[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 120 (Wednesday, July 24, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5436-S5437]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 3125. Mr. CARDIN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by 
him to the bill S. 4638, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2025 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of subtitle F of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1291. ENHANCING STRATEGIC COMPETITION AT THE DEPARTMENT 
                   OF STATE.

       (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
     States--
       (1) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the 
     PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development, 
     military, informational, and technological realms that 
     maximizes the United States' strengths and increases the 
     costs for the PRC of harming United States interests and the 
     values of United States allies and partners;

[[Page S5437]]

       (2) to lead a free, open, and secure international system 
     characterized by freedom from coercion, rule of law, open 
     markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared 
     commitment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, 
     human rights, and good and transparent governance;
       (3) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and 
     partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and Europe, by 
     pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative 
     initiatives that advance shared interests and values and 
     bolster the confidence of partner countries that the United 
     States is and will remain a strong, committed, and constant 
     partner;
       (4) to encourage and collaborate with United States allies 
     and partners in boosting their own capabilities and 
     resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests 
     and values, free from coercion and external pressure;
       (5) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy 
     competition in United States-China economic relations by--
       (A) advancing policies that harden the United States 
     economy against unfair and illegal commercial or trading 
     practices and the coercion of United States businesses; and
       (B) tightening United States laws and regulations as 
     necessary to prevent the PRC's attempts to harm United States 
     economic competitiveness;
       (6) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth 
     in emerging markets around the world, including through the 
     use of United States Government tools that--
       (A) support greater private sector investment and advance 
     capacity-building initiatives that are grounded in the rule 
     of law;
       (B) promote open markets;
       (C) establish clear policy and regulatory frameworks;
       (D) improve the management of key economic sectors;
       (E) combat corruption; and
       (F) foster and support greater collaboration with and among 
     partner countries and the United States private sector to 
     develop secure and sustainable infrastructure;
       (7) to lead in the advancement of international rules and 
     norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and 
     integrated markets;
       (8) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of 
     United States companies and businesses in partner countries 
     that seek fair competition;
       (9) to ensure that the United States leads in the 
     innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as 
     next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, 
     quantum information science, semiconductors, and 
     biotechnology, by--
       (A) providing necessary investment and concrete incentives 
     for the private sector and the United States Government to 
     accelerate development of such technologies;
       (B) modernizing export controls and investment screening 
     regimes and associated policies and regulations;
       (C) enhancing United States leadership in technical 
     standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing norms 
     regarding the use of emerging critical technologies;
       (D) reducing United States barriers and increasing 
     incentives for collaboration with allies and partners on the 
     research and co-development of critical technologies;
       (E) collaborating with allies and partners to protect 
     critical technologies by--
       (i) crafting multilateral export control measures;
       (ii) building capacity for defense technology security;
       (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in supply chains; and
       (iv) ensuring diversification; and
       (F) designing major defense capabilities for export to 
     allies and partners;
       (10) to collaborate with advanced democracies and other 
     willing partners to promote ideals and principles that--
       (A) advance a free and open international order;
       (B) strengthen democratic institutions;
       (C) protect and promote human rights; and
       (D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
       (11) to develop comprehensive and holistic strategies and 
     policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns;
       (12) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United 
     Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral 
     organizations and defend the integrity of these organizations 
     against co-optation by illiberal and authoritarian nations;
       (13) to prioritize the defense of fundamental freedoms and 
     human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC;
       (14) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral 
     organizations, leveraging their significant and growing 
     capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that 
     sustains and strengthens a free and open order and addresses 
     regional and global challenges to hold the Government of the 
     PRC accountable for--
       (A) violations and abuses of human rights;
       (B) restrictions on religious practices; and
       (C) undermining and abrogating treaties, other 
     international agreements, and other international norms 
     related to human rights;
       (15) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, repression, and 
     other malign behavior to attain unfair economic advantages 
     and to pressure other nations to defer to its political and 
     strategic objectives;
       (16) to maintain United States access to the Western 
     Pacific, including by--
       (A) increasing United States forward-deployed forces in the 
     Indo-Pacific region;
       (B) modernizing the United States military through 
     investments in existing and new platforms, emerging 
     technologies, critical in-theater force structure and 
     enabling capabilities, joint operational concepts, and a 
     diverse, operationally resilient and politically sustainable 
     posture; and
       (C) operating and conducting exercises with allies and 
     partners--
       (i) to mitigate the Peoples Liberation Army's ability to 
     project power and establish contested zones within the First 
     and Second Island Chains;
       (ii) to diminish the ability of the People's Liberation 
     Army to coerce its neighbors;
       (iii) to maintain open sea and air lanes, particularly in 
     the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China 
     Sea; and
       (iv) to project power from the United States and its allies 
     and partners to demonstrate the ability to conduct contested 
     logistics;
       (17) to deter the PRC from--
       (A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including by developing 
     more combat-credible forces that are integrated with allies 
     and partners in contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to 
     defeat any PRC theory of victory in the First or Second 
     Island Chains of the Western Pacific and beyond, as called 
     for in the 2018 National Defense Strategy;
       (B) using grey-zone tactics below the level of armed 
     conflict; or
       (C) initiating armed conflict;
       (18) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military 
     communication and improve de-escalation procedures to de-
     conflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, 
     including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges 
     between civilian and military officials and other measures, 
     in alignment with United States interests; and
       (19) to cooperate with the PRC if interests align, 
     including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the 
     United Nations, as appropriate.
       (b) Establishing and Expanding the Regional China Officer 
     Program.--
       (1) In general.--There is authorized to be established at 
     the Department of State a Regional China Officer (RCO) 
     program to support regional posts and officers with 
     reporting, information, and policy tools, and to enhance 
     expertise related to strategic competition with the PRC.
       (2) Authorization.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
     $2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to the 
     Department of State to expand the RCO program, including 
     for--
       (A) the placement of Regional China Officers at United 
     States missions to the United Nations and United Nations 
     affiliated organizations;
       (B) the placement of additional Regional China Officers in 
     Africa;
       (C) the hiring of locally employed staff to support 
     Regional China Officers serving abroad; and
       (D) the establishment of full-time equivalent positions to 
     assist in managing and facilitating the RCO program.
       (3) Program funds.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
     $50,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for each 
     Regional China Officer to support programs and public 
     diplomacy activities of the Regional China Officer.
       (c) Sense of Congress on Data-driven Policy Making.--It is 
     the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Office for China Coordination should employ at 
     least one full-time equivalent Data Officer, who shall not be 
     dual-hatted, focused on strategic competition with the PRC; 
     and
       (2) the Department should, to the extent possible within 
     existing authorities, prioritize access for the Office for 
     China Coordination to databases, commercial software, and 
     other data to support policy-making related to strategic 
     competition with the PRC.
                                 ______