[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 114 (Wednesday, July 10, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4522-S4525]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 2243. Mrs. SHAHEEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed 
by her to the bill S. 4638, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2025 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the appropriate place in title XII, insert the 
     following:

     Subtitle __--Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty

     SEC. __01. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Belarus Democracy, 
     Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2024''.

     SEC. __02. FINDINGS.

       Section 2 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (Public Law 
     108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       ``Congress finds the following:
       ``(1) Consistently, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the illegitimate 
     leader of Belarus, engages in a pattern of clear and 
     persistent violations of human rights, democratic governance, 
     and fundamental freedoms.
       ``(2) Alyaksandr Lukashenka has overseen and participated 
     in multiple fundamentally flawed presidential and 
     parliamentary elections undermining the legitimacy of 
     executive, judicial, and legislative authority in Belarus.

[[Page S4523]]

       ``(3) On August 9, 2020, the Government of Belarus 
     conducted a presidential election that was fraudulent and did 
     not meet international standards. There were serious 
     irregularities with ballot counting and the reporting of 
     election results. The Government of Belarus also put in place 
     restrictive measures that impeded the work of local 
     independent observers and did not provide sufficient notice 
     to the OSCE to allow for the OSCE to monitor the elections, 
     as is customary.
       ``(4) Independent election monitors recognized Sviatlana 
     Tsikhanouskaya as the legitimate winner of the August 9, 2020 
     election for president in Belarus following her candidacy 
     after her husband, opposition leader Sergei Tikhanovsky, was 
     imprisoned for challenging Lukashenka for president in 2020.
       ``(5) Following threats to her safety, Sviatlana 
     Tsikhanouskaya was forced into exile in Lithuania after Mr. 
     Lukashenka claimed victory in the fraudulent 2020 elections, 
     and since that time, the Government of Lithuania has hosted 
     the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the Belarusian 
     Democratic Leader, and the Government of Poland has hosted 
     the Belarusian United Transitional Cabinet.
       ``(6) Thousands of employees at Belarusian state-owned 
     enterprises went on strike across the country to protest Mr. 
     Lukashenka's illegitimate election and the subsequent 
     crackdowns on peaceful protestors to the contested results of 
     the election, including at some of Belarus's largest 
     factories such as the BelAZ truck plant, the Minsk Tractor 
     Works, and the Minsk Automobile Plant.
       ``(7) After the August 9, 2020, presidential election, the 
     Government of Belarus restricted the free flow of information 
     to silence the opposition and to conceal the regime's violent 
     crackdown on peaceful protestors, including by stripping the 
     accreditation of journalists from major foreign news outlets, 
     disrupting internet access, limiting access to social media 
     and other digital communication platforms, and detaining and 
     harassing countless journalists.
       ``(8) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr 
     Lukashenka, continues to subject thousands of pro-democracy 
     political activists and peaceful protesters to harassment, 
     beatings, enforced disappearance, and imprisonment, 
     particularly as a result of their attempts to peacefully 
     exercise their right to freedom of assembly and association, 
     including following violent crackdowns on peaceful protestors 
     and mass detentions of peaceful protesters resisting the 
     results of the contested 2020 election.
       ``(9) Women serve as the leading force in demonstrations 
     across the country, protesting police brutality and mass 
     detentions by wearing white, carrying flowers, forming 
     `solidarity chains', and unmasking undercover police trying 
     to arrest demonstrators.
       ``(10) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr 
     Lukashenka, suppresses independent media and journalists and 
     restricts access to the internet, including social media and 
     other digital communication platforms, in violation of the 
     right to freedom of speech and expression of those dissenting 
     from the dictatorship of Alyaksandr Lukashenka.
       ``(11) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr 
     Lukashenka, has criminalized access to independent media 
     sources and media channels, including foreign media, by 
     designating such sources and channels as extremist and 
     conducting arbitrary arrests and detainments of media 
     workers, activists, and users.
       ``(12) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr 
     Lukashenka, continues a systematic campaign of harassment, 
     repression, and closure of nongovernmental organizations, 
     including independent trade unions and entrepreneurs, 
     creating a climate of fear that inhibits the development of 
     civil society and social solidarity.
       ``(13) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr 
     Lukashenka, has pursued a policy undermining the country's 
     sovereignty and independence by making Belarus political, 
     economic, cultural, and societal interests subservient to 
