[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 63 (Friday, April 12, 2024)]
[House]
[Pages H2328-H2359]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            REFORMING INTELLIGENCE AND SECURING AMERICA ACT


                             General Leave

  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include 
extraneous material on H.R. 7888.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Langworthy). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1137 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 7888.
  The Chair appoints the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Meuser) to 
preside over the Committee of the Whole.

                              {time}  0940


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 7888) to reform the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978, with Mr. Meuser in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed 1 
hour equally divided among and controlled by the chair and ranking 
minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary, or their respective 
designees, and the chair and ranking minority member of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, or their respective designees.
  The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Jordan), the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Nadler), the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner), and the gentleman 
from Colorado (Mr. Crow) each will control 15 minutes.
  The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner).
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  This bill is about the extension of section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act. That is the act under which we are able 
to spy on our adversaries, those individuals who intend to do our 
Nation harm.
  There has been great debate and great discussion among the Members in 
this body. Everyone is in agreement that there have been unbelievable 
abuses by the FBI of access to foreign intelligence. The underlying 
bill, for which there is broad support, punishes the FBI. It 
criminalizes the FBI's abuses, limits and restricts the FBI's access to 
foreign intelligence, and further puts guardrails to punish the FBI.
  What is also in agreement here on this House floor is the protection 
of Americans' civil liberties. You have to have a warrant, and there is 
absolute constitutional protection of Americans' data. There is no 
place in this statute where Americans' data becomes at risk.
  Debate today, though, is not about FISA. It is not about spying on 
our adversaries. The debate today is about a warrant requirement in an 
amendment that has been offered by Representatives Biggs and Jayapal.
  This amendment, largely drafted by Senator Wyden and cosponsored by 
Senator Warren, would for the first time in history provide 
constitutional rights to our adversaries. It would provide 
constitutional rights to our enemies. No law has ever come out of this 
body that would provide constitutional rights to our adversaries.

[[Page H2329]]

  We spy on Hezbollah. We spy on Hamas. We spy on the Ayatollah. We spy 
on the Communist Party of China. This bill provides them constitutional 
protections to communicate with people in the United States to recruit 
them for the purposes of being terrorists, for being spies, and for 
doing espionage.
  The 9/11 perpetrators were in the United States, and they were 
communicating with al-Qaida. At that time, we made a grave mistake in 
that we were not spying on al-Qaida and didn't see who they were 
communicating with in the United States. We changed that and began to 
spy on al-Qaida and got to see the extent to which they were recruiting 
people in the United States to do us harm.

                              {time}  0945

  If this amendment passes, al-Qaida will have full constitutional 
protections to recruit in the United States; the Communist Party will 
have full constitutional protection to recruit in the United States; 
and there will be no increased protection of constitutional protections 
for Americans and their data. The only data that would become protected 
is data that is located in al-Qaida's inbox and the Communist Chinese's 
inbox.
  Now, how is it that they become protected? This amendment would 
require that we have to have a warrant to look into Chinese Communist 
Party data for the recruitment efforts that they are doing within the 
United States. We would have to have evidence of a crime that is 
occurring in order to get that warrant, which means we will be blind.
  If this becomes law, we will be blind, and we will be unable to look 
at what Hezbollah is doing in the United States, what Hamas is doing in 
the United States, and what the Communist Party is doing in the United 
States. There are no additional protections for Americans in this 
amendment. Americans still have full constitutional protection of their 
own data.
  Mr. Chair, let me give you an example of how this works under their 
amendment. We are spying on Hamas. Two people in the United States send 
emails to Hamas. One says happy birthday, and one says thank you for 
the bomb-making classes. When those two emails go to Hamas, right now, 
we see them.
  If you send a happy birthday to Hamas and we see it, that doesn't 
matter. It is not a threat to the United States.
  If you send an email that says thank you for the bomb-making classes, 
we intercept that email, read it, and find out who it is. Then, when we 
come here to go find that person to arrest them and to make certain 
that they don't harm Americans, we have to go to court and get a 
warrant.
  There already is a warrant requirement for the protection of 
Americans and people who are here in the United States. If you have to 
have a warrant to look at the two emails that are sent to Hamas, happy 
birthday and thank you for the bomb-making classes, then you have no 
evidence of a crime. You have no ability to read these two emails. We 
will go dark. We will go blind.
  The FBI abuses have been extraordinary in their searching of foreign 
data. We need to punish them. This underlying bill punishes the FBI. We 
should not punish Americans. We should not make our Nation less safe by 
giving constitutional protections to Hamas and by giving constitutional 
protections to the Chinese Communist Party.
  I have been talking to Members on the floor, and they say this 
amendment is about protecting Americans' data in the United States. It 
is not. Americans' data in the United States is already protected by 
the Constitution. There is nobody on this House floor who would argue 
that you don't need a warrant to look at Americans' data in the United 
States.
  I encourage everyone to pick this amendment up and read it. It 
applies to the data that we collect in spying on Hamas, Hezbollah, and 
the Chinese Communist Party. To give them a warrant and to give them 
constitutional protections means that they are open for business.
  The day after this passes and we go blind, the Chinese Communist 
Party has a complete pass to recruit in the United States students to 
spy on our industry and on our universities. Hamas and Hezbollah have a 
complete pass. We will be blind as they try to recruit people for 
terrorist attacks in the United States.
  Currently, we keep America safe by spying on our adversaries. Do not 
give our adversaries constitutional protection.
  Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chair, I rise in support of this legislation.
  First, let me emphasize again that, as the chairman said, section 702 
is our single most important intelligence authority. We use it every 
day to protect the Nation from threats ranging from China and Russia to 
terrorist plots, fentanyl traffickers, and much more. It cannot be 
allowed to expire.
  It is also true that the 702 program requires substantial reform. We 
have done this before, and we are doing it in this base bill.
  I would also make a critical point here, which is that this is 
arguably our most heavily scrutinized and overseen intelligence 
authority. It is approved--and I am going to say this twice--every 
single year and has been since 2009 by Federal judges, Federal judges 
who crawl all over this program looking for constitutional violations 
and looking for violations of law, and since 2009, they have 
recertified this program.
  It is also overseen by the Congress. The chairman and I see problems 
with the program. It is overseen inside by the Attorney General. It is 
the most scrutinized intelligence collection program that we have.
  The bill before the House today is the product of very serious 
oversight, resulting in a base text that preserves the value of 702 
while putting in place more than 50 significant reforms aimed at 
preventing its misuse, those misuses that were detailed and that the 
chairman referred to, which, by the way, are down to the tune of 90 
percent. This bill would codify those reforms and require that the FBI 
continue to follow those rules.
  This legislation contains the most significant reforms to 702 ever. 
Among many other proposals, this bill will continue the progress 
already made, which I referred to, by the Biden administration and 
others to ensure compliance.
  The bill would ban queries conducted to find evidence of a crime and 
cut by 90 percent--90 percent--the number of FBI personnel that can 
approve U.S. person queries.
  That is what we give up if we don't pass this bill.
  We will consider several amendments to the bill, most of which I will 
support. However, I am opposed to the Biggs amendment. It is an extreme 
and misguided proposal that seriously undermines our national security.

  I understand the instinct. There is no way to collect intelligence on 
foreign emails and texts without having some Americans on the other 
side of this. This bill puts in place protections to make sure that the 
abuses of the past don't continue into the future.
  I would add that I understand the concern. Federal judges crawl all 
over this program every single year, and not one Federal judge--not 
one--has found constitutional issues with U.S. person queries.
  The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the PCLOB, proposed 
a warrant that is much less extreme than the one in the Biggs 
amendment. The PCLOB--and by the way, this proposal was split on the 
PCLOB--proposed that only in the event that a U.S. person query 
produces information, only in that event, which is about 2 percent of 
all queries, would a warrant be required.
  The Biggs amendment would require a warrant for every single U.S. 
person query that the government makes inside information that it 
already has.
  The narrow exceptions included in this amendment will also not work. 
You don't need to take that from me, Mr. Chair. Talk to anybody in the 
government who uses this program.
  We don't know if a query is about something that is an exigency until 
we know what is in the information that that query would turn up.
  Enacting this amendment would make us far less safe. We will lose the 
ability to disrupt terrorist plots, identify spies, interdict fentanyl, 
and much

[[Page H2330]]

more, not because it was constitutionally required but because we 
simply chose not to look.
  As Jake Sullivan said this week: ``The extensive harms of this 
proposal simply cannot be mitigated.''
  I would point my colleagues, particularly on my side of the aisle, to 
the President's extraordinarily strong Statement of Administration 
Policy in which he reiterates the damage that will be done by this 
amendment should it pass.
  Mr. Chair, with a lot of what we do here, the consequences don't 
appear immediately. If we turn off the ability of the government to 
query U.S. person data, then the consequences will be known soon, and 
we will audit why what happened happened. The consequences will be 
known soon, and accountability will be visited.
  Once again, Mr. Chair, I urge Members to vote for the underlying bill 
and to oppose the Biggs amendment, and I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Wenstrup).
  Mr. WENSTRUP. Mr. Chair, I certainly am a supporter of this 
underlying bill. This is a bipartisan product. It came out of the 
Intelligence Committee, and it came out of the Intelligence Committee 
when we realized a few years ago all the abuses that were taking place 
within our intelligence system. We knew we had to act. There had to be 
reforms, and there had to be criminal liability when people and their 
agencies are doing the wrong things. That wasn't in place, and for the 
last 2\1/2\ years, we have worked on this.
  We have worked on it in a bipartisan way not just with the 
Intelligence Committee but with the whole body. We opened this up to 
the entire body, Republican and Democrat, regardless of what committee 
a Member is on, and we worked together to craft a very good bill.
  This isn't just an Intelligence Committee bill. This is a House of 
Representatives bill.
  That is what we have brought forward. This bill ensures Americans' 
civil liberties are secure and that we have intelligence collection 
tools that we need to safeguard our country from foreign threats.
  The Constitution asked us to provide for our defense, which is what 
we are trying to do, and to work against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic, which is what we are trying to do.
  I want to set the record straight. It is already in statute that a 
warrant is required every single time the United States Government 
wants to investigate a U.S. person under FISA under section 702, but a 
warrant is not required to do a query to find out what we might need 
for probable cause to get a warrant. Now, this amendment wants to put a 
warrant on getting a query when time is of the essence.
  Mr. Chair, if Ali Khamenei is talking about you and we pick up that, 
then I want to know why he is talking about you. I want to do a query 
into the information we already have to see if anyone else is talking 
about you.
  Moreover, I want to find out if they are planning to assassinate you, 
Mr. Chair. I shouldn't need a warrant to try to find out if a foreign 
actor is trying to assassinate a U.S. citizen. I shouldn't need a 
warrant to find out if a foreign actor or terrorist is working with 
someone in the United States to harm other Americans, but if we want to 
investigate that person, then yes, we do.
  There is a lot of misinformation out there. American civil liberties 
are not being harmed.
  Mr. Chair, I will give you a hypothetical example, too. American 
citizen Bob Smith pops up in a FISA database. Some are saying that 
government can obtain or search Bob's emails, texts, and phone calls. 
That is not true. That is not true, but you can do a query to see if 
anyone else is talking about this person, and not just anyone else 
anywhere, but a foreign actor or a foreign terrorist whose information 
you already have.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, how much time is remaining on Dr. 
Wenstrup's 3 minutes?
  The CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has 20 seconds remaining.
  Mr. WENSTRUP. Mr. Chair, I want to just say what is true and what is 
not true. A query does not investigate a U.S. citizen. In many cases, 
it is acting on behalf of a U.S. citizen to keep them safe.
  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi). The Speaker Emerita is the single longest 
serving member of the Committee on Intelligence ever. She is a member 
whose, as my Republican colleagues regularly remind me, progressive 
bona fides are unchallengeable and who came to this institution to 
fight for civil liberties.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding and for his 
great leadership of the Intelligence Committee, and I thank our members 
of the Intelligence Committee on both sides of the aisle for their 
important work to protect our national security.
  Having served there, I know it is a place where we strive for 
bipartisanship.
  Mr. Chair, as the gentleman indicated, I came to this committee in 
the early nineties, and my purpose was to protect the civil liberties 
as we protected the national security of our country. I had two 
purposes. One was to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and 
secondly, on par with that, was to make sure that we protect the civil 
liberties.
  Over the course of that time, I have voted for legislation that is 
less than what I would have liked but advanced the cause. Both the 
chair and the ranking member have put forth a very clear idea about why 
702 is important, and I associate myself with their remarks.
  I just want to say to this: I went in, in the early nineties. I 
became the ranking member, the top Democrat on the committee. For 20 
years, I was in the Gang of Eight, in terms of receiving intelligence, 
up until last year when I stopped being the Speaker of the House. For 
that whole time, it has been about what this means to the civil 
liberties of the American people.
  I had a bill that we brought when former President Bush was President 
that addressed some of our FISA concerns that didn't go all the way. 
This bill does.
  In this legislation, there are scores of provisions that could 
strengthen our case for civil liberties. Some of them are improvements 
on existing law. Some of them are new provisions in the law to protect 
the civil liberties of the American people.

                              {time}  1000

  Therefore, the Biggs amendment seriously undermines our ability to 
protect national security, and I urge our colleagues to vote against 
it.
  I don't have the time right now, but if Members want to know, I will 
tell them how we could have been saved from 9/11 if we didn't have to 
have the additional warrants.
  Mr. Chair, I urge a ``no'' vote on the Biggs amendment and a ``yes'' 
vote on the bill.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Arkansas (Mr. Crawford).
  Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chair, to my folks at home: Are you concerned about 
counterterrorism threats? I am, too.
  FISA section 702 informed the planning for the February 2022 U.S. 
military operation that resulted in the death in Syria of Hajji 
`Abdallah, the leader of ISIS. That is one example.
  Are you concerned about fentanyl? I am, too. We were able to leverage 
FISA section 702 intelligence to identify a foreign actor overseas who 
was supplying a pill press machine and other equipment to drug cartels 
in Mexico to help thwart that fentanyl threat.
  Are you concerned about cyber threats? I am, too.
  FISA section 702 played an important role in the U.S. Government's 
response to a cyberattack on Colonial Pipeline back in 2021 and other 
cyber threats that have taken place since then.
  Are you concerned about threats to our troops? I am, too.
  FISA section 702 has identified threats to U.S. troops and disrupted 
planned terrorist attacks on those troops overseas in places like the 
Middle East, a U.S. facility, specifically in the Middle East. Section 
702 was used to monitor communications as those terrorists traveled to 
execute those plans.
  We can't overstate the importance of 702, and I know you are 
concerned about the rights of the American people. I am, too.

[[Page H2331]]

  I am an American, just like you are. That is why there already is a 
warrant requirement in place. We are protecting U.S. persons. We can't 
allow 702 to expire and expect that we are going to have good results 
at the end of the day.
  Mr. Chair, I support section 702, and I urge a ``yes'' vote.
  The CHAIR. Members are reminded to direct their remarks to the Chair 
and not to a perceived viewing audience.
  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Georgia 
(Mr. Johnson).
  Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
  Mr. Chair, I rise in support of the reauthorization of section 702 of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which was first passed by 
Congress in 2008.
  FISA codified what had been a secret and legally unauthorized 
practice of warrantless collection of phone, email, and other 
communications of non-U.S. persons located outside of the United States 
in response to the deadly 9/11 attack that killed thousands of 
Americans.
  As they planned that deadly attack, al-Qaida plotters used U.S. 
communications facilities, and American foreign intelligence picked up 
the chatter. However, the stovepipe that kept this intel from domestic 
law enforcement created the situation where domestic law enforcement 
could not protect us from the threat because they did not know of the 
plot before it happened. If section 702 had been in place prior to 9/
11, the FBI could have been able to prevent the attack.
  Additionally, allowing section 702 to expire would expose Americans 
to grave danger, like the horrific massacre of Israeli Jews on October 
7; the military style assaults, for example, that happened in Russia 
recently; and other mass-casualty events, the limits of which are only 
limited by the depravity of those who would plan them.
  Mr. Chair, that is why I rise in support of this legislation.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, may I inquire as to how much time is 
remaining.
  The CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has 5 minutes remaining.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. LaHood).
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I 
thank the gentleman for his leadership on this bill.
  Mr. Chair, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 7888, the Reforming 
Intelligence and Securing America Act.
  Over the past year, I have led the Intelligence Committee task force 
on FISA reauthorization, working with my colleagues to find commonsense 
reforms to the processes under section 702 to create a balance between 
protecting national security and preserving constitutional liberties 
afforded to all U.S. persons.
  It is important to state at the outset that section 702 is used only 
to target bad actors overseas and our adversaries who are not protected 
under the Fourth Amendment. It is not used to surveil or target 
Americans.
  Throughout our process, we regularly engage with national security 
leaders, former Trump administration officials, and our colleagues both 
on the Judiciary Committee and throughout the Conference.
  This bill before us makes targeted, meaningful changes to FISA and 
section 702 without upending the statute in a way that will lead to 
unintended consequences resulting in the United States being less safe.
  Prior to coming to Congress, I served as an assistant U.S. attorney 
and chief terrorism prosecutor. I witnessed firsthand the valuable use 
of FISA. Section 702 is a critical tool that helps the IC defend the 
United States against the malign actors we worry about daily, and the 
value of what 702 has done for our country over the last 15-plus years 
is immense.
  I will mention four existential things that have happened in the last 
9 years: the taking out of bin Laden; the assassination of Soleimani, 
the Iranian leader, by President Trump; the taking out of al-Baghdadi, 
the leader of ISIS; and last year, the taking out of al-Zawahiri. The 
use of 702 in all of those cases was definitive in the taking out of 
those terrorists.
  I also say, with this bill, it institutes the largest reform of the 
FBI in a generation. It makes the necessary changes to prevent 
potential bad actors from improperly utilizing FISA from anything other 
than its intended use, protecting Americans from foreign threats.
  Particularly, in this day and age, with China, what is going on in 
the Middle East, and the nonenforcement at our southern border, it is 
now more important than ever that we have a vibrant, robust 702 in 
place.
  Lastly, I include in the Record a letter from Mike Pompeo, John 
Ratcliffe, Devin Nunes, William Barr, and Robert O'Brien, former Trump 
administration officials that worked in national security, where they 
specifically support our bill and express grave concerns about the 
warrant amendment that will be brought up today.

                                                 December 7, 2023.
     Hon. Mike Johnson,
     Speaker, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Mr. Speaker, As former officials who have either worked for 
     or with the Intelligence Community, we write today with 
     serious concerns that a critical tool to keep Americans safe 
     will cease to be available to the men and women who protect 
     the United States each day.
       At the end of this month, Section 702 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) will sunset. This is one 
     of the most critical tools the Intelligence Community has at 
     its disposal. Section 702 must be reauthorized and, as 
     evidenced by the FBI's prior flagrant abuses, FISA must also 
     be reformed. Those reforms should focus on concrete 
     improvements--including congressional oversight of and access 
     to FISA Court transcripts--rather than a warrant requirement 
     that may not achieve its intended objectives and could hinder 
     current national security efforts.
       We urge you to support the House Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence's bipartisan bill sponsored by Chairman Mike 
     Turner and Ranking Member Jim Himes.
           Respectfully,
     Mike Pompeo,
       Former Secretary of State, Former Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency.
     William Barr,
       Former Attorney General of the United States.
     John Ratcliffe,
       Former Director of National Intelligence.
     Robert O'Brien,
       Former National Security Advisor to the President.
     Devin Nunes,
       Former Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence.

  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chair, I urge a ``no'' vote on the warrant amendment 
and a ``yes'' vote on our underlying bill.
  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Colorado (Mr. Crow), who, prior to coming here, defended this Nation's 
security at risk to his own life in the uniform of the 75th Ranger 
Regiment.
  Mr. CROW. Mr. Chair, I rise in support of the Reforming Intelligence 
and Securing America Act to reauthorize section 702 of FISA.
  As one of the Nation's most essential intelligence-gathering tools, 
the importance of reauthorizing FISA cannot be overstated. Every day, 
our Nation's diplomats, intelligence professionals, defense officials, 
soldiers, marines, and airmen rely on intelligence derived from section 
702 to advance their missions and to protect our country.
  It provides vital insights into the kinds of threats that we need to 
be able to protect Americans from, including threats against our 
critical infrastructure, our computer networks, our financial system, 
and our citizens.
  This bill is the product of careful, bipartisan negotiations. These 
negotiations have insured that this bill will not only maintain the 
effectiveness of FISA, but also enhance protections for America's civil 
liberties. It makes targeted reforms to address compliance issues and 
to prevent abuses.
  The amendment proposed by my colleagues to require a warrant before 
accessing this information, which has already been lawfully collected 
and reviewed by courts and is in the possession of the U.S. Government, 
would serve as a de facto ban on ever accessing it. It creates an 
unacceptable level of risk with consequences that will be felt almost 
immediately for Americans and our national security.
  Therefore, Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to reject the Biggs 
amendment and to support the underlying bill.

[[Page H2332]]

  

  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Crenshaw).
  Mr. CRENSHAW. Mr. Chairman, I have seen a lot since we have been 
here. This is my third term. Never before have I actually been 
frightened about what could happen if FISA is not reauthorized or this 
warrant amendment is passed, which effectively kills our ability to 
detect and connect the dots between foreign terrorists and what they 
might do here domestically.
  I have never been more concerned. I spent the last 20 years of my 
life fighting for this country. I lost an eye doing it.
  Additionally, I don't think we actually disagree very much on 
principle. There is always a balance between civil liberties, privacy, 
and security. I don't think my colleagues and I are very far apart on 
that. We are very far apart on the facts at hand. So let's talk about 
some myths and some facts.
  Myth: FISA is used to spy on Americans.
  The myth goes like this: If you query an American's name, you can see 
their in-box. That is not true.
  It is used to spy on foreign intelligence targets, foreign 
terrorists, and you need a warrant to do so. If they speak to an 
American, you will get that part of the conversation. That is all you 
get.
  There is another myth. This bill doesn't go far enough. It doesn't do 
any reforms. That is not true.
  The reforms in here would stop in their tracks what happened to 
President Trump with Crossfire Hurricane. It is almost entirely 
intended to stop what happened to President Trump. Not only that, it 
would codify 56 warrant reforms. It would put in processes before 
queries are even made. It would put in criminal penalties for those who 
do not abide by those processes.
  The FBI hates these reforms, by the way.
  Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this bill and not to 
support the amendment to require a warrant for queries.
  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining.
  The CHAIR. The gentleman has 5\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Pennsylvania (Ms. Houlahan).
  Ms. HOULAHAN. Mr. Chair, I rise today in strong support of the 
Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, which would 
reauthorize FISA 702.
  We live in a dangerous world, and section 702 is crucial to keeping 
Americans safe. This is a tool that our intelligence agencies rely upon 
all day to counter all kinds of threats to our homeland from U.S. 
nonpersons. Again, U.S. nonpersons.
  Whether uncovering Chinese spies or foiling terrorist plots or 
intercepting cyberattacks, this authority is essential to our national 
security. This tool can even allow our intelligence community to 
counter drug cartels as they attempt to bring deadly fentanyl to our 
shores, but it would be enhanced by an amendment that Mr. Crenshaw and 
I are proposing, the Enhancing Intelligence Collection on Foreign Drug 
Traffickers Act.
  Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment when we 
vote later this morning.
  However, not all of the amendments today would strengthen this bill. 
In fact, I am strongly opposed to the amendment offered by Mr. Biggs, 
and I am obligated to point out the dangers of passing this extreme 
amendment.
  Intelligence professionals who rely on this tool, 702, keep us safe 
and have been crystal clear. This amendment would make it nearly 
impossible to access information essential to protect our homeland 
security.
  Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I urge a ``yes'' 
vote on the overall bill to reauthorize FISA, and a ``no'' vote on the 
Biggs amendment.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Rutherford), who opposes giving constitutional rights to our 
foreign adversaries.
  Mr. RUTHERFORD. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman from Ohio for 
yielding.
  Mr. Chair, I rise today in strong support of this bill and equally 
strong opposition to the amendment.
  Simply put, this amendment ties the hands of our intelligence 
community, making all of us less safe. This amendment requires the IC 
to get a probable cause warrant to search a set of data that has 
legally been collected. Our intelligence community must have access to 
legally collected, pertinent information, and we should not be adding 
roadblocks.

  As a former law enforcement officer, I strongly believe in the civil 
liberties of all Americans. I spent my life protecting them. However, 
this amendment does not provide any more protection to Americans. All 
this amendment does is gut 702, giving to terrorists, adversaries, and 
bad actors a major win.
  Restricting access to already legally collected data makes us all 
less safe, and 702 is a vital piece of our security and must be 
preserved.
  Mr. Chair, I urge a ``no'' vote on the amendment.
  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Goldman).
  Mr. GOLDMAN of New York. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
  Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of this bill that includes an 
absolutely essential national security program. However, I will support 
this bill only if the amendment that would impose a warrant requirement 
on queries regarding American citizens fails.
  First, a warrant is simply not needed because the query in question 
is not a new search. It simply identifies any contacts or 
communications with Americans within the universe of information that 
was already lawfully obtained from the original search, and that 
original search can only be of foreign nationals on foreign soil.
  I spent 10 years as a Federal prosecutor and obtained hundreds of 
search warrants. Based on that experience, I can say with confidence 
that requiring a warrant would render this program unusable and 
entirely worthless.
  Based on the information available to law enforcement, it would be 
impossible to get probable cause to obtain a search warrant from a 
judge in a timely manner. Additionally, even if it were possible, the 
time required to obtain a search warrant from a judge would frequently 
fail to meet the urgency posed by a terrorist or other national 
security threat.

