[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 95 (Tuesday, June 4, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3944-S3945]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                 Unanimous Consent Request--S. Res. 718

  Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss a very serious 
problem: viral gain-of-function research. I am calling on this body to 
place a pause on all viral gain-of-function research, just like 
President Obama did in 2014.
  Maybe I will start with an analogy. Could you imagine the United 
States participating in nuclear research and sending our scientists, 
sending our money to foreign adversaries to help them with their 
nuclear weapons research right now--say, a country like Iran or a 
country like North Korea? Of course, no one in this body would suggest 
that is a smart thing to do. But people can't see what viral gain-of-
function is, so they are not afraid of it, but they should be.
  Think about this: Nuclear bombs have killed 2-, 3-, maybe 400,000 
people at the max--2-, 3-, maybe 400,000 people--but viral gain-of-
function research, through COVID, has killed over 1 million Americans, 
and worldwide, it is at least 10 times that, maybe 20 times that. And 
we still have 15 million long COVID sufferers, but we continue to fund 
and we continue to participate in viral gain-of-function research. I 
would stop and ask this body, what do we have to show for it? Thirty 
years of viral gain-of-function research and what are the benefits? 
What have we benefited from this?
  Just like in January of 2020 when I was the first Member of Congress 
to sound the alarm on the COVID virus and the consequences and the 
pandemic that was coming, I am here once again to sound this alarm.
  Think about this: Why is this a concern to anybody? First of all, I 
want to talk about the risk of lab leaks. No matter what virus security 
level this research is done in, there is going to be risk of a lab 
leak. There is human error, there is mechanical error, people not 
following protocols. We have seen it over and over again, and that is 
actually what led to the pause in 2014 by President Obama.
  Laboratories, regardless of their biosafety levels, are not 
infallible. Human error, equipment failure, unforeseen accidents can 
lead to the escape of enhanced pathogens into the general population. 
The consequences of such an event have proven to be catastrophic. We 
witnessed this firsthand through the COVID-19 pandemic, just how fast a 
virus could spread throughout the world. A virus that is engineered to 
be more contagious or more deadly can cause an even more severe global 
death crisis, even worse than what we saw with COVID-19.
  Something people seldom talk about is the threat of bioresearch, of 
biosecurity when it comes to our food supply. Just like the Chinese 
developed a COVID virus to attack human lungs, they could develop new 
viruses that could attack our beef cattle, our pigs, our dairy. They 
could find new viruses to attack the wheat in Kansas. All these things 
are very feasible by viral gain-of-function research.
  I am very concerned about the risk of weaponization of these viruses, 
that all of these have a military potential, what we would call 
bioterrorism. Everything has a dual purpose. In America, we don't think 
about that. We always think about science being research for the good, 
but what we have found over and over is that rogue nations can use this 
type of research for the very, very worse.
  I just want to dive a little bit deeper into this subject and this 
threat of bioterrorism. Knowledge and techniques developed through 
gain-of-function research can be potentially misused by malicious 
actors. If detailed methodologies for enhancing pathogens are published 
or otherwise become accessible, they could be easy exploited to create 
biological weapons. These could be created by people with minimal 
means. They are called terrorists. They wouldn't have to go through the 
hassle, the time and expense of developing a nuclear weapon; they could 
more easily develop biological weapons that are even more deadly. The 
potential for such misuse makes the dissemination of research findings 
in this bill particularly perilous, and it lowers the barrier for entry 
for those who might wish to cause us harm.
  Ethically, gain-of-function research raises significant questions. Is 
it morally acceptable to create pathogens with pandemic potential, 
knowing the immense suffering they could cause if accidentally or, 
heaven forbid, deliberately released?
  The scientific pursuit of knowledge must be balanced with 
responsibility and awareness of their broader consequences. The 
principles that I swore an oath to as a physician--do no harm; above 
all, do no harm--should guide every one of our actions when we are 
funding science. Yet, gain-of-function research walks a tightrope 
between potential benefits and catastrophic risks.

