[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 66 (Tuesday, April 16, 2024)]
[House]
[Pages H2422-H2423]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      NO TECHNOLOGY FOR TERROR ACT

  Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill 
(H.R. 6603) to apply foreign-direct product rules to Iran, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 6603

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``No Technology for Terror 
     Act''.

     SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN-DIRECT PRODUCT RULES TO IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Beginning on the date that is 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, a foreign-
     produced item shall be subject to the Export Administration 
     Regulations (pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of 
     2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.)) if the item--
       (1) meets--
       (A) the product scope requirements described in subsection 
     (b); and
       (B) the destination scope requirements described in 
     subsection (c); and
       (2) is exported, reexported, or in-country transferred to 
     Iran from abroad or involves the Government of Iran.
       (b) Product Scope Requirements.--A foreign-produced item 
     meets the product scope requirements of this subsection if 
     the item--
       (1) is a direct product of United States-origin technology 
     or software subject to the Export Administration Regulations 
     that is specified in a covered Export Control Classification 
     Number or is identified in supplement no. 7 to part 746 of 
     the Export Administration Regulations; or
       (2) is produced by any plant or major component of a plant 
     that is located outside the United States, if the plant or 
     major component of a plant, whether made in the United States 
     or a foreign country, itself is a direct product of United 
     States-origin technology or software subject to the Export 
     Administration Regulations that is specified in a covered 
     Export Control Classification Number.
       (c) Destination Scope Requirements.--A foreign-produced 
     item meets the destination scope requirements of this 
     subsection if there is knowledge that the foreign-produced 
     item is destined to Iran or will be incorporated into or used 
     in the production or development of any part, component, or 
     equipment subject to the Export Administration Regulations 
     and produced in or destined to Iran.
       (d) License Requirements.--
       (1) In general.--A license shall be required to export, 
     reexport, or in-country transfer a foreign-produced item from 
     abroad that meets the product scope requirements described in 
     subsection (b) and the destination scope requirements 
     described in subsection (c) and is subject to the Export 
     Administration Regulations pursuant to this section.
       (2) Exceptions.--The license requirements of paragraph (1) 
     shall not apply to--
       (A) food, medicine, or medical devices that are--
       (i) designated as EAR99; or
       (ii) not designated under or listed on the Commerce Control 
     List; or
       (B) services, software, or hardware (other than services, 
     software, or hardware for end-users owned or controlled by 
     the Government of Iran) that are--
       (i) necessarily and ordinarily incident to communications; 
     or
       (ii) designated as--

       (I) EAR99; or
       (II) Export Control Classification Number 5A992.c or 
     5D992.c, and classified in accordance with section 740.17 of 
     title 15 Code of Federal Regulations; and

       (iii) subject to a general license issued by the Department 
     of Commerce or Department of Treasury.
       (e) National Interest Waiver.--The Secretary of Commerce 
     may waive the requirements imposed under this section if the 
     Secretary--
       (1) determines that the waiver is in the national interests 
     of the United States; and
       (2) submits to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, 
     Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate a report explaining 
     which requirements are being waived and the reasons for the 
     waiver.
       (f) Sunset.--The authority provided under this section 
     shall terminate on the date that is 7 years after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.
       (g) Definitions.--In this section--
       (1) the term ``Commerce Control List'' means the list 
     maintained pursuant to part 744 of the Export Administration 
     Regulations;
       (2) the term ``covered Export Control Classification 
     Number'' means an Export Control Classification Number in 
     product group D or E of Category 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 of 
     the Commerce Control List;
       (3) the terms ``Export Administration Regulations'', 
     ``export'', ``reexport'', and ``in-country transfer'' have 
     the meanings given those terms in section 1742 of the Export 
     Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801); and
       (4) the terms ``direct product'', ``technology'', 
     ``software'', ``major component'', ``knowledge'', 
     ``production'', ``development'', ``part'', ``component'', 
     ``equipment'', and ``government end users'' have the meanings 
     given those terms in section 734.9 or part 772 of the Export 
     Administration Regulations, as the case may be.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Moran) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Meeks) each will 
control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.


