[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 67 (Wednesday, April 17, 2024)]
[House]
[Pages H2459-H2468]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  FOURTH AMENDMENT IS NOT FOR SALE ACT


                             General Leave

  Ms. HAGEMAN. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks 
and insert extraneous material on H.R. 4639.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. De La Cruz). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentlewoman from Wyoming?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1149 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 4639.
  The Chair appoints the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Carl) to preside 
over the Committee of the Whole.

                              {time}  1222


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 4639) to amend section 2702 of title 18, United States Code, to 
prevent law enforcement and intelligence agencies from obtaining 
subscriber or customer records in exchange for anything of value, to 
address communications and records in the possession of intermediary 
internet service providers, and for other purposes, with Mr. Carl in 
the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed 1 
hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority 
member of the Committee on the Judiciary, or their respective 
designees.
  The gentlewoman from Wyoming (Ms. Hageman) and the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Nadler) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Wyoming (Ms. Hageman).
  Ms. HAGEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

[[Page H2460]]

  Today, the House will vote on H.R. 4639, the Fourth Amendment Is Not 
For Sale Act.
  Last July, the House Judiciary Committee favorably reported the 
Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act by a vote of 30-0, with one Member 
voting present.
  This bill makes crucial changes and closes a glaring loophole that 
allows the government to sidestep the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment to purchase data of Americans.

  I thank my colleague, Congressman Davidson, for introducing this 
much-needed legislation. This bill is the result of years of bipartisan 
negotiation, and I look forward to this debate and vote.
  The Fourth Amendment guarantees to all of us the right to be free of 
unreasonable government searches and seizures. However, the law and 
doctrine concerning the Fourth Amendment has failed to keep pace with 
the development of digital technologies.
  Nearly 40 years ago, Congress passed the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act, or ECPA, in an attempt to navigate the digital age, but it 
is clear that legislation is now insufficient to protect the 
constitutional rights of Americans. It is time that Congress accounts 
for the technological advances that have occurred in the decades since 
ECPA was passed.
  Today, seemingly every American carries a smartphone with them 
wherever they go. These devices contain vast amounts of information of 
Americans, such as where they travel, what they purchase, their health 
information, and so on. As the Supreme Court has noted, these devices 
``hold for many Americans the privacies of life.''
  Before the modern internet, the Fourth Amendment required law 
enforcement to execute a search warrant and subpoena the items they 
wished to review. The officer executing the search would have to 
provide a copy of the warrant and an inventory of the property seized. 
However, today, Federal agencies often sidestep the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment and access and collect massive amounts of private 
information on Americans by exploiting a legal loophole in the ECPA and 
Fourth Amendment doctrine.
  While ECPA prohibits communications companies from providing customer 
information to the government in the absence of a subpoena, warrant, or 
other court order, no such prohibition exists for providing this 
information to third parties, such as data brokers. Instead of going to 
a judge to demonstrate probable cause and obtain a warrant, government 
agencies, like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal 
Revenue Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the 
Department of Homeland Security can simply turn to data brokers and 
purchase mass amounts of Americans' data.
  The government is collecting vast amounts of data by purchasing it 
from data brokers or other third parties. Media reports have detailed 
that some data brokers have even tracked people at places of worship 
and at protests.
  While the Judiciary Committee has in recent years advanced major 
reforms to overhaul ECPA, those bills have not yet passed into law. It 
is long past time that Congress acts to protect the privacy of 
Americans.
  There is strong bipartisan support in Congress to finally address and 
close the data broker loophole. This bill is exactly the type of 
legislation needed to rein in the Federal Government and protect the 
privacy rights of Americans.
  The government is rifling through your personal information. You 
should have the right to know about it, but the government can just 
purchase your highly sensitive information from data brokers and use it 
against you without your ever knowing.
  The Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act would close this legal 
loophole and ensure that the government may only use existing statutes 
compliant with the Fourth Amendment to lawfully surveil Americans.
  When the government compels data brokers to disclose Americans' 
personal data, it should be required to get a court order. With this 
commonsense legislation, the government will no longer be able to make 
an end-run around the Fourth Amendment to purchase the data of 
Americans.
  Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support 
this important legislation, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4639, the Fourth 
Amendment Is Not For Sale Act. I was proud to join Congressman Davidson 
in introducing this strong bipartisan legislation to help prevent 
government overreach by prohibiting the warrantless purchase of 
customer data. When the Judiciary Committee considered this bill at 
markup last July, it received, as Ms. Hageman noted, a rare unanimous 
30-0 vote.
  When we download applications to our phones, we do so because we 
think they will make our lives just a little bit better. Weather apps 
tell us if we should bring an umbrella to work, delivery apps allow us 
to order groceries to our homes, and even employee work apps let us 
know the schedule for the week. Some of these convenience applications, 
however, can come with a dark side that they generally do not disclose 
to the American public, that the data they collect from us is 
immediately sold to the highest bidder.
  Third-party purchasers of this data, often referred to as ``data 
brokers,'' collect and package the data to sell to advertisers, market 
researchers, and government entities, to name a few. While many argue 
that the data they purchase from applications, websites, and social 
media is deidentified when it is sold, experts agree that just four 
points of data are needed to reidentify this data.
  Because of this, the purchaser of a dataset can piece together 
significant information about us. For example, they can track an 
individual's commuting habits, including which businesses they drive by 
on their way to work, when they are not at home, and even when they 
visit places that are not part of their normal commute.

                              {time}  1230

  That anyone should have Americans' private information is highly 
troubling to me. But that our Federal Government can obtain it without 
a warrant should be troubling to all of us.
  The Supreme Court in U.S. v. Jones unanimously found that the 
government's use of a GPS tracker on the subject's car is considered a 
search under the Fourth Amendment. But in 2004, when the search in 
Jones occurred, not everyone had a phone in their pocket--the ecosystem 
of data brokers had not yet come to life.
  If the government wants to track a suspect today, they can go through 
the trouble of establishing probable cause in getting a warrant, which 
is what they should do, or Federal law enforcement could simply 
purchase data from a third party about the target of their operation.
  If that purchased data included location data for their subject, they 
would have no need for checks and balances, no need for a warrant, and 
during an ensuing criminal trial, no obligation even to tell the court 
how they obtained the initial data in the first place.
  We have the Fourth Amendment for a reason. If law enforcement wants 
to gather information about you, they should first obtain a warrant. 
They should have to go to a judge and explain why there is probable 
cause and why they need to know this information. When Federal law 
enforcement agencies purchase this data, however, they bypass our 
judicial system entirely.
  Our current state of affairs is clearly not what our Founders 
intended. Our right to privacy is being abrogated every day by those 
whose job it is to keep us safe. The Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale 
Act would change that.
  Under the bill before us today, the Federal Government would be 
prohibited from exchanging anything of value for data from third-party 
vendors. The law already prohibits applications and websites, 
electronic communication services, and remote computing services from 
sharing information with the government without a warrant.
  The Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act would extend that same rule 
to the data brokers to which they sell. This legislation would also 
ensure that the government does not circumvent these rules by 
prohibiting both indirect acquisition of information and agency sharing 
of third-party data.

