[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 120 (Wednesday, July 24, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5351-S5353]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 3053. Mr. COTTON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by 
him to the bill S. 4638, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2025 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of division A, add the following:

               TITLE XVII--NO ICBMS FOR IRAN ACT OF 2024

     SEC. 1701. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``No ICBMs for Iran Act of 
     2024''.

 Subtitle A--Sanctions and Report on Iranian Space-launch Vehicles and 
                  Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

     SEC. 1711. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Islamic Republic of Iran has the largest ballistic 
     missile arsenal in the Middle East, which Iran uses to 
     threaten forces of the United States and partners of the 
     United States in the region.
       (2) Iran is progressing toward developing an 
     intercontinental ballistic missile (commonly referred to an 
     ``ICBM'') capability. In 2023, the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency reported that Iran's progress on its space-launch 
     vehicles shortens the time needed for Iran to produce an ICBM 
     since space-launch vehicles and ICBMs use similar 
     technologies.
       (3) Iran continues to rely on illicit foreign procurement 
     to support its long-range missile aspirations. For example, 
     Iran recently tried to purchase from the Russian Federation 
     and the People's Republic of China ammonium perchlorate, 
     which is the main ingredient in solid propellants to power 
     missiles.
       (4) Iran relies at least in part on networks in Hong Kong 
     and the People's Republic of China to procure dual-use 
     materials and equipment for its longer-range ballistic 
     missile program.
       (5) North Korea historically has played a role in 
     supporting longer-range Iranian ballistic missile 
     capabilities. Specifically, North Korea provided the Nodong-A 
     to Iran in the 1990s, which Iran used to develop both its 
     first nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missile and 
     liquid propellant engines for its space-launch vehicles.
       (6) While the Iran Space Agency, a government organization 
     subject to sanctions, develops space capabilities for Iran's 
     ministry of defense as well as the communications sector, 
     Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (commonly 
     referred to as the ``IRGC-AF'') runs a parallel space program 
     employing solid-propellant motors, which if used in ICBM 
     technology, would enable launches with little warning.
       (7) Iran continues work on larger diameter solid-propellant 
     motors, like the Rafa'e, and is now reportedly in the 
     possession of an all-solid-propellant space-launch vehicle 
     called the Qaem-100. Iran successfully launched a satellite 
     into orbit using its Qaem-100 rocket January 2024.
       (8) Iran's development, production, and transfer of space-
     launch vehicle and ballistic missile technology violated 
     Annex B of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 
     (2015), which enshrined certain restrictions under the Joint 
     Comprehensive Plan of Action. Those restrictions expired on 
     October 18, 2023.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) Iran's space program continues to function as a cover 
     for Iran's quest for an ICBM;
       (2) the possession by Iran of an ICBM would pose a direct 
     threat to the United States homeland and partners of the 
     United States in Europe; and
       (3) the United States should work to deny Iran the ability 
     to hold the United States homeland or European partners of 
     the United States at risk with an ICBM.

     SEC. 1712. DETERMINATION AND MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF 
                   SANCTIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 13382.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall--
       (1) determine whether each individual or entity specified 
     in subsection (b) meets the criteria for the imposition of 
     sanctions under Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; 
     relating to blocking property of weapons of mass destruction 
     proliferators and their supporters); and
       (2) with respect to any such individual or entity the 
     President determines does meet such criteria, impose such 
     sanctions.
       (b) Individuals and Entities Specified.--The individuals 
     and entities specified in this subsection are the following:
       (1) The Space Division of the IRGC-AF.
       (2) All senior officers of the IRGC-AF.
       (3) Brigadier General Amir-Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of 
     the IRGC-AF.
       (4) General Majid Mousavi, the deputy commander of the 
     IRGC-AF.
       (5) Second Brigadier General Ali-Jafarabadi, the commander 
     of the Space Division of the IRGC-AF.

