[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 114 (Wednesday, July 10, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4518-S4522]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 2242. Mrs. SHAHEEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed
by her to the bill S. 4638, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2025 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of subtitle C of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1239. PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND PROSPERITY IN THE WESTERN
BALKANS.--
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the
``Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity Act''.
(b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The Western Balkans countries (the Republic of Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic
of Kosovo, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia and
the Republic of Serbia) form a pluralistic, multi-ethnic
region in the heart of Europe that is critical to the peace,
stability, and prosperity of that continent.
(2) Continued peace, stability, and prosperity in the
Western Balkans is directly tied to the opportunities for
democratic and economic advancement available to the citizens
and residents of those seven countries.
(3) It is in the mutual interest of the United States and
the seven countries of the Western Balkans to promote stable
and sustainable economic growth and development in the
region.
(4) The reforms and integration with the European Union
pursued by countries in the Western Balkans have led to
significant democratic and economic progress in the region.
(5) Despite economic progress, rates of poverty and
unemployment in the Western Balkans remain higher than in
neighboring European Union countries.
(6) Out-migration, particularly of youth, is affecting
demographics in each Western Balkans country, resulting in
population decline in all seven countries.
(7) Implementing critical economic and governance reforms
could help enable investment and employment opportunities in
the Western Balkans, especially for youth, and can provide
powerful tools for economic development and for encouraging
broader participation in a political process that increases
trade and prosperity for all.
(8) Existing regional economic efforts, such as the Common
Regional Market, the Berlin Process, and the Open Balkan
Initiative, could have the potential to improve the economic
conditions in the Western Balkans, while promoting inclusion
and transparency.
(9) The Department of Commerce, through its Foreign
Commercial Service, plays an important role in promoting and
facilitating opportunities for United States trade and
investment.
(10) Corruption, including among key political leaders,
continues to plague the Western Balkans and represents one of
the greatest impediments to further economic and political
development in the region.
(11) Disinformation campaigns targeting the Western Balkans
undermine the credibility of its democratic institutions,
including the integrity of its elections.
(12) Vulnerability to cyberattacks or attacks on
information and communication technology infrastructure
increases risks to the functioning of government and the
delivery of public services.
(13) The Department of State, along with other Federal
agencies, plays a critical role in defending the national
security interests of the United States, including by
deploying cyber hunt forward teams at the request of partner
nations to reinforce their cyber defenses.
(14) Securing domestic and international cyber networks and
ICT infrastructure is a national security priority for the
United States, which is exemplified by offices and programs
across the Federal Government that support cybersecurity.
(15) Corruption and disinformation proliferate in political
environments marked by autocratic control or partisan
conflict.
(16) Dependence on Russian sources of fossil fuels and
natural gas for the countries of the Western Balkans ties
their economies and politics to the Russian Federation and
inhibits their aspirations for European integration.
(17) Reducing the reliance of the Western Balkans on
Russian natural gas supplies and fossil fuels is in the
national interest of the United States.
(18) The growing influence of China in the Western Balkans
could also have a deleterious impact on strategic
competition, democracy, and economic integration with Europe.
(19) In March 2022, President Biden launched the European
Democratic Resilience Initiative to bolster democratic
resilience, advance anti-corruption efforts, and defend human
rights in Ukraine and its neighbors in response to Russia's
war of aggression.
(20) The parliamentary and local elections held in Serbia
on December 17, 2023, and their immediate aftermath are cause
for
[[Page S4519]]
deep concern about the state of Serbia's democracy, including
due to the final report of the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe's Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights, which--
(A) found ``unjust conditions'' for the election;
(B) found ``numerous procedural deficiencies, including
inconsistent application of safeguards during voting and
counting, frequent instances of overcrowding, breaches in
secrecy of the vote, and numerous instances of group
voting''; and
(C) asserted that ``voting must be repeated'' in certain
polling stations.
(21) The Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe also noted that Serbian officials accused primarily
peaceful protestors, opposition parties, and civil society of
``attempting to destabilize the government'', a concerning
allegation that threatens the safety of important elements of
Serbian society.