[[Page H2461]]

  This way, Federal law enforcement could neither acquire prohibited 
data from individuals who purchase the data and then pass it on to the 
government, nor could they receive the desired data from non-law 
enforcement Federal agencies.
  The whole point of this bill is to stop the end run that is being 
done around the Fourth Amendment because of modern technology.
  I thank Congressman Davidson and Chairman Jordan for their 
leadership, and I thank my Democratic colleagues, Representatives 
Lofgren, Jayapal, and Jacobs for their hard work to get the bill to the 
floor.
  I encourage my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this legislation, and I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HAGEMAN. Mr. Chair, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Davidson).
  Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding. 
Frankly, in the House it is rare today that we have an issue that 
doesn't break on party lines, and privacy, unfortunately, isn't 
unanimous.
  The Fourth Amendment is clear that if the government wants to serve 
your data, they need to have probable cause and a warrant or a 
subpoena.
  The Fourth Amendment is a restriction on what government can do. It 
is not a restriction on commerce.
  Unfortunately, government agencies are buying nonpublic data that 
would otherwise require a warrant or a subpoena.
  Congress confronts an opportunity today to end that practice by 
passing the bipartisan and bicameral Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale 
Act. Nothing in this bill would prohibit a search, paid for or 
otherwise, of public information. It would, however, restore privacy 
protections grossly infringed by current practices. Congressman 
Higgins, a career law enforcement officer, is offering an amendment 
today that makes that clear. We have heard from law enforcement 
agencies, and we want to make it clear, nothing in this bill is 
designed to make your job harder to do.
  Mr. LaLota will offer an amendment that I do adamantly oppose. 
Frankly, it strips much of the content of the bill, and I regret that I 
do oppose that amendment because it undermines the intent of the bill.
  Closing this data broker loophole is an important step toward 
restoring a government small enough to fit within the Constitution, and 
we could afford a government that small.
  Finding bad guys would be easier if you had perfect information on 
everybody and full surveillance all the time. It has been recognized 
that the Third Amendment was put in place, despite the fact that we all 
might be more secure if we had a soldier stationed in our homes, but 
the Third Amendment prevents the government from doing that.
  The reality is that technology today effectively puts the government 
everywhere we go. We all essentially have a digital ID. It is a phone 
number, and we carry it with us. It is tracked. It goes to your car. 
Your car spies on you, as well.
  This data is being collected. People say, well, this amendment 
doesn't deal with all that. So let me address that concern. People back 
home might not realize that the committee structure in Congress is 
broken up into areas of jurisdiction, meaning that certain committees 
can deal only within their area of jurisdiction.
  The Judiciary Committee can reform things in that committee of 
jurisdiction, but other committees like Energy and Commerce would have 
to address a broader topic.
  People back home wonder why there so many half-baked solutions to 
problems. Well, a lot of it comes down to our jurisdiction. We don't 
solve the whole problem often.
  What about foreign governments buying our data? Congress in the House 
passed a ban on that last month. Just prior to the House ban, exporting 
your data was banned by executive order from the Biden administration. 
These are safeguards that are bipartisan, and, in some ways, they have 
already reached to the executive branch.
  Again, the Fourth Amendment is designed as a limitation on what the 
government can do. I am grateful to have the support of over 150 
organizations from Gun Owners of America on the one hand to the 
American Civil Liberties Union on the other.
  This is an issue that goes far and wide. It is important to 
understand, too, people might realize that if they have got a journal 
that they close it up and they keep it in their house, whether it is by 
their bed or in a bookshelf or in a safe, the government has to get a 
warrant or subpoena to get access to that, but your electronic 
communications don't enjoy the same kinds of protection. They are not 
being protected by the Fourth Amendment because you have trusted a 
third party with that, like Gmail, like Microsoft, like Apple. Somebody 
has your emails, and, because of that, the government is getting access 
to some of this very private information, nonpublic information, 
because they are able to buy it.
  They shouldn't be able to buy it. If this bill passes and becomes 
law, they won't be able to buy it and bypass your Fourth Amendment 
rights.
  I encourage all of our colleagues to support this important 
legislation. Look, freedom surrendered is rarely reclaimed. We have 
such an opportunity today to reclaim the right to privacy that is 
supposed to be protected by the Fourth Amendment. I hope everyone will 
join me in defending freedom today.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. Jayapal).
  Ms. JAYAPAL. Mr. Chair, I am proud to cosponsor this important 
bipartisan bill that protects Americans' constitutional privacy rights 
in this digital age by closing loopholes so that the government cannot 
purchase Americans' private data from data brokers without a warrant.
  Last year, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
declassified a report on how the intelligence community buys 
significant amounts of Americans' data from data brokers.
  We are talking about very sensitive personal information that can 
cover anything from Americans' location data to internet activity.
  That report noted that this data ``has increasingly important risks 
and implications for U.S. person privacy and civil liberties, as [the 
data] can reveal sensitive and intimate information about 
individuals.''
  This isn't just some small group of people saying that we don't like 
this. It is actually the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence saying that this practice of buying peoples' personal 
information without a warrant from these data brokers is dangerous, and 
it is a runaround of our constitutional protections.
  Just last month, we banned foreign adversaries from buying this data. 
It is important that this body today protect Americans, protect our 
constitutional rights, and ban this practice. Vote ``yes'' on this 
bill.
  Ms. HAGEMAN. Mr. Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Jordan).
  Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  Mr. Chair, the government is not allowed to get your information 
without a warrant. They are not allowed to do it. Even if they buy it, 
they are not allowed to do it. That is all this thing says. It couldn't 
be more straightforward or simple. It shows respect for the Fourth 
Amendment and respect for Americans' privacy.
  What we are saying is--and it has been said before by the ranking 
member and Ms. Jayapal and the gentlewoman from Wyoming (Ms. Hageman), 
you can't do an end run. You can't do a work-around. You can't say, oh, 
we are allowed to get information we otherwise wouldn't be able to get 
because we are going to purchase it from a data broker.
  No, you can't do that. That is all this says.
  If it would otherwise require a warrant, you can't go buy it, you 
can't do a work-around.
  It is a fundamental principle in our country. If the executive branch 
wants to get your stuff, wants to look at your information, they have 
to go to a separate and equal branch of government and get a probable 
cause warrant. They can't go around that and say, oh, we are purchasing 
it. This is public. They can't do it. It is plain and simple.
  I commend the ranking member and the Democrats on the committee for 
their bipartisanship. Again, as the ranking member said, we very seldom

