[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 95 (Tuesday, June 4, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3956-S3957]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

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  SENATE RESOLUTION 718--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT THE 
 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PLACE A MORATORIUM ON ALL 
 FEDERALLY FUNDED GAIN-OF-FUNCTION RESEARCH GIVEN THE INCREASED SAFETY 
                                CONCERNS

  Mr. MARSHALL (for himself, Mr. Braun, and Mr. Lee) submitted the 
following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions:

                              S. Res. 718

       Whereas the Obama Administration defined gain-of-function 
     studies as research that aims to increase the ability of 
     infectious agents to cause disease by enhancing its 
     pathogenicity or by increasing its transmissibility;
       Whereas the Obama Administration, on October 17, 2014, 
     mandated a Federal Government pause on new gain-of-function 
     research, citing recent concerns regarding biosafety and 
     biosecurity;
       Whereas the Obama Administration, on October 17, 2014, 
     stated that new Federal funding will not be released for 
     gain-of-function research projects that may be reasonably 
     anticipated to confer attributes to the influenza, Middle 
     East respiratory syndrome (referred to in this preamble as 
     ``MERS''), or severe acute respiratory syndrome (referred to 
     in this preamble as ``SARS'') viruses such that such a virus 
     would have enhanced pathogenicity or transmissibility in 
     mammals via the respiratory route;
       Whereas in the lead up to the Obama Administration pausing 
     new gain-of-function research, the Centers for Disease 
     Control and Prevention noted an increase in accidents 
     involving leaks, spills, or other releases of infectious 
     material inside the laboratories receiving Federal funding;
       Whereas the Cambridge Working Group, a consortium of some 
     of the leading international researchers and scientists, 
     released a 2014 open letter stating ``experiments involving 
     the creation of potential pandemic pathogens should be 
     curtailed until there has been a quantitative, objective and 
     credible assessment of the risks, potential benefits, and 
     opportunities for risk mitigation, as well as comparison 
     against safer experimental approaches.'';
       Whereas in 2014, after the Obama Administration mandated a 
     pause on gain-of-function research, the National Institutes 
     of Health (referred to in this preamble as

[[Page S3957]]