                              {time}  1015

  A warrant requirement is unnecessary and unworkable and I, therefore, 
urge my colleagues to oppose the Biggs amendment.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner) has 
expired.
  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman from Ohio for his 
terrific work in the face of very real challenges and his commitment to 
bipartisanship.
  This is a critical and bipartisan effort, and it is one that he and I 
and many others have spent thousands of hours on. As we close out 
debate, two things are very clear: Number one, this authority must be 
reauthorized.
  I have heard too many Members saying that I will vote to reauthorize 
it so long as I get this amendment passed. If you are serious about 
keeping the American people safe, if you are serious about what you 
said, which is that this must be reauthorized, vote for final passage. 
This is our single most important tool to keep Americans safe.
  Secondly, the Biggs amendment is an extreme amendment, and I 
understand the instinct.
  As I mentioned before, the PCLOB, the President's Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board, proposed something that would require, in very limited 
circumstances, a judicial amendment. This amendment is far more extreme 
than that one, and it is not driven by constitutional concerns. Not a 
single Federal court after years and years of scrutiny has identified a 
Fourth Amendment issue.
  This is a policy choice, and I would say to those friends of mine on 
my side of the aisle, maybe you have spent more time on this collection 
authority than I have. I have probably spent 2,000 or 3,000 hours, so 
maybe you have spent more. I am willing to concede that. Maybe you know 
better than I do, but I would ask you to listen to the people who use 
this every single day at the Department of Justice, at our intelligence 
community. I would ask you to read the last paragraph of the 
administration's statement of administration

[[Page H2333]]

policy, which concludes with the line: ``Our intelligence, defense, and 
public safety communities are united: The extensive harms of this 
proposal simply cannot be mitigated.''
  We are Article I. You have probably done a lot of work. Maybe you 
know better on the Biggs amendment. We will find out. Pass the Biggs 
amendment. Do what the SAP says would badly damage our safety. We will 
find out.
  Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Jordan) and the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Nadler) each will control 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chair, in 2021, 2022, the FBI did over 3 million U.S. person 
queries of this giant 702 database--of this giant haystack of 
information, 3 million queries of United States persons. Make no 
mistake, query is a fancy name for search. Three million Americans' 
data was searched in this database of information, and guess what? The 
FBI wasn't even following their own rules when they conducted those 
searches. That is why we need a warrant.
  This is not   Jim Jordan talking about it. This is not Ranking Member 
Nadler talking about it, but The Washington Post reported last May that 
278,000 times the FBI found, the Justice Department found, that they 
didn't even follow their own darn rules when they searched this giant 
haystack, this giant database of information on Americans.
  What we are saying is, let's do something that the Constitution has 
had in place for a couple hundred years that has served our Nation well 
and protected American citizens' liberties. Let's make the executive 
branch go to a separate and equal branch of government, the judicial 
branch, and get a probable cause warrant to do the search.
  After all, it has done pretty well for this great country, greatest 
country ever, for a long, long time. Why wouldn't we have that here?
  By the way, in a bipartisan fashion coming out of our committee, 35-2 
vote, we said we will even put exceptions in there. If it is an 
emergency situation, the FBI doesn't have to get a warrant. They can do 
the search. If it is an emergency situation, they can do it. We have 
put exceptions in there.
  Here is the fundamental question that I raised the other day: Of the 
over 3 million searches in a 2-year time span, how many of those aren't 
covered by the exceptions we have in our warrant amendment? What is the 
number? Guess what? We can't get an answer. They won't tell us, which 
should be concerning in and of itself, but if it is a big number, we 
should be particularly frightened.
  If they don't follow the exceptions and they are searching Americans, 
searching your name, your phone number, your email address in this 
giant database, that should scare us. And if it is a small number, then 
what is the big deal? We can't get an answer to that question.
  The underlying bill has got some changes and reforms that are 
positive, that are good, but short of having this warrant amendment 
added to the legislation, we shouldn't pass it.
  This amendment is critical, particularly when you think about the 
278,000 times they abused the system, didn't follow their own rules. 
Now we say, oh, we have got some new rules, they will follow them now. 
No. No.
  The real check we have in our system is a separate and equal branch 
of government signing off on it. That is how we do things in America. 
And never forget, this is the FBI who has had some other abuses in 
different areas.
  This is why we think this warrant requirement is so darn important, 
and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chair, I rise in strong support of meaningful reform to FISA 
section 702 and in strong opposition to a mere fig leaf or, even worse, 
an expansion of 702. Unfortunately, we will not know which of these 
paths we are taking until the conclusion of this debate.

  What I know at this moment is that the base text before us right now 
is completely inadequate. Although it has some perfectly fine 
provisions, it does not represent real reform. Some of the proposed 
amendments that will be coming up today would take us in the wrong 
direction, and changing the sunset from 5 years to 2 years does 
absolutely nothing to improve the bill.
  Ultimately, this legislation should only move forward if it contains 
an amendment to mandate that the intelligence community obtain a 
probable cause warrant before they search the 702 database for 
Americans' private communications.
  Some of my colleagues appear confused about how 702 collection works 
and what we mean when supporters of a warrant requirement refer to 
``backdoor searches'' for U.S. person information. Let's be clear about 
what we are talking about.
  FISA section 702 permits the intelligence community to sweep up the 
communication of foreign targets located overseas. When these 
communications are obtained, they go into what is known as a 702 
database where all the 702 data is housed.
  If the U.S. Government wants to target a U.S. person for foreign 
surveillance, U.S. person meaning an American or legal permanent 
resident, they already can. They do this by getting a warrant under 
title I of FISA, a separate and distinct part of FISA from section 702. 
The government cannot target Americans under 702 because 702 does not 
protect the constitutional rights of the targets of the surveillance. 
Foreigners not located on U.S. soil do not have constitutional rights, 
so this is not a problem.
  What is a problem, however, is that massive amounts of Americans' 
communications are still swept up in 702 searches. If a U.S. person 
communicates with a foreign target, that American's communications with 
the target end up in the 702 database, too. While we do not know 
precise numbers, we know that a vast amount of Americans' 
communications is swept up every year.
  The intelligence community is not supposed to search the 702 database 
for U.S. person identifiers, like our names, phone numbers, and 
addresses without cause. Searching for Americans' private 
communications in the 702 database, communications the government 
otherwise would not have access to without a warrant, is the 
constitutional equivalent of conducting a warrantless search.
  We know that the government breaks this law all the time--278,000 
times, in fact, at last count in 2021 alone. Officials are supposed to 
find it reasonably likely that a query will turn up evidence of a crime 
or foreign intelligence information, but that did not stop them from 
searching for protesters, politicians, and political donors, to name a 
few, without proper predicate.
  Because of these repeated violations, Chairman Jordan and I agree 
that the only way to preserve Americans' privacy and constitutional 
rights is to require the intelligence community to obtain a probable 
cause warrant when they want to search the communications of Americans 
housed in the 702 database. This is a basic tenet of the Fourth 
Amendment.
  Now, Chairman Turner stated incorrectly that the proposed warrant 
requirement gives constitutional rights to suspected terrorists abroad. 
Nonsense. The warrant requirement does not change any aspect of 
surveillance of valid targets under section 702, nor should it. The 
problem is that when we surveil the internet, we sweep up massive 
amounts of U.S. person information, and the warrant requirement we 
propose would apply the Fourth Amendment to that information--nothing 
more, and our Constitution demands nothing less.
  We have repeatedly heard some of our colleagues tell us that the sky 
is falling; that a probable cause requirement would end U.S. person 
searches of the 702 database, but there are no facts to back up these 
claims.
  We will be considering an amendment today to add a warrant 
requirement for U.S. person searches of the 702 database. This 
essential amendment makes exceptions for victim consent, cybersecurity 
cases, and exigencies, that is, emergencies. Thus, the vast majority of 
these searches can continue without a warrant, but for the small 
percentage of searches of Americans' communications that would be 
affected, the government should have probable cause to search their 
communications.

[[Page H2334]]

  It is simply unfair to ask the intelligence community to both 
zealously protect our security while also protecting the constitutional 
rights of those surveilled. America's system of checks and balances 
exist precisely for cases such as this, where two considerations must 
coexist at odds with one another.
  For too long, FISA section 702 has enabled the surveillance of 
Americans without adequate safeguards to protect our civil liberties. 
Americans need Congress to enact these guardrails, and with section 702 
expiring soon, we have a rare opportunity to protect Americans' privacy 
while giving enforcement the tools they need to keep us safe.

  Mr. Chair, I encourage my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this 
legislation unless a probable cause warrant is adopted, and I reserve 
the balance of my time.
  Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. McClintock), my friend and a member of the Judiciary 
Committee.
  Mr. McCLINTOCK. Mr. Chair, I don't discount the mounting dangers we 
face from enemies abroad, but we also cannot discount the dangers we 
face at home from the very powers that this bill would continue.
  As has been pointed out, the FBI abused these powers 278,000 times in 
a single year and turned them against American citizens by phishing for 
January 6th and Black Lives Matter rioters, probing political donors, 
and even piercing congressional offices.
  John Adams believed that the indiscriminate searches by British 
officials became the first spark of the American Revolution. Having 
lived under such a tyranny, the Founders protected us with the Fourth 
Amendment. Before authorities can search through our records, they have 
to get a warrant from an independent judge by showing probable cause to 
suspect that we have committed a crime.
  Now, there are many excellent reforms in this bill, and I applaud 
them, but they largely depend on these agencies policing themselves, 
and experience warns us that is just not enough. Without a warrant 
requirement, I fear these powers will, once again, be turned against 
our fundamental liberties and these days that scares me as much as a 
terrorist attack.

                              {time}  1030

  Just imagine how much safer we would all be if we stationed a soldier 
in every house, but we have the Third Amendment to protect us against 
that tyranny, just as we have a Fourth Amendment to protect us against 
the tyranny of indiscriminate searches.
  Benjamin Franklin's warning echoes from his age to ours today: 
``Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little 
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.'' Let that not be 
history's judgment of us.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. Jayapal).
  Ms. JAYAPAL. Mr. Chair, we have a critical opportunity today to stand 
up for the civil liberties that are enshrined in our Constitution while 
also safeguarding our national security.
  Every single day, the FBI conducts an average of 500 warrantless 
searches of Americans' private communications, resulting in over 
278,000 searches in 1 year alone. The FBI has invaded the privacy of 
Members of Congress, a State court judge who reported civil rights 
violations by a local police chief, Black Lives Matter protesters, and 
more.
  We cannot pass this bill without additional protections, like my 
amendment with Representatives Biggs, Nadler, Jordan, Lofgren, and 
Davidson, to close the backdoor search loophole.
  Unfortunately, there are some members of the intelligence community 
and some Members of this body who are circulating information that 
simply is not correct, and I need to correct the record right here. 
Some Members have implied that the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board does not support the amendment.
  To counter that, let me share some quotes from Sharon Bradford 
Franklin in her personal capacity as Chair of the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board, the independent government agency tasked 
with ensuring the executive branch conducts national security work in a 
way that protects our civil liberties and privacy. She said:

       It is critical that in reauthorizing section 702, Congress 
     includes a warrant requirement for U.S. person queries.
       Requiring a warrant for U.S. person queries would neither 
     end U.S. person queries nor undermine the overall value of 
     section 702.
       Outside of the category of ``victim queries,'' the FBI has 
     not been able to identify any cases in which a section 702 
     U.S. person query provided unique value in advancing a 
     criminal investigation. In addition, the government has been 
     unable to identify a single criminal prosecution that relied 
     on evidence identified through a U.S. person query.
       The warrant requirement contained in the warrant amendment 
     includes important exceptions that would address the 
     government's concerns about slowing down the process for U.S. 
     person queries. Exceptions are provided for exigent 
     circumstances, consent, cybersecurity, and metadata-only 
     queries.

  Mr. Chair, let me be clear that the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board, in its oversight capacity, has the same access to all 
the classified intelligence that the agencies cite when they try to 
scare us into reauthorizing FISA with minimal changes.
  We have a bipartisan amendment that would fix this problem. We have a 
responsibility to stand up for civil liberties of our constituents. We 
cannot pass this bill without requiring intelligence agencies to ensure 
that Americans' privacy rights are upheld at every turn.
  Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Before yielding to my good friend, I just want to underscore what the 
gentlewoman from Washington just described. The Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board, created by the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 
says that our amendment is consistent with what should happen. Our 
amendment is consistent with the majority recommendation of that board.
  This was a board specifically created to protect Americans' 
liberties, looking at how the intelligence community operates by the 9/
11 Commission Act of 2007. The majority of that board said this 
amendment is what needs to happen.
  Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
Van Drew), a member of our committee.
  Mr. VAN DREW. Mr. Chair, you just heard the words of Benjamin 
Franklin from my good friend   Tom McClintock, that those who would 
give up freedom for safety deserve neither. I hope that we aren't 
marked in history as the generation of Congress that was willing to 
give up American liberty and freedom. It is what we stood for. It is 
what we have worked for. It is what the men and women of this country 
have died for. We owe it to them. It is our most important right as 
Americans. It is what the United States of America represents.
  We were told all this before. We were told in the last renewal of 
section 702 that everything was going to be okay, no worries, all the 
security was there, nothing to be concerned about, don't look here.
  Then we saw what happened. We saw that political campaigns and donors 
were gone after. We saw that Members of Congress were investigated. We 
saw that journalists were investigated. We saw that individuals who 
were Libertarians or liberals or conservatives were investigated. We 
saw FBI agents' own coworkers and even their ex-girlfriends and others 
were investigated. The average man and woman in America were 
investigated.
  It was wrong. It occurred not dozens, not hundreds, not thousands, 
but, over that time period, millions of times, millions of illegal 
queries.
  I cannot support, and I will not support, this legislation unless 
there is a major change in the form of an amendment that would require 
what we know needs to be done: a search warrant. It is a basic American 
right.
  Don't let them scare you. It doesn't mean that we are not going to go 
after terrorists. It doesn't mean that we won't protect the United 
States of America.
  While I finally wrap up here, if this bill is so good the way it is 
written, why do we exempt Members of Congress? Do you know why? It is 
because they are scared that they may still at the end of the day go 
after us.

  It is wrong. Rules for thee, not for me. We should not stand for it.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), the ranking member of the 
Crime and

[[Page H2335]]

Federal Government Surveillance Subcommittee.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, I thank the distinguished ranking member 
of the Judiciary Committee and the chairman of the Judiciary Committee.
  Even in this time of 2024, we need this legislation to protect now 
one of the most revered civil rights leaders, Dr. Martin Luther King. 
Yes, we need legislation that would, in fact, protect someone who 
simply wanted to provide justice to this Nation. He was the subject of 
COINTELPRO, a distorted investigation of his family, his belongings, 
his extended family members, and his wife, who I think at the time was 
expecting.
  This legislation is important to save lives. It is important 
legislation to ensure that our intelligence community, our law 
enforcement community, can do their jobs, but it is not legislation 
that should be utilized to abuse the American people.
  I rise today to speak of the concerns on H.R. 7888. It is a 
bipartisan bill to reauthorize an essential intelligence authority, 
section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, and 
other FISA provisions before they would expire on April 19. In doing 
so, we find ourselves being subject to the eye of the knife, if you 
will, in penetrating the personal matters of individuals that have no 
desire to do harm to this country.
  As we know all too well, expiration of 702 authorities would deprive 
our Federal Government of the necessary insight into precisely the 
threats Americans expect their government to identify and counter. We 
understand that, as highlighted and emphasized through Federal 
administration, if we lose 702, we lose vital protections to the United 
States and its allies from hostile foreign adversaries, including 
terrorists, proliferators, and spies, and to inform cybersecurity 
efforts.
  We are also acutely aware that 702 is an extremely controversial, 
warrantless surveillance authority that must not be reauthorized 
without substantial reform to rein in warrantless surveillance of 
Americans. We simply cannot do that. Indeed, warrantless surveillance 
intended for non-American targets located abroad inevitably has 
resulted in the collection and capture of Americans' communications 
and, yes, the results of capturing information that safeguards the 
American people and provides us with a safety net that we can fight for 
justice, fight for civil rights, and yet be protected.
  It is no secret that intelligence agencies have turned section 702 
into a domestic spying tool used to perform hundreds of thousands of 
warrantless backdoor searches for Americans' private phone calls, 
emails, and text messages.
  By the way, Mr. Chair, we have a whole new world of technology where 
you can probe every aspect of our lives. These searches have included 
shocking abuses, including against civil rights leaders, protesters, 
Members of Congress, 19,000 donors to congressional campaigns, 
political parties.
  Mr. Chair, I rise today to speak on H .R. 7888--Reforming 
Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA), a bipartisan bill to 
reauthorize an essential intelligence authority, Section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (``FISA''), and other FISA 
provisions before they would expire on April 19, 2024.
  As we know all too well, expiration of Section 702 authorities would 
deprive our federal government of the necessary insight into precisely 
the threats Americans expect their government to identify and counter.
  As highlighted and emphasized through federal administration, if we 
lost 702, we would lose vital protections to the United States and its 
allies from hostile foreign adversaries, including terrorists, 
proliferators, and spies, and to inform cybersecurity efforts.
  We also are acutely aware, that Section 702 is an extremely 
controversial warrantless surveillance authority that must not be 
reauthorized without substantial reform to rein in warrantless 
surveillance of Americans.
  Indeed, warrantless surveillance intended for non-American targets 
located abroad ``inevitably'' has resulted in the collection and 
capture of Americans' communications, too.
  And it is no secret that intelligence agencies have turned Section 
702 into a domestic spying tool, using it to perform hundreds of 
thousands of warrantless ``backdoor'' searches for Americans' private 
phone calls, e-mails, and text messages every year.
  Yes, these searches have included shocking abuses, including baseless 
searches for the communications of Black Lives Matter protesters, 
members of Congress, 19,000 donors to a congressional campaign, a local 
political party, and tens of thousands of people involved in ``civil 
unrest.''
  To protect the American people, we need to maintain the vital 
collection authority as intended to protect our nation and national 
security, while at the same time strengthening its protective 
guardrails with the most robust set of reforms ever included in 
legislation to reauthorize Section 702.
  Importantly, H.R. 7888, as amended here today provides several 
critically needed reforms--including a fix to the backdoor search 
loophole and a prohibition on the ``abouts'' collection provision, and 
ultimately seeks to accomplish the necessary balancing we seek for 
national security protections and the protection of American's privacy 
rights.
  To protect the American people, we need to maintain the vital 
collection authority as intended to protect our Nation and national 
security. We must do that while at the same time strengthening its 
protective guardrails with the most robust set, if you will, of 
protection that we possibly can.
  That is why I have joined with several Members, including Mr. Cline, 
to offer the ``abouts'' amendment. We will offer that as one of the 
Judiciary three. This amendment does something Congress should have 
done 7 years ago, prohibit the government from resuming ``abouts'' 
collection, a form of section 702 that poses unique risks to Americans. 
``Abouts'' collection is a collection of communications that are 
neither to nor from an approved target of surveillance--can you 
imagine?--under section 702 of FISA but merely contain information 
related to the target.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the 
gentlewoman from Texas.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, it is unbelievable that we would go after 
innocent Americans and Members of Congress in the random searching and 
fishing of information that may not be relevant. In the past, 
``abouts'' collection focused on collecting communications that include 
a target's email address, phone number, or Twitter handle or something 
like that, but in theory, ``abouts'' collection could be used to 
collect emails that merely mention a person who is a target of section 
702 surveillance.
  Mr. Chair, I rise today to indicate that we cannot pass this 
legislation without these vital amendments and that we cannot pass this 
legislation without the American people believing that when they pledge 
allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, they are 
pledging allegiance to civil liberties, freedom, and justice and 
equality for all. I rise to support these amendments and as well a free 
nation with democracy and liberty for all.
  Mr. Chair, I include in the Record a list of groups who support this 
amendment.


                                Congress of the United States,

                                   Washington, DC, April 12, 2024.
       Dear Colleague: Please join us in supporting our amendment 
     to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America 
     Act. Rules Amendment #5 would end what is known as ``abouts'' 
     collection, which involves the capturing of massive amounts 
     of communications by government agencies such as the National 
     Security Agency (NSA) in which the selector, for example, an 
     email address, of a target appears somewhere in 
     communications, even if that target is not a party to the 
     communications. It has long been controversial.
       The FISA Court previously discovered that the government 
     had misrepresented its activities and held that handling this 
     type of data was of significant concern and a violation of 
     the Fourth Amendment. Although the NSA abandoned the practice 
     of ``abouts'' collection in 2017, Congress in 2018 amended 
     FISA to prohibit this type of collection unless the AG and 
     DNI notify the House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary 
     Committees of its plans to resume such collection. But that 
     only means that if the NSA notifies Congress, they can resume 
     ``abouts'' collection at any time. Our amendment would 
     proactively end the practice for good.
       The following groups support this important amendment:
       FreedomWorks--Key Vote; Due Process Institute; Americans 
     for Prosperity; Project for Privacy and Surveillance 
     Accountability; Reform Government Surveillance; Center for 
     Democracy and Technology; American Civil Liberties Union; 
     Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC); Restore the 
     Fourth; Defending Rights & Dissent; Brennan Center for 
     Justice; Wikimedia Foundation.
       Demand Progress; Electronic Frontier Foundation; Project on 
     Government Oversight; United We Dream; Asian Americans

[[Page H2336]]

     Advancing Justice; Muslim Advocates; Free Press Action; 
     National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Freedom of 
     the Press Foundation; New America's Open Technology 
     Institute; Fight for the Future; Stop AAPI Hate.
       We urge you to vote in favor of Amendment #5.
           Sincerely,
                                                        Ben Cline,
                                               Member of Congress.
                                               Sheila Jackson Lee,
                                               Member of Congress.

  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair,
  I rise today in support of the Cline (VA)/Jackson Lee (TX) Amendment 
[#3] to H.R. 7888--Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act 
(RISAA).
  This amendment does something Congress should have done seven years 
ago: prohibit the government from resuming ``abouts'' collection, a 
form of Section 702 surveillance that poses unique risks to Americans.
  ``Abouts'' collection is the collection of communications that are 
neither To nor From an approved target of surveillance under Section 
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), but merely 
contain information relating to that target.
  In the past, ``abouts'' collection focused on collecting 
communications that include a target's email address, or phone address, 
or Twitter handle, or something like that. But in theory, ``abouts'' 
collection could be used to collect emails that merely mention a person 
who is a target of Section 702 surveillance.
  Nothing in the text or legislative history of Section 702 indicates 
that this type of surveillance is authorized.
  Under Section 702, the surveillance must target a non-U.S. person 
outside the United States. The term ``target'' has a well-understood 
meaning. When a person is a target, it means the government can collect 
that person's information or other data, not the communications or data 
of other individuals.
  As we all know, ``abouts'' collection under Section 702 has a sordid 
history.
  The National Security Agency (NSA) used ``abouts'' collection when it 
was conducting upstream surveillance, in other words, when it was 
intercepting communications directly as they transited over the 
Internet backbone, rather than collecting stored communications from 
service providers.
  Not surprisingly, this practice resulted in the collection of tens of 
thousands of purely domestic communications--communications between and 
among Americans inside the United States.
  Moreover, often these Americans were not even discussing the target. 
Instead, their communications were lumped in with other communications, 
transiting over the Internet backbone as a packet. The NSA was 
collecting the entire packet of communications, simply because 
somewhere in that packet was a reference to information about a target.
  This was a problem from the moment Section 702 went into effect in 
2008. And yet for years, the government did not disclose this problem 
to the FISA Court.
  To the contrary, the government affirmatively misrepresented how the 
program was working. It was not until 2011 that the court learned the 
government was sweeping in tens of thousands of purely domestic 
communications.
  The court was livid. It noted that the belated disclosure, and I 
quote, ``marks the third instance in less than three years in which the 
government has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding the 
scope of a major collection program.''
  At the time, the court chose not to prohibit the use of ``abouts'' 
collection. But it held that special minimization rules were required 
for upstream communications, and that without those rules, the program 
would violate both Section 702 and the Fourth Amendment. One of those 
rules was a prohibition on U.S. person queries of communications 
obtained through upstream surveillance.
  Five years later, the NSA discovered that its agents had been 
routinely violating this prohibition. But rather than immediately 
report these violations to the FISA Court, the NSA waited for several 
months. When it finally admitted the violations, the FISA Court 
chastised the NSA for its ``institutional lack of candor,'' and refused 
to approve the continuation of Section 702 surveillance until the NSA 
cleaned up its act.
  The NSA proved incapable of bringing its agents into compliance. The 
agents continued to routinely search though the upstream data in an 
effort to find and review Americans' communications, in violation of 
Section 702, the Fourth Amendment, and the FISA Court's orders. Well 
aware that the court would not continue to approve Section 702 
surveillance under these conditions, the NSA, in 2017, made the only 
decision it could: it terminated ``abouts'' collection.
  Well, it has now been seven years since the NSA stopped ``abouts'' 
collection, and the government has not claimed that ending this 
practice has resulted in a loss of critical intelligence or had any 
other kind of negative impact on national security. No official has 
pointed to a single bad result that could have been averted through the 
use of ``abouts'' collection.
  Collecting communications that are neither to nor from an approved 
target of surveillance is contrary to the text and intent of Section 
702.
  It inevitably results in the collection of wholly domestic 
communications, which Section 702 expressly prohibits.
  Over the course of a decade, the NSA proved that it was incapable of 
operating ``abouts'' surveillance responsibly and in accordance with 
the law--and the past seven years shown that ``abouts'' collection is 
not necessary for national security.
  It is time for Congress to shut the door on ``abouts'' collection.
  In the future, if the government can show that it needs ``abouts'' 
collection for national security purposes and that it can operate the 
program without violating the law and the Fourth Amendment, it can come 
to Congress and ask for authorization. But the burden should be on the 
government to show the need and the ability to lawfully conduct the 
program.
  For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the 
Cline/Jackson Lee Amendment [#3].
  Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from the 
great State of Texas (Mr. Self), my friend and colleague.
  Mr. SELF. Mr. Chair, it appears that the House of Representatives is 
experiencing a constitutional crisis of conscience. We are actually 
debating if a warrant should be required for government intelligence 
agencies to spy on Americans. Frankly, I am stunned this is even called 
into question, especially amongst my Republican colleagues.
  The Constitution is absolutely clear. We, as Americans, have the 
right under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and 
seizures, a right that the FBI has violated in over 278,000 improper 
searches of Americans and 3.4 million warrantless queries of Americans' 
private communications.
  These facts are not up for debate. We know this. They have been 
caught. If we do not pass this warrant requirement, especially in light 
of these facts, the continued victimization of Americans by the FBI 
through FISA section 702 will be legitimized.
  As an Army officer, as a county judge, and now as a Member of 
Congress, for 40 years I have been under oath to defend the 
Constitution against all enemies. I will do so today. On behalf of over 
800,000 of my constituents in Texas District Three: Get a warrant.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Fitzgerald), a Judiciary Committee member and friend.
  Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chair, the debate today is really focused on 
whether or not the FBI should be required to obtain a warrant to access 
U.S. person data. As the quote we are all familiar with says, insanity 
is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different 
results.
  I remind my colleagues of the debate on the previous FISA 
reauthorization bill in the 115th Congress. Many of my current and 
former colleagues stood behind this very podium and swore up and down 
that the FISA Amendments Act of 2017 would provide necessary 
protections for U.S. person information while keeping our country safe.