[[Page H2462]]

have legislation that comes out unanimous like this.
  But this committee, which is charged with more than any other 
committee in Congress with protecting Americans' civil liberties, their 
rights, the fundamental principles and liberties that make our country 
the best place ever, unanimously agreed this thing should pass. I thank 
them, and I thank Ms. Hageman for leading this debate on the floor 
today for the committee and for our team. I also want to thank, of 
course, the sponsor of the legislation, Mr. Davidson.

  This is so simple.
  Last week, we had a similar fight, a similar debate. Unfortunately, 
we lost 212-212. Let's hope we can win this one.
  I think this makes so much sense, so much common sense. It is so 
consistent with how this great country has always operated. One branch 
of government doesn't get a side at all. We have separate and equal 
branches of government. If this branch wants information, the executive 
branch wants your information, they have got to go to a separate and 
equal branch and get a warrant. They can't go buy it from somebody else 
and be sneaky about it and avoid what the Constitution clearly mandates 
has to happen.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Jacobs).
  Ms. JACOBS. Mr. Chair, I thank Ranking Member Nadler for his 
leadership on this issue.
  Under almost any other circumstance, law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies need a warrant to access our personal information. Even in the 
cases of utmost national security like when Americans are suspected of 
terrorism, espionage, or cybercrimes, our government gets a warrant.
  This process isn't too burdensome, and it doesn't prevent law 
enforcement from investigating crimes or bringing people to justice.
  But there are a few loopholes in this process when it comes to 
section 702 queries and this data broker loophole, which allows our 
government to circumvent our Fourth Amendment rights to access our 
personal information without a warrant, a court order, or even a 
subpoena.
  This is only legal because they are buying the information. But our 
rights shouldn't have a price, and cash shouldn't hold the same 
legitimacy as a warrant.
  Law enforcement claims--they say this, this is their claim--this 
loophole, this data that they buy from data brokers is most useful 
before probable cause can be demonstrated. That is the whole point of 
the Fourth Amendment, of our right to prevent unreasonable seizures and 
searches.
  If you can't establish probable cause, you shouldn't be able to 
access or buy this information unless a court says otherwise.
  That is why we need this bipartisan Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale 
Act, which I am proud to co-lead.
  Our bill doesn't inhibit law enforcement's investigations. Instead, 
it ensures that police searches are above board, follow due process, 
and protect Americans' privacy.
  In a Congress where it feels almost impossible to get anything done 
and where the American people think all we do is disagree, this shows 
that we can do big things and there is a bipartisan consensus 
especially when it comes to Americans' privacy rights.
  Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support 
this bill.

                              {time}  1245

  Ms. HAGEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Rutherford).
  Mr. RUTHERFORD. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  Mr. Chair, I rise today in strong opposition to H.R. 4639, the Fourth 
Amendment Is Not For Sale Act, and all of the attending amendments, as 
well.
  Mr. Chair, I also stand with, I think, every major law enforcement 
agency association in the country. This bill will only make our 
communities less safe by preventing local law enforcement and State law 
enforcement from being able to access information that has been legally 
collected and is publicly open-source information.
  Every day, law enforcement officers use open-source, legally 
collected, and commercially available data. We use that to connect the 
dots to actually develop and find the leads that solve crimes like 
child abduction, drug trafficking, terrorism, and all sorts of 
different heinous crimes.
  The Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act will require law enforcement 
to get a warrant before they can access otherwise publicly open data.
  Google and Facebook can access it. The Chinese can access it. The 
cartels and criminals can access it. Private actors can access it, but 
not the police. Only law enforcement will be blocked.
  I can tell you, as a former sheriff, police officers work on time-
sensitive cases every day where accessing this information quickly is a 
matter of life and death. I am a 40-year law enforcement officer, and I 
can think of dozens of cases where minutes mattered and my officers 
saved lives by accessing this data.
  Some of the supporters of this bill say that all of those other folks 
who I just listed that still have access can't put you in jail. Let's 
be truthful here. The police can't put you in jail either without 
probable cause of a crime.
  The Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act will make communities far 
less safe by making officers' jobs harder. In fact, it helps out only 
the criminals.
  Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this dangerous, 
antipolice bill.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HAGEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. D'Esposito).
  Mr. D'ESPOSITO. Mr. Chair, I rise this morning in strong opposition 
to H.R. 4639, the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act.
  While I thank my good friends and colleagues and House Republicans 
from the Committee on the Judiciary for all the work that they do to 
keep law enforcement safe and to give law enforcement the resources 
they need to protect and serve, this bill is only going to hinder their 
ability to investigate crimes.
  Like my good friend, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Rutherford) 
said, you cannot arrest a suspect without probable cause.
  The information that is no longer going to be obtained by law 
enforcement agencies is information that has already been legally 
collected. Nearly every major law enforcement union and agency 
throughout this country is opposed to this legislation.
  I was proud to serve in the City of New York Police Department as a 
detective. It has investigated thousands of crimes, and we have 
utilized these third-party platforms to obtain information that has 
already been legally collected.
  This legislation would, without a doubt, make communities less safe 
and, in the process, would also lead us to follow in the same 
disastrous direction that New York Democrats have by handcuffing the 
ability of law enforcement to do their jobs.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HAGEMAN. Mr. Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Clyde).
  Mr. CLYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to strongly support H.R. 4639, the Fourth 
Amendment Is Not For Sale Act. This critical bill would prohibit 
government agencies, including the intelligence community, from 
purchasing Americans' data from third-party data brokers.
  U.S. Government agencies are purchasing Americans' data through a 
loophole with third-party groups when they would otherwise need a 
warrant. Recently, the Internal Revenue Service purchased records and 
locations of millions of American cell phones. The FBI purchased 
geolocation data for mobile advertising.
  The Cato Institute recently reported that data brokers collect and 
sell huge amounts of Americans' sensitive information, including 
whether they have an interest in firearms. Data brokers sell lists--in 
their words--of ``shooting fanatics'' and ``concealed carry licensed 
gun owners.'' They even sell information about Americans' interest in 
political organizations.
  Government agencies like the FBI purchase this information as a 
loophole to obtain private information about U.S. citizens without a 
warrant.

