[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 99 (Wednesday, June 12, 2024)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E618-E619]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 UNWINNABLE RACE: CONGRESS'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT A NUCLEAR ARMS 
                                  RACE

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. JOHN GARAMENDI

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, June 12, 2024

  Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to call on this body to 
fulfill its responsibility in addressing an existential challenge 
facing our nation. For decades, nuclear weapons have threatened the 
safety of our country and our planet. Today, as nations re-arm and 
competition re-emerges, we run the risk of repeating our past mistakes 
and entering a new cold war. A nuclear arms race is well underway, and 
it poses an existential threat to all. This Congress must stand up and 
stop the escalatory spiral before it's too late.
  It's well past time for our voices, the voices of restraint and risk 
reduction, to be heard in the nuclear arms debate. The United States, 
the Russian Federation, and the People's Republic of China are locked 
into an extraordinarily dangerous nuclear arms race. All three 
countries are rapidly increasing their nuclear firepower with new and 
more capable bombs, more long-range missiles, new stealth delivery 
systems, bombers, and submarines. And as tensions heighten, all of this 
is dependent on the newest field of warfare: space. All three countries 
depend upon their space assets to observe, detect threats, and 
communicate the commands to act.
  We must cut through the rhetoric of fear and doomsaying that 
dominates our nuclear policy debates. We can no longer allow the 
thoughtful, calm voices to be drowned out by fearmongering cries. We 
must rise above the noise. Instead of developing cost-effective 
military systems that provide security while defusing tensions, we have 
fallen into the fallacy that more missiles make us more secure. Nothing 
could be further from the truth.
  Today, we must call out the failures of our current approach to 
nuclear modernization and demand that we treat arms control and de-
escalation with the same dedication and focus we give to our nuclear 
weapons development. It is long past time to develop a strategy that 
sets priorities, recognizes limitations, and strives for a safer 
future.
  It is important to step back and consider the history and broader 
context of nuclear weapons and Congressional involvement. Since their 
development almost 80 years ago, the destructive capability of nuclear 
weapons has terrified and shocked, but also led governments to pursue 
their own arsenals and develop the capacity to destroy our civilization 
multiple times over. Governments have justified expanding stockpiles 
with convoluted theories of nuclear deterrence that often defy common 
sense.
  It wasn't until arms control programs and treaties were established 
that Russia and the United States de-escalated this spiral of 
stockpiling bombs. Through four decades, progress was made, the number 
of deployed and existing nuclear bombs was reduced, and even the most 
adversarial countries agreed that ``a nuclear war cannot be won and 
must never be fought.'' Yet, despite this understanding, we continue to 
maintain and modernize our arsenals with a belief that these weapons 
dissuade others from employing theirs. The threat of nuclear conflict 
remains, and with it, life on our planet ending or becoming 
dramatically changed.
  It would be useful to remind people of the arms control agreements 
and the leaders that negotiated them. I'm sure that some of my 
congressional nuclear warriors would be surprised to see that their 
most ardent national security heroes negotiated the reductions and 
controls.
  I recognize the nuclear threats posed by countries like North Korea, 
Russia, and China. I do not deny the challenging security environment 
we face. I am fully aware of the Taiwan/China threat, as well as 
China's military buildup and South China Sea expansion. The North 
Korean regime is dangerous and could precipitate a conflict at any 
moment. I condemn Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, 
irresponsible nuclear saber-rattling, and dangerous nuclear exercises.
  Despite these serious threats, we must be wise in preparing our 
defense and response. Aggression should not be our first thought when 
faced with threats, uncertainty, and misunderstandings. Therefore, I 
strongly support efforts by the U.S. and Chinese governments to engage 
in meaningful dialogue that results in specific, concrete actions to 
reduce the risk of miscommunication or escalation.
