[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 119 (Tuesday, July 23, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5312-S5313]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 3040. Mr. MARKEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by 
him to the bill S. 4638, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2025 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of subtitle B of title XV, add the following:

     SEC. 1526. SMARTER APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR EXPENDITURES ACT.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the 
     ``Smarter Approaches to Nuclear Expenditures Act''.
       (b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The United States continues to maintain an excessively 
     large and costly arsenal of nuclear delivery systems and 
     warheads that are a holdover from the Cold War.
       (2) The current nuclear arsenal of the United States 
     includes approximately 3,708 total nuclear warheads in its 
     military stockpile, of which approximately 1,744 are deployed 
     with five delivery components: land-based intercontinental 
     ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 
     long-range strategic bomber aircraft armed with nuclear 
     gravity bombs, long-range strategic bomber aircraft armed 
     with nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles, and short-
     range fighter aircraft that can deliver nuclear gravity 
     bombs. The strategic bomber fleet of the United States 
     comprises 87 B-52 and 20 B-2 aircraft, over 66 of which 
     contribute to the nuclear mission. The United States also 
     maintains 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 14 
     Ohio-class submarines, up to 12 of which are deployed. Each 
     of those submarines is armed with approximately 90 nuclear 
     warheads.
       (3) Between fiscal years 2021 and 2030, the United States 
     will spend an estimated $634,000,000,000 to maintain and 
     recapitalize its nuclear force, according to a January 2019 
     estimate from the Congressional Budget Office, an increase of 
     $140,000,000,000 from the Congressional Budget Office's 2019 
     estimate, with 36 percent of that additional cost stemming 
     ``mainly from new plans for modernizing [the Department of 
     Energy's] production facilities and from [the Department of 
     Defense's] modernization programs moving more fully into 
     production''.
       (4) Adjusted for inflation, the Congressional Budget Office 
     estimates that the United States will spend $634,000,000,000 
     between 2021 and 2030 on new nuclear weapons and 
     modernization and infrastructure programs, an estimate that 
     in total is 28 percent higher than the Congressional Budget 
     Office's most recent previous estimate of the 10-year costs 
     of nuclear forces.
       (5) Inaccurate budget forecasting is likely to continue to 
     plague the Department of Defense and the Department of 
     Energy, as evidenced by the fiscal year 2023 budget request 
     of the President for the National Nuclear Security 
     Administration ``Weapon Activities'' account, which far 
     exceeded what the National Nuclear Security Administration 
     had projected in previous years.
       (6) The projected growth in nuclear weapons spending is 
     coming due as the Department of Defense is seeking to replace 
     large portions of its conventional forces to better compete 
     with the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of 
     China and as internal and external fiscal pressures are 
     likely to limit the growth of, and perhaps reduce, military 
     spending. As then-Air Force Chief of Staff General Dave 
     Goldfein said in 2020, ``I think a debate is that this will 
     be the first time that the nation has tried to simultaneously 
     modernize the nuclear enterprise while it's trying to 
     modernize an aging conventional enterprise. The current 
     budget does not allow you to do both.''.
       (7) In 2023, the Government Accountability Office released 
     a report entitled ``Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Does Not Have a 
     Comprehensive Schedule or Cost Estimate for Pit Production 
     Capability'', stating the National Nuclear Security 
     Administration ``had limited assurance that it would be able 
     to produce sufficient numbers of pits in time'' to meet the 
     requirement under section 4219 of the Atomic Energy Defense 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 2538a) that the National Nuclear Security 
     Administration produce 80 plutonium pits by 2030.
       (8) According to the Government Accountability Office, the 
     National Nuclear Security Administration has still not 
     factored affordability concerns into its planning as was 
     recommended by the Government Accountability Office in 2017, 
     with the warning that ``it is essential for NNSA to present 
     information to Congress and other key decision makers 
     indicating whether the agency has prioritized certain 
     modernization programs or considered trade-offs (such as 
     deferring or cancelling specific modernization programs)''. 
     Instead, the budget estimate of the Department of Energy for 
     nuclear modernization activities during the period of fiscal 
     years 2021 through 2025 was $81,000,000,000--$15,000,000,000 
     more than the 2020 budget estimate of the Department for the 
     same period.
       (9) A December 2020 Congressional Budget Office analysis 
     showed that the projected costs of nuclear forces over the 
     next decade can be reduced by $12,400,000,000 to 
     $13,600,000,000 by trimming back current plans, while still 
     maintaining a triad of delivery systems. Even larger savings 
     would accrue over the subsequent decade.
       (10) The Department of Defense's June 2013 nuclear policy 
     guidance entitled ``Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of 
     the United States'' found that force levels under the April 
     2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and 
     Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms between the United 
     States and the Russian Federation (commonly known as the 
     ``New START Treaty'') ``are more than adequate for what the 
     United States needs to fulfill its national security 
     objectives'' and can be reduced by up to \1/3\ below levels 
     under the New START Treaty to 1,000 to 1,100 warheads.
       (11) Former President Trump expanded the role of, and 
     spending on, nuclear weapons in United States policy at the 
     same time that he withdrew from, unsigned, or otherwise 
     terminated a series of important arms control and 
     nonproliferation agreements.
       (c) Reductions in Nuclear Forces.--
       (1) Reduction of nuclear-armed submarines.--Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to 
     be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 
     2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of 
     Defense may be obligated or expended for purchasing more than 
     eight Columbia-class submarines.
       (2) Reduction of ground-based missiles.--Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of law, beginning in fiscal year 2024, 
     the forces of the Air Force shall include not more than 150 
     intercontinental ballistic missiles.
       (3) Reduction of deployed strategic warheads.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, beginning in 
     fiscal year 2024, the forces of the United States Military 
     shall include not more than 1,000 deployed strategic 
     warheads, as that term is defined in the New START Treaty.
       (4) Limitation on new long-range penetrating bomber 
     aircraft.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none 
     of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
     available for any of fiscal years 2024 through 2028 for the 
     Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for 
     purchasing more than 80 B-21 long-range penetrating bomber 
     aircraft.
       (5) Prohibition on f-35 nuclear mission.--Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to 
     be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 
     2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of 
     Defense or the Department of Energy may be used to make the 
     F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft capable of carrying 
     nuclear weapons.
       (6) Prohibition on new air-launched cruise missile.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds 
     authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for 
     fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the 
     Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be 
     obligated or expended for the research, development, test, 
     and evaluation or procurement of the long-range stand-off 
     weapon or any other new air-launched cruise missile or for 
     the W80 warhead life extension program.
       (7) Prohibition on new intercontinental ballistic 
     missile.--Notwithstanding any