                              {time}  1045

  Yet, since the bill became law, there were nearly 3 million U.S. 
person queries just in 2021 and hundreds of incomplete FISA 
applications and the use of section 702 to query data on Members

[[Page H2337]]

of Congress, protestors, and even FBI janitors.
  It appears to me that the factor that continues to fall by the 
wayside in all of the debates that are happening is that human nature 
plays a part.
  Mr. Chair, that is the dilemma that we find ourselves in. We didn't 
pick this. This is where we ended up.
  Do we allow human nature to take its course and permit the FBI to 
continue to abuse U.S. person data, which the Department of Justice IG 
Special Counsel Durham, the FISA court, and numerous independent review 
bodies have found to be negligent, inappropriate, and a threat to 
American privacy, or do we rein in the FBI and fight for our Fourth 
Amendment rights?
  I choose to side with the latter and support the amendments that 
limit rather than expand the FBI's ability to query U.S. person data.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chair, the suggestion has been made that the warrant requirement 
is extreme. Let's be clear: There is nothing extreme about this idea.
  Over a decade ago, a group of intelligence experts convened by 
President Obama unanimously recommended requiring a warrant for U.S. 
person queries of section 702 data. That group included Michael Morell, 
former Acting Director of the CIA and Richard Clarke, former Chief 
Counterterrorism Adviser to President George W. Bush.
  These top national security officials understood that we can protect 
national security while respecting the Fourth Amendment rights of 
Americans.
  The House of Representatives has twice passed amendments with a 
warrant requirement for backdoor searches by large bipartisan 
majorities. Some of my colleagues who spoke against this amendment 
today, including former Speaker Pelosi, have voted more than once for 
this reform.
  Over 75 percent of Americans support this reform. Calling something 
extreme doesn't make it extreme, and this is an idea that has been in 
the mainstream for over a decade.
  Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I am prepared to close, and I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Chairman Jordan and I agree on very little, but we are united in our 
belief that adding a warrant requirement to section 702 is absolutely 
necessary before we consider supporting reauthorization of these 
authorities.
  I will reserve judgment on final passage of this bill until we see 
what amendments pass, but I urge Members to join us in supporting real 
reform. Real reform means, at the minimum, the warrant requirement to 
give effect to Americans' constitutional rights.
  Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  I think the ranking member is right. The vote was 35-2 on a major 
piece of legislation. That doesn't happen a whole lot in our committee.
  I thank our committee and I thank the Members on the Republican side 
who worked so hard over the last year putting this legislation 
together. We had three individuals in particular, Ms. Lee, Mr. Biggs, 
and Mr. McClintock, who served on a task force focused on this getting 
in right. I think they have a good product if, as the ranking member 
just said, the warrant amendment is actually adopted into the base 
text.
  I also thank the Democrats who worked so hard, and their staff 
working with our good staff, on putting this together: Ranking Member 
Nadler, Ms. Jayapal, and several others working together to defend a 
fundamental principle.
  The Judiciary Committee is supposed to be that--we are all supposed 
to do this, but where it is really focused is the Judiciary Committee 
is supposed to be that committee that is determined to make sure 
Americans' liberties are protected. I think the staff and the Members 
have worked hard to put together a product that will do that if, in 
fact, this amendment gets added here in a few minutes.
  When the folks who started this country came together, they had it 
right when they created separate and equal branches of government. The 
checks and balances in our system are good. They protect our rights, 
our liberties, and key principles.
  We should adhere to that. As I said earlier, it has served us well. 
This amendment follows that fundamental principal, so I hope we adopt 
it. Then if we adopt it, I hope we adopt the legislation.
  Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. CARSON. Mr Chair, today I rise in support of H.R. 7888, Reforming 
Intelligence and Securing America Act, to reauthorize the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). As someone who has worked in law 
enforcement and served the intelligence community for many years, I 
feel strongly that the FISA Authority, including Section 702, must not 
be allowed to lapse. This could pose a grave danger to our national 
security. I believe the changes and reforms included in this bill will 
protect our safety while also preserving our civil liberties.
  I voted in the Intelligence Committee to reauthorize this vital 
legislation because I believe it represents a solid bipartisan 
approach. The bill includes reforms I fought for, and I believe it 
strikes the proper balance of protecting our national security in a way 
that is consistent with our American values. We know the FISA authority 
has been abused in the past, and that is unacceptable. That's why the 
reforms included in this bill are essential.
  Provisions I recommended in the bill prevent individuals from being 
unfairly targeted based on race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, 
or ethnicity by preventing the search of a person's name simply based 
on those factors. As a Black, Muslim man who has been the victim of 
profiling, this was personal for me--and I'm glad language to codify 
these essential protections is included in today's bill.
  It's disappointing that some of my colleagues and dedicated advocates 
have described our Intelligence Committee bill as fake reform, or a 
sham. That's not the case. Our committee's bill prohibits agencies from 
conducting a query for the purpose of suppressing political speech, 
reinforcing one of the most American liberties there is: the right to 
free speech.
  Finally, the bill improves and codifies accountability for the FBI in 
particular and prevents future abuses.
  This is not the end of our work to protect Americans' civil liberties 
in U.S. intelligence, but this program is too important for our 
national security to allow it to expire or experience any lapses. I 
urge all of my colleagues to support this bill.
  The Acting CHAIR (Mr. DesJarlais). All time for general debate has 
expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, an amendment in the nature of a substitute 
consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 118-27, shall be 
considered as adopted, and the bill, as amended, shall be considered as 
an original bill for the purpose of further amendment under the 5-
minute rule and shall be considered as read.
  The text of the bill, as amended is as follows:

                               H.R. 7888

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Reforming Intelligence and 
     Securing America Act''.

     SEC. 2. QUERY PROCEDURE REFORM.

       (a) Strictly Limiting Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     Personnel Authorizing United States Person Queries.--
     Subsection (f) of section 702 is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (5); and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(3) Restrictions imposed on federal bureau of 
     investigation.--
       ``(A) Limits on authorizations of united states person 
     queries.--
       ``(i) In general.--Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     personnel must obtain prior approval from a Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation supervisor (or employee of equivalent or 
     greater rank) or attorney who is authorized to access 
     unminimized contents or noncontents obtained through 
     acquisitions authorized under subsection (a) for any query of 
     such unminimized contents or noncontents made using a United 
     States person query term.
       ``(ii) Exception.--A United States person query to be 
     conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of 
     unminimized contents or noncontents obtained through 
     acquisitions authorized under subsection (a) using a United 
     States person query term may be conducted without obtaining 
     prior approval as specified in clause (i) only if the person 
     conducting the United States person query has a reasonable 
     belief that conducting the query could assist in mitigating 
     or eliminating a threat to life or serious bodily harm.''.
       (b) Prohibition on Involvement of Political Appointees in 
     Process To Approve Federal Bureau of Investigation Queries.--
     Subparagraph (D) of section 702(f)(3), as added by subsection 
     (d) of this section, is amended by inserting after clause (v) 
     the following:

[[Page H2338]]

       ``(vi) Prohibition on political appointees within the 
     process to approve federal bureau of investigation queries.--
     The procedures shall prohibit any political personnel, such 
     as those classified by the Office of Personnel Management as 
     Presidential Appointment with Senate Confirmation, 
     Presidential Appointment (without Senate Confirmation), 
     Noncareer Senior Executive Service Appointment, or Schedule C 
     Excepted Appointment, from inclusion in the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation's prior approval process under clause (ii).''.

       (c) Mandatory Audits of United States Person Queries 
     Conducted by Federal Bureau of Investigation.--
       (1) Audits required.--For each query identified by the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation as a United States person 
     query against information acquired pursuant to subsection (a) 
     of section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) conducted by the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, not later than 180 days after the conduct of 
     such query, the Department of Justice shall conduct an audit 
     of such query.
       (2) Applicability.--The requirement under paragraph (1) 
     shall apply with respect to queries conducted on or after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       (3) Sunset.--This section shall terminate on the earlier of 
     the following:
       (A) The date that is 2 years after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (B) The date on which the Attorney General submits to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a certification that the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation has implemented a process for 
     the internal audit of all queries referred to in paragraph 
     (1).
       (4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (A) the congressional intelligence committees, as such term 
     is defined in subsection (b) of section 701 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881); and
       (B) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and of the Senate.
       (d) Restrictions Relating to Conduct of Certain Queries by 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation.--Paragraph (3) of section 
     702(f), as added by subsection (a)(2) of this section, is 
     amended by adding after subparagraph (C), as added by 
     subsection (f) of this section, the following:
       ``(D) Querying procedures applicable to federal bureau of 
     investigation.--For any procedures adopted under paragraph 
     (1) applicable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
     Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of 
     National Intelligence, shall include the following 
     requirements:
       ``(i) Training.--A requirement that, prior to conducting 
     any query, personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     successfully complete training on the querying procedures on 
     an annual basis.
       ``(ii) Additional prior approvals for sensitive queries.--A 
     requirement that, absent exigent circumstances, prior to 
     conducting certain queries, personnel of the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation receive approval, at minimum, as follows:

       ``(I) Approval from the Deputy Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation if the query uses a query term 
     reasonably believed to identify a United States elected 
     official, an appointee of the President or a State governor, 
     a United States political candidate, a United States 
     political organization or a United States person prominent in 
     such organization, or a United States media organization or a 
     United States person who is a member of such organization.
       ``(II) Approval from an attorney of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation if the query uses a query term reasonably 
     believed to identify a United States religious organization 
     or a United States person who is prominent in such 
     organization.
       ``(III) Approval from an attorney of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation if such conduct involves batch job technology 
     (or successor tool).

       ``(iii) Prior written justification.--A requirement that, 
     prior to conducting a query using a United States person 
     query term, personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     provide a written statement of the specific factual basis to 
     support the reasonable belief that such query meets the 
     standards required by the procedures adopted under paragraph 
     (1). For each United States person query, the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation shall keep a record of the query term, the 
     date of the conduct of the query, the identifier of the 
     personnel conducting the query, and such written statement.
       ``(iv) Storage of certain contents and noncontents.--Any 
     system of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that stores 
     unminimized contents or noncontents obtained through 
     acquisitions authorized under subsection (a) together with 
     contents or noncontents obtained through other lawful means 
     shall be configured in a manner that--

       ``(I) requires personnel of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation to affirmatively elect to include such 
     unminimized contents or noncontents obtained through 
     acquisitions authorized under subsection (a) when running a 
     query; or
       ``(II) includes other controls reasonably expected to 
     prevent inadvertent queries of such unminimized contents or 
     noncontents.

       ``(v) Waiver authority for foreign intelligence 
     surveillance court.--If the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court finds that the procedures adopted under paragraph (1) 
     include measures that are reasonably expected to result in 
     similar compliance outcomes as the measures specified in 
     clauses (i) through (iv) of this subparagraph, the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court may waive one or more of the 
     requirements specified in such clauses.''.
       (e) Notification for Certain Queries Conducted by Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation.--Paragraph (3) of section 702(f), as 
     added by subsection (a) of this section, is amended by adding 
     at the end the following:
       ``(B) Notification requirement for certain fbi queries.--
       ``(i) Requirement.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall promptly notify appropriate congressional 
     leadership of any query conducted by the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation using a query term that is reasonably believed 
     to be the name or other personally identifying information of 
     a member of Congress, and shall also notify the member who is 
     the subject of such query.
       ``(ii) Appropriate congressional leadership defined.--In 
     this subparagraph, the term `appropriate congressional 
     leadership' means the following:

       ``(I) The chairs and ranking minority members of the 
     congressional intelligence committees.
       ``(II) The Speaker and minority leader of the House of 
     Representatives.
       ``(III) The majority and minority leaders of the Senate.

       ``(iii) National security considerations.--In submitting a 
     notification under clause (i), the Director shall give due 
     regard to the protection of classified information, sources 
     and methods, and national security.
       ``(iv) Waiver.--

       ``(I) In general.--The Director may waive a notification 
     required under clause (i) if the Director determines such 
     notification would impede an ongoing national security or law 
     enforcement investigation.
       ``(II) Termination.--A waiver under subclause (I) shall 
     terminate on the date the Director determines the relevant 
     notification would not impede the relevant national security 
     or law enforcement investigation or on the date that such 
     investigation ends, whichever is earlier.''.

       (f) Requirement for Congressional Consent Prior to Certain 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation Queries for Purpose of 
     Defensive Briefings.--Paragraph (3) of section 702(f), as 
     added by subsection (a) of this section, is amended by adding 
     after subparagraph (B), as added by subsection (e) of this 
     section, the following:
       ``(C) Consent required for fbi to conduct certain queries 
     for purpose of defensive briefing.--
       ``(i) Consent required.--The Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation may not, for the exclusive purpose of 
     supplementing the contents of a briefing on the defense 
     against a counterintelligence threat to a member of Congress, 
     conduct a query using a query term that is the name or 
     restricted personal information (as such term is defined in 
     section 119 of title 18, United States Code) of that member 
     unless--

       ``(I) the member provides consent to the use of the query 
     term; or
       ``(II) the Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation determines that exigent circumstances exist 
     sufficient to justify the conduct of such query.

       ``(ii) Notification.--

       ``(I) Notification of consent sought.--Not later than three 
     business days after submitting a request for consent from a 
     member of Congress under clause (i), the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify the appropriate 
     congressional leadership, regardless of whether the member 
     provided such consent.
       ``(II) Notification of exception used.--Not later than 
     three business days after the conduct of a query under clause 
     (i) without consent on the basis of the existence of exigent 
     circumstances determined under subclause (II) of such clause, 
     the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall 
     notify the appropriate congressional leadership.

       ``(iii) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subparagraph 
     may be construed as--

       ``(I) applying to matters outside of the scope of the 
     briefing on the defense against a counterintelligence threat 
     to be provided or supplemented under clause (i); or
       ``(II) limiting the lawful investigative activities of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation other than supplementing the 
     contents of a briefing on the defense against a 
     counterintelligence threat to a member of Congress.

       ``(iv) Appropriate congressional leadership defined.--In 
     this subparagraph, the term `appropriate congressional 
     leadership' means the following:

       ``(I) The chairs and ranking minority members of the 
     congressional intelligence committees.
       ``(II) The Speaker and minority leader of the House of 
     Representatives.
       ``(III) The majority and minority leaders of the Senate.''.

     SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON USE OF INFORMATION OBTAINED UNDER 
                   SECTION 702.

       (a) Revoking Federal Bureau of Investigation Authority To 
     Conduct Queries Unrelated to National Security.--Subsection 
     (f)(2) of section 702 is amended to read as follows:
       ``(2) Prohibition on conduct of queries that are solely 
     designed to find and extract evidence of a crime.--
       ``(A) Limits on authorizations of united states person 
     queries.--The querying procedures adopted pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) for the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall 
     prohibit queries of information acquired under subsection (a) 
     that are solely designed to find and extract evidence of 
     criminal activity.
       ``(B) Exceptions.--The restriction under subparagraph (A) 
     shall not apply with respect to a query if--
       ``(i) there is a reasonable belief that such query may 
     retrieve information that could assist in mitigating or 
     eliminating a threat to life or serious bodily harm; or
       ``(ii) such query is necessary to identify information that 
     must be produced or preserved in

[[Page H2339]]

     connection with a litigation matter or to fulfill discovery 
     obligations in criminal matters under the laws of the United 
     States or any State thereof.''.
       (b) Restriction on Certain Information Available to Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation.--Section 702 is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new subsection:
       ``(n) Restriction on Certain Information Available to 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation.--
       ``(1) Restriction.--The Federal Bureau of Investigation may 
     not ingest unminimized information acquired under this 
     section into its analytic repositories unless the targeted 
     person is relevant to an existing, open, predicated full 
     national security investigation by the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation.
       ``(2) Exception for exigent circumstances.--Paragraph (1) 
     does not apply if the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation decides it is necessary due to exigent 
     circumstances and provides notification within three business 
     days to the congressional intelligence committees, the 
     Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, 
     and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate.
       ``(3) Exception for assistance to other agencies.--
     Paragraph (1) does not apply where the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation has agreed to provide technical, analytical, or 
     linguistic assistance at the request of another Federal 
     agency.''.

     SEC. 4. TARGETING DECISIONS UNDER SECTION 702.

       (a) Sense of Congress on the Targeted Collection of United 
     States Person Information.--It is the sense of Congress that, 
     as proscribed in section 702(b)(2), section 702 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 has always 
     prohibited, and continues to prohibit, the intelligence 
     community from targeting a United States person for 
     collection of foreign intelligence information. If the 
     intelligence community intends to target a United States 
     person for collection of foreign intelligence information 
     under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, the 
     Government must first obtain an individualized court order 
     based upon a finding of probable cause that the United States 
     person is a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an 
     officer or employee of a foreign power, in order to conduct 
     surveillance targeting that United States person.
       (b) Annual Audit of Targeting Decisions Under Section 
     702.--
       (1) Mandatory review.--Not less frequently than annually, 
     the Department of Justice National Security Division shall 
     review each person targeted under section 702 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 in the preceding year 
     to ensure that the purpose of each targeting decision is not 
     to target a known United States person. The results of this 
     review shall be submitted to the Department of Justice Office 
     of the Inspector General, the congressional intelligence 
     committees, and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House 
     of Representatives and of the Senate, subject to a 
     declassification review.
       (2) Inspector general audit.--Not less frequently than 
     annually, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector 
     General shall audit a sampling of the targeting decisions 
     reviewed by the National Security Division under paragraph 
     (1) and submit a report to the congressional intelligence 
     committees and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House 
     of Representatives and of the Senate.
       (3) Certification.--Within 180 days of enactment of this 
     Act, and annually thereafter, each agency authorized to 
     target non-United States persons under section 702 shall 
     certify to Congress that the purpose of each targeting 
     decision made in the prior year was not to target a known 
     United States person.
       (4) Application.--The requirements under this subsection 
     apply for any year to the extent that section 702 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 was in effect 
     during any portion of the previous year.

     SEC. 5. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT REFORM.

       (a) Requirement for Same Judge To Hear Extension 
     Applications.--Subsection (d) of section 105 is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(5) An extension of an order issued under this title for 
     surveillance targeted against a United States person, to the 
     extent practicable and absent exigent circumstances, shall be 
     granted or denied by the same judge who issued the original 
     order unless the term of such judge has expired or such judge 
     is otherwise no longer serving on the court.''.
       (b) Use of Amici Curiae in Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court Proceedings.--Subsection (i) of section 
     103 is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clause 
     (i) and (ii), respectively;
       (B) by striking ``A court established'' and inserting the 
     following subparagraph:
       ``(A) In general.--A court established'';
       (C) in subparagraph (A), as inserted by subparagraph (B) of 
     this section--
       (i) in clause (i), as so redesignated--

       (I) by striking ``appoint an individual who has'' and 
     inserting ``appoint one or more individuals who have''; and
       (II) by striking ``; and'' and inserting a semicolon;

       (ii) in clause (ii), as so redesignated--

       (I) by striking ``appoint an individual or organization'' 
     and inserting ``appoint one or more individuals or 
     organizations''; and
       (II) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; 
     and''; and

       (iii) by adding at the end the following new clause:
       ``(iii) shall appoint one or more individuals who have been 
     designated under paragraph (1) to serve as amicus curiae to 
     assist such court in the consideration of any certification 
     or procedures submitted for review pursuant to section 702, 
     including any amendments to such certifications or 
     procedures, if the court established under subsection (a) has 
     not appointed an individual under clause (i) or (ii), unless 
     the court issues a finding that such appointment is not 
     appropriate or is likely to result in undue delay.''; and
       (D) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
       ``(B) Expertise.--In appointing one or more individuals 
     under subparagraph (A)(iii), the court shall, to the maximum 
     extent practicable, appoint an individual who possesses 
     expertise in both privacy and civil liberties and 
     intelligence collection.
       ``(C) Timing.--In the event that the court appoints one or 
     more individuals or organizations pursuant to this paragraph 
     to assist such court in a proceeding under section 702, 
     notwithstanding subsection (j)(1)(B) of such section, the 
     court shall issue an order pursuant to subsection (j)(3) of 
     such section as expeditiously as possible consistent with 
     subsection (k)(1) of such section, but in no event later than 
     60 days after the date on which such certification, 
     procedures, or amendments are submitted for the court's 
     review, or later than 60 days after the court has issued an 
     order appointing one or more individuals pursuant to this 
     paragraph, whichever is earlier, unless a judge of that court 
     issues an order finding that extraordinary circumstances 
     necessitate additional time for review and that such 
     extension of time is consistent with the national 
     security.''; and
       (2) in paragraph (4)--
       (A) by striking ``paragraph (2)(A)'' and inserting 
     ``paragraph (2)'';
       (B) by striking ``provide to the court, as appropriate'';
       (C) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (C) as 
     clauses (i) through (iii), respectively;
       (D) by inserting before clause (i) the following new 
     subparagraphs:
       ``(A) be limited to addressing the specific issues 
     identified by the court; and
       ``(B) provide to the court, as appropriate--''; and
       (E) in subparagraph (B)(i), as redesignated, by inserting 
     ``of United States persons'' after ``civil liberties''.
       (c) Designation of Counsel To Scrutinize Applications for 
     United States Persons.--Section 103 is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new subsection:
       ``(l) Designation of Counsel for Certain Applications.--To 
     assist the court in the consideration of any application for 
     an order pursuant to section 104 that targets a United States 
     person, the presiding judge designated under subsection (a) 
     shall designate one or more attorneys to review such 
     applications, and provide a written analysis to the judge 
     considering the application, of--
       ``(1) the sufficiency of the evidence used to make the 
     probable cause determination under section 105(a)(2);
       ``(2) any material weaknesses, flaws, or other concerns in 
     the application; and
       ``(3) a recommendation as to the following, which the judge 
     shall consider during a proceeding on the application in 
     which such attorney is present, as appropriate--
       ``(A) that the application should be approved, denied, or 
     modified;
       ``(B) that the Government should supply additional 
     information in connection with such application; or
       ``(C) that any requirements or conditions should be imposed 
     on the Government for the approval of such application.''.

     SEC. 6. APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER UNDER THE FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT.

       (a) Requirement for Sworn Statements for Factual 
     Assertions.--
       (1) Title i.--Subsection (a)(3) of section 104 is amended 
     by striking ``a statement of'' and inserting ``a sworn 
     statement of''.
       (2) Title iii.--Subsection (a)(3) of section 303 is amended 
     by striking ``a statement of'' and inserting ``a sworn 
     statement of''.
       (3) Section 703.--Subsection (b)(1)(C) of section 703 is 
     amended by striking ``a statement of'' and inserting ``a 
     sworn statement of''.
       (4) Section 704.--Subsection (b)(3) of section 704 is 
     amended by striking ``a statement of'' and inserting ``a 
     sworn statement of''.
       (5) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection 
     shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the 
     date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act.
       (b) Prohibition on Use of Politically Derived Information 
     in Applications for Certain Orders by the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court.--
       (1) Title i.--Subsection (a)(6) of section 104 is amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (B) in subparagraph (E)(ii), by striking the semicolon and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding after subparagraph (E) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(F) that none of the information included in the 
     statement described in paragraph (3) was solely produced by, 
     derived from information produced by, or obtained using the 
     funds of, a political organization (as such term is defined 
     in section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986), 
     unless--
       ``(i) the political organization is clearly identified in 
     the body of the statement described in paragraph (3);
       ``(ii) the information has been corroborated; and
       ``(iii) the investigative techniques used to corroborate 
     the information are clearly identified in the body of the 
     statement described in paragraph (3); and''.

[[Page H2340]]

       (2) Title iii.--Subsection (a)(6) of section 303 is 
     amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (B) in subparagraph (E), by striking the semicolon and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(F) that none of the information included in the 
     statement described in paragraph (3) was solely produced by, 
     derived from information produced by, or obtained using the 
     funds of, a political organization (as such term is defined 
     in section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986), 
     unless--
       ``(i) the political organization is clearly identified in 
     the body of the statement described in paragraph (3);
       ``(ii) the information has been corroborated; and
       ``(iii) the investigative techniques used to corroborate 
     the information are clearly identified in the body of the 
     statement described in paragraph (3); and''.
       (3) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection 
     shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the 
     date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act.
       (c) Prohibition on Use of Press Reports in Applications for 
     Certain Orders by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court.--
       (1) Title i.--Subsection (a)(6) of section 104, as amended 
     by this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subparagraph:
       ``(G) that none of the information included in the 
     statement described in paragraph (3) is attributable to or 
     derived from the content of a media source unless the 
     statement includes a clear identification of each author of 
     that content, and where applicable, the publisher of that 
     content, information to corroborate that which was derived 
     from the media source, and an explanation of the 
     investigative techniques used to corroborate the 
     information;''.
       (2) Title iii.--Subsection (a)(6) of section 303, as 
     amended by this Act, is further amended by adding at the end 
     the following new subparagraph:
       ``(G) that none of the information included in the 
     statement described in paragraph (3) is attributable to or 
     derived from the content of a media source unless the 
     statement includes a clear identification of each author of 
     that content, where applicable, the publisher of that 
     content, information to corroborate that which was derived 
     from the media source, and an explanation of the 
     investigative techniques used to corroborate the 
     information;''.
       (3) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection 
     shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the 
     date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act.
       (d) Description of Techniques Carried Out Before 
     Application.--
       (1) Title i.--Subsection (a) of section 104, as amended by 
     this Act, is further amended--
       (A) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (B) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(10) with respect to a target who is a United States 
     person, a statement summarizing the investigative techniques 
     carried out before making the application;''.
       (2) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection 
     shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the 
     date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act.
       (e) Requirement for Certain Justification Prior to 
     Extension of Orders.--
       (1) Applications for extension of orders under title i.--
     Subsection (a) of section 104, as amended by this Act, is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(11) in the case of an application for an extension of an 
     order under this title for a surveillance targeted against a 
     United States person, a summary statement of the foreign 
     intelligence information obtained pursuant to the original 
     order (and any preceding extension thereof) as of the date of 
     the application for the extension, or a reasonable 
     explanation of the failure to obtain such information; and''.
       (2) Applications for extension of orders under title iii.--
     Subsection (a) of section 303, as amended by this Act, is 
     further amended--
       (A) in paragraph (7), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (B) in paragraph (8), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting a semicolon; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(9) in the case of an application for an extension of an 
     order under this title in which the target of the physical 
     search is a United States person, a summary statement of the 
     foreign intelligence information obtained pursuant to the 
     original order (and any preceding extension thereof) as of 
     the date of the application for the extension, or a 
     reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such 
     information; and''.
       (3) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection 
     shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the 
     date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act.
       (f) Requirement for Justification of Underlying Criminal 
     Offense in Certain Applications.--
       (1) Title i.--Subsection (a)(3)(A) of section 104 is 
     amended by inserting before the semicolon at the end the 
     following: ``, and, in the case of a target that is a United 
     States person alleged to be acting as an agent of a foreign 
     power (as described in section 101(b)(2)(B)), that a 
     violation of the criminal statutes of the United States as 
     referred to in section 101(b)(2)(B) has occurred or is about 
     to occur''.
       (2) Title iii.--Subsection (a)(3)(A) of section 303 is 
     amended by inserting before the semicolon at the end the 
     following: ``, and, in the case of a target that is a United 
     States person alleged to be acting as an agent of a foreign 
     power (as described in section 101(b)(2)(B)), that a 
     violation of the criminal statutes of the United States as 
     referred to in section 101(b)(2)(B) has occurred or is about 
     to occur''.
       (3) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection 
     shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the 
     date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act.
       (g) Modification to Duration of Approved Period Under 
     Certain Orders for Non-United States Persons.--
       (1) Title i.--Subsection (d) of section 105 is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``against a foreign 
     power, as defined in section 101(a), (1), (2), or (3),'' and 
     inserting ``against a foreign power''; and
       (ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``120 days'' and 
     inserting ``one year''; and
       (B) by striking paragraph (2); and
       (C) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs 
     (2) and (3), respectively.
       (2) Title iii.--Subsection (d) of section 304 is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``against a foreign 
     power, as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 
     101(a),'' and inserting ``against a foreign power''; and
       (ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``120 days'' and 
     inserting ``one year''; and
       (B) by striking paragraph (2); and
       (C) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2).

     SEC. 7. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND DECLASSIFICATION OF CERTAIN 
                   DOCUMENTS.

       Subsection (a) of section 602 is amended by inserting after 
     ``shall conduct a declassification review'' the following: 
     ``, to be concluded as soon as practicable, but not later 
     than 180 days after the commencement of such review,''.

     SEC. 8. TRANSCRIPTIONS OF PROCEEDINGS.