     those of Russia.
       ``(14) Against the will of the majority of the Belarusian 
     people, Russian President Vladimir Putin has propped up the 
     Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime, including by offering security 
     assistance, providing significant financial support, and 
     sending Russian propagandists to help disseminate pro-regime 
     and pro-Kremlin propaganda on Belarus state television.
       ``(15) Efforts by the Government of the Russian Federation 
     to subsume Belarus into its sphere of influence and consider 
     Belarus as part of the Russian empire or as a `Union State' 
     include security, political, economic, and ideological 
     integration between Russia and Belarus, which intensified in 
     2020 after President Putin supported Mr. Lukashenka's 
     illegitimate election and resulted in the Government of 
     Belarus permitting Russian troops to use Belarusian territory 
     to conduct military exercises ahead of the February 2022 
     further invasion of Ukraine and staging part of the February 
     2022 further invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian territory, 
     including by providing Russia with the use of airbases which 
     allowed Russia to shoot artillery and missiles from 
     Belarusian territory into Ukraine.
       ``(16) The United States Government and United States 
     partners and allies have imposed sanctions on Alyaksandr 
     Lukashenka and the Government of Belarus in response to anti-
     democratic activities and human rights abuses for more than 
     20 years, including in response to the Government of Belarus' 
     support for Russia's further invasion of Ukraine, which 
     include property blocking and visa restrictions and export 
     restrictions.
       ``(17) The Kremlin has provided the Government of Belarus 
     with loans amounting to more than $1,500,000,000 dollars to 
     prop up Lukashenka's illegitimate regime and Russia continues 
     to provide Belarus with access to an economic market to avoid 
     the impacts of United States and allied countries' sanctions 
     on key Belarusian industries.
       ``(18) The Government of Belarus is relied upon by the 
     Government of the Russian Federation to increase production 
     of ammunition and other military equipment to facilitate the 
     Kremlin's crimes of aggression, war crimes, and crimes 
     against humanity during the illegal war in Ukraine.
       ``(19) Since before the 2022 further invasion of Ukraine, 
     the Government of Belarus has hosted Russian troops on 
     Belarusian territory and enabled the violation of Ukraine's 
     sovereignty by Russia in February 2022 and since the further 
     invasion of Ukraine, the Government of Belarus has also 
     hosted Russian mercenary fighters and reportedly hosted 
     Russian nuclear warheads.
       ``(20) The international community has seen credible 
     evidence that children forcibly removed from Ukraine by 
     Russia during the further invasion of Ukraine have transited 
     through the territory of Belarus or been illegally removed to 
     the territory of Belarus with support from Alyaksandr 
     Lukashenka and been subjected to Russian re-education 
     programs.
       ``(21) The Government of Belarus' continued support of 
     Russia, especially in the unprovoked further invasion of 
     Ukraine, and continued oppression of the Belarusian people 
     may amount to crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the 
     crime of aggression.
       ``(22) The Government of Belarus also threatens the safety, 
     security, and sovereignty of European countries, including 
     NATO allies Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, by facilitating 
     illegal migration through the territory of Belarus, resulting 
     in efforts by the United States to support a Customs and 
     Border Patrol Technical Assessment in Latvia to ensure 
     European allies and partners can secure their borders.
       ``(23) The Government of Lithuania and other United States 
     partners and allies host independent Belarusian free media, 
     including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Minsk bureau, and 
     facilitate information and content in the Belarusian 
     language, which the Lukashenka regime has dismissed and de-
     facto outlawed as an inferior language to Russian for the 
     purpose of facilitating Russification campaigns in Belarus.
       ``(24) The governments of Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and 
     other European partners host members of the Belarusian pro-
     democracy movement, including political leaders, free and 
     independent media, and exiled civil society groups and 
     provide essential support to these individuals and groups 
     that make up the Belarus democracy movement.
       ``(25) The Government of Belarus has further attempted to 
     suppress freedom of movement of Belarusian people and 
     Belarusian diaspora and retaliate against those Belarusians 
     living overseas and who have fled the Lukashenka regime by 
     refusing to provide overseas passport services.
       ``(26) The International Civil Aviation Organization found 
     that the Government of Belarus committed an act of unlawful 
     interference when it deliberately diverted Ryanair Flight 
     9478 in order to arrest two Belarusian citizens, including an 
     opposition activist and journalist.
       ``(27) The Belarus democracy movement has legitimate 
     aspirations for a transatlantic future for the people of 
     Belarus and continue to seek justice for those imprisoned and 
     oppressed by the Lukashenka regime and resist Russian 
     encroachment on Belarusian territory, culture, and 
     identity.''.