[[Page S5313]]

     other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be 
     appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 
     or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense 
     may be obligated or expended for the research, development, 
     test, and evaluation or procurement of the LGM-35 Sentinel, 
     previously known as the ground-based strategic deterrent, or 
     any new intercontinental ballistic missile.
       (8) Termination of uranium processing facility.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds 
     authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for 
     fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the 
     Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be 
     obligated or expended for the Uranium Processing Facility 
     located at the Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, 
     Tennessee.
       (9) Prohibition on procurement and deployment of new low-
     yield warhead.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise 
     made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year 
     thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of 
     Energy may be obligated or expended to deploy the W76-2 low-
     yield nuclear warhead or any other low-yield or nonstrategic 
     nuclear warhead.
       (10) Prohibition on new submarine-launched cruise 
     missile.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of 
     the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
     available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter 
     for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may 
     be obligated or expended for the research, development, test, 
     and evaluation or procurement of a new submarine-launched 
     cruise missile capable of carrying a low-yield or 
     nonstrategic nuclear warhead, as the 2022 Nuclear Posture 
     Review found this system ``no longer necessary''.
       (11) Limitation on plutonium pit production.--
       (A) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or 
     otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal 
     year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the 
     Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for 
     expanding production of plutonium pits at the Los Alamos 
     National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, or the Savannah 
     River Site, South Carolina, until the Administrator for 
     Nuclear Security submits to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress an integrated master schedule and total estimated 
     cost for the National Nuclear Security Administration's 
     overall plutonium pit production effort during the period of 
     2025 through 2035.
       (B) Requirements for schedule.--The schedule required to be 
     submitted under paragraph (1) shall--
       (i) include timelines, resources, and budgets for planned 
     work; and
       (ii) be consistent with modern management standards and 
     best practices as described in guidelines of the Government 
     Accountability Office.
       (12) Prohibition on sustainment of b83-1 bomb.--
     Notwithstanding other provision of law, none of the funds 
     authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for 
     fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the 
     Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be 
     obligated or expended for the sustainment of the B83-1 bomb, 
     as the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review declared the B83-1 ``will 
     be retired''.
       (13) Prohibition on space-based missile defense.--
     Notwithstanding other provision of law, none of the funds 
     authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for 
     fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the 
     Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be 
     obligated or expended for the research, development, test, 
     and evaluation or procurement of a space-based missile 
     defense system.
       (14) Prohibition on the w-93 warhead.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be 
     appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 
     or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense 
     or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for 
     the procurement and deployment of a W-93 warhead on a 
     submarine launched ballistic missile.
       (d) Reports Required.--
       (1) Initial report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and 
     the Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress a report outlining the 
     plan of each Secretary to carry out subsection (c).
       (2) Annual report.--Not later than March 1, 2024, and 
     annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense and the 
     Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress a report outlining the plan of each 
     Secretary to carry out subsection (c), including any updates 
     to previously submitted reports.
       (3) Annual nuclear weapons accounting.--Not later than 
     September 30, 2024, and annually thereafter, the President 
     shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
     report containing a comprehensive accounting by the Director 
     of the Office of Management and Budget of the amounts 
     obligated and expended by the Federal Government for each 
     nuclear weapon and related nuclear program during--
       (A) the fiscal year covered by the report; and
       (B) the life cycle of such weapon or program.
       (4) Cost estimate report.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to 
     the appropriate committees of Congress a report outlining the 
     estimated cost savings that result from carrying out 
     subsection (c).
       (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the 
     Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the 
     Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on 
     Natural Resources of the House of Representatives.
                                 ______