(22) Democratic countries whose values are in alignment
with the United States make for stronger and more durable
partnerships.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is a sense of Congress that the
United States should--
(1) encourage increased trade and investment between the
United States and allies and partners in the Western Balkans;
(2) expand United States assistance to regional integration
efforts in the Western Balkans;
(3) strengthen and expand regional economic integration in
the Western Balkans, especially enterprises owned by and
employing women and youth;
(4) work with allies and partners committed to improving
the rule of law, energy resource diversification, democratic
and economic reform, and the reduction of poverty in the
Western Balkans;
(5) increase United States trade and investment with the
Western Balkans, particularly in ways that support countries'
efforts--
(A) to decrease dependence on Russian energy sources and
fossil fuels;
(B) to increase energy diversification, efficiency, and
conservation; and
(C) to facilitate the transition to cleaner and more
reliable sources of energy, including renewables, as
appropriate;
(6) continue to assist in the development, within the
Western Balkans, of--
(A) strong civil societies;
(B) public-private partnerships;
(C) independent media;
(D) transparent, accountable, citizen-responsive
governance, including equal representation for women and
youth;
(E) political stability; and
(F) modern, free-market based economies.
(7) support the expeditious accession of those Western
Balkans countries that are not already members to the
European Union and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(referred to in this section as ``NATO'') for countries that
desire and are eligible for such membership;
(8) support--
(A) maintaining the full European Union Force (EUFOR)
mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina as being in the national
security interests of the United States;
(B) encouraging NATO and the European Union to review their
mission mandates and posture in Bosnia and Herzegovina to
ensure they are playing a proactive role in establishing a
safe and secure environment, particularly in the realm of
defense;
(C) working within NATO to encourage contingency planning
for an international military force to maintain a safe and
secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially if
Russia blocks reauthorization of the mission in the United
Nations; and
(D) a strengthened NATO headquarters in Sarajevo;
(9) continue to support the European Union membership
aspirations of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia by supporting meeting the
benchmarks required for their accession;
(10) continue to support the overarching mission of the
Berlin Process and locally-driven initiatives that are
inclusive of all Western Balkans countries and remains
aligned with the objectives and standards laid out by the
European Union as requirements for accession to the European
Union;
(11) continue to support the cultural heritage, and
recognize the languages, of the Western Balkans;
(12) coordinate closely with the European Union, the United
Kingdom, and other allies and partners on sanctions
designations in Western Balkans countries and work to align
efforts as much as possible to demonstrate a clear commitment
to upholding democratic values;
(13) expand bilateral security cooperation with non-NATO
member Western Balkans countries, particularly efforts
focused on regional integration and cooperation, including
through the Adriatic Charter, which was launched at Tirana on
May 2, 2003;
(14) increase efforts to combat Russian malign influence
campaigns and any other destabilizing or disruptive
activities targeting the Western Balkans through engagement
with government institutions, political stakeholders,
journalists, civil society organizations, and industry
leaders;
(15) develop a series of cyber resilience standards,
consistent with the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy and
Readiness Action Plan endorsed at the 2014 Wales Summit of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to expand cooperation
with partners and allies, including in the Western Balkans,
on cyber security and ICT infrastructure;
(16) articulate clearly and unambiguously the United States
commitment to supporting democratic values and respect for
international law as the sole path forward for the countries
of the Western Balkans; and
(17) prioritize partnerships and programming with Western
Balkan countries that demonstrate commitment toward
strengthening their democracies and show respect for human
rights.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) ICT.--The term ``ICT'' means information and
communication technology.
(3) Western balkans.--The term ``Western Balkans'' means
the region comprised of the following countries:
(A) The Republic of Albania.
(B) Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(C) The Republic of Croatia.
(D) The Republic of Kosovo.
(E) Montenegro.
(F) The Republic of North Macedonia.
(G) The Republic of Serbia.
(4) Western balkans country.--The term ``Western Balkans
country'' means any country listed in subparagraphs (A)
through (G) of paragraph (3).
(e) Codification of Sanctions Relating to the Western
Balkans.--
(1) In general.--Each person listed or designated for the
imposition of sanctions under an executive order described in
paragraph (3) as of the date of the enactment of this Act
shall remain so designated, except as provided in paragraphs
(4) and (5).
(2) Continuation of sanctions authorities.--Each authority
to impose sanctions provided for under an executive order
described in paragraph (3) shall remain in effect.
(3) Executive orders specified.--The executive orders
specified in this paragraph are--
(A) Executive Order 13219, as amended by Executive Order
13304 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of
persons who threaten international stabilization efforts in
the Western Balkans); and
(B) Executive Order 14033 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
blocking property and suspending entry into the United States
of certain persons contributing to the destabilizing
situation in the Western Balkans), as in effect on such date
of enactment.
