[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 115 (Thursday, July 11, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5061-S5063]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 2826. Mr. RICKETTS (for himself, Mrs. Shaheen, and Mr. Coons) 
submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 
4638, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2025 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and 
for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other 
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of subtitle D of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1266. IMPROVING MULTILATERAL COOPERATION TO IMPROVE THE 
                   SECURITY OF TAIWAN.

       (a) Short Titles.--This section may be cited as the 
     ``Building Options for the Lasting Security of Taiwan through 
     European Resolve Act'' or the ``BOLSTER Act''.
       (b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) In an October 2022 speech before the 20th National 
     Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, General Secretary Xi 
     Jinping declared that the People's Republic of China 
     (referred to in this section as the ``PRC'') has not ruled 
     out the use of force regarding Taiwan.
       (2) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence's 
     Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 
     published on February 6, 2023, noted that ``Beijing is 
     working to meet its goal of fielding a military by 2027 
     designed to deter U.S. intervention in a future cross-Strait 
     crisis.''.
       (3) The risk of economic disruption following a conflict in 
     the Taiwan Strait could amount to approximately 
     $2,000,000,000,000 in a blockade scenario, which would 
     immediately, and potentially irreversibly impact global trade 
     and investment, key supply chains for semiconductors, and 
     other trade and national security priorities.
       (4) The European Union's foreign and security policy 
     service, the European External Action Service, recognizes 
     that the European Union may use sanctions to promote the 
     objectives of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, all of 
     which have potential relevance in the event of military 
     action or coercion against Taiwan.
       (5) The European Union has imposed sanctions on--
       (A) PRC officials and entities responsible for human rights 
     abuses in Xinjiang; and
       (B) PRC entities for their support of Russia's illegal and 
     unprovoked war in Ukraine.
       (6) In July 2022, Jorge Toledo Albinana, Ambassador of the 
     European Union to the People's Republic of China, said, ``In 
     the event of a military invasion [of Taiwan], we have made it 
     very clear that the European Union, with the United States 
     and its allies, will impose similar or even greater measures 
     than those we have now taken against Russia.''.
       (7) On January 18, 2023, the European Parliament passed a 
     resolution calling upon ``all competent European Union 
     institutions to urgently draw up a scenario-based strategy 
     for tackling security challenges in Taiwan.''.
       (8) In an April 18, 2023, speech to the European 
     Parliament, European Commission President Ursula von der 
     Leyen emphasized that the European Union ``stand[s] strongly 
     against any unilateral change of the status quo [in the 
     Taiwan Strait], in particular by the use of force.''.
       (9) The PRC has supported Russia's illegal, full-scale 
     invasion of Ukraine by resupplying Russia's defense 
     industrial base.
       (10) Taiwan has--
       (A) aligned itself with European Union sanctions against 
     Russia in response to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine; and
       (B) provided Ukraine more than $113,000,000 in financial 
     support and more than 950 metric tons of humanitarian 
     supplies.
       (c) Consultations With European Governments Regarding 
     Sanctions Against the PRC Under Certain Circumstances.--
       (1) In general.--The head of the Office of Sanctions 
     Coordination at the Department of State, in consultation with 
     the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control at the 
     Department of the Treasury, shall engage in regular 
     consultations with the International Special Envoy for the 
     Implementation of European Union Sanctions and appropriate 
     government officials of European countries, including the 
     United Kingdom, to develop coordinated plans and share 
     information on independent plans to impose sanctions and 
     other economic measures against the PRC, as appropriate, if 
     the PRC is found to be involved in--
       (A) overthrowing or dismantling the governing institutions 
     in Taiwan, including engaging in disinformation campaigns in 
     Taiwan that promote the strategic interests of the PRC;
       (B) occupying any territory controlled or administered by 
     Taiwan as of the date of the enactment of this Act;
       (C) violating the territorial integrity of Taiwan;
       (D) taking significant action against Taiwan, including--
       (i) creating a naval blockade or other quarantine of 
     Taiwan;
       (ii) seizing the outer lying islands of Taiwan; or
       (iii) initiating a cyberattack that threatens civilian or 
     military infrastructure in Taiwan; or
       (E) providing assistance that helps the security forces of 
     the Russian Federation in executing Russia's unprovoked, 
     illegal war against Ukraine.
