.' The
Federalist No. 69, at 337-38'';
(7) the Supreme Court of the United States, however,
vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and incorrectly
declared in Trump v. United States, No. 23-939, 2024 WL
3237603 (U.S. July 1, 2024) that ``the President is
absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct
within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority'' and
that a President ``is entitled, at a minimum, to a
presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official
acts'', assertions at odds with the plain text of the
Constitution of the United States; and
(8) Congress has explicit and broad authority to make
exceptions and regulations to the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of the United States under clause 2 of
section 2 of article III of the Constitution of the United
States.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are to--
(1) reassert the constitutional authority of Congress to
determine the general applicability of the criminal laws of
the United States, including to Presidents and Vice
Presidents;
(2) clarify that a President or Vice President is not
entitled to any form of immunity from criminal prosecution
for violations of the criminal laws of the United States
unless specified by Congress; and
(3) impose certain limitations on the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States to
decide questions related to criminal immunity for Presidents
and Vice Presidents.
SEC. 3. NO PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY FOR CRIMES.
(a) In General.--
(1) No immunity.--A President, former President, Vice
President, or former Vice President shall not be entitled to
any form of immunity (whether absolute, presumptive, or
otherwise) from criminal prosecution for alleged violations
of the criminal laws of the United States unless specified by
Congress.
(2) Considerations.--A court of the United States may not
consider whether an alleged violation of the criminal laws of
the United States committed by a President or Vice President
was within the conclusive or preclusive constitutional
authority of a President or Vice President or was related to
the official duties of a President or Vice President unless
directed by Congress.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to immunize a President, former President, Vice
President, or former Vice President from criminal prosecution
for alleged violations of the criminal laws of the States.
SEC. 4. JUDICIAL REVIEW.
(a) Criminal Proceedings.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, for any criminal proceeding commenced by
the United States against a President, former President, Vice
President, or former Vice President for alleged violations of
the criminal laws of the United States, the following rules
shall apply:
(1) The action shall be filed in the applicable district
court of the United States or the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia.
(2) The Supreme Court of the United States shall have no
appellate jurisdiction, on the basis that an alleged criminal
act was within the conclusive or preclusive constitutional
authority of a President or Vice President or on the basis
that an alleged criminal act was related to the official
duties of a President or Vice President, to (or direct
another court of the United States to)--
(A) dismiss an indictment or any other charging instrument;
(B) grant acquittal or dismiss or otherwise terminate a
criminal proceeding;
(C) halt, suspend, disband, or otherwise impede the
functions of any grand jury;
(D) grant a motion to suppress or bar evidence or
testimony, or otherwise exclude information from a criminal
proceeding;
(E) grant a writ of habeas corpus, a writ of coram nobis, a
motion to set aside a verdict or judgment, or any other form
of post-conviction or collateral relief;
(F) overturn a conviction;
(G) declare a criminal proceeding unconstitutional; or
(H) enjoin or restrain the enforcement or application of a
law.
(b) Constitutional Challenges.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, for
[[Page S5782]]
any civil action brought for declaratory, injunctive, or
other relief to adjudge the constitutionality, whether
facially or as-applied, of any provision of this Act
(including this section), or to bar or restrain the
enforcement or application of any provision of this Act
(including this section) on the ground of its
unconstitutionality, the following rules shall apply:
(1) A plaintiff may bring a civil action under this
subsection, and there shall be no other cause of action
available.
(2) Only a President, former President, Vice President, or
former Vice President shall have standing to bring a civil
action under this subsection.
(3) A facial challenge to the constitutionality of any
provision of this Act (including this section) may only be
brought not later than 180 days after the date of enactment
of this Act. An as-applied challenge to the constitutionality
of the enforcement or application of any provision of this
Act (including this section) may only be brought not later
than 90 days after the date of such enforcement or
application.
(4) A court of the United States shall presume that a
provision of this Act (including this section) or the
enforcement or application of any such provision is
constitutional unless it is demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence that such provision or its enforcement or
application is unconstitutional.
(5) The civil action shall be filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, which shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of a civil action under this
subsection. An appeal may be taken from the district court to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, which shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
hear an appeal in a civil action under this subsection.
(6) In a civil action under this subsection, a decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit shall be final and not appealable to the
Supreme Court of the United States.
(7) The Supreme Court of the United States shall have no
appellate jurisdiction to declare any provision of this Act
(including this section) unconstitutional or to bar or
restrain the enforcement or application of any provision of
this Act (including this section) on the ground of its
unconstitutionality.
(c) Clarifying Scope of Jurisdiction.--
(1) In general.--If an action at the time of its
commencement is not subject to subsection (a) or (b), but an
amendment, counterclaim, cross-claim, affirmative defense, or
any other pleading or motion is filed such that the action
would be subject to subsection (a) or (b), the action shall
thereafter be conducted pursuant to subsection (a) or (b), as
applicable.
(2) State courts.--An action subject to subsection (a) or
(b) may not be heard in any State court.
(3) Sua sponte relief.--No court may issue relief sua
sponte on the ground that a provision of this Act (including
this section), or its enforcement or application, is
unconstitutional.
SEC. 5. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act, or application of such
provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be
unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, and the
application of the provisions of this Act to any person or
circumstance shall not be affected thereby.
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