[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 119 (Tuesday, July 23, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5309-S5310]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 3037. Mr. MARKEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by 
him to the bill S. 4638, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2025 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of subtitle B of title XV, add the following:

     SEC. 1526. HASTENING ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS ACT OF 2024.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the 
     ``Hastening Arms Limitations Talks Act of 2024'' or the 
     ``HALT Act of 2024''.
       (b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an existential threat 
     to humanity, a fact that led President Ronald Reagan and 
     Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev to declare in a joint 
     statement in 1987 that a ``nuclear war cannot be won and must 
     never be fought'', a sentiment affirmed by the People's 
     Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United 
     Kingdom, and the United States in January 2022.
       (2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 people 
     attended the largest peace rally in United States history, in 
     support of a movement to freeze and reverse the nuclear arms 
     race, a movement that helped to create the political will 
     necessary for the negotiation of several bilateral arms 
     control treaties between the United States and former Soviet 
     Union, and then the Russian Federation. Those treaties 
     contributed to strategic stability through mutual and 
     verifiable reciprocal nuclear weapons reductions.
       (3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, millions 
     of people around the world have stood up to demand 
     meaningful, immediate international action to halt, reduce, 
     and eliminate the threats posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear 
     weapons testing, and nuclear war, to humankind and the 
     planet.
       (4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
     Weapons done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 
     (21 UST 483) (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT''), entered into force, 
     which includes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weapon 
     states (commonly referred to as the ``P5''), among other 
     things, ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
     measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race . 
     . . and to nuclear disarmament''.
       (5) Bipartisan United States global leadership has curbed 
     the growth in the number of countries possessing nuclear 
     weapons and has slowed overall vertical proliferation among 
     countries already possessing nuclear weapons, as is 
     highlighted by a more than 90 percent reduction in the United 
     States nuclear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of 
     31,255 in 1967.
       (6) The United States testing of nuclear weapons is no 
     longer necessary as a result of the following major technical 
     developments since the Senate's consideration of the 
     Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to 
     as the ``CTBT'') in 1999:
       (A) The verification architecture of the Comprehensive 
     Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (commonly referred to as 
     the ``CTBTO'')--
       (i) has made significant advancements, as seen through its 
     network of 300 International Monitoring Stations and its 
     International Data Centre, which together provide for the 
     near instantaneous detection of nuclear explosives tests, 
     including all 6 such tests conducted by North Korea between 
     2006 and 2017; and
       (ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
       (B) Since the United States signed the CTBT, confidence has 
     grown in the science-based Stockpile Stewardship and 
     Management Plan of the Department of Energy, which forms the 
     basis of annual certifications to the President regarding the 
     continual safety, security, and effectiveness of the United 
     States nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, 
     leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz to remark in 
     2015 that ``lab directors today now state that they certainly 
     understand much more about how nuclear weapons work than 
     during the period of nuclear testing''.
       (7) Despite the progress made to reduce the number and role 
     of, and risks posed by, nuclear weapons, and to halt the Cold 
     War-era nuclear arms race, tensions between countries that 
     possess nuclear weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk 
     reduction treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles 
     of weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a qualitative 
     global nuclear arms race is now underway with each of the 
     countries that possess nuclear weapons spending tens of 
     billions of dollars each year to maintain and improve their 
     arsenals.
       (8) The Russian Federation is pursuing the development of 
     destabilizing types of nuclear weapons that are not presently 
     covered under any existing arms control treaty or agreement 
     and the People's Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea have each taken 
     concerning steps to diversify their more modest sized, but 
     nonetheless very deadly, nuclear arsenals.
       (9) President Joseph R. Biden's 2022 Nuclear Posture Review 
     was right to label the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise 
     missile as ``no longer necessary'', as that missile, if 
     deployed, would have the effect of lowering the threshold for 
     nuclear weapons use.
       (10) On February 3, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden 
     preserved binding and verifiable limits on the deployed and 
     non-deployed strategic forces of the largest two nuclear 
     weapons powers through the five-year extension of the Treaty 
     between the United States of America and the Russian 
     Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and 
     Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, 
     and entered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly referred to 
     as the ``New START Treaty'').
       (11) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons employment 
     strategy of the United States submitted under section 492 of 
     title 10, United States Code, determined that it is possible 
     to ensure the security of the United States and allies and 
     partners of the United

[[Page S5310]]

