[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 115 (Thursday, July 11, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4974-S4976]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 2662. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by 
him to the bill S. 4638, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2025 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of subtitle F of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1291. ADVANCING OVERSIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE SCIENCES 
                   RESEARCH.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the 
     ``Biological Weapons Act of 2024''.
       (b) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
       (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
       (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
       (D) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
     of the Senate
       (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (F) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (G) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives; and
       (H) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (2) Biological weapons convention.--The term ``Biological 
     Weapons Convention'' means the Convention on the Prohibition 
     of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
     Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 
     done at Washington, London, and Moscow, April 10, 1972.
       (3) Dual use research of concern.--The term ``dual use 
     research of concern'' is life sciences research that--
       (A) involves an international partner; and
       (B) based on current understanding can be reasonably 
     anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or 
     technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a 
     significant threat with broad potential consequences to 
     public health and safety, agricultural crops and other 
     plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national 
     security.
       (4) Other international life sciences research of 
     concern.--The term ``other international life sciences 
     research of concern'' means --
       (A) research conducted by or with an international partner;
       (B) involves or is anticipated to involve enhancing a 
     potential pandemic pathogen, the characterization of 
     pathogens with pandemic potential, or modifying a pathogen in 
     such a way that it could acquire pandemic potential; or
       (C) involves enhancing the pathogenicity, contagiousness, 
     or transmissibility of viruses or bacteria in ways or for 
     purposes that can be reasonably anticipated to pose a threat 
     to public health and safety or national security.
       (c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
     States--
       (1) to conduct rigorous scrutiny of and regularly review 
     international biological, bacteriological, virological, and 
     other relevant research collaboration that could be 
     weaponized or reasonably considered dual-use research of 
     concern, and incorporate national security and 
     nonproliferation considerations and country-specific 
     conditions into decisions regarding such collaborations;
       (2) to ensure that, in the search for solutions to pressing 
     global health challenges, United States Government support 
     for public health research and other actions does not advance 
     the capabilities of foreign adversaries in the area of dual 
     use research of concern or inadvertently contribute to the 
     proliferation of biological weapons technologies; and
       (3) to declassify, to the maximum extent possible, all 
     intelligence relevant to the People's Republic of China's 
     compliance or lack of compliance with its obligations under 
     the Biological Weapons Convention, and other national 
     security concerns regarding biological, bacteriological, 
     virological, and other relevant research by the People's 
     Republic of China that could be weaponized or reasonably 
     considered dual use research of concern that may be outside 
     the scope of the Biological Weapons Convention.
       (d) Amendments to Secretary of State Authorities in the 
     Arms Control and Disarmament Act.--
       (1) Research, development, and other studies.--Section 
     301(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2571(a)) is amended by inserting ``biological, virological,'' 
     after ``bacteriological''.
       (2) Oversight of dual-use research.--
       (A) In general.--Title III of the Arms Control and 
     Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2571 et seq.) is amended by adding 
     at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 309. AUTHORITIES WITH RESPECT TO DUAL USE RESEARCH OF 
                   CONCERN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL LIFE SCIENCES 
                   RESEARCH OF CONCERN.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--In this section, 
     the term `appropriate committees of Congress' means--
       ``(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
       ``(B) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
     Pensions of the Senate;
       ``(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       ``(D) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 
     Representatives.
       ``(2) Dual use research of concern.--The term ` dual use 
     research of concern' has the meaning given such term in 
     section 1299(b)(3) of the Biological Weapons Act of 2024.
       ``(3) Other international life sciences research of 
     concern.--The term `other international life sciences 
     research of concern' has the meaning given such term in 
     section 1299(b)(4) of the Biological Weapons Act of 2024.
       ``(b) Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Other 
     International Life Sciences Research of Concern.--The 
     Secretary of State, with respect to oversight of dual-use 
     research of concern and other international life sciences 
     research of concern, shall--
       ``(1) ensure robust and consistent Department of State 
     participation in interagency processes and review mechanisms;
       ``(2) require the Administrator of the United States Agency 
     for International Development to report to and consult with 
     the Department of State on any proposed programs, projects, 
     initiatives, or funding for dual use research of concern or 
     other international life sciences research of concern;
       ``(3) evaluate whether proposed international scientific 
     and technological cooperation activities in which the United 
     States Government participates that involves dual use 
     research of concern or other international life sciences 
     research of concern, including research related to biological 
     agents, toxins, and pathogens, aligns with the United States 
     National Security Strategy and related strategic documents;
       ``(4) create, in consultation with other Federal 
     departments and agencies, policies and processes for post-
     award oversight of grants and funding for dual use research 
     of concern and other international life sciences research of 
     concern, including as aligned with current laws and 
     regulations and for grants or funding from other Federal 
     departments and agencies, such that the Department of State 
     is kept apprised of any national security or foreign policy 
     concerns that may

[[Page S4975]]

     arise with respect to a project funded by another Federal 
     department or agency;
       ``(5) conduct periodic reviews of the adequacy of 
     consultative mechanisms with other Federal Departments and 
     agencies with respect to oversight of dual use research of 
     concern and other international life sciences research of 
     concern, especially consultative mechanisms required under 
     United States law, and identify recommendations for improving 
     such consultative mechanisms;
       ``(6) direct Chiefs of Mission to ensure Country Team 
     Assessments are submitted to the Department of State and the 
     head of the Federal department or agency proposing to sponsor 
     programs and collaborations to scrutinize whether such 
     programs or collaborations involve dual use research of 
     concern or other life international life sciences research of 
     concern, and that such assessments are integrated into 
     relevant interagency processes; and
       ``(7) direct Chiefs of Mission to increase embassy 
     reporting in other countries on dual use research of concern, 
     other international life sciences research of concern, 
     biosecurity hazards trends in the development of synthetic 
     biology and biotechnology, and other related matters.