                             General Leave

  Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to 
include extraneous material on this measure.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill, H.R. 6603, the No 
Technology for Terror Act, and thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
McCaul) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Moskowitz) for their 
support in co-leading this important bipartisan legislation.
  This bill would codify recently expanded export control sanctions on 
Iran, restricting their ability to manufacture missiles and drones 
using U.S. material and technology.
  This weekend, Iran unleashed an unprecedented direct attack on 
Israel, launching over 350 missiles and drones. Thankfully, 99 percent 
of these were intercepted by Israel, the United States, and other 
partners. Were it not for our incredible, capable militaries, this 
could have been an absolute catastrophe.
  Iran has the largest missile arsenal in the Middle East, and it is 
increasingly supplying malign actors around the world with missiles and 
drones as a merchant of death. Iran's weapons are spreading death and 
destruction around the world.
  The Iran-backed Houthis use drones to fuel their attacks on global 
ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Iran's proxies in Iraq and Syria 
have launched over 170 attacks on U.S. troops in the last 6 months. 
Iran-backed Hezbollah is aggressively firing on Israel's northern 
border.
  Russia uses these weapons to target civilians and civilian 
infrastructure in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. In 
fact, reports have found that components recovered in the Iranian-made 
drones used against the people of Ukraine have included more than 50 
American-made components.
  Other reports have found that out of roughly 500 components 
identified in a recovered Iranian drone, 82 percent were manufactured 
by United States companies.
  These reports are backed by a June 2023 report released by the State 
Department where they acknowledged that Iran relies on foreign 
procurement and that Iran even prefers American-made sourcing to 
manufacture its lethal weapons. This is unacceptable.
  Urgent action is needed to combat Iran's longstanding missile and 
drone proliferation. That includes doing more to prevent them from 
accessing and benefiting from U.S. parts and technology.
  In addition to robust sanctions enforcement to cut off its key 
sources of financial and military support to proxies like Hezbollah, 
the Houthis, and Hamas, we must make full use of our export controls to 
limit the export or re-export of U.S. goods and technology to Iran.
  The No Technology for Terror Act will do just that. The limitations 
set forth in my bill would make it harder for Iran to produce missiles 
and drones

[[Page H2423]]

that are used against American troops and our allies and will make it 
more difficult to transfer these weapons to Russia and other proxies.
  American equipment, technology, and other know-how under no 
circumstance should be transferred to Iran. The Iranian regime is 
relentlessly evil and seeks to become the superpower in the Middle 
East, which means eliminating America and its allies at all costs.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support this bill as it 
extends the foreign-direct product rule to Iran, which restricts the 
re-export or transfer of U.S.-originated items from one foreign country 
to Iran.
  Iran and its terrorist proxies continue to sow instability on a 
global scale. We must take urgent action to restrict Iran's access to 
technology that it uses to manufacture lethal missiles and drones.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure, and I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, 
and I rise in strong support of H.R. 6603.
  This past weekend, Mr. Speaker, Iran launched more than 350 drones 
and ballistic missiles toward our ally Israel, an attack largely 
thwarted by the Israeli Defense Forces, alongside American, British, 
French, Jordanian, and other partner militaries. Nevertheless, the 
attack demonstrated Iran's airborne capacity and domestic drone and 
missile capabilities. Iran has not only launched its drones at Israel, 
but they have provided them to Russia for use in Putin's illegal war in 
Ukraine.
  The administration has implemented numerous export controls to 
prevent American materials from being sent to Iran for use in their 
drone program. It has been an interagency priority to help ensure our 
technologies do not wind up in the hands of the enemy.
  To that end, the Bureau of Industry and Security has imposed a 
foreign-direct product rule, BIS' most powerful tool, to prevent the 
production and proliferation of Iranian drones and missiles.

                              {time}  1500

  The legislation before us now, the No Technology for Terror Act 
introduced by my colleagues, Mr. Moran and Mr. McCaul, makes permanent 
certain U.S. export control restrictions on American-made drones 
technology, and would be the first instance ever of codifying a 
foreign-direct product rule.
  During markup of this bill, the bill was improved to include 
exceptions to ensure it does not unintentionally prevent the sale of 
humanitarian goods such as food and medicine. The bill also contains a 
national interest waiver to provide the executive branch greater 
flexibility in minimizing the export control's humanitarian impact and 
maximizing our leverage against Iran. A waiver also provides Iran an 
incentive to stop its malignant conduct, cease its nuclear ambitions, 
and end its funding for terrorism.
  While it is a big deal to codify a foreign-direct product rule, 
Iran's conduct and the flexibility built into the legislation warrant 
my support and the support of all the Members of this House.
  So, Mr. Speaker, I thank Representatives Moran and Chairman McCaul 
for their good-faith efforts to make this bill a bipartisan bill, and I 
encourage my colleagues to join with me in supporting this measure.
  In closing, Mr. Speaker, Iran's weaponized drone program is a threat 
to our allies, Israel and Ukraine, and to United States national 
security. This legislation codifies the Biden administration's export 
control restrictions to prohibit United States-made technology and 
software from being transferred to Iran, preventing that technology 
from being used in the manufacturing of Iranian drones.
  I thank Representative Moran and Chairman McCaul for introducing this 
legislation and for working in the good-faith, bipartisan manner that 
we often do on this committee so that we can make this legislation as 
effective and flexible as it needs to be.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 6603, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, first, I thank the ranking member for his support and 
his work on this bill as well.
  Mr. Speaker, we must continue to work together to do all that we can 
to address Iran's ongoing proliferation of lethal drones and missiles. 
From Israel to Ukraine, we see the devastating impacts of failing to do 
so.
  In order to safeguard our national security and innocent civilians 
around the world, we need to make sure that U.S.-origin goods are not 
helping Iran manufacture deadly weapons. That is what this bill, the No 
Technology for Terror Act, does.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill, 
H.R. 6603, the No Technology for Terror Act, to stop supplying goods to 
Iran that are used against us.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Moran) that the House suspend the rules and 
pass the bill, H.R. 6603, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

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