[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 120 (Wednesday, July 24, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Page S5435]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 3122. Mr. CARDIN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill S. 4638, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2025 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of subtitle D of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1266. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUNTERING THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA INFLUENCE FUND.
(a) Countering the People's Republic of China Influence
Fund.--There is authorized to be appropriated $600,000,000
for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the Countering
the People's Republic of China Influence Fund to counter PRC
malign influence. Amounts appropriated pursuant to this
authorization are authorized to remain available until
expended and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise
authorized to be appropriated to counter such influence.
(b) Policy Guidance, Coordination, and Approval.--
(1) Coordinator.--The Secretary of State shall designate an
existing senior official as the Coordinator for the
Countering the People's Republic of China Influence Fund (in
this section referred to as ``Coordinator'') to provide
policy guidance, coordination within the Department and the
interagency as appropriate, and recommendations for the
obligation of funds authorized pursuant to subsection (a).
(2) Duties.--The Coordinator designated pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall be responsible for--
(A) on an annual basis, the identification of specific
strategic priorities for using the funds authorized to be
appropriated under subsection (a), such as geographic areas
of focus or functional categories of programming that funds
are to be concentrated within, consistent with the national
interests of the United States and the purposes of this
section;
(B) the coordination and approval of all programming
conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated under
subsection (a), based on an assessment that such programming
directly counters PRC malign influence, including specific
activities or policies advanced by such influence, pursuant
to the strategic objectives of the United States;
(C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a
sufficiently direct nexus to countering PRC malign influence
and adheres to the requirements outlined in subsection (d);
(D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the
effectiveness of all programming conducted using the funds
authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a) to ensure
that it advances United States interests and degrades the
ability of the Government of the PRC, the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), or entities acting on their behalf, to advance
the activities described in subsection (c); and
(E) ensuring, to the maximum extent practicable, that all
approved programming under subsection (a) is carried out in
coordination with other Federal activities to counter the
malign influence and activities of the Government of the PRC,
the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf.
(3) Assistant coordinator.--The Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development shall designate
an official with direct responsibility for policy with
respect to the PRC to assist the Coordinator designated
pursuant to paragraph (1), particularly with respect to such
assistance handled by the United States Agency for
International Development.
(c) PRC Malign Influence Defined.--In this section, the
term ``PRC malign influence'' means influence of the
Government of the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
or entities acting on their behalf globally that--
(1) undermines a free and open international order;
(2) advances an alternative, repressive international order
that bolsters the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party's
hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by coercion and
dependency;
(3) undermines the national security, territorial
integrity, or sovereignty of the United States or other
countries; or
(4) undermines the political and economic security of the
United States or other countries, including by promoting
corruption or elite capture, and advancing coercive economic
practices.
(d) Activities To Counter PRC Malign Influence.--In this
section, countering malign influence through the use of funds
authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) include
efforts--
(1) to promote transparency and accountability, and reduce
corruption, including in governance structures targeted by
the malign influence of the Government of the PRC or the CCP;
(2) to support civil society and independent media to raise
awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative
impact of activities and initiatives of the Government of the
PRC and the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf,
including the Belt and Road Initiative and other initiatives
that lack transparency, fail to meet international standards,
and are associated with coercive economic practices;
(3) to counter transnational criminal networks that
benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of the
Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their
behalf;
(4) to encourage economic development structures that help
protect against predatory lending schemes, including support
for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such
as digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;
(5) to counter activities that provide undue influence to
the security forces of the PRC;
(6) to expose foreign influence operations and propaganda
of the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on
their behalf;
(7) to counter efforts by the Government of the PRC, the
CCP, or entities acting on their behalf to legitimize or
promote authoritarian ideology and governance models,
including its model of a state-dominated cyber and digital
ecosystem;
(8) to counter efforts by the Government of the PRC, the
CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, to silence,
intimidate, or exact reprisal against individuals outside of
their sovereign borders, including members of diaspora
populations such as political opponents, repressed religious
or spiritual practitioners, marginalized ethnic community
members, civil society activists, human rights defenders,
researchers, and journalists;
(9) to provide alternatives to problematic PRC technology
offerings, which could provide the Government of the PRC
undue access to or influence over global data flows or
sensitive information, and compete with problematic PRC
efforts to leverage or make gains in the development of
advanced and emerging technologies;
(10) to counter PRC activities that directly enable
critical supply chain monopolization or other monopolistic
practices;
(11) to counter aggressive PRC efforts to make inroads into
the nuclear energy sectors of countries to the detriment of
United States national security, strategic, and
nonproliferation interests; and
(12) to counter efforts by the Government of the PRC, the
CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, to undermine the
democratic processes and institutions of United States allies
and partners.
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