       ``(c) Reports to Congress.--
       ``(1) Implementation report.--Not later than 1 year after 
     the date of the enactment of the Biological Weapons Act of 
     2024, and semiannually thereafter for the following 5 years, 
     the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress regarding the 
     implementation of subsection (a).
       ``(2) Report on approvals of collaboration.--Not later than 
     1 year after the date of the enactment of the Biological 
     Weapons Act of 2024, and annually thereafter for the 
     following 4 years, the Secretary of State should shall submit 
     a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that 
     describes any research or other collaboration, including 
     transfer agreements, memoranda of understanding, joint 
     research projects, training, and conferences involving 
     significant knowledge transfer that was approved or not 
     objected to by the Secretary of State and the justification 
     for such approval or lack of an objection.''.
       (e) Report on Threats Related to Specific Dual Use Research 
     of Concern and Other International Life Sciences Research of 
     Concern.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment 
     of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State 
     shall submit to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate 
     and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of 
     Representatives an assessment of the key national security 
     risks of dual use research of concern or other international 
     life sciences research of concern, including--
       (1) major issues the Department of State is prioritizing 
     with respect to the misuse or weaponization of, or that be 
     reasonably anticipated to be misused or weaponized, 
     biological, bacteriological, and virological research, or the 
     misuse or weaponization of, or that be reasonably anticipated 
     to be misused or weaponized, any other category of dual use 
     research of concern or other international life sciences 
     research of concern by state and non-state actors;
       (2) the Department of State's efforts to develop and 
     promote measures to prevent such misuse, weaponization, or 
     proliferation of dual use research of concern or other 
     international life sciences research of concern;
       (3) an assessment of targeted national level and government 
     directed policies, research initiatives, or other relevant 
     efforts focused on dual use research of concern or other 
     international life sciences research of concern, including--
       (A) the People's Republic of China;
       (B) the Russian Federation;
       (C) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
       (D) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
       (E) any other nation identified in the report required 
     under section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 
     U.S.C. 2593a); and
       (F) any terrorist group or malign non-state actor;
       (4) an assessment of the national security concerns posed 
     by any of the activities described in paragraphs (1) or (3);
       (5) a description of collaboration between ostensibly 
     civilian entities, including research laboratories, and 
     military entities on the activities identified in paragraph 
     (3);
       (6) a description of the confidence-building measures or 
     other attempts by the countries in paragraph (3) to justify, 
     clarify, or explain the activities described in such 
     paragraph;
       (7) the extent to which the Secretary of State assesses the 
     Biological Weapons Convention and any other relevant 
     international agreements account for or keep pace with the 
     security threats of the activities identified in paragraph 
     (3);
       (8) a description of the process the United States 
     Government uses, including the role of the Department of 
     State, to approve and review funding or other support, 
     including subgrants in other countries for dual use research 
     of concern or other life sciences research of concern, 
     including research related to biological agents, toxins, and 
     pathogens that does or can reasonably be anticipated to pose 
     a risk of misuse, weaponization, or other threat to United 
     States national security;
       (9) a list and description of United States Government 
     interagency mechanisms and international groups or 
     coordinating bodies on biosecurity and dual use research of 
     concern in which the Department of State is a member or has a 
     formal role; and
       (10) a description of any obstacles or challenges to the 
     ability of United States Government to address the 
     requirements specified in this section, including a 
     description of gaps in authorities, intelligence collection 
     and analysis, organizational responsibilities, and resources.
       (f) Report on United States Funding Research With the 
     People's Republic of China.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 400 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall conduct a 
     formal review, and produce a written report, all United 
     States Government-funded research collaboration initiatives 
     conducted with international partners in the past 20 years 
     with the People's Republic of China related to research areas 
     that pose potential biological weapons proliferation risks or 
     meet the criteria of dual use research of concern or other 
     international life sciences research of concern.
