Congressional Record, Volume 170 Issue 63 (Friday, April 12, 2024)

[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 63 (Friday, April 12, 2024)]
[House]
[Pages H2328-H2359]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

REFORMING INTELLIGENCE AND SECURING AMERICA ACT

General Leave

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include
extraneous material on H.R. 7888.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Langworthy). Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from Ohio?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1137 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 7888.
The Chair appoints the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Meuser) to
preside over the Committee of the Whole.

{time} 0940

In the Committee of the Whole

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 7888) to reform the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, with Mr. Meuser in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed 1
hour equally divided among and controlled by the chair and ranking
minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary, or their respective
designees, and the chair and ranking minority member of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, or their respective designees.
The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Jordan), the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Nadler), the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner), and the gentleman
from Colorado (Mr. Crow) each will control 15 minutes.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner).
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
This bill is about the extension of section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. That is the act under which we are able
to spy on our adversaries, those individuals who intend to do our
Nation harm.
There has been great debate and great discussion among the Members in
this body. Everyone is in agreement that there have been unbelievable
abuses by the FBI of access to foreign intelligence. The underlying
bill, for which there is broad support, punishes the FBI. It
criminalizes the FBI's abuses, limits and restricts the FBI's access to
foreign intelligence, and further puts guardrails to punish the FBI.
What is also in agreement here on this House floor is the protection
of Americans' civil liberties. You have to have a warrant, and there is
absolute constitutional protection of Americans' data. There is no
place in this statute where Americans' data becomes at risk.
Debate today, though, is not about FISA. It is not about spying on
our adversaries. The debate today is about a warrant requirement in an
amendment that has been offered by Representatives Biggs and Jayapal.
This amendment, largely drafted by Senator Wyden and cosponsored by
Senator Warren, would for the first time in history provide
constitutional rights to our adversaries. It would provide
constitutional rights to our enemies. No law has ever come out of this
body that would provide constitutional rights to our adversaries.

[[Page H2329]]

We spy on Hezbollah. We spy on Hamas. We spy on the Ayatollah. We spy
on the Communist Party of China. This bill provides them constitutional
protections to communicate with people in the United States to recruit
them for the purposes of being terrorists, for being spies, and for
doing espionage.
The 9/11 perpetrators were in the United States, and they were
communicating with al-Qaida. At that time, we made a grave mistake in
that we were not spying on al-Qaida and didn't see who they were
communicating with in the United States. We changed that and began to
spy on al-Qaida and got to see the extent to which they were recruiting
people in the United States to do us harm.

{time} 0945

If this amendment passes, al-Qaida will have full constitutional
protections to recruit in the United States; the Communist Party will
have full constitutional protection to recruit in the United States;
and there will be no increased protection of constitutional protections
for Americans and their data. The only data that would become protected
is data that is located in al-Qaida's inbox and the Communist Chinese's
inbox.
Now, how is it that they become protected? This amendment would
require that we have to have a warrant to look into Chinese Communist
Party data for the recruitment efforts that they are doing within the
United States. We would have to have evidence of a crime that is
occurring in order to get that warrant, which means we will be blind.
If this becomes law, we will be blind, and we will be unable to look
at what Hezbollah is doing in the United States, what Hamas is doing in
the United States, and what the Communist Party is doing in the United
States. There are no additional protections for Americans in this
amendment. Americans still have full constitutional protection of their
own data.
Mr. Chair, let me give you an example of how this works under their
amendment. We are spying on Hamas. Two people in the United States send
emails to Hamas. One says happy birthday, and one says thank you for
the bomb-making classes. When those two emails go to Hamas, right now,
we see them.
If you send a happy birthday to Hamas and we see it, that doesn't
matter. It is not a threat to the United States.
If you send an email that says thank you for the bomb-making classes,
we intercept that email, read it, and find out who it is. Then, when we
come here to go find that person to arrest them and to make certain
that they don't harm Americans, we have to go to court and get a
warrant.
There already is a warrant requirement for the protection of
Americans and people who are here in the United States. If you have to
have a warrant to look at the two emails that are sent to Hamas, happy
birthday and thank you for the bomb-making classes, then you have no
evidence of a crime. You have no ability to read these two emails. We
will go dark. We will go blind.
The FBI abuses have been extraordinary in their searching of foreign
data. We need to punish them. This underlying bill punishes the FBI. We
should not punish Americans. We should not make our Nation less safe by
giving constitutional protections to Hamas and by giving constitutional
protections to the Chinese Communist Party.
I have been talking to Members on the floor, and they say this
amendment is about protecting Americans' data in the United States. It
is not. Americans' data in the United States is already protected by
the Constitution. There is nobody on this House floor who would argue
that you don't need a warrant to look at Americans' data in the United
States.
I encourage everyone to pick this amendment up and read it. It
applies to the data that we collect in spying on Hamas, Hezbollah, and
the Chinese Communist Party. To give them a warrant and to give them
constitutional protections means that they are open for business.
The day after this passes and we go blind, the Chinese Communist
Party has a complete pass to recruit in the United States students to
spy on our industry and on our universities. Hamas and Hezbollah have a
complete pass. We will be blind as they try to recruit people for
terrorist attacks in the United States.
Currently, we keep America safe by spying on our adversaries. Do not
give our adversaries constitutional protection.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chair, I rise in support of this legislation.
First, let me emphasize again that, as the chairman said, section 702
is our single most important intelligence authority. We use it every
day to protect the Nation from threats ranging from China and Russia to
terrorist plots, fentanyl traffickers, and much more. It cannot be
allowed to expire.
It is also true that the 702 program requires substantial reform. We
have done this before, and we are doing it in this base bill.
I would also make a critical point here, which is that this is
arguably our most heavily scrutinized and overseen intelligence
authority. It is approved--and I am going to say this twice--every
single year and has been since 2009 by Federal judges, Federal judges
who crawl all over this program looking for constitutional violations
and looking for violations of law, and since 2009, they have
recertified this program.
It is also overseen by the Congress. The chairman and I see problems
with the program. It is overseen inside by the Attorney General. It is
the most scrutinized intelligence collection program that we have.
The bill before the House today is the product of very serious
oversight, resulting in a base text that preserves the value of 702
while putting in place more than 50 significant reforms aimed at
preventing its misuse, those misuses that were detailed and that the
chairman referred to, which, by the way, are down to the tune of 90
percent. This bill would codify those reforms and require that the FBI
continue to follow those rules.
This legislation contains the most significant reforms to 702 ever.
Among many other proposals, this bill will continue the progress
already made, which I referred to, by the Biden administration and
others to ensure compliance.
The bill would ban queries conducted to find evidence of a crime and
cut by 90 percent--90 percent--the number of FBI personnel that can
approve U.S. person queries.
That is what we give up if we don't pass this bill.
We will consider several amendments to the bill, most of which I will
support. However, I am opposed to the Biggs amendment. It is an extreme
and misguided proposal that seriously undermines our national security.

I understand the instinct. There is no way to collect intelligence on
foreign emails and texts without having some Americans on the other
side of this. This bill puts in place protections to make sure that the
abuses of the past don't continue into the future.
I would add that I understand the concern. Federal judges crawl all
over this program every single year, and not one Federal judge--not
one--has found constitutional issues with U.S. person queries.
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the PCLOB, proposed
a warrant that is much less extreme than the one in the Biggs
amendment. The PCLOB--and by the way, this proposal was split on the
PCLOB--proposed that only in the event that a U.S. person query
produces information, only in that event, which is about 2 percent of
all queries, would a warrant be required.
The Biggs amendment would require a warrant for every single U.S.
person query that the government makes inside information that it
already has.
The narrow exceptions included in this amendment will also not work.
You don't need to take that from me, Mr. Chair. Talk to anybody in the
government who uses this program.
We don't know if a query is about something that is an exigency until
we know what is in the information that that query would turn up.
Enacting this amendment would make us far less safe. We will lose the
ability to disrupt terrorist plots, identify spies, interdict fentanyl,
and much

[[Page H2330]]

more, not because it was constitutionally required but because we
simply chose not to look.
As Jake Sullivan said this week: ``The extensive harms of this
proposal simply cannot be mitigated.''
I would point my colleagues, particularly on my side of the aisle, to
the President's extraordinarily strong Statement of Administration
Policy in which he reiterates the damage that will be done by this
amendment should it pass.
Mr. Chair, with a lot of what we do here, the consequences don't
appear immediately. If we turn off the ability of the government to
query U.S. person data, then the consequences will be known soon, and
we will audit why what happened happened. The consequences will be
known soon, and accountability will be visited.
Once again, Mr. Chair, I urge Members to vote for the underlying bill
and to oppose the Biggs amendment, and I reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Wenstrup).
Mr. WENSTRUP. Mr. Chair, I certainly am a supporter of this
underlying bill. This is a bipartisan product. It came out of the
Intelligence Committee, and it came out of the Intelligence Committee
when we realized a few years ago all the abuses that were taking place
within our intelligence system. We knew we had to act. There had to be
reforms, and there had to be criminal liability when people and their
agencies are doing the wrong things. That wasn't in place, and for the
last 2\1/2\ years, we have worked on this.
We have worked on it in a bipartisan way not just with the
Intelligence Committee but with the whole body. We opened this up to
the entire body, Republican and Democrat, regardless of what committee
a Member is on, and we worked together to craft a very good bill.
This isn't just an Intelligence Committee bill. This is a House of
Representatives bill.
That is what we have brought forward. This bill ensures Americans'
civil liberties are secure and that we have intelligence collection
tools that we need to safeguard our country from foreign threats.
The Constitution asked us to provide for our defense, which is what
we are trying to do, and to work against all enemies, foreign and
domestic, which is what we are trying to do.
I want to set the record straight. It is already in statute that a
warrant is required every single time the United States Government
wants to investigate a U.S. person under FISA under section 702, but a
warrant is not required to do a query to find out what we might need
for probable cause to get a warrant. Now, this amendment wants to put a
warrant on getting a query when time is of the essence.
Mr. Chair, if Ali Khamenei is talking about you and we pick up that,
then I want to know why he is talking about you. I want to do a query
into the information we already have to see if anyone else is talking
about you.
Moreover, I want to find out if they are planning to assassinate you,
Mr. Chair. I shouldn't need a warrant to try to find out if a foreign
actor is trying to assassinate a U.S. citizen. I shouldn't need a
warrant to find out if a foreign actor or terrorist is working with
someone in the United States to harm other Americans, but if we want to
investigate that person, then yes, we do.
There is a lot of misinformation out there. American civil liberties
are not being harmed.
Mr. Chair, I will give you a hypothetical example, too. American
citizen Bob Smith pops up in a FISA database. Some are saying that
government can obtain or search Bob's emails, texts, and phone calls.
That is not true. That is not true, but you can do a query to see if
anyone else is talking about this person, and not just anyone else
anywhere, but a foreign actor or a foreign terrorist whose information
you already have.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, how much time is remaining on Dr.
Wenstrup's 3 minutes?
The CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has 20 seconds remaining.
Mr. WENSTRUP. Mr. Chair, I want to just say what is true and what is
not true. A query does not investigate a U.S. citizen. In many cases,
it is acting on behalf of a U.S. citizen to keep them safe.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi). The Speaker Emerita is the single longest
serving member of the Committee on Intelligence ever. She is a member
whose, as my Republican colleagues regularly remind me, progressive
bona fides are unchallengeable and who came to this institution to
fight for civil liberties.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding and for his
great leadership of the Intelligence Committee, and I thank our members
of the Intelligence Committee on both sides of the aisle for their
important work to protect our national security.
Having served there, I know it is a place where we strive for
bipartisanship.
Mr. Chair, as the gentleman indicated, I came to this committee in
the early nineties, and my purpose was to protect the civil liberties
as we protected the national security of our country. I had two
purposes. One was to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and
secondly, on par with that, was to make sure that we protect the civil
liberties.
Over the course of that time, I have voted for legislation that is
less than what I would have liked but advanced the cause. Both the
chair and the ranking member have put forth a very clear idea about why
702 is important, and I associate myself with their remarks.
I just want to say to this: I went in, in the early nineties. I
became the ranking member, the top Democrat on the committee. For 20
years, I was in the Gang of Eight, in terms of receiving intelligence,
up until last year when I stopped being the Speaker of the House. For
that whole time, it has been about what this means to the civil
liberties of the American people.
I had a bill that we brought when former President Bush was President
that addressed some of our FISA concerns that didn't go all the way.
This bill does.
In this legislation, there are scores of provisions that could
strengthen our case for civil liberties. Some of them are improvements
on existing law. Some of them are new provisions in the law to protect
the civil liberties of the American people.

{time} 1000

Therefore, the Biggs amendment seriously undermines our ability to
protect national security, and I urge our colleagues to vote against
it.
I don't have the time right now, but if Members want to know, I will
tell them how we could have been saved from 9/11 if we didn't have to
have the additional warrants.
Mr. Chair, I urge a ``no'' vote on the Biggs amendment and a ``yes''
vote on the bill.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Arkansas (Mr. Crawford).
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chair, to my folks at home: Are you concerned about
counterterrorism threats? I am, too.
FISA section 702 informed the planning for the February 2022 U.S.
military operation that resulted in the death in Syria of Hajji
`Abdallah, the leader of ISIS. That is one example.
Are you concerned about fentanyl? I am, too. We were able to leverage
FISA section 702 intelligence to identify a foreign actor overseas who
was supplying a pill press machine and other equipment to drug cartels
in Mexico to help thwart that fentanyl threat.
Are you concerned about cyber threats? I am, too.
FISA section 702 played an important role in the U.S. Government's
response to a cyberattack on Colonial Pipeline back in 2021 and other
cyber threats that have taken place since then.
Are you concerned about threats to our troops? I am, too.
FISA section 702 has identified threats to U.S. troops and disrupted
planned terrorist attacks on those troops overseas in places like the
Middle East, a U.S. facility, specifically in the Middle East. Section
702 was used to monitor communications as those terrorists traveled to
execute those plans.
We can't overstate the importance of 702, and I know you are
concerned about the rights of the American people. I am, too.

