[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 125 (Wednesday, July 31, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5691-S5709]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 3209. Mr. RUBIO (for Mr. Warner (for himself and Mr. Rubio))
submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by Mr. Rubio to the bill
S. 4638, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2025 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and
for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
[[Page S5692]]
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
DIVISION __--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This division may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this
division is as follows:
DIVISION __--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 301. Improvements relating to conflicts of interest in the
Intelligence Innovation Board.
Sec. 302. National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment
and National Counterintelligence Strategy.
Sec. 303. Open Source Intelligence Division of Office of Intelligence
and Analysis personnel.
Sec. 304. Improvements to advisory board of National Reconnaissance
Office.
Sec. 305. National Intelligence University acceptance of grants.
Sec. 306. Limitation on availability of funds for new controlled access
programs.
Sec. 307. Limitation on transfers from controlled access programs.
Sec. 308. Expenditure of funds for certain intelligence and
counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard.
Sec. 309. Strengthening of Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
Sec. 310. Report on collection of United States location information.
TITLE IV--COUNTERING FOREIGN THREATS
Subtitle A--People's Republic of China
Sec. 401. Assessment of current status of biotechnology of People's
Republic of China.
Sec. 402. Intelligence sharing with law enforcement agencies on
synthetic opioid precursor chemicals originating in
People's Republic of China.
Sec. 403. Report on efforts of the People's Republic of China to evade
United States transparency and national security
regulations.
Sec. 404. Plan for recruitment of Mandarin speakers.
Subtitle B--The Russian Federation
Sec. 411. Report on Russian Federation sponsorship of acts of
international terrorism.
Sec. 412. Assessment of likely course of war in Ukraine.
Subtitle C--International Terrorism
Sec. 421. Assessment and report on the threat of ISIS-Khorasan to the
United States.
Subtitle D--Other Foreign Threats
Sec. 431. Assessment of visa-free travel to and within Western
Hemisphere by nationals of countries of concern.
Sec. 432. Assessment of threat posed by citizenship-by-investment
programs.
Sec. 433. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence review of
visitors and assignees.
Sec. 434. Assessment of the lessons learned by the intelligence
community with respect to the Israel-Hamas war.
Sec. 435. Central Intelligence Agency intelligence assessment on Tren
de Aragua.
Sec. 436. Assessment of Maduro regime's economic and security
relationships with state sponsors of terrorism and
foreign terrorist organizations.
Sec. 437. Continued congressional oversight of Iranian expenditures
supporting foreign military and terrorist activities.
TITLE V--EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Sec. 501. Strategy to counter foreign adversary efforts to utilize
biotechnologies in ways that threaten United States
national security.
Sec. 502. Improvements to the roles, missions, and objectives of the
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
Sec. 503. Enhancing capabilities to detect foreign adversary threats
relating to biological data.
Sec. 504. National security procedures to address certain risks and
threats relating to artificial intelligence.
Sec. 505. Establishment of Artificial Intelligence Security Center.
Sec. 506. Sense of Congress encouraging intelligence community to
increase private sector capital partnerships and
partnership with Office of Strategic Capital of
Department of Defense to secure enduring technological
advantages.
Sec. 507. Intelligence Community Technology Bridge Program.
Sec. 508. Enhancement of authority for intelligence community public-
private talent exchanges.
Sec. 509. Enhancing intelligence community ability to acquire emerging
technology that fulfills intelligence community needs.
Sec. 510. Sense of Congress on hostile foreign cyber actors.
Sec. 511. Deeming ransomware threats to critical infrastructure a
national intelligence priority.
Sec. 512. Enhancing public-private sharing on manipulative adversary
practices in critical mineral projects.
TITLE VI--CLASSIFICATION REFORM
Sec. 601. Classification and declassification of information.
Sec. 602. Minimum standards for Executive agency insider threat
programs.
TITLE VII--SECURITY CLEARANCES AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE
IMPROVEMENTS
Sec. 701. Security clearances held by certain former employees of
intelligence community.
Sec. 702. Policy for authorizing intelligence community program of
contractor-owned and contractor-operated sensitive
compartmented information facilities.
Sec. 703. Enabling intelligence community integration.
Sec. 704. Appointment of spouses of certain Federal employees.
Sec. 705. Plan for staffing the intelligence collection positions of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 706. Sense of Congress on Government personnel support for foreign
terrorist organizations.
TITLE VIII--WHISTLEBLOWERS
Sec. 801. Improvements regarding urgent concerns submitted to
Inspectors General of the intelligence community.
Sec. 802. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity as
act of reprisal.
Sec. 803. Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures to
Inspectors General of elements of the intelligence
community.
Sec. 804. Clarification of authority of certain Inspectors General to
receive protected disclosures.
Sec. 805. Whistleblower protections relating to psychiatric testing or
examination.
Sec. 806. Establishing process parity for adverse security clearance
and access determinations.
Sec. 807. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory
revocation of security clearances and access
determinations.
TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS
Sec. 901. Modification of authority for Secretary of State and heads of
other Federal agencies to pay costs of treating
qualifying injuries and make payments for qualifying
injuries to the brain.
TITLE X--UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA
Sec. 1001. Comptroller General of the United States review of All-
domain Anomaly Resolution Office.
Sec. 1002. Sunset of requirements relating to audits of unidentified
anomalous phenomena historical record report.
Sec. 1003. Funding limitations relating to unidentified anomalous
phenomena.
TITLE XI--OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 1101. Limitation on directives under Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 relating to certain electronic
communication service providers.
Sec. 1102. Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect for
Elections through Independent Testing Act of 2024.
Sec. 1103. Parity in pay for staff of the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board and the intelligence community.
Sec. 1104. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements.
Sec. 1105. Technical amendments.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning
given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in such section.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2025 for the conduct of
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the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
Federal Government.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to
be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the
intelligence activities of the Federal Government are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany this division.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,
within the executive branch of the Federal Government.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2025 the sum of $656,573,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In
addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the
Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a),
there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account for fiscal year 2025 such
additional amounts as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
SEC. 104. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund
$514,000,000 for fiscal year 2025.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 301. IMPROVEMENTS RELATING TO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
THE INTELLIGENCE INNOVATION BOARD.
Section 7506(g) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2)--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``active and'' before
``potential'';
(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community'' and inserting ``the
designated agency ethics official'';
(C) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D);
and
(D) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following:
``(C) Authority for the designated agency ethics official
to grant a waiver for a conflict of interest, except that--
``(i) no waiver may be granted for an active conflict of
interest identified with respect to the Chair of the Board;
``(ii) every waiver for a potential conflict of interest
requires review and approval by the Director of National
Intelligence; and
``(iii) for every waiver granted, the designated agency
ethics official shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees notice of the waiver.''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) Definition of designated agency ethics official.--In
this subsection, the term `designated agency ethics official'
means the designated agency ethics official (as defined in
section 13101 of title 5, United States Code) in the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence.''.
SEC. 302. NATIONAL THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND PRIORITIZATION
ASSESSMENT AND NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
STRATEGY.
Section 904(f)(3) of the Counterintelligence Enhancement
Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383(f)(3)) is amended by striking
``National Counterintelligence Executive'' and inserting
``Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center''.
SEC. 303. OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF OFFICE OF
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS PERSONNEL.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this
division for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security may be obligated or expended
by the Office to increase, above the staffing level in effect
on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, the
number of personnel assigned to the Open Source Intelligence
Division who work exclusively or predominantly on domestic
terrorism issues.
SEC. 304. IMPROVEMENTS TO ADVISORY BOARD OF NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
Section 106A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3041a(d)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3)(A)--
(A) in clause (i)--
(i) by striking ``five members appointed by the Director''
and inserting ``up to 8 members appointed by the Director'';
and
(ii) by inserting ``, and who do not present any actual or
potential conflict of interest'' before the period at the
end;
(B) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and
(C) by inserting after clause (i) the following:
``(ii) Membership structure.--The Director shall ensure
that no more than 2 concurrently serving members of the Board
qualify for membership on the Board based predominantly on a
single qualification set forth under clause (i).'';
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (7) as
paragraphs (6) through (8), respectively;
(3) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
``(5) Charter.--The Director shall establish a charter for
the Board that includes the following:
``(A) Mandatory processes for identifying potential
conflicts of interest, including the submission of initial
and periodic financial disclosures by Board members.
``(B) The vetting of potential conflicts of interest by the
designated agency ethics official, except that no individual
waiver may be granted for a conflict of interest identified
with respect to the Chair of the Board.
``(C) The establishment of a process and associated
protections for any whistleblower alleging a violation of
applicable conflict of interest law, Federal contracting law,
or other provision of law.''; and
(4) in paragraph (8), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
striking ``September 30, 2024'' and inserting ``August 31,
2027''.
SEC. 305. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY ACCEPTANCE OF
GRANTS.
(a) In General.--Subtitle D of title X of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3227 et seq.) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 1035. National Intelligence University acceptance of
grants
``(a) Authority.--The Director of National Intelligence may
authorize the President of the National Intelligence
University to accept qualifying research grants.
``(b) Qualifying Grants.--A qualifying research grant under
this section is a grant that is awarded on a competitive
basis by an entity referred to in subsection (c) for a
research project with a scientific, literary, or educational
purpose.
``(c) Entities From Which Grants May Be Accepted.--A
qualifying research grant may be accepted under this section
only from a Federal agency or from a corporation, fund,
foundation, educational institution, or similar entity that
is organized and operated primarily for scientific, literary,
or educational purposes.
``(d) Administration of Grant Funds.--
``(1) Establishment of account.--The Director shall
establish an account for administering funds received as
qualifying research grants under this section.
``(2) Use of funds.--The President of the University shall
use the funds in the account established pursuant to
paragraph (1) in accordance with applicable provisions of the
regulations and the terms and conditions of the grants
received.
``(e) Related Expenses.--Subject to such limitations as may
be provided in appropriations Acts, appropriations available
for the National Intelligence University may be used to pay
expenses incurred by the University in applying for, and
otherwise pursuing, the award of qualifying research grants.
``(f) Regulations.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall prescribe regulations for the administration of this
section.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents preceding
section 2 of such Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 1034 the following new item:
``Sec. 1035. National Intelligence University acceptance of grants.''.
SEC. 306. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR NEW
CONTROLLED ACCESS PROGRAMS.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this
division for the National Intelligence Program (as defined in
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003)) may be obligated or expended for any controlled access
program (as defined in section 501A(d) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091a(d))), or a compartment
or subcompartment therein, that is established on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act, until the head of the
element of the intelligence community responsible for the
establishment of such program, compartment, or
subcompartment, submits the notification required by section
501A(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3091a(b)).
SEC. 307. LIMITATION ON TRANSFERS FROM CONTROLLED ACCESS
PROGRAMS.
Section 501A(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3091a(b)) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Limitation on
Establishment'' and inserting ``Limitations'';
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(2) by striking ``A head'' and inserting the following:
``(1) Establishment.--A head''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Transfers.--A head of an element of the intelligence
community may not transfer a capability from a controlled
access program, including from a compartment or
subcompartment therein to a compartment or subcompartment of
another controlled access program, to a special access
program (as defined in section 1152(g) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (50 U.S.C.
3348(g))), or to anything else outside the controlled access
program, until the head submits to the appropriate
congressional committees and congressional leadership notice
of the intent of the head to make such transfer.''.
SEC. 308. EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE COAST
GUARD.
The Commandant of the Coast Guard may use up to 1 percent
of the amounts made available for the National Intelligence
Program (as such term is defined in section 3 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) for each fiscal year
for intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the
Coast Guard relating to objects of a confidential,
extraordinary, or emergency nature, which amounts may be
accounted for solely on the certification of the Commandant
and each such certification shall be considered to be a
sufficient voucher for the amount contained in the
certification.
SEC. 309. STRENGTHENING OF OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND
ANALYSIS.
(a) Improvements.--
(1) In general.--Section 311 of title 31, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 311. Office of Economic Intelligence and Security
``(a) Definitions.--In this section, the terms
`counterintelligence', `foreign intelligence', and
`intelligence community' have the meanings given such terms
in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003).
``(b) Establishment.--There is established within the
Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the
Department of the Treasury, the Office of Economic
Intelligence and Security (in this section referred to as the
`Office'), which, subject to the availability of
appropriations, shall--
``(1) be responsible for the receipt, analysis, collation,
and dissemination of foreign intelligence and foreign
counterintelligence information relating to the operation and
responsibilities of the Department of the Treasury and other
Federal agencies executing economic statecraft tools that do
not include any elements that are elements of the
intelligence community;
``(2) provide intelligence support and economic analysis to
Federal agencies implementing United States economic policy,
including for purposes of global strategic competition; and
``(3) have such other related duties and authorities as may
be assigned by the Secretary for purposes of the
responsibilities described in paragraph (1), subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.
``(c) Assistant Secretary for Economic Intelligence and
Security.--The Office shall be headed by an Assistant
Secretary, who shall be appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Assistant
Secretary shall report directly to the Undersecretary for
Terrorism and Financial Crimes.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 3 of such title is amended by striking
the item relating to section 311 and inserting the following:
``311. Office of Economic Intelligence and Security.''.
(3) Conforming amendment.--Section 3(4)(J) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)(J)) is amended by
striking ``Office of Intelligence and Analysis'' and
inserting ``Office of Economic Intelligence and Security''.
(4) References.--Any reference in a law, regulation,
document, paper, or other record of the United States to the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the
Treasury shall be deemed a reference to the Office of
Economic Intelligence and Security of the Department of the
Treasury.