       (a) Requirement for Transcripts of Proceedings.--Subsection 
     (c) of section 103 is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``, and hearings shall be transcribed'' 
     before the first period;
       (2) by inserting ``, transcriptions of hearings,'' after 
     ``applications made''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new sentence: 
     ``Transcriptions and any related records, including testimony 
     and affidavits, shall be stored in a file associated with the 
     relevant application or order.''.
       (b) Requirement for Notification to Congress of Certain 
     Transcripts.--Subsection (c) of section 601 is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting 
     a semicolon; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(3) for any hearing, oral argument, or other proceeding 
     before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review for which a court 
     reporter produces a transcript, not later than 45 days after 
     the government receives the final transcript or the date on 
     which the matter of the hearing, oral argument, or other 
     proceeding is resolved, whichever is later, a notice of the 
     existence of such transcript. Not later than three business 
     days after a committee referred to in subsection (a) requests 
     to review an existing transcript, the Attorney General shall 
     facilitate such request; and
       ``(4) a copy of each declassified document that has 
     undergone review under section 602.''.

     SEC. 9. AUDIT OF FISA COMPLIANCE BY INSPECTOR GENERAL.

       (a) Inspector General Report on Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation Querying Practices.--
       (1) Report.--Not later than 545 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Justice shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report on the querying practices 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under section 702.
       (2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall 
     include, at a minimum, the following:
       (A) An evaluation of compliance by personnel of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation with the querying procedures adopted 
     under section 702(f), with a particular focus on compliance 
     by such personnel with the procedures governing queries using 
     United States person query terms.
       (B) An analysis of each specific reform that, in the view 
     of the Inspector General, is responsible for any identified 
     improvement in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's record 
     of compliance with the querying procedures, including an 
     identification of whether such reform was--
       (i) required by this Act or another Act of Congress;
       (ii) required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court or the Attorney General; or
       (iii) voluntarily adopted by the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation.
       (C) An assessment of the status of the implementation by 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation of all reforms related to 
     querying that are required by this Act.
       (D) An evaluation of the effectiveness of the Office of 
     Internal Auditing of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with 
     respect to monitoring and improving query compliance by 
     personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (E) Recommendations to further improve compliance with 
     querying procedures by personnel of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, particularly with respect to compliance with 
     the procedures governing queries using United States person 
     query terms.
       (F) Any other relevant matter the Inspector General 
     determines appropriate.
       (3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form and may include a classified 
     annex.

[[Page H2341]]

       (4) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in this subsection, 
     terms used in this subsection have the meanings given such 
     terms in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
       (B) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (i) the congressional intelligence committees, as such term 
     is defined in subsection (b) of section 701 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881); and
       (ii) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.

     SEC. 10. ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS OF APPLICATIONS.

       (a) Requirement for Certifications Regarding Accuracy of 
     Applications.--
       (1) Title i.--Subsection (a) of section 104, as amended by 
     this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new paragraph:
       ``(12) a certification by the applicant or declarant that, 
     to the best knowledge of the applicant or declarant, the 
     Attorney General or a designated attorney for the Government 
     has been apprised of all information that might reasonably--
       ``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or 
     the reasonableness of any assessment in the application 
     conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the 
     application is made; or
       ``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings 
     required under section 105(a).''.
       (2) Title iii.--Subsection (a) of section 303 is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(10) a certification by the applicant that, to the best 
     knowledge of the applicant, the Attorney General or a 
     designated attorney for the Government has been apprised of 
     all information that might reasonably--
       ``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or 
     the reasonableness of any assessment in the application 
     conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the 
     application is made; or
       ``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings 
     required under section 304(a).''.
       (3) Title iv.--Subsection (c) of section 402 is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (B) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) a certification by the Federal Officer seeking to use 
     the pen register or trap and trace device covered by the 
     application that, to the best knowledge of the Federal 
     Officer, the Attorney General or a designated attorney for 
     the Government has been apprised of all information that 
     might reasonably--
       ``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or 
     the reasonableness of any assessment in the application 
     conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the 
     application is made; or
       ``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings 
     required under subsection (d).''.
       (4) Title v.--Subsection (b)(2) of section 502 is amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(E) a statement by the applicant that, to the best 
     knowledge of the applicant, the application fairly reflects 
     all information that might reasonably--
       ``(i) call into question the accuracy of the application or 
     the reasonableness of any assessment in the application 
     conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the 
     application is made; or
       ``(ii) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings 
     required under subsection (c).''.
       (5) Title vii.--
       (A) Section 703.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 703 is 
     amended--
       (i) in subparagraph (I), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (ii) in subparagraph (J), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (iii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(K) a certification by the applicant that, to the best 
     knowledge of the applicant, the Attorney General or a 
     designated attorney for the Government has been apprised of 
     all information that might reasonably--
       ``(i) call into question the accuracy of the application or 
     the reasonableness of any assessment in the application 
     conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the 
     application is made; or
       ``(ii) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings 
     required under subsection (c).''.
       (B) Section 704.--Subsection (b) of section 704 is 
     amended--
       (i) in paragraph (6), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (ii) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (iii) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(8) a certification by the applicant that, to the best 
     knowledge of the applicant, the Attorney General or a 
     designated attorney for the Government has been apprised of 
     all information that might reasonably--
       ``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or 
     the reasonableness of any assessment in the application 
     conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the 
     application is made; or
       ``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings 
     required under subsection (c).''.
       (6) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection 
     shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the 
     date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act.
       (7) Accuracy procedures.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General, in 
     consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, shall issue procedures governing the review of 
     case files, as appropriate, to ensure that applications to 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under title I or 
     III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) that target United States persons are 
     accurate and complete.
       (b) Disclosure of Exculpatory Information.--
       (1) Title i.--Subsection (a) of section 104, as amended by 
     this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new paragraph:
       ``(13) non-cumulative information known to the applicant or 
     declarant that is potentially exculpatory regarding the 
     requested legal findings or any assessment in the 
     application.''.
       (2) Title iii.--Subsection (a) of section 303, as amended 
     by this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(11) non-cumulative information known to the applicant or 
     declarant that is potentially exculpatory regarding the 
     requested legal findings or any assessment in the 
     application.''.
       (3) Title iv.--Subsection (c) of section 402, as amended by 
     this Act, is further amended--
       (A) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (B) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(5) non-cumulative information known to the Federal 
     officer seeking to use the pen register or trap and trace 
     device covered by the application, that is potentially 
     exculpatory regarding the requested legal findings or any 
     assessment in the application.''.
       (4) Title v.--Subsection (b)(2) of section 502, as amended 
     by this Act, is further amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (B) in subparagraph (E)(ii), by striking the period at the 
     end and inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(F) non-cumulative information known to the applicant 
     that is potentially exculpatory regarding the requested legal 
     findings or any assessment in the application.''.
       (5) Title vii.--
       (A) Section 703.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 703, as 
     amended by this Act, is further amended--
       (i) in subparagraph (J), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (ii) in subparagraph (K), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (iii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(L) non-cumulative information known to the applicant or 
     declarant that is potentially exculpatory regarding the 
     requested legal findings or any assessment in the 
     application.''.
       (B) Section 704.--Subsection (b) of section 704, as amended 
     by this Act, is further amended--
       (i) in paragraph (7), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (ii) in paragraph (8), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (iii) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(9) non-cumulative information known to the applicant or 
     declarant that is potentially exculpatory regarding the 
     requested legal findings or any assessment in the 
     application.''.
       (6) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection 
     shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the 
     date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act.

     SEC. 11. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
                   INVESTIGATION.

       (a) Revocation of Statutory Reporting Exemption and 
     Additional Reporting Requirement for Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation.--
       (1) In general.--Section 603, as amended by this Act, is 
     further amended--
       (A) in subsection (b)(2)(B) by inserting ``(or combined 
     unminimized contents and noncontents information)'' after 
     ``unminimized contents'';
       (B) in subsection (d), by amending paragraph (2) to read as 
     follows:
       ``(2) Nonapplicability to electronic mail address and 
     telephone numbers.--Paragraph (3)(B) of subsection (b) shall 
     not apply to orders resulting in the acquisition of 
     information by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that does 
     not include electronic mail addresses or telephone 
     numbers.''; and
       (C) by inserting the following new subsection:
       ``(f) Mandatory Reporting on Section 702 by Director of 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation.--
       ``(1) Annual report.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall annually submit to the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate 
     a report that includes--
       ``(A) the number of United States person queries by the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation of unminimized contents or 
     noncontents acquired pursuant to section 702(a);
       ``(B) the number of approved queries using the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation's batch job technology, or successor 
     tool;
       ``(C) the number of queries using the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation's batch job technology, or successor tool, 
     conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation against 
     information acquired pursuant to section 702(a) for which 
     pre-approval was not obtained due to emergency circumstances;

[[Page H2342]]

       ``(D) the number of United States person queries conducted 
     by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of unminimized 
     contents or noncontents acquired pursuant to section 702(a) 
     solely to retrieve evidence of a crime;
       ``(E) a good faith estimate of the number of United States 
     person query terms used by the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation to conduct queries of unminimized contents or 
     noncontents acquired pursuant to section 702(a) primarily to 
     protect the United States person who is the subject of the 
     query; and
       ``(F) a good faith estimate of the number of United States 
     person query terms used by the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation to conduct queries of unminimized contents or 
     noncontents acquired pursuant to section 702(a) where the 
     United States person who is the subject of the query is a 
     target or subject of an investigation by the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation.
       ``(2) Public availability.--Subject to declassification 
     review by the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence, each annual report submitted pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) shall be available to the public during the 
     first April following the calendar year covered by the 
     report.''.
       (2) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection 
     shall take effect on January 1, 2025.

     SEC. 12. ADVERSE PERSONNEL ACTIONS FOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
                   INVESTIGATION.

       (a) Annual Reporting on Disciplinary Actions by Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation.--Section 603 is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (g); and
       (2) by inserting the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Mandatory Reporting by Director of Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall annually submit to the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Judiciary of 
     the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
     Senate, a report describing the accountability actions taken 
     by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the preceding 12-
     month period for noncompliant querying of information 
     acquired under section 702 and any such actions taken 
     pursuant to section 103(m), to include the number of ongoing 
     personnel investigations, the outcome of any completed 
     personnel investigations and any related adverse personnel 
     actions taken.''.
       (b) Accountability Measures for Executive Leadership of 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation.--
       (1) Measures required.--The Director of the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation shall ensure that, as soon as practicable 
     following the date of enactment of this Act, there are in 
     effect measures for holding the executive leadership of each 
     covered component appropriately accountable for ensuring 
     compliance with covered procedures by the personnel of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation assigned to that covered 
     component. Such measures shall include a requirement for an 
     annual evaluation of the executive leadership of each such 
     covered component with respect to ensuring such compliance 
     during the preceding year.
       (2) Briefings required.--
       (A) Briefings.--Not later than December 31 of each calendar 
     year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to 
     the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the 
     implementation of paragraph (1).
       (B) Matters.--Each briefing under subparagraph (A) shall 
     include, with respect to the period covered by the briefing, 
     the following:
       (i) A description of specific measures under paragraph (1) 
     that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has implemented.
       (ii) A description of specific measures under such 
     subsection that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has 
     proposed to be implemented or modified, and the timeline for 
     such proposed implementation or modification.
       (iii) A summary of compliance with covered procedures by 
     the personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
     disaggregated by covered component, and a description of any 
     adverse personnel actions taken against, or other actions 
     taken to ensure the appropriate accountability of, the 
     executive leadership of covered components that 
     underperformed with respect to ensuring such compliance.
       (3) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       (A) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (i) the congressional intelligence committees, as such term 
     is defined in subsection (b) of section 701 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881) on the 
     date of enactment of this Act; and
       (ii) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.
       (B) Covered component.--The term ``covered component'' 
     means a field office, Headquarters division, or other element 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with personnel who, 
     for any period during which section 702 is in effect, have 
     access to the unminimized contents of communications obtained 
     through acquisitions authorized under section 702(a).
       (C) Covered procedure.--The term ``covered procedure''--
       (i) means any procedure governing the use of authorities 
     under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.); and
       (ii) includes querying procedures and minimization 
     procedures adopted pursuant to such Act.
       (D) Executive leadership.--The term ``executive 
     leadership'' includes--
       (i) with respect to a field office of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, an Assistant Director in Charge or Special 
     Agent in Charge of the field office; and
       (ii) with respect to a division of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation Headquarters, an Assistant Director of the 
     division.

     SEC. 13. CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF FISA.

       (a) Penalties for Unauthorized Disclosure of Application 
     for Electronic Surveillance.--
       (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 109 is amended--
       (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking 
     ``intentionally'';
       (B) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) by inserting ``intentionally'' before ``engages in''; 
     and
       (ii) by striking ``; or'' and inserting a semicolon;
       (C) in paragraph (2)--
       (i) by striking ``disclose'' and inserting ``intentionally 
     discloses''; and
       (ii) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; 
     or''; and
       (D) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, 
     transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized 
     person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to 
     the safety or interest of the United States or for the 
     benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the 
     United States an application, in whole or in part, for an 
     order for electronic surveillance under this Act.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--Subsection (b) of such section 
     is amended by striking ``under subsection (a)'' and inserting 
     ``under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a)''.
       (b) Increased Criminal Penalties for Offense Under FISA.--
     Subsection (c) of section 109 is amended to read as follows:
       ``(c) Penalty.--A person guilty of an offense in this 
     section shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned for not 
     more than 10 years, or both.''.
       (c) Criminal Penalties for Unauthorized Disclosure of 
     Certain Incidentally Collected United States Person 
     Information.--Title VII is amended by inserting the following 
     new section:

     ``SEC. 709. PENALTIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE.

       ``(a) Offense.--A person is guilty of an offense under this 
     section if that person knowingly and willfully communicates, 
     furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an 
     unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner 
     prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or 
     for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of 
     the United States any classified information that contains 
     the contents of any communication acquired under this title 
     to which a known United States person is a party.
       ``(b) Penalty.--A person guilty of an offense in this 
     section shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned for not 
     more than 8 years, or both.
       ``(c) Jurisdiction.--There is Federal jurisdiction over an 
     offense under this section if the person committing the 
     offense was an officer or employee of the United States at 
     the time the offense was committed.''.
       (d) Sentencing Enhancement for False Declarations Before 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.--Subsection (a) of 
     section 1623 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting before ``, or both'' the following: ``or, if such 
     proceedings are before or ancillary to the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court of Review established by section 103 of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1803), imprisoned not more than ten years''.

     SEC. 14. CONTEMPT POWER OF FISC AND FISC-R.

       (a) Contempts Constituting Crimes.--Section 402 of title 
     18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after ``any 
     district court of the United States'' the following: ``, 
     including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review established 
     by section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803),''.
       (b) Annual Reporting on Contempt.--Subsection (a)(1) of 
     section 603 is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (2) in subparagraph (F), by striking the period and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(G) the number of times the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court of Review exercised authority under chapter 21 of title 
     18, United States Code and a description of each use of such 
     authority.''.

     SEC. 15. INCREASED PENALTIES FOR CIVIL ACTIONS.

       (a) Increased Penalties.--Subsection (a) of section 110 is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(a) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages 
     equal to the greater of--
       ``(1) if the aggrieved person is a United States person, 
     $10,000 or $1,000 per day for each day of violation; or
       ``(2) for any other aggrieved person, $1,000 or $100 per 
     day for each day of violation;''.
       (b) Reporting Requirement.--Title I of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is amended by inserting 
     after section 110 the following:

     ``SEC. 110A. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVIL ACTIONS.

       ``(a) Report to Congress.--If a court finds that a person 
     has violated this Act in a civil action under section 110, 
     the head of the agency that employs that person shall report 
     to Congress on the administrative action taken against that 
     person pursuant to section 103(m) or any other provision of 
     law.
       ``(b) Report to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.--
     If a court finds that a person has violated this Act in a 
     civil action under section 110, the head of the agency that 
     employs

[[Page H2343]]

     that person shall report the name of such person to the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court shall maintain a list of each 
     person about whom it received a report under this 
     subsection.''.

     SEC. 16. ACCOUNTABILITY STANDARDS FOR INCIDENTS RELATING TO 
                   QUERIES CONDUCTED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
                   INVESTIGATION.

       (a) Requirement for Adoption of Certain Minimum 
     Accountability Standards.--
       (1) Minimum accountability standards.--Subsection (f) of 
     section 702, as amended by this Act, is further amended by 
     inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) Minimum accountability standards.--The Director of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall issue minimum 
     accountability standards that set forth escalating 
     consequences for noncompliant querying of United States 
     person terms within the contents of communications that were 
     acquired under this section. Such standards shall include, at 
     minimum, the following:
       ``(A) Zero tolerance for willful misconduct.
       ``(B) Escalating consequences for unintentional 
     noncompliance, including the threshold for mandatory 
     revocation of access to query information acquired under this 
     section.
       ``(C) Consequences for supervisors who oversee users that 
     engage in noncompliant queries.''.
       (2) Deadlines.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation shall issue the minimum accountability 
     standards required under subsection (f)(4) of section 702 of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1881a).
       (3) Reports.--
       (A) Submission of standards.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees the minimum 
     accountability standards issued under paragraph (1).
       (B) Annual report on implementation.--Not later than 
     December 1, 2024, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit 
     to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     detailing each adverse personnel action taken pursuant to the 
     minimum accountability standards and a description of the 
     conduct that led to each such action.
       (4) Definition of appropriate congressional committees.--In 
     this section, the term ``appropriate congressional 
     committees'' means--
       (A) the congressional intelligence committees, as such term 
     is defined in subsection (b) of section 701 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881); and
       (B) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and of the Senate.

     SEC. 17. REMOVAL OR SUSPENSION OF FEDERAL OFFICERS FOR 
                   MISCONDUCT BEFORE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   SURVEILLANCE COURT.

       (a) Removal or Suspension of Federal Officers for 
     Misconduct Before Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.--
     Section 103, as amended by this Act, is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(m) Removal or Suspension of Federal Officers for 
     Misconduct Before Courts.--An officer or employee of the 
     United States Government who engages in intentional 
     misconduct with respect to proceedings before the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court of Review shall be subject to appropriate 
     adverse actions, including, at minimum, suspension without 
     pay or removal, up to and including termination.''.

     SEC. 18. REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS.

       (a) Notification to Congress of Certain Unauthorized 
     Disclosures.--If the Director of National Intelligence 
     becomes aware of an actual or potential significant 
     unauthorized disclosure or compromise of information acquired 
     under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a), as soon as practicable, but 
     not later than 7 days after the date on which the Director 
     becomes so aware, the Director shall notify the congressional 
     intelligence committees of such actual or potential 
     disclosure or compromise.
       (b) Report on Technology Needed for Near-real Time 
     Monitoring of Federal Bureau of Investigation Compliance.--
       (1) Study required.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
     in coordination with the National Security Agency and in 
     consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall 
     conduct a study on technological enhancements that would 
     enable the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct near-
     real time monitoring of compliance in any system of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation that stores information 
     acquired under section 702. Such study shall consider the 
     potential cost and assess the feasibility of implementation 
     within a period of one year of each technological enhancement 
     under consideration.
       (2) Submission.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit the results of the study to the appropriate 
     congressional committees.
       (3) Definitions.--In this section the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the congressional intelligence committees, as such term 
     is defined in subsection (b) of section 701 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881); and
       (B) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.
       (c) FISA Reform Commission.--
       (1) Establishment.--
       (A) In general.--There is established a commission to 
     consider ongoing reforms to the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
       (B) Designation.--The commission established under 
     subparagraph (A) shall be known as the ``FISA Reform 
     Commission'' (in this section the ``Commission'').
       (2) Membership.--
       (A) Composition.--
       (i) In general.--Subject to clause (ii), the Commission 
     shall be composed of the following members:

       (I) The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
       (II) The Deputy Attorney General.
       (III) The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
       (IV) The Deputy Secretary of State.
       (V) The Chair of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
     Board.
       (VI) Three members appointed by the majority leader of the 
     Senate, in consultation with the Chairman of the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Chairman of 
     the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, 1 of whom shall 
     be a member of the Senate and 2 of whom shall not be.
       (VII) Three members appointed by the minority leader of the 
     Senate, in consultation with the Vice Chairman of the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Ranking 
     Member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, 1 of 
     whom shall be a member of the Senate and 2 of whom shall not 
     be.
       (VIII) Three members appointed by the Speaker of the House 
     of Representatives, in consultation with the Chairman of the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 1 of whom shall be 
     a member of the House of Representatives and 2 of whom shall 
     not be.
       (IX) Three members appointed by the minority leader of the 
     House of Representatives, in consultation with the Ranking 
     Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the House of Representatives and the Ranking Member of the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 1 
     of whom shall be a member of the House of Representatives and 
     2 of whom shall not be.

       (ii) Nonmembers of congress.--

       (I) Qualifications.--The members of the Commission who are 
     not members of Congress and who are appointed under 
     subclauses (VI) through (IX) of clause (i) shall be 
     individuals who are nationally recognized for expertise, 
     knowledge, or experience in--

       (aa) use of intelligence information by the intelligence 
     community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), national policymakers, and 
     military leaders;
       (bb) the implementation, funding, or oversight of the 
     national security laws of the United States;
       (cc) privacy, civil liberties, and transparency; or
       (dd) laws and policies governing methods of electronic 
     surveillance.

       (II) Conflicts of interest.--An official who appoints 
     members of the Commission may not appoint an individual as a 
     member of the Commission if such individual possesses any 
     personal or financial interest in the discharge of any of the 
     duties of the Commission.
       (III) Security clearances.--All members of the Commission 
     described in subclause (I) shall possess an appropriate 
     security clearance in accordance with applicable provisions 
     of law concerning the handling of classified information.

       (B) Co-chairs.--
       (i) In general.--The Commission shall have 2 co-chairs, 
     selected from among the members of the Commission.
       (ii) Agreement.--The individuals who serve as the co-chairs 
     of the Commission shall be agreed upon by the members of the 
     Commission.
       (3) Appointment; initial meeting.--
       (A) Appointment.--Members of the Commission shall be 
     appointed not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (B) Initial meeting.--The Commission shall hold its initial 
     meeting on or before the date that is 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act.
       (4) Meetings; quorum; vacancies.--
       (A) In general.--After its initial meeting, the Commission 
     shall meet upon the call of the co-chairs of the Commission.
       (B) Quorum.--Nine members of the Commission shall 
     constitute a quorum for purposes of conducting business, 
     except that 2 members of the Commission shall constitute a 
     quorum for purposes of receiving testimony.
       (C) Vacancies.--Any vacancy in the Commission shall not 
     affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in 
     which the original appointment was made.
       (D) Quorum with vacancies.--If vacancies in the Commission 
     occur on any day after 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, a quorum shall consist of a majority 
     of the members of the Commission as of such day.
       (5) Duties.--The duties of the Commission are as follows:
       (A) To review the effectiveness of the current 
     implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
       (B) To develop recommendations for legislative action to 
     reform the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) that provide for the effective conduct 
     of United States intelligence activities and the protection 
     of privacy and civil liberties.
       (6) Powers of commission.--
       (A) In general.--
       (i) Hearings.--The Commission or, on the authorization of 
     the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for 
     the purpose of carrying out this section--

       (I) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and 
     places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, and 
     administer such oaths; and
       (II) require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and 
     testimony of such witnesses and

[[Page H2344]]

     the production of such books, records, correspondence, 
     memoranda, papers, and documents, as the Commission or such 
     designated subcommittee or designated member considers 
     necessary.

       (ii) Issuance and enforcement of subpoenas.--

       (I) Issuance.--A subpoena issued under clause (i)(II) 
     shall--

       (aa) bear the signature of the co-chairs of the Commission; 
     and
       (bb) be served by a person or class of persons designated 
     by the co-chairs for that purpose.

       (II) Enforcement.--The provisions of sections 102 through 
     104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 
     192-194) shall apply in the case of any failure of a witness 
     to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under 
     authority of this paragraph.

       (B) Information from federal agencies.--
       (i) In general.--The Commission may secure directly from 
     any executive department, agency, bureau, board, commission, 
     office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the 
     Federal Government information, suggestions, estimates, and 
     statistics for the purposes of this section.
       (ii) Furnishing information.--Each such department, agency, 
     bureau, board, commission, office, establishment, or 
     instrumentality described in clause (i) shall, to the extent 
     authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions, 
     estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon 
     request of the co-chairs of the Commission.
       (iii) Protection of classified information.--The Commission 
     shall handle and protect all classified information provided 
     to it under this section in accordance with applicable 
     provisions of law.
       (C) Assistance from federal agencies.--
       (i) Director of national intelligence.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall provide to the Commission, on a 
     nonreimbursable basis, such administrative services, funds, 
     staff, facilities, and other support services as are 
     necessary for the performance of the duties of the Commission 
     under this section.
       (ii) Attorney general.--The Attorney General may provide 
     the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, with such 
     administrative services, staff, and other support services as 
     the Commission may request.
       (iii) Other departments and agencies.--In addition to the 
     assistance set forth in clauses (i) and (ii), other 
     departments and agencies of the United States may provide the 
     Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other 
     support as such departments and agencies consider advisable 
     and as may be authorized by law.
       (iv) Cooperation.--The Commission shall receive the full 
     and timely cooperation of any official, department, or agency 
     of the Federal Government whose assistance is necessary, as 
     jointly determined by the co-chairs selected under paragraph 
     (2)(B), for the fulfillment of the duties of the Commission, 
     including the provision of full and current briefings and 
     analyses.
       (D) Postal services.--The Commission may use the United 
     States postal services in the same manner and under the same 
     conditions as the departments and agencies of the Federal 
     Governments.
       (E) Gifts.--No member or staff of the Commission may 
     receive a gift or benefit by reason of the service of such 
     member or staff to the Commission.
       (7) Staff of commission.--
       (A) Appointment and compensation of staff.--The co-chairs 
     of the Commission, in accordance with rules agreed upon by 
     the Commission, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a 
     staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary 
     to enable the Commission to carry out its duties, without 
     regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, 
     governing appointments in the competitive service, and 
     without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter 
     III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification 
     and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay 
     fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that 
     payable to a person occupying a position at level V of the 
     Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.
       (B) Detail of government employees.--Any Federal Government 
     employee may be detailed to the Commission without 
     reimbursement from the Commission, and such detailee shall 
     retain the rights, status, and privileges of his or her 
     regular employment without interruption.
       (C) Security clearances.--All staff of the Commission and 
     all experts and consultants employed by the Commission shall 
     possess a security clearance in accordance with applicable 
     provisions of law concerning the handling of classified 
     information.
       (8) Compensation and travel expenses.--
       (A) Compensation of members.--
       (i) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     each member of the Commission may be compensated at not to 
     exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay 
     in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive 
     Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, 
     for each day during which that member is engaged in the 
     actual performance of the duties of the Commission under this 
     title.
       (ii) Exception.--Members of the Commission who are officers 
     or employees of the United States or Members of Congress 
     shall receive no additional pay by reason of their service on 
     the Commission.
       (B) Travel expenses.--While away from their homes or 
     regular places of business in the performance of services for 
     the Commission, a member of the Commission may be allowed 
     travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, 
     in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the 
     Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703 of 
     title 5, United States Code.
       (9) Treatment of information relating to national 
     security.--
       (A) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall assume responsibility for the handling and disposition 
     of any information related to the national security of the 
     United States that is received, considered, or used by the 
     Commission under this title.
       (B) Information provided by congressional intelligence 
     committees.--Any information related to the national security 
     of the United States that is provided to the Commission by a 
     congressional intelligence committee may not be further 
     provided or released without the approval of the chairman of 
     such committee.
       (C) Access after termination of commission.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after the 
     termination of the Commission under paragraph (10)(B), only 
     the members and designated staff of the congressional 
     intelligence committees, the Director of National 
     Intelligence (and the designees of the Director), and such 
     other officials of the executive branch of the Federal 
     Government as the President may designate shall have access 
     to information related to the national security of the United 
     States that is received, considered, or used by the 
     Commission.
       (10) Final report; termination.--
       (A) Final report.--
       (i) Definitions.--In this subparagraph:

       (I) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
     ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--

       (aa) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (bb) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
       (cc) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives.