     SEC. __03. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       Section 3 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (Public Law 
     108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       ``It is the policy of the United States--
       ``(1) to condemn the conduct of the August 9, 2020, 
     presidential election and crackdown on opposition candidates, 
     members of the Coordination Council, peaceful protestors, 
     employees from state-owned enterprises participating in 
     strikes, independent election observers, and independent 
     journalists and bloggers;
       ``(2) to recognize Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as the 
     Democratic Leader of Belarus;
       ``(3) to refuse to recognize Alyaksandr Lukashenka as the 
     legitimately elected leader of Belarus;
       ``(4) to seek to engage with the United Transitional 
     Cabinet as the executive body that represents the aspirations 
     and beliefs of the Belarusian people and as a legitimate 
     institution to participate in a dialogue on a peaceful 
     transition of power and support its stated objectives of--
       ``(A) defending the independence and sovereignty of the 
     Republic of Belarus;
       ``(B) representing the national interests of Belarus;
       ``(C) carrying out the de-facto de-occupation of Belarus;
       ``(D) restoring constitutional legality and the rule of 
     law;
       ``(E) developing and implementing measures to thwart 
     illegal retention of power;

[[Page S4524]]

       ``(F) ensuring the transition of power from dictatorship to 
     democracy;
       ``(G) creating conditions for free and fair elections in 
     Belarus; and
       ``(H) developing and implementing solutions needed to 
     secure democratic changes in Belarus;
       ``(5) to continue to call for the immediate release without 
     preconditions of all political prisoners in Belarus;
       ``(6) to continue to support the aspirations of the people 
     of Belarus for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law;
       ``(7) to continue to support actively the aspirations of 
     the people of the Republic of Belarus to preserve the 
     independence and sovereignty of their country and to pursue a 
     Euro-Atlantic future;
       ``(8) not to recognize any incorporation of Belarus into a 
     `Union State' with Russia, as this so-called `Union State' 
     would be both an attempt to absorb Belarus and a step to 
     reconstituting the totalitarian Soviet Union;
       ``(9) to condemn efforts by the Government of the Russian 
     Federation to undermine the sovereignty and independence of 
     Belarus, and to continue to implement policies, including 
     sanctions, that serve to punish Russia for its anti-
     democratic and illegal actions involving Belarus;
       ``(10) to continue to reject the fraudulent victory of Mr. 
     Lukashenka on August 9, 2020, and to support calls for new 
     presidential and parliamentary elections, conducted in a 
     manner that is free and fair according to OSCE standards and 
     under the supervision of OSCE observers and independent 
     domestic observers;
       ``(11) to continue to call for the fulfillment by the 
     Government of Belarus of Belarus's freely undertaken 
     obligations as an OSCE participating state and as a signatory 
     of the Charter of the United Nations;
       ``(12) to support an OSCE role in mediating a dialogue 
     within Belarus between the government and genuine 
     representatives of Belarusian society;
       ``(13) to support international efforts to launch 
     investigations into the Government of Belarus and individuals 
     associated with the Government of Belarus for war crimes and 
     crimes against humanity against the people of Belarus and the 
     people of Ukraine for their actions during the further 
     invasion of Ukraine;
       ``(14) to support a United States diplomatic presence to 
     engage with the people of Belarus, including the regular 
     appointment of a United States Special Envoy to Belarus until 
     such a time that the credentials of a United States 
     Ambassador to Belarus are recognized by the Government of 
     Belarus;
       ``(15) to continue to work closely with the European Union, 
     the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries and 
     international organizations, to promote the principles of 
     democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in Belarus;
       ``(16) to remain open to reevaluating United States policy 
     toward Belarus as warranted by demonstrable progress made by 
     the Government of Belarus consistent with the aims of this 
     Act, as stated in this section;
       ``(17) to express concern in the event that social media or 
     technology companies move to block independent media content 
     or participate in media blackouts that prevent free and 
     independent media services from transmitting information into 