     SEC. 1713. REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S SPACE, AEROSPACE, AND 
                   BALLISTIC MISSILE SECTORS AND UNITED STATES 
                   CAPACITY TO DENY INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC 
                   MISSILE ATTACKS FROM IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act,

[[Page S5352]]

     the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary 
     of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
     submit to the congressional defense committees a report that 
     includes the following:
       (1) An identification of entities in Iran not subject to 
     sanctions imposed by the United States as of the date of the 
     report that are helping to support Iran's space, aerospace, 
     and ballistic missile sectors, including public and private 
     entities making a material contribution to Iran's development 
     of space-launch vehicles or ICBMs.
       (2) An identification of the countries the governments of 
     which continue to support Iran's space, aerospace, and 
     ballistic missile activities.
       (3) With respect to each country identified under paragraph 
     (2), the following:
       (A) Actions taken by the government of the country or other 
     entities within the country to support Iran's space, 
     aerospace, and ballistic missile activities, including the 
     transfer of missiles, engines, propellant or materials that 
     can be used for fuel, or other technologies that could make a 
     material contribution to development of space-launch vehicles 
     or ICBMs.
       (B) Any actions described in subparagraph (A) or proposals 
     for such actions being negotiated or discussed as of the date 
     of the report.
       (4) An assessment of Iran's ICBM technology, including the 
     following:
       (A) Key steps Iran would need to take to develop an ICBM.
       (B) An assessment of which rocket motors Iran would likely 
     use to build an ICBM.
       (C) Technological hurdles Iran would still need to overcome 
     to develop an ICBM.
       (D) Pathways to overcome the hurdles described in 
     subparagraph (C), including the potential transfer of 
     technologies from North Korea, the Russian Federation, or the 
     People's Republic of China.
       (E) An estimated timeline for Iran to develop an ICBM if 
     Iran chooses to do so.
       (b) Updates.--As new information becomes available and not 
     less frequently than annually, the Secretary shall submit to 
     the congressional defense committees an updated version of 
     the report required by subsection (a) that includes updated 
     information under paragraphs (1) through (4) of that 
     subsection.
       (c) Form.--Each report submitted under this section shall 
     be submitting in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 1714. REPORT ON SENIOR OFFICIALS OF GOVERNMENT OF IRAN 
                   RESPONSIBLE FOR SPACE-LAUNCH VEHICLE OR 
                   BALLISTIC MISSILE TESTS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date on 
     which the President determines that the Government of Iran 
     has conducted a test of a space-launch vehicle or ballistic 
     missile, the President shall submit to the congressional 
     defense committees a notification that identifies each senior 
     official of the Government of Iran that the President 
     determines is responsible for ordering, controlling, or 
     otherwise directing the test.
       (b) Elements.--The notification required by subsection (a) 
     shall include--
       (1) available information on the ballistic missile or the 
     generic class of ballistic missile or space rocket that was 
     launched;
       (2) the trajectory, duration, range, and altitude of the 
     flight of the missile or rocket;
       (3) the duration, range, and altitude of the flight of each 
     stage of the missile or rocket;
       (4) the location of the launch point and impact point;
       (5) the payload; and
       (6) other technical information that is available.
       (c) Form.--The notification required by subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex.

 Subtitle B--Sanctions and Reports Relating to Iranian Unmanned Aerial 
                                Systems

