[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 66 (Tuesday, April 16, 2024)]
[House]
[Pages H2422-H2423]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NO TECHNOLOGY FOR TERROR ACT
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill
(H.R. 6603) to apply foreign-direct product rules to Iran, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 6603
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``No Technology for Terror
Act''.
SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN-DIRECT PRODUCT RULES TO IRAN.
(a) In General.--Beginning on the date that is 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, a foreign-
produced item shall be subject to the Export Administration
Regulations (pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of
2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.)) if the item--
(1) meets--
(A) the product scope requirements described in subsection
(b); and
(B) the destination scope requirements described in
subsection (c); and
(2) is exported, reexported, or in-country transferred to
Iran from abroad or involves the Government of Iran.
(b) Product Scope Requirements.--A foreign-produced item
meets the product scope requirements of this subsection if
the item--
(1) is a direct product of United States-origin technology
or software subject to the Export Administration Regulations
that is specified in a covered Export Control Classification
Number or is identified in supplement no. 7 to part 746 of
the Export Administration Regulations; or
(2) is produced by any plant or major component of a plant
that is located outside the United States, if the plant or
major component of a plant, whether made in the United States
or a foreign country, itself is a direct product of United
States-origin technology or software subject to the Export
Administration Regulations that is specified in a covered
Export Control Classification Number.
(c) Destination Scope Requirements.--A foreign-produced
item meets the destination scope requirements of this
subsection if there is knowledge that the foreign-produced
item is destined to Iran or will be incorporated into or used
in the production or development of any part, component, or
equipment subject to the Export Administration Regulations
and produced in or destined to Iran.
(d) License Requirements.--
(1) In general.--A license shall be required to export,
reexport, or in-country transfer a foreign-produced item from
abroad that meets the product scope requirements described in
subsection (b) and the destination scope requirements
described in subsection (c) and is subject to the Export
Administration Regulations pursuant to this section.
(2) Exceptions.--The license requirements of paragraph (1)
shall not apply to--
(A) food, medicine, or medical devices that are--
(i) designated as EAR99; or
(ii) not designated under or listed on the Commerce Control
List; or
(B) services, software, or hardware (other than services,
software, or hardware for end-users owned or controlled by
the Government of Iran) that are--
(i) necessarily and ordinarily incident to communications;
or
(ii) designated as--
(I) EAR99; or
(II) Export Control Classification Number 5A992.c or
5D992.c, and classified in accordance with section 740.17 of
title 15 Code of Federal Regulations; and
(iii) subject to a general license issued by the Department
of Commerce or Department of Treasury.
(e) National Interest Waiver.--The Secretary of Commerce
may waive the requirements imposed under this section if the
Secretary--
(1) determines that the waiver is in the national interests
of the United States; and
(2) submits to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate a report explaining
which requirements are being waived and the reasons for the
waiver.
(f) Sunset.--The authority provided under this section
shall terminate on the date that is 7 years after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
(g) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) the term ``Commerce Control List'' means the list
maintained pursuant to part 744 of the Export Administration
Regulations;
(2) the term ``covered Export Control Classification
Number'' means an Export Control Classification Number in
product group D or E of Category 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 of
the Commerce Control List;
(3) the terms ``Export Administration Regulations'',
``export'', ``reexport'', and ``in-country transfer'' have
the meanings given those terms in section 1742 of the Export
Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801); and
(4) the terms ``direct product'', ``technology'',
``software'', ``major component'', ``knowledge'',
``production'', ``development'', ``part'', ``component'',
``equipment'', and ``government end users'' have the meanings
given those terms in section 734.9 or part 772 of the Export
Administration Regulations, as the case may be.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Moran) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Meeks) each will
control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
General Leave
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to
include extraneous material on this measure.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Texas.
There was no objection.
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill, H.R. 6603, the No
Technology for Terror Act, and thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
McCaul) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Moskowitz) for their
support in co-leading this important bipartisan legislation.
This bill would codify recently expanded export control sanctions on
Iran, restricting their ability to manufacture missiles and drones
using U.S. material and technology.
This weekend, Iran unleashed an unprecedented direct attack on
Israel, launching over 350 missiles and drones. Thankfully, 99 percent
of these were intercepted by Israel, the United States, and other
partners. Were it not for our incredible, capable militaries, this
could have been an absolute catastrophe.
Iran has the largest missile arsenal in the Middle East, and it is
increasingly supplying malign actors around the world with missiles and
drones as a merchant of death. Iran's weapons are spreading death and
destruction around the world.
The Iran-backed Houthis use drones to fuel their attacks on global
ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Iran's proxies in Iraq and Syria
have launched over 170 attacks on U.S. troops in the last 6 months.
Iran-backed Hezbollah is aggressively firing on Israel's northern
border.