     Belarus;
       ``(18) to continue to support Belarusian language and 
     cultural programs, including by supporting Belarusian 
     language independent media programs, and Belarusian civil 
     society, including efforts to restore democracy and the 
     regular function of democratic institutions in Belarus;
       ``(19) to work with the Belarusian democratic movement and 
     European allies and partners to ensure Belarusian nationals 
     living outside of Belarus have access to national 
     identification documentation following the Lukashenka 
     regime's decision to stop supplying overseas passport 
     services to Belarusians;
       ``(20) to provide technical support to the United 
     Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and European allies and 
     partners to develop and implement national identification 
     documents (New Belarusian Passport) that will enable the more 
     than 2,000,000 Belarusians living abroad to access freedom of 
     movement and essential services while maintaining Belarusian 
     national identity and unity;
       ``(21) to include Belarusian nationals living in Ukraine as 
     of February 24, 2022, in the Uniting For Ukraine program to 
     provide a pathway for Belarusian nations and their immediate 
     family members outside of the United States to come to the 
     United States and stay for a period of not more than two 
     years of parole and subject those Belarusian nationals to the 
     same qualifications for entry into the program as Ukrainian 
     nationals;
       ``(22) to engage in the United States-Belarus democratic 
     movement strategic dialogue when necessary to reaffirm 
     commitments to promoting freedom and democracy in Belarus and 
     promote efforts to restore free and open presidential and 
     parliamentary elections in Belarus that are conducted 
     consistent with OSCE standards and under the supervision of 
     OSCE observers and independent domestic observers;
       ``(23) to refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the 
     Lukashenka regime to enter into any international agreements 
     or treaties;
       ``(24) to advocate for the inclusion of the Belarus 
     democratic movement to participate in international 
     institutions and be granted Permanent Observer Status by the 
     United Nations General Assembly;
       ``(25) to establish a Belarus service at Voice of America 
     through the United States Agency for Global Media that 
     broadcasts in the Belarusian language;
       ``(26) to continue to support the Governments of Lithuania, 
     Latvia, and Poland in providing critical support to the 
     Belarusian government, civil society, and media in exile;
       ``(27) to transfer when applicable existing bilateral 
     funding for Belarus toward sustaining pro-democracy and civil 
     society initiatives outside the territory of Belarus;
       ``(28) to continue to ban ticket sales for air travel to 
     Belarus until such a time that civilians do not face random 
     arrests by the Government of Belarus, a ban that was enacted 
     following the unlawful actions of the Government of Belarus 
     to deliberately divert Ryanair Flight 9478; and
       ``(29) to continue to work with international allies and 
     partners to coordinate support for the people of Belarus and 
     their legitimate aspirations for a free, open, and democratic 
     society and the regular conduct of free and fair 
     elections.''.

     SEC. __04. STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH THE BELARUS DEMOCRACY 
                   MOVEMENT.

       (a) Strategic Dialogue.--The President shall direct the 
     Secretary of State to host a strategic dialogue with the 
     Belarus Democracy Movement not fewer than once every 12 
     months following the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Central Objective.--The central objective of the 
     strategic dialogue required under subsection (a) is to 
     coordinate and promote efforts--
       (1) to consider the efforts needed to return to democratic 
     rule in Belarus, including the efforts needed to support free 
     and fair elections in Belarus;
       (2) to support the day-to-day functions of the Belarus 
     Democracy Movement, which represents the legitimate 
     aspirations of the Belarusian people, and ensure that 
     Belarusians living outside the territory of Belarus have 
     adequate access to essential services; and
       (3) to respond to the political, economic, and security 
     impacts of events in Belarus and Russia on neighboring 
     countries and the wider region.
       (c) Termination.--The strategic dialogue with the Belarus 
     Democracy Movement and the authorities provided by this 
     section shall terminate on the date that is five years after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. __05. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SOCIETY, 
                   AND SOVEREIGNTY IN BELARUS.