(4) Termination of sanctions.--The President may terminate
the application of a sanction described in paragraph (1) with
respect to a person if the President certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that such person--
(A) has not engaged in the activity that was the basis for
such sanctions, if applicable, during the two-year period
immediately preceding such termination date; or
(B) otherwise no longer meets the criteria that was the
basis for such sanctions.
(5) Waiver.--
(A) In general.--The President may waive the application of
sanctions under this subsection for renewable periods not to
exceed 180 days if the President--
(i) determines that such a waiver is in the national
security interests of the United States; and
(ii) not less than 15 days before the granting of the
waiver, submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
notice of and justification for the waiver.
(B) Form.--The waiver described in subparagraph (A) may be
transmitted in classified form.
(6) Exceptions.--
(A) Humanitarian assistance.--Sanctions under this
subsection shall not apply to--
(i) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the
provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine,
medical devices, humanitarian assistance, or for humanitarian
purposes; or
(ii) transactions that are necessary for, or related to,
the activities described in clause (i).
(B) Compliance with international obligations and law
enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this section shall
not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling
such alien is necessary--
(i) to comply with United States obligations under--
(I) the Agreement between the United Nations and the United
States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered
into force November 21, 1947;
(II) the Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna
April 24, 1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967; or
(III) any other international agreement; or
(ii) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the
United States.
(C) Exception for intelligence activities.--Sanctions under
this section shall not apply to--
(i) any activity subject to the reporting requirements
under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3091 et seq.); or
(ii) any authorized intelligence activities of the United
States.
[[Page S4520]]
(D) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(i) In general.--The requirement to block and prohibit all
transactions in all property and interests in property under
this section shall not include the authority or a requirement
to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.
(ii) Defined term.--In this subparagraph, the term ``good''
means any article, natural or manmade substance, material,
supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test
equipment, and excluding technical data.
(7) Rulemaking.--The President is authorized to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this section (which may include regulatory
exceptions), including under section 205 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1704)).
(8) Sunset.--This subsection shall cease to have force or
effect beginning on the date that is 8 years after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
(f) Democratic and Economic Development and Prosperity
Initiatives.--
(1) Anti-corruption initiative.--The Secretary of State,
through ongoing and new programs, shall develop an initiative
that--
(A) seeks to expand technical assistance in each Western
Balkans country, taking into account local conditions and
contingent on the agreement of the host country government to
develop new national anti-corruption strategies;
(B) seeks to share best practices with, and provide
training to, civilian law enforcement agencies and judicial
institutions, and other relevant administrative bodies, of
the Western Balkans countries, to improve the efficiency,
transparency, and accountability of such agencies and
institutions;
(C) strengthens existing national anti-corruption
strategies--
(i) to combat political corruption, particularly in the
judiciary, independent election oversight bodies, and public
procurement processes; and
(ii) to strengthen regulatory and legislative oversight of
critical governance areas, such as freedom of information and
public procurement, including by strengthening cyber defenses
and ICT infrastructure networks;
(D) includes the Western Balkans countries in the European
Democratic Resilience Initiative of the Department of State,
or any equivalent successor initiative, and considers the
Western Balkans as a recipient of anti-corruption funding for
such initiative; and
(E) seeks to promote the important role of an independent
media in countering corruption through engagements with
governments of Western Balkan countries and providing
training opportunities for journalists on investigative
reporting.
(2) Prioritizing cyber resilience, regional trade, and
economic competitiveness.--
(A) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(i) promoting stronger economic, civic, and political
relationships among Western Balkans countries will enable
countries to better utilize existing resources and maximize
their economic security and democratic resilience by
reinforcing cyber defenses and increasing trade in goods and
services among other countries in the region; and
(ii) United States investments in and assistance toward
creating a more integrated region ensures political stability
and security for the region.
