[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 120 (Wednesday, July 24, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5436-S5437]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 3125. Mr. CARDIN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill S. 4638, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2025 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of subtitle F of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1291. ENHANCING STRATEGIC COMPETITION AT THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States--
(1) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the
PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development,
military, informational, and technological realms that
maximizes the United States' strengths and increases the
costs for the PRC of harming United States interests and the
values of United States allies and partners;
[[Page S5437]]
(2) to lead a free, open, and secure international system
characterized by freedom from coercion, rule of law, open
markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared
commitment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes,
human rights, and good and transparent governance;
(3) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and
partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and Europe, by
pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative
initiatives that advance shared interests and values and
bolster the confidence of partner countries that the United
States is and will remain a strong, committed, and constant
partner;
(4) to encourage and collaborate with United States allies
and partners in boosting their own capabilities and
resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests
and values, free from coercion and external pressure;
(5) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy
competition in United States-China economic relations by--
(A) advancing policies that harden the United States
economy against unfair and illegal commercial or trading
practices and the coercion of United States businesses; and
(B) tightening United States laws and regulations as
necessary to prevent the PRC's attempts to harm United States
economic competitiveness;
(6) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth
in emerging markets around the world, including through the
use of United States Government tools that--
(A) support greater private sector investment and advance
capacity-building initiatives that are grounded in the rule
of law;
(B) promote open markets;
(C) establish clear policy and regulatory frameworks;
(D) improve the management of key economic sectors;
(E) combat corruption; and
(F) foster and support greater collaboration with and among
partner countries and the United States private sector to
develop secure and sustainable infrastructure;
(7) to lead in the advancement of international rules and
norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and
integrated markets;
(8) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of
United States companies and businesses in partner countries
that seek fair competition;
(9) to ensure that the United States leads in the
innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as
next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence,
quantum information science, semiconductors, and
biotechnology, by--
(A) providing necessary investment and concrete incentives
for the private sector and the United States Government to
accelerate development of such technologies;
(B) modernizing export controls and investment screening
regimes and associated policies and regulations;
(C) enhancing United States leadership in technical
standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing norms
regarding the use of emerging critical technologies;
(D) reducing United States barriers and increasing
incentives for collaboration with allies and partners on the
research and co-development of critical technologies;
(E) collaborating with allies and partners to protect
critical technologies by--
(i) crafting multilateral export control measures;
(ii) building capacity for defense technology security;
(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in supply chains; and
(iv) ensuring diversification; and
(F) designing major defense capabilities for export to
allies and partners;
(10) to collaborate with advanced democracies and other
willing partners to promote ideals and principles that--
(A) advance a free and open international order;
(B) strengthen democratic institutions;
(C) protect and promote human rights; and
(D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
(11) to develop comprehensive and holistic strategies and
policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns;
(12) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United
Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral
organizations and defend the integrity of these organizations
against co-optation by illiberal and authoritarian nations;
(13) to prioritize the defense of fundamental freedoms and
human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC;
(14) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral
organizations, leveraging their significant and growing
capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that
sustains and strengthens a free and open order and addresses
regional and global challenges to hold the Government of the
PRC accountable for--
(A) violations and abuses of human rights;
(B) restrictions on religious practices; and
(C) undermining and abrogating treaties, other
international agreements, and other international norms
related to human rights;
(15) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, repression, and
other malign behavior to attain unfair economic advantages
and to pressure other nations to defer to its political and
strategic objectives;
(16) to maintain United States access to the Western
Pacific, including by--
(A) increasing United States forward-deployed forces in the
Indo-Pacific region;
(B) modernizing the United States military through
investments in existing and new platforms, emerging
technologies, critical in-theater force structure and
enabling capabilities, joint operational concepts, and a
diverse, operationally resilient and politically sustainable
posture; and
(C) operating and conducting exercises with allies and
partners--
(i) to mitigate the Peoples Liberation Army's ability to
project power and establish contested zones within the First
and Second Island Chains;
(ii) to diminish the ability of the People's Liberation
Army to coerce its neighbors;
(iii) to maintain open sea and air lanes, particularly in
the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China
Sea; and
(iv) to project power from the United States and its allies
and partners to demonstrate the ability to conduct contested
logistics;
(17) to deter the PRC from--
(A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including by developing
more combat-credible forces that are integrated with allies
and partners in contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to
defeat any PRC theory of victory in the First or Second
Island Chains of the Western Pacific and beyond, as called
for in the 2018 National Defense Strategy;
(B) using grey-zone tactics below the level of armed
conflict; or
(C) initiating armed conflict;
(18) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military
communication and improve de-escalation procedures to de-
conflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict,
including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges
between civilian and military officials and other measures,
in alignment with United States interests; and
(19) to cooperate with the PRC if interests align,
including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the
United Nations, as appropriate.
(b) Establishing and Expanding the Regional China Officer
Program.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be established at
the Department of State a Regional China Officer (RCO)
program to support regional posts and officers with
reporting, information, and policy tools, and to enhance
expertise related to strategic competition with the PRC.
(2) Authorization.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to the
Department of State to expand the RCO program, including
for--
(A) the placement of Regional China Officers at United
States missions to the United Nations and United Nations
affiliated organizations;
(B) the placement of additional Regional China Officers in
Africa;
(C) the hiring of locally employed staff to support
Regional China Officers serving abroad; and
(D) the establishment of full-time equivalent positions to
assist in managing and facilitating the RCO program.
(3) Program funds.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$50,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for each
Regional China Officer to support programs and public
diplomacy activities of the Regional China Officer.
(c) Sense of Congress on Data-driven Policy Making.--It is
the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Office for China Coordination should employ at
least one full-time equivalent Data Officer, who shall not be
dual-hatted, focused on strategic competition with the PRC;
and
(2) the Department should, to the extent possible within
existing authorities, prioritize access for the Office for
China Coordination to databases, commercial software, and
other data to support policy-making related to strategic
competition with the PRC.
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