(b) Strategic Plan and Effective Date.--
(1) Definition of appropriate committees of congress.--In
this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of
Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Financial Services and the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) In general.--Subsection (a) shall take effect on the
date that is 180 days after the date on which the Secretary
of the Treasury submits to the appropriate committees of
Congress a 3-year strategic plan detailing the resources
required by the Department of the Treasury.
(3) Contents.--The strategic plan submitted pursuant to
paragraph (2) shall include the following:
(A) Staffing and administrative expenses planned for the
Department for the 3-year period beginning on the date of the
submittal of the plan, including resourcing requirements for
each office and division in the Department during such
period.
(B) Stuctural changes and resources, including leadership
structure and staffing, required to implement subsection (a)
during the period described in subparagraph (A).
(c) Limitation.--None of the amounts appropriated or
otherwise made available before the date of the enactment of
this Act for the Office of Foreign Asset Control, the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Office of
International Affairs, the Office of Tax Policy, or the
Office of Domestic Finance may be transferred or reprogrammed
to support the Office of Economic Intelligence and Security
established by section 311 of title 31, United States Code,
as added by subsection (a).
SEC. 310. REPORT ON COLLECTION OF UNITED STATES LOCATION
INFORMATION.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on
Homeland Security, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce
of the House of Representatives.
(2) United states location information.--The term ``United
States location information'' means information derived or
otherwise calculated from the use of technology, including
global positioning systems-level latitude and longitude
coordinates or other mechanisms, that reveals the past or
present approximate or specific location of a customer,
subscriber, user, or device in the United States, or, if the
customer, subscriber, or user is known to be a United States
person, outside the United States.
(3) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1801).
(b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Attorney General,
shall issue a report on the collection of United States
location information by the intelligence community.
(c) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
address the filtering, segregation, use, dissemination,
masking, and retention of United States location information
by the intelligence community.
(d) Form; Public Availability.--The report required by
subsection (a)--
(1) shall be issued in unclassified form and made available
to the public; and
(2) may include a classified annex, which the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress.
(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed as authorizing--
(1) any rulemaking; or
(2) the collection or access of United States location
information.
TITLE IV--COUNTERING FOREIGN THREATS
Subtitle A--People's Republic of China
SEC. 401. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT STATUS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY OF
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Assessment.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Director of the
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center and such
heads of elements of the intelligence community as the
Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate,
conduct an assessment of the current status of the
biotechnology of the People's Republic of China, which shall
include an assessment of how the People's Republic of China
is supporting the biotechnology sector through both licit and
illicit means, such as foreign direct investment, subsidies,
talent recruitment, or other efforts.
(b) Report.--
(1) Definition of appropriate committees of congress.--In
this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of
Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the
Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Homeland
Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date on
which the Direct of National Intelligence completes the
assessment required by subsection (a), the Director shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on
the findings of the Director with respect to the assessment.
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(3) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (2)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 402. INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
ON SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECURSOR CHEMICALS
ORIGINATING IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Strategy Required.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Attorney
General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of such
other departments and agencies as the Director considers
appropriate, develop a strategy to ensure robust intelligence
sharing relating to the illicit trafficking of synthetic
opioid precursor chemicals from the People's Republic of
China and other source countries.
(b) Elements.--The strategy developed pursuant to
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of existing intelligence sharing between
the intelligence community, the Department of Justice, the
Department of Homeland Security, any other relevant Federal
departments, and State, local, territorial and tribal law
enforcement entities, including any mechanisms that allow
subject matter experts with and without security clearances
to share and receive information and any gaps identified.
(2) A plan to ensure robust intelligence sharing, including
by addressing gaps identified pursuant to subparagraph (1)
and identifying additional capabilities and resources needed;
(3) A detailed description of the measures used to ensure
the protection of civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy
rights in carrying out this strategy.
SEC. 403. REPORT ON EFFORTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
TO EVADE UNITED STATES TRANSPARENCY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY REGULATIONS.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee
on Armed Services of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the
Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Financial
Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(b) Report Required.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report on efforts of the People's Republic of China to evade
the following:
(1) Identification under section 1260H of the William M.
(Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283; 10 U.S.C. 113 note).
(2) Restrictions or limitations imposed by any of the
following:
(A) Section 805 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31).
(B) Section 889 of the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232;
41 U.S.C. 3901 note prec.).
(C) The list of specially designated nationals and blocked
persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of
the Department of the Treasury (commonly known as the ``SDN
list'').
(D) The Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry
and Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in
Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15, Code of Federal
Regulations.
(E) Commercial or dual-use export controls under the Export
Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.) and the
Export Administration Regulations.
(F) Executive Order 14105 (88 Fed. Reg. 54867; relating to
addressing United States investments in certain national
security technologies and products in countries of concern),
or successor order.
(G) Import restrictions on products made with forced labor
implemented by U.S. Customs and Border Protection pursuant to
Public Law 117-78 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).
(c) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to subsection (b)
shall be submitted in unclassified form.
SEC. 404. PLAN FOR RECRUITMENT OF MANDARIN SPEAKERS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a comprehensive plan to prioritize the recruitment
and training of individuals who speak Mandarin Chinese for
each element of the intelligence community.
(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Subtitle B--The Russian Federation
SEC. 411. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION SPONSORSHIP OF ACTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
(a) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee
on Homeland Security, the Committee on Financial Services,
and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term ``foreign
terrorist organization'' means an organization that has been
designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the
Secretary of State, pursuant to section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
(3) Specially designated global terrorist organization.--
The term ``specially designated global terrorist
organization'' means an organization that has been designated
as a specially designated global terrorist by the Secretary
of State or the Secretary, pursuant to Executive Order 13224
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property and
prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to
commit, or support terrorism).
(4) State sponsor of terrorism.--The term ``state sponsor
of terrorism'' means a country the government of which the
Secretary of State has determined has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism, for purposes
of--
(A) section 1754(c)(1)(A)(i) of the Export Control Reform
Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4813(c)(1)(A)(i));
(B) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2371);
(C) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2780(d)); or
(D) any other provision of law.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, in concurrence with the Secretary of
State, conduct and submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that includes the following:
(1) A list of all instances in which the Russian
Federation, or an official of the Russian Federation, has
provided financial, material, technical, or lethal support to
foreign terrorist organizations, specially designated global
terrorist organizations, state sponsors of terrorism, or for
acts of international terrorism.
(2) A list of all instances in which the Russian
Federation, or an official of the Russian Federation, has
willfully aided or abetted--
(A) the international proliferation of nuclear explosive
devices to persons;
(B) a person in acquiring unsafeguarded special nuclear
material; or
(C) the efforts of a person to use, develop, produce,
stockpile, or otherwise acquire chemical, biological, or
radiological weapons.
(3) An assessment of threats to the homeland as a result of
Russian government assistance to the Russian Imperial
Movement.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(d) Briefings.--Not later than 30 days after submittal of
the report required by subsection (b), the Director of
National Intelligence shall provide a classified briefing to
the appropriate congressional committees on the methodology
and findings of the report.
SEC. 412. ASSESSMENT OF LIKELY COURSE OF WAR IN UKRAINE.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in collaboration with the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress an assessment of the likely course of
the war in Ukraine through December 31, 2025.
(c) Elements.--The assessment required by subsection (b)
shall include an assessment of each of the following:
(1) The ability of the military of Ukraine to defend
against Russian aggression if the United States does, or does
not, continue to provide military and economic assistance to
Ukraine and does, or does not, maintain policy restrictions
on the use of United States weapons during the period
described in such subsection.
(2) The likely course of the war during such period if the
United States does, or does
[[Page S5696]]
not, continue to provide military and economic assistance to
Ukraine.
(3) The ability and willingness of countries in Europe and
outside of Europe to continue to provide military and
economic assistance to Ukraine if the United States does, or
does not, do so, including the ability of such countries to
make up for any shortfall in United States assistance.
(4) The effects of a potential defeat of Ukraine by the
Russian Federation on United States national security and
foreign policy interests, including the potential for further
aggression from the Russian Federation, the People's Republic
of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea.
(d) Form.--The assessment required by subsection (b) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
Subtitle C--International Terrorism
SEC. 421. ASSESSMENT AND REPORT ON THE THREAT OF ISIS-
KHORASAN TO THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on the
Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, the Committee on the
Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, in coordination with such elements
of the intelligence community as the Director considers
relevant, shall--
(1) conduct an assessment of the threats to the United
States and United States citizens posed by ISIS-Khorasan; and
(2) submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
written report on the findings of the assessment.
(c) Report Elements.--The report required by subsection (b)
shall include the following:
(1) A description of the historical evolution of ISIS-
Khorasan, beginning with Al-Qaeda and the attacks on the
United States on September 11, 2001.
(2) A description of the ideology and stated intentions of
ISIS-Khorasan as related to the United States and the
interests of the United States, including the homeland.
(3) A list of all terrorist attacks worldwide attributable
to ISIS-Khorasan or for which ISIS-Khorasan claimed credit,
beginning on January 1, 2015.
(4) A description of the involvement of ISIS-Khorasan in
Afghanistan before, during, and after the withdrawal of
United States military and civilian personnel and resources
in August 2021.
(5) The recruiting and training strategy of ISIS-Khorasan
following the withdrawal described in paragraph (4),
including--
(A) the geographic regions in which ISIS-Khorasan is
physically present;
(B) regions from which ISIS-Khorasan is recruiting; and
(C) its ambitions for individual actors worldwide and in
the United States.
(6) A description of the relationship between ISIS-Khorasan
and ISIS core, the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and other terrorist
groups, as appropriate.
(7) A description of the association of members of ISIS-
Khorasan with individuals formerly detained at United States
Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
(8) A description of ISIS-Khorasan's development of, and
relationships with, travel facilitation networks in Europe,
Central Asia, Eurasia, and Latin America.
(9) An assessment of ISIS-Khorasan's understanding of the
border and immigration policies of the United States.
(10) An assessment of the known travel of members of ISIS-
Khorasan within the Western Hemisphere and specifically
across the southern border of the United States.
(11) As assessment of ISIS-Khorasan's intentions and
capabilities within the United States.
(d) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
Subtitle D--Other Foreign Threats
SEC. 431. ASSESSMENT OF VISA-FREE TRAVEL TO AND WITHIN
WESTERN HEMISPHERE BY NATIONALS OF COUNTRIES OF
CONCERN.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the
Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Countries of concern.--The term ``countries of
concern'' means--
(A) the Russian Federation;
(B) the People's Republic of China;
(C) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(D) the Syrian Arab Republic;
(E) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
(F) the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; and
(G) the Republic of Cuba.
(b) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a written assessment of the impacts to national
security caused by travel without a visa to and within
countries in the Western Hemisphere by nationals of countries
of concern.
(c) Form.--The assessment required by subsection (b) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 432. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT POSED BY CITIZENSHIP-BY-
INVESTMENT PROGRAMS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Select Committee on
Intelligence, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Assistant secretary.--The term ``Assistant Secretary''
means the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
of the Department of the Treasury.
(3) Citizenship-by-investment program.--The term
``citizenship-by-investment program'' means an immigration,
investment, or other program of a foreign country that, in
exchange for a covered contribution, authorizes the
individual making the covered contribution to acquire
citizenship in such country, including temporary or permanent
residence that may serve as the basis for subsequent
naturalization.
(4) Covered contribution.--The term ``covered
contribution'' means--
(A) an investment in, or a monetary donation or any other
form of direct or indirect capital transfer to, including
through the purchase or rental of real estate--
(i) the government of a foreign country; or
(ii) any person, business, or entity in such a foreign
country; and
(B) a donation to, or endowment of, any activity
contributing to the public good in such a foreign country.
(5) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
National Intelligence.
(b) Assessment of Threat Posed by Citizenship-by-investment
Programs.--
(1) Assessment.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director and the Assistant
Secretary, in coordination with the heads of the other
elements of the intelligence community and the head of any
appropriate Federal agency, shall complete an assessment of
the threat posed to the United States by citizenship-by-
investment programs.
(2) Elements.--The assessment required by paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
(A) An identification of each citizenship-by-investment
program, including an identification of the foreign country
that operates each such program.
(B) With respect to each citizenship-by-investment program
identified under subparagraph (A)--
(i) a description of the types of investments required
under the program; and
(ii) an identification of the sectors to which an
individual may make a covered contribution under the program.
(C) An assessment of the threats posed to the national
security of the United States by malign actors that use
citizenship-by-investment programs--
(i) to evade sanctions or taxes;
(ii) to facilitate or finance--
(I) crimes relating to national security, including
terrorism, weapons trafficking or proliferation, cybercrime,
drug trafficking, human trafficking, and espionage; or
(II) any other activity that furthers the interests of a
foreign adversary or undermines the integrity of the
immigration laws or security of the United States; or
(iii) to undermine the United States and its interests
through any other means identified by the Director and the
Assistant Secretary.
(D) An identification of the foreign countries the
citizenship-by-investment programs of which pose the greatest
threat to the national security of the United States.
(3) Report and briefing.--
(A) Report.--
(i) In general.--Not later than 180 days after completing
the assessment required by paragraph (1), the Director and
the Assistant Secretary shall jointly submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the findings
of the Director and the Assistant Secretary with respect to
the assessment.
(ii) Elements.--The report required by clause (i) shall
include the following:
[[Page S5697]]
(I) A detailed description of the threats posed to the
national security of the United States by citizenship-by-
investment programs.
(II) Recommendations for additional resources or
authorities necessary to counter such threats.
(III) A description of opportunities to counter such
threats.
(iii) Form.--The report required by clause (i) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified
annex, as appropriate.