(B) 5-year strategy for economic development and democratic
resilience in western balkans.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
and the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, in coordination with the heads of
other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a regional
economic development and democratic resilience strategy for
the Western Balkans that complements the efforts of the
European Union, European nations, and other multilateral
financing institutions--
(i) to consider the full set of tools and resources
available from the relevant agencies;
(ii) to include efforts to ensure coordination with
multilateral and bilateral partners, such as the European
Union, the World Bank, and other relevant assistance
frameworks;
(iii) to include an initial public assessment of--
(I) economic opportunities for which United States
businesses, or those of other like-minded partner countries,
would be competitive;
(II) legal, economic, governance, infrastructural, or other
barriers limiting United States trade and investment in the
Western Balkans;
(III) the effectiveness of all existing regional
cooperation initiatives, such as the Open Balkan initiative
and the Western Balkans Common Regional Market; and
(IV) ways to increase United States trade and investment
within the Western Balkans;
(iv) to develop human and institutional capacity and
infrastructure across multiple sectors of economies,
including clean energy, energy efficiency, agriculture, small
and medium-sized enterprise development, health, and cyber-
security;
(v) to assist with the development and implementation of
regional and international trade agreements;
(vi) to support women-owned enterprises;
(vii) to promote government and civil society policies and
programs that combat corruption and encourage transparency
(including by supporting independent media by promoting the
safety and security of journalists), free and fair
competition, sound governance, judicial reform, environmental
stewardship, and business environments conducive to
sustainable and inclusive economic growth; and
(viii) to include a public diplomacy strategy that
describes the actions that will be taken by relevant agencies
to increase support for the United States relationship by
citizens of Western Balkans countries.
(C) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide a
briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that
describes the progress made towards developing the strategy
required under subparagraph (B).
(3) Regional trade and development initiative.--
(A) Authorization.--The Secretary of State and the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, in coordination with the heads of other relevant
Federal departments and agencies, may coordinate a regional
trade and development initiative for the region comprised of
each Western Balkans country and any European Union member
country that shares a border with a Western Balkans country
(referred to in this subsection as the ``Western Balkans
region'') in accordance with this paragraph.
(B) Initiative elements.--The initiative authorized under
subparagraph (A) shall--
(i) promote private sector growth and competitiveness and
increase the capacity of businesses, particularly small and
medium-sized enterprises, in the Western Balkans region;
(ii) aim to increase intraregional exports to countries in
the Balkans and European Union member states;
(iii) aim to increase United States exports to, and
investments in, countries in the Balkans;
(iv) support startup companies, including companies led by
youth or women, in the Western Balkans region by--
(I) providing training in business skills and leadership;
and
(II) providing opportunities to connect to sources of
capital;
(v) encourage and promote inward and outward trade and
investment through engagement with the Western Balkans
diaspora communities in the United States and abroad;
(vi) provide assistance to the governments and civil
society organizations of Western Balkans countries to
develop--
(I) regulations to ensure fair and effective investment;
and
(II) screening tools to identify and deter malign
investments and other coercive economic practices;
(vii) review existing assistance programming relating to
the Western Balkans across Federal agencies--
(I) to eliminate duplication; and
(II) to identify areas of potential coordination within the
Western Balkans region;
(viii) identify areas where application of additional
resources could expand successful programs to 1 or more
countries in the Western Balkans region by building on the
existing experience and program architecture;
(ix) compare existing single-country sector analyses to
determine areas of focus that would benefit from a regional
approach with respect to the Western Balkans region; and
(x) promote intraregional trade throughout the Western
Balkans region through--
(I) programming, including grants, cooperative agreements,
and other forms of assistance;
(II) expanding awareness of the availability of loans and
other financial instruments from the United States
Government; and
(III) coordinating access to existing trade instruments
available through allies and partners in the Western Balkans
region, including the European Union and international
financial institutions.
(C) Support for regional infrastructure projects.--The
initiative authorized under subparagraph (A) should
facilitate and prioritize support for regional infrastructure
projects, including--
(i) transportation projects that build roads, bridges,
railways and other physical infrastructure to facilitate
travel of goods and people throughout the Western Balkans
region;
(ii) technical support and investments needed to meet
United States and European Union standards for air travel,
including screening and information sharing;
(iii) the development of telecommunications networks with
trusted providers;
(iv) infrastructure projects that connect Western Balkans
countries to each other and to countries with which they
share a border;
(v) the effective analysis of tenders and transparent
procurement processes;
(vi) investment transparency programs that will help
countries in the Western Balkans analyze gaps and establish
institutional and regulatory reforms necessary--
(I) to create an enabling environment for trade and
investment; and
(II) to strengthen protections against suspect investments
through public procurement and privatization and through
foreign direct investments;
[[Page S4521]]
(vii) sharing best practices learned from the United States
and other international partners to ensure that institutional
and regulatory mechanisms for addressing these issues are
fair, nonarbitrary, effective, and free from corruption;
(viii) projects that support regional energy security and
reduce dependence on Russian energy;
(ix) technical assistance and generating private investment
in projects that promote connectivity and energy-sharing in
the Western Balkans region;
(x) technical assistance to support regional collaboration
on environmental protection that includes governmental,
political, civic, and business stakeholders; and
(xi) technical assistance to develop financing options and
help create linkages with potential financing institutions
and investors.