       Section 4 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (Public Law 
     108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, including by 
     establishing a Belarus service at Voice of America to include 
     broadcasts in the Belarusian language'' after ``within 
     Belarus'';
       (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``in the Belarusian 
     language'' after ``and Internet media'';
       (C) by striking paragraphs (11) and (14);
       (D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (10) as 
     paragraphs (4) through (11), respectively;
       (E) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(3) countering internet and media censorship and 
     repressive surveillance technology that seeks to limit free 
     association, control access to information, and prevent 
     citizens from exercising their rights to free speech;'';
       (F) in paragraph (11), as redesignated by subparagraph (C), 
     by inserting ``and the development of Belarusian cultural 
     programs'' after ``supporting the development of Belarusian 
     language education'';
       (G) in paragraph (12), by inserting ``, including refugees 
     from Belarus in Ukraine and refugees from Ukraine fleeing 
     Russia's unprovoked war following the February 2022 further 
     invasion of Ukraine'' after ``supporting political refugees 
     in neighboring European countries fleeing the crackdown in 
     Belarus'';
       (H) in paragraph (13)--
       (i) by inserting ``and war crimes'' after ``human rights 
     abuses''; and
       (ii) by striking the semicolon and inserting ``; and''; and
       (I) by redesignating paragraph (15) as paragraph (14);
       (2) in subsection (f), by striking ``2020'' and inserting 
     ``2024''; and
       (3) by striking subsection (g).

     SEC. __06. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, INTERNET FREEDOM, AND 
                   ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN BELARUS.

       Section 5 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and 
     Sovereignty Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 
     note) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1), by inserting ``and Voice of 
     America'' after ``Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty''; and
       (2) in subsection (b)(1)--
       (A) by striking ``2020'' and inserting ``2024'';
       (B) in subparagraph (A) by inserting ``, including through 
     social media platforms,'' after ``communications in 
     Belarus''; and
       (C) in subparagraph (C) by inserting ``, including by 
     ensuring private companies do not comply with media blackouts 
     directed by or favored by the Government of Belarus'' after 
     ``access and block content online''.

[[Page S4525]]

  


     SEC. __07. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS.

       Section 6 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and 
     Sovereignty Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 
     note) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)--
       (A) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as 
     paragraphs (3) through (6), respectively;
       (B) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(2) The release of Ukrainian nationals illegally held in 
     Belarus, including those illegally transferred to Belarus 
     after the 2022 Russian further invasion of Ukraine.'';
       (C) in paragraph (3), as redesignated by subparagraph (A), 
     by inserting ``, and people who protested the support of the 
     Government of Belarus for the further Russian invasion of 
     Ukraine and cooperation of the Government of Belarus with 
     Russia'' after ``August 9, 2020''; and
       (D) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by inserting ``, 
     or for providing support in connection with the illegal 
     further Russian invasion of Ukraine'' after ``August 9, 
     2020''; and
       (2) in subsection (c)--
       (A) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``and the 
     February, 24, 2022, Further Invasion of Ukraine'' after 
     ``Election'';
       (B) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (9) as 
     paragraphs (6) through (10), respectively;
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(5) assisted the Government of Belarus in--
       ``(A) supporting security cooperation with the Government 
     of Russia in advance of the February 24, 2022, further 
     invasion of Ukraine;
       ``(B) supporting the presence of Russian mercenaries in the 
     territory of Belarus; or
       ``(C) supporting ongoing security cooperation with the 
     Government of Russia, including the Government of Belarus' 
     decision to host Russian tactical nuclear weapons;''; and
       (D) in paragraph (6), as redesignated by subparagraph (B), 
     by inserting ``, or in connection with the 2022 Russian 
     further invasion of Ukraine'' after ``August 9, 2020''.

     SEC. __08. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.

       Section 7 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and 
     Sovereignty Act of 2020 (Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 
     note) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1); by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new 
     paragraphs:
       ``(3) to condemn the continued collaboration between the 
     Government of Belarus and the Government of Russia, 
     particularly as it relates to the further invasion of 
     Ukraine, and further the purposes of this Act, including, as 
     appropriate, to levy sanctions and additional measures 
     against the Government of Belarus for its complicity in war 
     crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the territory 
     of Ukraine; and
       ``(4) to provide technical assistance to the Belarus 
     democracy movement on the creation and international 
     recognition of national identity documentation following the 
     Lukashenka regime's decision to cease overseas passport 
     services for Belarusian nationals, with the objective of 
     maintaining Belarusian national identity and unity but 
     providing Belarusians living overseas with freedom of 
     movement and the ability to access essential services.''.