     SEC. 1721. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Iran has a robust unmanned aerial system program under 
     which Iran operates several unmanned aerial systems, 
     including combat drones, drones capable of conducting 
     intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and suicide 
     or kamikaze drones.
       (2) Iran has supplied thousands of unmanned aerial systems 
     to the Russian Federation, including several hundred of the 
     Shahed-136 suicide drone.
       (3) Iran and the Russian Federation are reportedly planning 
     to build 6,000 Geran-2 drones, the Russian-made version of 
     the Iranian Shahed-136, at a new facility in the Russian 
     Federation.
       (4) The Iranian supply of unmanned aerial systems to the 
     Russian Federation has fueled the Russian Federation's 
     murderous invasion of Ukraine and caused countless civilian 
     deaths.
       (5) The United States found parts made by more than a dozen 
     United States or western companies in an Iranian unmanned 
     aerial system downed in Ukraine, which are likely transferred 
     to Iran illegally.
       (6) Iran is also responsible for the proliferation of 
     unmanned aerial systems to terrorist groups in the Middle 
     East, including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the 
     Houthis in Yemen, which have all employed drones in their 
     murderous attacks on Israel following the October 7, 2023, 
     terrorist attacks by Hamas in Israel, which killed more than 
     1,400 innocent civilians.
       (7) Iran's transfer of unmanned aerial systems to other 
     governments and terrorist groups has violated Annex B of 
     United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) and 
     restrictions imposed under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
     Action, which expired on October 18, 2023.
       (8) Upon the expiration of those restrictions, Iran's 
     transfer of deadly unmanned aerial systems and ballistic 
     missiles to actors like Hamas and the Russian Federation 
     became legal under international law.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) Iran's unmanned aerial system program contributes 
     significantly to the instability of the Middle East and 
     threatens the security of the United States and its partners 
     in the Middle East, including Israel;
       (2) the provision of Iranian unmanned aerial systems gives 
     the Russian Federation an advantage in its war in Ukraine and 
     contributes to the dangerous partnership between Iran and the 
     Russian Federation;
       (3) the expiration of restrictions under the Joint 
     Comprehensive Plan of Action and Annex B of United Nations 
     Security Council Resolution 2231 on October 18, 2023, helps 
     facilitate Iran's development and transfer of deadly unmanned 
     aerial systems and ballistic missiles to actors like Hamas 
     and the Russian Federation; and
       (4) the United States should seek to hinder Iran's unmanned 
     aerial system production, its transfer of such systems to the 
     Russian Federation, Hamas, and other hostile state and non-
     state actors, and to prevent the further use of United States 
     components in Iranian unmanned aerial systems.

     SEC. 1722. INCLUSION OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS AND CRUISE 
                   MISSILES UNDER COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS, 
                   ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIVESTMENT ACT OF 2010.

       (a) Findings.--Section 2(1) of the Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 
     U.S.C. 8501(1)) is amended by striking ``and ballistic 
     missiles'' and inserting ``, ballistic missiles, and unmanned 
     aerial systems and cruise missiles''.
       (b) Inclusion in Goods, Services, and Technologies of 
     Diversion Concern.--Section 302(b)(1)(B) of the Comprehensive 
     Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 
     (22 U.S.C. 8542(b)(1)(B)) is amended--
       (1) in clause (ii), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv); and
       (3) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:
       ``(iii) unmanned aerial system (as defined in section 1727 
     of the No ICBMs for Iran Act of 2024) or cruise missile 
     program; or''.
       (c) Sunset.--Section 401(a)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 
     U.S.C. 8551(a)(2)) is amended by striking ``and ballistic 
     missiles and ballistic missile launch technology'' and 
     inserting ``, ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch 
     technology, and unmanned aerial system (as defined in section 
     1727 of the No ICBMs for Iran Act of 2024) and cruise missile 
     programs.''.

     SEC. 1723. INCLUSION OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS IN 
                   ENFORCEMENT OF ARMS EMBARGOS UNDER COUNTERING 
                   AMERICA'S ADVERSARIES THROUGH SANCTIONS ACT.

       Section 107(a)(1) of the Countering America's Adversaries 
     Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9406(a)(1)) is amended by 
     inserting ``unmanned aerial systems (as defined in section 
     1727 of the No ICBMs for Iran Act of 2024),'' after 
     ``warships,''.

     SEC. 1724. INCLUSION OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS UNDER IRAN-
                   IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1992.

       Section 1608(1) of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act 
     of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended 
     by inserting ``unmanned aerial systems (as defined in section 
     1727 of the No ICBMs for Iran Act of 2024),'' after ``cruise 
     missiles,''.

     SEC. 1725. STRATEGY TO COUNTER IRANIAN UNMANNED AERIAL 
                   SYSTEMS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     congressional defense committees a report (with a classified 
     annex) that includes a strategy for countering Iran's growing 
     unmanned aerial systems program and its transfer of unmanned 
     aerial systems and related technology to foreign states and 
     non-state actors.
       (b) Plan To Prevent Iran Obtaining United States 
     Materials.--
       (1) In general.--The strategy required by subsection (a) 
     shall draw upon the work of the President Biden's interagency 
     task force investigating the presence of United States parts 
     in Iranian unmanned aerial systems to develop a plan for 
     preventing Iran from obtaining United States materials for 
     its unmanned aerial system program.
       (2) Elements.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (A) A list of identified United States components found in 
     Iranian unmanned aerial systems and a list of United States 
     suppliers of those components.
       (B) An assessment of existing export controls for 
     components described in subparagraph (A) and a plan to 
     strengthen those export controls, including through any 
     necessary legislative action by Congress.
       (C) An investigation into and identification of foreign 
     actors, including individuals and government and 
     nongovernmental entities, that are supplying components to 
     the Iranian unmanned aerial system and weapons programs.