(D) Requirements.--All programming under the initiative
authorized under subparagraph (A) shall--
(i) be open to the participation of Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia;
(ii) be consistent with European Union accession
requirements;
(iii) be focused on retaining talent within the Western
Balkans;
(iv) promote government policies in Western Balkans
countries that encourage free and fair competition, sound
governance, environmental protection, and business
environments that are conducive to sustainable and inclusive
economic growth; and
(v) include a public diplomacy strategy to inform local and
regional audiences in the Western Balkans region about the
initiative, including specific programs and projects.
(4) United states international development finance
corporation.--
(A) Appointments.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, subject to the availability of
appropriations, the Chief Executive Officer of the United
States International Development Finance Corporation, in
collaboration with the Secretary of State, should consider
including a regional office with responsibilities for the
Western Balkans within the Corporation's plans to open new
regional offices.
(B) Joint report.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of
the United States International Development Finance
Corporation and the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development shall submit a joint report to
the appropriate congressional committees that includes--
(i) an assessment of the benefits of providing sovereign
loan guarantees to countries in the Western Balkans to
support infrastructure and energy diversification projects;
(ii) an outline of additional resources, such as tools,
funding, and personnel, which may be required to offer
sovereign loan guarantees in the Western Balkans; and
(iii) an assessment of how the United States International
Development Finance Corporation can deploy its insurance
products in support of bonds or other instruments issued to
raise capital through United States financial markets in the
Western Balkans.
(g) Promoting Cross-cultural and Educational Engagement.--
(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) promoting partnerships between United States
universities and universities in the Western Balkans,
particularly universities in traditionally under-served
communities, advances United States foreign policy goals and
requires a whole-of-government approach, including the
utilization of public-private partnerships;
(B) such university partnerships would provide
opportunities for exchanging academic ideas, technical
expertise, research, and cultural understanding for the
benefit of the United States; and
(C) the seven countries in the Western Balkans meet the
requirements under section 105(c)(4) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151c(c)(4)).
(2) University partnerships.--The President, working
through the Secretary of State, is authorized to provide
assistance, consistent with section 105 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151c), to promote the
establishment of partnerships between United States
universities and universities in the Western Balkans,
including--
(A) supporting research and analysis on foreign policy,
cyber resilience, and disinformation;
(B) working with partner governments to reform policies,
improve curricula, strengthen data systems, train teachers
and students, including English language teaching, and to
provide quality, inclusive learning materials;
(C) encouraging knowledge exchanges to help provide
individuals, particularly at-risk youth, women, people with
disabilities, and other vulnerable, marginalized, or
underserved communities, with relevant education, training,
and skills for meaningful employment;
(D) promoting teaching and research exchanges between
institutions of higher education in the Western Balkans and
in the United States; and
(E) encouraging alliances and exchanges with like-minded
institutions of education within the Western Balkans and the
larger European continent.
(h) Peace Corps in the Western Balkans.--
(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the Peace Corps, whose mission is to promote world peace and
friendship, in part by helping the people of interested
countries in meeting their need for trained men and women,
provides an invaluable opportunity to connect the people of
the United States with the people of the Western Balkans.
(2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps should
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees
that includes an analysis of current opportunities for Peace
Corps expansion in the Western Balkans region.
(i) Young Balkan Leaders Initiative.--
(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
regular people-to-people exchange programs that bring
religious leaders, journalists, civil society members,
politicians, and other individuals from the Western Balkans
to the United States will strengthen existing relationships
and advance United States interests and shared values in the
Western Balkans region.
(2) BOLD leadership program for young balkans leaders.--
(A) Sense of congress.--The Department of State, through
BOLD, a leadership program for young leaders in certain
Western Balkans countries, plays an important role to develop
young leaders in improving civic engagement and economic
development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and
Montenegro.
(B) Expansion.--BOLD should be expanded, subject to the
availability of appropriations, to the entire Western Balkans
region.