  As we navigate these complex geopolitical landscapes, it is 
imperative that we pause and reflect on the strategies guiding our 
nuclear policy. Strategy must be more than a word thrown on top of 
grandiose statements. True strategy is making the hard choices to align 
our country's limited resources with our unlimited aspirations.
  The greatest problem facing our nuclear strategy today is that we 
fail to realistically consider that balance, revisit our assumptions, 
adjust course when programs fail, and figure out new paths forward. 
Once approved, weapons programs persist, even when they nearly double 
and triple their budget. No one stops and says, ``Enough.''
  Too often, we allow these debates to be driven by military 
calculations and how ``experts'' would fight a nuclear war. But we must 
not forget that in a democratic society, the military is the extension 
of the political and not the other way around. When it comes to 
programs and strategies that threaten our very existence, we, as a 
whole society, must decide what costs we should bear and what risks we 
must take. Our nuclear strategy must be balanced and rational, allowing 
for deterrence and defensive actions while encouraging collaboration 
for a more peaceful future.
  We in Congress are part of the problem. We have bought into the 
assumption that more nuclear weapons will make us safer. Ever-growing 
costs reflect the irrationality that has plagued our nuclear policy. In 
the name of ``modernization,'' we've taken on hundreds of billions of 
dollars of additional spending, and the nuclear accounts grow without 
question or scrutiny.
  An example is the nuclear modernization efforts. The political price 
tag for New START was the modernization of all three legs of America's 
nuclear triad. Proponents told us the multi-billion-dollar cost was 
necessary to ensure that we continue to have a viable deterrent. Today, 
we can and should debate whether every part of modernization is cost-
effective and necessary for deterrence. We must also fully understand 
the reasons for the massive growth in the cost of all these programs.
  Let's turn to the new Sentinel ICBM, which is destined to replace the 
Minuteman III. It has incurred an egregious 37 percent cost overrun, 
making the program's cost almost 211 percent higher than the Air 
Force's initial 2015 estimate. This has triggered a critical Nunn-
McCurdy cost overrun, forcing a stop and a full statutory review. 
Despite the new estimated cost of $130 billion, there are loud and 
clear reflexive signals that the Pentagon and Congress intend to plow 
ahead no matter the cost or the necessity. ``We'll do whatever is 
necessary.''
  While this may be convenient, the law requires a complete and full 
review that addresses five critical steps. (1) The program is essential 
to national security; (2) there are no alternatives to the program that 
will provide acceptable capability; (3) the new cost estimates have 
been determined to be reasonable; (4) the program is a higher priority 
than programs whose funding will be reduced to cover the increased cost 
of this program; and (5) the management structure is sufficient to 
control additional cost growth. It is imperative that the Pentagon 
conduct a thorough examination to assess the necessity and feasibility 
of continuing the program in its current state. Equally necessary is 
that Congress engage in a full debate to assess the Pentagon's 
rationale. Without public pressure, it is doubtful that any hearings 
will occur, and that's why our Congressional Nuclear Weapons and Arms 
Control Working Group will hold its own hearing on July 24th.
  For years, Congress has dictated in the annual NDAA that the U.S. 
maintain a minimum of 400 ICBMs. A number founded not on logic but 
because ``that's what we have always had.'' The number of ground-based 
ICBMs should not be set by the number of existing concrete silos but in 
the honest analysis of nuclear strategy. Such a review must consider 
the risk of a catastrophic mistake inherent in the Sentinel program. In 
the event of an attack, it is assumed that the first target is the 
well-known locations of the ICBMs. It's a use-it or lose-it situation. 
Therefore, a ``Launch on Warning'' is the operational imperative. The 
President has only minutes to decide if the attack is real.
  If the nuclear program is for deterrence, then the submarines, 
airplanes, and their missiles offer sufficient firepower to dissuade an 
adversary. These systems have the benefit of stealth, and the President 
has the time to gather all information and then decide to use the 
nuclear response. If that weren't enough, we also have ample 
conventional weapons capability to deter potential adversaries.
  However, the Sentinel program is not the only problem. The hidden 
costs of ground-