       (2) Elements.--The review required under subsection (a) 
     shall--
       (A) provide a detailed description and example projects of 
     the initiatives identified pursuant to subsection (a), the 
     current status of such programs, including dates of 
     initiation and termination, and the criteria for granting 
     approval of funding;
       (B) outline the procedures used to approve or deny such 
     grants or other funding, including coordination, if any, 
     between agencies responsible for public health preparedness 
     and biomedical research agencies, including the Department of 
     Health and Human Services, and national security agencies, 
     including the Department of State, the Department of Defense, 
     and the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003));
       (C) identify gaps in United States Government safeguards 
     regarding sufficient measures to prevent any such research 
     intended for civilian purposes from being diverted for 
     military research in the People's Republic of China;
       (D) an assessment of how to best address any such gaps in 
     procedures, especially regarding greater interagency input;
       (E) how the research conducted with the grants and funding 
     requests listed pursuant to subparagraph (A) may have 
     contributed to the development of biological weapons, or the 
     development of technology and advancements that meet the 
     criteria of dual use research of concern or other 
     international life sciences research of concern in the 
     People's Republic of China;
       (F) how the United States Government's understanding of the 
     People's Republic of China's ``military-civil fusion'' 
     national strategy informed and affected such funding 
     decisions, and how it will inform future funding decisions in 
     research related to gain-of-function, synthetic biology, 
     biotechnology, or other research areas that pose biological 
     weapons proliferation or dual-use concerns;
       (G) whether any United States Government funding was used 
     to support gain-of-function research in the People's Republic 
     of China during the United States moratorium on such research 
     between 2014 and 2017;
       (H) steps taken the by United States Government, if any to 
     apply additional scrutiny to United States Government 
     funding, including subgrants, to support gain-of-function 
     research in the People's Republic of China after the United 
     States Government lifted the moratorium on gain-of-function 
     research in 2017; and
       (I) any other relevant matter discovered during the course 
     of the review.
       (3) Report submission.--Not later than 15 days after 
     completing the report required under paragraph (1), the 
     President shall submit such report to the appropriate 
     congressional committees.
       (4) Form of report.--The report required under paragraph 
     (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (g) Biological and Toxin Weapons Review Conference.--
       (1) Statement of policy.--In order to promote international 
     peace and security, it is the policy of the United States to 
     promote compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention in 
     accordance with paragraphs (2) through (4).
       (2) Activities to advance united states interests at 
     meetings of the biological weapons convention.--Before each 
     Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, the 
     Secretary of State shall--
       (A) demand greater transparency from the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China's activities on dual use research 
     of concern and the applications of such research that raise 
     concerns regarding its compliance with Article I of the 
     Biological Weapons Convention;
       (B) engage with other governments, the private sector 
     (including in relevant science and technology fields), and 
     other stakeholders, as appropriate, regarding--
       (i) United States concerns about the People's Republic of 
     China's compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention; 
     and
       (ii) the national security, public health, and non-
     proliferation implications of such concerns; and
       (C) emphasize that the People's Republic of China's 
     national strategy of military-civil fusion undermines the 
     underlying utility and effectiveness of the Biological 
     Weapons Convention, which may not adequately capture the full 
     range of technologies with dual-use

[[Page S4976]]

     implications being pursued by the People's Republic of China.
       (3) Declassification of intelligence.--The President 
     should, as appropriate, declassify intelligence relevant to 
     the People's Republic of China's obligations under the 
     Biological Weapons Convention and concerns about its 
     compliance.
       (4) Security council complaint.--If the questions and 
     concerns raised pursuant to paragraph (2) are not adequately 
     addressed and another state party is believed to be in breach 
     of an obligation under the Biological Weapons Convention, the 
     President should consider lodging a complaint to the Security 
     Council pursuant to Article VI of the Biological Weapons 
     Convention.
       (h) Annual Report by the United States Agency for 
     International Development.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the 
     following 5 years, the Administrator of the United States 
     Agency for International Development shall submit an annual 
     report to the appropriate congressional committees that 
     describes all funding, including subgrants, for research 
     involving or related to the study of pathogens, viruses, and 
     toxins provided to entities subject to the jurisdiction of 
     countries listed in paragraph (2), which shall include a 
     national security justification by the Secretary of State for 
     such funding.
       (2) List of countries specified.--The countries covered by 
     the report required under paragraph (1) are--
       (A) the People's Republic of China;
       (B) the Russian Federation;
       (C) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
       (D) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
       (E) any other country specified in the report assessing 
     compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, as 
     required under section 403(a) of the Arms Control and 
     Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)) in the relevant calendar 
     year.
       (3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1)) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (i) United Nations Agencies, Programs, and Funds.--
       (1) Requirement.--The Permanent Representative of the 
     United States to the United Nations shall use the voice, 
     vote, and influence of the United States at the United 
     Nations to block representatives from any country specified 
     in the report required under section 403(a) of the Arms 
     Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)) from serving 
     in leadership positions within any United Nations organ, 
     fund, program, or related specialized agency with 
     responsibility for global health security (including animal 
     health), biosecurity, atomic, biological or chemical weapons, 
     or food security and agricultural development.
       (2) List of countries specified.--The countries covered by 
     the report required under paragraph (1) are--
       (A) the People's Republic of China;
       (B) the Russian Federation;
       (C) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
       (D) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
       (E) the Assad Regime of Syria; and
       (F) any other country specified in the report required 
     under section 403(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act 
     (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)) in the relevant calendar year.
       (3) Sunset.--This subsection shall cease to have any force 
     or effect beginning on the date that is 5 years after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 ______