[[Page H2463]]

  Mr. Chair, I am deeply concerned that the practice of buying 
commercial data could not only threaten Americans' Fourth Amendment 
rights but could also pose a threat to their Second Amendment freedoms 
and be used as a way to track and target lawful gun owners in America. 
We must prevent this.
  H.R. 4639 will provide the necessary guardrails to ensure that these 
three-letter government agencies, including the intelligence community, 
do not and cannot overstep and infringe on Americans' constitutional 
rights.
  Why can civilian companies buy this data but not the government 
without a warrant? Because the government can take away your liberties. 
The government can put you in jail. Civilian companies cannot do that.
  Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to stand 
with the Constitution and support H.R. 4639, the Fourth Amendment Is 
Not For Sale Act.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, data brokers collect massive amounts of information 
about Americans that can track and identify our most intimate details. 
It is bad enough that companies have access to all this personal data, 
but now the government can access this data, too, without securing a 
warrant just by purchasing it on the open market. This amounts to an 
end run around the Fourth Amendment.
  This legislation would end this practice and protect our privacy as 
the Constitution demands.
  Mr. Chair, I urge all Members to support it, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  Ms. HAGEMAN. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chair, there are a couple of points that I would make. One is 
that I reject the notion that in order to beat China or other foreign 
adversaries, we must become like they are.
  If the real opposition to this bill is that it prevents the United 
States Government from becoming the same type of surveillance state 
that Communist China is, then I think that says everything that we need 
to know about those opposed to the bill, and I challenge them to 
explain that position to their constituents.
  Mr. Chair, I believe absolutely in protecting our constitutional 
rights, and I believe it is important to understand the significance of 
how these various Federal agencies have been abusing this power to 
surveil and persecute American citizens.
  As part of the Committee on the Judiciary's investigation into the 
IRS' troubling visit to the home of journalist Matt Taibbi on the very 
day that he testified before the Select Subcommittee on the 
Weaponization of the Federal Government, we learned that the IRS 
collected personal data from data brokers to use in its investigation 
of Mr. Taibbi. For example, the IRS collected data from the data broker 
Anywho, a people search website.
  It is concerning enough that the IRS would take the extreme step of 
visiting someone's home on the day he testified before Congress, but 
the IRS also compiled its information from a data broker, potentially 
accessing vast amounts of Taibbi's private information.
  That is the nature of the abuse that these Federal agencies are 
engaging in in violating Americans' civil rights.
  Mr. Chair, the Fourth Amendment exists for a reason. There is no 
exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement of getting a warrant.
  Mr. Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Turner) to speak on this bill.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition of H.R. 4639. Vote ``no'' 
on H.R. 4639.
  The bill bans law enforcement from paying for information available 
to any willing buyer in all contexts. There is no exception, zero. 
There is no exception to even allow law enforcement to pay for stolen 
information to investigate and solve identity theft, data theft, data 
breaches, ransomware attacks.
  The bill will not make people safer. The bill puts police officers' 
lives at risk. It bans the police from data used to understand the 
danger they face when executing a search warrant or an arrest warrant.
  If this bill becomes law, police will be going in blind when 
executing a warrant, and this could cost lives.
  This bill is bad for law enforcement, bad for the intelligence 
community, and bad for national security.
  That is why, yesterday, The Wall Street Journal wrote an editorial 
opposing this bill. It is also why this bill is uniformly opposed by 
the Fraternal Order of Police, the National Sheriffs' Association, the 
National Association of Police Organizations, the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, the Association of State Criminal 
Investigative Agencies, the Federal Law Enforcement Officers 
Association, the Major Cities Chiefs Association, the Major County 
Sheriffs of America, the National District Attorneys Association, the 
National Fusion Center Association, and the National Narcotic Officers 
Association Coalition.
  Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues: Do not digitally defund the police.
  Ms. HAGEMAN. Mr. Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time to 
close.
  Mr. Chair, I think it is important for the American people to 
understand the scope of what we are talking about and what our 
government is purchasing from these third-party brokers. Data brokers 
aggregate packages and sell the data acquired from a variety of 
sources, including those that have already been described today.
  Often, data brokers have thousands of different data points 
reflecting information about a person that, when combined, reveal 
valuable and intimate insights about an individual that would otherwise 
be unavailable.
  In other words, for data brokers, consumers and their information are 
the product. For example, data brokers can receive geolocation data, 
sometimes accurate to just a few yards, from a mobile device up to 
14,000 times per day.
  This data allows a purchaser to identify patterns that can reveal 
where a person lives, where they work, and where they spend their free 
time.
  These actions allow government agencies and law enforcement to evade 
the Fourth Amendment if they are allowed to purchase this data and 
collect limitless information on Americans.
  The Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act closes this legal loophole 
and stops data brokers from selling Americans' personal information to 
the government by requiring the government to obtain a court order 
before acquiring customer or subscriber information from a third party.
  The fact is that we all support our police. We want them to have the 
tools that they need to catch the bad guys, but I think if there is 
anything that has been disclosed over the last several years, it is 
that there are people within our intelligence community and who work 
for the Federal Government, including the FBI, the IRS, and similar 
agencies, who are abusing their power and authority and going after 
people for political reasons.
  Mr. Chair, that is one of the most important reasons as to why we 
need to close this loophole.
  As technology continues to advance and Americans incidentally share 
more data through the devices we use every day, it is imperative for 
Congress to protect privacy interests and ensure that government 
agencies and law enforcement abide by the Fourth Amendment.
  This bill does nothing more and nothing less. It simply protects our 
Fourth Amendment rights.
  Every person who has been elected to this body took an oath of office 
to uphold our Constitution. That is what we are attempting to do with 
the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act.
  Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this bill, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Bost). All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment 
under the 5-minute rule.
  An amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of 
the Rules Committee Print 118-28 shall be considered as adopted. The 
bill, as amended, shall be considered as the original bill for the 
purpose of further amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be 
considered as read.
  The text of the bill, as amended is as follows:

                               H.R. 4639

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

[[Page H2464]]

  


     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Fourth Amendment Is Not For 
     Sale Act''.

     SEC. 2. PROTECTION OF RECORDS HELD BY DATA BROKERS.