       (II) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional 
     leadership'' means--

       (aa) the majority leader of the Senate;
       (bb) the minority leader of the Senate;
       (cc) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
       (dd) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
       (ii) Final report required.--Not later than 5 years from 
     the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress, 
     congressional leadership, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and the Attorney General a final report on the 
     findings of the Commission.
       (iii) Form of final report.--The final report submitted 
     pursuant to clause (ii) shall be in unclassified form but may 
     include a classified annex.
       (iv) Assessments of final report.--Not later than 1 year 
     after receipt of the final report under clause (ii), the 
     Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General 
     shall each submit to the appropriate committees of Congress 
     and congressional leadership an assessment of such report.
       (B) Termination.--
       (i) In general.--The Commission, and all the authorities of 
     this section, shall terminate on the date that is 2 years 
     after the date on which the final report is submitted under 
     subparagraph (A)(ii).
       (ii) Wind-down period.--The Commission may use the 2-year 
     period referred to in clause (i) for the purposes of 
     concluding its activities, including providing testimony to 
     Congress concerning the final report referred to in that 
     paragraph and disseminating the report.
       (11) Inapplicability of certain administrative 
     provisions.--
       (A) Federal advisory committee act.--The provisions of the 
     Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not 
     apply to the activities of the Commission under this section.
       (B) Freedom of information act.--The provisions of section 
     552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as 
     the ``Freedom of Information Act''), shall not apply to the 
     activities, records, and proceedings of the Commission under 
     this section.
       (12) Funding.--
       (A) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated funds to the extent and in such amounts as 
     specifically provided in advance in appropriations acts for 
     the purposes detailed in this subsection.
       (B) Availability in general.--Subject to subparagraph (A), 
     the Director of National Intelligence shall make available to 
     the Commission such amounts as the Commission may require for 
     purposes of the activities of the Commission under this 
     section.
       (C) Duration of availability.--Amounts made available to 
     the Commission under subparagraph (B) shall remain available 
     until expended or upon termination under paragraph (10)(B), 
     whichever occurs first.
       (13) Congressional intelligence committees defined.--In 
     this subsection, the term ``congressional intelligence 
     committees'' means--
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (d) Severability; Applicability Date.--
       (1) Severability.--If any provision of this Act, any 
     amendment made by this Act, or the application thereof to any 
     person or circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the 
     remainder of the Act, of any such amendments, and of the 
     application of such provisions to other persons and 
     circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
       (2) Applicability date.--Subsection (f) of section 702 of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1881a), as amended by this Act, shall apply with respect to 
     certifications submitted under subsection (h) of such section 
     to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court after January 
     1, 2024.

     SEC. 19. EXTENSION OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES.

       (a) FISA Amendments Act of 2008.--Section 403(b) of the 
     FISA Amendments Act of 2008

[[Page H2345]]

     (Public Law 110-261; 122 Stat. 2474) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) by striking ``April 19, 2024'' and inserting ``two 
     years after the date of enactment of the Reforming 
     Intelligence and Securing America Act''; and
       (B) by inserting ``and the Reforming Intelligence and 
     Securing America Act'' after ``the FISA Amendments 
     Reauthorization Act of 2017''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2) in the matter preceding subparagraph 
     (A), by striking ``April 19, 2024'' and inserting ``two years 
     after the date of enactment of the Reforming Intelligence and 
     Securing America Act''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 404(b) of the FISA 
     Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-261; 122 Stat. 2476), 
     is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) in the heading, by striking ``April 19, 2024'' and 
     inserting ``Two Years After the Date of Enactment of the 
     Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act''; and
       (B) by inserting ``and the Reforming Intelligence and 
     Securing America Act'' after ``the FISA Amendments 
     Reauthorization Act of 2017'';
       (2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``and the Reforming 
     Intelligence and Securing America Act'' after ``the FISA 
     Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017''; and
       (3) in paragraph (4), by inserting ``and the Reforming 
     Intelligence and Securing America Act'' after ``the FISA 
     Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017'' in each place it 
     appears.

     SEC. 20. AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
                   ACT OF 1978.

       (a) References to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978.--Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in 
     this Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an 
     amendment to, or a repeal of, a section or other provision, 
     the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or 
     other provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
       (b) Effect of Certain Amendments on Conforming Changes to 
     Tables of Contents.--When an amendment made by this Act adds 
     a section or larger organizational unit to the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.), repeals or transfers a section or larger 
     organizational unit in such Act, or amends the designation or 
     heading of a section or larger organizational unit in such 
     Act, that amendment also shall have the effect of amending 
     the table of contents in such Act to alter the table to 
     conform to the changes made by the amendment.

     SEC. 21. REQUIREMENT FOR RECERTIFICATION.

       Notwithstanding any orders or authorizations issued or made 
     under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) during the period beginning on 
     January 1, 2024 and ending on April 30, 2024, no later than 
     90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney 
     General and the Director of National Intelligence shall be 
     required to seek new orders consistent with the provisions of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended 
     by this Act, and thereafter to issue new authorizations 
     consistent with such new orders.


  The Acting CHAIR. No further amendment to the bill, as amended, is in 
order except those printed in House Report 118-46. Each such further 
amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a 
Member designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be 
debatable for the time specified in the report, equally divided and 
controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to 
amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the 
question.


                  Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Biggs

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 
printed in House Report 118-456.
  Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 14, strike line 8 and all that follows through line 10 
     on page 15, and insert the following:
       (a) Prohibition on Warrantless Queries for the 
     Communications of United States Persons.--Section 702(f) of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1881a(f))--
       (1) in paragraph (1)(A) by inserting ``and the limitations 
     and requirements in paragraph (2)'' after ``Constitution of 
     the United States'';
       (2) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (7); and
       (3) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
       ``(2) Prohibition on warrantless queries for the 
     communications and other information of united states 
     persons.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) 
     and (C), no officer or employee of the United States may 
     conduct a query of information acquired under this section 
     for the purpose of finding communications or information the 
     compelled production of which would require a probable cause 
     warrant if sought for law enforcement purposes in the United 
     States, of a United States person.
       ``(B) Exceptions for concurrent authorization, consent, 
     emergency situations, and certain defensive cybersecurity 
     queries.--
       ``(i) In general.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a 
     query related to a United States person if--

       ``(I) such person is the subject of an order or emergency 
     authorization authorizing electronic surveillance or physical 
     search under section 105 (50 U.S.C. 1805) or section 304 (50 
     U.S.C. 1824) of this Act, or a warrant issued pursuant to the 
     Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court of competent 
     jurisdiction;
       ``(II)(aa) the officer or employee conducting the query has 
     a reasonable belief that--

       ``(AA) an emergency exists involving an imminent threat of 
     death or serious bodily harm; and
       ``(BB) in order to prevent or mitigate the threat described 
     in subitem (AA), the query must be conducted before 
     authorization described in subclause (I) can, with due 
     diligence, be obtained; and

       ``(bb) a description of the query is provided to the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the Committees on the Judiciary 
     of the House of Representatives and of the Senate in a timely 
     manner;
       ``(III) such person or, if such person is incapable of 
     providing consent, a third party legally authorized to 
     consent on behalf of such person, has provided consent to the 
     query on a case-by-case basis; or
       ``(IV)(aa) the query uses a known cybersecurity threat 
     signature as a query term;
       ``(bb) the query is conducted, and the results of the query 
     are used, for the sole purpose of identifying targeted 
     recipients of malicious software and preventing or mitigating 
     harm from such malicious software;
       ``(cc) no additional contents of communications acquired as 
     a result of the query are accessed or reviewed; and
       ``(dd) each such query is reported to the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court.

       ``(ii) Limitations.--

       ``(I) Use in subsequent proceedings.--No information 
     acquired pursuant to a query authorized under clause (i)(II) 
     or information derived from the information acquired pursuant 
     to such query may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise 
     disseminated in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or 
     before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, 
     regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of 
     the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, 
     except in a proceeding that arises from the threat that 
     prompted the query.
       ``(II) Assessment of compliance.--Not less frequently than 
     annually, the Attorney General shall assess compliance with 
     the requirements under subclause (I).

       ``(C) Matters relating to emergency queries.--
       ``(i) Treatment of denials.--In the event that a query for 
     communications or information, the compelled production of 
     which would require a probable cause warrant if sought for 
     law enforcement purposes in the United States, of a United 
     States person is conducted pursuant to an emergency 
     authorization described in subparagraph (B)(i)(I) and the 
     subsequent application for such surveillance pursuant to 
     section 105(e) (50 U.S.C. 1805(e)) or section 304(e) (50 
     U.S.C. 1824(e)) of this Act is denied, or in any other case 
     in which the query has been conducted in violation of this 
     paragraph--

       ``(I) no information acquired or evidence derived from such 
     query may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise 
     disseminated in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or 
     before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, 
     regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of 
     the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof; 
     and
       ``(II) no information concerning any United States person 
     acquired from such query may subsequently be used or 
     disclosed in any other manner without the consent of such 
     person, except in the case that the Attorney General approves 
     the use or disclosure of such information in order to prevent 
     death or serious bodily harm to any person.

       ``(ii) Assessment of compliance.--Not less frequently than 
     annually, the Attorney General shall assess compliance with 
     the requirements under clause (i).
       ``(D) Foreign intelligence purpose.--Except as provided in 
     subparagraph (B)(i)(II)-(IV), no officer or employee of the 
     United States may conduct a query of information acquired 
     under this section for the purpose of finding information of 
     a United States person unless the query is reasonably likely 
     to retrieve foreign intelligence information.
       ``(3) Documentation.--No officer or employee of the United 
     States may conduct a query of information acquired under this 
     section for the purpose of finding information of or about a 
     United States person, unless an electronic record is created 
     that includes the following:
       ``(A) Each term used for the conduct of the query.
       ``(B) The date of the query.
       ``(C) The identifier of the officer or employee.
       ``(D) A statement of facts showing that the use of each 
     query term included under subparagraph (A)--
       ``(i) falls within an exception specified in paragraph 
     (2)(B)(i); and
       ``(ii) is--

       ``(I) reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence 
     information; or

[[Page H2346]]

       ``(II) in furtherance of an exception described in 
     subclauses (II) through (IV) of paragraph (2)(B)(i).

       ``(4) Query record system.--The head of each agency that 
     conducts queries shall ensure that a system, mechanism, or 
     business practice is in place to maintain the record 
     described in paragraph (3). Not later than 90 days after 
     enactment of this paragraph, the head of each agency shall 
     report to Congress on its compliance with this procedure.
       ``(5) Prohibition on results of metadata query as a basis 
     for access to communications and other protected 
     information.--If a query of information acquired under this 
     section is conducted for the purpose of finding 
     communications metadata of a United States person and the 
     query returns such metadata, the communications content 
     associated with the metadata may not be reviewed except as 
     provided under paragraph (2)(B)(i) of this subsection.
       ``(6) Federated datasets.--The prohibitions and 
     requirements under this subsection shall apply to queries of 
     federated and mixed datasets that include information 
     acquired under this section, unless each agency has 
     established a system, mechanism, or business practice to 
     limit the query to information not acquired under this 
     section.''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1137, the gentleman 
from Arizona (Mr. Biggs) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.
  Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chairman, to hear the administration tell it, having 
to get a warrant is the end of the world.
  Well, guess what? In literally any other context in which law 
enforcement or intelligence agencies want to read an American's 
communications, they have to get a warrant. That has been the rule for 
over 200 years, and for 46 years the government has had to get a FISA 
title I order to read Americans' communications in a foreign 
intelligence investigation.
  These are investigations in which Americans are suspected of 
terrorism, espionage, cybercrimes--you name it.
  Somehow, a warrant or title I requirement is completely consistent 
with national security in those high-stakes cases, yet the 
administration and those who are opposed to this amendment allege it 
will plunge us into a dystopian nightmare if we apply this same basic 
longstanding protection to section 702 queries where the American often 
isn't even suspected of any wrongdoing at the time of the query.
  I don't buy it, and neither should you.
  Over a decade ago, as my friend Mr. Nadler said just a moment ago, a 
group of intelligence experts unanimously recommended requiring a 
warrant for U.S. person queries of section 702 data.
  That group included Michael Morell, former Acting Director of the 
CIA, and Richard A. Clarke, former Chief Counterterrorism Adviser to 
President George W. Bush--bipartisan--recommended the same thing that 
we have today.
  Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I claim time in opposition.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to this amendment by Mr. 
Biggs.
  First of all, I thank Mr. Biggs. He participated in the working group 
that we had that was joint between the Intelligence Committee and the 
Judiciary Committee that drafted and put together this underlying bill, 
including working directly with the Speaker's Office in the second 
working group that drafted the specific bill, this underlying bill.
  We disagree about his amendment though, which is why we are here on 
the debate.
  This amendment is not about Americans' inboxes and outboxes. This is 
not about Americans' data. This amendment is about Hezbollah's data, 
Hamas' data, and the Communist Chinese Party's data.
  You don't have to take my word for it. Just pick up this amendment. 
Read the front of the amendment. This amendment says that you need to 
get a warrant to go into data collected by 702. The 702 data which we 
all agree--everybody on this floor agrees that 702 data is the 
collection of foreigners abroad. That is Hamas, Hezbollah, the Chinese 
Communist Party, al-Qaida.
  What they want is a warrant to search the inbox and outbox of 
Hezbollah, al-Qaida, and the Chinese Communist Party when they are 
communicating with people in the United States.
  This is dangerous, it will make us go blind, and it will absolutely 
increase their recruitment of people inside the United States--not even 
American citizens--to do terrorist attacks, recruit for espionage, and 
to harm Americans.
  Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Nadler), the cosponsor of this amendment.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this absolutely 
essential amendment.
  In 2021, the intelligence community conducted over 278,000 
inappropriate searches of Americans' private communications. They broke 
the law more than 278,000 times.
  Mr. Biggs and I do not agree on much, but we agree that the status 
quo is unacceptable. Without a probable cause warrant requirement, it 
is clear that the intelligence community will go on breaking the law 
and violating Americans' rights in the process.
  As I have said again and again, if the government wants to peruse the 
private communications of Americans, they can go to title I of FISA. 
Section 702 has fewer privacy protections because it is meant for 
foreigners located overseas--people who do not have constitutional 
rights.
  Any Americans' data we collect under 702 is collected at a standard 
far below the Fourth Amendment, and that should not be.
  I strongly support this amendment, and I encourage my colleagues to 
vote ``yes.''
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Himes), the ranking member of the Intelligence 
Committee.
  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chairman, I thank both the Judiciary Committee and the 
Intelligence Committee for this important debate.
  I sat here and listened to the Judiciary Committee's support for the 
warrant amendment, and the entire argument is constructed on the 
foundation of the notion that U.S. person queries violate the 
Constitution. That is the argument.
  I am not a lawyer, so I tend to defer to my good friends on the 
Judiciary Committee, but I am likely to defer more immediately to the 
people who are charged with defending our constitutional rights in the 
Federal courts. I am going to quote from the PCLOB report here, a 
statement made by the FIS court in April of 2022: ``All three United 
States Circuit Courts of Appeals to consider the issue [the Second, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits] have held that the incidental collection of 
a U.S. person's communications under section 702 does not require a 
warrant and is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.''
  I am not a lawyer, but I am inclined to defer to three separate 
circuits.
  So my friends on Judiciary point to the PCLOB. The gentlewoman from 
Washington (Ms. Jayapal) quoted the chair of the PCLOB. She did it 
right. She was quoting the Chair of the PCLOB in her personal capacity. 
The PCLOB had profound misgivings with their own warrant requirement, 
which was far narrower than the Biggs amendment warrant requirement.

  The two Republican members of the PCLOB wrote a rebuttal of the 
PCLOB's proposal, and I will just quote this. The Republican members--I 
would suggest that I am always amazed by the Chairman of Judiciary's 
alignment with his party. The Republicans said that: ``FISC preapproval 
would most negatively impact the most important and urgent queries--the 
ones that show a connection between foreign targets and U.S. persons, 
the ones that the FBI must review as quickly as possible.''
  Please vote against the Biggs amendment.
  Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chairman, so let's just consider that the Second 
Circuit has said that a Fourth Amendment warrant is appropriate, and 
they haven't finished concluding it. I don't know why Mr. Himes is 
going to just keep riding off on that, but the Second Circuit is still 
considering that.
  Let's take a look at something else. The U.S. person queries designed 
to search for communications between Americans and foreigners who 
happen to be U.S. person targets. That is what we are hearing.

[[Page H2347]]

  So Mr. Turner says the law already requires a warrant to surveil an 
American. When he says ``surveil'' what he is talking about is 
collecting all of an American's communications. In that case, under 
title I a warrant is required.
  A U.S. person query is an attempt to access some of an American's 
communications, namely, those that are incidentally collected under 
section 702 and to do so without a warrant. They can do it right now 
without a warrant.
  That is the distinction that we are getting at.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. TURNER. What Mr. Biggs just said is a great description. If this 
amendment passes, the Chinese Communist Party, Hezbollah, and Hamas get 
to fully recruit in the United States free because we would have to get 
a warrant to monitor them--not to monitor Americans. Already the 
Constitution requires that you have to have a warrant and you have to 
go to court for a warrant because their constitutional rights have been 
protected since the birth of this Nation.
  Americans' inboxes and outboxes are protected by a constitutional 
right for a warrant.

                              {time}  1100

  The inbox and outbox of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Chinese Communist 
Party are not. If they are recruiting into the United States and people 
are communicating back with them, that is not protected speech. If you 
send a thanks for the bomb-making classes email to the head of Hamas, 
that shouldn't take a warrant for us to see because we need to protect 
Americans.
  Now, inside the United States, everybody's communications are 
protected. The Constitution is sound, and since the birth of this 
Nation, we have fought to ensure that. I would say it is the definition 
of a swamp when you stand on this floor and say you are going to give 
the American people something they already have; they have protections 
of their communications. They don't have the protection to be able to 
talk to Hamas and Hezbollah and the Chinese Communist Party and say 
that they are going to be recruited to be a terrorist to do espionage 
or to be a spy. That is what we are talking about.
  There should not be a warrant for those types of communications. We 
wouldn't be able to see them. We would go blind. Our Nation would be 
unsafe.
  Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chair, may I inquire how much time I have remaining.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Jordan), the chairman of the Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Chair, I would just point out that my good friend from Ohio says 
that we are searching foreigners in this database. Well, if we are just 
searching foreigners, why do we have this distinction called ``U.S. 
person queries''?
  If you are just searching the bad guys, that is one thing, but you 
are not or you wouldn't have violated U.S. person inquiries 278,000 
times. That is the fundamental distinction.
  You can search all the bad guys you want--that is what we want. Do 
surveillance on them. They are in the database. You want more about 
them in the database, go do it. But if you want to search an American--
their name, their phone number, their email address--you have to get a 
warrant.
  That is all this does. We shouldn't make it too complicated. That is 
all this does.
  Mr. Himes just used the term, ``U.S. person queries.'' That is not a 
foreigner, that is someone here in the United States who is a person, 
and they are being searched. All we are saying is if you are going to 
do that, go get a warrant from a separate and equal branch of 
government.
  Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chair, I want to just dovetail on that because my 
friend from the Intelligence Committee keeps talking about us not being 
able to look at Hamas or any of these nefarious actors. That is simply 
inaccurate.
  The administration cites multiple examples where using section 702 to 
monitor foreign targets has provided critical intelligence, but when it 
comes to warrantless searches for Americans, they can't provide any 
examples of where they have provided any useful information. Yet, they 
want to continue to look at U.S. persons' information without a 
warrant.
  Mr. Chair, I urge support of my amendment, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Biggs).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arizona will 
be postponed.


                   Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Roy

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 
printed in House Report 118-456.
  Mr. ROY. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 23, insert after line 17 the following:
       (d) Member Access to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
     Review.--The chair and ranking minority member of each of the 
     congressional intelligence committees, the chairs and ranking 
     members of the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and of the Senate, the Majority and Minority 
     Leaders of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives, and the Minority Leader of the House of 
     Representatives shall be entitled to attend any proceeding of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or any proceeding 
     of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. 
     Each person entitled to attend a proceeding pursuant to this 
     paragraph may designate not more than 2 staff members of such 
     committee or office to attend on their behalf, pursuant to 
     such procedures as the Attorney General, in consultation with 
     the Director of National Intelligence may establish.
       Page 45, strike line 16 and all that follows through line 
     17, and insert the following:

     SEC. 11. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
                   AND QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS.

       Page 48, line 14, insert after ``the report.'' the 
     following:
       ``(3) Quarterly report.--Beginning on the date that is not 
     later than 1 year after the effective date of this paragraph, 
     the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall 
     submit a quarterly report to the congressional intelligence 
     committees and to the Committees on the Judiciary of the 
     House of Representatives and of the Senate that includes the 
     number of U.S. person queries conducted during that 
     quarter.''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1137, the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Roy) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. ROY. Mr. Chair, the amendment that I have put forward here 
requires the FBI to report to Congress on a quarterly basis rather than 
an annual basis the number of U.S. person queries conducted.
  We simply want to have more information. We simply want to have the 
ability to look at this and understand whether the FBI is actually 
conducting these the proper way. We think quarterly is more efficient 
and more effective. By the way, we extended it, it does not kick in for 
1 year.
  The FBI was complaining it was too burdensome. The FBI couldn't get 
this done. They got a $200 million new headquarters, but they couldn't 
figure out how to get this done, so we gave them 1 year.
  Great, so you have a year; quarterly reporting.
  It also grants the chairs and ranking members of the Committees on 
Judiciary and Intelligence in the House and the Senate, the ability to 
go to the FISC.
  Now, the problem is the chairman is going to say they oppose this. I 
know this because they put out their propaganda last night saying: This 
amendment would result in an unprecedented expansion of access to 
details on the most sensitive and highly classified current 
intelligence operations being undertaken by the government to numerous 
congressional staff which raises significant counterintelligence 
concerns.
  We can't have congressional staff in the FISC. No, no, no, that would 
be terrible. We don't want to have Article I

[[Page H2348]]

be able to go over and get in front of the FISC and be able to see what 
is happening and protect American citizens. We would rather the intel 
community in all of its infinite wisdom be able to make all of the 
determinations about the security and safety of the American people.
  By the way, we have all the provisions in the language that say that 
it is up to the intel world and the FBI and all the security people to 
set the circumstances and all of the requirements under what the 
congressional staff would have to have in terms of clearances. However, 
to say that we can't have congressional staff be able to observe the 
FISC, to be able to understand what is happening there, and be able to 
come back here so Congress can know what is happening to protect the 
American people is facially absurd.
  Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, the gentleman is correct, the Intelligence 
Committee does oppose this amendment. We oppose this. There was a 
working group that was put together by the Speaker which had two 
Representatives of the Judiciary Committee, two Representatives of the 
Intelligence Committee, two Representatives appointed by the leadership 
and the chair, Mario Diaz-Balart. Every person in that working group 
opposed this amendment.
  Now, the underlying bill already includes a provision of a 
requirement that the FISA court now create transcripts and that those 
transcripts be transmitted to the Congressional committees of 
jurisdiction, which includes Judiciary and Intelligence.
  We will already know what is happening. The difference is whether or 
not you pull up a seat and you eat popcorn while you are watching the 
court.
  I want to go back to the Biggs amendment here for a second because 
the Biggs/Jayapal amendment is really what is dominating this whole 
debate.
  This amendment, if you just read the front page of it, clearly says 
that it is about the intelligence that is gathered from foreigners 
abroad. This is not about Americans' data. Americans' data is safe, 
constitutionally protected. They are inboxed and outboxed. No amendment 
on this floor can change the Constitution. No statute on this floor can 
change the Constitution.
  The statute that we are talking about is 702, which is the spying on 
foreigners abroad.
  Now, everybody in this House is pissed at the FBI and is pissed about 
the abuses that occurred. Punish the FBI. Pass this underlying bill. Do 
not pass the Biggs amendment and cause us to go blind and make America 
less safe.
  Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROY. Mr. Chair, pretty much the entirety of the debate that has 
been done here has been focused on the warrant requirement, right.
  The reason that we have this particular amendment before us right now 
is simply to just be able have more reporting and more understanding of 
what is happening in the FISC. But there is always constant resistance 
by the intelligence community to looking under the hood. Because it is 
always the case that they want to use the fear.
  ``Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is 
to be charged against danger real or pretended from abroad.'' James 
Madison, Thomas Jefferson, May 13, 1798.
  The fact is, the Founders knew precisely what would occur, that the 
government, in the quest to have power in the name of stopping foreign 
adversaries and in the name of fear, would use that power against our 
own citizens. That is what is occurring. That is what is happening.
  We have before us real and obvious abuses--278,000 of those abuses, 
going after the American people. And our response is a bunch of 
technical stuff that chases the actual core problem.
  Our friends don't want to get into peeling back the hood of what is 
happening in the intel community because our friends are the intel 
community.
  Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, in conclusion, as we look at this debate and 
this bill, which is about spying on foreigners abroad, Hezbollah, 
Hamas, the Chinese Communist Party, giving them constitutional 
protections is unprecedented. There is no court that has ever done it. 
There has been no bill that has passed this House that gives 
constitutional protections to foreigners abroad.

  Americans' constitutional rights are preserved in the Constitution. 
This amendment undermines our security by giving Americans' 
constitutional rights here in the United States to foreign adversaries.
  Mr. Chair, I urge a ``no'' vote on the Biggs amendment, and a ``no'' 
vote on this amendment.
  Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROY. Mr. Chair, to be clear, this amendment is about reporting 
requirements. However, on the point of the warrant, after the rampant 
abuses by the Federal Government, it is clear that we should have a 
warrant requirement under 702 to protect Americans from the querying of 
incidental communications collected en masse, under a broad reign of 
power, to target foreign entities. That is the truth.
  This is the FBI that targeted Catholics, put pro-life progressive 
activists in jail, and targeted President Trump.
  The proponents give up the game, saying openly the need to target 
U.S. persons, right here on the floor. The only thing that makes this 
warrantless collection of millions of Americans' international 
communications ``lawful'' is the government's certification that it is 
targeting foreigners and only foreigners.
  If the government changes its mind and wants to go after an American, 
it should have to go back and get the warrant that it skipped on the 
front end. This is not that hard.
  By the way, the argument that we would need 2,000 judges to filter 
through warrant requirements begs the question. Which is it?
  The proponents' own data indicate they would only get a hit for 1 to 
2 percent via metadata. Some of those will have exceptions under our 
warrant amendment that we offered, so it would probably be less than 1 
percent; so the 2,000 judges argument is straight up false. It is just 
not that hard.
  If you want to go after an American, if you want to look at their 
information, get a warrant.
  Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Roy).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas will 
be postponed.