  Public trust in science and research institutes is another critical 
aspect. Higher profile accidents or ethical breaches have eroded public 
confidence, making it even more difficult to garner support for 
necessary scientific endeavors. Transparency, accountability, and 
stringent regulatory frameworks are essential to maintaining this 
trust.
  That is why we are here today calling for this body to pass our Viral 
Gain-of-Function Research Moratorium Act. Our bill will prohibit the 
funding of this research, allowing time for an honest conversation 
about the pros and cons of gain-of-function research, setting up 
guardrails that ensure a system of checks and balances.
  Getting transparency for the American people for what happened during 
the pandemic shouldn't be controversial. I hope my colleagues will join 
me in agreeing that if we can't measure it, we can't manage it--
especially when we are discussing the creation of lethal viruses at the 
taxpayers' expense.
  The Federal Government should not provide another dime in funding for 
viral gain-of-function research in the deceptive name of global health 
and national security.
  For these reasons, I am proud to be back here on the Senate floor to 
sound the alarm again and call for the immediate passage of our bill, 
the Viral Gain-of-Function Research Moratorium Act.
  I want to conclude by thanking Senators Braun and Lee for their 
support of this resolution, and we look forward to continuing the 
discussion on this issue with their colleagues.
  As if in legislative session and notwithstanding rule XXII, I ask 
unanimous consent the Senate proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 
718, which is at the desk; further, that the resolution be agreed to, 
the preamble be agreed to, and that the motions to reconsider be 
considered made and laid upon the table with no intervening action or 
debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. President, this resolution threatens fundamental life 
sciences research. Research is medicine's field of dreams from which we 
harvest the findings that give hope to families.
  Over 1 million people died from COVID-19, and tens of thousands of 
Americans die annually from the seasonal flu. It is scientific research 
that develops the vaccines and treatments that save lives.
  It is clear that we need every tool at our disposal to combat viral 
illnesses and pandemics, and labs across the country are developing 
research that will create the vaccines and the therapeutics of 
tomorrow. But what this resolution does is create overbroad 
restrictions on scientific research in order to accomplish a goal which 
unfortunately is unrelated to what should be our highest goals.
  Bans like those envisioned by this resolution would tie the hands of 
researchers who are doing lifesaving work. This resolution would send a 
dangerous signal that the U.S. Senate does not value lifesaving 
research

[[Page S3945]]

being conducted by our Federal research Agencies and at our world-class 
research universities.
  We must be prepared for future pandemics, especially as climate 
change accelerates the transmission of deadly diseases.
  In the last few months, we have seen H5N1 bird flu transmitted from 
dairy cattle to humans. This resolution could block researchers from 
understanding the mutations that allow bird flu to infect humans, 
effectively banning us from preventing outbreaks and protecting farm 
workers.
  Medical research is an issue of national security. Stronger research 
means stronger security. This resolution would not prepare us for 
emerging disease threats, and it would not make our Nation safer. 
Bowing to political pressure to promote a research ban without 
understanding the implications on research, biosecurity, biosafety, or 
public health is dangerous, and it is reckless.
  Investments in biomedical research are investments in hope and health 
and safety that serve our country today and into the future. For those 
reasons, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The objection is heard.
  The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. President, certainly I understand the Senator from 
Massachusetts' comments and his concerns. I would still continue to 
argue that the benefits have not outweighed the risk. We have not seen 
any benefits from this type of research.
  The whole concept, just going back to what the definition of ``viral 
gain-of-function research'' is--we wouldn't do it if it is causing 
potential for harm, but we can still continue to research flu vaccines. 
We can continue to research avian influenza. There are all sorts of 
things we could do. But let's not make avian influenza worse. Let's not 
put a protein spike on it that is going to make it stick to human lung 
cells like they did with SARS-CoV-1.
  The justification of gain-of-function research hinges on its 
purported benefits, as you described, such as improved preparedness for 
pandemics; however, it is important to scrutinize whether these 
benefits are indeed reliable and they outweigh the risks.
  Critics argue that the knowledge gained from such research can often 
be obtained through safer means, such as computational models or 
studying natural outbreaks. Moreover, these resources invested in high-
risk research can be redirected toward strengthening public health 
infrastructure, improving our surveillance system, and developing 
broad-spectrum antivirals and vaccines.
  Let's quit throwing good money after bad money. Let's take good care 
of the American taxpayer dollars and actually do things that are going 
to protect them from future pandemics.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.