       (2) Semiannual congressional briefings.--Not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
     semiannually thereafter for the following 5 years, the head 
     of the Office of Sanctions Coordination shall provide a 
     briefing regarding the progress of the consultations required 
     under paragraph (1) to--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
       (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of 
     the Senate;
       (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (D) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (d) Coordination of Humanitarian Support in a Taiwan 
     Contingency.--
       (1) Plan.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the United States 
     Agency for International Development (referred to in this 
     section as the ``Administrator''), in coordination with the 
     Secretary of State, shall develop a plan to deliver 
     humanitarian aid to Taiwan in the event of a blockade, 
     quarantine, or military invasion of Taiwan by the People's 
     Liberation Army (referred to in this section as the ``PLA'').
       (2) Consultation requirement.--In developing the plan 
     required under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall consult 
     with the European Commission's Emergency Response 
     Coordination Centre and appropriate government officials of 
     European countries regarding cooperation to provide aid to 
     Indo-Pacific countries as the result of a blockade, 
     quarantine, or military invasion of Taiwan by the PLA, 
     including the extent to which European countries could 
     backfill United States humanitarian aid to other parts of the 
     world.
       (3) Congressional engagement.--Upon completion of the plan 
     required under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall provide 
     a briefing regarding the details of such plan and the 
     consultations required under paragraph (2) to the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
       (e) Report on the Economic Impacts of PRC Military Action 
     Against Taiwan.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a 
     report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
     and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives that contains an independent assessment of 
     the expected economic impact of--
       (A) a 30-day blockade or quarantine of Taiwan by the PLA; 
     and
       (B) a 180-day blockade or quarantine of Taiwan by the PLA.
       (2) Assessment elements.--The assessment required under 
     paragraph (1) shall contain a description of--
       (A) the impact of the blockade or quarantine of Taiwan on 
     global trade and output;
       (B) the 10 economic sectors that would be most disrupted by 
     a sustained blockade of Taiwan by the PLA; and
       (C) the expected economic impact of a sustained blockade of 
     Taiwan by the PLA on the domestic economies of European 
     countries that are members of NATO or the European Union.
       (3) Independent assessment.--
       (A) In general.--The assessment required under paragraph 
     (1) shall be conducted by a federally-funded research and 
     development center or another appropriate independent entity 
     with expertise in economic analysis.
       (B) Use of data from previous studies.--The entity 
     conducting the assessment required under paragraph (1) may 
     use and incorporate information contained in previous studies 
     on matters relevant to the elements of the assessment.
       (f) Consultations With the European Union and European 
     Governments Regarding Increasing Political and Economic 
     Relations With Taiwan.--
       (1) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (A) Representative offices in Taiwan have been established 
     by--
       (i) 16 of the 27 European Union member states;
       (ii) the European Union;
       (iii) the United Kingdom; and
       (iv) Switzerland.
       (B) Taiwan has representative offices in--
       (i) 19 of the 27 European Union countries;
       (ii) the United Kingdom; and
       (iii) Switzerland.
       (C) The PRC has used its economic power to pressure 
     Taiwan's diplomatic allies to cut ties and switch diplomatic 
     recognition to the PRC, which has reduced Taiwan's diplomatic 
     allies to just 12, including The Holy See.
       (D) On November 18, 2021, Taiwan formally opened the 
     Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania, which is the 
     first such office in Europe that uses Taiwan in its title 
     rather than the PRC-preferred title, ``Taipei'', despite 
     actions of economic coercion imposed on Lithuania by the PRC.
       (E) Since 2020, legislative bodies in Poland, Lithuania, 
     France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Italy, 
     Switzerland, Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, 
     and Slovakia have passed legislation or resolutions that call 
     for--

[[Page S5062]]

       (i) deepening ties and exchanges with Taiwan;
       (ii) supporting Taiwan's participation in international 
     organizations; or
       (iii) maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
       (F) Since 2020, parliamentary delegations from Slovakia, 
     the Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Spain, 
     France, Finland, Romania, Portugal, Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, 
     Italy, Estonia, Latvia, and the European Union have visited 
     Taiwan.
       (G) In May 2023, representatives from the United Kingdom, 
     France, Germany, and the Czech Republic joined the United 
     States, Australia, and Japan in a joint statement calling for 
     Taiwan's inclusion in the 76th World Health Assembly.
       (H) The November 2023 Group of 7 Japan 2023 Foreign 
     Ministers' Statement expressed ``support for Taiwan's 
     meaningful participation in international organizations, 
     including in the World Health Assembly and WHO technical 
     meetings.''.