[[Page H2331]]

I am an American, just like you are. That is why there already is a
warrant requirement in place. We are protecting U.S. persons. We can't
allow 702 to expire and expect that we are going to have good results
at the end of the day.
Mr. Chair, I support section 702, and I urge a ``yes'' vote.
The CHAIR. Members are reminded to direct their remarks to the Chair
and not to a perceived viewing audience.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Georgia
(Mr. Johnson).
Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for
yielding.
Mr. Chair, I rise in support of the reauthorization of section 702 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which was first passed by
Congress in 2008.
FISA codified what had been a secret and legally unauthorized
practice of warrantless collection of phone, email, and other
communications of non-U.S. persons located outside of the United States
in response to the deadly 9/11 attack that killed thousands of
Americans.
As they planned that deadly attack, al-Qaida plotters used U.S.
communications facilities, and American foreign intelligence picked up
the chatter. However, the stovepipe that kept this intel from domestic
law enforcement created the situation where domestic law enforcement
could not protect us from the threat because they did not know of the
plot before it happened. If section 702 had been in place prior to 9/
11, the FBI could have been able to prevent the attack.
Additionally, allowing section 702 to expire would expose Americans
to grave danger, like the horrific massacre of Israeli Jews on October
7; the military style assaults, for example, that happened in Russia
recently; and other mass-casualty events, the limits of which are only
limited by the depravity of those who would plan them.
Mr. Chair, that is why I rise in support of this legislation.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, may I inquire as to how much time is
remaining.
The CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has 5 minutes remaining.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. LaHood).
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I
thank the gentleman for his leadership on this bill.
Mr. Chair, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 7888, the Reforming
Intelligence and Securing America Act.
Over the past year, I have led the Intelligence Committee task force
on FISA reauthorization, working with my colleagues to find commonsense
reforms to the processes under section 702 to create a balance between
protecting national security and preserving constitutional liberties
afforded to all U.S. persons.
It is important to state at the outset that section 702 is used only
to target bad actors overseas and our adversaries who are not protected
under the Fourth Amendment. It is not used to surveil or target
Americans.
Throughout our process, we regularly engage with national security
leaders, former Trump administration officials, and our colleagues both
on the Judiciary Committee and throughout the Conference.
This bill before us makes targeted, meaningful changes to FISA and
section 702 without upending the statute in a way that will lead to
unintended consequences resulting in the United States being less safe.
Prior to coming to Congress, I served as an assistant U.S. attorney
and chief terrorism prosecutor. I witnessed firsthand the valuable use
of FISA. Section 702 is a critical tool that helps the IC defend the
United States against the malign actors we worry about daily, and the
value of what 702 has done for our country over the last 15-plus years
is immense.
I will mention four existential things that have happened in the last
9 years: the taking out of bin Laden; the assassination of Soleimani,
the Iranian leader, by President Trump; the taking out of al-Baghdadi,
the leader of ISIS; and last year, the taking out of al-Zawahiri. The
use of 702 in all of those cases was definitive in the taking out of
those terrorists.
I also say, with this bill, it institutes the largest reform of the
FBI in a generation. It makes the necessary changes to prevent
potential bad actors from improperly utilizing FISA from anything other
than its intended use, protecting Americans from foreign threats.
Particularly, in this day and age, with China, what is going on in
the Middle East, and the nonenforcement at our southern border, it is
now more important than ever that we have a vibrant, robust 702 in
place.
Lastly, I include in the Record a letter from Mike Pompeo, John
Ratcliffe, Devin Nunes, William Barr, and Robert O'Brien, former Trump
administration officials that worked in national security, where they
specifically support our bill and express grave concerns about the
warrant amendment that will be brought up today.

December 7, 2023.
Hon. Mike Johnson,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Mr. Speaker, As former officials who have either worked for
or with the Intelligence Community, we write today with
serious concerns that a critical tool to keep Americans safe
will cease to be available to the men and women who protect
the United States each day.
At the end of this month, Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) will sunset. This is one
of the most critical tools the Intelligence Community has at
its disposal. Section 702 must be reauthorized and, as
evidenced by the FBI's prior flagrant abuses, FISA must also
be reformed. Those reforms should focus on concrete
improvements--including congressional oversight of and access
to FISA Court transcripts--rather than a warrant requirement
that may not achieve its intended objectives and could hinder
current national security efforts.
We urge you to support the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence's bipartisan bill sponsored by Chairman Mike
Turner and Ranking Member Jim Himes.
Respectfully,
Mike Pompeo,
Former Secretary of State, Former Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
William Barr,
Former Attorney General of the United States.
John Ratcliffe,
Former Director of National Intelligence.
Robert O'Brien,
Former National Security Advisor to the President.
Devin Nunes,
Former Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.

Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chair, I urge a ``no'' vote on the warrant amendment
and a ``yes'' vote on our underlying bill.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Colorado (Mr. Crow), who, prior to coming here, defended this Nation's
security at risk to his own life in the uniform of the 75th Ranger
Regiment.
Mr. CROW. Mr. Chair, I rise in support of the Reforming Intelligence
and Securing America Act to reauthorize section 702 of FISA.
As one of the Nation's most essential intelligence-gathering tools,
the importance of reauthorizing FISA cannot be overstated. Every day,
our Nation's diplomats, intelligence professionals, defense officials,
soldiers, marines, and airmen rely on intelligence derived from section
702 to advance their missions and to protect our country.
It provides vital insights into the kinds of threats that we need to
be able to protect Americans from, including threats against our
critical infrastructure, our computer networks, our financial system,
and our citizens.
This bill is the product of careful, bipartisan negotiations. These
negotiations have insured that this bill will not only maintain the
effectiveness of FISA, but also enhance protections for America's civil
liberties. It makes targeted reforms to address compliance issues and
to prevent abuses.
The amendment proposed by my colleagues to require a warrant before
accessing this information, which has already been lawfully collected
and reviewed by courts and is in the possession of the U.S. Government,
would serve as a de facto ban on ever accessing it. It creates an
unacceptable level of risk with consequences that will be felt almost
immediately for Americans and our national security.
Therefore, Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to reject the Biggs
amendment and to support the underlying bill.

[[Page H2332]]

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Crenshaw).
Mr. CRENSHAW. Mr. Chairman, I have seen a lot since we have been
here. This is my third term. Never before have I actually been
frightened about what could happen if FISA is not reauthorized or this
warrant amendment is passed, which effectively kills our ability to
detect and connect the dots between foreign terrorists and what they
might do here domestically.
I have never been more concerned. I spent the last 20 years of my
life fighting for this country. I lost an eye doing it.
Additionally, I don't think we actually disagree very much on
principle. There is always a balance between civil liberties, privacy,
and security. I don't think my colleagues and I are very far apart on
that. We are very far apart on the facts at hand. So let's talk about
some myths and some facts.
Myth: FISA is used to spy on Americans.
The myth goes like this: If you query an American's name, you can see
their in-box. That is not true.
It is used to spy on foreign intelligence targets, foreign
terrorists, and you need a warrant to do so. If they speak to an
American, you will get that part of the conversation. That is all you
get.
There is another myth. This bill doesn't go far enough. It doesn't do
any reforms. That is not true.
The reforms in here would stop in their tracks what happened to
President Trump with Crossfire Hurricane. It is almost entirely
intended to stop what happened to President Trump. Not only that, it
would codify 56 warrant reforms. It would put in processes before
queries are even made. It would put in criminal penalties for those who
do not abide by those processes.
The FBI hates these reforms, by the way.
Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this bill and not to
support the amendment to require a warrant for queries.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining.
The CHAIR. The gentleman has 5\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from
Pennsylvania (Ms. Houlahan).
Ms. HOULAHAN. Mr. Chair, I rise today in strong support of the
Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, which would
reauthorize FISA 702.
We live in a dangerous world, and section 702 is crucial to keeping
Americans safe. This is a tool that our intelligence agencies rely upon
all day to counter all kinds of threats to our homeland from U.S.
nonpersons. Again, U.S. nonpersons.
Whether uncovering Chinese spies or foiling terrorist plots or
intercepting cyberattacks, this authority is essential to our national
security. This tool can even allow our intelligence community to
counter drug cartels as they attempt to bring deadly fentanyl to our
shores, but it would be enhanced by an amendment that Mr. Crenshaw and
I are proposing, the Enhancing Intelligence Collection on Foreign Drug
Traffickers Act.
Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment when we
vote later this morning.
However, not all of the amendments today would strengthen this bill.
In fact, I am strongly opposed to the amendment offered by Mr. Biggs,
and I am obligated to point out the dangers of passing this extreme
amendment.
Intelligence professionals who rely on this tool, 702, keep us safe
and have been crystal clear. This amendment would make it nearly
impossible to access information essential to protect our homeland
security.
Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I urge a ``yes''
vote on the overall bill to reauthorize FISA, and a ``no'' vote on the
Biggs amendment.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Rutherford), who opposes giving constitutional rights to our
foreign adversaries.
Mr. RUTHERFORD. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman from Ohio for
yielding.
Mr. Chair, I rise today in strong support of this bill and equally
strong opposition to the amendment.
Simply put, this amendment ties the hands of our intelligence
community, making all of us less safe. This amendment requires the IC
to get a probable cause warrant to search a set of data that has
legally been collected. Our intelligence community must have access to
legally collected, pertinent information, and we should not be adding
roadblocks.

As a former law enforcement officer, I strongly believe in the civil
liberties of all Americans. I spent my life protecting them. However,
this amendment does not provide any more protection to Americans. All
this amendment does is gut 702, giving to terrorists, adversaries, and
bad actors a major win.
Restricting access to already legally collected data makes us all
less safe, and 702 is a vital piece of our security and must be
preserved.
Mr. Chair, I urge a ``no'' vote on the amendment.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Goldman).
Mr. GOLDMAN of New York. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for
yielding.
Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of this bill that includes an
absolutely essential national security program. However, I will support
this bill only if the amendment that would impose a warrant requirement
on queries regarding American citizens fails.
First, a warrant is simply not needed because the query in question
is not a new search. It simply identifies any contacts or
communications with Americans within the universe of information that
was already lawfully obtained from the original search, and that
original search can only be of foreign nationals on foreign soil.
I spent 10 years as a Federal prosecutor and obtained hundreds of
search warrants. Based on that experience, I can say with confidence
that requiring a warrant would render this program unusable and
entirely worthless.
Based on the information available to law enforcement, it would be
impossible to get probable cause to obtain a search warrant from a
judge in a timely manner. Additionally, even if it were possible, the
time required to obtain a search warrant from a judge would frequently
fail to meet the urgency posed by a terrorist or other national
security threat.

{time} 1015

A warrant requirement is unnecessary and unworkable and I, therefore,
urge my colleagues to oppose the Biggs amendment.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner) has
expired.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman from Ohio for his
terrific work in the face of very real challenges and his commitment to
bipartisanship.
This is a critical and bipartisan effort, and it is one that he and I
and many others have spent thousands of hours on. As we close out
debate, two things are very clear: Number one, this authority must be
reauthorized.
I have heard too many Members saying that I will vote to reauthorize
it so long as I get this amendment passed. If you are serious about
keeping the American people safe, if you are serious about what you
said, which is that this must be reauthorized, vote for final passage.
This is our single most important tool to keep Americans safe.
Secondly, the Biggs amendment is an extreme amendment, and I
understand the instinct.
As I mentioned before, the PCLOB, the President's Civil Liberties
Oversight Board, proposed something that would require, in very limited
circumstances, a judicial amendment. This amendment is far more extreme
than that one, and it is not driven by constitutional concerns. Not a
single Federal court after years and years of scrutiny has identified a
Fourth Amendment issue.
This is a policy choice, and I would say to those friends of mine on
my side of the aisle, maybe you have spent more time on this collection
authority than I have. I have probably spent 2,000 or 3,000 hours, so
maybe you have spent more. I am willing to concede that. Maybe you know
better than I do, but I would ask you to listen to the people who use
this every single day at the Department of Justice, at our intelligence
community. I would ask you to read the last paragraph of the
administration's statement of administration

[[Page H2333]]

policy, which concludes with the line: ``Our intelligence, defense, and
public safety communities are united: The extensive harms of this
proposal simply cannot be mitigated.''
We are Article I. You have probably done a lot of work. Maybe you
know better on the Biggs amendment. We will find out. Pass the Biggs
amendment. Do what the SAP says would badly damage our safety. We will
find out.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Jordan) and the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Nadler) each will control 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chair, in 2021, 2022, the FBI did over 3 million U.S. person
queries of this giant 702 database--of this giant haystack of
information, 3 million queries of United States persons. Make no
mistake, query is a fancy name for search. Three million Americans'
data was searched in this database of information, and guess what? The
FBI wasn't even following their own rules when they conducted those
searches. That is why we need a warrant.
This is not Jim Jordan talking about it. This is not Ranking Member
Nadler talking about it, but The Washington Post reported last May that
278,000 times the FBI found, the Justice Department found, that they
didn't even follow their own darn rules when they searched this giant
haystack, this giant database of information on Americans.
What we are saying is, let's do something that the Constitution has
had in place for a couple hundred years that has served our Nation well
and protected American citizens' liberties. Let's make the executive
branch go to a separate and equal branch of government, the judicial
branch, and get a probable cause warrant to do the search.
After all, it has done pretty well for this great country, greatest
country ever, for a long, long time. Why wouldn't we have that here?
By the way, in a bipartisan fashion coming out of our committee, 35-2
vote, we said we will even put exceptions in there. If it is an
emergency situation, the FBI doesn't have to get a warrant. They can do
the search. If it is an emergency situation, they can do it. We have
put exceptions in there.
Here is the fundamental question that I raised the other day: Of the
over 3 million searches in a 2-year time span, how many of those aren't
covered by the exceptions we have in our warrant amendment? What is the
number? Guess what? We can't get an answer. They won't tell us, which
should be concerning in and of itself, but if it is a big number, we
should be particularly frightened.
If they don't follow the exceptions and they are searching Americans,
searching your name, your phone number, your email address in this
giant database, that should scare us. And if it is a small number, then
what is the big deal? We can't get an answer to that question.
The underlying bill has got some changes and reforms that are
positive, that are good, but short of having this warrant amendment
added to the legislation, we shouldn't pass it.
This amendment is critical, particularly when you think about the
278,000 times they abused the system, didn't follow their own rules.
Now we say, oh, we have got some new rules, they will follow them now.
No. No.
The real check we have in our system is a separate and equal branch
of government signing off on it. That is how we do things in America.
And never forget, this is the FBI who has had some other abuses in
different areas.
This is why we think this warrant requirement is so darn important,
and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chair, I rise in strong support of meaningful reform to FISA
section 702 and in strong opposition to a mere fig leaf or, even worse,
an expansion of 702. Unfortunately, we will not know which of these
paths we are taking until the conclusion of this debate.