       Section 2702 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(e) Prohibition on Obtaining in Exchange for Anything of 
     Value Certain Records and Information by Law Enforcement and 
     Intelligence Agencies.--
       ``(1) Definitions.--In this subsection--
       ``(A) the term `covered customer or subscriber record' 
     means a covered record that is--
       ``(i) disclosed to a third party by--

       ``(I) a provider of an electronic communication service to 
     the public or a provider of a remote computing service of 
     which the covered person with respect to the covered record 
     is a subscriber or customer; or
       ``(II) an intermediary service provider that delivers, 
     stores, or processes communications of such covered person;

       ``(ii) collected by a third party from an online account of 
     a covered person; or
       ``(iii) collected by a third party from or about an 
     electronic device of a covered person;
       ``(B) the term `covered person' means--
       ``(i) a person who is located inside the United States; or
       ``(ii) a person--

       ``(I) who is located outside the United States or whose 
     location cannot be determined; and
       ``(II) who is a United States person, as defined in section 
     101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801);

       ``(C) the term `covered record' means a record or other 
     information that--
       ``(i) pertains to a covered person; and
       ``(ii) is--

       ``(I) a record or other information described in the matter 
     preceding paragraph (1) of subsection (c);
       ``(II) the contents of a communication; or
       ``(III) location information;

       ``(D) the term `electronic device' has the meaning given 
     the term `computer' in section 1030(e);
       ``(E) the term `illegitimately obtained information' means 
     a covered record that--
       ``(i) was obtained--

       ``(I) from a provider of an electronic communication 
     service to the public or a provider of a remote computing 
     service in a manner that--

       ``(aa) violates the service agreement between the provider 
     and customers or subscribers of the provider; or
       ``(bb) is inconsistent with the privacy policy of the 
     provider;

       ``(II) by deceiving the covered person whose covered record 
     was obtained; or
       ``(III) through the unauthorized accessing of an electronic 
     device or online account; or

       ``(ii) was--

       ``(I) obtained from a provider of an electronic 
     communication service to the public, a provider of a remote 
     computing service, or an intermediary service provider; and
       ``(II) collected, processed, or shared in violation of a 
     contract relating to the covered record;

       ``(F) the term `intelligence community' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003);
       ``(G) the term `location information' means information 
     derived or otherwise calculated from the transmission or 
     reception of a radio signal that reveals the approximate or 
     actual geographic location of a customer, subscriber, or 
     device;
       ``(H) the term `obtain in exchange for anything of value' 
     means to obtain by purchasing, to receive in connection with 
     services being provided for consideration, or to otherwise 
     obtain in exchange for consideration, including an access 
     fee, service fee, maintenance fee, or licensing fee;
       ``(I) the term `online account' means an online account 
     with an electronic communication service to the public or 
     remote computing service;
       ``(J) the term `pertain', with respect to a person, means--
       ``(i) information that is linked to the identity of a 
     person; or
       ``(ii) information--

       ``(I) that has been anonymized to remove links to the 
     identity of a person; and
       ``(II) that, if combined with other information, could be 
     used to identify a person; and

       ``(K) the term `third party' means a person who--
       ``(i) is not a governmental entity; and
       ``(ii) in connection with the collection, disclosure, 
     obtaining, processing, or sharing of the covered record at 
     issue, was not acting as--

       ``(I) a provider of an electronic communication service to 
     the public; or
       ``(II) a provider of a remote computing service.

       ``(2) Limitation.--
       ``(A) In general.--A law enforcement agency of a 
     governmental entity and an element of the intelligence 
     community may not obtain from a third party in exchange for 
     anything of value a covered customer or subscriber record or 
     any illegitimately obtained information.
       ``(B) Indirectly acquired records and information.--The 
     limitation under subparagraph (A) shall apply without regard 
     to whether the third party possessing the covered customer or 
     subscriber record or illegitimately obtained information is 
     the third party that initially obtained or collected, or is 
     the third party that initially received the disclosure of, 
     the covered customer or subscriber record or illegitimately 
     obtained information.
       ``(3) Limit on sharing between agencies.--An agency of a 
     governmental entity that is not a law enforcement agency or 
     an element of the intelligence community may not provide to a 
     law enforcement agency of a governmental entity or an element 
     of the intelligence community a covered customer or 
     subscriber record or illegitimately obtained information that 
     was obtained from a third party in exchange for anything of 
     value.
       ``(4) Prohibition on use as evidence.--A covered customer 
     or subscriber record or illegitimately obtained information 
     obtained by or provided to a law enforcement agency of a 
     governmental entity or an element of the intelligence 
     community in violation of paragraph (2) or (3), and any 
     evidence derived therefrom, may not be received in evidence 
     in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any 
     court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory 
     body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United 
     States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof.
       ``(5) Minimization procedures.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Attorney General shall adopt 
     specific procedures that are reasonably designed to minimize 
     the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the 
     dissemination, of information pertaining to a covered person 
     that is acquired in violation of paragraph (2) or (3).
       ``(B) Use by agencies.--If a law enforcement agency of a 
     governmental entity or element of the intelligence community 
     acquires information pertaining to a covered person in 
     violation of paragraph (2) or (3), the law enforcement agency 
     of a governmental entity or element of the intelligence 
     community shall minimize the acquisition and retention, and 
     prohibit the dissemination, of the information in accordance 
     with the procedures adopted under subparagraph (A).''.

     SEC. 3. REQUIRED DISCLOSURE.

       Section 2703 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(i) Covered Customer or Subscriber Records and 
     Illegitimately Obtained Information.--
       ``(1) Definitions.--In this subsection, the terms `covered 
     customer or subscriber record', `illegitimately obtained 
     information', and `third party' have the meanings given such 
     terms in section 2702(e).
       ``(2) Limitation.--Unless a governmental entity obtains an 
     order in accordance with paragraph (3), the governmental 
     entity may not require a third party to disclose a covered 
     customer or subscriber record or any illegitimately obtained 
     information if a court order would be required for the 
     governmental entity to require a provider of remote computing 
     service or a provider of electronic communication service to 
     the public to disclose such a covered customer or subscriber 
     record or illegitimately obtained information that is a 
     record of a customer or subscriber of the provider.
       ``(3) Orders.--
       ``(A) In general.--A court may only issue an order 
     requiring a third party to disclose a covered customer or 
     subscriber record or any illegitimately obtained information 
     on the same basis and subject to the same limitations as 
     would apply to a court order to require disclosure by a 
     provider of remote computing service or a provider of 
     electronic communication service to the public of a record of 
     a customer or subscriber of the provider.
       ``(B) Standard.--For purposes of subparagraph (A), a court 
     shall apply the most stringent standard under Federal statute 
     or the Constitution of the United States that would be 
     applicable to a request for a court order to require a 
     comparable disclosure by a provider of remote computing 
     service or a provider of electronic communication service to 
     the public of a record of a customer or subscriber of the 
     provider.''.