[[Page S5353]]

       (D) Strategies to deny supply chains for such components, 
     including any sanctions or other actions to target the 
     individuals or entities identified under subparagraph (C).
       (E) An identification of any additional authorities or 
     funding needed to enable the investigation of how Iran is 
     obtaining United States components for its unmanned aerial 
     system program.
       (F) An assessment of how the Bureau of Industry and 
     Security of the Department of Commerce is monitoring 
     compliance with their restrictions on Iranian unmanned aerial 
     system producers aimed at ensuring United States and other 
     foreign-made components are not being used in Iranian 
     unmanned aerial systems.
       (G) An investigation into Iran's use of shell companies to 
     evade sanctions and restrictions on the use of United States 
     or other foreign-made components in Iranian unmanned aerial 
     system production.
       (H) Strategies to ensure United States manufacturers of 
     critical components for unmanned aerial systems can verify 
     the end users of those components.
       (I) Any other actions that could be use to disrupt Iran's 
     unmanned aerial system and weapons programs and its transfers 
     to foreign states and non-state actors.
       (c) Diplomatic Strategy.--The strategy required by 
     subsection (a) shall include a diplomatic strategy to 
     coordinate with allies of the United States to counter Iran's 
     unmanned aerial system production and transfer of unmanned 
     aerial systems and related technologies to foreign states and 
     non-state actors, including the following:
       (1) Coordination with respect to sanctions comparable to 
     the sanctions the United States is required to apply under 
     the amendments made by this subtitle.
       (2) Intelligence sharing with allies of the United States 
     to determine how Iran is obtaining western components for its 
     unmanned aerial system program.
       (3) Intelligence sharing with allies of the United States 
     to track, monitor, and disrupt Iranian transfers of its 
     unmanned aerial system technology to foreign states and non-
     state actors.
       (4) A plan to cooperate with allies of the United States to 
     develop or advance anti-unmanned aerial system equipment.

     SEC. 1726. REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S UNMANNED AERIAL 
                   SYSTEM PROGRAM AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY 
                   TRANSFERS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in 
     coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of 
     National Intelligence, shall submit to the congressional 
     defense committees a report that outlines the following:
       (1) Domestic industries, individuals, or entities in Iran 
     not subject to sanctions imposed by the United States as of 
     the date of the report that are helping to support Iran's 
     unmanned aerial system program, including both public and 
     private entities making a material contribution to Iran's 
     production of unmanned aerial systems.
       (2) A list of foreign states or non-state actors using 
     Iranian unmanned aerial system technology or looking to 
     purchase it, including any negotiations or discussions 
     ongoing as of the date of the enactment of this Act between 
     Iran and a foreign state or non-state actor to acquire such 
     technology from Iran.
       (3) An assessment of cooperation between Iran and the 
     People's Republic of China to develop, produce, acquire, or 
     export unmanned aerial system technology.
       (4) An assessment of cooperation between Iran and the 
     Russian Federation to develop, produce, acquire, or export 
     unmanned aerial system technology, including a status update 
     on Russian capabilities to produce Iranian unmanned aerial 
     systems.
       (5) An assessment on how the October 18, 2023, expiration 
     of sanctions and other restrictions under Annex B of United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) have or have 
     not increased cooperation between Iran and the Russian 
     Federation or Iran and the People's Republic of China 
     relating to transactions previously restricted under that 
     resolution.
       (b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.

     SEC. 1727. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM DEFINED.