                  Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Cline

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 
printed in House Report 118-456.
  Mr. CLINE. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Add at the end the following:

     SEC. __. REPEAL OF AUTHORITY FOR THE RESUMPTION OF ABOUTS 
                   COLLECTION.

       (a) In General.--Section 702(b)(5) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(b)(5)) 
     is amended by striking ``, except as provided under section 
     103(b) of the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Foreign intelligence surveillance act of 1978.--Section 
     702(m) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1881a(m)) is amended--
       (A) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Reviews, and 
     Reporting'' and inserting ``and Reviews''; and
       (B) by striking paragraph (4).
       (2) FISA amendments reauthorization act of 2017.--Section 
     103 of the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 
     (Public Law 115-118; 50 U.S.C. 1881a note) is amended--
       (A) by striking subsection (b); and
       (B) by striking ``(a) In General.--''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1137, the gentleman 
from Virginia (Mr. Cline) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.

[[Page H2349]]

  

  Mr. CLINE. Mr. Chair, I rise in support of these vital reforms to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, especially section 702.
  While H.R. 7888 in its current form includes many provisions that the 
Judiciary and Intelligence Committees agree on, it falls short of 
preventing numerous documented abuses by our government against U.S. 
citizens.
  Congress must act to protect Americans' privacy and civil rights. To 
do that, any legislation that reauthorizes FISA section 702 must also 
include a warrant requirement for searches of Americans' communications 
collected; an end to the law enforcement and intelligence agencies' 
purchases of Americans' location data and other sensitive information; 
the reporting requirements offered by Congressman Roy and my amendment, 
which would permanently end the practice of ``abouts'' collection, 
which has long been a controversial subject.
  On top of collecting communications to or from the selector of an 
intelligence target, upstream collection of communications from 
companies that operate internet cables that interconnect with ISPs' 
local networks has included the collection of communications about the 
selector.
  FISA court opinions from 2011, since declassified, have shone a light 
on this type of collection and noted that it resulted in the collection 
of ``tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications each year'' by 
the NSA due to what was described then as technical limitations in the 
implementation of ``about'' collection.
  This practice has been halted by the FBI, but they have acknowledged 
that they maintain the right to initiate this upon notification back to 
Congress.
  This must be codified in order to stop this type of abuse from 
occurring, and my amendment would do that.
  Mr. Chair, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. 
Jackson Lee).

                              {time}  1115

  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman very much.
  I am delighted to be able to work with the gentleman from Virginia on 
what I think is crucial to codify, because as you said, the FBI had 
stopped doing it, but here we are again.
  Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. 
Himes), the ranking member on the Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentlewoman from Texas and the 
gentleman from Virginia. I support this amendment and will be 
recommending a ``yes'' vote on this amendment to the minority caucus.
  I surprised the gentleman from Virginia in asking for a minute, 
because I think it is very important that this Chamber not believe that 
this is an argument between civil rights and denigrating civil rights.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman will suspend.
  Does the gentleman from Virginia yield to the gentleman from 
Connecticut?
  Mr. CLINE. I yield to the gentleman.
  The Acting CHAIR. For?
  Mr. CLINE. For 1 minute.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have the time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentlewoman from Texas may not reyield time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have yielded a minute to the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Himes).
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Virginia controls the time.
  Mr. CLINE. If the gentlewoman will yield back, I will yield a minute 
to the gentleman from Connecticut.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. He had yielded to me, but I will be happy to yield 
back so he can get his time.
  Mr. CLINE. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Himes).
  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, again, I think I surprised the gentleman from 
Virginia in saying that I will recommend a ``yes'' vote on this 
amendment because I think it is very, very important that this not 
become a debate between civil rights and perhaps those who are less 
concerned about civil rights.
  I will yield to no one in my defense of the civil rights incorporated 
in our Bill of Rights. I am the ranking member of the Intelligence 
Committee. I spend my days marinating in the depredations that the 
Chinese would visit upon us, but I voted against the TikTok ban because 
I felt it had, and courts have held that it has, First Amendment 
equities at stake.
  This amendment is a good one. ``About'' collection, first of all, is 
not undertaken today by the IC; it is too technically difficult and too 
risky. There is too much of a risk that communications that are not 
about a target to an American get swept up in this ``about'' 
collection.
  I will be adamant and stand with the Second, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits in saying that the Biggs amendment is not addressing 
constitutional issues, but this is an important amendment that I 
support.
  Mr. CLINE. Mr. Chair, I yield such time as she may consume to the 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman from Virginia, the 
home of my alma mater, the University of Virginia School of Law, and 
the gentleman from Connecticut, also the home of my alma mater.
  To be able to find collegiality in a very important question for the 
American people is very much a statement that should be made.
  This amendment does something Congress should have done 7 years ago, 
as I have indicated, prohibiting the government from resuming 
``abouts'' collection, a form of section 702 surveillance that poses a 
unique risk to Americans.
  It is also very disturbing, Mr. Chair, because most Americans would 
scratch their heads and wonder why is this relevant to the immediate 
investigation. ``Abouts'' collection is a collection of communications 
that are neither to nor from an approved target of surveillance under 
702, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, but merely 
contain information relating to that target. That means that you become 
a target because it happened to be sitting around you or it happened to 
be going to you or from you.
  In the past, ``abouts'' collections focused on collecting 
communications that include a target's email or phone, address, Twitter 
handle, or something like that, but in theory ``abouts'' collection 
could be used to collect emails that merely mention a person who is a 
target of 702 surveillance.
  I think it is extremely important to recognize ``merely mentions'' 
that individual, and you could have your materials, your private 
information, wrapped up in a roundup or a lassoing of the extended 
material that is scattered around you, and you could be subject to some 
kind of haul, if you will, a hauling in of data about you.
  Nothing in the text or legislative history of 702 indicates that this 
type of surveillance is authorized. That is why I think this amendment 
with Mr. Cline is extremely important because it shows that we are 
working together.
  Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of the Cline (VA)/Jackson Lee (TX) 
Amendment No. 3 to H.R. 7888--Reforming Intelligence and Securing 
America Act (RISAA).
  This amendment does something Congress should have done seven years 
ago: prohibit the government from resuming ``abouts'' collection, a 
form of Section 702 surveillance that poses unique risks to Americans.
  ``Abouts'' collection is the collection of communications that are 
neither to nor from an approved target of surveillance under Section 
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), but merely 
contain information relating to that target.
  In the past, ``abouts'' collection focused on collecting 
communications that include a target's email address, or phone address, 
or Twitter handle, or something like that. But in theory, ``abouts'' 
collection could be used to collect emails that merely mention a person 
who is a target of Section 702 surveillance.
  Nothing in the text or legislative history of Section 702 indicates 
that this type of surveillance is authorized.
  Under Section 702, the surveillance must target a non-U.S. person 
outside the United States. The term ``target'' has a well-understood 
meaning. When a person is a target, it means the government can collect 
that person's information or other data, not the communications or data 
of other individuals.
  As we all know, ``abouts'' collection under Section 702 has a sordid 
history.
  The National Security Agency (NSA) used ``abouts'' collection when it 
was conducting upstream surveillance, in

[[Page H2350]]

other words, when it was intercepting communications directly as they 
transited over the Internet backbone, rather than collecting stored 
communications from service providers.
  Not surprisingly, this practice resulted in the collection of tens of 
thousands of purely domestic communications--communications between and 
among Americans inside the United States.
  Moreover, often these Americans were not even discussing the target. 
Instead, their communications were lumped in with other communications, 
transiting over the Internet backbone as a packet. The NSA was 
collecting the entire packet of communications, simply because 
somewhere in that packet was a reference to information about a target.
  This was a problem from the moment Section 702 went into effect in 
2008. And yet for years, the government did not disclose this problem 
to the FISA Court.
  To the contrary, the government affirmatively misrepresented how the 
program was working. It was not until 2011 that the court learned the 
government was sweeping in tens of thousands of purely domestic 
communications.
  The court was livid. It noted that the belated disclosure, and I 
quote, ``marks the third instance in less than three years in which the 
government has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding the 
scope of a major collection program.''
  At the time, the court chose not to prohibit the use of ``abouts'' 
collection. But it held that special minimization rules were required 
for upstream communications, and that without those rules, the program 
would violate both Section 702 and the Fourth Amendment. One of those 
rules was a prohibition on U.S. person queries of communications 
obtained through upstream surveillance.
  Five years later, the NSA discovered that its agents had been 
routinely violating this prohibition. But rather than immediately 
report these violations to the FISA Court, the NSA waited for several 
months. When it finally admitted the violations, the FISA Court 
chastised the NSA for its ``institutional lack of candor,'' and refused 
to approve the continuation of Section 702 surveillance until the NSA 
cleaned up its act.
  The NSA proved incapable of bringing its agents into compliance. The 
agents continued to routinely search though the upstream data in an 
effort to find and review Americans' communications, in violation of 
Section 702, the Fourth Amendment, and the FISA Court's orders. Well 
aware that the court would not continue to approve Section 702 
surveillance under these conditions, the NSA, in 2017, made the only 
decision it could: it terminated ``abouts'' collection.
  Well, it has now been seven years since the NSA stopped ``abouts'' 
collection, and the government has not claimed that ending this 
practice has resulted in a loss of critical intelligence or had any 
other kind of negative impact on national security. No official has 
pointed to a single bad result that could have been averted through the 
use of ``abouts'' collection.
  Collecting communications that are neither to nor from an approved 
target of surveillance is contrary to the text and intent of Section 
702.
  It inevitably results in the collection of wholly domestic 
communications, which Section 702 expressly prohibits.
  Over the course of a decade, the NSA proved that it was incapable of 
operating ``abouts'' surveillance responsibly and in accordance with 
the law--and the past seven years shown that ``abouts'' collection is 
not necessary for national security.
  It is time for Congress to shut the door on ``abouts'' collection.
  In the future, if the government can show that it needs ``abouts'' 
collection for national security purposes and that it can operate the 
program without violating the law and the Fourth Amendment, it can come 
to Congress and ask for authorization. But the burden should be on the 
government to show the need and the ability to lawfully conduct the 
program.
  For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the 
Cline/Jackson Lee Amendment No. 3.
  Mr. Chair, I include in the record a letter from Representative Cline 
and myself listing the groups in support of this amendment.

                                Congress of the United States,

                                   Washington, DC, April 12, 2024.
       Dear Colleague: Please join us in supporting our amendment 
     to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America 
     Act. Rules Amendment No. 5 would end what is known as 
     ``abouts'' collection, which involves the capturing of 
     massive amounts of communications by government agencies such 
     as the National Security Agency (NSA) in which the selector, 
     for example, an email address, of a target appears somewhere 
     in communications, even if that target is not a party to the 
     communications. It has long been controversial.
       The FISA Court previously discovered that the government 
     had misrepresented its activities and held that handling this 
     type of data was of significant concern and a violation of 
     the Fourth Amendment. Although the NSA abandoned the practice 
     of ``abouts'' collection in 2017, Congress in 2018 amended 
     FISA to prohibit this type of collection unless the AG and 
     DNI notify the House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary 
     Committees of its plans to resume such collection. But that 
     only means that if the NSA notifies Congress, they can resume 
     ``abouts'' collection at any time. Our amendment would 
     proactively end the practice for good.
       The following groups support this important amendment:
       Freedom Works--Key Vote; Due Process Institute; Americans 
     for Prosperity; Project for Privacy and Surveillance 
     Accountability; Reform Government Surveillance; Center for 
     Democracy and Technology; American Civil Liberties Union; 
     Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC); Restore the 
     Fourth; Defending Rights & Dissent; Brennan Center for 
     Justice; Wikimedia Foundation.
       Demand Progress; Electronic Frontier Foundation; Project on 
     Government Oversight; United We Dream; Asian Americans 
     Advancing Justice; Muslim Advocates; Free Press Action; 
     National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Freedom of 
     the Press Foundation; New America's Open Technology 
     Institute; Fight for the Future; Stop AAPI Hate.
       We urge you to vote in favor of Amendment No. 5.
           Sincerely,
                                                        Ben Cline,
                                               Member of Congress.
                                               Sheila Jackson Lee,
                                               Member of Congress.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman from Virginia has 
expired.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition because the 
National Security Agency stopped ``abouts'' collection in 2017 because 
it was fraught with peril. This amendment is not necessary because the 
intelligence community is not doing this and hasn't been doing it since 
2017.
  I do want to go back and assist somewhat in the debate of some of the 
terms that are occurring with respect to the Biggs-Jayapal amendment.
  The Biggs-Jayapal amendment, as I indicated, would make us go blind. 
It would make it so that we can't read the inboxes and outboxes of 
foreigners abroad who are al-Qaida, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Chinese 
Communist Party.
  The reason I say that is because 702, which is the underlying bill 
here that is being reauthorized, is tailored only to the adversaries 
and those who want to do us harm. It is for national security threats. 
It is for our adversaries. Their inbox and their outbox are not 
protected. If you are a terrorist or if you are committing espionage or 
you are a spy and you are communicating with the Chinese Communist 
Party or Hezbollah, Hamas, or al-Qaida, right now, because we are 
spying on them, we can read those communications. America wants us to 
read those communications because it is how we keep America safe.
  On 9/11, we had terrorists inside the United States. For all intents 
and purposes, as people were saying in this debate, they were 
Americans. They weren't American citizens, but under this law, they 
were Americans and they had protection under the Constitution. Their 
communications to al-Qaida were not protected. At that time, we weren't 
looking. We were not looking. We were blind and we were not listening.
  Now, we are looking. If somebody is in this country and they are a 
terrorist or they are a spy for the Chinese Communist Party, we are 
looking at the Chinese Communist Party and al-Qaida. In reading those, 
we can take those to a court and get a warrant and then keep America 
safe from people who are here who intend to do us harm. This would shut 
that off. It would

[[Page H2351]]

make us be blind with respect to those communications.
  Mr. Chair, vote ``no'' on the Biggs-Jayapal amendment, and vote 
``no'' on this amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Cline).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Crenshaw

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 
printed in House Report 118-456.
  Mr. CRENSHAW. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Add at the end the following new section:

     SEC. __. INCLUSION OF COUNTERNARCOTICS IN DEFINITION OF 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 101(e)(1) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; or'' and inserting 
     a semicolon; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(D) international production, distribution, or financing 
     of illicit synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or other drugs 
     driving overdose deaths, or precursors of any aforementioned; 
     or''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1137, the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Crenshaw) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. CRENSHAW. Mr. Chair, I want to let my fellow Americans know 
something that might shock them.
  We all know that fentanyl is a scourge on our country. We all know 
that fentanyl is produced by the Mexican drug cartels. We all know that 
the precursor chemicals for fentanyl come from Chinese companies.
  What you might not know is that we can't even get a FISA warrant to 
stop that, to collect intelligence on those production companies, on 
those attorneys, on those bankers, on those facilitators that help the 
cartels murder and poison tens of thousands of Americans every single 
year.
  That is a pretty shocking statement. I bet you didn't know that. You 
should know that.
  FISA, despite all of the misinformation put out about it, is actually 
very narrowly tailored. It only allows you to get a warrant on a 
foreigner in foreign land if it is related to foreign intelligence, if 
it is related to countering weapons of mass destruction, or if it is 
related to counterterrorism. Nowhere in there is there anything about 
counternarcotics, the thing that is actually killing Americans today 
and every single day.
  My amendment would simply upgrade that categorization to ensure that 
we can collect intelligence on the Chinese precursor being shipped into 
Mexico and into our own country so that we can actually stop the death 
of Americans.
  It is a very narrowly tailored amendment. It is not about all drug 
traffickers. It does not swoop in a bunch of Americans. It is about 
international drug traffickers trafficking illicit synthetics that are 
killing people.
  It is a very simple amendment. It is a bipartisan amendment. It is 
one of the biggest things that I have learned in my role as chairman on 
the cartel task force, that we actually are blind to the supply chains 
of fentanyl.
  To be against this amendment is to say we should give the cartels and 
China more Fourth Amendment rights and more First Amendment rights than 
we have. That is what it would mean in practice. I hope that anyone who 
votes against this amendment stops talking about the cartels being a 
problem. If we are not even allowed to collect intelligence on the 
cartels, then what are we doing?
  Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania 
(Ms. Houlahan).
  Ms. HOULAHAN. Mr. Chair, today, I also rise in support of this 
important amendment that will help our intelligence community, 
strengthen our southern border, and save American lives.
  This amendment will fully enlist our country's intelligence agencies 
in the fight against foreign drug traffickers. Foreign-made fentanyl is 
killing tens of thousands of Americans every year. It is critical that 
we start treating this danger as the very serious national threat that 
it is.
  My legislation, which is called the Enhancing Intelligence Collection 
on Foreign Drug Traffickers Act, is now the bipartisan amendment that 
is led by myself and Mr. Crenshaw. This would allow our intelligence 
community to counter drug cartels as they attempt to bring deadly 
fentanyl to our shores.
  Today, the intelligence community can only leverage section 702 
against counternarcotics targets under one of the existing 
certifications, none of which are focused currently on drug 
trafficking.
  This amendment would close that gap, without expanding domestic law 
enforcement's abilities to police drug dealers, in order to keep 
fentanyl from ever reaching the United States.
  Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to pass this legislation, to pass the 
counternarcotics amendment led by myself and Mr. Crenshaw, and to 
reject any amendment that would put our national security at risk.
  Mr. CRENSHAW. Mr. Chair, to those opposed to the underlying bill, I 
understand. We are going to have to agree to disagree, but I cannot 
imagine being opposed to this amendment, even if you vote against the 
overall bill.
  I thought we all agreed that the cartels are one of our number one 
threats. They are killing tens of thousands of Americans every year by 
poisoning them with fentanyl. We need to know how they are doing it. We 
need to know who their suppliers are. We need to know who is laundering 
their money. We can't know that within our current law. All we have to 
do is allow ourselves to do it.
  This is one of the most important things that I think our 
constituents actually care about. If we are going to act like we have 
sympathy for the sons and daughters who have been killed from an 
overdose of fentanyl, then we actually have to take action on it.
  I have got to say, too, that the warrant amendment would kill our 
ability to do this. Remember, the whole point of drug trafficking is to 
get it in the United States.
  The whole point of terrorism is to conduct a terrorist attack here in 
the United States.
  When you are collecting intelligence on foreigners, the only way they 
do those things is to communicate with entities inside the United 
States. To demand a secondary warrant just to search that communication 
kills our ability to connect those dots.
  Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BISHOP of North Carolina. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in 
opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from North Carolina is recognized for 
5 minutes.
  Mr. BISHOP of North Carolina. Mr. Chair, the Crenshaw amendment would 
expand FISA's definition of foreign intelligence to encompass 
international drug crimes.
  FISA is a counterintelligence and counterterrorism tool. It is 
limited to that purpose. The clear distinction between foreign 
intelligence and crime are essential to preserving the fundamental 
liberties of Americans under our constitutional system.

                              {time}  1130

  It is the essential design of the law: spying abroad, criminal 
justice at home.
  Simply redefining foreign intelligence to include ordinary crime 
eviscerates the entire distinction on which the design of the FISA law 
rests.
  Moreover, the Intelligence Committee proponents of this amendment 
fail even to explain to us why this blurred definition is needed. They 
assert it, but they don't explain it.
  After all, the DNI's FISA section 702 fact sheet lists the 
government's use of section 702 to learn about our adversaries' plans 
to smuggle fentanyl into the United States as the number one successful 
use of existing section 702.
  If section 702 already allows us to go after fentanyl, then why do we 
need to change and blur the critical definition of foreign 
intelligence? What is the purpose of doing so? What comes next?
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has the only time remaining.
  Mr. BISHOP of North Carolina. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Roy).

[[Page H2352]]

  

  Mr. ROY. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman from North Carolina for 
yielding.
  I will just note that I certainly appreciate the intent of my friend 
and colleague from Texas. Obviously, we want to go after cartels, and 
we want to make sure we can stop the flow of fentanyl into our 
communities that is killing and ravaging Texans and Americans across 
our country.
  The problem here is it is unnecessary. They can go certify right now. 
They can go right now and certify a whole other class. We don't need 
this law to do that. That is the important part. We don't need this 
amendment, and we don't need to risk expanding it.
  Be that as it may, here is my real problem. Just today we have 
information where we had a terrorist on an Afghan watch list who was 
released into San Antonio, Texas. ICE just walked away from it, and now 
we have somebody on the terrorist watch list sitting in San Antonio, 
Texas.
  So am I supposed to say I want to grant more power to the 
intelligence community and more power to the government that is 
releasing terrorists as we speak onto the streets of Texas? It defies 
any kind of logic.
  They have the tools to do what they need to go after fentanyl without 
expanding FISA, which is being abused against Americans.
  By the way, Mr. Chair, you need the warrant requirement in order to 
protect against expansion of FISA.
  Mr. BISHOP of North Carolina. Mr. Chair, everyone agrees that the 
fentanyl crisis is a terrible and serious public health and crime 
issue, but a mass, warrantless surveillance tool created by word games 
is not the answer. It is dangerous.
  Indeed, the willingness and desire of some to create exactly that 
points back to the reason that Congress must impose a warrant 
requirement to deter the abuse of the section 702 foreign intelligence 
database collected to surveil foreigners abroad to permit backdoor 
searches against Americans. That is the issue.
  Oppose the Crenshaw amendment and support the Biggs amendment to make 
them get a warrant.
  Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Crenshaw).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. CRENSHAW. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas will 
be postponed.


                  amendment no. 5 offered by Mr. Waltz

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 
printed in House Report 118-456.
  Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Add at the end the following new section:

     SEC. ___. VETTING OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS.

       Subsection (f) of section 702, as amended by this Act, is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(6) Vetting of non-united states persons.--For any 
     procedures for one or more agencies adopted under paragraph 
     (1)(A), the Attorney General, in consultation with the 
     Director of National Intelligence, shall ensure that the 
     procedures enable the vetting of all non-United States 
     persons who are being processed for travel to the United 
     States using terms that do not qualify as United States 
     person query terms under this Act.''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1137, the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Waltz) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of my amendment to permit the use 
of 702 information to vet foreign nationals entering the United States. 
This amendment enables the thorough vetting of all foreigners being 
processed for traveling to the United States, whether that is a foreign 
national applying for a visa, applying for legal immigration, or 
illegally crossing our southern border.
  This is what I think a lot of Americans probably don't realize: 
Currently, section 702 has only been authorized to collect information 
to support some Department of Homeland Security efforts to screen and 
vet foreign persons applying for travel or immigration to the United 
States. This amendment will enhance the vetting of all foreigners who 
come here.
  If national security concerns are found through this vetting, these 
results will be provided to the Department of Homeland Security, the 
State Department, and the Department of Defense to ensure the Federal 
Government is making the most informed decision before we allow foreign 
nationals' admission.
  Mr. Chair, we are 3 years into the worst crisis at the southern 
border in the history of the United States. Last year, Customs and 
Border Protection reported 2\1/2\ million encounters with people 
attempting to cross into the United States from Mexico. Alarmingly, 
over the last 2 years, CBP has apprehended more than 70,000 special 
interest aliens, people from countries identified as having conditions 
that promote or protect terrorism.
  Mr. Chair, the FBI Director is ringing the alarm bell with the over 
300 people on the terrorist watch list who are now somewhere in America 
compared to just 12 under the last administration. This population 
includes 538 aliens from Syria and 659 aliens from Iran, two state 
sponsors of terrorism, I might add, in addition to 139 from Yemen, 
which right now houses the Houthis, and over 1,600 from Pakistan. We 
just saw ISIS-K attack Moscow. We have just seen six plots stopped in 
Europe, and I fear that we are about to suffer another attack like San 
Bernardino, like Pulse nightclub, or, God forbid, another 9/11.
  Equally concerning, the fastest growing group entering through our 
southern border is now from China, our number one adversary. Over 
24,000 Chinese nationals have been apprehended at the southern border 
just in the last year. Of the 1.3 million illegal immigrants in the 
United States with deportation orders, over 100,000 are Chinese 
nationals.
  The American people expect us to use every tool we legally can, every 
intelligence piece of equipment and every database that we can, to 
protect them against foreigners who would mean us harm.
  Mr. Chair, we have these tools. We have reformed the abuses of these 
tools, and we have to allow our national security professionals to have 
the best information possible to keep Americans safe. We can't wait 
until there is another attack and then throw up our hands in this body 
and say: Why didn't we stop it?
  I am astounded, frankly, that anyone, any Republican, would oppose 
this amendment after we have been here time and time again saying that 
we have to protect our border, that we have to protect Americans, and 
that if you want to come to the United States, then, fine, you need to 
do so legally, but we are going to look into your background, we are 
going to make sure you are not a terrorist, and we are going to make 
sure you are not a Chinese national spy who means to do us harm.
  Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this and use every tool we 
can to keep Americans safe, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, now they want to expand it. This is the second 
amendment in a row where they are going to expand FISA.
  We can't have a warrant for the existing program, this giant haystack 
of information. You can't have a warrant when you go search American 
citizens there, but now they want to expand it and tell us you still 
can't have a warrant.
  Holy cow. Pretty soon, this is going to be everybody gets searched 
for any darned reason they want. That is not how it works in America, 
at least it is not how it is supposed to work.
  The third amendment is going to expand it, too. We spent all morning 
talking about the warrant requirement, which should be so obvious, and 
they want to expand it.
  Mr. Chair, I understand we have a border problem. Holy cow, do we 
understand that. I may not agree with my

[[Page H2353]]

Democratic colleagues on how to fix it. In fact, I know I don't, but 
expanding FISA, you have to be kidding me. This amendment authorizes 
surveillance of a whole new category of individuals.
  We should absolutely vet foreigners who seek to enter the United 
States, whether legally or illegally, but Congress should not expand 
FISA or section 702 beyond its current scope of authority.
  This whole year, we have been focusing our committee on limiting FISA 
and reining it in so that we still can do what we needs to be done: 
look after bad guys and look at bad guys but not infringe on Americans' 
liberties. This just expands it. That is not what the purpose of this 
bill is.
  We should address the border problem. Holy cow, our committee spent a 
boatload of time on it. That is an issue where, unfortunately, we 
didn't get a 35-2 vote on H.R. 2, which is a good piece of legislation.
  This is going to sweep up so many more Americans, where the FBI 
278,000 times illegally--not illegally but didn't follow their own 
rules when they queried the database. Now, they have even more.
  Holy cow, Mr. Chair, this is the wrong way to go.
  Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. 
Jayapal).
  Ms. JAYAPAL. Mr. Chair, I rise in strong opposition to this 
amendment, and, yes, I agree with Chairman Jordan on an immigration 
amendment because this is an expansion of the government's ability to 
surveil. We have this opportunity right here in Congress today to add 
critical safeguards and not expand the government's use of this 
surveillance authority.
  This inexcusable expansion of FISA will further increase warrantless 
surveillance, and it is at the expense of a whole slew of innocent 
immigrants.
  People seeking to come to this country are not monolithic communities 
cut off from Americans. Many of them are close family members of U.S. 
citizens seeking reunification through family sponsorship or just a 
simple visit. Many others are sponsored by U.S. employers.
  There is already ample vetting of immigrants. Just look at refugees, 
who are the most vetted group of people who come to this country. It 
takes years of vetting through multiple agencies, including the FBI, 
the National Counterterrorism Center, and other agencies.
  This amendment is only going to make these processing backlogs worse. 
It will further delay American businesses from getting the workers we 
need to maintain our competitiveness and our ability to attract the 
best and the brightest. It could harm local economies that rely on 
tourism as delays in processing travel visas deter people from travel 
to America.
  We should not be expanding FISA. We should be creating safeguards to 
protect foundational civil liberties rights.
  Earlier, one of my colleagues claimed that not a single Federal court 
has identified a Fourth Amendment issue with U.S. person queries. Mr. 
Chair, that is false. In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit found Fourth Amendment concerns with U.S. person queries, and 
that issue is still being debated.
  We are talking about an average of 500 warrantless searches of 
Americans' private communications every single day. Don't take it from 
me.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
  Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the 
gentlewoman from Washington.
  Ms. JAYAPAL. Here is a quote from Travis LeBlanc, a Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board member:

       Although section 702 is touted as a foreign intelligence 
     tool, it is apparent that a key feature is domestic 
     intelligence and criminal law enforcement. For example, DOJ 
     reported that the FBI queried over 19,000 donors to a 
     congressional campaign. The FBI also has run numerous 
     improper queries of social advocates, religious community 
     leaders, and even individuals who provide tips or who are 
     victims of crime. Five million warrantless searches by the 
     FBI of Americans' private communications is 5 million too 
     many.