     ``NIH''), led by Francis Collins, including the National 
     Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (referred to in 
     this preamble as ``NIAID''), led by Anthony Fauci, continued 
     to authorize grants and research awards to organizations that 
     study the spread of viruses from animals to humans;
       Whereas some such awards went to EcoHealth Alliance and its 
     President, Peter Daszak, who then disbursed research money to 
     the Wuhan Institute of Virology (referred to in this preamble 
     as the ``WIV'') and East China Normal University;
       Whereas experiments advanced by EcoHealth Alliance during 
     the pause included, among other projects, combining genetic 
     material from a ``parent'' coronavirus, known as WIV1, with 
     other viruses;
       Whereas the results of such experiments demonstrated 
     varying pathogenicity of SARS-CoV-2 with different spike 
     proteins in humanized mice;
       Whereas a majority of scientists and researchers, including 
     Dr. Lawrence Tabak and Dr. Ralph Baric, an EcoHealth Alliance 
     collaborator and top coronavirus expert, when made aware of 
     such experiment, admitted that EcoHealth Alliance's 
     coronavirus research appeared to meet the standard criteria 
     for gain-of-function research;
       Whereas NIH and NIAID continued to support EcoHealth 
     Alliance and other organizations conducting gain-of-function 
     research, according to the Obama Administration's definition, 
     through 2017, even though the pause remained in effect;
       Whereas on July 7, 2016, NIAID identified possible gain-of-
     function research concerns in an experiment proposed by 
     EcoHealth and conducted by the WIV;
       Whereas in May 2021, Anthony Fauci conceded that during the 
     period between 2014 and 2017 that ``it is impossible to 
     guarantee that researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology 
     did not use American funds to perform gain-of-function 
     research on coronaviruses.'';
       Whereas Anthony Fauci and NIAID did not alert senior White 
     House officials before lifting a ban on gain-of-function 
     research in 2017;
       Whereas in November 2019, 3 researchers from the WIV became 
     sick enough to receive hospital care, and according to United 
     States officials, those sick researchers were involved in 
     coronavirus research;
       Whereas the Chinese government deliberately delayed 
     notifying the World Health organization that it had detected 
     SARS-like infections from an unknown, novel pathogen well 
     before it sent official notification in December 2019;
       Whereas on April 24, 2020, NIH instructed EcoHealth to 
     terminate all funding to the WIV, and NIH terminated the 
     WIV's entire sub-grant award;
       Whereas in July 2020, NIH, having procedurally erred in its 
     April 2020 termination of EcoHealth's grant, reinstated and 
     then immediately suspended EcoHealth's grant while requiring 
     EcoHealth to meet certain conditions, such as obtaining a 
     sample of the SARS-CoV-2 virus that the Wuhan lab used to 
     determine its genetic sequence and arranging for an 
     independent team to examine the Wuhan lab and determine 
     whether it had possession of the SARS-CoV-2 virus prior to 
     December 2019;
       Whereas Peter Daszak reacted to those conditions by calling 
     them ``preposterous'';
       Whereas based on tips from the scientific community that 
     suspected EcoHealth's science research at the WIV may have 
     caused the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, NIH investigated 
     EcoHealth's compliance with its grant agreement terms, 
     including the gain-of-function provisions in June 2016 and 
     again from April 2020 to April 2023 and concluded that 
     EcoHealth was noncompliant;
       Whereas in October 2021, NIH acknowledged to Congress that 
     EcoHealth Alliance did not have access to laboratory 
     notebooks or other records supporting its research, even 
     though keeping such records was a requirement of the NIH 
     grant;
       Whereas although EcoHealth's Year 5 Research Performance 
     Progress Report for its research activities was due to NIH in 
     September 2019, EcoHealth did not submit the report until 
     August 3, 2021;
       Whereas on October 20, 2021, it was revealed than an 
     experiment in EcoHealth's Year 5 Progress Report (for 
     research between June 2018 and May 2019) exhibited virus 
     growth greater than one log, thus constituting gain-of-
     function research, which should have triggered immediate 
     suspension and reporting to NIAID according to contract 
     agreements;
       Whereas instead of EcoHealth taking either action, 
     EcoHealth used language in its report that obfuscated the 
     severity and timing of the gain-of-function experiments, 
     which contradicted the Obama-era pause on gain-of-function 
     research and the additional terms of agreement NIH added to 
     EcoHealth's grant in June 2016;
       Whereas in October 2021, NIH updated the definition of 
     gain-of-function research to focus more on enhanced pandemic 
     potential pathogens (referred to in this preamble as 
     ``ePPP''), which meant that because the majority of gain-of-
     function research does not include ePPPs, once considered 
     gain-of-function research now fell outside the scope of the 
     stricter oversight required for ePPP studies;
       Whereas NIH determined that no evidence existed to support 
     the testimony Peter Daszak gave to Congress on November 14, 
     2023, that EcoHealth was prevented from submitting its Year 5 
     Research Performance Progress Report to NIH due to a 
     technical problem in NIH's system;
       Whereas in April 2023, when NIH reinstated EcoHealth's 
     suspended grant and imposed new conditions, NIH stated that 
     it was executing a corrective action plan to EcoHealth that 
     satisfied NIH's compliance efforts regarding gain-of-function 
     research;
       Whereas as part of the April 2023 reinstatement, EcoHealth 
     pledged it would not perform work in, or with, Chinese-
     affiliated institutions;
       Whereas the prime reasoning for EcoHealth's reinstatement 
     was EcoHealth's representation to NIAID that EcoHealth had 
     access to sequences and samples that were required to be 
     supplied to the Federal Government as a condition of 
     receiving Federal grants, which still needed analysis;
       Whereas EcoHealth was not forthcoming and failed to 
     disclose to NIAID that those samples were stored in China at 
     the WIV, which was EcoHealth's subcontractor that conducted 
     the coronavirus gain-of-function research that could have 
     caused the COVID-19 pandemic;
       Whereas as of new guidance issued in May 2024, the Biden 
     Administration removed avian influenza and current forms of 
     SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes Covid-19, from the category 
     of pathogens of pandemic potential, thus excluding them from 
     updated rules governing gain-of-function research;
       Whereas effective May 14, 2024, the Department of Health 
     and Human Services (referred to in this preamble as ``HHS'') 
     announced it would commence official debarment proceedings 
     against EcoHealth Alliance and implement a government-wide 
     suspension of United States taxpayer funds to include a hold 
     on all active grants;
       Whereas on May 21, 2024, HHS, in an effort to protect 
     public interest, suspended and recommended debarment of Peter 
     Daszak's individual ability to receive any Federal funds;
       Whereas both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
     Department of Energy have assessed that the COVID-19 pandemic 
     was a result of a lab leak from the WIV;
       Whereas the majority members of the Select Subcommittee on 
     the Coronavirus Pandemic of the Committee on Oversight and 
     Accountability of the House of Representatives (referred to 
     in this preamble as the ``Subcommittee'') reported that 
     EcoHealth's actions were often enabled by NIH and NIAID and 
     the failures of NIH and NIAID to properly oversee EcoHealth's 
     research projects;
       Whereas the majority members of the Subcommittee found that 
     EcoHealth's actions were often enabled by the lack of grant 
     management and oversight by NIH and NIAID; and
       Whereas the majority members of the Subcommittee believe 
     that such NIH and NIAID grant management oversight failures 
     necessitate both Congressional and Executive action to 
     increase transparency and grantee oversight: Now, therefore, 
     be it
       Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that Congress 
     should immediately consider the Viral Gain-of-Function 
     Research Moratorium Act (S. 81, 118th Congress, as introduced 
     on January 25, 2023), which would--
       (1) define gain-of-function research as any research that--
       (A) could confer attributes to the influenza, Middle East 
     respiratory syndrome, or severe acute respiratory syndrome 
     viruses such that such a virus would have enhanced 
     pathogenicity or transmissibility in any organism; or
       (B) involves methods that could enhance potential pandemic 
     pathogens or related risky research with potentially 
     dangerous pathogens; and
       (2) prohibit, notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     research grants supported by Federal funds from being awarded 
     to institutions of higher education, or other research 
     organizations, that are conducting gain-of-function research.

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