       In this subtitle, the term ``unmanned aerial system''--
       (1) means an aircraft without a human pilot onboard that is 
     controlled by an operator remotely or programmed to fly 
     autonomously; and
       (2) includes--
       (A) unmanned vehicles that conduct intelligence, 
     surveillance, or reconnaissance operations;
       (B) unmanned vehicles that can loiter, such as suicide or 
     kamikaze drones; and
       (C) unmanned combat aerial vehicles.

          Subtitle C--Expansion of Iran Sanctions Act of 1996

     SEC. 1731. EXPANSION OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.

       (a) Expansion of Sanctions With Respect to Weapons of Mass 
     Destruction and Conventional Weapons.--Section 5(b)(1) of the 
     Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note) is amended--
       (1) in the paragraph heading, by striking ``Exports, 
     transfers, and transshipments'' and inserting ``Weapons of 
     mass destruction and conventional weapons'';
       (2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``the Iran Threat 
     Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012'' and inserting 
     ``the No ICBMs for Iran Act of 2024'';
       (3) in subparagraph (B)--
       (A) in clause (i), by striking ``would likely'' and 
     inserting ``may'';
       (B) in clause (ii)--
       (i) in subclause (I)--

       (I) by striking ``or develop'' and inserting ``develop, or 
     export''; and
       (II) by striking ``; or'' and inserting a semicolon;

       (ii) by redesignating subclause (II) as subclause (IV); and
       (iii) by inserting after subclause (I) the following:

       ``(II) acquire or develop ballistic missiles or ballistic 
     missile launch technologies;
       ``(III) acquire or develop unmanned aerial systems (as 
     defined in section 1727 of the No ICBMs for Iran Act of 
     2024); or''.

       (b) Sanctions With Respect to Space-launch and Ballistic 
     Missile Programs.--Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(4) Space-launch and ballistic missile goods, services, 
     or technology.--
       ``(A) Transfer to iran.--Except as provided in subsection 
     (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions 
     described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the 
     President determines that the person, on or after the date of 
     the enactment of the No ICBMs for Iran Act of 2024, knowingly 
     exports, transfers, or permits or otherwise facilitates the 
     transshipment or reexport of goods, services, technology, or 
     other items to Iran that may support Iran's efforts to 
     acquire, develop, or export its space-launch programs, space-
     launch vehicles, or ballistic missiles or ballistic missile 
     launch technologies.
       ``(B) Development and support for development.--Except as 
     provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or 
     more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect 
     to--
       ``(i) an agency or instrumentality of the Government of 
     Iran if the President determines that the agency or 
     instrumentality knowingly, on or after the date of the 
     enactment of the No ICBMs for Iran Act of 2024, seeks to 
     develop, procure, or acquire goods, services, or technology 
     that may support efforts by the Government of Iran with 
     respect to space-launch vehicle or ballistic missile-related 
     goods, services, and items listed on the Equipment, Software, 
     and Technology Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
     (commonly referred to as the `MTCR Annex');
       ``(ii) a foreign person or an agency or instrumentality of 
     a foreign state (as defined in section 1603(b) of title 28, 
     United States Code) if the President determines that the 
     person or agency or instrumentality knowingly, on or after 
     such date of enactment, provides material support to the 
     Government of Iran that may support efforts by the Government 
     of Iran with respect to space-launch vehicle or ballistic 
     missile-related goods, services, and items listed on the MTCR 
     Annex; and
       ``(iii) a foreign person that the President determines 
     knowingly, on or after such date of enactment, engages in a 
     transaction or transactions with, or provides financial 
     services for, a foreign person or an agency or 
     instrumentality of a foreign state described in clause (i) or 
     (ii) with respect to space-launch vehicle or ballistic 
     missile-related goods, services, and items listed on the MTCR 
     Annex.
       ``(C) Congressional requests.--Not later than 30 days after 
     receiving a request from the chairman or ranking member of 
     the appropriate congressional committees with respect to 
     whether a person meets the criteria for the imposition of 
     sanctions under subparagraph (A) or (B), the President 
     shall--
       ``(i) determine if the person meets such criteria; and
       ``(ii) submit a report to the chairman or ranking member, 
     as the case may be, who submitted the request with respect to 
     that determination that includes a statement of whether or 
     not the President imposed or intends to impose sanctions with 
     respect to the person.''.
                                 ______