(B) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date on
which the report required by subparagraph (A) is submitted,
the Director and Assistant Secretary shall provide the
appropriate committees of Congress with a briefing on the
report.
SEC. 433. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
REVIEW OF VISITORS AND ASSIGNEES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland
Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Country of risk.--The term ``country of risk'' means a
country identified in the report submitted to Congress by the
Director of National Intelligence in 2024 pursuant to section
108B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3043b)
(commonly referred to as the ``Annual Threat Assessment'').
(3) Covered assignee; covered visitor.--The terms
``covered assignee'' and ``covered visitor'' mean a foreign
national from a country of risk that is ``engaging in
competitive behavior that directly threatens U.S. national
security'', who is not an employee of either the Department
of Energy or the management and operations contractor
operating a National Laboratory on behalf of the Department
of Energy, and has requested access to the premises,
information, or technology of a National Laboratory.
(4) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the
Department of Energy (or their designee).
(5) Foreign national.--The term ``foreign national'' has
the meaning given the term ``alien'' in section 101(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)).
(6) National laboratory.--The term ``National Laboratory''
has the meaning given the term in section 2 of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801).
(7) Nontraditional collection threat.--The term
``nontraditional collection threat'' means a threat posed by
an individual not employed by a foreign intelligence service,
who is seeking access to information about a capability,
research, or organizational dynamics of the United States to
inform a foreign adversary or non-state actor.
(b) Findings.--The Senate finds the following:
(1) The National Laboratories conduct critical, cutting-
edge research across a range of scientific disciplines that
provide the United States with a technological edge over
other countries.
(2) The technologies developed in the National Laboratories
contribute to the national security of the United States,
including classified and sensitive military technology and
dual-use commercial technology.
(3) International cooperation in the field of science is
critical to the United States maintaining its leading
technological edge.
(4) The research enterprise of the Department of Energy,
including the National Laboratories, is increasingly targeted
by adversarial nations to exploit military and dual-use
technologies for military or economic gain.
(5) Approximately 40,000 citizens of foreign countries,
including more than 8,000 citizens from China and Russia,
were granted access to the premises, information, or
technology of National Laboratories in fiscal year 2023.
(6) The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of
the Department of Energy is responsible for identifying
counterintelligence risks to the Department, including the
National Laboratories, and providing direction for the
mitigation of such risks.
(c) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that--
(1) before being granted access to the premises,
information, or technology of a National Laboratory, citizens
of foreign countries identified in the 2024 Annual Threat
Assessment of the intelligence community as ``engaging in
competitive behavior that directly threatens U.S. national
security'' should be appropriately screened by the National
Laboratory to which they seek access, and by the Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department, to
identify risks associated with granting the requested access
to sensitive military, or dual-use technologies; and
(2) identified risks should be mitigated.
(d) Review of Country of Risk Covered Visitor and Covered
Assignee Access Requests.--The Director shall, in
consultation with the applicable Under Secretary of the
Department of Energy that oversees the National Laboratory,
or their designee, promulgate a policy to assess the
counterintelligence risk that covered visitors or covered
assignees pose to the research or activities undertaken at a
National Laboratory.
(e) Advice With Respect to Covered Visitors or Covered
Assignees.--
(1) In general.--The Director shall provide advice to a
National Laboratory on covered visitors and covered assignees
when 1 or more of the following conditions are present:
(A) The Director has reason to believe that a covered
visitor or covered assignee is a nontraditional intelligence
collection threat.
(B) The Director is in receipt of information indicating
that a covered visitor or covered assignee constitutes a
counterintelligence risk to a National Laboratory.
(2) Advice described.--Advice provided to a National
Laboratory in accordance with paragraph (1) shall include a
description of the assessed risk.
(3) Risk mitigation.--When appropriate, the Director shall,
in consultation with the applicable Under Secretary of the
Department of Energy that oversees the National Laboratory,
or their designee, provide recommendations to mitigate the
risk as part of the advice provided in accordance with
paragraph (1).
(f) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and quarterly thereafter,
the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report, which shall include--
(1) the number of covered visitors or covered assignees
permitted to access the premises, information, or technology
of each National Laboratory;
(2) the number of instances in which the Director provided
advice to a National Laboratory in accordance with subsection
(e); and
(3) the number of instances in which a National Laboratory
took action inconsistent with advice provided by the Director
in accordance with subsection (e).
(g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out
this section for each of fiscal years 2024 through 2032.
SEC. 434. ASSESSMENT OF THE LESSONS LEARNED BY THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO THE
ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with such other heads of
elements of the intelligence community as the Director
considers appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a written assessment of the lessons
learned from the Israel-Hamas war.
(c) Elements.--The assessment required by subsection (b)
shall include the following:
(1) Lessons learned from the timing and scope of the
October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas against Israel, including
lessons related to United States intelligence cooperation
with Israel and other regional partners.
(2) Lessons learned from advances in warfare, including the
use by adversaries of a complex tunnel network.
(3) Lessons learned from attacks by adversaries against
maritime shipping routes in the Red Sea.
(4) Lessons learned from the use by adversaries of rockets,
missiles, and unmanned aerial systems, including attacks by
Iran.
(5) Analysis of the impact of the Israel-Hamas war on the
global security environment, including the war in Ukraine.
(d) Form.--The assessment required by subsection (b) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 435. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
ON TREN DE ARAGUA.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the
Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Homeland Security, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, in consultation with such other
[[Page S5698]]
heads of elements of the intelligence community as the
Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress an intelligence assessment
on the gang known as ``Tren de Aragua''.
(c) Elements.--The intelligence assessment required by
subsection (b) shall include the following:
(1) A description of the key leaders, organizational
structure, subgroups, presence in countries in the Western
Hemisphere, and cross-border illicit drug smuggling routes of
Tren de Aragua.
(2) A description of the practices used by Tren de Aragua
to generate revenue.
(3) A description of the level at which Tren de Aragua
receives support from the regime of Nicolas Maduro in
Venezuela.
(4) A description of the manner in which Tren de Aragua is
exploiting heightened migratory flows out of Venezuela and
throughout the Western Hemisphere to expand its operations.
(5) A description of the degree to which Tren de Aragua
cooperates or competes with other criminal organizations in
the Western Hemisphere.
(6) An estimate of the annual revenue received by Tren de
Aragua from the sale of illicit drugs, kidnapping, and human
trafficking, disaggregated by activity.
(7) Any other information the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency considers relevant.
(d) Form.--The intelligence assessment required by
subsection (b) may be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 436. ASSESSMENT OF MADURO REGIME'S ECONOMIC AND SECURITY
RELATIONSHIPS WITH STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM
AND FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a written assessment of the economic and security
relationships of the regime of Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela
with the countries and organizations described in subsection
(c), including formal and informal support to and from such
countries and organizations.
(c) Countries and Organizations Described.--The countries
and organizations described in this subsection are the
following:
(1) The following countries designated by the United States
as state sponsors of terrorism:
(A) The Republic of Cuba.
(B) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
(2) The following organizations designated by the United
States as foreign terrorist organizations:
(A) The National Liberation Army (ELN).
(B) The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's
Army (FARC-EP).
(C) The Segunda Marquetalia.
(d) Form.--The assessment required by subsection (b) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 437. CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF IRANIAN
EXPENDITURES SUPPORTING FOREIGN MILITARY AND
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
(b) Update Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress an update to the report submitted under section 6705
of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019,
and 2020 (22 U.S.C. 9412) to reflect current occurrences,
circumstances, and expenditures.
(c) Form.--The update submitted pursuant to subsection (b)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
TITLE V--EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
SEC. 501. STRATEGY TO COUNTER FOREIGN ADVERSARY EFFORTS TO
UTILIZE BIOTECHNOLOGIES IN WAYS THAT THREATEN
UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Homeland Security, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that as
biotechnologies become increasingly important with regard to
the national security interests of the United States, and
with the addition of biotechnologies to the biosecurity
mission of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity
Center, the intelligence community must articulate and
implement a strategy to identify and assess threats relating
to biotechnologies.
(c) Strategy for Biotechnologies Critical to National
Security.--
(1) Strategy required.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, acting through the Director of the
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center and in
coordination with the heads of such other elements of the
intelligence community as the Director of National
Intelligence considers appropriate, develop and submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a whole-of-government
strategy to address concerns relating to biotechnologies.
(2) Elements.--The strategy developed and submitted
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) Identification and assessment of threats associated
with biotechnologies critical to the national security of the
United States, including materials that involve a dependency
on foreign adversary nations.
(B) A determination of how best to counter foreign
adversary efforts to utilize biotechnologies that threaten
the national security of the United States, including threats
identified pursuant to paragraph (1).
(C) A plan to support efforts of other Federal departments
and agencies to secure United States supply chains of the
biotechnologies critical to the national security of the
United States, by coordinating--
(i) across the intelligence community;
(ii) the support provided by the intelligence community to
other relevant Federal departments and agencies and
policymakers;
(iii) the engagement of the intelligence community with
private sector entities, in coordination with other relevant
Federal departments and agencies, as may be applicable; and
(iv) how the intelligence community, in coordination with
other relevant Federal departments and agencies, can support
such efforts to secure United States supply chains for and
use of biotechnologies.
(D) Proposals for such legislative or administrative action
as the Directors consider necessary to support the strategy.
SEC. 502. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE ROLES, MISSIONS, AND OBJECTIVES
OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND
BIOSECURITY CENTER.
Section 119A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3057) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(4), by striking ``biosecurity and''
and inserting ``counterproliferation, biosecurity, and''; and
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``analyzing and'';
(ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``Establishing'' and
inserting ``Coordinating the establishment of'';
(iii) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``Disseminating''
and inserting ``Overseeing the dissemination of'';
(iv) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ``and coordinating''
after ``Conducting''; and
(v) in subparagraph (G), by striking ``Conducting'' and
inserting ``Coordinating and advancing''; and
(B) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and analysis'';
(ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (C) through (E) as
subparagraphs (D) through (F), respectively;
(iii) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following:
``(C) Overseeing and coordinating the analysis of
intelligence on biosecurity and foreign biological threats in
support of the intelligence needs of Federal departments and
agencies responsible for public health, including by
providing analytic priorities to elements of the intelligence
community and by conducting and coordinating net
assessments.'';
(iv) in subparagraph (D), as redesignated by clause (ii),
by inserting ``on matters relating to biosecurity and foreign
biological threats'' after ``public health'';
(v) in subparagraph (F), as redesignated by clause (ii), by
inserting ``and authorities'' after ``capabilities''; and
(vi) by adding at the end the following:
``(G) Enhancing coordination between elements of the
intelligence community and private sector entities on
information relevant to biosecurity, biotechnology, and
foreign biological threats, and coordinating such information
with relevant Federal departments and agencies, as
applicable.''.
SEC. 503. ENHANCING CAPABILITIES TO DETECT FOREIGN ADVERSARY
THREATS RELATING TO BIOLOGICAL DATA.
(a) Definition of Biological Data.--The term ``biological
data'' means information,
[[Page S5699]]
including associated descriptors, derived from the structure,
function, or process of a biological system that is either
measured, collected, or aggregated for analysis.
(b) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, in consultation with relevant heads of
Federal departments and agencies, take the following steps to
standardize the use by the intelligence community of
biological data and the ability of the intelligence community
to detect foreign adversary threats relating to biological
data:
(1) Standardize the processes and procedures for the
collection, analysis, and dissemination of information
relating to foreign adversary use of biological data,
particularly in ways that threaten or could threaten the
national security of the United States.
(2) Issue policy guidance within the intelligence
community--
(A) to standardize the data security practices for
biological data maintained by the intelligence community,
including security practices for the handling and processing
of biological data, including with respect to protecting the
civil rights, liberties, and privacy of United States
persons;
(B) to standardize intelligence engagements with foreign
allies and partners with respect to biological data; and
(C) to standardize the creation of metadata relating to
biological data maintained by the intelligence community.
(3) Ensure coordination with such Federal departments and
agencies and entities in the private sector as the Director
considers appropriate to understand how foreign adversaries
are accessing and using biological data stored within the
United States.
SEC. 504. NATIONAL SECURITY PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS CERTAIN
RISKS AND THREATS RELATING TO ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Definition of Artificial Intelligence.--In this
section, the term ``artificial intelligence''--
(1) has the meaning given that term in section 5002 of the
National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (15
U.S.C. 9401); and
(2) includes the artificial systems and techniques
described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 238(g) of
the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232; 10 U.S.C. 4061 note
prec.)
(b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Artificial intelligence systems demonstrate increased
capabilities in the generation of synthetic media and
computer programming code, as well as areas such as object
recognition, natural language processing, and workflow
orchestration.
(2) The growing capabilities of artificial intelligence
systems in the areas described in paragraph (1), as well as
the greater accessibility of large-scale artificial
intelligence models and advanced computation capabilities to
individuals, businesses, and governments, have dramatically
increased the adoption of artificial intelligence products in
the United States and globally.
(3) The advanced capabilities of the systems described in
paragraph (1), and their accessibility to a wide-range of
users, have increased the likelihood and effect of foreign
misuse or malfunction of these systems, such as to assist
foreign actors to generate synthetic media for disinformation
campaigns, develop or refine malware for computer network
exploitation activity by foreign actors, enhance foreign
surveillance capabilities in ways that undermine the privacy
of citizens of the United States, and increase the risk of
foreign exploitation or malfunction of information technology
systems incorporating artificial intelligence systems in
mission-critical fields such as health care, critical
infrastructure, and transportation.