     SEC. 4. INTERMEDIARY SERVICE PROVIDERS.

       (a) Definition.--Section 2711 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(5) the term `intermediary service provider' means an 
     entity or facilities owner or operator that directly or 
     indirectly delivers, stores, or processes communications for 
     or on behalf of a provider of electronic communication 
     service to the public or a provider of remote computing 
     service.''.
       (b) Prohibition.--Section 2702(a) of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (3) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(4) an intermediary service provider shall not knowingly 
     divulge--
       ``(A) to any person or entity the contents of a 
     communication while in electronic storage by that provider; 
     or
       ``(B) to any governmental entity a record or other 
     information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of, a 
     recipient of a communication from a subscriber to or customer 
     of, or the sender of a communication to a subscriber to or 
     customer of, the provider of electronic communication service 
     to the public or the provider of remote computing service 
     for, or on behalf of, which the intermediary service provider 
     directly or indirectly delivers, transmits, stores, or 
     processes communications.''.

     SEC. 5. LIMITS ON SURVEILLANCE CONDUCTED FOR FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES OTHER THAN UNDER THE 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

       (a) In General.--Section 2511(2)(f) of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(f)(i)(A) Nothing contained in this chapter, chapter 121 
     or 206 of this title, or section 705 of the Communications 
     Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) shall be deemed to affect 
     an acquisition or activity described in clause (B) that is 
     carried out utilizing a means other than electronic 
     surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).

[[Page H2465]]

       ``(B) An acquisition or activity described in this clause 
     is--
       ``(I) an acquisition by the United States Government of 
     foreign intelligence information from international or 
     foreign communications that--
       ``(aa) is acquired pursuant to express statutory authority; 
     or
       ``(bb) only includes information of persons who are not 
     United States persons and are located outside the United 
     States; or
       ``(II) a foreign intelligence activity involving a foreign 
     electronic communications system that--
       ``(aa) is conducted pursuant to express statutory 
     authority; or
       ``(bb) only involves the acquisition by the United States 
     Government of information of persons who are not United 
     States persons and are located outside the United States.
       ``(ii) The procedures in this chapter, chapter 121, and the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 
     et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which electronic 
     surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the 
     interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic 
     communications may be conducted.''.
       (b) Exclusive Means Related to Communications Records.--The 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 
     et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which electronic 
     communications transactions records, call detail records, or 
     other information from communications of United States 
     persons or persons inside the United States are acquired for 
     foreign intelligence purposes inside the United States or 
     from a person or entity located in the United States that 
     provides telecommunications, electronic communication, or 
     remote computing services.
       (c) Exclusive Means Related to Location Information, Web 
     Browsing History, and Internet Search History.--
       (1) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``location 
     information'' has the meaning given that term in subsection 
     (e) of section 2702 of title 18, United States Code, as added 
     by section 2 of this Act.
       (2) Exclusive means.--Title I and sections 303, 304, 703, 
     704, and 705 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., 1823, 1824, 1881b, 1881c, 
     1881d) shall be the exclusive means by which location 
     information, web browsing history, and internet search 
     history of United States persons or persons inside the United 
     States are acquired for foreign intelligence purposes inside 
     the United States or from a person or entity located in the 
     United States.
       (d) Exclusive Means Related to Fourth Amendment-Protected 
     Information.--Title I and sections 303, 304, 703, 704, and 
     705 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq., 1823, 1824, 1881b, 1881c, 1881d) shall 
     be the exclusive means by which any information, records, 
     data, or tangible things are acquired for foreign 
     intelligence purposes from a person or entity located in the 
     United States if the compelled production of such 
     information, records, data, or tangible things would require 
     a warrant for law enforcement purposes.
       (e) Definition.--In this section, the term ``United States 
     person'' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1801).

     SEC. 6. LIMIT ON CIVIL IMMUNITY FOR PROVIDING INFORMATION, 
                   FACILITIES, OR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE 
                   GOVERNMENT ABSENT A COURT ORDER.

       Section 2511(2)(a) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (ii), by striking clause (B) and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(B) a certification in writing--
       ``(I) by a person specified in section 2518(7) or the 
     Attorney General of the United States;
       ``(II) that the requirements for an emergency authorization 
     to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication under 
     section 2518(7) have been met; and
       ``(III) that the specified assistance is required,''; and
       (2) by striking subparagraph (iii) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(iii) For assistance provided pursuant to a certification 
     under subparagraph (ii)(B), the limitation on causes of 
     action under the last sentence of the matter following 
     subparagraph (ii)(B) shall only apply to the extent that the 
     assistance ceased at the earliest of the time the application 
     for a court order was denied, the time the communication 
     sought was obtained, or 48 hours after the interception 
     began.''.

  The Acting CHAIR. No further amendment to the bill, as amended, shall 
be in order except those printed in House Report 118-464. Each such 
further amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the 
report, by the Member designated in the report, shall be considered as 
read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally 
divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be 
subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division 
of the question.

                              {time}  1300


                Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Davidson

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 
printed in House Report 118-464.
  Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 14, line 10, insert ``702,'' after ``304,''.
       Page 14, line 12, insert ``1881a,'' after ``1824,''.
       Page 14, line 21, insert ``702,'' after ``304,''.
       Page 14, line 23, insert ``1881a,'' after ``1824,''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1149, the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Davidson) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chair, the purpose of this amendment is a technical 
correction. Often this is done simply in the Rules Committee. For some 
reason, they chose not to do it.
  The bill itself states that existing Federal laws are the exclusive 
means by which the government obtains location information of U.S. 
persons or persons inside the United States, their web browsing 
history, internet search history, or any other data that would require 
a court order.
  The list is complete except for section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act. That needs to be added. That is all this 
amendment does is simply cover comprehensively the list of authorities, 
including section 702 as a covered authority. The bill isn't really 
complete without covering that.
  I think last week the body spoke that they want to continue to have 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This bill would say it also 
covers everything, including what just passed last week.
  Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from New York is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chair, this amendment makes technical changes to the bill to 
clarify that it does not interfere with section 702 of FISA. FISA, 
including but not limited to section 702, is the only way the 
government should acquire data that in any other scenario would need a 
warrant. While we may have different opinions on how the government 
should treat the incidentally collected U.S. person data, as we debated 
last week, we should all agree that this bill is not intended to 
address or affect section 702 in any way.
  This amendment is a technical change to correct a minor error in the 
bill, and I hope that all Members will support it.
  I thank my colleague for offering the amendment, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chair, I will close by saying I think the case is 
clear. I appreciate Mr. Nadler for working with me.
  I thank Senator Wyden and Senator Lee for being champions of this on 
the Senate side. I thank the unusual cohort of colleagues here. We have 
Zoe Lofgren, Pramila Jayapal, Sara Jacobs, and Jerry Nadler from the 
Democratic Party, and on our side Chairman   Jim Jordan,   Andy Biggs,  
 Thomas Massie, and me.
  There are so few things today that everyone agrees on. When you have 
the political spectrum covered from those angles, I think, hopefully, 
the American people will see this is a reliable solution. It moved 
through the Judiciary Committee with unanimous support. We don't 
believe it will get unanimous support today, but I sure hope that it 
passes.
  Mr. Chair, I encourage my colleagues to support this amendment and 
the underlying bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Davidson).
  The amendment was agreed to.


          Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Higgins of Louisiana

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 
printed in House Report 118-464.
  Mr. HIGGINS of Louisiana. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 2, strike line 24 and all that follows through line 8 
     on page 3, and insert the following:

[[Page H2466]]

       ``(C) the term `covered record'--
       ``(i) means a record or other information that--

       ``(I) pertains to a covered person; and
       ``(II) is--

       ``(aa) a record or other information described in the 
     matter preceding paragraph (1) of subsection (c);
       ``(bb) the contents of a communication; or
       ``(cc) location information; and
       ``(ii) does not include a record or other information 
     that--

       ``(I) has been voluntarily made available to the general 
     public by a covered person on a social media plat form or 
     similar service;
       ``(II) is lawfully available to the public as a Federal, 
     State, or local government record or through other widely 
     distributed media;
       ``(III) is obtained by a law enforcement agency of a 
     governmental entity or an element of the intelligence 
     community for the purpose of conducting a background check of 
     a covered person--

       ``(aa) with the written consent of such person;
       ``(bb) for access or use by such agency or element for the 
     purpose of such background check; and
       ``(cc) that is destroyed after the date on which it is no 
     longer needed for such background check; or

       ``(IV) is data generated by a public or private ALPR 
     system;''.

       Page 5, line 22, strike ``and'' at the end.
       Page 6, line 9, strike the period at the end and insert ``; 
     and''.
       Page 6, insert after line 9 the following:
       ``(L) the term `automated license plate recognition system' 
     or `ALPR system' means a system of one or more mobile or 
     fixed high-speed cameras combined with computer algorithms to 
     convert images of license plates into computer-readable 
     data.''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1149, the gentleman 
from Louisiana (Mr. Higgins) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana.
  Mr. HIGGINS of Louisiana. Mr. Chair, as the underlying bill was being 
developed, those of us on both sides of the aisle were concerned about 
constitutional protections, the preservation of our representative 
Republic, and the core principles of individual rights, liberties, 
freedoms, and privacies that our representative Republic relies upon 
and our citizenry anticipates and expects, rightfully so, that their 
Congress shall protect.
  As the underlying bill was being developed, there were concerns 
communicated from law enforcement and citizens across the country, at 
the local level especially, and there began an effort, a very good-
faith effort, across the spectrum politically here in this body to 
address those concerns. That is what my amendment does.
  The Fourth Amendment specifically calls for probable cause to be 
necessary for a warrant particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
  My amendment seeks to address the concerns of law enforcement. We 
have sworn an oath to protect our Constitution, but we are bound by 
duty to protect the communities that we serve. Therefore, legitimate 
investigations are required. Consistent with that ethic, I propose my 
amendment to not include as a covered record the following items to 
ensure that law enforcement has the clarity to know that they will 
continue to have the tools they need to succeed:
  Records made available to the general public on social media. This 
remains available to law enforcement, as clarified by my amendment.
  Records made lawfully available through government records or widely 
distributed media. This remains available to local law enforcement and 
is clarified in my amendment.
  Records wherein consent has been given by the citizen or the business 
for the government to access for a background check. This remains 
undisturbed and is clarified by my amendment.
  Records generated by public or private ALPRs, automated license plate 
recognition systems. This is a very important consideration that law 
enforcement was concerned about. Again, my amendment clarifies and 
addresses the fact that this right for legitimate investigation through 
ALPR remains undisturbed.
  I encourage full support of my amendment from my colleagues.
  Mr. Chair, I yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Nehls), my friend 
and colleague of the Thin Blue Line.
  Mr. NEHLS. Mr. Chair, I rise in strong support of Mr. Higgins' 
amendment before us today which seeks to address some of the concerns 
several law enforcement groups have with this legislation.
  As someone who has served in law enforcement for nearly 30 years, I 
understand the concerns our brave men and women in blue have with this 
bill.
  Now, more than ever, we must uphold law and order in our society and 
also ensure the Fourth Amendment rights of the American people are 
protected.
  That is why this amendment is so important. It clarifies data 
exceptions for public content, public records, background checks, and 
license plate readers in order to help preserve some of the tools law 
enforcement currently uses.
  I will give you an example. A kid threatens to shoot up a school on 
Facebook. A data collector is scanning social media for posts like this 
and sends it to local law enforcement. The police would be able to use 
this information gathered from social media under this amendment 
because it is public user-generated information.
  The same applies to police records, property deeds, and other public 
records. We want to make crystal clear these records will remain 
available for our law enforcement community to use in their 
investigations while also preventing unreasonable search and seizure by 
the government.
  As a former sheriff, I will always back the blue and always uphold 
the Constitution and the rights of citizens therein. I believe this 
amendment allows us to do both.
  Mr. Chair, I encourage my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to 
vote ``yes.''
  Mr. HIGGINS of Louisiana. Mr. Chair, may I inquire how much time is 
remaining.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Louisiana has 15 seconds 
remaining.
  Mr. HIGGINS of Louisiana. Mr. Chair, 15 seconds, for a gentleman from 
Louisiana, is just about enough time to say thank you.
  Mr. Chair, I encourage support of my amendment, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment, although I am not opposed to it.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from New York is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chair, this amendment will clarify that the underlying bill will 
not impact information that is publicly available, that the government 
has in its own databases, or that the government lawfully acquires. 
Scraping pictures and data off public social media accounts for facial 
recognition technology is certainly a problem, but it is not this 
problem.
  It does us no good to conflate one surveillance issue with another. 
This legislation is intended to prohibit the purchase of data in cases 
where Federal law enforcement would otherwise need a warrant. License 
plate databases, facial recognition technology platforms, and advanced 
policing technologies are often powered by publicly available data.
  We are not here to impede government access to data that is public or 
that law enforcement already contains in its databases. While I have 
serious concerns about the irresponsible deployment of advanced 
policing technologies, those are fights for another day.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his amendment. I encourage my 
colleagues to join me in supporting it, and I yield back the balance of 
my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Higgins).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. LaLota