[[Page E619]]

based ICBM modernization are found in unexpected and little-noticed 
places like the ``Energy and Water'' appropriations bill, which would 
spend $19.8 billion for ``Weapons Activities,'' a $2.7 billion increase 
from the previous year. So, what is the $19.8 billion for? This year, 
the Department of Energy/NNSA requested a $3 billion down payment for 
the production of ``plutonium pits,'' which are the hollow plutonium 
shells used to trigger the nuclear reaction. On its own, this number is 
astonishingly high, but it doesn't include the anticipated $8 billion 
to build the production facility in Los Alamos and the second facility 
at Savannah River, which alone has a projected total project cost of 
$18-25 billion, nearly six times the initial estimated cost for 
construction. It will be the most expensive building in America. And 
there is the $1.4 billion requested for stockpile sustainment, the $1.1 
billion dollars for the Sentinel warhead development at Lawrence Lab, 
which has grown by 63 percent, and the untold cost of the six other 
warheads and bombs that support the other nuclear modernization 
programs.
  Even proponents of modernizing nuclear programs should be concerned 
about the high costs. The January 2023 GAO report found that the NNSA 
has not developed a comprehensive schedule or cost estimate and has not 
identified all necessary activities or milestones to achieve the 
required 80-pit-per-year production capacity. And why do we need to 
produce 80 pits per year when America already has over 4,000 plutonium 
pits in storage? Has anyone studied the potential of repurposing these 
pits for the new bombs? The bottom line is this: Senior officials at 
the NNSA admit they won't meet deadlines and have no idea what the 
ultimate cost will be.
  I have tried to force common-sense reforms to better estimate cost. 
For example, I offered a straightforward amendment that would change 
the current law requiring 80 pits per year to a lower number that 
represents the realistic number of plutonium pits our country needs and 
can feasibly produce. To some, this is seen as an ``extreme radical 
position,'' and my proposal was voted down. Time and time again, I have 
been denied the opportunity to bring important nuclear matters to the 
floor for debate.
  Across the nuclear enterprise, costs are soaring, fears are growing, 
and it remains unclear what goals we are achieving. Yet, amidst soaring 
costs and escalating risks, it's imperative to reassess our nuclear 
priorities. Investing more of the modernization budget into diplomacy, 
arms control, and education could yield far-reaching benefits, 
fostering a stronger and more secure nation. Congress must fulfill its 
duty to allocate taxpayer funds responsibly, avoiding excessive 
expenses on wasteful nuclear programs that do little to enhance genuine 
security. Maintaining a ``safe, secure, and effective deterrent'' does 
not necessitate these costly modernization plans, especially given the 
pressing needs in other areas critical to national strength and 
stability.
  The significance of arms control cannot be overstated. Prioritizing 
de-escalation isn't just an idealistic notion; it's a necessity. Arms 
races cannot be won. When we attempt to outpace our adversaries in 
weapon development, they inevitably respond in kind, draining our 
limited resources and fostering international instability as fear 
predominates and the world's most devastating weapons become a more 
likely option.
  The critical role of arms control in preserving global stability and 
security is evident from history's many close calls. We can't afford to 
wait for another Cuban missile crisis to recognize the dangers of 
miscommunication and the failure to engage in dialogue.
  Only a few lonely congressional voices have joined the clarion call 
put forth by the Arms Control Association, Ploughshares, Council for a 
Livable World, Union of Concerned Scientists, Friends Committee on 
National Legislation, Nuclear Threat Initiative, and other well-known 
arms control organizations. Year after year, funding proposals and 
resolutions to support non-proliferation, nuclear fissile material 
control and verification, and weapons negotiations have been made to 
draw attention to the importance of arms control. Like Sisyphus pushing 
the boulder up the hill, it is often thankless work, fighting and 
clawing for progress only to see it roll back down again, as had 
happened in the Intermediate Range Nuclear Missile Treaty, New START, 
and the Iran nuclear agreement. But the work could not be more 
important. Unlike that Greek myth, I do believe that we can get the 
boulder to the top of the hill and develop robust arms control regimes 
that will help us all to avoid an existential threat.
  There are three key pillars in this endeavor. First, knowledge of the 
destructive power of nuclear weapons and an understanding of their role 
in modern warfare. The library is full of studies on nuclear war, 
deterrence, the risks of misunderstanding, compelling arguments for 
risk reduction, and the value of arms control. We cannot forget the 
horrors that nuclear weapons would inflict if they were ever used 
again. This work cannot be understated. It's been 79 years since 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and 40 years since the movie ``The Day After'' 
aired, showing Americans and their leadership just how terrible such an 
event would be. It is a hard truth, but one we must face. We can't 
allow nuclear weapons rhetoric to be divorced from the very real 
consequences of their use.
  Secondly, encouraging dialogue and fostering open communication 
channels are essential. While it may appear impossible to have any arms 
control negotiations with Russia as it conducts its war of aggression 
in Ukraine, it is important to remember that many of the previous arms 
treaties with Russia began at the moment of maximum international 
tension. The recent dialogues with China's political and military 
leaders are encouraging. We should accept China's offer to discuss ``No 
first use'' policy. We don't know where the discussion may lead, but 
it's an opening.
  Lastly, garnering political support is crucial. Non-profits and 
advocacy groups have laid the groundwork; now, we must amplify their 
efforts and call on Congress to act. For too long, our focus on arms 
control has waned, and members of Congress have paid too little focus.
  This is the moment to redouble our efforts. In a world marked by 
uncertainty and growing competition, building bridges and fostering 
understanding is more critical than ever. However, this effort must 
start at home. Inevitably, Congress must reconcile our infinite desires 
with our limited means. That means making hard decisions about how and 
where to spend taxpayer dollars to achieve real security. Hundreds of 
billions of dollars and 14 years have been spent in the modernization 
of America's nuclear weapons programs, and it has yielded a three-
nation nuclear arms and space race. Are we more secure?
  The Sentinel ICBM program, now estimated to be $150 billion, breached 
the cost escalation limit of the Nunn-McCurdy law. The Pentagon and 
Congress must now justify the continuation of the program. Congress and 
the American public must not waste this pivotal moment to study the 
reality of the nuclear weapon arms race and make a decision to shift 
course. It's past time to maximize our efforts to negotiate an end to 
the race and seek paths to reduce nuclear arms and the associated 
existential threat.
  We face real challenges in this world, but too often, hyperbole and 
fear are being used to drive our decision-making. Competition need not 
mean hostility. It is time we returned to reason and rationality. 
Together, we must confront the challenges before us, not by building 
ever more dangerous weapons, but by placing the same priority on 
effective arms control and risk reduction measures that we currently 
place on modernization. We may face challenges, but we still have the 
choice of which future we will pursue. We know the risks, we know the 
dangers that modernizations and the inevitable arms race could hold, 
but that's why it is so important we redouble our efforts toward making 
de-escalation real. Let us take this moment, this opportunity, to 
engage in a meaningful dialogue and choose the path towards a safer and 
more world.

                          ____________________