What I know at this moment is that the base text before us right now
is completely inadequate. Although it has some perfectly fine
provisions, it does not represent real reform. Some of the proposed
amendments that will be coming up today would take us in the wrong
direction, and changing the sunset from 5 years to 2 years does
absolutely nothing to improve the bill.
Ultimately, this legislation should only move forward if it contains
an amendment to mandate that the intelligence community obtain a
probable cause warrant before they search the 702 database for
Americans' private communications.
Some of my colleagues appear confused about how 702 collection works
and what we mean when supporters of a warrant requirement refer to
``backdoor searches'' for U.S. person information. Let's be clear about
what we are talking about.
FISA section 702 permits the intelligence community to sweep up the
communication of foreign targets located overseas. When these
communications are obtained, they go into what is known as a 702
database where all the 702 data is housed.
If the U.S. Government wants to target a U.S. person for foreign
surveillance, U.S. person meaning an American or legal permanent
resident, they already can. They do this by getting a warrant under
title I of FISA, a separate and distinct part of FISA from section 702.
The government cannot target Americans under 702 because 702 does not
protect the constitutional rights of the targets of the surveillance.
Foreigners not located on U.S. soil do not have constitutional rights,
so this is not a problem.
What is a problem, however, is that massive amounts of Americans'
communications are still swept up in 702 searches. If a U.S. person
communicates with a foreign target, that American's communications with
the target end up in the 702 database, too. While we do not know
precise numbers, we know that a vast amount of Americans'
communications is swept up every year.
The intelligence community is not supposed to search the 702 database
for U.S. person identifiers, like our names, phone numbers, and
addresses without cause. Searching for Americans' private
communications in the 702 database, communications the government
otherwise would not have access to without a warrant, is the
constitutional equivalent of conducting a warrantless search.
We know that the government breaks this law all the time--278,000
times, in fact, at last count in 2021 alone. Officials are supposed to
find it reasonably likely that a query will turn up evidence of a crime
or foreign intelligence information, but that did not stop them from
searching for protesters, politicians, and political donors, to name a
few, without proper predicate.
Because of these repeated violations, Chairman Jordan and I agree
that the only way to preserve Americans' privacy and constitutional
rights is to require the intelligence community to obtain a probable
cause warrant when they want to search the communications of Americans
housed in the 702 database. This is a basic tenet of the Fourth
Amendment.
Now, Chairman Turner stated incorrectly that the proposed warrant
requirement gives constitutional rights to suspected terrorists abroad.
Nonsense. The warrant requirement does not change any aspect of
surveillance of valid targets under section 702, nor should it. The
problem is that when we surveil the internet, we sweep up massive
amounts of U.S. person information, and the warrant requirement we
propose would apply the Fourth Amendment to that information--nothing
more, and our Constitution demands nothing less.
We have repeatedly heard some of our colleagues tell us that the sky
is falling; that a probable cause requirement would end U.S. person
searches of the 702 database, but there are no facts to back up these
claims.
We will be considering an amendment today to add a warrant
requirement for U.S. person searches of the 702 database. This
essential amendment makes exceptions for victim consent, cybersecurity
cases, and exigencies, that is, emergencies. Thus, the vast majority of
these searches can continue without a warrant, but for the small
percentage of searches of Americans' communications that would be
affected, the government should have probable cause to search their
communications.

[[Page H2334]]

It is simply unfair to ask the intelligence community to both
zealously protect our security while also protecting the constitutional
rights of those surveilled. America's system of checks and balances
exist precisely for cases such as this, where two considerations must
coexist at odds with one another.
For too long, FISA section 702 has enabled the surveillance of
Americans without adequate safeguards to protect our civil liberties.
Americans need Congress to enact these guardrails, and with section 702
expiring soon, we have a rare opportunity to protect Americans' privacy
while giving enforcement the tools they need to keep us safe.

Mr. Chair, I encourage my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this
legislation unless a probable cause warrant is adopted, and I reserve
the balance of my time.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. McClintock), my friend and a member of the Judiciary
Committee.
Mr. McCLINTOCK. Mr. Chair, I don't discount the mounting dangers we
face from enemies abroad, but we also cannot discount the dangers we
face at home from the very powers that this bill would continue.
As has been pointed out, the FBI abused these powers 278,000 times in
a single year and turned them against American citizens by phishing for
January 6th and Black Lives Matter rioters, probing political donors,
and even piercing congressional offices.
John Adams believed that the indiscriminate searches by British
officials became the first spark of the American Revolution. Having
lived under such a tyranny, the Founders protected us with the Fourth
Amendment. Before authorities can search through our records, they have
to get a warrant from an independent judge by showing probable cause to
suspect that we have committed a crime.
Now, there are many excellent reforms in this bill, and I applaud
them, but they largely depend on these agencies policing themselves,
and experience warns us that is just not enough. Without a warrant
requirement, I fear these powers will, once again, be turned against
our fundamental liberties and these days that scares me as much as a
terrorist attack.

{time} 1030

Just imagine how much safer we would all be if we stationed a soldier
in every house, but we have the Third Amendment to protect us against
that tyranny, just as we have a Fourth Amendment to protect us against
the tyranny of indiscriminate searches.
Benjamin Franklin's warning echoes from his age to ours today:
``Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.'' Let that not be
history's judgment of us.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished
gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. Jayapal).
Ms. JAYAPAL. Mr. Chair, we have a critical opportunity today to stand
up for the civil liberties that are enshrined in our Constitution while
also safeguarding our national security.
Every single day, the FBI conducts an average of 500 warrantless
searches of Americans' private communications, resulting in over
278,000 searches in 1 year alone. The FBI has invaded the privacy of
Members of Congress, a State court judge who reported civil rights
violations by a local police chief, Black Lives Matter protesters, and
more.
We cannot pass this bill without additional protections, like my
amendment with Representatives Biggs, Nadler, Jordan, Lofgren, and
Davidson, to close the backdoor search loophole.
Unfortunately, there are some members of the intelligence community
and some Members of this body who are circulating information that
simply is not correct, and I need to correct the record right here.
Some Members have implied that the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board does not support the amendment.
To counter that, let me share some quotes from Sharon Bradford
Franklin in her personal capacity as Chair of the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board, the independent government agency tasked
with ensuring the executive branch conducts national security work in a
way that protects our civil liberties and privacy. She said:

It is critical that in reauthorizing section 702, Congress
includes a warrant requirement for U.S. person queries.
Requiring a warrant for U.S. person queries would neither
end U.S. person queries nor undermine the overall value of
section 702.
Outside of the category of ``victim queries,'' the FBI has
not been able to identify any cases in which a section 702
U.S. person query provided unique value in advancing a
criminal investigation. In addition, the government has been
unable to identify a single criminal prosecution that relied
on evidence identified through a U.S. person query.
The warrant requirement contained in the warrant amendment
includes important exceptions that would address the
government's concerns about slowing down the process for U.S.
person queries. Exceptions are provided for exigent
circumstances, consent, cybersecurity, and metadata-only
queries.

Mr. Chair, let me be clear that the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board, in its oversight capacity, has the same access to all
the classified intelligence that the agencies cite when they try to
scare us into reauthorizing FISA with minimal changes.
We have a bipartisan amendment that would fix this problem. We have a
responsibility to stand up for civil liberties of our constituents. We
cannot pass this bill without requiring intelligence agencies to ensure
that Americans' privacy rights are upheld at every turn.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Before yielding to my good friend, I just want to underscore what the
gentlewoman from Washington just described. The Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board, created by the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
says that our amendment is consistent with what should happen. Our
amendment is consistent with the majority recommendation of that board.
This was a board specifically created to protect Americans'
liberties, looking at how the intelligence community operates by the 9/
11 Commission Act of 2007. The majority of that board said this
amendment is what needs to happen.
Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.
Van Drew), a member of our committee.
Mr. VAN DREW. Mr. Chair, you just heard the words of Benjamin
Franklin from my good friend Tom McClintock, that those who would
give up freedom for safety deserve neither. I hope that we aren't
marked in history as the generation of Congress that was willing to
give up American liberty and freedom. It is what we stood for. It is
what we have worked for. It is what the men and women of this country
have died for. We owe it to them. It is our most important right as
Americans. It is what the United States of America represents.
We were told all this before. We were told in the last renewal of
section 702 that everything was going to be okay, no worries, all the
security was there, nothing to be concerned about, don't look here.
Then we saw what happened. We saw that political campaigns and donors
were gone after. We saw that Members of Congress were investigated. We
saw that journalists were investigated. We saw that individuals who
were Libertarians or liberals or conservatives were investigated. We
saw FBI agents' own coworkers and even their ex-girlfriends and others
were investigated. The average man and woman in America were
investigated.
It was wrong. It occurred not dozens, not hundreds, not thousands,
but, over that time period, millions of times, millions of illegal
queries.
I cannot support, and I will not support, this legislation unless
there is a major change in the form of an amendment that would require
what we know needs to be done: a search warrant. It is a basic American
right.
Don't let them scare you. It doesn't mean that we are not going to go
after terrorists. It doesn't mean that we won't protect the United
States of America.
While I finally wrap up here, if this bill is so good the way it is
written, why do we exempt Members of Congress? Do you know why? It is
because they are scared that they may still at the end of the day go
after us.

It is wrong. Rules for thee, not for me. We should not stand for it.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), the ranking member of the
Crime and

[[Page H2335]]

Federal Government Surveillance Subcommittee.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, I thank the distinguished ranking member
of the Judiciary Committee and the chairman of the Judiciary Committee.
Even in this time of 2024, we need this legislation to protect now
one of the most revered civil rights leaders, Dr. Martin Luther King.
Yes, we need legislation that would, in fact, protect someone who
simply wanted to provide justice to this Nation. He was the subject of
COINTELPRO, a distorted investigation of his family, his belongings,
his extended family members, and his wife, who I think at the time was
expecting.
This legislation is important to save lives. It is important
legislation to ensure that our intelligence community, our law
enforcement community, can do their jobs, but it is not legislation
that should be utilized to abuse the American people.
I rise today to speak of the concerns on H.R. 7888. It is a
bipartisan bill to reauthorize an essential intelligence authority,
section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, and
other FISA provisions before they would expire on April 19. In doing
so, we find ourselves being subject to the eye of the knife, if you
will, in penetrating the personal matters of individuals that have no
desire to do harm to this country.
As we know all too well, expiration of 702 authorities would deprive
our Federal Government of the necessary insight into precisely the
threats Americans expect their government to identify and counter. We
understand that, as highlighted and emphasized through Federal
administration, if we lose 702, we lose vital protections to the United
States and its allies from hostile foreign adversaries, including
terrorists, proliferators, and spies, and to inform cybersecurity
efforts.
We are also acutely aware that 702 is an extremely controversial,
warrantless surveillance authority that must not be reauthorized
without substantial reform to rein in warrantless surveillance of
Americans. We simply cannot do that. Indeed, warrantless surveillance
intended for non-American targets located abroad inevitably has
resulted in the collection and capture of Americans' communications
and, yes, the results of capturing information that safeguards the
American people and provides us with a safety net that we can fight for
justice, fight for civil rights, and yet be protected.
It is no secret that intelligence agencies have turned section 702
into a domestic spying tool used to perform hundreds of thousands of
warrantless backdoor searches for Americans' private phone calls,
emails, and text messages.
By the way, Mr. Chair, we have a whole new world of technology where
you can probe every aspect of our lives. These searches have included
shocking abuses, including against civil rights leaders, protesters,
Members of Congress, 19,000 donors to congressional campaigns,
political parties.
Mr. Chair, I rise today to speak on H .R. 7888--Reforming
Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA), a bipartisan bill to
reauthorize an essential intelligence authority, Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (``FISA''), and other FISA
provisions before they would expire on April 19, 2024.
As we know all too well, expiration of Section 702 authorities would
deprive our federal government of the necessary insight into precisely
the threats Americans expect their government to identify and counter.
As highlighted and emphasized through federal administration, if we
lost 702, we would lose vital protections to the United States and its
allies from hostile foreign adversaries, including terrorists,
proliferators, and spies, and to inform cybersecurity efforts.
We also are acutely aware, that Section 702 is an extremely
controversial warrantless surveillance authority that must not be
reauthorized without substantial reform to rein in warrantless
surveillance of Americans.
Indeed, warrantless surveillance intended for non-American targets
located abroad ``inevitably'' has resulted in the collection and
capture of Americans' communications, too.
And it is no secret that intelligence agencies have turned Section
702 into a domestic spying tool, using it to perform hundreds of
thousands of warrantless ``backdoor'' searches for Americans' private
phone calls, e-mails, and text messages every year.
Yes, these searches have included shocking abuses, including baseless
searches for the communications of Black Lives Matter protesters,
members of Congress, 19,000 donors to a congressional campaign, a local
political party, and tens of thousands of people involved in ``civil
unrest.''
To protect the American people, we need to maintain the vital
collection authority as intended to protect our nation and national
security, while at the same time strengthening its protective
guardrails with the most robust set of reforms ever included in
legislation to reauthorize Section 702.
Importantly, H.R. 7888, as amended here today provides several
critically needed reforms--including a fix to the backdoor search
loophole and a prohibition on the ``abouts'' collection provision, and
ultimately seeks to accomplish the necessary balancing we seek for
national security protections and the protection of American's privacy
rights.
To protect the American people, we need to maintain the vital
collection authority as intended to protect our Nation and national
security. We must do that while at the same time strengthening its
protective guardrails with the most robust set, if you will, of
protection that we possibly can.
That is why I have joined with several Members, including Mr. Cline,
to offer the ``abouts'' amendment. We will offer that as one of the
Judiciary three. This amendment does something Congress should have
done 7 years ago, prohibit the government from resuming ``abouts''
collection, a form of section 702 that poses unique risks to Americans.
``Abouts'' collection is a collection of communications that are
neither to nor from an approved target of surveillance--can you
imagine?--under section 702 of FISA but merely contain information
related to the target.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the
gentlewoman from Texas.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, it is unbelievable that we would go after
innocent Americans and Members of Congress in the random searching and
fishing of information that may not be relevant. In the past,
``abouts'' collection focused on collecting communications that include
a target's email address, phone number, or Twitter handle or something
like that, but in theory, ``abouts'' collection could be used to
collect emails that merely mention a person who is a target of section
702 surveillance.
Mr. Chair, I rise today to indicate that we cannot pass this
legislation without these vital amendments and that we cannot pass this
legislation without the American people believing that when they pledge
allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, they are
pledging allegiance to civil liberties, freedom, and justice and
equality for all. I rise to support these amendments and as well a free
nation with democracy and liberty for all.
Mr. Chair, I include in the Record a list of groups who support this
amendment.