(c) Procedures Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
develop and issue procedures to facilitate and promote
mechanisms by which--
(1) vendors of advanced computation capabilities, vendors
and commercial users of artificial intelligence systems, as
well as independent researchers and other third parties, may
effectively notify appropriate elements of the United States
Government of--
(A) information security risks emanating from artificial
intelligence systems, such as the use of an artificial
intelligence system by foreign actors to develop or refine
malicious software;
(B) information security risks such as indications of
compromise or other threat information indicating a
compromise to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability
of an artificial intelligence system, or to the supply chain
of an artificial intelligence system, including training or
test data, frameworks, computing environments, or other
components necessary for the training, management, or
maintenance of an artificial intelligence system posed by
foreign actors;
(C) biosecurity risks emanating from artificial
intelligence systems, such as the use of an artificial
intelligence system by foreign actors to design, develop, or
acquire dual-use biological entities such as putatively toxic
small molecules, proteins, or pathogenic organisms;
(D) suspected foreign malign influence (as defined by
section 119C of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3059(f))) activity that appears to be facilitated by an
artificial intelligence system;
(E) chemical security risks emanating from artificial
intelligence systems, such as the use of an artificial
intelligence system to design, develop, or acquire chemical
weapons or their analogues, or other hazardous chemical
compounds; and
(F) any other unlawful activity by foreign actors
facilitated by, or directed at, an artificial intelligence
system;
(2) elements of the Federal Government may provide threat
briefings to vendors of advanced computation capabilities and
vendors of artificial intelligence systems, alerting them, as
may be appropriate, to potential or confirmed foreign
exploitation of their systems, as well as malign foreign
plans and intentions; and
(3) an inter-agency process is convened to identify
appropriate Federal agencies to assist in the private sector
engagement described in this subsection and to coordinate
with respect to risks that implicate multiple sectors and
Federal agencies, including leveraging Sector Risk Management
Agencies (as defined in section 2200 of the Homeland Security
Act of 20002 (6 U.S.C. 650)) where appropriate.
(d) Briefing Required.--
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the Committee on the
Judiciary, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) In general.--The President shall provide the
appropriate committees of Congress a briefing on procedures
developed and issued pursuant to subsection (c).
(3) Elements.--The briefing provided pursuant to paragraph
(2) shall include the following:
(A) A clear specification of which Federal agencies are
responsible for leading outreach to affected industry and the
public with respect to the matters described in subparagraphs
(A) through (E) of paragraph (1) of subsection (c) and
paragraph (2) of such subsection.
(B) An outline of a plan for industry outreach and public
education regarding risks posed by, and directed at,
artificial intelligence systems associated with foreign
actors.
(C) Use of research and development, stakeholder outreach,
and risk management frameworks established pursuant to--
(i) provisions of law in effect on the day before the date
of the enactment of this Act; or
(ii) Federal agency guidelines.
SEC. 505. ESTABLISHMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY
CENTER.
(a) Definition of Counter-artificial Intelligence.--In this
section, the term ``counter-artificial intelligence'' means
techniques or procedures to extract information about the
behavior or characteristics of an artificial intelligence
system, or to learn how to manipulate an artificial
intelligence system, in order to subvert the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of an artificial intelligence
system or adjacent system.
(b) Establishment.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National
Security Agency shall establish an Artificial Intelligence
Security Center within the Cybersecurity Collaboration Center
of the National Security Agency.
(c) Functions.--The functions of the Artificial
Intelligence Security Center shall be as follows:
(1) Developing guidance to prevent or mitigate counter-
artificial intelligence techniques.
(2) Promoting secure artificial intelligence adoption
practices for managers of national security systems (as
defined in section 3552 of title 44, United States Code) and
elements of the defense industrial base.
(3) Such other functions as the Director considers
appropriate.
SEC. 506. SENSE OF CONGRESS ENCOURAGING INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY TO INCREASE PRIVATE SECTOR CAPITAL
PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERSHIP WITH OFFICE OF
STRATEGIC CAPITAL OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO
SECURE ENDURING TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) acquisition leaders in the intelligence community
should further explore the strategic use of private capital
partnerships to secure enduring technological advantages for
the intelligence community, including through the
identification, development, and transfer of promising
technologies to full-scale programs capable of meeting
intelligence community requirements; and
(2) the intelligence community should undertake regular
consultation with Federal partners, such as the Office of
Strategic Capital of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
on best practices and lessons learned from their experiences
integrating these resources so as to accelerate attainment of
national security objectives.
SEC. 507. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY BRIDGE PROGRAM.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
[[Page S5700]]
(1) Nonprofit organization.--The term ``nonprofit
organization'' means an organization that is described in
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and
that is exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such Code.
(2) Work program.--The term ``work program'' means any
agreement between In-Q-Tel and a third-party company, where
such third-party company furnishes or is furnishing a product
or service for use by any of In-Q-Tel's government customers
to address those customers' technology needs or requirements.
(b) Establishment of Program.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall establish within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence a program to assist in the transitioning of
products or services from the research and development phase
to the contracting and production phase, subject to the
extent and in such amounts as specifically provided in
advance in appropriations Acts for such purposes.
(2) Designation.--The program established pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall be known as the ``Intelligence Community
Technology Bridge Program'' (in this subsection referred to
as the ``Program'').
(c) Provision of Assistance.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (3), the Director
shall, in consultation with In-Q-Tel, carry out the Program
by providing assistance to businesses or nonprofit
organizations that are transitioning products or services.
(2) Types of assistance.--Assistance provided under
paragraph (1) may be provided in the form of a grant or a
payment for a product or service.
(3) Requirements for assistance.--Assistance may be
provided under paragraph (1) to a business or nonprofit
organization that is transitioning a product or service only
if--
(A) the business or nonprofit organization--
(i) has participated or is participating in a work program;
or
(ii) is engaged with an element of the intelligence
community or Department of Defense for research and
development; and
(B) the Director or the head of an element of the
intelligence community attests that the product or service
will be utilized by an element of the intelligence community
for a mission need, such as because it would be valuable in
addressing a needed capability, fill or complement a
technology gap, or increase the supplier base or price-
competitiveness for the Federal Government.
(4) Priority for small business concerns and nontraditional
defense contractors.--In providing assistance under paragraph
(1), the Director shall prioritize the provision of
assistance to small business concerns (as defined under
section 3(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632(a)))
and nontraditional defense contractors (as defined in section
3014 of title 10, United States Code).
(d) Administration of Program.--
(1) In general.--The Program shall be administered by the
Director.
(2) Consultation.--In administering the Program, the
Director--
(A) shall consult with the heads of the elements of the
intelligence community; and
(B) may consult with In-Q-Tel, the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Investment Fund, and the Defense Innovation
Unit.
(e) Semiannual Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not later than September 30, 2025, and not
less frequently than twice each fiscal year thereafter in
which amounts are available for the provision of assistance
under the Program, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a semiannual report on
the Program.
(2) Contents.--Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph
(1) shall include, for the period covered by the report,
information about the following:
(A) How much was expended or obligated by the Program in
the provision of assistance under subsection (c).
(B) For what the amounts were expended or obligated.
(C) The effects of such expenditures and obligations,
including a timeline for expected milestones for operational
use.
(D) A summary of annual transition activities and outcomes
of such activities for the intelligence community.
(E) A description of why products and services were chosen
for transition, including a description of milestones
achieved.
(3) Form.--Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence to carry out the Program $75,000,000 for fiscal
year 2025.
SEC. 508. ENHANCEMENT OF AUTHORITY FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
PUBLIC-PRIVATE TALENT EXCHANGES.
(a) Focus Areas.--Subsection (a) of section 5306 of the
Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50
U.S.C. 3334) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Not later than'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--Not later than''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Focus areas.--The Director shall ensure that the
policies, processes, and procedures developed pursuant to
paragraph (1) require exchanges under this section relate to
intelligence or counterintelligence with a focus on rotations
described in such paragraph with private-sector organizations
in the following fields:
``(A) Finance.
``(B) Acquisition.
``(C) Biotechnology.
``(D) Computing.
``(E) Artificial intelligence.
``(F) Business process innovation and entrepreneurship.
``(G) Cybersecurity.
``(H) Materials and manufacturing.
``(I) Any other technology or research field the Director
determines relevant to meet evolving national security
threats in technology sectors.''.
(b) Duration of Temporary Details.--Subsection (e) of
section 5306 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018,
2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``3 years'' and inserting
``5 years''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``3 years'' and inserting
``5 years''.
(c) Treatment of Private-sector Employees.--Subsection (g)
of such section is amended--
(1) in paragraph (5), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(7) shall not be considered to have a conflict of
interest with an element of the intelligence community solely
because of being detailed to an element of the intelligence
community under this section.''.
(d) Hiring Authority.--Such section is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (j) as subsection (k); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (i) the following:
``(j) Hiring Authority.--
``(1) In general.--The Director may hire, under section
213.3102(r) of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, or
successor regulations, an individual who is an employee of a
private-sector organization who is detailed to an element of
the intelligence community under this section.
``(2) No personnel billet required.--Hiring an individual
under paragraph (1) shall not require a personnel billet.''.
(e) Annual Reports.--
(1) Definition of appropriate committees of congress.--In
this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of
Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for 2 more
years, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress an annual report on--
(A) the implementation of the policies, processes, and
procedures developed pursuant to subsection (a) of such
section 5306 (50 U.S.C. 3334) and the administration of such
section;
(B) how the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community are using or plan to use the authorities provided
under such section; and
(C) recommendations for legislative or administrative
action to increase use of the authorities provided under such
section.
SEC. 509. ENHANCING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ABILITY TO ACQUIRE
EMERGING TECHNOLOGY THAT FULFILLS INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY NEEDS.
(a) Definition of Work Program.--The term ``work program''
means any agreement between In-Q-Tel and a third-party
company, where such third-party company furnishes or is
furnishing a property, product, or service for use by any of
In-Q-Tel's government customers to address those customers'
technology needs or requirements.
(b) In General.--In addition to the exceptions listed under
section 3304(a) of title 41, United States Code, and under
section 3204(a) of title 10, United States Code, for the use
of competitive procedures, the Director of National
Intelligence or the head of an element of the intelligence
community may use procedures other than competitive
procedures to acquire a property, product, or service if--
(1) the property, product, or service is a work program;
and
(2) the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an
element of the intelligence community certifies that such
property, product, or service has been shown to meet an
identified need of the intelligence community.
(c) Justification for Use of Procedures Other Than
Competitive Procedures.--
(1) In general.--A property, product, or service may not be
acquired by the Director or the head of an element of the
intelligence community under subsection (b) using procedures
other than competitive procedures unless the acquiring
officer for the acquisition justifies, at the directorate
level, the use of such procedures in writing.
(2) Contents.--A justification in writing described in
paragraph (1) for an acquisition using procedures other than
competitive procedures shall include the following:
[[Page S5701]]
(A) A description of the need of the element of the
intelligence community that the property, product, or service
satisfies.
(B) A certification that the anticipated costs will be fair
and reasonable.
(C) A description of the market survey conducted or a
statement of the reasons a market survey was not conducted.
(D) Such other matters as the Director or the head, as the
case may be, determines appropriate.
SEC. 510. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON HOSTILE FOREIGN CYBER ACTORS.
It is the sense of Congress that foreign ransomware
organizations, and foreign affiliates associated with them,
constitute hostile foreign cyber actors, that covered nations
abet and benefit from the activities of these actors, and
that such actors should be treated as hostile foreign cyber
actors by the United States. Such actors include the
following:
(1) DarkSide.
(2) Conti.
(3) REvil.
(4) BlackCat, also known as ``ALPHV''.
(5) LockBit.
(6) Rhysida, also known as ``Vice Society''.
(7) Royal.
(8) Phobos, also known as ``Eight'' and also known as
``Joanta''.
(9) C10p.
(10) Hackers associated with the SamSam ransomware
campaigns.
(11) Play.
(12) BianLian.
(13) Killnet.
(14) Akira.
(15) Ragnar Locker, also known as ``Dark Angels''.
(16) Blacksuit.
(17) INC.
(18) Black Basta.
SEC. 511. DEEMING RANSOMWARE THREATS TO CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
PRIORITY.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on
the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Critical infrastructure.--The term ``critical
infrastructure'' has the meaning given such term in
subsection (e) of the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act
of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)).
(b) Ransomware Threats to Critical Infrastructure as
National Intelligence Priority.--The Director of National
Intelligence, pursuant to the provisions of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.), the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(Public Law 108-458), section 1.3(b)(17) of Executive Order
12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States
intelligence activities), as in effect on the day before the
date of the enactment of this Act, and National Security
Presidential Directive-26 (February 24, 2003; relating to
intelligence priorities), as in effect on the day before the
date of the enactment of this Act, shall deem ransomware
threats to critical infrastructure a national intelligence
priority component to the National Intelligence Priorities
Framework.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report on the implications of the
ransomware threat to United States national security.
(2) Contents.--The report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall address the following:
(A) Identification of individuals, groups, and entities who
pose the most significant threat, including attribution to
individual ransomware attacks whenever possible.
(B) Locations from which individuals, groups, and entities
conduct ransomware attacks.
(C) The infrastructure, tactics, and techniques ransomware
actors commonly use.
(D) Any relationships between the individuals, groups, and
entities that conduct ransomware attacks and their
governments or countries of origin that could impede the
ability to counter ransomware threats.
(E) Intelligence gaps that have impeded, or currently are
impeding, the ability to counter ransomware threats.
(3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 512. ENHANCING PUBLIC-PRIVATE SHARING ON MANIPULATIVE
ADVERSARY PRACTICES IN CRITICAL MINERAL
PROJECTS.