     States and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent 
     while safely pursuing up to a \1/3\ reduction in deployed 
     nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START 
     Treaty.
       (12) On January 12, 2017, then-Vice President Biden stated, 
     ``[G]iven our non-nuclear capabilities and the nature of 
     today's threats--it's hard to envision a plausible scenario 
     in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United 
     States would be necessary. Or make sense.''.
       (13) In light of moves by the United States and other 
     countries to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons, a 
     global nuclear freeze would seek to halt the new nuclear arms 
     race by seeking conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable 
     freeze on the testing, deployment, and production of nuclear 
     weapons and delivery vehicles for such weapons.
       (14) The reckless and repeated nuclear threats by Russian 
     President Vladimir Putin since the February 2022 invasion of 
     Ukraine by the Russian Federation underscore the need for a 
     global nuclear freeze.
       (c) Statement of Policy.--The following is the policy of 
     the United States:
       (1) The United States should build upon its decades long, 
     bipartisan efforts to reduce the number and salience of 
     nuclear weapons by leading international negotiations on 
     specific arms-reduction measures as part of a 21st century 
     global nuclear freeze movement.
       (2) Building on the 2021 extension of the New START Treaty, 
     the United States should engage with all other countries that 
     possess nuclear weapons to seek to negotiate and conclude 
     future multilateral arms control, disarmament, and risk 
     reduction agreements, which should contain some or all of the 
     following provisions:
       (A) An agreement by the United States and the Russian 
     Federation on a resumption of on-site inspections and 
     verification measures per the New START Treaty and a follow-
     on treaty or agreement to the New START Treaty that may lower 
     the central limits of the Treaty and cover new kinds of 
     strategic delivery vehicles or non-strategic nuclear weapons.
       (B) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on the testing, 
     production, and further deployment of all nuclear weapons and 
     delivery vehicles for such weapons.
       (C) An agreement that establishes a verifiable numerical 
     ceiling on the deployed shorter-range and intermediate-range 
     and strategic delivery systems (as defined by the Treaty 
     Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
     Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate- 
     Range and Shorter-Range Missiles signed at Washington 
     December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988 
     (commonly referred to as the ``Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
     Forces Treaty''), and the New START Treaty, respectively) and 
     the nuclear warheads associated with such systems belonging 
     to the P5, and to the extent possible, all countries that 
     possess nuclear weapons, at August 2, 2019, levels.
       (D) An agreement by each country to adopt a policy of no 
     first use of nuclear weapons or provide transparency into its 
     nuclear declaratory policy.
       (E) An agreement on a proactive United Nations Security 
     Council resolution that expands access by the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency to any country found by the Board of 
     Governors of that Agency to be noncompliant with its 
     obligations under the NPT.
       (F) An agreement to refrain from configuring nuclear forces 
     in a ``launch on warning'' or ``launch under warning'' 
     nuclear posture, which may prompt a nuclear armed country to 
     launch a ballistic missile attack in response to detection by 
     an early-warning satellite or sensor of a suspected incoming 
     ballistic missile.
       (G) An agreement not to target or interfere in the nuclear 
     command, control, and communications (commonly referred to as 
     ``NC3'') infrastructure of another country through a kinetic 
     attack or a cyberattack.
       (H) An agreement on transparency measures or verifiable 
     limits, or both, on hypersonic cruise missiles and glide 
     vehicles that are fired from sea-based, ground, and air 
     platforms.
       (I) An agreement to provide a baseline and continuous 
     exchanges detailing the aggregate number of active nuclear 
     weapons and associated systems possessed by each country.
       (3) The United States should rejuvenate efforts in the 
     United Nations Conference on Disarmament toward the 
     negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Treaty or 
     Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, or move negotiations to 
     another international body or fora, such as a meeting of the 
     P5. Successful conclusion of such a treaty would verifiably 
     prevent any country's production of highly enriched uranium 
     and plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.
       (4) The United States should convene a series of head-of-
     state level summits on nuclear disarmament modeled on the 
     Nuclear Security Summits process, which saw the elimination 
     of the equivalent of 3,000 nuclear weapons.
       (5) The President should seek ratification by the Senate of 
     the CTBT and mobilize all countries covered by Annex 2 of the 
     CTBT to pursue similar action to hasten entry into force of 
     the CTBT. The entry into force of the CTBT, for which 
     ratification by the United States will provide critical 
     momentum, will activate the CTBT's onsite inspection 
     provision to investigate allegations that any country that is 
     a party to the CTBT has conducted a nuclear test of any 
     yield.
       (6) The President should make the accession of North Korea 
     to the CTBT a component of any final agreement in fulfilling 
     the pledges the Government of North Korea made in Singapore, 
     as North Korea is reportedly the only country to have 
     conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1998.
       (7) The United States should--
       (A) refrain from developing any new designs for nuclear 
     warheads or bombs, but especially designs that could add a 
     level of technical uncertainty into the United States 
     stockpile and thus renew calls to resume nuclear explosive 
     testing in order to test that new design; and
       (B) seek reciprocal commitments from other countries that 
     possess nuclear weapons.
       (d) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Nuclear Test 
     Explosions.--
       (1) In general.--None of the funds authorized to be 
     appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 
     or any fiscal year thereafter, or authorized to be 
     appropriated or otherwise made available for any fiscal year 
     before fiscal year 2024 and available for obligation as of 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, may be obligated or 
     expended to conduct or make preparations for any explosive 
     nuclear weapons test that produces any yield until such time 
     as--
       (A) the President submits to Congress an addendum to the 
     report required by section 4205 of the Atomic Energy Defense 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 2525) that details any change to the condition 
     of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile from the 
     report submitted under that section in the preceding year; 
     and
       (B) there is enacted into law a joint resolution of 
     Congress that approves the test.
       (2) Rule of construction.--Paragraph (1) does not limit 
     nuclear stockpile stewardship activities that are consistent 
     with the zero-yield standard and other requirements under 
     law.
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