Congress of the United States,

Washington, DC, April 12, 2024.
Dear Colleague: Please join us in supporting our amendment
to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America
Act. Rules Amendment #5 would end what is known as ``abouts''
collection, which involves the capturing of massive amounts
of communications by government agencies such as the National
Security Agency (NSA) in which the selector, for example, an
email address, of a target appears somewhere in
communications, even if that target is not a party to the
communications. It has long been controversial.
The FISA Court previously discovered that the government
had misrepresented its activities and held that handling this
type of data was of significant concern and a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Although the NSA abandoned the practice
of ``abouts'' collection in 2017, Congress in 2018 amended
FISA to prohibit this type of collection unless the AG and
DNI notify the House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary
Committees of its plans to resume such collection. But that
only means that if the NSA notifies Congress, they can resume
``abouts'' collection at any time. Our amendment would
proactively end the practice for good.
The following groups support this important amendment:
FreedomWorks--Key Vote; Due Process Institute; Americans
for Prosperity; Project for Privacy and Surveillance
Accountability; Reform Government Surveillance; Center for
Democracy and Technology; American Civil Liberties Union;
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC); Restore the
Fourth; Defending Rights & Dissent; Brennan Center for
Justice; Wikimedia Foundation.
Demand Progress; Electronic Frontier Foundation; Project on
Government Oversight; United We Dream; Asian Americans

[[Page H2336]]

Advancing Justice; Muslim Advocates; Free Press Action;
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Freedom of
the Press Foundation; New America's Open Technology
Institute; Fight for the Future; Stop AAPI Hate.
We urge you to vote in favor of Amendment #5.
Sincerely,
Ben Cline,
Member of Congress.
Sheila Jackson Lee,
Member of Congress.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair,
I rise today in support of the Cline (VA)/Jackson Lee (TX) Amendment
[#3] to H.R. 7888--Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act
(RISAA).
This amendment does something Congress should have done seven years
ago: prohibit the government from resuming ``abouts'' collection, a
form of Section 702 surveillance that poses unique risks to Americans.
``Abouts'' collection is the collection of communications that are
neither To nor From an approved target of surveillance under Section
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), but merely
contain information relating to that target.
In the past, ``abouts'' collection focused on collecting
communications that include a target's email address, or phone address,
or Twitter handle, or something like that. But in theory, ``abouts''
collection could be used to collect emails that merely mention a person
who is a target of Section 702 surveillance.
Nothing in the text or legislative history of Section 702 indicates
that this type of surveillance is authorized.
Under Section 702, the surveillance must target a non-U.S. person
outside the United States. The term ``target'' has a well-understood
meaning. When a person is a target, it means the government can collect
that person's information or other data, not the communications or data
of other individuals.
As we all know, ``abouts'' collection under Section 702 has a sordid
history.
The National Security Agency (NSA) used ``abouts'' collection when it
was conducting upstream surveillance, in other words, when it was
intercepting communications directly as they transited over the
Internet backbone, rather than collecting stored communications from
service providers.
Not surprisingly, this practice resulted in the collection of tens of
thousands of purely domestic communications--communications between and
among Americans inside the United States.
Moreover, often these Americans were not even discussing the target.
Instead, their communications were lumped in with other communications,
transiting over the Internet backbone as a packet. The NSA was
collecting the entire packet of communications, simply because
somewhere in that packet was a reference to information about a target.
This was a problem from the moment Section 702 went into effect in
2008. And yet for years, the government did not disclose this problem
to the FISA Court.
To the contrary, the government affirmatively misrepresented how the
program was working. It was not until 2011 that the court learned the
government was sweeping in tens of thousands of purely domestic
communications.
The court was livid. It noted that the belated disclosure, and I
quote, ``marks the third instance in less than three years in which the
government has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding the
scope of a major collection program.''
At the time, the court chose not to prohibit the use of ``abouts''
collection. But it held that special minimization rules were required
for upstream communications, and that without those rules, the program
would violate both Section 702 and the Fourth Amendment. One of those
rules was a prohibition on U.S. person queries of communications
obtained through upstream surveillance.
Five years later, the NSA discovered that its agents had been
routinely violating this prohibition. But rather than immediately
report these violations to the FISA Court, the NSA waited for several
months. When it finally admitted the violations, the FISA Court
chastised the NSA for its ``institutional lack of candor,'' and refused
to approve the continuation of Section 702 surveillance until the NSA
cleaned up its act.
The NSA proved incapable of bringing its agents into compliance. The
agents continued to routinely search though the upstream data in an
effort to find and review Americans' communications, in violation of
Section 702, the Fourth Amendment, and the FISA Court's orders. Well
aware that the court would not continue to approve Section 702
surveillance under these conditions, the NSA, in 2017, made the only
decision it could: it terminated ``abouts'' collection.
Well, it has now been seven years since the NSA stopped ``abouts''
collection, and the government has not claimed that ending this
practice has resulted in a loss of critical intelligence or had any
other kind of negative impact on national security. No official has
pointed to a single bad result that could have been averted through the
use of ``abouts'' collection.
Collecting communications that are neither to nor from an approved
target of surveillance is contrary to the text and intent of Section
702.
It inevitably results in the collection of wholly domestic
communications, which Section 702 expressly prohibits.
Over the course of a decade, the NSA proved that it was incapable of
operating ``abouts'' surveillance responsibly and in accordance with
the law--and the past seven years shown that ``abouts'' collection is
not necessary for national security.
It is time for Congress to shut the door on ``abouts'' collection.
In the future, if the government can show that it needs ``abouts''
collection for national security purposes and that it can operate the
program without violating the law and the Fourth Amendment, it can come
to Congress and ask for authorization. But the burden should be on the
government to show the need and the ability to lawfully conduct the
program.
For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the
Cline/Jackson Lee Amendment [#3].
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from the
great State of Texas (Mr. Self), my friend and colleague.
Mr. SELF. Mr. Chair, it appears that the House of Representatives is
experiencing a constitutional crisis of conscience. We are actually
debating if a warrant should be required for government intelligence
agencies to spy on Americans. Frankly, I am stunned this is even called
into question, especially amongst my Republican colleagues.
The Constitution is absolutely clear. We, as Americans, have the
right under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and
seizures, a right that the FBI has violated in over 278,000 improper
searches of Americans and 3.4 million warrantless queries of Americans'
private communications.
These facts are not up for debate. We know this. They have been
caught. If we do not pass this warrant requirement, especially in light
of these facts, the continued victimization of Americans by the FBI
through FISA section 702 will be legitimized.
As an Army officer, as a county judge, and now as a Member of
Congress, for 40 years I have been under oath to defend the
Constitution against all enemies. I will do so today. On behalf of over
800,000 of my constituents in Texas District Three: Get a warrant.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. Fitzgerald), a Judiciary Committee member and friend.
Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chair, the debate today is really focused on
whether or not the FBI should be required to obtain a warrant to access
U.S. person data. As the quote we are all familiar with says, insanity
is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different
results.
I remind my colleagues of the debate on the previous FISA
reauthorization bill in the 115th Congress. Many of my current and
former colleagues stood behind this very podium and swore up and down
that the FISA Amendments Act of 2017 would provide necessary
protections for U.S. person information while keeping our country safe.

{time} 1045

Yet, since the bill became law, there were nearly 3 million U.S.
person queries just in 2021 and hundreds of incomplete FISA
applications and the use of section 702 to query data on Members

[[Page H2337]]

of Congress, protestors, and even FBI janitors.
It appears to me that the factor that continues to fall by the
wayside in all of the debates that are happening is that human nature
plays a part.
Mr. Chair, that is the dilemma that we find ourselves in. We didn't
pick this. This is where we ended up.
Do we allow human nature to take its course and permit the FBI to
continue to abuse U.S. person data, which the Department of Justice IG
Special Counsel Durham, the FISA court, and numerous independent review
bodies have found to be negligent, inappropriate, and a threat to
American privacy, or do we rein in the FBI and fight for our Fourth
Amendment rights?
I choose to side with the latter and support the amendments that
limit rather than expand the FBI's ability to query U.S. person data.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chair, the suggestion has been made that the warrant requirement
is extreme. Let's be clear: There is nothing extreme about this idea.
Over a decade ago, a group of intelligence experts convened by
President Obama unanimously recommended requiring a warrant for U.S.
person queries of section 702 data. That group included Michael Morell,
former Acting Director of the CIA and Richard Clarke, former Chief
Counterterrorism Adviser to President George W. Bush.
These top national security officials understood that we can protect
national security while respecting the Fourth Amendment rights of
Americans.
The House of Representatives has twice passed amendments with a
warrant requirement for backdoor searches by large bipartisan
majorities. Some of my colleagues who spoke against this amendment
today, including former Speaker Pelosi, have voted more than once for
this reform.
Over 75 percent of Americans support this reform. Calling something
extreme doesn't make it extreme, and this is an idea that has been in
the mainstream for over a decade.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I am prepared to close, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Chairman Jordan and I agree on very little, but we are united in our
belief that adding a warrant requirement to section 702 is absolutely
necessary before we consider supporting reauthorization of these
authorities.
I will reserve judgment on final passage of this bill until we see
what amendments pass, but I urge Members to join us in supporting real
reform. Real reform means, at the minimum, the warrant requirement to
give effect to Americans' constitutional rights.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I think the ranking member is right. The vote was 35-2 on a major
piece of legislation. That doesn't happen a whole lot in our committee.
I thank our committee and I thank the Members on the Republican side
who worked so hard over the last year putting this legislation
together. We had three individuals in particular, Ms. Lee, Mr. Biggs,
and Mr. McClintock, who served on a task force focused on this getting
in right. I think they have a good product if, as the ranking member
just said, the warrant amendment is actually adopted into the base
text.
I also thank the Democrats who worked so hard, and their staff
working with our good staff, on putting this together: Ranking Member
Nadler, Ms. Jayapal, and several others working together to defend a
fundamental principle.
The Judiciary Committee is supposed to be that--we are all supposed
to do this, but where it is really focused is the Judiciary Committee
is supposed to be that committee that is determined to make sure
Americans' liberties are protected. I think the staff and the Members
have worked hard to put together a product that will do that if, in
fact, this amendment gets added here in a few minutes.
When the folks who started this country came together, they had it
right when they created separate and equal branches of government. The
checks and balances in our system are good. They protect our rights,
our liberties, and key principles.
We should adhere to that. As I said earlier, it has served us well.
This amendment follows that fundamental principal, so I hope we adopt
it. Then if we adopt it, I hope we adopt the legislation.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CARSON. Mr Chair, today I rise in support of H.R. 7888, Reforming
Intelligence and Securing America Act, to reauthorize the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). As someone who has worked in law
enforcement and served the intelligence community for many years, I
feel strongly that the FISA Authority, including Section 702, must not
be allowed to lapse. This could pose a grave danger to our national
security. I believe the changes and reforms included in this bill will
protect our safety while also preserving our civil liberties.
I voted in the Intelligence Committee to reauthorize this vital
legislation because I believe it represents a solid bipartisan
approach. The bill includes reforms I fought for, and I believe it
strikes the proper balance of protecting our national security in a way
that is consistent with our American values. We know the FISA authority
has been abused in the past, and that is unacceptable. That's why the
reforms included in this bill are essential.
Provisions I recommended in the bill prevent individuals from being
unfairly targeted based on race, religion, gender, sexual orientation,
or ethnicity by preventing the search of a person's name simply based
on those factors. As a Black, Muslim man who has been the victim of
profiling, this was personal for me--and I'm glad language to codify
these essential protections is included in today's bill.
It's disappointing that some of my colleagues and dedicated advocates
have described our Intelligence Committee bill as fake reform, or a
sham. That's not the case. Our committee's bill prohibits agencies from
conducting a query for the purpose of suppressing political speech,
reinforcing one of the most American liberties there is: the right to
free speech.
Finally, the bill improves and codifies accountability for the FBI in
particular and prevents future abuses.
This is not the end of our work to protect Americans' civil liberties
in U.S. intelligence, but this program is too important for our
national security to allow it to expire or experience any lapses. I
urge all of my colleagues to support this bill.
The Acting CHAIR (Mr. DesJarlais). All time for general debate has
expired.
Pursuant to the rule, an amendment in the nature of a substitute
consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 118-27, shall be
considered as adopted, and the bill, as amended, shall be considered as
an original bill for the purpose of further amendment under the 5-
minute rule and shall be considered as read.
The text of the bill, as amended is as follows:

H.R. 7888

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Reforming Intelligence and
Securing America Act''.

SEC. 2. QUERY PROCEDURE REFORM.

(a) Strictly Limiting Federal Bureau of Investigation
Personnel Authorizing United States Person Queries.--
Subsection (f) of section 702 is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (5); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new
paragraph:
``(3) Restrictions imposed on federal bureau of
investigation.--
``(A) Limits on authorizations of united states person
queries.--
``(i) In general.--Federal Bureau of Investigation
personnel must obtain prior approval from a Federal Bureau of
Investigation supervisor (or employee of equivalent or
greater rank) or attorney who is authorized to access
unminimized contents or noncontents obtained through
acquisitions authorized under subsection (a) for any query of
such unminimized contents or noncontents made using a United
States person query term.
``(ii) Exception.--A United States person query to be
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of
unminimized contents or noncontents obtained through
acquisitions authorized under subsection (a) using a United
States person query term may be conducted without obtaining
prior approval as specified in clause (i) only if the person
conducting the United States person query has a reasonable
belief that conducting the query could assist in mitigating
or eliminating a threat to life or serious bodily harm.''.
(b) Prohibition on Involvement of Political Appointees in
Process To Approve Federal Bureau of Investigation Queries.--
Subparagraph (D) of section 702(f)(3), as added by subsection
(d) of this section, is amended by inserting after clause (v)
the following:

[[Page H2338]]

``(vi) Prohibition on political appointees within the
process to approve federal bureau of investigation queries.--
The procedures shall prohibit any political personnel, such
as those classified by the Office of Personnel Management as
Presidential Appointment with Senate Confirmation,
Presidential Appointment (without Senate Confirmation),
Noncareer Senior Executive Service Appointment, or Schedule C
Excepted Appointment, from inclusion in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's prior approval process under clause (ii).''.

(c) Mandatory Audits of United States Person Queries
Conducted by Federal Bureau of Investigation.--
(1) Audits required.--For each query identified by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation as a United States person
query against information acquired pursuant to subsection (a)
of section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) conducted by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, not later than 180 days after the conduct of
such query, the Department of Justice shall conduct an audit
of such query.
(2) Applicability.--The requirement under paragraph (1)
shall apply with respect to queries conducted on or after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) Sunset.--This section shall terminate on the earlier of
the following:
(A) The date that is 2 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(B) The date on which the Attorney General submits to the
appropriate congressional committees a certification that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation has implemented a process for
the internal audit of all queries referred to in paragraph
(1).
(4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees, as such term
is defined in subsection (b) of section 701 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881); and
(B) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate.
(d) Restrictions Relating to Conduct of Certain Queries by
Federal Bureau of Investigation.--Paragraph (3) of section
702(f), as added by subsection (a)(2) of this section, is
amended by adding after subparagraph (C), as added by
subsection (f) of this section, the following:
``(D) Querying procedures applicable to federal bureau of
investigation.--For any procedures adopted under paragraph
(1) applicable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of
National Intelligence, shall include the following
requirements:
``(i) Training.--A requirement that, prior to conducting
any query, personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
successfully complete training on the querying procedures on
an annual basis.
``(ii) Additional prior approvals for sensitive queries.--A
requirement that, absent exigent circumstances, prior to
conducting certain queries, personnel of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation receive approval, at minimum, as follows:

``(I) Approval from the Deputy Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation if the query uses a query term
reasonably believed to identify a United States elected
official, an appointee of the President or a State governor,
a United States political candidate, a United States
political organization or a United States person prominent in
such organization, or a United States media organization or a
United States person who is a member of such organization.
``(II) Approval from an attorney of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation if the query uses a query term reasonably
believed to identify a United States religious organization
or a United States person who is prominent in such
organization.
``(III) Approval from an attorney of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation if such conduct involves batch job technology
(or successor tool).

``(iii) Prior written justification.--A requirement that,
prior to conducting a query using a United States person
query term, personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
provide a written statement of the specific factual basis to
support the reasonable belief that such query meets the
standards required by the procedures adopted under paragraph
(1). For each United States person query, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation shall keep a record of the query term, the
date of the conduct of the query, the identifier of the
personnel conducting the query, and such written statement.
``(iv) Storage of certain contents and noncontents.--Any
system of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that stores
unminimized contents or noncontents obtained through
acquisitions authorized under subsection (a) together with
contents or noncontents obtained through other lawful means
shall be configured in a manner that--

``(I) requires personnel of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to affirmatively elect to include such
unminimized contents or noncontents obtained through
acquisitions authorized under subsection (a) when running a
query; or
``(II) includes other controls reasonably expected to
prevent inadvertent queries of such unminimized contents or
noncontents.