(a) Strategy Required.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of such
Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate,
develop a strategy to improve the sharing between the Federal
Government and private entities of information and
intelligence to mitigate the threat that foreign adversary
illicit activities and tactics pose to United States persons
in foreign jurisdictions on projects relating to energy
generation and storage, including with respect to critical
minerals inputs.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a)
shall cover--
(1) how best to assemble and transmit information to United
States persons--
(A) to protect against foreign adversary illicit tactics
and activities relating to critical mineral projects abroad,
including foreign adversary efforts to undermine such
projects abroad;
(B) to mitigate the risk that foreign adversary government
involvement in the ownership and control of entities engaging
in deceptive or illicit activities targeting critical mineral
supply chains pose to the interests of the United States; and
(C) to inform on economic espionage and other threats from
foreign adversaries to the rights of owners of intellectual
property, including owners of patents, trademarks,
copyrights, and trade secrets, and other sensitive
information, with respect to such property that is dependent
on critical mineral inputs; and
(2) how best to receive information from United States
persons on threats to United States interests in the critical
mineral supply chains, resources, mines, and products,
including disinformation campaigns abroad or other suspicious
malicious activity.
(c) Implementation Plan Required.--
(1) Definition of appropriate committees of congress.--In
this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of
Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date on
which the Director completes developing the strategy pursuant
to subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress, or provide such
committees a briefing on, a plan for implementing the
strategy.
TITLE VI--CLASSIFICATION REFORM
SEC. 601. CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--The President may, in accordance with this
section, protect from unauthorized disclosure any information
owned by, produced by or for, or under the control of the
executive branch of the Federal Government when there is a
demonstrable need to do so to protect the national security
of the United States.
(b) Establishment of Standards, Categories, and Procedures
for Classification and Declassification.--
(1) Governmentwide procedures.--
(A) Classification.--The President shall, to the extent
necessary, establish categories of information that may be
classified and procedures for classifying information under
subsection (a).
(B) Declassification.--At the same time the President
establishes categories and procedures under subparagraph (A),
the President shall establish procedures for declassifying
information that was previously classified.
(C) Minimum requirements.--The procedures established
pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall--
(i) be the exclusive means for classifying information on
or after the effective date established by subsection (c),
except with respect to information classified pursuant to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.);
(ii) ensure that no information is classified unless there
is a demonstrable need to do so to protect the national
security and there is a reasonable basis to believe that
means other than classification will not provide sufficient
protection;
(iii) ensure that no information may remain classified
indefinitely;
(iv) ensure that no information shall be classified,
continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be
declassified in order--
(I) to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or
administrative error;
(II) to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or
agency;
(III) to restrain competition; or
(IV) to prevent or delay the release of information that
does not require protection in the interest of the national
security;
(v) ensure that basic scientific research information not
clearly related to the national security shall not be
classified;
(vi) ensure that information may not be reclassified after
being declassified and released to the public under proper
authority unless personally approved by the President based
on a determination that such reclassification is required to
prevent significant and demonstrable damage to the national
security;
(vii) establish standards and criteria for the
classification of information;
(viii) establish standards, criteria, and timelines for the
declassification of information classified under this
section;
(ix) provide for the automatic declassification of
classified records with permanent historical value;
(x) provide for the timely review of materials submitted
for pre-publication;
(xi) ensure that due regard is given for the public
interest in disclosure of information;
[[Page S5702]]
(xii) ensure that due regard is given for the interests of
departments and agencies in sharing information at the lowest
possible level of classification;
(D) Submittal to congress.--The President shall submit to
Congress the categories and procedures established under
subsection (b)(1)(A) and the procedures established under
subsection (b)(1)(B) at least 60 days prior to their
effective date.
(2) Agency standards and procedures.--
(A) In general.--The head of each Federal agency shall
establish a single set of consolidated standards and
procedures to permit such agency to classify and declassify
information created by such agency in accordance with the
categories and procedures established by the President under
this section and otherwise to carry out this section.
(B) Submittal to congress.--Each agency head shall submit
to Congress the standards and procedures established by such
agency head under subparagraph (A).
(c) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Subsections (a) and (b) shall take effect
on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act.
(2) Relation to presidential directives.--Presidential
directives regarding classifying, safeguarding, and
declassifying national security information, including
Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
classified national security information), in effect on the
day before the date of the enactment of this Act, as well as
procedures issued pursuant to such Presidential directives,
shall remain in effect until superseded by procedures issued
pursuant to subsection (b).
(d) Conforming Amendment.--Section 805(2) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3164(2)) is amended by
inserting ``section 603 of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2025,'' before ``Executive Order''.
SEC. 602. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR EXECUTIVE AGENCY INSIDER
THREAT PROGRAMS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means any Executive agency
as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code, any
military department as defined in section 102 of such title,
and any other entity in the executive branch of the Federal
Government that comes into the possession of classified
information.
(2) Classified information.--The term ``classified
information'' means information that has been determined to
require protection from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to
Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
classified national security information), or predecessor or
successor order, to protect the national security of the
United States.
(b) Establishment of Insider Threat Programs.--Each head of
an agency with access to classified information shall
establish an insider threat program to protect classified
information from unauthorized disclosure.
(c) Minimum Standards.--In carrying out an insider threat
program established by the head of an agency pursuant to
subsection (b), the head of the agency shall--
(1) designate a senior official of the agency who shall be
responsible for management of the program;
(2) monitor user activity on all classified networks to
detect activity indicative of insider threat behavior;
(3) build and maintain an insider threat analytic and
response capability to review, assess, and respond to
information obtained pursuant to paragraph (2); and
(4) provide insider threat awareness training to all
cleared employees within 30 days of entry-on-duty or granting
of access to classified information and annually thereafter.
(d) Annual Reports.--Not less frequently than once each
year, the Director of National Intelligence shall, serving as
the Security Executive Agent under section 803 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162a), submit to
Congress an annual report on the compliance of agencies with
respect to the requirements of this section.
(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to revoke or diminish any right of an individual
provided by section 2303 or 7211 of title 5, United States
Code, or under any other applicable protections for
whistleblowers provided by law.
TITLE VII--SECURITY CLEARANCES AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE
IMPROVEMENTS
SEC. 701. SECURITY CLEARANCES HELD BY CERTAIN FORMER
EMPLOYEES OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Issuance of Guidelines and Instructions Required.--
Section 803(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3162a(c)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(5) issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of
Federal agencies to ensure that any individual who was
appointed by the President to a position in an element of the
intelligence community but is no longer employed by the
Federal Government shall maintain a security clearance only
in accordance with Executive Order 12968 (50 U.S.C. 3161
note; relating to access to classified information), or
successor order.''.
(b) Submittal of Guidelines and Instructions to Congress
Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall, in the Director's capacity as the Security Executive
Agent pursuant to subsection (a) of section 803 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162a), submit to
the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional defense committees the guidelines and
instructions required by subsection (c)(5) of such Act, as
added by subsection (a) of this section.
(c) Annual Report Required.--
(1) Definition of appropriate committees of congress.--In
this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of
Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the congressional defense committees;
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate; and
(D) the Committee on Oversight and Accountability of the
House of Representatives.
(2) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than once
each year thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence
shall, in the Director's capacity as the Security Executive
Agent pursuant to section 803(a) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162a(a)), submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress an annual report on the eligibility
status of former senior employees of the intelligence
community to access classified information.
(3) Contents.--Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph
(2) shall include, for the period covered by the report, the
following:
(A) A list of individuals who were appointed by the
President to a position in an element of the intelligence
community who currently hold security clearances.
(B) The number of such former employees who still hold
security clearances.
(C) For each former employee described in subparagraph
(B)--
(i) the position in the intelligence community held by the
former employee;
(ii) the years of service in such position; and
(iii) the individual's current employment position and
employer.
(D) The Federal entity authorizing and adjudicating the
former employees' need to know classified information.
SEC. 702. POLICY FOR AUTHORIZING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
PROGRAM OF CONTRACTOR-OWNED AND CONTRACTOR-
OPERATED SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
FACILITIES.
(a) Policy.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
establish a standardized policy for the intelligence
community that authorizes a program of contractor-owned and
contractor-operated sensitive compartmented information
facilities as a service to the national security and
intelligence enterprises.
(b) Requirements.--The policy established pursuant to
subsection (a) shall--
(1) authorize the head of an element of the intelligence
community to approve and accredit contractor-owned and
contractor-operated sensitive compartmented information
facilities; and
(2) designate an element of the intelligence community as a
service of common concern (as defined in Intelligence
Community Directive 122, or successor directive) to serve as
an accrediting authority (in accordance with Intelligence
Community Directive 705, or successor directive) on behalf of
other elements of the intelligence community for contractor-
owned and contractor-operated sensitive compartmented
information facilities.
(c) Cost Considerations.--In establishing the policy
required by subsection (a), the Director shall consider
existing demonstrated models where a contractor acquires,
outfits, and manages a facility pursuant to an agreement with
the Federal Government such that no funding from the Federal
Government is required to carry out the agreement.
(d) Briefing Required.--
(1) Definition of appropriate committees of congress.--In
this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of
Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date on
which the Director establishes the policy pursuant to
subsection (a), the Director shall brief the appropriate
committees of Congress on--
(A) additional opportunities to leverage contractor-owned
and contractor-operated sensitive compartmented information
facilities; and
(B) recommendations to address barriers, including
resources or authorities needed.
SEC. 703. ENABLING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INTEGRATION.
(a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
113B the following new section:
``SEC. 113C. ENABLING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INTEGRATION.
``(a) Provision of Goods or Services.--Subject to and in
accordance with any guidance and requirements developed by
the Director of National Intelligence, the head of an element
of the intelligence community may provide goods or services
to another element of the intelligence community without
reimbursement or transfer of funds for
[[Page S5703]]
hoteling initiatives for intelligence community employees and
affiliates defined in any such guidance and requirements
issued by the Director of National Intelligence.
``(b) Approval.--Prior to the provision of goods or
services pursuant to subsection (a), the head of the element
of the intelligence community providing such goods or
services and the head of the element of the intelligence
community receiving such goods or services shall approve such
provision.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the
National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after
the item relating to section 113B the following:
``Sec. 113C. Enabling intelligence community integration.''.
SEC. 704. APPOINTMENT OF SPOUSES OF CERTAIN FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES.
(a) In General.--Section 3330d of title 5, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in the section heading, by striking ``military and
Department of Defense civilian spouses'' and inserting
``military and Department of Defense, Department of State,
and intelligence community spouses'';
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) by redesignating the second paragraph (4) (relating to
a spouse of an employee of the Department of Defense) as
paragraph (7);
(B) by striking paragraph (5);
(C) by redesignating paragraph (4) (relating to the spouse
of a disabled or deceased member of the Armed Forces) as
paragraph (6);
(D) by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following:
``(3) The term `covered spouse' means an individual who is
married to an individual who--
``(A)(i) is an employee of the Department of State or an
element of the intelligence community; or
``(ii) is a member of the Armed Forces who is assigned to
an element of the intelligence community; and
``(B) is transferred in the interest of the Government from
one official station within the applicable agency to another
within the agency (that is outside of normal commuting
distance) for permanent duty.
``(4) The term `intelligence community' has the meaning
given the term in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
``(5) The term `remote work' refers to a work flexibility
arrangement under which an employee--
``(A) is not expected to physically report to the location
from which the employee would otherwise work, considering the
position of the employee; and
``(B) performs the duties and responsibilities of such
employee's position, and other authorized activities, from an
approved worksite--
``(i) other than the location from which the employee would
otherwise work;
``(ii) that may be inside or outside the local commuting
area of the location from which the employee would otherwise
work; and
``(iii) that is typically the residence of the employee.'';
and
(E) by adding at the end the following:
``(8) The term `telework' has the meaning given the term in
section 6501.''; and
(3) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(B) in the first paragraph (3) (relating to a spouse of a
member of the Armed Forces on active duty), by striking the
period at the end and inserting a semicolon;
(C) by redesignating the second paragraph (3) (relating to
a spouse of an employee of the Department of Defense) as
paragraph (4);
(D) in paragraph (4), as so redesignated--
(i) by inserting ``, including to a position in which the
spouse will engage in remote work'' after ``Department of
Defense''; and
(ii) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``;
or''; and
(E) by adding at the end the following:
``(5) a covered spouse to a position in which the covered
spouse will engage in remote work.''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of
sections for subchapter I of chapter 33 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to
section 3330d and inserting the following:
``3330d. Appointment of military and Department of Defense, Department
of State, and intelligence community civilian spouses.''.
(c) Report.--
(1) Definition of appropriation committees of congress.--In
this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of
Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
(2) In general.--Not later than 5 years after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
detailing the use of the authority provided pursuant to the
amendments made by subsection (a) and the impacts on
recruitment, retention, and job opportunities created by such
amendments.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or an
amendment made by this section shall be construed to revoke
or diminish any right of an individual provided by title 5,
United States Code.
(e) Sunset and Snapback.--On the date that is 5 years after
the date of the enactment of this Act--
(1) section 3330d of title 5, United States Code, as
amended by subsection (a), is amended to read as it read on
the day before the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(2) the item for such section in the table of sections for
subchapter I of chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code, as
amended by subsection (b), is amended to read as it read on
the day before the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 705. PLAN FOR STAFFING THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
POSITIONS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a plan for ensuring that the
Directorate of Operations of the Agency has staffed every
civilian full-time equivalent position authorized for that
Directorate under the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2024 (division G of Public Law 118-31).