       (I) As of 2022, Taiwan was the European Union's 13th 
     largest trading partner overall and its 5th largest Asian 
     trading partner.
       (J) Taiwan is a leading investor in the Czech Republic, 
     which currently hosts more than $1,000,000,000 in foreign 
     direct investment from Taiwan, resulting in thousands of jobs 
     for Czech citizens.
       (K) From 2021 to 2022, trade between Lithuania and Taiwan 
     increased by 50 percent. Taiwan has invested in Lithuania's 
     emerging chip sector, laser companies, and other high-tech 
     industries.
       (L) In June 2022, the European Commission, for the first 
     time, upgraded its trade and investment dialogues with 
     Taiwan, which had been ongoing at the technical level for 
     more than 20 years, to the ministerial and director-general 
     level for the first time in recognition of the benefit from 
     higher-level coordination.
       (M) In August 2023, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing 
     Company Limited announced partnerships with various European 
     technology firms and investments of $3,500,000,000 to build 
     its first semiconductor plant in Europe in Germany.
       (N) On November 8, 2023, the Government of the United 
     Kingdom signed an Enhanced Trade Partnership agreement with 
     Taiwan. This is the first such agreement between Taiwan and a 
     European country.
       (O) On December 13, 2023 the European Parliament passed a 
     resolution that--
       (i) urges the European Union to pursue a resilient supply 
     chain agreement with Taiwan; and
       (ii) calls for a bilateral investment agreement between 
     Taiwan and the European Union to enhance a 2-way partnership 
     in digital trade and cyber resilience.
       (2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (A) the United States, Europe, and Taiwan are like-minded 
     partners that--
       (i) share common values, such as democracy, the rule of law 
     and human rights; and
       (ii) enjoy a close trade and economic partnership;
       (B) bolstering political, economic, and people-to-people 
     relations with Taiwan would benefit the European Union, 
     individual European countries, and the United States;
       (C) the European Union can play an important role in 
     helping Taiwan resist the economic coercion of the PRC by 
     negotiating with Taiwan regarding new economic, commercial, 
     and investment agreements;
       (D) the United States and European countries should 
     coordinate and increase diplomatic efforts to facilitate 
     Taiwan's meaningful participation in international 
     organizations;
       (E) the United States and European countries should--
       (i) publicly and repeatedly emphasize the differences 
     between their respective ``One China'' policies and the PRC's 
     ``One China'' principle; and
       (ii) counter the PRC's propaganda and false narratives 
     about United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), 
     which claim the resolution recognizes PRC territorial claims 
     to Taiwan; and
       (F) Taiwan's inclusion in the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology 
     Council's Secure Supply Chain working group would bring 
     valuable expertise and enhance transatlantic cooperation in 
     the semiconductor sector.
       (3) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually 
     thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State 
     shall provide a briefing to the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
     of the House of Representatives regarding the Department of 
     State's engagements with the European Union and the 
     governments of European countries to increase political and 
     economic relations with Taiwan, including--
       (A) public statements of support for Taiwan's democracy and 
     its meaningful participation in international organizations;
       (B) unofficial diplomatic visits to and from Taiwan by 
     high-ranking government officials and parliamentarians;
       (C) the establishment of parliamentary caucuses or groups 
     that promote strong relations with Taiwan;
       (D) strengthening subnational diplomacy, including 
     diplomatic and trade-related visits to and from Taiwan by 
     local government officials;
       (E) strengthening coordination between United States and 
     European business chambers, universities, think tanks, and 
     other civil society groups with similar groups in Taiwan;
       (F) establishing new representative, economic, or cultural 
     offices in a European country or in Taiwan;
       (G) promoting direct flights to and from Taiwan;
       (H) facilitating visits by religious leaders to Taiwan; and
       (I) increasing economic engagement and trade relations.
       (g) Consultations With European Governments on Supporting 
     Taiwan's Self-defense.--
       (1) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (A) In September 2021, the European Commission released the 
     European Union Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, 
     which acknowledges that increased tensions between the PRC 
     and Taiwan could impact European security and economic 
     prosperity.
       (B) In 2019, 2021, and 2023, the French Navy sent warships 
     to transit the Taiwan Strait and in 2021, the British Navy 
     frigate HMS Richmond transited the Taiwan Strait.
       (C) In November 2021, the German Navy committed to sending 
     vessels to the Indo-Pacific every 2 years to expand 
     cooperation with like-minded states advocating for freedom of 
     navigation and a rules-based international order.