``(v) Waiver authority for foreign intelligence
surveillance court.--If the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court finds that the procedures adopted under paragraph (1)
include measures that are reasonably expected to result in
similar compliance outcomes as the measures specified in
clauses (i) through (iv) of this subparagraph, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court may waive one or more of the
requirements specified in such clauses.''.
(e) Notification for Certain Queries Conducted by Federal
Bureau of Investigation.--Paragraph (3) of section 702(f), as
added by subsection (a) of this section, is amended by adding
at the end the following:
``(B) Notification requirement for certain fbi queries.--
``(i) Requirement.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall promptly notify appropriate congressional
leadership of any query conducted by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation using a query term that is reasonably believed
to be the name or other personally identifying information of
a member of Congress, and shall also notify the member who is
the subject of such query.
``(ii) Appropriate congressional leadership defined.--In
this subparagraph, the term `appropriate congressional
leadership' means the following:

``(I) The chairs and ranking minority members of the
congressional intelligence committees.
``(II) The Speaker and minority leader of the House of
Representatives.
``(III) The majority and minority leaders of the Senate.

``(iii) National security considerations.--In submitting a
notification under clause (i), the Director shall give due
regard to the protection of classified information, sources
and methods, and national security.
``(iv) Waiver.--

``(I) In general.--The Director may waive a notification
required under clause (i) if the Director determines such
notification would impede an ongoing national security or law
enforcement investigation.
``(II) Termination.--A waiver under subclause (I) shall
terminate on the date the Director determines the relevant
notification would not impede the relevant national security
or law enforcement investigation or on the date that such
investigation ends, whichever is earlier.''.

(f) Requirement for Congressional Consent Prior to Certain
Federal Bureau of Investigation Queries for Purpose of
Defensive Briefings.--Paragraph (3) of section 702(f), as
added by subsection (a) of this section, is amended by adding
after subparagraph (B), as added by subsection (e) of this
section, the following:
``(C) Consent required for fbi to conduct certain queries
for purpose of defensive briefing.--
``(i) Consent required.--The Federal Bureau of
Investigation may not, for the exclusive purpose of
supplementing the contents of a briefing on the defense
against a counterintelligence threat to a member of Congress,
conduct a query using a query term that is the name or
restricted personal information (as such term is defined in
section 119 of title 18, United States Code) of that member
unless--

``(I) the member provides consent to the use of the query
term; or
``(II) the Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation determines that exigent circumstances exist
sufficient to justify the conduct of such query.

``(ii) Notification.--

``(I) Notification of consent sought.--Not later than three
business days after submitting a request for consent from a
member of Congress under clause (i), the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify the appropriate
congressional leadership, regardless of whether the member
provided such consent.
``(II) Notification of exception used.--Not later than
three business days after the conduct of a query under clause
(i) without consent on the basis of the existence of exigent
circumstances determined under subclause (II) of such clause,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
notify the appropriate congressional leadership.

``(iii) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subparagraph
may be construed as--

``(I) applying to matters outside of the scope of the
briefing on the defense against a counterintelligence threat
to be provided or supplemented under clause (i); or
``(II) limiting the lawful investigative activities of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation other than supplementing the
contents of a briefing on the defense against a
counterintelligence threat to a member of Congress.

``(iv) Appropriate congressional leadership defined.--In
this subparagraph, the term `appropriate congressional
leadership' means the following:

SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON USE OF INFORMATION OBTAINED UNDER
SECTION 702.

(a) Revoking Federal Bureau of Investigation Authority To
Conduct Queries Unrelated to National Security.--Subsection
(f)(2) of section 702 is amended to read as follows:
``(2) Prohibition on conduct of queries that are solely
designed to find and extract evidence of a crime.--
``(A) Limits on authorizations of united states person
queries.--The querying procedures adopted pursuant to
paragraph (1) for the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
prohibit queries of information acquired under subsection (a)
that are solely designed to find and extract evidence of
criminal activity.
``(B) Exceptions.--The restriction under subparagraph (A)
shall not apply with respect to a query if--
``(i) there is a reasonable belief that such query may
retrieve information that could assist in mitigating or
eliminating a threat to life or serious bodily harm; or
``(ii) such query is necessary to identify information that
must be produced or preserved in

[[Page H2339]]

connection with a litigation matter or to fulfill discovery
obligations in criminal matters under the laws of the United
States or any State thereof.''.
(b) Restriction on Certain Information Available to Federal
Bureau of Investigation.--Section 702 is amended by adding at
the end the following new subsection:
``(n) Restriction on Certain Information Available to
Federal Bureau of Investigation.--
``(1) Restriction.--The Federal Bureau of Investigation may
not ingest unminimized information acquired under this
section into its analytic repositories unless the targeted
person is relevant to an existing, open, predicated full
national security investigation by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
``(2) Exception for exigent circumstances.--Paragraph (1)
does not apply if the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation decides it is necessary due to exigent
circumstances and provides notification within three business
days to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives,
and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate.
``(3) Exception for assistance to other agencies.--
Paragraph (1) does not apply where the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has agreed to provide technical, analytical, or
linguistic assistance at the request of another Federal
agency.''.

SEC. 4. TARGETING DECISIONS UNDER SECTION 702.

(a) Sense of Congress on the Targeted Collection of United
States Person Information.--It is the sense of Congress that,
as proscribed in section 702(b)(2), section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 has always
prohibited, and continues to prohibit, the intelligence
community from targeting a United States person for
collection of foreign intelligence information. If the
intelligence community intends to target a United States
person for collection of foreign intelligence information
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, the
Government must first obtain an individualized court order
based upon a finding of probable cause that the United States
person is a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an
officer or employee of a foreign power, in order to conduct
surveillance targeting that United States person.
(b) Annual Audit of Targeting Decisions Under Section
702.--
(1) Mandatory review.--Not less frequently than annually,
the Department of Justice National Security Division shall
review each person targeted under section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 in the preceding year
to ensure that the purpose of each targeting decision is not
to target a known United States person. The results of this
review shall be submitted to the Department of Justice Office
of the Inspector General, the congressional intelligence
committees, and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives and of the Senate, subject to a
declassification review.
(2) Inspector general audit.--Not less frequently than
annually, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector
General shall audit a sampling of the targeting decisions
reviewed by the National Security Division under paragraph
(1) and submit a report to the congressional intelligence
committees and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives and of the Senate.
(3) Certification.--Within 180 days of enactment of this
Act, and annually thereafter, each agency authorized to
target non-United States persons under section 702 shall
certify to Congress that the purpose of each targeting
decision made in the prior year was not to target a known
United States person.
(4) Application.--The requirements under this subsection
apply for any year to the extent that section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 was in effect
during any portion of the previous year.

SEC. 5. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT REFORM.

(a) Requirement for Same Judge To Hear Extension
Applications.--Subsection (d) of section 105 is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(5) An extension of an order issued under this title for
surveillance targeted against a United States person, to the
extent practicable and absent exigent circumstances, shall be
granted or denied by the same judge who issued the original
order unless the term of such judge has expired or such judge
is otherwise no longer serving on the court.''.
(b) Use of Amici Curiae in Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court Proceedings.--Subsection (i) of section
103 is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2)--
(A) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clause
(i) and (ii), respectively;
(B) by striking ``A court established'' and inserting the
following subparagraph:
``(A) In general.--A court established'';
(C) in subparagraph (A), as inserted by subparagraph (B) of
this section--
(i) in clause (i), as so redesignated--

(I) by striking ``appoint an individual who has'' and
inserting ``appoint one or more individuals who have''; and
(II) by striking ``; and'' and inserting a semicolon;

(ii) in clause (ii), as so redesignated--

(I) by striking ``appoint an individual or organization''
and inserting ``appoint one or more individuals or
organizations''; and
(II) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``;
and''; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following new clause:
``(iii) shall appoint one or more individuals who have been
designated under paragraph (1) to serve as amicus curiae to
assist such court in the consideration of any certification
or procedures submitted for review pursuant to section 702,
including any amendments to such certifications or
procedures, if the court established under subsection (a) has
not appointed an individual under clause (i) or (ii), unless
the court issues a finding that such appointment is not
appropriate or is likely to result in undue delay.''; and
(D) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
``(B) Expertise.--In appointing one or more individuals
under subparagraph (A)(iii), the court shall, to the maximum
extent practicable, appoint an individual who possesses
expertise in both privacy and civil liberties and
intelligence collection.
``(C) Timing.--In the event that the court appoints one or
more individuals or organizations pursuant to this paragraph
to assist such court in a proceeding under section 702,
notwithstanding subsection (j)(1)(B) of such section, the
court shall issue an order pursuant to subsection (j)(3) of
such section as expeditiously as possible consistent with
subsection (k)(1) of such section, but in no event later than
60 days after the date on which such certification,
procedures, or amendments are submitted for the court's
review, or later than 60 days after the court has issued an
order appointing one or more individuals pursuant to this
paragraph, whichever is earlier, unless a judge of that court
issues an order finding that extraordinary circumstances
necessitate additional time for review and that such
extension of time is consistent with the national
security.''; and
(2) in paragraph (4)--
(A) by striking ``paragraph (2)(A)'' and inserting
``paragraph (2)'';
(B) by striking ``provide to the court, as appropriate'';
(C) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (C) as
clauses (i) through (iii), respectively;
(D) by inserting before clause (i) the following new
subparagraphs:
``(A) be limited to addressing the specific issues
identified by the court; and
``(B) provide to the court, as appropriate--''; and
(E) in subparagraph (B)(i), as redesignated, by inserting
``of United States persons'' after ``civil liberties''.
(c) Designation of Counsel To Scrutinize Applications for
United States Persons.--Section 103 is amended by adding at
the end the following new subsection:
``(l) Designation of Counsel for Certain Applications.--To
assist the court in the consideration of any application for
an order pursuant to section 104 that targets a United States
person, the presiding judge designated under subsection (a)
shall designate one or more attorneys to review such
applications, and provide a written analysis to the judge
considering the application, of--
``(1) the sufficiency of the evidence used to make the
probable cause determination under section 105(a)(2);
``(2) any material weaknesses, flaws, or other concerns in
the application; and
``(3) a recommendation as to the following, which the judge
shall consider during a proceeding on the application in
which such attorney is present, as appropriate--
``(A) that the application should be approved, denied, or
modified;
``(B) that the Government should supply additional
information in connection with such application; or
``(C) that any requirements or conditions should be imposed
on the Government for the approval of such application.''.

SEC. 6. APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER UNDER THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT.

(a) Requirement for Sworn Statements for Factual
Assertions.--
(1) Title i.--Subsection (a)(3) of section 104 is amended
by striking ``a statement of'' and inserting ``a sworn
statement of''.
(2) Title iii.--Subsection (a)(3) of section 303 is amended
by striking ``a statement of'' and inserting ``a sworn
statement of''.
(3) Section 703.--Subsection (b)(1)(C) of section 703 is
amended by striking ``a statement of'' and inserting ``a
sworn statement of''.
(4) Section 704.--Subsection (b)(3) of section 704 is
amended by striking ``a statement of'' and inserting ``a
sworn statement of''.
(5) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the
date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this
Act.
(b) Prohibition on Use of Politically Derived Information
in Applications for Certain Orders by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court.--
(1) Title i.--Subsection (a)(6) of section 104 is amended--
(A) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) in subparagraph (E)(ii), by striking the semicolon and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding after subparagraph (E) the following new
subparagraph:
``(F) that none of the information included in the
statement described in paragraph (3) was solely produced by,
derived from information produced by, or obtained using the
funds of, a political organization (as such term is defined
in section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986),
unless--
``(i) the political organization is clearly identified in
the body of the statement described in paragraph (3);
``(ii) the information has been corroborated; and
``(iii) the investigative techniques used to corroborate
the information are clearly identified in the body of the
statement described in paragraph (3); and''.

[[Page H2340]]

(2) Title iii.--Subsection (a)(6) of section 303 is
amended--
(A) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) in subparagraph (E), by striking the semicolon and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new
subparagraph:
``(F) that none of the information included in the
statement described in paragraph (3) was solely produced by,
derived from information produced by, or obtained using the
funds of, a political organization (as such term is defined
in section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986),
unless--
``(i) the political organization is clearly identified in
the body of the statement described in paragraph (3);
``(ii) the information has been corroborated; and
``(iii) the investigative techniques used to corroborate
the information are clearly identified in the body of the
statement described in paragraph (3); and''.
(3) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the
date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this
Act.
(c) Prohibition on Use of Press Reports in Applications for
Certain Orders by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court.--
(1) Title i.--Subsection (a)(6) of section 104, as amended
by this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the
following new subparagraph:
``(G) that none of the information included in the
statement described in paragraph (3) is attributable to or
derived from the content of a media source unless the
statement includes a clear identification of each author of
that content, and where applicable, the publisher of that
content, information to corroborate that which was derived
from the media source, and an explanation of the
investigative techniques used to corroborate the
information;''.
(2) Title iii.--Subsection (a)(6) of section 303, as
amended by this Act, is further amended by adding at the end
the following new subparagraph:
``(G) that none of the information included in the
statement described in paragraph (3) is attributable to or
derived from the content of a media source unless the
statement includes a clear identification of each author of
that content, where applicable, the publisher of that
content, information to corroborate that which was derived
from the media source, and an explanation of the
investigative techniques used to corroborate the
information;''.
(3) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the
date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this
Act.
(d) Description of Techniques Carried Out Before
Application.--
(1) Title i.--Subsection (a) of section 104, as amended by
this Act, is further amended--
(A) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(B) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(10) with respect to a target who is a United States
person, a statement summarizing the investigative techniques
carried out before making the application;''.
(2) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the
date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this
Act.
(e) Requirement for Certain Justification Prior to
Extension of Orders.--
(1) Applications for extension of orders under title i.--
Subsection (a) of section 104, as amended by this Act, is
further amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(11) in the case of an application for an extension of an
order under this title for a surveillance targeted against a
United States person, a summary statement of the foreign
intelligence information obtained pursuant to the original
order (and any preceding extension thereof) as of the date of
the application for the extension, or a reasonable
explanation of the failure to obtain such information; and''.
(2) Applications for extension of orders under title iii.--
Subsection (a) of section 303, as amended by this Act, is
further amended--
(A) in paragraph (7), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(B) in paragraph (8), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(9) in the case of an application for an extension of an
order under this title in which the target of the physical
search is a United States person, a summary statement of the
foreign intelligence information obtained pursuant to the
original order (and any preceding extension thereof) as of
the date of the application for the extension, or a
reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such
information; and''.
(3) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the
date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this
Act.
(f) Requirement for Justification of Underlying Criminal
Offense in Certain Applications.--
(1) Title i.--Subsection (a)(3)(A) of section 104 is
amended by inserting before the semicolon at the end the
following: ``, and, in the case of a target that is a United
States person alleged to be acting as an agent of a foreign
power (as described in section 101(b)(2)(B)), that a
violation of the criminal statutes of the United States as
referred to in section 101(b)(2)(B) has occurred or is about
to occur''.
(2) Title iii.--Subsection (a)(3)(A) of section 303 is
amended by inserting before the semicolon at the end the
following: ``, and, in the case of a target that is a United
States person alleged to be acting as an agent of a foreign
power (as described in section 101(b)(2)(B)), that a
violation of the criminal statutes of the United States as
referred to in section 101(b)(2)(B) has occurred or is about
to occur''.
(3) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the
date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this
Act.
(g) Modification to Duration of Approved Period Under
Certain Orders for Non-United States Persons.--
(1) Title i.--Subsection (d) of section 105 is amended--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``against a foreign
power, as defined in section 101(a), (1), (2), or (3),'' and
inserting ``against a foreign power''; and
(ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``120 days'' and
inserting ``one year''; and
(B) by striking paragraph (2); and
(C) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs
(2) and (3), respectively.
(2) Title iii.--Subsection (d) of section 304 is amended--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``against a foreign
power, as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section
101(a),'' and inserting ``against a foreign power''; and
(ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``120 days'' and
inserting ``one year''; and
(B) by striking paragraph (2); and
(C) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2).