(b) Elements.--The plan required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) Specific benchmarks and timelines for accomplishing the
goal described in such subsection by September 30, 2025.
(2) An assessment of the appropriate balance of staffing
between the Directorate of Operations and the Directorate of
Analysis consistent with the responsibilities of the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency under section 104A(d) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3036(d)).
SEC. 706. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SUPPORT
FOR FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
It is the sense of Congress that for the purposes of
adjudicating the eligibility of an individual for access to
classified information, renewal of a prior determination of
eligibility for such access, or continuous vetting of an
individual for eligibility for such access, including on form
SF-86 or any successor form, each of the following should be
considered an action advocating for an act of terrorism:
(1) Advocating for violence by an organization designated
as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
(2) Soliciting funds for or contributing funds to an
organization described in paragraph (1).
TITLE VIII--WHISTLEBLOWERS
SEC. 801. IMPROVEMENTS REGARDING URGENT CONCERNS SUBMITTED TO
INSPECTORS GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.--
Section 103H(k)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) by inserting ``(i)'' before ``An employee of'';
(B) by inserting ``in writing'' before ``to the Inspector
General''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(ii) The Inspector General shall provide any support
necessary to ensure that an employee can submit a complaint
or information under this subparagraph in writing and, if
such submission is not feasible, shall create a written
record of the employee's verbal complaint or information and
treat such written record as a written submission.'';
(2) by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the
following:
``(B)(i)(I) Not later than the end of the period specified
in subclause (II), the Inspector General shall determine
whether the written complaint or information submitted under
subparagraph (A) appears credible. Upon making such a
determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the
Director notice of that determination, together with the
complaint or information.
``(II) The period specified in this subclause is the 14-
calendar-day period beginning on the date on which an
employee who has submitted an initial written complaint or
information under subparagraph (A) confirms that the employee
has submitted to the Inspector General the material the
employee intends to submit to Congress under such
subparagraph.
``(ii) The Inspector General may transmit a complaint or
information submitted under subparagraph (A) directly to the
congressional intelligence committees--
``(I) without transmittal to the Director if the Inspector
General determines that transmittal to the Director could
compromise the anonymity of the employee or result in the
complaint or information being transmitted to a subject of
the complaint or information; or
``(II) following transmittal to the Director if the
Director does not transmit the complaint or information to
the congressional intelligence committees within the time
period specified in subparagraph (C).'';
(3) in subparagraph (D)--
(A) in clause (i), by striking ``or does not transmit the
complaint or information to the Director in accurate form
under subparagraph (B),'' and inserting ``does not transmit
the complaint or information to the Director in accurate form
under subparagraph (B)(i)(I), or makes a determination
pursuant
[[Page S5704]]
to subparagraph (B)(ii)(I) but does not transmit the
complaint or information to the congressional intelligence
committees within 21 calendar days of receipt,''; and
(B) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:
``(ii) An employee may contact the congressional
intelligence committees directly as described in clause (i)
only if--
``(I) the employee, before making such a contact--
``(aa) transmits to the Director, through the Inspector
General, a statement of the employee's complaint or
information and notice of the employee's intent to contact
the congressional intelligence committees directly; and
``(bb) obtains and follows from the Director, through the
Inspector General, direction on how to contact the
congressional intelligence committees in accordance with
appropriate security practices; or
``(II) the Inspector General--
``(aa) determines that--
``(AA) a transmittal under subclause (I) could compromise
the anonymity of the employee or result in the complaint or
information being transmitted to a subject of the complaint
or information; or
``(BB) the Director has failed to provide adequate
direction pursuant to item (bb) of subclause (I) within 7
calendar days of a transmittal under such subclause; and
``(bb) provides the employee direction on how to contact
the congressional intelligence committees in accordance with
appropriate security practices.''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
``(J) In this paragraph, the term `employee', with respect
to an employee of an element of the intelligence community,
an employee assigned or detailed to an element of the
intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to the
intelligence community who may submit a complaint or
information to the Inspector General under subparagraph (A),
means--
``(i) a current employee at the time of such submission; or
``(ii) a former employee at the time of such submission, if
such complaint or information arises from and relates to the
period of employment as such an employee.''.
(b) Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.--
Section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) by inserting (i) before ``An employee'';
(B) by inserting ``in writing'' before ``to the Inspector
General''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(ii) The Inspector General shall provide any support
necessary to ensure that an employee can submit a complaint
or information under this subparagraph in writing and, if
such submission is not feasible, shall create a written
record of the employee's verbal complaint or information and
treat such written record as a written submission.'';
(2) in subparagraph (B)--
(A) by striking clause (i) and inserting the following:
``(i)(I) Not later than the end of the period specified in
subclause (II), the Inspector General shall determine whether
the written complaint or information submitted under
subparagraph (A) appears credible. Upon making such a
determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the
Director notice of that determination, together with the
complaint or information.
``(II) The period specified in this subclause is the 14-
calendar-day period beginning on the date on which an
employee who has submitted an initial written complaint or
information under subparagraph (A) confirms that the employee
has submitted to the Inspector General the material the
employee intends to submit to Congress under such
subparagraph.''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(iii) The Inspector General may transmit a complaint or
information submitted under subparagraph (A) directly to the
congressional intelligence committees--
``(I) without transmittal to the Director if the Inspector
General determines that transmittal to the Director could
compromise the anonymity of the employee or result in the
complaint or information being transmitted to a subject of
the complaint or information;
``(II) following transmittal to the Director if the
Director does not transmit the complaint or information to
the congressional intelligence committees within the time
period specified in subparagraph (C) and has not made a
determination regarding a conflict of interest pursuant to
clause (ii); or
``(III) following transmittal to the Director and a
determination by the Director that a conflict of interest
exists pursuant to clause (ii) if the Inspector General
determines that--
``(aa) transmittal to the Director of National Intelligence
could compromise the anonymity of the employee or result in
the complaint or information being transmitted to a subject
of the complaint or information; or
``(bb) the Director of National Intelligence has not
transmitted the complaint or information to the congressional
intelligence committees within the time period specified in
subparagraph (C).'';
(3) in subparagraph (D)--
(A) in clause (i), by striking ``or does not transmit the
complaint or information to the Director in accurate form
under subparagraph (B),'' and inserting ``does not transmit
the complaint or information to the Director in accurate form
under subparagraph (B)(i)(I), or makes a determination
pursuant to subparagraph (B)(iii)(I) but does not transmit
the complaint or information to the congressional
intelligence committees within 21 calendar days of
receipt,''; and
(B) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:
``(ii) An employee may contact the congressional
intelligence committees directly as described in clause (i)
only if--
``(I) the employee, before making such a contact--
``(aa) transmits to the Director, through the Inspector
General, a statement of the employee's complaint or
information and notice of the employee's intent to contact
the congressional intelligence committees directly; and
``(bb) obtains and follows from the Director, through the
Inspector General, direction on how to contact the
congressional intelligence committees in accordance with
appropriate security practices; or
``(II) the Inspector General--
``(aa) determines that--
``(AA) the transmittal under subclause (I) could compromise
the anonymity of the employee or result in the complaint or
information being transmitted to a subject of the complaint
or information; or
``(BB) the Director has failed to provide adequate
direction pursuant to item (bb) of subclause (I) within 7
calendar days of a transmittal under such subclause; and
``(bb) provides the employee direction on how to contact
the congressional intelligence committees in accordance with
appropriate security practices.''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
``(I) In this paragraph, the term `employee', with respect
to an employee of the Agency, or of a contractor to the
Agency, who may submit a complaint or information to the
Inspector General under subparagraph (A), means--
``(i) a current employee at the time of such submission; or
``(ii) a former employee at the time of such submission, if
such complaint or information arises from and relates to the
period of employment as such an employee.''.
(c) Other Inspectors General of Elements of the
Intelligence Community.--Section 416 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as paragraphs
(2) and (3), respectively; and
(B) by inserting before paragraph (2), as redesignated by
paragraph (1), the following:
``(1) Employee.--The term `employee', with respect to an
employee of an element of the Federal Government covered by
subsection (b), or of a contractor to such an element, who
may submit a complaint or information to an Inspector General
under such subsection, means--
``(A) a current employee at the time of such submission; or
``(B) a former employee at the time of such submission, if
such complaint or information arises from and relates to the
period of employment as such an employee.'';
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) in the paragraph heading, by inserting ``; support for
written submission''; after ``made'';
(ii) by inserting ``in writing'' after ``may report the
complaint or information'' each place it appears; and
(iii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``in writing''
after ``such complaint or information''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(E) Support for written submission.--The Inspector
General shall provide any support necessary to ensure that an
employee can submit a complaint or information under this
paragraph in writing and, if such submission is not feasible,
shall create a written record of the employee's verbal
complaint or information and treat such written record as a
written submission.'';
(3) in subsection (c)--
(A) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:
``(1) Credibility.--
``(A) Determination.--Not later than the end of the period
specified in subparagraph (B), the Inspector General shall
determine whether the written complaint or information
submitted under subsection (b) appears credible. Upon making
such a determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to
the head of the establishment notice of that determination,
together with the complaint or information.
``(B) Period specified.--The period specified in this
subparagraph is the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the
date on which an employee who has submitted an initial
written complaint or information under subsection (b)
confirms that the employee has submitted to the Inspector
General the material the employee intends to submit to
Congress under such subsection.''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) Transmittal directly to intelligence committees.--The
Inspector General may transmit the complaint or information
directly to the intelligence committees--
``(A) without transmittal to the head of the establishment
if the Inspector General determines that transmittal to the
head of the establishment could compromise the anonymity of
the employee or result in the complaint or information being
transmitted to a subject of the complaint or information;
[[Page S5705]]
``(B) following transmittal to the head of the
establishment if the head of the establishment does not
transmit the complaint or information to the intelligence
committees within the time period specified in subsection (d)
and has not made a determination regarding a conflict of
interest pursuant to paragraph (2); or
``(C) following transmittal to the head of the
establishment and a determination by the head of the
establishment that a conflict of interest exists pursuant to
paragraph (2) if the Inspector General determines that--
``(i) transmittal to the Director of National Intelligence
or the Secretary of Defense could compromise the anonymity of
the employee or result in the complaint or information being
transmitted to a subject of the complaint or information; or
``(ii) the Director of National Intelligence or the
Secretary of Defense has not transmitted the complaint or
information to the intelligence committees within the time
period specified in subsection (d).'';
(4) in subsection (e)(1), by striking ``or does not
transmit the complaint or information to the head of the
establishment in accurate form under subsection (c),'' and
inserting ``does not transmit the complaint or information to
the head of the establishment in accurate form under
subsection (c)(1)(A), or makes a determination pursuant to
subsection (c)(3)(A) but does not transmit the complaint or
information to the intelligence committees within 21 calendar
days of receipt,''; and
(5) in subsection (e), by striking paragraph (2) and
inserting the following:
``(2) Limitation.--An employee may contact the intelligence
committees directly as described in paragraph (1) only if--
``(A) the employee, before making such a contact--
``(i) transmits to the head of the establishment, through
the Inspector General, a statement of the employee's
complaint or information and notice of the employee's intent
to contact the intelligence committees directly; and
``(ii) obtains and follows from the head of the
establishment, through the Inspector General, direction on
how to contact the intelligence committees in accordance with
appropriate security practices; or
``(B) the Inspector General--
``(i) determines that the transmittal under subparagraph
(A) could compromise the anonymity of the employee or result
in the complaint or information being transmitted to a
subject of the complaint or information; or
``(ii) determines that the head of the establishment has
failed to provide adequate direction pursuant to clause (ii)
of subparagraph (A) within 7 calendar days of a transmittal
under such subparagraph; and
``(iii) provides the employee direction on how to contact
the intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate
security practices.''.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or an
amendment made by this section shall be construed to revoke
or diminish any right of an individual provided by section
2303 or 7211 of title 5, United States Code, to make a
protected disclosure to any congressional committee.
SEC. 802. PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF WHISTLEBLOWER
IDENTITY AS ACT OF REPRISAL.
(a) In General.--Section 1104(a) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234(a)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3)--
(A) in subparagraph (I), by striking ``; or'' and inserting
a semicolon;
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (J) as subparagraph (K);
and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (I) the following:
``(J) an unauthorized whistleblower identity disclosure;'';
and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(5) Unauthorized whistleblower identity disclosure.--The
term `unauthorized whistleblower identity disclosure' means,
with respect to an employee or a contractor employee
described in paragraph (3), a knowing and willful disclosure
revealing the identity or other personally identifiable
information of the employee or contractor employee so as to
identify the employee or contractor employee as an employee
or contractor employee who has made a lawful disclosure
described in subsection (b) or (c), but does not include such
a knowing and willful disclosure that meets any of the
following criteria:
``(A) Such disclosure was made with the express consent of
the employee or contractor employee.
``(B) Such disclosure was made during the course of
reporting or remedying the subject of the lawful disclosure
of the whistleblower through management, legal, or oversight
processes, including such processes relating to human
resources, equal opportunity, security, or an Inspector
General.
``(C) An Inspector General with oversight responsibility
for the relevant covered intelligence community element
determines that such disclosure--
``(i) was unavoidable under section 103H of this Act (50
U.S.C. 3033), section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517), section 407 of title 5, United
States Code, or section 420(b)(2)(B) of such title;
``(ii) was made to an official of the Department of Justice
responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be
undertaken; or
``(iii) was required by statute or an order from a court of
competent jurisdiction.''.
(b) Harmonization of Enforcement.--Subsection (f) of such
section is amended to read as follows:
``(f) Enforcement.--
``(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, the President shall provide for the enforcement
of this section.