       (D) European deterrence efforts in the Taiwan Strait 
     support the United States' strategic interests, as the United 
     States also sends warships through the Taiwan Strait to 
     promote deterrence and respond to aggressive behavior by the 
     PRC towards Taiwan.
       (E) In April 2023, European Commission Vice-President Josep 
     Borrell Fontelles called on European navies to patrol the 
     Taiwan Strait to show Europe's commitment to freedom of 
     navigation.
       (F) In August 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron signed 
     into law legislation emphasizing that France would defend 
     freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region, including 
     the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
       (G) European countries, including France, Germany, the 
     United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and 
     Lithuania, have developed Indo-Pacific strategies.
       (H) At the 2022 Madrid Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization unveiled a new Strategic Concept, stating that 
     allies will work together ``to address the systemic 
     challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security'' and 
     underscored the importance of the Indo-Pacific for NATO, 
     ``given that developments in that region can directly affect 
     Euro-Atlantic security.''.
       (I) In September 2022, the North Atlantic Council held its 
     first dedicated discussion about the status of Taiwan, its 
     democratic government, and its critical role in the 
     manufacturing of microchips globally.
       (J) In 2022, the United Kingdom approved a substantial 
     increase in exports of submarine components and technology to 
     Taiwan to upgrade its naval forces.
       (K) In 2024, Taiwan's defense ministry signed an agreement 
     with France's DCI Group for the supply of parts and 
     accessories to maintain its Lafayette-class frigates.
       (2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (A) preserving peace and security in the Taiwan Strait is a 
     shared interest of the United States and Europe;
       (B) European countries, particularly countries with 
     experience combating Russian aggression and malign 
     activities, can provide Taiwan with lessons learned from 
     their ``total defense'' programs to mobilize the military and 
     civilians in a time of crisis;
       (C) the United States and Europe should increase 
     coordination to strengthen Taiwan's cybersecurity, especially 
     for critical infrastructure and network defense operations;
       (D) the United States and Europe should work with Taiwan--
       (i) to improve its energy resiliency;
       (ii) to strengthen its food security;
       (iii) to combat misinformation, disinformation, digital 
     authoritarianism, and foreign interference; and
       (iv) to provide expertise on how to improve defense 
     infrastructure;
       (E) European naval powers, in coordination with the United 
     States, should increase freedom of navigation transits 
     through the Taiwan Strait; and
       (F) European naval powers, the United States, and Taiwan 
     should establish exchanges and partnerships among their coast 
     guards to counter coercion by the PRC.
       (3) Congressional briefings.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually 
     thereafter for the following 5 years the Secretary of State, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall provide 
     a briefing to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 
     and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives regarding discussions with governments of 
     European NATO countries about contributions to Taiwan's self-
     defense through--
       (A) public statements of support for Taiwan's security;
       (B) arms transfers or arms sales, particularly of weapons 
     consistent with an asymmetric defense strategy;
       (C) transfers or sales of dual-use items and technology;
       (D) transfers or sales of critical nonmilitary supplies, 
     such as food and medicine;

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       (E) increasing the military presence of such countries in 
     the Indo-Pacific region;
       (F) joint training and military exercises;
       (G) enhancing Taiwan's critical infrastructure resiliency, 
     including communication and digital infrastructure;
       (H) coordination to counter disinformation;
       (I) coordination to counter offensive cyber operations; and
       (J) any other matter deemed important by the Secretary of 
     State and the Secretary of Defense.
       (h) Expedited Licensing for European Countries Transferring 
     Military Equipment to Taiwan.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
     establish an expedited decision-making process for blanket 
     third party transfers of defense articles and services from 
     NATO countries to Taiwan, including transfers and re-
     transfers of United States origin grant, Foreign Military 
     Sales, and Direct Commercial Sales end-items not covered by 
     an exemption under the International Traffic in Arms 
     Regulations under subchapter M of chapter I of title 22, Code 
     of Federal Regulations.
       (2) Availability.--The expedited decision-making process 
     described in paragraph (1)--
       (A) shall be available for classified and unclassified 
     items; and
       (B) shall, to the extent practicable--
       (i) require the approval, return, or denial of any 
     licensing application to export defense articles and services 
     that is related to a government-to-government agreement 
     within 15 days after the submission of such application; and
       (ii) require the completion of the review of all other 
     licensing requests not later than 30 days after the 
     submission of such application.
                                 ______