SEC. 7. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND DECLASSIFICATION OF CERTAIN
DOCUMENTS.

Subsection (a) of section 602 is amended by inserting after
``shall conduct a declassification review'' the following:
``, to be concluded as soon as practicable, but not later
than 180 days after the commencement of such review,''.

SEC. 8. TRANSCRIPTIONS OF PROCEEDINGS.

(a) Requirement for Transcripts of Proceedings.--Subsection
(c) of section 103 is amended--
(1) by inserting ``, and hearings shall be transcribed''
before the first period;
(2) by inserting ``, transcriptions of hearings,'' after
``applications made''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new sentence:
``Transcriptions and any related records, including testimony
and affidavits, shall be stored in a file associated with the
relevant application or order.''.
(b) Requirement for Notification to Congress of Certain
Transcripts.--Subsection (c) of section 601 is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting
a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(3) for any hearing, oral argument, or other proceeding
before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review for which a court
reporter produces a transcript, not later than 45 days after
the government receives the final transcript or the date on
which the matter of the hearing, oral argument, or other
proceeding is resolved, whichever is later, a notice of the
existence of such transcript. Not later than three business
days after a committee referred to in subsection (a) requests
to review an existing transcript, the Attorney General shall
facilitate such request; and
``(4) a copy of each declassified document that has
undergone review under section 602.''.

SEC. 9. AUDIT OF FISA COMPLIANCE BY INSPECTOR GENERAL.

(a) Inspector General Report on Federal Bureau of
Investigation Querying Practices.--
(1) Report.--Not later than 545 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Department of Justice shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the querying practices
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under section 702.
(2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall
include, at a minimum, the following:
(A) An evaluation of compliance by personnel of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation with the querying procedures adopted
under section 702(f), with a particular focus on compliance
by such personnel with the procedures governing queries using
United States person query terms.
(B) An analysis of each specific reform that, in the view
of the Inspector General, is responsible for any identified
improvement in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's record
of compliance with the querying procedures, including an
identification of whether such reform was--
(i) required by this Act or another Act of Congress;
(ii) required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court or the Attorney General; or
(iii) voluntarily adopted by the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
(C) An assessment of the status of the implementation by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation of all reforms related to
querying that are required by this Act.
(D) An evaluation of the effectiveness of the Office of
Internal Auditing of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with
respect to monitoring and improving query compliance by
personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(E) Recommendations to further improve compliance with
querying procedures by personnel of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, particularly with respect to compliance with
the procedures governing queries using United States person
query terms.
(F) Any other relevant matter the Inspector General
determines appropriate.
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form and may include a classified
annex.

[[Page H2341]]

(4) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) In general.--Except as provided in this subsection,
terms used in this subsection have the meanings given such
terms in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
(B) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(i) the congressional intelligence committees, as such term
is defined in subsection (b) of section 701 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881); and
(ii) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.

SEC. 10. ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS OF APPLICATIONS.

(a) Requirement for Certifications Regarding Accuracy of
Applications.--
(1) Title i.--Subsection (a) of section 104, as amended by
this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the
following new paragraph:
``(12) a certification by the applicant or declarant that,
to the best knowledge of the applicant or declarant, the
Attorney General or a designated attorney for the Government
has been apprised of all information that might reasonably--
``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or
the reasonableness of any assessment in the application
conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the
application is made; or
``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings
required under section 105(a).''.
(2) Title iii.--Subsection (a) of section 303 is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(10) a certification by the applicant that, to the best
knowledge of the applicant, the Attorney General or a
designated attorney for the Government has been apprised of
all information that might reasonably--
``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or
the reasonableness of any assessment in the application
conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the
application is made; or
``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings
required under section 304(a).''.
(3) Title iv.--Subsection (c) of section 402 is amended--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) a certification by the Federal Officer seeking to use
the pen register or trap and trace device covered by the
application that, to the best knowledge of the Federal
Officer, the Attorney General or a designated attorney for
the Government has been apprised of all information that
might reasonably--
``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or
the reasonableness of any assessment in the application
conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the
application is made; or
``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings
required under subsection (d).''.
(4) Title v.--Subsection (b)(2) of section 502 is amended--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(E) a statement by the applicant that, to the best
knowledge of the applicant, the application fairly reflects
all information that might reasonably--
``(i) call into question the accuracy of the application or
the reasonableness of any assessment in the application
conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the
application is made; or
``(ii) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings
required under subsection (c).''.
(5) Title vii.--
(A) Section 703.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 703 is
amended--
(i) in subparagraph (I), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(ii) in subparagraph (J), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(K) a certification by the applicant that, to the best
knowledge of the applicant, the Attorney General or a
designated attorney for the Government has been apprised of
all information that might reasonably--
``(i) call into question the accuracy of the application or
the reasonableness of any assessment in the application
conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the
application is made; or
``(ii) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings
required under subsection (c).''.
(B) Section 704.--Subsection (b) of section 704 is
amended--
(i) in paragraph (6), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(ii) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(8) a certification by the applicant that, to the best
knowledge of the applicant, the Attorney General or a
designated attorney for the Government has been apprised of
all information that might reasonably--
``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or
the reasonableness of any assessment in the application
conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the
application is made; or
``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings
required under subsection (c).''.
(6) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the
date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this
Act.
(7) Accuracy procedures.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General, in
consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, shall issue procedures governing the review of
case files, as appropriate, to ensure that applications to
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under title I or
III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) that target United States persons are
accurate and complete.
(b) Disclosure of Exculpatory Information.--
(1) Title i.--Subsection (a) of section 104, as amended by
this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the
following new paragraph:
``(13) non-cumulative information known to the applicant or
declarant that is potentially exculpatory regarding the
requested legal findings or any assessment in the
application.''.
(2) Title iii.--Subsection (a) of section 303, as amended
by this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(11) non-cumulative information known to the applicant or
declarant that is potentially exculpatory regarding the
requested legal findings or any assessment in the
application.''.
(3) Title iv.--Subsection (c) of section 402, as amended by
this Act, is further amended--
(A) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(B) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(5) non-cumulative information known to the Federal
officer seeking to use the pen register or trap and trace
device covered by the application, that is potentially
exculpatory regarding the requested legal findings or any
assessment in the application.''.
(4) Title v.--Subsection (b)(2) of section 502, as amended
by this Act, is further amended--
(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) in subparagraph (E)(ii), by striking the period at the
end and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(F) non-cumulative information known to the applicant
that is potentially exculpatory regarding the requested legal
findings or any assessment in the application.''.
(5) Title vii.--
(A) Section 703.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 703, as
amended by this Act, is further amended--
(i) in subparagraph (J), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(ii) in subparagraph (K), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(L) non-cumulative information known to the applicant or
declarant that is potentially exculpatory regarding the
requested legal findings or any assessment in the
application.''.
(B) Section 704.--Subsection (b) of section 704, as amended
by this Act, is further amended--
(i) in paragraph (7), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(ii) in paragraph (8), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(9) non-cumulative information known to the applicant or
declarant that is potentially exculpatory regarding the
requested legal findings or any assessment in the
application.''.
(6) Applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall apply with respect to applications made on or after the
date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this
Act.

SEC. 11. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION.

(a) Revocation of Statutory Reporting Exemption and
Additional Reporting Requirement for Federal Bureau of
Investigation.--
(1) In general.--Section 603, as amended by this Act, is
further amended--
(A) in subsection (b)(2)(B) by inserting ``(or combined
unminimized contents and noncontents information)'' after
``unminimized contents'';
(B) in subsection (d), by amending paragraph (2) to read as
follows:
``(2) Nonapplicability to electronic mail address and
telephone numbers.--Paragraph (3)(B) of subsection (b) shall
not apply to orders resulting in the acquisition of
information by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that does
not include electronic mail addresses or telephone
numbers.''; and
(C) by inserting the following new subsection:
``(f) Mandatory Reporting on Section 702 by Director of
Federal Bureau of Investigation.--
``(1) Annual report.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall annually submit to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate
a report that includes--
``(A) the number of United States person queries by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation of unminimized contents or
noncontents acquired pursuant to section 702(a);
``(B) the number of approved queries using the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's batch job technology, or successor
tool;
``(C) the number of queries using the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's batch job technology, or successor tool,
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation against
information acquired pursuant to section 702(a) for which
pre-approval was not obtained due to emergency circumstances;

[[Page H2342]]

``(D) the number of United States person queries conducted
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of unminimized
contents or noncontents acquired pursuant to section 702(a)
solely to retrieve evidence of a crime;
``(E) a good faith estimate of the number of United States
person query terms used by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to conduct queries of unminimized contents or
noncontents acquired pursuant to section 702(a) primarily to
protect the United States person who is the subject of the
query; and
``(F) a good faith estimate of the number of United States
person query terms used by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to conduct queries of unminimized contents or
noncontents acquired pursuant to section 702(a) where the
United States person who is the subject of the query is a
target or subject of an investigation by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
``(2) Public availability.--Subject to declassification
review by the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence, each annual report submitted pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall be available to the public during the
first April following the calendar year covered by the
report.''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall take effect on January 1, 2025.

SEC. 12. ADVERSE PERSONNEL ACTIONS FOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION.

(a) Annual Reporting on Disciplinary Actions by Federal
Bureau of Investigation.--Section 603 is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (g); and
(2) by inserting the following new subsection:
``(e) Mandatory Reporting by Director of Federal Bureau of
Investigation.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall annually submit to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Judiciary of
the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Senate, a report describing the accountability actions taken
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the preceding 12-
month period for noncompliant querying of information
acquired under section 702 and any such actions taken
pursuant to section 103(m), to include the number of ongoing
personnel investigations, the outcome of any completed
personnel investigations and any related adverse personnel
actions taken.''.
(b) Accountability Measures for Executive Leadership of
Federal Bureau of Investigation.--
(1) Measures required.--The Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation shall ensure that, as soon as practicable
following the date of enactment of this Act, there are in
effect measures for holding the executive leadership of each
covered component appropriately accountable for ensuring
compliance with covered procedures by the personnel of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation assigned to that covered
component. Such measures shall include a requirement for an
annual evaluation of the executive leadership of each such
covered component with respect to ensuring such compliance
during the preceding year.
(2) Briefings required.--
(A) Briefings.--Not later than December 31 of each calendar
year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to
the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the
implementation of paragraph (1).
(B) Matters.--Each briefing under subparagraph (A) shall
include, with respect to the period covered by the briefing,
the following:
(i) A description of specific measures under paragraph (1)
that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has implemented.
(ii) A description of specific measures under such
subsection that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has
proposed to be implemented or modified, and the timeline for
such proposed implementation or modification.
(iii) A summary of compliance with covered procedures by
the personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
disaggregated by covered component, and a description of any
adverse personnel actions taken against, or other actions
taken to ensure the appropriate accountability of, the
executive leadership of covered components that
underperformed with respect to ensuring such compliance.
(3) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(i) the congressional intelligence committees, as such term
is defined in subsection (b) of section 701 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881) on the
date of enactment of this Act; and
(ii) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
(B) Covered component.--The term ``covered component''
means a field office, Headquarters division, or other element
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with personnel who,
for any period during which section 702 is in effect, have
access to the unminimized contents of communications obtained
through acquisitions authorized under section 702(a).
(C) Covered procedure.--The term ``covered procedure''--
(i) means any procedure governing the use of authorities
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.); and
(ii) includes querying procedures and minimization
procedures adopted pursuant to such Act.
(D) Executive leadership.--The term ``executive
leadership'' includes--
(i) with respect to a field office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, an Assistant Director in Charge or Special
Agent in Charge of the field office; and
(ii) with respect to a division of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation Headquarters, an Assistant Director of the
division.

SEC. 13. CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF FISA.

(a) Penalties for Unauthorized Disclosure of Application
for Electronic Surveillance.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 109 is amended--
(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking
``intentionally'';
(B) in paragraph (1)--
(i) by inserting ``intentionally'' before ``engages in'';
and
(ii) by striking ``; or'' and inserting a semicolon;
(C) in paragraph (2)--
(i) by striking ``disclose'' and inserting ``intentionally
discloses''; and
(ii) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``;
or''; and
(D) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes,
transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized
person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to
the safety or interest of the United States or for the
benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the
United States an application, in whole or in part, for an
order for electronic surveillance under this Act.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--Subsection (b) of such section
is amended by striking ``under subsection (a)'' and inserting
``under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a)''.
(b) Increased Criminal Penalties for Offense Under FISA.--
Subsection (c) of section 109 is amended to read as follows:
``(c) Penalty.--A person guilty of an offense in this
section shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned for not
more than 10 years, or both.''.
(c) Criminal Penalties for Unauthorized Disclosure of
Certain Incidentally Collected United States Person
Information.--Title VII is amended by inserting the following
new section:

``SEC. 709. PENALTIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE.

``(a) Offense.--A person is guilty of an offense under this
section if that person knowingly and willfully communicates,
furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an
unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or
for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of
the United States any classified information that contains
the contents of any communication acquired under this title
to which a known United States person is a party.
``(b) Penalty.--A person guilty of an offense in this
section shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned for not
more than 8 years, or both.
``(c) Jurisdiction.--There is Federal jurisdiction over an
offense under this section if the person committing the
offense was an officer or employee of the United States at
the time the offense was committed.''.
(d) Sentencing Enhancement for False Declarations Before
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.--Subsection (a) of
section 1623 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting before ``, or both'' the following: ``or, if such
proceedings are before or ancillary to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review established by section 103 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1803), imprisoned not more than ten years''.

SEC. 14. CONTEMPT POWER OF FISC AND FISC-R.

(a) Contempts Constituting Crimes.--Section 402 of title
18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after ``any
district court of the United States'' the following: ``,
including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review established
by section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803),''.
(b) Annual Reporting on Contempt.--Subsection (a)(1) of
section 603 is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(2) in subparagraph (F), by striking the period and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(G) the number of times the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review exercised authority under chapter 21 of title
18, United States Code and a description of each use of such
authority.''.

SEC. 15. INCREASED PENALTIES FOR CIVIL ACTIONS.

(a) Increased Penalties.--Subsection (a) of section 110 is
amended to read as follows:
``(a) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages
equal to the greater of--
``(1) if the aggrieved person is a United States person,
$10,000 or $1,000 per day for each day of violation; or
``(2) for any other aggrieved person, $1,000 or $100 per
day for each day of violation;''.
(b) Reporting Requirement.--Title I of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is amended by inserting
after section 110 the following:

``SEC. 110A. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVIL ACTIONS.