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 
printed in House Report 118-464.
  Mr. LaLOTA. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 6, line 16, insert after ``information.'' the 
     following: ``This subparagraph does not apply in the case of 
     information that the law enforcement agency or element of the 
     intelligence community could lawfully access without a 
     warrant.''.
       Page 7, line 11, insert after ``value.'' the following: 
     ``This paragraph does not apply in

[[Page H2467]]

     the case of information that the law enforcement agency or 
     element of the intelligence community could lawfully access 
     without a warrant.''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1149, the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. LaLota) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. LaLOTA. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Indeed, Mr. Chair, the Fourth Amendment should not be for sale. We 
agree on that. That is to say our government should not be able to buy 
from a third-party information about American citizens that it could 
otherwise not obtain without a warrant.
  The title of the bill, the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale, is 
compelling. We should all agree to that, yet the language of the bill 
does not coincide with the title of the bill. The bill, without 
amendment, is somewhere between innocently misleading and a full-on 
Fourth Amendment bait and switch.
  My amendment would narrowly tailor the bill to include searches and 
seizures normally covered by the Fourth Amendment.
  Mr. Chair, the Fourth Amendment states: ``The right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.''

                              {time}  1315

  So let's agree that Congress should restrict the government from, via 
a third party, searching or seizing persons that it could not otherwise 
search or seize without a warrant. We should all agree on that. 
Everyone in the House, from the Freedom Caucus to the squad and 
everybody else, should agree on that.
  If that is what the bill actually said, then the bill would likely 
sail through the House without any real, legitimate opposition because 
government should not be able to contract out its violation of our 
Fourth Amendment protections.
  Yet, without my amendment, the bill would prevent our law enforcement 
officers from utilizing information that is currently publicly 
available, information that is accessible without a need for a warrant 
in fighting crime.
  This Republican Conference backs the blue. It is part of our 
Commitment to America to keep America safe. Unfortunately, the bill, 
without my amendment, breaks our commitment and would prevent law 
enforcement from using everyday tools which do not violate any 
American's Fourth Amendment rights.
  My amendment would clarify that any restriction made on this bill and 
information that could be obtained by law enforcement or the 
intelligence community would not include information that is lawfully 
obtainable without a warrant.
  If my amendment is adopted, then the name of the bill would actually 
fit, and the bill would actually give more weight and confidence to our 
Nation's Fourth Amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, this amendment would create exceptions for 
government purchase of data that a Federal agency can already lawfully 
access without a warrant. I am sure that my colleague from New York 
means well, but I worry that this amendment would create confusion in 
the long run rather than clarify an area where we both agree.
  I agree that the government should continue accessing information 
that it is already able to acquire without a warrant, but we should be 
closing the door on government purchase of third-party data, period.
  First, it is unclear how a data broker subscription for ``only 
information that law enforcement could acquire without a warrant'' 
would work. By suggesting that some data could be purchased, we open up 
a Pandora's box of hypotheticals instead of turning off a tap that 
should not be on to begin with.
  Second, when section 2703 of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act was passed back in 1986, the internet was in its nascency. At that 
time, there were few, if any, data brokers purchasing data and selling 
it to the government. I am confident that if they had existed, then 
third parties' data sales would have been included in the prohibition 
against service providers sharing their data with the government 
without a warrant.
  As I said, I appreciate what the gentleman is trying to do, but I 
cannot agree with this approach.
  Mr. Chair, I oppose the amendment, and I encourage my colleagues to 
do the same. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LaLOTA. Mr. Chair, I am prepared to close, and I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Davidson).
  Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chair, I strongly oppose Mr. LaLota's amendment.
  He makes a great point. We all want to stand with law enforcement. 
That is a unifying position for Republicans, and I think most Democrats 
want to support them, as well.
  Nothing in this bill prohibits them from doing their job. The Fourth 
Amendment is a restriction on government activity though, and they are 
already used to getting warrants for all kinds of things. The novelty 
is the way that they acquire data to avoid getting a warrant or 
subpoena. In fact, under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and 
the Stored Communications Act, they are required to get a court order.
  This amendment doesn't make it clear that this isn't an effort to 
expand that to say, no, you don't really have to do that anymore.
  It is an expansion of surveillance without a warrant instead of the 
purpose of the bill, so it is hostile to the entire purpose of the 
bill. It guts the core of the protection that is meant to be restored 
here.
  Mr. Chair, for that reason, I oppose Mr. LaLota's amendment, and I 
strongly encourage our colleagues to do the same so that we can pass a 
very functional Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act and restore the 
infringed right to privacy that Americans need restored.

  Mr. LaLOTA. Mr. Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chair, we cannot say that we support law enforcement officers and 
then take away the tools they need to do their job.
  My amendment would strike a proper balance between ensuring our 
government does not use a third party to violate the Fourth Amendment 
while at the same time preserving the ability for law enforcement to do 
its job.
  Without adopting my amendment, this bill will make it almost 
impossible for State, local, and Federal law enforcement to investigate 
crime. We should be making it easier for law enforcement to do their 
job rather than tying one hand behind their back. At the same time, we 
should protect against government's warrantless searches and seizures 
of American citizens.
  Mr. Chair, I urge all of my colleagues to vote ``yes,'' and I yield 
back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment. We 
all support the police and criminal investigations, but we all support, 
we hope, the Fourth Amendment, the requirement to get a warrant for 
probable cause in order to search something or somebody.
  This bill is to avoid an end run around that by the government 
purchasing information from data brokers for which they should need a 
warrant. This amendment would gut that and destroy the whole purpose of 
the bill.
  The bill is essential to protecting liberty and to protecting the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment.
  Mr. Chair, I urge the defeat of this amendment, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. LaLota).

[[Page H2468]]

  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. LaLOTA. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. LaLota) will be postponed.
  Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
LaLota) having assumed the chair, Mr. Bost, Acting Chair of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4639) to 
amend section 2702 of title 18, United States Code, to prevent law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies from obtaining subscriber or 
customer records in exchange for anything of value, to address 
communications and records in the possession of intermediary internet 
service providers, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution 
thereon.

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