``(2) Harmonization with other enforcement.--To the fullest
extent possible, the President shall provide for enforcement
of this section in a manner that is consistent with the
enforcement of section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States
Code, especially with respect to policies and procedures used
to adjudicate alleged violations of such section.''.
SEC. 803. PROTECTION FOR INDIVIDUALS MAKING AUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURES TO INSPECTORS GENERAL OF ELEMENTS
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.--
Section 103H(g)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses
(i) and (ii), respectively;
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B) An individual may disclose classified information to
the Inspector General in accordance with the applicable
security standards and procedures established under Executive
Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified
national security information), section 102A or section 803,
chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161
et seq.), or any applicable provision of law. Such a
disclosure of classified information that is made by an
individual who at the time of the disclosure does not hold
the appropriate clearance or authority to access such
classified information, but that is otherwise made in
accordance with such security standards and procedures, shall
be treated as an authorized disclosure and does not violate--
``(i) any otherwise applicable nondisclosure agreement;
``(ii) any otherwise applicable regulation or order issued
under the authority of Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161
note; relating to classified national security information)
or chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2271 et seq.); or
``(iii) section 798 of title 18, United States Code, or any
other provision of law relating to the unauthorized
disclosure of national security information.''; and
(3) in the paragraph enumerator, by striking ``(3) '' and
inserting ``(3)(A)''.
(b) Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.--
Section 17(e)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(e)(3)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses
(i) and (ii), respectively;
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B) An individual may disclose classified information to
the Inspector General in accordance with the applicable
security standards and procedures established under Executive
Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified
national security information), section 102A or 803 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024; 3162a), or
chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161
et seq.). Such a disclosure of classified information that is
made by an individual who at the time of the disclosure does
not hold the appropriate clearance or authority to access
such classified information, but that is otherwise made in
accordance with such security standards and procedures, shall
be treated as an authorized disclosure and does not violate--
``(i) any otherwise applicable nondisclosure agreement;
``(ii) any otherwise applicable regulation or order issued
under the authority of Executive Order 13526 or chapter 18 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.); or
``(iii) section 798 of title 18, United States Code, or any
other provision of law relating to the unauthorized
disclosure of national security information.''; and
(3) in the paragraph enumerator, by striking ``(3) '' and
inserting ``(3)(A)''.
(c) Other Inspectors General of Elements of the
Intelligence Community.--Section 416 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
``(i) Protection for Individuals Making Authorized
Disclosures.--An individual may disclose classified
information to an Inspector General of an element of the
intelligence community in accordance with the applicable
security standards and procedures established under Executive
Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified
national security information), section 102A or 803 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024; 3162a), or
chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161
et seq.). Such a disclosure of classified information that is
made by an individual who at the time of the disclosure does
not hold the appropriate clearance or authority to access
such classified information, but that is otherwise made in
accordance with such security standards and procedures, shall
be treated as an authorized disclosure and does not violate--
``(1) any otherwise applicable nondisclosure agreement;
``(2) any otherwise applicable regulation or order issued
under the authority of Executive Order 13526 or chapter 18 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.); or
[[Page S5706]]
``(3) section 798 of title 18, or any other provision of
law relating to the unauthorized disclosure of national
security information.''.
SEC. 804. CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITY OF CERTAIN INSPECTORS
GENERAL TO RECEIVE PROTECTED DISCLOSURES.
Section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3234) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(1), by inserting ``or covered
intelligence community element'' after ``the appropriate
inspector general of the employing agency''; and
(2) in subsection (c)(1)(A), by inserting ``or covered
intelligence community element'' after ``the appropriate
inspector general of the employing or contracting agency''.
SEC. 805. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS RELATING TO PSYCHIATRIC
TESTING OR EXAMINATION.
(a) Prohibited Personnel Practices.--Section 1104(a)(3) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234(a)(3)) is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (I), by striking ``; or'' and inserting
a semicolon;
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (J) as subparagraph (K);
and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (I) the following new
subparagraph:
``(J) a decision to order psychiatric testing or
examination; or''.
(b) Application.--The amendments made by this section shall
apply with respect to matters arising under section 1104 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 806. ESTABLISHING PROCESS PARITY FOR ADVERSE SECURITY
CLEARANCE AND ACCESS DETERMINATIONS.
Subparagraph (C) of section 3001(j)(4) of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C.
3341(j)(4)) is amended to read as follows:
``(C) Contributing factor.--
``(i) In general.--Subject to clause (iii), in determining
whether the adverse security clearance or access
determination violated paragraph (1), the agency shall find
that paragraph (1) was violated if the individual has
demonstrated that a disclosure described in paragraph (1) was
a contributing factor in the adverse security clearance or
access determination taken against the individual.
``(ii) Circumstantial evidence.--An individual under clause
(i) may demonstrate that the disclosure was a contributing
factor in the adverse security clearance or access
determination taken against the individual through
circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that--
``(I) the official making the determination knew of the
disclosure; and
``(II) the determination occurred within a period such that
a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a
contributing factor in the determination.
``(iii) Defense.--In determining whether the adverse
security clearance or access determination violated paragraph
(1), the agency shall not find that paragraph (1) was
violated if, after a finding that a disclosure was a
contributing factor, the agency demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have made the same security
clearance or access determination in the absence of such
disclosure.''.
SEC. 807. ELIMINATION OF CAP ON COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR
RETALIATORY REVOCATION OF SECURITY CLEARANCES
AND ACCESS DETERMINATIONS.
Section 3001(j)(4)(B) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)(B)) is
amended, in the second sentence, by striking ``not to exceed
$300,000''.
TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS
SEC. 901. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY FOR SECRETARY OF STATE
AND HEADS OF OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES TO PAY
COSTS OF TREATING QUALIFYING INJURIES AND MAKE
PAYMENTS FOR QUALIFYING INJURIES TO THE BRAIN.
Section 901(e) of division J of the Further Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2020 (22 U.S.C. 2680b(e)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by striking ``a
employee who, on or after January 1, 2016'' and inserting
``an employee who, on or after September 11, 2001''; and
(B) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``, or duty station
in the United States'' before the semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (2)--
(A) by striking ``January 1, 2016'' and inserting
``September 11, 2001''; and
(B) by inserting ``, or duty station in the United
States,'' after ``pursuant to subsection (f)'';
(3) in paragraph (3)--
(A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by striking
``January 1, 2016'' and inserting ``September 11, 2001''; and
(B) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``, or duty station
in the United States'' before the semicolon; and
(4) in paragraph (4)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(i), by inserting ``, or duty
station in the United States'' before the semicolon; and
(B) in subparagraph (B)(i), by inserting ``, or duty
station in the United States'' before the semicolon.
TITLE X--UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA
SEC. 1001. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES REVIEW OF
ALL-DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE.
(a) Definitions.--In this section, the terms
``congressional defense committees'', ``congressional
leadership'', and ``unidentified anomalous phenomena'' have
the meanings given such terms in section 1683(n) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50
U.S.C. 3373(n)).
(b) Review Required.--The Comptroller General of the United
States shall conduct a review of the All-domain Anomaly
Resolution Office (in this section referred to as the
``Office'').
(c) Elements.--The review conducted pursuant to subsection
(b) shall include the following:
(1) A review of the implementation by the Office of the
duties and requirements of the Office under section 1683 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022
(50 U.S.C. 3373), such as the process for operational
unidentified anomalous phenomena reporting and coordination
with the Department of Defense, the intelligence community,
and other departments and agencies of the Federal Government
and non-Government entities.
(2) A review of such other matters relating to the
activities of the Office that pertain to unidentified
anomalous phenomena as the Comptroller General considers
appropriate.
(d) Report.--Following the review required by subsection
(b), in a timeframe mutually agreed upon by the congressional
intelligence committees, the congressional defense
committees, congressional leadership, and the Comptroller
General, the Comptroller General shall submit to such
committees and congressional leadership a report on the
findings of the Comptroller General with respect to the
review conducted under subsection (b).
SEC. 1002. SUNSET OF REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO AUDITS OF
UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA HISTORICAL
RECORD REPORT.
Section 6001 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3373 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``until April 1,
2025'' after ``quarterly basis''; and
(2) in subsection (c), by inserting ``until June 30, 2025''
after ``semiannually thereafter''.
SEC. 1003. FUNDING LIMITATIONS RELATING TO UNIDENTIFIED
ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' means--
(A) the majority leader of the Senate;
(B) the minority leader of the Senate;
(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(3) National intelligence program.--The term ``National
Intelligence Program'' has the meaning given such term in
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003).
(4) Unidentified anomalous phenomena.--The term
``unidentified anomalous phenomena'' has the meaning given
such term in section 1683(n) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(n)).
(b) Limitations.--None of the funds authorized to be
appropriated by this division for the National Intelligence
Program may be obligated or expended in support of any
activity involving unidentified anomalous phenomena protected
under any form of special access or restricted access
limitation unless the Director of National Intelligence has
provided the details of the activity to the appropriate
committees of Congress and congressional leadership,
including for any activities described in a report released
by the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office in fiscal year
2024.
(c) Limitation Regarding Independent Research and
Development.--Independent research and development funding
relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena shall not be
allowable as indirect expenses for purposes of contracts
covered by such instruction, unless such material and
information is made available to the appropriate
congressional committees and leadership.
TITLE XI--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 1101. LIMITATION ON DIRECTIVES UNDER FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 RELATING
TO CERTAIN ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION SERVICE
PROVIDERS.
Section 702(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(i)) is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``(7) Limitation relating to certain electronic
communication service providers.--
``(A) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
``(i) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
`appropriate committees of Congress' means--
[[Page S5707]]
``(I) the congressional intelligence committees;
``(II) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
``(III) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
``(ii) Covered electronic communication service provider.--
``(I) In general.--Subject to subclause (II), the term
`covered electronic communication service provider' means--
``(aa) a service provider described in section
701(b)(4)(E);
``(bb) a custodian of an entity as defined in section
701(b)(4)(F); or
``(cc) an officer, employee, or agent of a service provider
described in section 701(b)(4)(E).
``(II) Exclusion.--The term `covered electronic
communication service provider' does not include--
``(aa) an electronic communication service provider
described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of section
701(b)(4); or
``(bb) an officer, employee, or agent of an electronic
communication service provider described in subparagraph (A),
(B), (C), or (D) of section 701(b)(4).
``(iii) Covered opinions.--The term `covered opinions'
means the opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review authorized for public release on August 23, 2023
(Opinion and Order, In re Petition to Set Aside or Modify
Directive Issued to [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], (FISA Ct.
[REDACTED] 2022) (Contreras J.); Opinion, In re Petition to
Set Aside or Modify Directive Issued to [REDACTED], No.
[REDACTED], (FISA Ct. Rev. [REDACTED] 2023) (Sentelle, J.;
Higginson, J.; Miller J.)).
``(B) Limitation.--A directive may not be issued under
paragraph (1) to a covered electronic communication service
provider unless the covered electronic communication service
provider is a provider of the type of service at issue in the
covered opinions.
``(C) Requirements for directives to covered electronic
communication service providers.--
``(i) In general.--Subject to clause (ii), any directive
issued under paragraph (1) on or after the date of the
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2025 to a covered electronic communication service
provider that is not prohibited by subparagraph (B) of this
paragraph shall include a summary description of the services
at issue in the covered opinions.
``(ii) Duplicate summaries not required.--A directive need
not include a summary description of the services at issue in
the covered opinions if such summary was included in a prior
directive issued to the covered electronic communication
service provider and the summary has not materially changed.
``(D) Foreign intelligence surveillance court notification
and review.--
``(i) Notification.--
``(I) In general.--Subject to subclause (II), on or after
the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2025, each time the Attorney General and
the Director of National Intelligence serve a directive under
paragraph (1) to a covered electronic communication service
provider that is not prohibited by subparagraph (B) and each
time the Attorney General and the Director materially change
a directive under paragraph (1) served on a covered
electronic communication service provider that is not
prohibited by subparagraph (B), the Attorney General shall
provide the directive to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court on or before the date that is 7 days after
the date on which the Attorney General and the Director
served the directive, along with a description of the covered
electronic communication service provider to whom the
directive is issued and the services at issue.
``(II) Duplication not required.--The Attorney General does
not need to provide a directive or description to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court under subclause (I) if a
directive and description concerning the covered electronic
communication service provider was previously provided to the
Court and the directive or description has not materially
changed.
``(ii) Additional information.--As soon as feasible and not
later than the initiation of collection, the Attorney General
shall, for each directive described in subparagraph (i),
provide the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court a summary
description of the type of equipment to be accessed, the
nature of the access, and the form of assistance required
pursuant to the directive.
``(iii) Review.--
``(I) In general.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court may review a directive received by the Court under
clause (i) to determine whether the directive is consistent
with subparagraph (B) and affirm, modify, or set aside the
directive.
``(II) Notice of intent to review.--Not later than 10 days
after the date on which the Court receives information under
clause (ii) with respect to a directive, the Court shall
provide notice to the Attorney General and cleared counsel
for the covered electronic communication service provider
indicating whether the Court intends to undertake a review
under subclause (I) of this clause.
``(III) Completion of reviews.--In a case in which the
Court provides notice under subclause (II) indicating that
the Court intends to review a directive under subclause (I),
the Court shall, not later than 30 days after the date on
which the Court provides notice under subclause (II) with
respect to the directive, complete the review.