  Vote ``no'' on this amendment.
  Mr. JORDAN. I will close my time by saying, Mr. Chairman, every time 
you expand FISA, you underscore the need for a warrant. The bigger and 
bigger this database gets and the more that U.S. persons are going to 
be searched, you underscore the need for a warrant, which we spent a 
whole morning debating.
  Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Chair, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Florida has 1 minute remaining.
  Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Chair, I find it astounding the leader of the 
Progressive Caucus, Ms. Jayapal, and Mr. Jordan agree on these issues.
  Mr. Chair, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Turner).
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, we had Members stand and say that they are for 
vetting foreigners who want to come into the United States. I assume we 
should vet them for whether or not they have ties to terrorist groups 
and organizations. Perhaps we should just ask them because I am sure 
they will tell us the truth, but they won't, which is why we have 702. 
Section 702 collects information on foreigners abroad and terrorist 
groups and organizations.
  What this amendment does is it allows us to search Hamas on these 
individuals who want to come into the United States, to find out if 
they are affiliated with Hamas because they are not just going to tell 
us.

                              {time}  1145

  If my colleagues are for vetting, my colleagues are for vetting, 
looking at terrorist groups and organizations to see if they have ties 
to people who are trying to come into the United States.
  Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Waltz).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Ms. JAYAPAL. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida will 
be postponed.


                 Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Turner

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 
printed in House Report 118-456.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Add at the end the following new section:

     SEC. __. DEFINITION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION SERVICE 
                   PROVIDER.

       (a) Section 701(b)(4) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (F);
       (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``; or'' and inserting 
     a semicolon;
       (3) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(E) any other service provider who has access to 
     equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store 
     wire or electronic communications, but not including any 
     entity that serves primarily as--
       ``(i) a public accommodation facility, as that term is 
     defined in section 501(4);
       ``(ii) a dwelling, as that term is defined in section 802 
     of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3602);
       ``(iii) a community facility, as that term is defined in 
     section 315 of the Defense Housing and Community Facilities 
     and Services Act of 1951 (42 U.S.C. 1592n); or
       ``(iv) a food service establishment, as that term is 
     defined in section 281 of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 
     1946 (7 U.S.C. 1638); or'';
       (4) in subparagraph (F), as redesignated--
       (A) by inserting ``custodian,'' after ``employee,'';
       (B) by striking ``or'' before ``(D)''; and
       (C) by inserting ``, or (E)'' after ``(D)''.
       (b) Paragraph (6) of section 801 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (E) and (F) as 
     subparagraphs (F) and (G), respectively;
       (2) in subparagraph (F), as redesignated, by striking ``; 
     or'' and inserting a semicolon;
       (3) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(E) any other service provider who has access to 
     equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store 
     wire or electronic communications, but not including any 
     entity that serves primarily as--
       ``(i) a public accommodation facility, as that term is 
     defined in section 501(4);
       ``(ii) a dwelling, as that term is defined in section 802 
     of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3602);
       ``(iii) a community facility, as that term is defined in 
     section 315 of the Defense Housing and Community Facilities 
     and Services Act of 1951 (42 U.S.C. 1592n); or

[[Page H2354]]

       ``(iv) a food service establishment, as that term is 
     defined in section 281 of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 
     1946 (7 U.S.C. 1638);''; and
       (4) in subparagraph (G), as redesignated--
       (A) by inserting ``custodian,'' after ``employee,'';
       (B) by striking ``or'' before ``(E)''; and
       (C) by inserting ``, or (F)'' after ``(E)''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1137, the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Turner) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, there is a SCIF off of the House floor to 
provide additional information to Members that I am not able to present 
here.
  This amendment is to correct a technical issue that was found by the 
FISA court with respect to critical intelligence and a technological 
issue in which there was a gap.
  Again, 702 is about collecting data and information on foreigners 
abroad. You have to be both. You have to be a foreigner, and you have 
to be abroad. You can't be a foreigner in the United States, and you 
can't be an American abroad. It is about foreigners abroad.
  There have been people who have been saying on this amendment that 
this is about collecting at your local Starbucks, this is about 
collecting at your local McDonald's. It is not. It is about foreigners 
abroad.
  I end with this: With respect to the Biggs-Jayapal amendment, this 
important surveillance tool of foreigners abroad is limited to just 
foreigners abroad and individuals who are in the United States who are 
being recruited by terrorist groups and organizations and the Chinese 
Communist Party when they communicate with them and their 
communications end up in the inboxes of the Chinese Communist Party, 
Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaida.
  If we are reading the inbox of al-Qaida, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the 
Chinese Communist Party, and there is an email in there from somebody 
located in the United States because they are being recruited, either 
to do espionage, or because they are being recruited for terrorism, my 
colleagues want the government to read that.
  Now, our constitutional protections, which we dearly uphold here and 
everybody is committed to, is that no American shall have their inbox, 
their outbox, their electronic communications, and their data spied on 
by their government. Our constitutional protections require that there 
be a warrant, and no one should stand in this well and pretend that 
they do not.
  There are constitutional protections for American communications 
within their data. However, if a person located in the United States is 
communicating with al-Qaida, Hamas, and the Chinese Communist Party, in 
this limited group of people that we collect under 702, they can pose a 
threat to this country.
  Additionally, if the Biggs-Jayapal amendment passes, we will go dark. 
We will no longer see solicitations from the Chinese Communist Party to 
students in the United States to go and spy for them.
  We will no longer see al-Qaida recruiting people in the United States 
to undertake terrorist attacks.
  We will no longer see people who are sympathetic with Hamas, who 
contact Hamas and say: How can I perpetrate a terrorist attack in the 
United States?
  It is imperative that the Biggs-Jayapal amendment fail and that this 
underlying bill, which punishes the FBI but protects the American 
people, pass.
  Mr. Chair, I urge passage of this bill and a ``no'' vote on the 
Biggs-Jayapal amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. Chair, like all the amendments offered by HPSCI, this amendment 
drastically expands the scope of FISA. This amendment will actually 
change the definition of ``electronic communication service provider'' 
to require a whole new class of businesses and other entities to assist 
in FISA section 702 surveillance.
  When the amendment first came out 1\1/2\ months ago, it caused a 
massive commotion, as can be imagined. One of the FISA amici did 
something highly unusual. He went public with a warning. He confirmed 
that the amendment originally was exactly as broad as it looked, in 
that it could force hotels, libraries, and coffee shops to serve as 
surrogate spies because, of course, customers in those establishments 
might well be engaging in international communications, which would 
transit over the WiFi equipment in those locations. That was the 
original.
  Therefore, the amendment sponsors threw in an exemption for hotels, 
libraries, coffee shops and a handful of other establishments, but that 
hardly solves the problem because the vast majority of U.S. businesses 
are not exempted. Hence, the amendment would still apply to grocery 
stores, department stores, hardware stores, barber shops, laundromats, 
fitness centers, nail salons.
  Perhaps most worrisome of all, it would apply to business landlords 
who rent out office space and provide WiFi for their building. That 
would include the offices that many of us in this room go to when we 
are back in our districts, as well as the offices of tens of millions 
of Americans across the country, offices for lawyers, journalists, 
nonprofits, and others.
  That is how expansive this amendment is. That is why we should defeat 
this amendment.
  Mr. Chair, I have enjoyed all the attention the Biggs-Jayapal-Jordan-
Nadler-Davidson-Lofgren amendment has received. It has been flattering 
that, on every other amendment and the underlying bill, we don't talk 
about any of that other stuff, and we talk about the warrants.
  That gets to the reality of the situation. The intelligence community 
wants control. They want to continue to have control without any 
checks.
  The Biggs amendment does not require a warrant for the government to 
surveil foreigners in foreign countries or to incidentally collect the 
communication of Americans under section 702.
  Let me repeat that. The amendment does not require a warrant for the 
government to surveil foreigners in foreign countries, nor does it 
require a warrant for incidentally collecting the communications of 
Americans under section 702. It just doesn't, but that is what was 
heard.
  Instead, it requires that the Federal Government and the spying and 
surveillance apparatus get a warrant if they want to read an American's 
communications or query them in the 702 database. That is what the 
essence of this is.
  They don't want to have to get a warrant. They are okay with getting 
a warrant under title I of FISA, but not under 702 for some reason. It 
is very odd.
  Additionally, not only do they not want to get a warrant, but they 
want to expand the database and the scope of the Americans that they 
can scoop up in that database to include, in this particular amendment, 
virtually every retail outlet in the country, virtually every 
commercial enterprise in the country, virtually every commercial 
property in this country, but we don't want to have a warrant if we are 
going to look into U.S. persons' information. We don't want to do that. 
After all, that might cause them to actually develop information and 
investigate further.
  Let me tell you something. This underlying bill loses its quality if 
the Biggs amendment on the warrant amendment doesn't pass.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Ellzey). The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio will be 
postponed.


                    Announcement by the Acting Chair

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings 
will now resume on those amendments printed in House Report 118-456 on 
which further proceedings were postponed, in the following order:
  Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Biggs of Arizona.
  Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Roy of Texas.
  Amendment No. 4 by Mr. Crenshaw of Texas.
  Amendment No. 5 by Mr. Waltz of Florida.

[[Page H2355]]

  Amendment No. 6 by Mr. Turner of Ohio.
  The Chair will reduce to 2 minutes the minimum time for any 
electronic vote after the first vote in this series.


                  Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Biggs

  The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on amendment No. 1, printed in House Report 118-456, 
offered by the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Biggs), on which further 
proceedings were postponed and on which the ayes prevailed by voice 
vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 212, 
noes 212, not voting 13, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 114]

                               AYES--212

     Adams
     Alford
     Allen
     Amodei
     Armstrong
     Arrington
     Baird
     Balint
     Banks
     Bean (FL)
     Beatty
     Bentz
     Bergman
     Biggs
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (NC)
     Blumenauer
     Boebert
     Bonamici
     Bost
     Bowman
     Brecheen
     Brown
     Burchett
     Burlison
     Bush
     Cammack
     Cardenas
     Carey
     Casar
     Castro (TX)
     Cherfilus-McCormick
     Chu
     Ciscomani
     Clarke (NY)
     Cline
     Cloud
     Clyde
     Collins
     Comer
     Correa
     Crane
     Crockett
     Curtis
     Davidson
     Davis (IL)
     DeGette
     DelBene
     Deluzio
     DeSaulnier
     DesJarlais
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donalds
     Duncan
     Dunn (FL)
     Edwards
     Emmer
     Escobar
     Espaillat
     Evans
     Fallon
     Finstad
     Fischbach
     Fitzgerald
     Fleischmann
     Foushee
     Foxx
     Frost
     Fry
     Fulcher
     Gaetz
     Garcia (IL)
     Garcia (TX)
     Garcia, Robert
     Good (VA)
     Gooden (TX)
     Gosar
     Graves (LA)
     Green (TN)
     Green, Al (TX)
     Greene (GA)
     Griffith
     Grothman
     Guest
     Hageman
     Harris
     Harshbarger
     Hern
     Higgins (LA)
     Horsford
     Houchin
     Hoyle (OR)
     Hudson
     Huffman
     Huizenga
     Hunt
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson (NC)
     Jackson (TX)
     Jackson Lee
     Jacobs
     James
     Jayapal
     Johnson (SD)
     Jordan
     Joyce (PA)
     Kamlager-Dove
     Khanna
     Kildee
     Kiley
     LaMalfa
     Langworthy
     Lee (CA)
     Lee (FL)
     Lee (PA)
     Leger Fernandez
     Lofgren
     Loudermilk
     Luna
     Luttrell
     Mace
     Maloy
     Mann
     Massie
     Mast
     Matsui
     McClain
     McClintock
     McCormick
     McGarvey
     McGovern
     Meng
     Meuser
     Mfume
     Miller (IL)
     Mills
     Molinaro
     Moolenaar
     Moore (AL)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Nehls
     Newhouse
     Norman
     Norton
     Ocasio-Cortez
     Ogles
     Omar
     Owens
     Pallone
     Palmer
     Peltola
     Perry
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Porter
     Posey
     Pressley
     Ramirez
     Reschenthaler
     Rodgers (WA)
     Rose
     Rosendale
     Ross
     Roy
     Sablan
     Salinas
     Scanlon
     Schakowsky
     Scholten
     Schweikert
     Scott (VA)
     Self
     Sessions
     Sherman
     Simpson
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NJ)
     Spartz
     Stansbury
     Stauber
     Steel
     Steil
     Steube
     Takano
     Thanedar
     Thompson (PA)
     Tiffany
     Timmons
     Tlaib
     Tokuda
     Tonko
     Torres (NY)
     Van Drew
     Van Duyne
     Velazquez
     Walberg
     Waters
     Watson Coleman
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Westerman
     Williams (GA)
     Williams (NY)
     Williams (TX)
     Wilson (SC)
     Yakym
     Zinke

                               NOES--212

     Aderholt
     Aguilar
     Allred
     Amo
     Auchincloss
     Bacon
     Balderson
     Barr
     Barragan
     Bera
     Beyer
     Bice
     Bishop (GA)
     Blunt Rochester
     Boyle (PA)
     Brownley
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Budzinski
     Burgess
     Calvert
     Caraveo
     Carbajal
     Carl
     Carson
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (LA)
     Carter (TX)
     Cartwright
     Case
     Casten
     Castor (FL)
     Chavez-DeRemer
     Clark (MA)
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Cole
     Connolly
     Costa
     Courtney
     Craig
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Crow
     Cuellar
     D'Esposito
     Davids (KS)
     Davis (NC)
     De La Cruz
     Dean (PA)
     DeLauro
     Diaz-Balart
     Duarte
     Ellzey
     Eshoo
     Estes
     Ezell
     Feenstra
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick
     Fletcher
     Flood
     Foster
     Frankel, Lois
     Franklin, Scott
     Gallagher
     Garamendi
     Garbarino
     Garcia, Mike
     Gimenez
     Golden (ME)
     Goldman (NY)
     Gomez
     Gonzales, Tony
     Gonzalez, Vicente
     Gottheimer
     Granger
     Graves (MO)
     Guthrie
     Harder (CA)
     Hayes
     Hill
     Himes
     Hinson
     Houlahan
     Hoyer
     Ivey
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (LA)
     Joyce (OH)
     Kaptur
     Kean (NJ)
     Keating
     Kelly (IL)
     Kelly (MS)
     Kelly (PA)
     Kiggans (VA)
     Kilmer
     Kim (CA)
     Kim (NJ)
     Krishnamoorthi
     Kuster
     Kustoff
     LaHood
     LaLota
     Lamborn
     Landsman
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latta
     LaTurner
     Lawler
     Lee (NV)
     Letlow
     Levin
     Lieu
     Lucas
     Lynch
     Magaziner
     Malliotakis
     Manning
     McBath
     McCaul
     McClellan
     McCollum
     McHenry
     Meeks
     Menendez
     Miller (OH)
     Miller (WV)
     Miller-Meeks
     Moore (UT)
     Morelle
     Moskowitz
     Moulton
     Moylan
     Mrvan
     Mullin
     Murphy
     Neal
     Neguse
     Nickel
     Norcross
     Nunn (IA)
     Obernolte
     Panetta
     Pappas
     Pascrell
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Peters
     Pettersen
     Pfluger
     Phillips
     Quigley
     Raskin
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rouzer
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Rutherford
     Ryan
     Salazar
     Sanchez
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Schrier
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sewell
     Sherrill
     Slotkin
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (WA)
     Smucker
     Sorensen
     Soto
     Spanberger
     Stanton
     Stefanik
     Stevens
     Strong
     Suozzi
     Swalwell
     Sykes
     Tenney
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Titus
     Torres (CA)
     Trahan
     Trone
     Turner
     Underwood
     Valadao
     Van Orden
     Vargas
     Vasquez
     Veasey
     Wagner
     Waltz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Wenstrup
     Wexton
     Wild
     Wilson (FL)
     Womack

                             NOT VOTING--13

     Babin
     Gallego
     Gonzalez-Colon
     Grijalva
     Lesko
     Luetkemeyer
     Mooney
     Payne
     Perez
     Plaskett
     Radewagen
     Strickland
     Wittman

                              {time}  1227

  Messrs. BURGESS, NUNN of Iowa, Ms. WILD, Mr. SMITH of Washington, 
Mses. BROWNLEY, and WILSON of Florida changed their vote from ``aye'' 
to ``no.''
  Mses. LEE of California, MOORE of Wisconsin, CLARKE of New York, 
Messrs. JACKSON of Illinois, and SIMPSON changed their vote from ``no'' 
to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                   Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Roy

  The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on amendment No. 2, printed in House Report 118-456, 
offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Roy), on which further 
proceedings were postponed and on which the ayes prevailed by voice 
vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 269, 
noes 153, not voting 15, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 115]

                               AYES--269

     Adams
     Aderholt
     Alford
     Allen
     Amodei
     Armstrong
     Arrington
     Bacon
     Baird
     Balderson
     Balint
     Banks
     Barr
     Barragan
     Bean (FL)
     Beatty
     Bentz
     Bergman
     Bice
     Biggs
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (NC)
     Blumenauer
     Blunt Rochester
     Boebert
     Bonamici
     Bost
     Bowman
     Brecheen
     Brown
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Burchett
     Burgess
     Burlison
     Bush
     Cammack
     Carey
     Carl
     Carter (GA)
     Casar
     Castro (TX)
     Chavez-DeRemer
     Cherfilus-McCormick
     Chu
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Cleaver
     Cline
     Cloud
     Clyde
     Cohen
     Collins
     Comer
     Correa
     Courtney
     Crane
     Crockett
     Cuellar
     Curtis
     D'Esposito
     Davidson
     Davis (IL)
     De La Cruz
     Dean (PA)
     DeGette
     DelBene
     Deluzio
     DeSaulnier
     DesJarlais
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donalds
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Ellzey
     Escobar
     Espaillat
     Estes
     Evans
     Ezell
     Fallon
     Feenstra
     Ferguson
     Finstad
     Fischbach
     Fitzgerald
     Fleischmann
     Flood
     Foster
     Foushee
     Franklin, Scott
     Frost
     Fry
     Fulcher
     Gaetz
     Garbarino
     Garcia (IL)
     Garcia (TX)
     Garcia, Robert
     Gimenez
     Good (VA)
     Gooden (TX)
     Gosar
     Graves (LA)
     Green (TN)
     Green, Al (TX)
     Greene (GA)
     Griffith
     Grothman
     Guest
     Guthrie
     Hageman
     Harder (CA)
     Harris
     Harshbarger
     Hayes
     Hern
     Higgins (LA)
     Hill
     Hoyle (OR)
     Hudson
     Huffman
     Huizenga
     Hunt
     Issa
     Ivey
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson (NC)
     Jackson (TX)
     Jacobs
     James
     Jayapal
     Jeffries
     Johnson (LA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Jordan
     Joyce (PA)
     Kaptur
     Kean (NJ)
     Khanna
     Kildee
     Kiley
     Kim (CA)
     Kuster
     LaLota
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Langworthy
     Latta
     LaTurner
     Lawler
     Lee (CA)
     Lee (FL)
     Lee (PA)
     Letlow
     Levin
     Lieu
     Lofgren
     Loudermilk
     Luna
     Luttrell
     Mace
     Malliotakis
     Maloy
     Mann
     Massie
     Mast
     Matsui
     McClain

[[Page H2356]]


     McClintock
     McCormick
     McGarvey
     Meng
     Meuser
     Miller (IL)
     Miller (OH)
     Miller (WV)
     Miller-Meeks
     Mills
     Moolenaar
     Moore (AL)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran
     Morelle
     Moylan
     Mullin
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Nehls
     Newhouse
     Norman
     Norton
     Obernolte
     Ocasio-Cortez
     Ogles
     Omar
     Owens
     Pallone
     Palmer
     Pappas
     Peltola
     Pence
     Perez
     Perry
     Pfluger
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Porter
     Posey
     Pressley
     Ramirez
     Raskin
     Reschenthaler
     Rodgers (WA)
     Rose
     Rosendale
     Ross
     Roy
     Sablan
     Salinas
     Sanchez
     Scalise
     Scanlon
     Schakowsky
     Scholten
     Schrier
     Schweikert
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, David
     Self
     Sessions
     Sherman
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NJ)
     Spartz
     Stansbury
     Stauber
     Stefanik
     Steil
     Steube
     Takano
     Tenney
     Thanedar
     Thompson (PA)
     Tiffany
     Timmons
     Tlaib
     Tokuda
     Tonko
     Trahan
     Valadao
     Van Drew
     Van Duyne
     Vargas
     Velazquez
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Waltz
     Waters
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Wenstrup
     Westerman
     Williams (GA)
     Williams (NY)
     Williams (TX)
     Wilson (SC)
     Zinke

                               NOES--153

     Aguilar
     Allred
     Amo
     Auchincloss
     Bera
     Beyer
     Bishop (GA)
     Boyle (PA)
     Brownley
     Budzinski
     Calvert
     Caraveo
     Carbajal
     Cardenas
     Carson
     Carter (LA)
     Carter (TX)
     Cartwright
     Case
     Casten
     Castor (FL)
     Ciscomani
     Clyburn
     Cole
     Connolly
     Costa
     Craig
     Crawford
     Crow
     Davids (KS)
     Davis (NC)
     DeLauro
     Diaz-Balart
     Duarte
     Dunn (FL)
     Emmer
     Eshoo
     Fitzpatrick
     Fletcher
     Foxx
     Frankel, Lois
     Gallagher
     Garamendi
     Garcia, Mike
     Golden (ME)
     Goldman (NY)
     Gomez
     Gonzales, Tony
     Gonzalez, Vicente
     Gottheimer
     Granger
     Graves (MO)
     Himes
     Hinson
     Horsford
     Houchin
     Houlahan
     Hoyer
     Johnson (GA)
     Joyce (OH)
     Kamlager-Dove
     Keating
     Kelly (IL)
     Kelly (MS)
     Kelly (PA)
     Kiggans (VA)
     Kilmer
     Kim (NJ)
     Krishnamoorthi
     Kustoff
     LaHood
     Landsman
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee (NV)
     Leger Fernandez
     Lucas
     Lynch
     Magaziner
     Manning
     McBath
     McCaul
     McClellan
     McCollum
     McGovern
     McHenry
     Meeks
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Molinaro
     Moore (UT)
     Moskowitz
     Moulton
     Mrvan
     Murphy
     Neal
     Neguse
     Nickel
     Norcross
     Nunn (IA)
     Panetta
     Pascrell
     Pelosi
     Peters
     Pettersen
     Phillips
     Quigley
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rouzer
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Rutherford
     Ryan
     Salazar
     Sarbanes
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Scott, Austin
     Sewell
     Sherrill
     Simpson
     Slotkin
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (WA)
     Smucker
     Sorensen
     Soto
     Spanberger
     Steel
     Stevens
     Strong
     Suozzi
     Swalwell
     Sykes
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Titus
     Torres (CA)
     Torres (NY)
     Trone
     Turner
     Underwood
     Van Orden
     Vasquez
     Veasey
     Wasserman Schultz
     Watson Coleman
     Wexton
     Wild
     Wilson (FL)
     Womack
     Yakym

                             NOT VOTING--15

     Babin
     Crenshaw
     Gallego
     Gonzalez-Colon
     Grijalva
     Jackson Lee
     Lesko
     Luetkemeyer
     Mooney
     Payne
     Plaskett
     Radewagen
     Stanton
     Strickland
     Wittman

                              {time}  1232

  Mr. LaLOTA, Ms. STEFANIK, and Mr. D'ESPOSITO changed their vote from 
``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Crenshaw

  The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on amendment No. 4, printed in House Report 118-456, 
offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Crenshaw), on which further 
proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice 
vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 268, 
noes 152, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 116]