``(a) Report to Congress.--If a court finds that a person
has violated this Act in a civil action under section 110,
the head of the agency that employs that person shall report
to Congress on the administrative action taken against that
person pursuant to section 103(m) or any other provision of
law.
``(b) Report to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.--
If a court finds that a person has violated this Act in a
civil action under section 110, the head of the agency that
employs

[[Page H2343]]

that person shall report the name of such person to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court shall maintain a list of each
person about whom it received a report under this
subsection.''.

SEC. 16. ACCOUNTABILITY STANDARDS FOR INCIDENTS RELATING TO
QUERIES CONDUCTED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION.

(a) Requirement for Adoption of Certain Minimum
Accountability Standards.--
(1) Minimum accountability standards.--Subsection (f) of
section 702, as amended by this Act, is further amended by
inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph:
``(4) Minimum accountability standards.--The Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall issue minimum
accountability standards that set forth escalating
consequences for noncompliant querying of United States
person terms within the contents of communications that were
acquired under this section. Such standards shall include, at
minimum, the following:
``(A) Zero tolerance for willful misconduct.
``(B) Escalating consequences for unintentional
noncompliance, including the threshold for mandatory
revocation of access to query information acquired under this
section.
``(C) Consequences for supervisors who oversee users that
engage in noncompliant queries.''.
(2) Deadlines.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation shall issue the minimum accountability
standards required under subsection (f)(4) of section 702 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1881a).
(3) Reports.--
(A) Submission of standards.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees the minimum
accountability standards issued under paragraph (1).
(B) Annual report on implementation.--Not later than
December 1, 2024, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report
detailing each adverse personnel action taken pursuant to the
minimum accountability standards and a description of the
conduct that led to each such action.
(4) Definition of appropriate congressional committees.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees, as such term
is defined in subsection (b) of section 701 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881); and
(B) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate.

SEC. 17. REMOVAL OR SUSPENSION OF FEDERAL OFFICERS FOR
MISCONDUCT BEFORE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT.

(a) Removal or Suspension of Federal Officers for
Misconduct Before Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.--
Section 103, as amended by this Act, is further amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(m) Removal or Suspension of Federal Officers for
Misconduct Before Courts.--An officer or employee of the
United States Government who engages in intentional
misconduct with respect to proceedings before the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review shall be subject to appropriate
adverse actions, including, at minimum, suspension without
pay or removal, up to and including termination.''.

SEC. 18. REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS.

(a) Notification to Congress of Certain Unauthorized
Disclosures.--If the Director of National Intelligence
becomes aware of an actual or potential significant
unauthorized disclosure or compromise of information acquired
under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a), as soon as practicable, but
not later than 7 days after the date on which the Director
becomes so aware, the Director shall notify the congressional
intelligence committees of such actual or potential
disclosure or compromise.
(b) Report on Technology Needed for Near-real Time
Monitoring of Federal Bureau of Investigation Compliance.--
(1) Study required.--The Director of National Intelligence,
in coordination with the National Security Agency and in
consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall
conduct a study on technological enhancements that would
enable the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct near-
real time monitoring of compliance in any system of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation that stores information
acquired under section 702. Such study shall consider the
potential cost and assess the feasibility of implementation
within a period of one year of each technological enhancement
under consideration.
(2) Submission.--Not later than one year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit the results of the study to the appropriate
congressional committees.
(3) Definitions.--In this section the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees, as such term
is defined in subsection (b) of section 701 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881); and
(B) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
(c) FISA Reform Commission.--
(1) Establishment.--
(A) In general.--There is established a commission to
consider ongoing reforms to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
(B) Designation.--The commission established under
subparagraph (A) shall be known as the ``FISA Reform
Commission'' (in this section the ``Commission'').
(2) Membership.--
(A) Composition.--
(i) In general.--Subject to clause (ii), the Commission
shall be composed of the following members:

(I) The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(II) The Deputy Attorney General.
(III) The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
(IV) The Deputy Secretary of State.
(V) The Chair of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board.
(VI) Three members appointed by the majority leader of the
Senate, in consultation with the Chairman of the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Chairman of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, 1 of whom shall
be a member of the Senate and 2 of whom shall not be.
(VII) Three members appointed by the minority leader of the
Senate, in consultation with the Vice Chairman of the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Ranking
Member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, 1 of
whom shall be a member of the Senate and 2 of whom shall not
be.
(VIII) Three members appointed by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, in consultation with the Chairman of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 1 of whom shall be
a member of the House of Representatives and 2 of whom shall
not be.
(IX) Three members appointed by the minority leader of the
House of Representatives, in consultation with the Ranking
Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives and the Ranking Member of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 1
of whom shall be a member of the House of Representatives and
2 of whom shall not be.

(ii) Nonmembers of congress.--

(I) Qualifications.--The members of the Commission who are
not members of Congress and who are appointed under
subclauses (VI) through (IX) of clause (i) shall be
individuals who are nationally recognized for expertise,
knowledge, or experience in--

(aa) use of intelligence information by the intelligence
community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), national policymakers, and
military leaders;
(bb) the implementation, funding, or oversight of the
national security laws of the United States;
(cc) privacy, civil liberties, and transparency; or
(dd) laws and policies governing methods of electronic
surveillance.

(II) Conflicts of interest.--An official who appoints
members of the Commission may not appoint an individual as a
member of the Commission if such individual possesses any
personal or financial interest in the discharge of any of the
duties of the Commission.
(III) Security clearances.--All members of the Commission
described in subclause (I) shall possess an appropriate
security clearance in accordance with applicable provisions
of law concerning the handling of classified information.

(B) Co-chairs.--
(i) In general.--The Commission shall have 2 co-chairs,
selected from among the members of the Commission.
(ii) Agreement.--The individuals who serve as the co-chairs
of the Commission shall be agreed upon by the members of the
Commission.
(3) Appointment; initial meeting.--
(A) Appointment.--Members of the Commission shall be
appointed not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(B) Initial meeting.--The Commission shall hold its initial
meeting on or before the date that is 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
(4) Meetings; quorum; vacancies.--
(A) In general.--After its initial meeting, the Commission
shall meet upon the call of the co-chairs of the Commission.
(B) Quorum.--Nine members of the Commission shall
constitute a quorum for purposes of conducting business,
except that 2 members of the Commission shall constitute a
quorum for purposes of receiving testimony.
(C) Vacancies.--Any vacancy in the Commission shall not
affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in
which the original appointment was made.
(D) Quorum with vacancies.--If vacancies in the Commission
occur on any day after 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, a quorum shall consist of a majority
of the members of the Commission as of such day.
(5) Duties.--The duties of the Commission are as follows:
(A) To review the effectiveness of the current
implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
(B) To develop recommendations for legislative action to
reform the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) that provide for the effective conduct
of United States intelligence activities and the protection
of privacy and civil liberties.
(6) Powers of commission.--
(A) In general.--
(i) Hearings.--The Commission or, on the authorization of
the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for
the purpose of carrying out this section--

(I) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and
places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, and
administer such oaths; and
(II) require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and
testimony of such witnesses and

[[Page H2344]]

the production of such books, records, correspondence,
memoranda, papers, and documents, as the Commission or such
designated subcommittee or designated member considers
necessary.

(ii) Issuance and enforcement of subpoenas.--

(I) Issuance.--A subpoena issued under clause (i)(II)
shall--

(aa) bear the signature of the co-chairs of the Commission;
and
(bb) be served by a person or class of persons designated
by the co-chairs for that purpose.

(II) Enforcement.--The provisions of sections 102 through
104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C.
192-194) shall apply in the case of any failure of a witness
to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under
authority of this paragraph.

(B) Information from federal agencies.--
(i) In general.--The Commission may secure directly from
any executive department, agency, bureau, board, commission,
office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the
Federal Government information, suggestions, estimates, and
statistics for the purposes of this section.
(ii) Furnishing information.--Each such department, agency,
bureau, board, commission, office, establishment, or
instrumentality described in clause (i) shall, to the extent
authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions,
estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon
request of the co-chairs of the Commission.
(iii) Protection of classified information.--The Commission
shall handle and protect all classified information provided
to it under this section in accordance with applicable
provisions of law.
(C) Assistance from federal agencies.--
(i) Director of national intelligence.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall provide to the Commission, on a
nonreimbursable basis, such administrative services, funds,
staff, facilities, and other support services as are
necessary for the performance of the duties of the Commission
under this section.
(ii) Attorney general.--The Attorney General may provide
the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, with such
administrative services, staff, and other support services as
the Commission may request.
(iii) Other departments and agencies.--In addition to the
assistance set forth in clauses (i) and (ii), other
departments and agencies of the United States may provide the
Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other
support as such departments and agencies consider advisable
and as may be authorized by law.
(iv) Cooperation.--The Commission shall receive the full
and timely cooperation of any official, department, or agency
of the Federal Government whose assistance is necessary, as
jointly determined by the co-chairs selected under paragraph
(2)(B), for the fulfillment of the duties of the Commission,
including the provision of full and current briefings and
analyses.
(D) Postal services.--The Commission may use the United
States postal services in the same manner and under the same
conditions as the departments and agencies of the Federal
Governments.
(E) Gifts.--No member or staff of the Commission may
receive a gift or benefit by reason of the service of such
member or staff to the Commission.
(7) Staff of commission.--
(A) Appointment and compensation of staff.--The co-chairs
of the Commission, in accordance with rules agreed upon by
the Commission, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a
staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary
to enable the Commission to carry out its duties, without
regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code,
governing appointments in the competitive service, and
without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter
III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification
and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay
fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that
payable to a person occupying a position at level V of the
Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.
(B) Detail of government employees.--Any Federal Government
employee may be detailed to the Commission without
reimbursement from the Commission, and such detailee shall
retain the rights, status, and privileges of his or her
regular employment without interruption.
(C) Security clearances.--All staff of the Commission and
all experts and consultants employed by the Commission shall
possess a security clearance in accordance with applicable
provisions of law concerning the handling of classified
information.
(8) Compensation and travel expenses.--
(A) Compensation of members.--
(i) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
each member of the Commission may be compensated at not to
exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay
in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive
Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code,
for each day during which that member is engaged in the
actual performance of the duties of the Commission under this
title.
(ii) Exception.--Members of the Commission who are officers
or employees of the United States or Members of Congress
shall receive no additional pay by reason of their service on
the Commission.
(B) Travel expenses.--While away from their homes or
regular places of business in the performance of services for
the Commission, a member of the Commission may be allowed
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence,
in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the
Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703 of
title 5, United States Code.
(9) Treatment of information relating to national
security.--
(A) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall assume responsibility for the handling and disposition
of any information related to the national security of the
United States that is received, considered, or used by the
Commission under this title.
(B) Information provided by congressional intelligence
committees.--Any information related to the national security
of the United States that is provided to the Commission by a
congressional intelligence committee may not be further
provided or released without the approval of the chairman of
such committee.
(C) Access after termination of commission.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after the
termination of the Commission under paragraph (10)(B), only
the members and designated staff of the congressional
intelligence committees, the Director of National
Intelligence (and the designees of the Director), and such
other officials of the executive branch of the Federal
Government as the President may designate shall have access
to information related to the national security of the United
States that is received, considered, or used by the
Commission.
(10) Final report; termination.--
(A) Final report.--
(i) Definitions.--In this subparagraph:

(I) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--

(aa) the congressional intelligence committees;
(bb) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
(cc) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives.

(II) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' means--

(aa) the majority leader of the Senate;
(bb) the minority leader of the Senate;
(cc) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
(dd) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(ii) Final report required.--Not later than 5 years from
the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress,
congressional leadership, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Attorney General a final report on the
findings of the Commission.
(iii) Form of final report.--The final report submitted
pursuant to clause (ii) shall be in unclassified form but may
include a classified annex.
(iv) Assessments of final report.--Not later than 1 year
after receipt of the final report under clause (ii), the
Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General
shall each submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
and congressional leadership an assessment of such report.
(B) Termination.--
(i) In general.--The Commission, and all the authorities of
this section, shall terminate on the date that is 2 years
after the date on which the final report is submitted under
subparagraph (A)(ii).
(ii) Wind-down period.--The Commission may use the 2-year
period referred to in clause (i) for the purposes of
concluding its activities, including providing testimony to
Congress concerning the final report referred to in that
paragraph and disseminating the report.
(11) Inapplicability of certain administrative
provisions.--
(A) Federal advisory committee act.--The provisions of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not
apply to the activities of the Commission under this section.
(B) Freedom of information act.--The provisions of section
552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as
the ``Freedom of Information Act''), shall not apply to the
activities, records, and proceedings of the Commission under
this section.
(12) Funding.--
(A) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated funds to the extent and in such amounts as
specifically provided in advance in appropriations acts for
the purposes detailed in this subsection.
(B) Availability in general.--Subject to subparagraph (A),
the Director of National Intelligence shall make available to
the Commission such amounts as the Commission may require for
purposes of the activities of the Commission under this
section.
(C) Duration of availability.--Amounts made available to
the Commission under subparagraph (B) shall remain available
until expended or upon termination under paragraph (10)(B),
whichever occurs first.
(13) Congressional intelligence committees defined.--In
this subsection, the term ``congressional intelligence
committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
(d) Severability; Applicability Date.--
(1) Severability.--If any provision of this Act, any
amendment made by this Act, or the application thereof to any
person or circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the
remainder of the Act, of any such amendments, and of the
application of such provisions to other persons and
circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
(2) Applicability date.--Subsection (f) of section 702 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1881a), as amended by this Act, shall apply with respect to
certifications submitted under subsection (h) of such section
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court after January
1, 2024.

SEC. 19. EXTENSION OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES.

(a) FISA Amendments Act of 2008.--Section 403(b) of the
FISA Amendments Act of 2008

[[Page H2345]]

(Public Law 110-261; 122 Stat. 2474) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) by striking ``April 19, 2024'' and inserting ``two
years after the date of enactment of the Reforming
Intelligence and Securing America Act''; and
(B) by inserting ``and the Reforming Intelligence and
Securing America Act'' after ``the FISA Amendments
Reauthorization Act of 2017''; and
(2) in paragraph (2) in the matter preceding subparagraph
(A), by striking ``April 19, 2024'' and inserting ``two years
after the date of enactment of the Reforming Intelligence and
Securing America Act''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 404(b) of the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-261; 122 Stat. 2476),
is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) in the heading, by striking ``April 19, 2024'' and
inserting ``Two Years After the Date of Enactment of the
Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act''; and
(B) by inserting ``and the Reforming Intelligence and
Securing America Act'' after ``the FISA Amendments
Reauthorization Act of 2017'';
(2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``and the Reforming
Intelligence and Securing America Act'' after ``the FISA
Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017''; and
(3) in paragraph (4), by inserting ``and the Reforming
Intelligence and Securing America Act'' after ``the FISA
Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017'' in each place it
appears.

SEC. 20. AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT OF 1978.