Russia uses these weapons to target civilians and civilian
infrastructure in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. In
fact, reports have found that components recovered in the Iranian-made
drones used against the people of Ukraine have included more than 50
American-made components.
Other reports have found that out of roughly 500 components
identified in a recovered Iranian drone, 82 percent were manufactured
by United States companies.
These reports are backed by a June 2023 report released by the State
Department where they acknowledged that Iran relies on foreign
procurement and that Iran even prefers American-made sourcing to
manufacture its lethal weapons. This is unacceptable.
Urgent action is needed to combat Iran's longstanding missile and
drone proliferation. That includes doing more to prevent them from
accessing and benefiting from U.S. parts and technology.
In addition to robust sanctions enforcement to cut off its key
sources of financial and military support to proxies like Hezbollah,
the Houthis, and Hamas, we must make full use of our export controls to
limit the export or re-export of U.S. goods and technology to Iran.
The No Technology for Terror Act will do just that. The limitations
set forth in my bill would make it harder for Iran to produce missiles
and drones
[[Page H2423]]
that are used against American troops and our allies and will make it
more difficult to transfer these weapons to Russia and other proxies.
American equipment, technology, and other know-how under no
circumstance should be transferred to Iran. The Iranian regime is
relentlessly evil and seeks to become the superpower in the Middle
East, which means eliminating America and its allies at all costs.
Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support this bill as it
extends the foreign-direct product rule to Iran, which restricts the
re-export or transfer of U.S.-originated items from one foreign country
to Iran.
Iran and its terrorist proxies continue to sow instability on a
global scale. We must take urgent action to restrict Iran's access to
technology that it uses to manufacture lethal missiles and drones.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure, and I
reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume,
and I rise in strong support of H.R. 6603.
This past weekend, Mr. Speaker, Iran launched more than 350 drones
and ballistic missiles toward our ally Israel, an attack largely
thwarted by the Israeli Defense Forces, alongside American, British,
French, Jordanian, and other partner militaries. Nevertheless, the
attack demonstrated Iran's airborne capacity and domestic drone and
missile capabilities. Iran has not only launched its drones at Israel,
but they have provided them to Russia for use in Putin's illegal war in
Ukraine.
The administration has implemented numerous export controls to
prevent American materials from being sent to Iran for use in their
drone program. It has been an interagency priority to help ensure our
technologies do not wind up in the hands of the enemy.
To that end, the Bureau of Industry and Security has imposed a
foreign-direct product rule, BIS' most powerful tool, to prevent the
production and proliferation of Iranian drones and missiles.
{time} 1500
The legislation before us now, the No Technology for Terror Act
introduced by my colleagues, Mr. Moran and Mr. McCaul, makes permanent
certain U.S. export control restrictions on American-made drones
technology, and would be the first instance ever of codifying a
foreign-direct product rule.
During markup of this bill, the bill was improved to include
exceptions to ensure it does not unintentionally prevent the sale of
humanitarian goods such as food and medicine. The bill also contains a
national interest waiver to provide the executive branch greater
flexibility in minimizing the export control's humanitarian impact and
maximizing our leverage against Iran. A waiver also provides Iran an
incentive to stop its malignant conduct, cease its nuclear ambitions,
and end its funding for terrorism.
While it is a big deal to codify a foreign-direct product rule,
Iran's conduct and the flexibility built into the legislation warrant
my support and the support of all the Members of this House.
So, Mr. Speaker, I thank Representatives Moran and Chairman McCaul
for their good-faith efforts to make this bill a bipartisan bill, and I
encourage my colleagues to join with me in supporting this measure.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, Iran's weaponized drone program is a threat
to our allies, Israel and Ukraine, and to United States national
security. This legislation codifies the Biden administration's export
control restrictions to prohibit United States-made technology and
software from being transferred to Iran, preventing that technology
from being used in the manufacturing of Iranian drones.
I thank Representative Moran and Chairman McCaul for introducing this
legislation and for working in the good-faith, bipartisan manner that
we often do on this committee so that we can make this legislation as
effective and flexible as it needs to be.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 6603,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, first, I thank the ranking member for his support and
his work on this bill as well.
Mr. Speaker, we must continue to work together to do all that we can
to address Iran's ongoing proliferation of lethal drones and missiles.
From Israel to Ukraine, we see the devastating impacts of failing to do
so.
In order to safeguard our national security and innocent civilians
around the world, we need to make sure that U.S.-origin goods are not
helping Iran manufacture deadly weapons. That is what this bill, the No
Technology for Terror Act, does.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill,
H.R. 6603, the No Technology for Terror Act, to stop supplying goods to
Iran that are used against us.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Moran) that the House suspend the rules and
pass the bill, H.R. 6603, as amended.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.
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