``(E) Congressional oversight.--
``(i) Notification.--
``(I) In general.--Subject to subclause (II), on or after
the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2025, each time the Attorney General and
the Director of National Intelligence serve a directive under
paragraph (1) on a covered electronic communication service
provider that is not prohibited by subparagraph (B) and each
time the Attorney General and the Director materially change
a directive under paragraph (1) served on a covered
electronic communication service provider that is not
prohibited by subparagraph (B), the Attorney General shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress the
directive on or before the date that is 7 days after the date
on which the Attorney General and the Director serve the
directive, along with a description of the covered electronic
communication service provider to whom the directive is
issued and the services at issue.
``(II) Duplication not required.--The Attorney General does
not need to submit a directive or description to the
appropriate committees of Congress under subclause (I) if a
directive and description concerning the covered electronic
communication service provider was previously submitted to
the appropriate committees of Congress and the directive or
description has not materially changed.
``(ii) Additional information.--As soon as feasible and not
later than the initiation of collection, the Attorney General
shall, for each directive described in subparagraph (i),
provide the appropriate committees of Congress a summary
description of the type of equipment to be accessed, the
nature of the access, and the form of assistance required
pursuant to the directive.
``(iii) Reporting.--
``(I) Quarterly reports.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2025 and not less frequently than once each
quarter thereafter, the Attorney General shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the number of
directives served, during the period covered by the report,
under paragraph (1) to a covered electronic communication
service provider and the number of directives provided during
the same period to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court under subparagraph (D)(i).
``(II) Form of reports.--Each report submitted pursuant to
subclause (I) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
``(III) Submittal of court opinions.--Not later than 45
days after the date on which the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review issues an opinion relating to a directive
issued to a covered electronic communication service provider
under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a copy of the opinion.''.
SEC. 1102. STRENGTHENING ELECTION CYBERSECURITY TO UPHOLD
RESPECT FOR ELECTIONS THROUGH INDEPENDENT
TESTING ACT OF 2024.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the
``Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect for
Elections through Independent Testing Act of 2024'' or the
``SECURE IT Act of 2024''.
(b) Requiring Penetration Testing as Part of the Testing
and Certification of Voting Systems.--Section 231 of the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) Required Penetration Testing.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this subsection, the Commission shall
provide for the conduct of penetration testing as part of the
testing, certification, decertification, and recertification
of voting system hardware and software by the Commission
based on accredited laboratories under this section.
``(2) Accreditation.--The Commission shall develop a
program for the acceptance of the results of penetration
testing on election systems. The penetration testing required
by this subsection shall be required for Commission
certification. The Commission shall vote on the selection of
any entity identified. The requirements for such selection
shall be based on consideration of an entity's competence to
conduct penetration testing under this subsection. The
Commission may consult with the National Institute of
Standards and Technology or any other appropriate Federal
agency on lab selection criteria and other aspects of this
program.''.
(c) Independent Security Testing and Coordinated
Cybersecurity Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Election
Systems.--
(1) In general.--Subtitle D of title II of the Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15401 et seq.) is amended by
adding at the end the following new part:
[[Page S5708]]
``PART 7--INDEPENDENT SECURITY TESTING AND COORDINATED CYBERSECURITY
VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE PILOT PROGRAM FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS
``SEC. 297. INDEPENDENT SECURITY TESTING AND COORDINATED
CYBERSECURITY VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE PILOT
PROGRAM FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS.
``(a) In General.--
``(1) Establishment.--The Commission, in consultation with
the Secretary, shall establish an Independent Security
Testing and Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Pilot
Program for Election Systems (VDP-E) (in this section
referred to as the `program') to test for and disclose
cybersecurity vulnerabilities in election systems.
``(2) Duration.--The program shall be conducted for a
period of 5 years.
``(3) Requirements.--In carrying out the program, the
Commission, in consultation with the Secretary, shall--
``(A) establish a mechanism by which an election systems
vendor may make their election system (including voting
machines and source code) available to cybersecurity
researchers participating in the program;
``(B) provide for the vetting of cybersecurity researchers
prior to their participation in the program, including the
conduct of background checks;
``(C) establish terms of participation that--
``(i) describe the scope of testing permitted under the
program;
``(ii) require researchers to--
``(I) notify the vendor, the Commission, and the Secretary
of any cybersecurity vulnerability they identify with respect
to an election system; and
``(II) otherwise keep such vulnerability confidential for
180 days after such notification;
``(iii) require the good faith participation of all
participants in the program;
``(iv) require an election system vendor, within 180 days
after validating notification of a critical or high
vulnerability (as defined by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology) in an election system of the
vendor, to--
``(I) send a patch or propound some other fix or mitigation
for such vulnerability to the appropriate State and local
election officials, in consultation with the researcher who
discovered it; and
``(II) notify the Commission and the Secretary that such
patch has been sent to such officials;
``(D) in the case where a patch or fix to address a
vulnerability disclosed under subparagraph (C)(ii)(I) is
intended to be applied to a system certified by the
Commission, provide--
``(i) for the expedited review of such patch or fix within
90 days after receipt by the Commission; and
``(ii) if such review is not completed by the last day of
such 90-day period, that such patch or fix shall be deemed to
be certified by the Commission, subject to any subsequent
review of such determination by the Commission; and
``(E) 180 days after the disclosure of a vulnerability
under subparagraph (C)(ii)(I), notify the Director of the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the
vulnerability for inclusion in the database of Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures.
``(4) Voluntary participation; safe harbor.--
``(A) Voluntary participation.--Participation in the
program shall be voluntary for election systems vendors and
researchers.
``(B) Safe harbor.--When conducting research under this
program, such research and subsequent publication shall be--
``(i) authorized in accordance with section 1030 of title
18, United States Code (commonly known as the `Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act'), (and similar State laws), and the election
system vendor will not initiate or support legal action
against the researcher for accidental, good faith violations
of the program; and
``(ii) exempt from the anti-circumvention rule of section
1201 of title 17, United States Code (commonly known as the
`Digital Millennium Copyright Act'), and the election system
vendor will not bring a claim against a researcher for
circumvention of technology controls.
``(C) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this paragraph may
be construed to limit or otherwise affect any exception to
the general prohibition against the circumvention of
technological measures under subparagraph (A) of section
1201(a)(1) of title 17, United States Code, including with
respect to any use that is excepted from that general
prohibition by the Librarian of Congress under subparagraphs
(B) through (D) of such section 1201(a)(1).
``(5) Definitions.--In this subsection:
``(A) Cybersecurity vulnerability.--The term `cybersecurity
vulnerability' means, with respect to an election system, any
security vulnerability that affects the election system.
``(B) Election infrastructure.--The term `election
infrastructure' means--
``(i) storage facilities, polling places, and centralized
vote tabulation locations used to support the administration
of elections for public office; and
``(ii) related information and communications technology,
including--
``(I) voter registration databases;
``(II) election management systems;
``(III) voting machines;
``(IV) electronic mail and other communications systems
(including electronic mail and other systems of vendors who
have entered into contracts with election agencies to support
the administration of elections, manage the election process,
and report and display election results); and
``(V) other systems used to manage the election process and
to report and display election results on behalf of an
election agency.
``(C) Election system.--The term `election system' means
any information system that is part of an election
infrastructure, including any related information and
communications technology described in subparagraph (B)(ii).
``(D) Election system vendor.--The term `election system
vendor' means any person providing, supporting, or
maintaining an election system on behalf of a State or local
election official.
``(E) Information system.--The term `information system'
has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44,
United States Code.
``(F) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the Secretary
of Homeland Security.
``(G) Security vulnerability.--The term `security
vulnerability' has the meaning given the term in section 102
of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6
U.S.C. 1501).''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents of such Act
is amended by adding at the end of the items relating to
subtitle D of title II the following:
``PART 7--Independent Security Testing and Coordinated Cybersecurity
Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Election Systems
``Sec. 297. Independent security testing and coordinated cybersecurity
vulnerability disclosure program for election systems.''.
SEC. 1103. PARITY IN PAY FOR STAFF OF THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD AND THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
Section 1061(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(j)(1)) is amended by
striking ``except that'' and all that follows through the
period at the end and inserting ``except that no rate of pay
fixed under this subsection may exceed the highest amount
paid by any element of the intelligence community for a
comparable position, based on salary information provided to
the chairman of the Board by the Director of National
Intelligence.''.
SEC. 1104. MODIFICATION AND REPEAL OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Briefing on Iranian Expenditures Supporting Foreign
Military and Terrorist Activities.--Section 6705(a)(1) of the
Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (22
U.S.C. 9412(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``, and not less
frequently than once each year thereafter provide a briefing
to Congress,''.
(b) Reports and Briefings on National Security Effects of
Global Water Insecurity and Emerging Infectious Diseases and
Pandemics.--Section 6722(b) of the Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3024 note;
division E of Public Law 116-92) is amended by--
(1) striking paragraph (2); and
(2) redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs (2)
and (3), respectively.
(c) Repeal of Report on Removal of Satellites and Related
Items From the United States Munitions List.--Section 1261(e)
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013 (22 U.S.C. 2778 note; Public Law 112-239) is repealed.
(d) Briefing on Review of Intelligence Community Analytic
Production.--Section 1019(c) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364(c)) is
amended by striking ``December 1'' and inserting ``February
1''.
(e) Repeal of Report on Oversight of Foreign Influence in
Academia.--Section 5713 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3369b) is repealed.
(f) Repeal of Briefing on Iranian Expenditures Supporting
Foreign Military and Terrorist Activities.--Section 6705 of
the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (22
U.S.C. 9412) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (b);
(2) by striking the enumerator and heading for subsection
(a);
(3) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subsections
(a) and (b), respectively, and moving such subsections, as so
redesignated, 2 ems to the left;
(4) in subsection (a), as so redesignated, by redesignating
subparagraphs (A) and (B) as paragraphs (1) and (2),
respectively, and moving such paragraphs, as so redesignated,
2 ems to the left; and
(5) in paragraph (1), as so redesignated, by redesignating
clauses (i) through (v) as subparagraphs (A) through (E),
respectively, and moving such subparagraphs, as so
redesignated, 2 ems to the left.
[[Page S5709]]
(g) Repeal of Report on Foreign Investment Risks.--Section
6716 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019,
and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3370a) is repealed.
(h) Repeal of Report on Intelligence Community Loan
Repayment Programs.--Section 6725(c) of the Damon Paul Nelson
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334g(c)) is
repealed.
(i) Repeal of Report on Data Collection on Attrition in
Intelligence Community.--Section 306(c) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (50 U.S.C. 3334h(c))
is repealed.
SEC. 1105. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.
(a) Requirements Relating to Construction of Facilities to
Be Used Primarily by Intelligence Community.--Section 602(a)
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995
(50 U.S.C. 3304(a)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``$6,000,000'' and
inserting ``$9,000,000''; and
(2) in paragraph (2)--
(A) by striking ``$2,000,000'' each place it appears and
inserting ``$4,000,000''; and
(B) by striking ``$6,000,000'' and inserting
``$9,000,000''.
(b) Copyright Protection for Civilian Faculty of Certain
Accredited Institutions.--Section 105 of title 17, United
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 105. Subject matter of copyright: United States
Government works
``(a) In General.--Copyright protection under this title is
not available for any work of the United States Government,
but the United States Government is not precluded from
receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by
assignment, bequest, or otherwise.
``(b) Copyright Protection of Certain Works.--Subject to
subsection (c), the covered author of a covered work owns the
copyright to that covered work.
``(c) Use by Federal Government.--
``(1) Secretary of defense authority.--With respect to a
covered author who produces a covered work in the course of
employment at a covered institution described in
subparagraphs (A) through (K) of subsection (d)(2), the
Secretary of Defense may direct the covered author to provide
the Federal Government with an irrevocable, royalty-free,
worldwide, nonexclusive license to reproduce, distribute,
perform, or display such covered work for purposes of the
United States Government.
``(2) Secretary of homeland security authority.--With
respect to a covered author who produces a covered work in
the course of employment at the covered institution described
in subsection (d)(2)(L), the Secretary of Homeland Security
may direct the covered author to provide the Federal
Government with an irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide,
nonexclusive license to reproduce, distribute, perform, or
display such covered work for purposes of the United States
Government.
``(3) Director of national intelligence authority.--With
respect to a covered author who produces a covered work in
the course of employment at the covered institution described
in subsection (d)(2)(M), the Director of National
Intelligence may direct the covered author to provide the
Federal Government with an irrevocable, royalty-free,
worldwide, nonexclusive license to reproduce, distribute,
perform, or display such covered work for purposes of the
United States Government.
``(4) Secretary of transportation authority.--With respect
to a covered author who produces a covered work in the course
of employment at the covered institution described in
subsection (d)(2)(N), the Secretary of Transportation may
direct the covered author to provide the Federal Government
with an irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide, nonexclusive
license to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display such
covered work for purposes of the United States Government.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered author.--The term `covered author' means a
civilian member of the faculty of a covered institution.
``(2) Covered institution.--The term `covered institution'
means the following:
``(A) National Defense University.
``(B) United States Military Academy.
``(C) Army War College.
``(D) United States Army Command and General Staff College.
``(E) United States Naval Academy.
``(F) Naval War College.
``(G) Naval Postgraduate School.
``(H) Marine Corps University.
``(I) United States Air Force Academy.
``(J) Air University.
``(K) Defense Language Institute.
``(L) United States Coast Guard Academy.
``(M) National Intelligence University.
``(N) United States Merchant Marine Academy.
``(3) Covered work.--The term `covered work' means a
literary work produced by a covered author in the course of
employment at a covered institution for publication by a
scholarly press or journal.''.
______