(3) Authorization.--The Secretary of State should further
develop and implement BOLD, which shall hereafter be known as
the ``Young Balkan Leaders Initiative'', to promote
educational and professional development for young adult
leaders and professionals in the Western Balkans who have
demonstrated a passion to contribute to the continued
development of the Western Balkans region.
(4) Conduct of initiative.--The goals of the Young Balkan
Leaders Initiative shall be--
(A) to further build the capacity of young Balkan leaders
in the Western Balkans in the areas of business and
information technology, cyber security and digitization,
agriculture, civic engagement, and public administration;
(B) to support young Balkan leaders by offering
professional development, training, and networking
opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership,
innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights,
entrepreneurship, good governance, public administration, and
journalism;
(C) to support young political, parliamentary, and civic
Balkan leaders in collaboration on regional initiatives
related to good governance, environmental protection,
government ethics, and minority inclusion;
(D) to provide increased economic and technical assistance
to young Balkan leaders to promote economic growth and
strengthen ties between businesses, investors, and
entrepreneurs in the United States and in Western Balkans
countries;
(E) to tailor such assistance to advance the particular
objectives of each United States mission in the Western
Balkans within the framework outlined in this subsection; and
(F) to secure funding for such assistance from existing
funds available to each United States Mission in the Western
Balkans.
(5) Fellowships.--Under the Young Balkan Leaders
Initiative, the Secretary of State shall award fellowships to
young leaders from the Western Balkans who--
(A) are between 18 and 35 years of age;
(B) have demonstrated strong capabilities in
entrepreneurship, innovation, public service, and leadership;
(C) have had a positive impact in their communities,
organizations, or institutions, including by promoting cross-
regional and multiethnic cooperation; and
(D) represent a cross-section of geographic, gender,
political, and cultural diversity.
(6) Public engagement and leadership center.--Under the
Young Balkan Leaders Initiative, the Secretary of State shall
take advantage of existing and future public diplomacy
facilities (commonly known as ``American Spaces'') to hire
staff and develop programming for the establishment of a
flagship public engagement and leadership center in the
Western Balkans that seeks--
(A) to counter disinformation and malign influence;
(B) to promote cross-cultural engagement;
(C) to provide training for young leaders from Western
Balkans countries described in paragraph (5);
(D) to harmonize the efforts of existing venues throughout
Western Balkans countries established by the Office of
American Spaces; and
(E) to annually bring together participants from the Young
Balkans Leaders Initiative to provide platforms for regional
networking.
(7) Briefing on certain exchange programs.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional
committees that describes the status of exchange programs
involving the Western Balkans region.
(B) Elements.--The briefing required under subparagraph (A)
shall--
[[Page S4522]]
(i) assess the factors constraining the number and
frequency of participants from Western Balkans countries in
the International Visitor Leadership Program of the
Department of State;
(ii) identify the resources that are necessary to address
the factors described in clause (i); and
(iii) describe a strategy for connecting alumni and
participants of professional development exchange programs of
the Department of State in the Western Balkans with alumni
and participants from other countries in Europe, to enhance
inter-region and intra-region, people-to-people ties.
(j) Supporting Cybersecurity and Cyber Resilience in the
Western Balkans.--
(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) United States support for cybersecurity, cyber
resilience, and secure ICT infrastructure in Western Balkans
countries will strengthen the region's ability to defend
itself from and respond to malicious cyber activity conducted
by nonstate and foreign actors, including foreign
governments, that seek to influence the region;
(B) insecure ICT networks that are vulnerable to
manipulation can increase opportunities for--
(i) the compromise of cyber infrastructure, including data
networks, electronic infrastructure, and software systems;
and
(ii) the use of online information operations by
adversaries and malign actors to undermine United States
allies and interests; and
(C) it is in the national security interest of the United
States to support the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of
Western Balkans countries.