     SEC. __09. PARTICIPATION OF BELARUS IN UNITING FOR UKRAINE.

       The Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 
     2004 (Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating sections 8 and 9 as sections 9 and 10, 
     respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after section 7 the following new section:

     ``SEC. 8. PARTICIPATION OF BELARUS IN UNITING FOR UKRAINE.

       ``(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress 
     that--
       ``(1) there are a significant number of Belarusian 
     nationals residing in Ukraine and suffering from Russian 
     aggression during the further Russian invasion of Ukraine; 
     and
       ``(2) Belarusian nationals may experience threats to their 
     physical security due to political persecution or retribution 
     or human rights abuses if they return to Belarus.
       ``(b) Uniting for Ukraine Participation.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State and 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide a pathway 
     for Belarusian nationals living in Ukraine following the 
     February 24, 2022, further invasion of Ukraine to participate 
     in the Uniting for Ukraine program.
       ``(2) Exception.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary 
     of Homeland Security may delay implementation of the pathway 
     required under paragraph (1) if they determine that it is 
     counter to United States national security interests.''.

     SEC. __10. REPORTS.

       Section 9 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and 
     Sovereignty Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 
     note), as redesignated by section__07(1) of this Act, is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``2020'' and inserting 
     ``2024''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2)--
       (i) in subparagraph (G), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (ii) in subparagraph (H), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting a semicolon; and
       (iii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
       ``(I) an assessment of how the Government of Russia is 
     working to achieve deeper security cooperation and 
     interdependence or integration with Belarus;
       ``(J) a description of the Government of Belarus actions to 
     support the 2022 further Russian invasion of Ukraine and 
     ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine;
       ``(K) a description of how the Government of Belarus 
     supports, adopts, and deploys Russian disinformation 
     campaigns or Belarusian disinformation campaigns; and
       ``(L) an identification of Belarusian officials involved in 
     continued support to Russia and the further invasion of 
     Ukraine and an identification of Russian officials involved 
     in continued support to Belarus and the further invasion of 
     Ukraine.'';
       (2) in subsection (b)(1)--
       (A) by striking ``2020'' and inserting ``2024'';
       (B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (C) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting a semicolon; and
       (D) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
       ``(C) an identification of efforts by the Government of 
     Belarus and the Government of Russia to circumvent sanctions, 
     including those imposed by the United States in response to 
     the further invasion of Ukraine;
       ``(D) an assessment of the shared assets and business 
     interests of Vladimir Putin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka and the 
     Government of Belarus and the Government of Russia; and
       ``(E) a determination on the possibility for Belarus to 
     host free and fair elections during the parliamentary 
     elections scheduled for 2024 and the presidential election 
     scheduled for 2025, including a proposal of how the United 
     States may support a return to democracy in the anticipated 
     elections in Belarus.''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(c) Report on Efforts to Enable Belarusians Living 
     Outside the Territory of Belarus to Travel Freely.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and 
     Sovereignty Act of 2024, the Secretary of State, in 
     coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     describing efforts to provide Belarusians living outside the 
     territory of Belarus with national identification documents.
       ``(2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
     shall include the following elements:
       ``(A) An assessment of the European Union's efforts to 
     provide Belarusians living overseas with national 
     identification documents that maintain Belarusian nationality 
     but enable Belarusians living overseas to travel freely and 
     access essential services.
       ``(B) A description of efforts to provide technical 
     assistance to the Belarus democratic movement on the creation 
     of national identification documents that fulfill the needs 
     described in subparagraph (A).
       ``(3) Form.--The report required by this subsection shall 
     be transmitted in unclassified form but may contain a 
     classified annex.''.

     SEC. __12. DEFINITIONS.

       Section 10(1)(B) of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 
     (Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note), as redesignated by 
     section __09(1) of this Act, is amended by striking 
     ``Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs'' and 
     inserting ``the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs''.
                                 ______