                               AYES--268

     Adams
     Aderholt
     Aguilar
     Alford
     Allen
     Allred
     Amo
     Amodei
     Auchincloss
     Bacon
     Baird
     Balderson
     Barr
     Barragan
     Bera
     Bergman
     Beyer
     Bishop (GA)
     Blunt Rochester
     Boyle (PA)
     Brownley
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Budzinski
     Burgess
     Calvert
     Caraveo
     Carbajal
     Carey
     Carl
     Carson
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (LA)
     Carter (TX)
     Cartwright
     Case
     Casten
     Castor (FL)
     Chavez-DeRemer
     Cherfilus-McCormick
     Ciscomani
     Clark (MA)
     Clyburn
     Cole
     Connolly
     Correa
     Costa
     Courtney
     Craig
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Crockett
     Crow
     Cuellar
     Curtis
     D'Esposito
     Davids (KS)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (NC)
     De La Cruz
     Dean (PA)
     DeLauro
     Diaz-Balart
     Doggett
     Duarte
     Duncan
     Dunn (FL)
     Edwards
     Ellzey
     Escobar
     Eshoo
     Ezell
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick
     Fletcher
     Flood
     Foster
     Foxx
     Frankel, Lois
     Franklin, Scott
     Gallagher
     Garamendi
     Garbarino
     Garcia, Mike
     Gimenez
     Golden (ME)
     Goldman (NY)
     Gomez
     Gonzales, Tony
     Gonzalez, Vicente
     Gottheimer
     Granger
     Graves (LA)
     Graves (MO)
     Grothman
     Guest
     Guthrie
     Harder (CA)
     Hayes
     Hern
     Higgins (LA)
     Hill
     Himes
     Hinson
     Horsford
     Houchin
     Houlahan
     Hoyer
     Hudson
     Ivey
     Jackson (NC)
     Jackson (TX)
     James
     Jeffries
     Johnson (SD)
     Joyce (OH)
     Joyce (PA)
     Kaptur
     Kean (NJ)
     Keating
     Kelly (IL)
     Kelly (MS)
     Kelly (PA)
     Kiggans (VA)
     Kiley
     Kilmer
     Kim (CA)
     Kim (NJ)
     Krishnamoorthi
     Kuster
     Kustoff
     LaHood
     LaLota
     Lamborn
     Landsman
     Langworthy
     Larson (CT)
     Latta
     LaTurner
     Lawler
     Lee (CA)
     Lee (NV)
     Leger Fernandez
     Letlow
     Levin
     Loudermilk
     Lucas
     Luttrell
     Lynch
     Magaziner
     Malliotakis
     Manning
     Matsui
     McBath
     McCaul
     McClain
     McClellan
     McCollum
     McCormick
     McGarvey
     McHenry
     Meeks
     Menendez
     Meuser
     Miller (WV)
     Molinaro
     Moore (UT)
     Moran
     Morelle
     Moskowitz
     Moulton
     Moylan
     Mrvan
     Murphy
     Neal
     Neguse
     Newhouse
     Nickel
     Norcross
     Nunn (IA)
     Obernolte
     Owens
     Pallone
     Palmer
     Panetta
     Pappas
     Pascrell
     Pelosi
     Peltola
     Pence
     Perez
     Peters
     Pettersen
     Pfluger
     Phillips
     Porter
     Quigley
     Raskin
     Reschenthaler
     Rodgers (WA)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rose
     Rouzer
     Ruiz
     Rutherford
     Ryan
     Sablan
     Salazar
     Sanchez
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Scholten
     Schrier
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sessions
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Sherrill
     Simpson
     Slotkin
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Smucker
     Sorensen
     Soto
     Spanberger
     Stansbury
     Stauber
     Stefanik
     Stevens
     Strong
     Suozzi
     Swalwell
     Sykes
     Tenney
     Thanedar
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thompson (PA)
     Titus
     Torres (CA)
     Torres (NY)
     Trahan
     Trone
     Turner
     Underwood
     Valadao
     Van Drew
     Van Duyne
     Vasquez
     Veasey
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Waltz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Wenstrup
     Wexton
     Wild
     Williams (NY)
     Williams (TX)
     Wilson (SC)
     Womack
     Zinke

                               NOES--152

     Armstrong
     Arrington
     Balint
     Banks
     Bean (FL)
     Beatty
     Bentz
     Bice
     Biggs
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (NC)
     Blumenauer
     Boebert
     Bonamici
     Bost
     Bowman
     Brecheen
     Brown
     Burchett
     Burlison
     Bush
     Cammack
     Cardenas
     Casar
     Castro (TX)
     Chu
     Clarke (NY)
     Cleaver
     Cline
     Cloud
     Clyde
     Cohen
     Collins
     Comer
     Crane
     Davidson
     DeGette
     DelBene
     Deluzio
     DeSaulnier
     DesJarlais
     Dingell
     Donalds
     Emmer
     Espaillat
     Estes
     Evans
     Fallon
     Feenstra
     Finstad
     Fischbach
     Fitzgerald
     Fleischmann
     Foushee
     Frost
     Fry
     Fulcher
     Gaetz
     Garcia (IL)
     Garcia (TX)
     Garcia, Robert
     Good (VA)
     Gooden (TX)
     Gosar
     Green (TN)
     Green, Al (TX)
     Greene (GA)
     Griffith
     Hageman
     Harris
     Harshbarger
     Hoyle (OR)
     Huffman
     Huizenga
     Hunt
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jacobs
     Johnson (GA)
     Jordan
     Kamlager-Dove
     Khanna
     Kildee
     LaMalfa
     Larsen (WA)
     Lee (FL)
     Lee (PA)
     Lieu
     Lofgren
     Luna
     Mace
     Maloy
     Mann
     Massie
     Mast
     McClintock
     McGovern
     Meng
     Mfume
     Miller (IL)
     Miller (OH)
     Miller-Meeks
     Mills
     Moolenaar
     Moore (AL)
     Moore (WI)
     Mullin
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Nehls
     Norman
     Norton
     Ocasio-Cortez
     Ogles
     Omar
     Perry
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Posey
     Pressley
     Ramirez
     Rosendale
     Ross
     Roy
     Ruppersberger
     Salinas
     Scanlon
     Schakowsky
     Schweikert
     Scott (VA)
     Self
     Spartz
     Steel
     Steil
     Steube
     Takano
     Tiffany
     Timmons
     Tlaib
     Tokuda
     Tonko
     Van Orden
     Vargas
     Velazquez
     Waters
     Watson Coleman
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Westerman
     Williams (GA)
     Wilson (FL)
     Yakym

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Babin
     Gallego
     Gonzalez-Colon
     Grijalva
     Jackson Lee
     Jayapal
     Lesko
     Luetkemeyer
     Mooney
     Payne
     Plaskett
     Radewagen
     Smith (MO)
     Stanton
     Strickland
     Wittman


                    Announcement by the Acting Chair

  The Acting CHAIR (during the vote). There is 1 minute remaining.

[[Page H2357]]

  


                              {time}  1236

  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                  Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Waltz

  The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on amendment No. 5, printed in House Report 118-456, 
offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Waltz), on which further 
proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice 
vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 227, 
noes 193, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 117]

                               AYES--227

     Aderholt
     Alford
     Allen
     Allred
     Amo
     Amodei
     Arrington
     Auchincloss
     Bacon
     Balderson
     Barr
     Bera
     Bergman
     Bice
     Boyle (PA)
     Brownley
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Budzinski
     Burgess
     Calvert
     Caraveo
     Carbajal
     Carey
     Carl
     Carson
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (LA)
     Carter (TX)
     Cartwright
     Case
     Casten
     Chavez-DeRemer
     Ciscomani
     Clyburn
     Cole
     Costa
     Courtney
     Craig
     Crane
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Crockett
     Cuellar
     Curtis
     D'Esposito
     Davids (KS)
     Davis (NC)
     De La Cruz
     DeLauro
     Diaz-Balart
     Duarte
     Dunn (FL)
     Edwards
     Ellzey
     Eshoo
     Estes
     Ezell
     Feenstra
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick
     Fletcher
     Frankel, Lois
     Franklin, Scott
     Gallagher
     Garamendi
     Garbarino
     Garcia, Mike
     Gimenez
     Golden (ME)
     Goldman (NY)
     Gonzales, Tony
     Gonzalez, Vicente
     Gottheimer
     Granger
     Graves (LA)
     Graves (MO)
     Griffith
     Grothman
     Guest
     Guthrie
     Harder (CA)
     Hayes
     Hern
     Hill
     Himes
     Hinson
     Horsford
     Houchin
     Hudson
     Huizenga
     Hunt
     Jackson (TX)
     Johnson (SD)
     Joyce (OH)
     Joyce (PA)
     Kaptur
     Kean (NJ)
     Keating
     Kelly (MS)
     Kelly (PA)
     Kiggans (VA)
     Kiley
     Kilmer
     Kim (CA)
     Kuster
     Kustoff
     LaHood
     LaLota
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Landsman
     Larson (CT)
     Latta
     LaTurner
     Lawler
     Lee (NV)
     Letlow
     Levin
     Loudermilk
     Lucas
     Luttrell
     Lynch
     Magaziner
     Malliotakis
     Manning
     Mast
     Matsui
     McBath
     McCaul
     McClain
     McClellan
     McCollum
     McCormick
     McGarvey
     McHenry
     Meeks
     Meuser
     Miller-Meeks
     Mills
     Molinaro
     Moore (UT)
     Moran
     Morelle
     Moskowitz
     Moulton
     Moylan
     Mrvan
     Murphy
     Nickel
     Norcross
     Norman
     Nunn (IA)
     Obernolte
     Panetta
     Pappas
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Perez
     Peters
     Pettersen
     Pfluger
     Phillips
     Posey
     Quigley
     Reschenthaler
     Rodgers (WA)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rose
     Rouzer
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Rutherford
     Ryan
     Salazar
     Scalise
     Schneider
     Scholten
     Schrier
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sessions
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Sherrill
     Simpson
     Slotkin
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smucker
     Sorensen
     Spanberger
     Stauber
     Stefanik
     Steil
     Stevens
     Strong
     Suozzi
     Swalwell
     Sykes
     Tenney
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thompson (PA)
     Titus
     Torres (CA)
     Torres (NY)
     Trahan
     Trone
     Turner
     Underwood
     Valadao
     Van Duyne
     Vasquez
     Veasey
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Waltz
     Wenstrup
     Wexton
     Wild
     Williams (NY)
     Williams (TX)
     Wilson (SC)
     Womack
     Zinke

                               NOES--193

     Adams
     Aguilar
     Armstrong
     Baird
     Balint
     Banks
     Barragan
     Bean (FL)
     Beatty
     Bentz
     Beyer
     Biggs
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NC)
     Blumenauer
     Blunt Rochester
     Boebert
     Bonamici
     Bost
     Bowman
     Brecheen
     Brown
     Burchett
     Burlison
     Bush
     Cammack
     Cardenas
     Casar
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Cherfilus-McCormick
     Chu
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Cleaver
     Cline
     Cloud
     Clyde
     Cohen
     Collins
     Comer
     Connolly
     Correa
     Crow
     Davidson
     Davis (IL)
     Dean (PA)
     DeGette
     DelBene
     Deluzio
     DeSaulnier
     DesJarlais
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donalds
     Duncan
     Emmer
     Escobar
     Espaillat
     Evans
     Fallon
     Finstad
     Fischbach
     Fitzgerald
     Fleischmann
     Flood
     Foster
     Foushee
     Foxx
     Frost
     Fry
     Fulcher
     Gaetz
     Garcia (IL)
     Garcia (TX)
     Garcia, Robert
     Gomez
     Good (VA)
     Gooden (TX)
     Gosar
     Green (TN)
     Green, Al (TX)
     Greene (GA)
     Hageman
     Harris
     Harshbarger
     Higgins (LA)
     Houlahan
     Hoyer
     Hoyle (OR)
     Huffman
     Issa
     Ivey
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson (NC)
     Jacobs
     James
     Jayapal
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Jordan
     Kamlager-Dove
     Kelly (IL)
     Khanna
     Kildee
     Kim (NJ)
     Krishnamoorthi
     Langworthy
     Larsen (WA)
     Lee (CA)
     Lee (FL)
     Lee (PA)
     Leger Fernandez
     Lieu
     Lofgren
     Luna
     Mace
     Mann
     Massie
     McClintock
     McGovern
     Menendez
     Meng
     Mfume
     Miller (IL)
     Miller (OH)
     Miller (WV)
     Moolenaar
     Moore (AL)
     Moore (WI)
     Mullin
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Neguse
     Nehls
     Newhouse
     Norton
     Ocasio-Cortez
     Ogles
     Omar
     Owens
     Pallone
     Palmer
     Pascrell
     Perry
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Porter
     Pressley
     Ramirez
     Raskin
     Rosendale
     Ross
     Roy
     Sablan
     Salinas
     Sanchez
     Sarbanes
     Scanlon
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schweikert
     Scott (VA)
     Self
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Soto
     Spartz
     Stansbury
     Steel
     Steube
     Takano
     Thanedar
     Tiffany
     Timmons
     Tlaib
     Tokuda
     Tonko
     Van Drew
     Van Orden
     Vargas
     Velazquez
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson Coleman
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Westerman
     Williams (GA)
     Wilson (FL)
     Yakym

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Babin
     Gallego
     Gonzalez-Colon
     Grijalva
     Jackson Lee
     Lesko
     Luetkemeyer
     Maloy
     Mooney
     Payne
     Peltola
     Plaskett
     Radewagen
     Stanton
     Strickland
     Wittman


                    Announcement by the Acting Chair

  The Acting CHAIR (during the vote). There is 1 minute remaining.

                              {time}  1240

  Mr. DAVIS of Illinois changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated against:
  Ms. MALOY. Mr. Chair, had I been present, I would have voted ``no'' 
on rollcall No. 117.


                 Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Turner

  The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment 6, printed in House Report 118-456, 
offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner), on which further 
proceedings were postponed and on which the ayes prevailed by voice 
vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The Acting CHAIR. This is a 2-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 236, 
noes 186, not voting 14, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 118]

                               AYES--236

     Aderholt
     Aguilar
     Allred
     Amodei
     Auchincloss
     Bacon
     Balderson
     Barr
     Barragan
     Bera
     Bergman
     Beyer
     Bice
     Bishop (GA)
     Blunt Rochester
     Boyle (PA)
     Brownley
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Budzinski
     Burgess
     Calvert
     Caraveo
     Carbajal
     Carl
     Carson
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (LA)
     Carter (TX)
     Cartwright
     Case
     Casten
     Castor (FL)
     Chavez-DeRemer
     Ciscomani
     Clark (MA)
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Cole
     Costa
     Courtney
     Craig
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Crow
     Cuellar
     D'Esposito
     Davids (KS)
     Davis (NC)
     De La Cruz
     DeLauro
     Diaz-Balart
     Duarte
     Dunn (FL)
     Edwards
     Ellzey
     Emmer
     Escobar
     Eshoo
     Estes
     Ezell
     Feenstra
     Fitzpatrick
     Fletcher
     Flood
     Foster
     Frankel, Lois
     Franklin, Scott
     Fulcher
     Gallagher
     Garamendi
     Garbarino
     Garcia, Mike
     Gimenez
     Golden (ME)
     Goldman (NY)
     Gomez
     Gonzales, Tony
     Gonzalez, Vicente
     Gottheimer
     Granger
     Graves (LA)
     Graves (MO)
     Guest
     Guthrie
     Harder (CA)
     Hayes
     Hill
     Himes
     Hinson
     Horsford
     Houchin
     Houlahan
     Hoyer
     Hudson
     Huizenga
     Ivey
     Jackson (NC)
     Jackson (TX)
     Jacobs
     James
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Joyce (OH)
     Kamlager-Dove
     Kaptur
     Kean (NJ)
     Keating
     Kelly (MS)
     Kelly (PA)
     Kiggans (VA)
     Kilmer
     Kim (CA)
     Kim (NJ)
     Krishnamoorthi
     Kuster
     Kustoff
     LaHood
     LaLota
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Landsman
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     LaTurner
     Lawler
     Lee (FL)
     Lee (NV)
     Letlow
     Levin
     Lucas
     Lynch
     Magaziner
     Malliotakis
     Manning
     McBath
     McCaul
     McClain
     McClellan
     McCollum
     McCormick
     McGarvey
     McHenry
     Meeks
     Menendez
     Miller (WV)
     Moore (UT)
     Moran
     Morelle
     Moskowitz
     Moulton
     Moylan
     Mrvan
     Mullin
     Murphy
     Neguse
     Newhouse
     Nickel
     Norcross
     Nunn (IA)
     Obernolte
     Panetta
     Pappas
     Pascrell
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Perez
     Peters
     Pettersen
     Pfluger
     Phillips
     Quigley
     Reschenthaler
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rose
     Rouzer
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Rutherford
     Ryan

[[Page H2358]]


     Salazar
     Sarbanes
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Scholten
     Schrier
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sessions
     Sewell
     Sherrill
     Simpson
     Slotkin
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (WA)
     Smucker
     Sorensen
     Soto
     Spanberger
     Stansbury
     Stauber
     Stefanik
     Steil
     Stevens
     Strong
     Suozzi
     Swalwell
     Sykes
     Tenney
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Titus
     Torres (CA)
     Torres (NY)
     Trahan
     Trone
     Turner
     Underwood
     Valadao
     Van Duyne
     Vasquez
     Veasey
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Waltz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Wenstrup
     Wexton
     Wild
     Williams (NY)
     Wilson (FL)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Womack

                               NOES--186

     Adams
     Alford
     Allen
     Amo
     Armstrong
     Arrington
     Baird
     Balint
     Banks
     Bean (FL)
     Beatty
     Bentz
     Biggs
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (NC)
     Blumenauer
     Boebert
     Bonamici
     Bost
     Bowman
     Brecheen
     Brown
     Burchett
     Burlison
     Bush
     Cammack
     Cardenas
     Carey
     Casar
     Castro (TX)
     Cherfilus-McCormick
     Chu
     Clarke (NY)
     Cline
     Cloud
     Clyde
     Collins
     Comer
     Connolly
     Correa
     Crane
     Crockett
     Curtis
     Davidson
     Davis (IL)
     Dean (PA)
     DeGette
     DelBene
     Deluzio
     DeSaulnier
     DesJarlais
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donalds
     Duncan
     Espaillat
     Evans
     Fallon
     Ferguson
     Finstad
     Fischbach
     Fitzgerald
     Fleischmann
     Foushee
     Foxx
     Frost
     Fry
     Gaetz
     Garcia (IL)
     Garcia (TX)
     Garcia, Robert
     Good (VA)
     Gooden (TX)
     Gosar
     Green (TN)
     Green, Al (TX)
     Greene (GA)
     Griffith
     Grothman
     Hageman
     Harris
     Harshbarger
     Hern
     Higgins (LA)
     Hoyle (OR)
     Huffman
     Hunt
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jayapal
     Johnson (SD)
     Jordan
     Joyce (PA)
     Kelly (IL)
     Khanna
     Kildee
     Kiley
     Langworthy
     Latta
     Lee (CA)
     Lee (PA)
     Leger Fernandez
     Lieu
     Lofgren
     Loudermilk
     Luna
     Luttrell
     Mace
     Maloy
     Mann
     Massie
     Mast
     Matsui
     McClintock
     McGovern
     Meng
     Meuser
     Mfume
     Miller (IL)
     Miller (OH)
     Miller-Meeks
     Mills
     Molinaro
     Moolenaar
     Moore (AL)
     Moore (WI)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Nehls
     Norman
     Norton
     Ocasio-Cortez
     Ogles
     Omar
     Owens
     Pallone
     Palmer
     Perry
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Porter
     Posey
     Pressley
     Ramirez
     Raskin
     Rodgers (WA)
     Rosendale
     Ross
     Roy
     Sablan
     Salinas
     Sanchez
     Scalise
     Scanlon
     Schakowsky
     Schweikert
     Scott (VA)
     Self
     Sherman
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NJ)
     Spartz
     Steel
     Steube
     Takano
     Thanedar
     Thompson (PA)
     Tiffany
     Timmons
     Tlaib
     Tokuda
     Tonko
     Van Drew
     Van Orden
     Vargas
     Velazquez
     Waters
     Watson Coleman
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Westerman
     Williams (GA)
     Williams (TX)
     Yakym
     Zinke

                             NOT VOTING--14

     Babin
     Gallego
     Gonzalez-Colon
     Grijalva
     Jackson Lee
     Lesko
     Luetkemeyer
     Mooney
     Payne
     Peltola
     Plaskett
     Radewagen
     Stanton
     Strickland


                    Announcement by the Acting Chair

  The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Alford) (during the vote). There is 1 minute 
remaining.

                              {time}  1245

  Mr. MEUSER changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. MEEKS changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                          PERSONAL EXPLANATION

  Mrs. PELTOLA. Mr. Chair, had I been present, I would have voted 
``aye'' on rollcall No. 117 and ``aye'' on rollcall No. 118.
  The Acting CHAIR. There being no further amendments under the rule, 
the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Ellzey) having assumed the chair, Mr. Alford, Acting Chair of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 7888) to 
reform the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and, pursuant 
to House Resolution 1137, he reported the bill, as amended by that 
resolution, back to the House with sundry further amendments adopted in 
the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any further amendment reported from 
the Committee of the Whole? If not, the Chair will put them en gros.
  The amendments were agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Ms. LEE of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 273, 
noes 147, not voting 11, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 119]

                               AYES--273

     Adams
     Aderholt
     Aguilar
     Allen
     Allred
     Amo
     Amodei
     Auchincloss
     Bacon
     Balderson
     Barr
     Barragan
     Bentz
     Bera
     Bergman
     Beyer
     Bice
     Bishop (GA)
     Blunt Rochester
     Boyle (PA)
     Brownley
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Budzinski
     Burgess
     Calvert
     Caraveo
     Carbajal
     Carl
     Carson
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (LA)
     Carter (TX)
     Cartwright
     Case
     Casten
     Castor (FL)
     Chavez-DeRemer
     Ciscomani
     Clark (MA)
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Cole
     Connolly
     Correa
     Costa
     Courtney
     Craig
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Crockett
     Crow
     Cuellar
     D'Esposito
     Davids (KS)
     Davis (NC)
     De La Cruz
     Dean (PA)
     DeLauro
     Diaz-Balart
     Duarte
     Edwards
     Ellzey
     Emmer
     Escobar
     Eshoo
     Estes
     Evans
     Ezell
     Feenstra
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Fletcher
     Flood
     Foster
     Frankel, Lois
     Franklin, Scott
     Gallagher
     Garamendi
     Garbarino
     Garcia, Mike
     Gimenez
     Golden (ME)
     Goldman (NY)
     Gomez
     Gonzales, Tony
     Gonzalez, Vicente
     Gottheimer
     Granger
     Graves (LA)
     Graves (MO)
     Green, Al (TX)
     Grothman
     Guest
     Guthrie
     Harder (CA)
     Hayes
     Hern
     Hill
     Himes
     Hinson
     Horsford
     Houchin
     Houlahan
     Hoyer
     Hudson
     Huizenga
     Ivey
     Jackson (NC)
     Jackson (TX)
     James
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (LA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Joyce (OH)
     Kamlager-Dove
     Kaptur
     Kean (NJ)
     Keating
     Kelly (IL)
     Kelly (MS)
     Kelly (PA)
     Kiggans (VA)
     Kiley
     Kilmer
     Kim (CA)
     Kim (NJ)
     Krishnamoorthi
     Kuster
     Kustoff
     LaHood
     LaLota
     Lamborn
     Landsman
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latta
     LaTurner
     Lawler
     Lee (FL)
     Lee (NV)
     Leger Fernandez
     Letlow
     Levin
     Lieu
     Lucas
     Lynch
     Magaziner
     Malliotakis
     Maloy
     Manning
     McBath
     McCaul
     McClain
     McClellan
     McCollum
     McGarvey
     McHenry
     Meeks
     Menendez
     Meng
     Mfume
     Miller (OH)
     Miller (WV)
     Miller-Meeks
     Molinaro
     Moolenaar
     Moore (UT)
     Moran
     Morelle
     Moskowitz
     Moulton
     Mrvan
     Mullin
     Murphy
     Neal
     Neguse
     Newhouse
     Nickel
     Norcross
     Nunn (IA)
     Obernolte
     Palmer
     Panetta
     Pappas
     Pascrell
     Pelosi
     Peltola
     Pence
     Perez
     Peters
     Pettersen
     Pfluger
     Phillips
     Quigley
     Raskin
     Reschenthaler
     Rodgers (WA)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rose
     Ross
     Rouzer
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Rutherford
     Ryan
     Salazar
     Sanchez
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Scholten
     Schrier
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sessions
     Sewell
     Sherrill
     Simpson
     Slotkin
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (WA)
     Smucker
     Sorensen
     Soto
     Spanberger
     Stansbury
     Stauber
     Steel
     Stefanik
     Steil
     Stevens
     Strong
     Suozzi
     Swalwell
     Sykes
     Tenney
     Thanedar
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thompson (PA)
     Titus
     Tokuda
     Tonko
     Torres (CA)
     Torres (NY)
     Trahan
     Trone
     Turner
     Underwood
     Valadao
     Vargas
     Vasquez
     Veasey
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Waltz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Webster (FL)
     Wenstrup
     Wexton
     Wild
     Williams (NY)
     Williams (TX)
     Wilson (FL)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Womack

                               NOES--147

     Alford
     Armstrong
     Arrington
     Baird
     Balint
     Banks
     Bean (FL)
     Beatty
     Biggs
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (NC)
     Blumenauer
     Boebert
     Bonamici
     Bost
     Bowman
     Brecheen
     Brown
     Burchett
     Burlison
     Bush
     Cammack
     Cardenas
     Carey
     Casar
     Castro (TX)
     Cherfilus-McCormick
     Chu
     Clarke (NY)
     Cline
     Cloud
     Clyde
     Collins
     Comer
     Crane
     Curtis
     Davidson
     Davis (IL)
     DeGette
     DelBene
     Deluzio
     DeSaulnier
     DesJarlais
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donalds
     Duncan
     Dunn (FL)
     Espaillat
     Fallon
     Finstad
     Fischbach
     Fitzgerald
     Foushee
     Foxx
     Frost
     Fry
     Fulcher
     Gaetz
     Garcia (IL)
     Garcia (TX)
     Garcia, Robert
     Good (VA)
     Gooden (TX)
     Gosar
     Green (TN)
     Greene (GA)
     Griffith
     Hageman
     Harris
     Harshbarger

[[Page H2359]]


     Higgins (LA)
     Hoyle (OR)
     Huffman
     Hunt
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jacobs
     Jayapal
     Jordan
     Joyce (PA)
     Khanna
     LaMalfa
     Langworthy
     Lee (CA)
     Lee (PA)
     Lofgren
     Loudermilk
     Luna
     Luttrell
     Mace
     Mann
     Massie
     Mast
     Matsui
     McClintock
     McCormick
     McGovern
     Meuser
     Miller (IL)
     Mills
     Moore (AL)
     Moore (WI)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Nehls
     Norman
     Ocasio-Cortez
     Ogles
     Omar
     Owens
     Pallone
     Perry
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Porter
     Posey
     Pressley
     Ramirez
     Rosendale
     Roy
     Salinas
     Scanlon
     Schakowsky
     Schweikert
     Scott (VA)
     Self
     Sherman
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NJ)
     Spartz
     Steube
     Takano
     Tiffany
     Timmons
     Tlaib
     Van Drew
     Van Duyne
     Van Orden
     Velazquez
     Waters
     Watson Coleman
     Weber (TX)
     Westerman
     Williams (GA)
     Yakym
     Zinke

                             NOT VOTING--11

     Babin
     Gallego
     Grijalva
     Jackson Lee
     Kildee
     Lesko
     Luetkemeyer
     Mooney
     Payne
     Stanton
     Strickland


                      Announcement by the Speaker

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There is 1 minute 
remaining.

                              {time}  1257

  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated against:
  Mr. KILDEE. Mr. Speaker, had I been present, I would have voted 
``nay'' on rollcall No. 119, H.R. 7888.


                          personal explanation

  Mr. STANTON. Mr. Speaker, I was necessarily absent and missed five 
votes. Had I been present, I would have voted ``no'' on rollcall No. 
115, Roy Amendment, ``aye'' on rollcall No. 116, Crenshaw Amendment, 
``aye'' on rollcall No. 117, Waltz Amendment, ``aye'' on rollcall No. 
118, Turner Amendment, and ``aye'' on rollcall No. 119, final passage 
of H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, a motion to reconsider 
was laid on the table.
  Mrs. LUNA. Mr. Speaker, I object.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The objection is heard.


                          motion to reconsider

  Ms. LEE of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion at the desk.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Ms. Lee of Florida moves to reconsider the vote on passage 
     of H.R. 7888.

                            motion to table

  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion at the desk.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Turner of Ohio moves to table the motion to reconsider.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to table.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mrs. LUNA. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this question will be postponed.

                          ____________________