(2) Interagency report on cybersecurity and the digital
information environment in western balkans countries.--Not
later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads
of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to
the appropriate congressional committees that contains--
(A) an overview of interagency efforts to strengthen
cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans
countries;
(B) a review of the information environment in each Western
Balkans country;
(C) a review of existing United States Government cyber and
digital initiatives that--
(i) counter influence operations and safeguard elections
and democratic processes in Western Balkans countries;
(ii) strengthen ICT infrastructure and cybersecurity
capacity in the Western Balkans;
(iii) support democracy and internet freedom in Western
Balkans countries; and
(iv) build cyber capacity of governments who are allies or
partners of the United States;
(D) an assessment of cyber threat information sharing
between the United States and Western Balkans countries;
(E) an assessment of--
(i) options for the United States to better support
cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans
countries through changes to current assistance authorities;
and
(ii) the advantages or limitations, such as funding or
office space, of posting cyber professionals from other
Federal departments and agencies to United States diplomatic
posts in Western Balkans countries and providing relevant
training to Foreign Service Officers; and
(F) any additional support needed from the United States
for the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of the following
NATO Allies: Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and
Croatia.
(k) Relations Between Kosovo and Serbia.--
(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) the Agreement on the Path to Normalization of
Relations, which was agreed to by Kosovo and Serbia on
February 27, 2023, with the facilitation of the European
Union, is a positive step forward in advancing normalization
between the two countries;
(B) Serbia and Kosovo should seek to make immediate
progress on the Implementation Annex to the agreement
referred to in subparagraph (A);
(C) once sufficient progress has been made on the
Implementation Annex, the United States should consider
advancing initiatives to strengthen bilateral relations with
both countries, which could include--
(i) establishing bilateral strategic dialogues with Kosovo
and Serbia; and
(ii) advancing concrete initiatives to deepen trade and
investment with both countries; and
(D) the United States should continue to support a
comprehensive final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia based
on mutual recognition.
(2) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United
States Government that--
(A) it shall not pursue any policy that advocates for land
swaps, partition, or other forms of redrawing borders along
ethnic lines in the Western Balkans as a means to arbitrate
disputes between nation states in the region; and
(B) it should support pluralistic democracies in countries
in the Western Balkans as a means to prevent a return to the
ethnic strife that once characterized the region.
(l) Reports on Russian and Chinese Malign Influence
Operations and Campaigns in the Western Balkans.--
(1) Reports required..--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every two years
thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
heads of other Federal departments or agencies, as
appropriate, shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees regarding Russian and Chinese malign
influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect
to Balkan countries that seek--
(A) to undermine democratic institutions;
(B) to promote political instability; and
(C) to harm the interests of the United States and other
North Atlantic Treaty Organization member and partner states
in the Western Balkans.
(2) Elements.--Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph
(1) shall include--
(A) an assessment of the objectives of the Russian
Federation and the People's Republic of China regarding
malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with
respect to Western Balkans countries--
(i) to undermine democratic institutions, including the
planning and execution of democratic elections;
(ii) to promote political instability; and
(iii) to manipulate the information environment;
(B) the activities and roles of the Department of State and
other relevant Federal agencies in countering Russian and
Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns;
(C) a comprehensive list identifying--
(i) each network, entity and individual, to the extent such
information is available, of Russia, China, or any other
country with which Russia or China may cooperate, that is
supporting such Russian or Chinese malign influence
operations or campaigns, including the provision of financial
or operational support to activities in a Western Balkans
country that may limit freedom of speech or create barriers
of access to democratic processes, including exercising the
right to vote in a free and fair election; and
(ii) the role of each such entity in providing such
support;
(D) the identification of the tactics, techniques, and
procedures used in Russian or Chinese malign influence
operations and campaigns in Western Balkans countries;
(E) an assessment of the effect of previous Russian or
Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns that
targeted alliances and partnerships of the United States
Armed Forces in the Western Balkans, including the
effectiveness of such operations and campaigns in achieving
the objectives of Russia and China, respectively;
(F) the identification of each Western Balkans country with
respect to which Russia or China has conducted or attempted
to conduct a malign influence operation or campaign;
(G) an assessment of the capacity and efforts of NATO and
of each individual Western Balkans country to counter Russian
or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried
out with respect to Western Balkans countries;
(H) the efforts by the United States to combat such malign
influence operations in the Western Balkans, including
through the Countering Russian Influence Fund and the
Countering People's Republic of China Malign Influence Fund;
(I) an assessment of the tactics, techniques, and
procedures that the Secretary of State determines are likely
to be used in future Russian or Chinese malign influence
operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Western
Balkans countries; and
(J) any additional authorities, resources, or activities
that could increase the United States Government's capacity
to counter Russian and Chinese malign influence operations
and campaigns in Western Balkans countries.
(3) Form.--Each report required under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
______