(a) References to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978.--Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in
this Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an
amendment to, or a repeal of, a section or other provision,
the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or
other provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
(b) Effect of Certain Amendments on Conforming Changes to
Tables of Contents.--When an amendment made by this Act adds
a section or larger organizational unit to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.), repeals or transfers a section or larger
organizational unit in such Act, or amends the designation or
heading of a section or larger organizational unit in such
Act, that amendment also shall have the effect of amending
the table of contents in such Act to alter the table to
conform to the changes made by the amendment.

SEC. 21. REQUIREMENT FOR RECERTIFICATION.

Notwithstanding any orders or authorizations issued or made
under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) during the period beginning on
January 1, 2024 and ending on April 30, 2024, no later than
90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney
General and the Director of National Intelligence shall be
required to seek new orders consistent with the provisions of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended
by this Act, and thereafter to issue new authorizations
consistent with such new orders.

The Acting CHAIR. No further amendment to the bill, as amended, is in
order except those printed in House Report 118-46. Each such further
amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a
Member designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be
debatable for the time specified in the report, equally divided and
controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to
amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the
question.

Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Biggs

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1
printed in House Report 118-456.
Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 14, strike line 8 and all that follows through line 10
on page 15, and insert the following:
(a) Prohibition on Warrantless Queries for the
Communications of United States Persons.--Section 702(f) of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1881a(f))--
(1) in paragraph (1)(A) by inserting ``and the limitations
and requirements in paragraph (2)'' after ``Constitution of
the United States'';
(2) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (7); and
(3) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
``(2) Prohibition on warrantless queries for the
communications and other information of united states
persons.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraphs (B)
and (C), no officer or employee of the United States may
conduct a query of information acquired under this section
for the purpose of finding communications or information the
compelled production of which would require a probable cause
warrant if sought for law enforcement purposes in the United
States, of a United States person.
``(B) Exceptions for concurrent authorization, consent,
emergency situations, and certain defensive cybersecurity
queries.--
``(i) In general.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a
query related to a United States person if--

``(I) such person is the subject of an order or emergency
authorization authorizing electronic surveillance or physical
search under section 105 (50 U.S.C. 1805) or section 304 (50
U.S.C. 1824) of this Act, or a warrant issued pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court of competent
jurisdiction;
``(II)(aa) the officer or employee conducting the query has
a reasonable belief that--

``(AA) an emergency exists involving an imminent threat of
death or serious bodily harm; and
``(BB) in order to prevent or mitigate the threat described
in subitem (AA), the query must be conducted before
authorization described in subclause (I) can, with due
diligence, be obtained; and

``(bb) a description of the query is provided to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the congressional
intelligence committees and the Committees on the Judiciary
of the House of Representatives and of the Senate in a timely
manner;
``(III) such person or, if such person is incapable of
providing consent, a third party legally authorized to
consent on behalf of such person, has provided consent to the
query on a case-by-case basis; or
``(IV)(aa) the query uses a known cybersecurity threat
signature as a query term;
``(bb) the query is conducted, and the results of the query
are used, for the sole purpose of identifying targeted
recipients of malicious software and preventing or mitigating
harm from such malicious software;
``(cc) no additional contents of communications acquired as
a result of the query are accessed or reviewed; and
``(dd) each such query is reported to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court.

``(ii) Limitations.--

``(I) Use in subsequent proceedings.--No information
acquired pursuant to a query authorized under clause (i)(II)
or information derived from the information acquired pursuant
to such query may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise
disseminated in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency,
regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof,
except in a proceeding that arises from the threat that
prompted the query.
``(II) Assessment of compliance.--Not less frequently than
annually, the Attorney General shall assess compliance with
the requirements under subclause (I).

``(C) Matters relating to emergency queries.--
``(i) Treatment of denials.--In the event that a query for
communications or information, the compelled production of
which would require a probable cause warrant if sought for
law enforcement purposes in the United States, of a United
States person is conducted pursuant to an emergency
authorization described in subparagraph (B)(i)(I) and the
subsequent application for such surveillance pursuant to
section 105(e) (50 U.S.C. 1805(e)) or section 304(e) (50
U.S.C. 1824(e)) of this Act is denied, or in any other case
in which the query has been conducted in violation of this
paragraph--

``(I) no information acquired or evidence derived from such
query may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise
disseminated in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency,
regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof;
and
``(II) no information concerning any United States person
acquired from such query may subsequently be used or
disclosed in any other manner without the consent of such
person, except in the case that the Attorney General approves
the use or disclosure of such information in order to prevent
death or serious bodily harm to any person.

``(ii) Assessment of compliance.--Not less frequently than
annually, the Attorney General shall assess compliance with
the requirements under clause (i).
``(D) Foreign intelligence purpose.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B)(i)(II)-(IV), no officer or employee of the
United States may conduct a query of information acquired
under this section for the purpose of finding information of
a United States person unless the query is reasonably likely
to retrieve foreign intelligence information.
``(3) Documentation.--No officer or employee of the United
States may conduct a query of information acquired under this
section for the purpose of finding information of or about a
United States person, unless an electronic record is created
that includes the following:
``(A) Each term used for the conduct of the query.
``(B) The date of the query.
``(C) The identifier of the officer or employee.
``(D) A statement of facts showing that the use of each
query term included under subparagraph (A)--
``(i) falls within an exception specified in paragraph
(2)(B)(i); and
``(ii) is--

``(I) reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence
information; or

[[Page H2346]]

``(II) in furtherance of an exception described in
subclauses (II) through (IV) of paragraph (2)(B)(i).

``(4) Query record system.--The head of each agency that
conducts queries shall ensure that a system, mechanism, or
business practice is in place to maintain the record
described in paragraph (3). Not later than 90 days after
enactment of this paragraph, the head of each agency shall
report to Congress on its compliance with this procedure.
``(5) Prohibition on results of metadata query as a basis
for access to communications and other protected
information.--If a query of information acquired under this
section is conducted for the purpose of finding
communications metadata of a United States person and the
query returns such metadata, the communications content
associated with the metadata may not be reviewed except as
provided under paragraph (2)(B)(i) of this subsection.
``(6) Federated datasets.--The prohibitions and
requirements under this subsection shall apply to queries of
federated and mixed datasets that include information
acquired under this section, unless each agency has
established a system, mechanism, or business practice to
limit the query to information not acquired under this
section.''.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1137, the gentleman
from Arizona (Mr. Biggs) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.
Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chairman, to hear the administration tell it, having
to get a warrant is the end of the world.
Well, guess what? In literally any other context in which law
enforcement or intelligence agencies want to read an American's
communications, they have to get a warrant. That has been the rule for
over 200 years, and for 46 years the government has had to get a FISA
title I order to read Americans' communications in a foreign
intelligence investigation.
These are investigations in which Americans are suspected of
terrorism, espionage, cybercrimes--you name it.
Somehow, a warrant or title I requirement is completely consistent
with national security in those high-stakes cases, yet the
administration and those who are opposed to this amendment allege it
will plunge us into a dystopian nightmare if we apply this same basic
longstanding protection to section 702 queries where the American often
isn't even suspected of any wrongdoing at the time of the query.
I don't buy it, and neither should you.
Over a decade ago, as my friend Mr. Nadler said just a moment ago, a
group of intelligence experts unanimously recommended requiring a
warrant for U.S. person queries of section 702 data.
That group included Michael Morell, former Acting Director of the
CIA, and Richard A. Clarke, former Chief Counterterrorism Adviser to
President George W. Bush--bipartisan--recommended the same thing that
we have today.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I claim time in opposition.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to this amendment by Mr.
Biggs.
First of all, I thank Mr. Biggs. He participated in the working group
that we had that was joint between the Intelligence Committee and the
Judiciary Committee that drafted and put together this underlying bill,
including working directly with the Speaker's Office in the second
working group that drafted the specific bill, this underlying bill.
We disagree about his amendment though, which is why we are here on
the debate.
This amendment is not about Americans' inboxes and outboxes. This is
not about Americans' data. This amendment is about Hezbollah's data,
Hamas' data, and the Communist Chinese Party's data.
You don't have to take my word for it. Just pick up this amendment.
Read the front of the amendment. This amendment says that you need to
get a warrant to go into data collected by 702. The 702 data which we
all agree--everybody on this floor agrees that 702 data is the
collection of foreigners abroad. That is Hamas, Hezbollah, the Chinese
Communist Party, al-Qaida.
What they want is a warrant to search the inbox and outbox of
Hezbollah, al-Qaida, and the Chinese Communist Party when they are
communicating with people in the United States.
This is dangerous, it will make us go blind, and it will absolutely
increase their recruitment of people inside the United States--not even
American citizens--to do terrorist attacks, recruit for espionage, and
to harm Americans.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Nadler), the cosponsor of this amendment.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this absolutely
essential amendment.
In 2021, the intelligence community conducted over 278,000
inappropriate searches of Americans' private communications. They broke
the law more than 278,000 times.
Mr. Biggs and I do not agree on much, but we agree that the status
quo is unacceptable. Without a probable cause warrant requirement, it
is clear that the intelligence community will go on breaking the law
and violating Americans' rights in the process.
As I have said again and again, if the government wants to peruse the
private communications of Americans, they can go to title I of FISA.
Section 702 has fewer privacy protections because it is meant for
foreigners located overseas--people who do not have constitutional
rights.
Any Americans' data we collect under 702 is collected at a standard
far below the Fourth Amendment, and that should not be.
I strongly support this amendment, and I encourage my colleagues to
vote ``yes.''
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Himes), the ranking member of the Intelligence
Committee.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chairman, I thank both the Judiciary Committee and the
Intelligence Committee for this important debate.
I sat here and listened to the Judiciary Committee's support for the
warrant amendment, and the entire argument is constructed on the
foundation of the notion that U.S. person queries violate the
Constitution. That is the argument.
I am not a lawyer, so I tend to defer to my good friends on the
Judiciary Committee, but I am likely to defer more immediately to the
people who are charged with defending our constitutional rights in the
Federal courts. I am going to quote from the PCLOB report here, a
statement made by the FIS court in April of 2022: ``All three United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals to consider the issue [the Second,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits] have held that the incidental collection of
a U.S. person's communications under section 702 does not require a
warrant and is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.''
I am not a lawyer, but I am inclined to defer to three separate
circuits.
So my friends on Judiciary point to the PCLOB. The gentlewoman from
Washington (Ms. Jayapal) quoted the chair of the PCLOB. She did it
right. She was quoting the Chair of the PCLOB in her personal capacity.
The PCLOB had profound misgivings with their own warrant requirement,
which was far narrower than the Biggs amendment warrant requirement.

The two Republican members of the PCLOB wrote a rebuttal of the
PCLOB's proposal, and I will just quote this. The Republican members--I
would suggest that I am always amazed by the Chairman of Judiciary's
alignment with his party. The Republicans said that: ``FISC preapproval
would most negatively impact the most important and urgent queries--the
ones that show a connection between foreign targets and U.S. persons,
the ones that the FBI must review as quickly as possible.''
Please vote against the Biggs amendment.
Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chairman, so let's just consider that the Second
Circuit has said that a Fourth Amendment warrant is appropriate, and
they haven't finished concluding it. I don't know why Mr. Himes is
going to just keep riding off on that, but the Second Circuit is still
considering that.
Let's take a look at something else. The U.S. person queries designed
to search for communications between Americans and foreigners who
happen to be U.S. person targets. That is what we are hearing.

[[Page H2347]]

So Mr. Turner says the law already requires a warrant to surveil an
American. When he says ``surveil'' what he is talking about is
collecting all of an American's communications. In that case, under
title I a warrant is required.
A U.S. person query is an attempt to access some of an American's
communications, namely, those that are incidentally collected under
section 702 and to do so without a warrant. They can do it right now
without a warrant.
That is the distinction that we are getting at.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. TURNER. What Mr. Biggs just said is a great description. If this
amendment passes, the Chinese Communist Party, Hezbollah, and Hamas get
to fully recruit in the United States free because we would have to get
a warrant to monitor them--not to monitor Americans. Already the
Constitution requires that you have to have a warrant and you have to
go to court for a warrant because their constitutional rights have been
protected since the birth of this Nation.
Americans' inboxes and outboxes are protected by a constitutional
right for a warrant.

{time} 1100

The inbox and outbox of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Chinese Communist
Party are not. If they are recruiting into the United States and people
are communicating back with them, that is not protected speech. If you
send a thanks for the bomb-making classes email to the head of Hamas,
that shouldn't take a warrant for us to see because we need to protect
Americans.
Now, inside the United States, everybody's communications are
protected. The Constitution is sound, and since the birth of this
Nation, we have fought to ensure that. I would say it is the definition
of a swamp when you stand on this floor and say you are going to give
the American people something they already have; they have protections
of their communications. They don't have the protection to be able to
talk to Hamas and Hezbollah and the Chinese Communist Party and say
that they are going to be recruited to be a terrorist to do espionage
or to be a spy. That is what we are talking about.
There should not be a warrant for those types of communications. We
wouldn't be able to see them. We would go blind. Our Nation would be
unsafe.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chair, may I inquire how much time I have remaining.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Jordan), the chairman of the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
Mr. Chair, I would just point out that my good friend from Ohio says
that we are searching foreigners in this database. Well, if we are just
searching foreigners, why do we have this distinction called ``U.S.
person queries''?
If you are just searching the bad guys, that is one thing, but you
are not or you wouldn't have violated U.S. person inquiries 278,000
times. That is the fundamental distinction.
You can search all the bad guys you want--that is what we want. Do
surveillance on them. They are in the database. You want more about
them in the database, go do it. But if you want to search an American--
their name, their phone number, their email address--you have to get a
warrant.
That is all this does. We shouldn't make it too complicated. That is
all this does.
Mr. Himes just used the term, ``U.S. person queries.'' That is not a
foreigner, that is someone here in the United States who is a person,
and they are being searched. All we are saying is if you are going to
do that, go get a warrant from a separate and equal branch of
government.
Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chair, I want to just dovetail on that because my
friend from the Intelligence Committee keeps talking about us not being
able to look at Hamas or any of these nefarious actors. That is simply
inaccurate.
The administration cites multiple examples where using section 702 to
monitor foreign targets has provided critical intelligence, but when it
comes to warrantless searches for Americans, they can't provide any
examples of where they have provided any useful information. Yet, they
want to continue to look at U.S. persons' information without a
warrant.
Mr. Chair, I urge support of my amendment, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Biggs).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arizona will
be postponed.

Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Roy

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2
printed in House Report 118-456.
Mr. ROY. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 23, insert after line 17 the following:
(d) Member Access to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review.--The chair and ranking minority member of each of the
congressional intelligence committees, the chairs and ranking
members of the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate, the Majority and Minority
Leaders of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and the Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives shall be entitled to attend any proceeding of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or any proceeding
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.
Each person entitled to attend a proceeding pursuant to this
paragraph may designate not more than 2 staff members of such
committee or office to attend on their behalf, pursuant to
such procedures as the Attorney General, in consultation with
the Director of National Intelligence may establish.
Page 45, strike line 16 and all that follows through line
17, and insert the following:

SEC. 11. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AND QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS.

Page 48, line 14, insert after ``the report.'' the
following:
``(3) Quarterly report.--Beginning on the date that is not
later than 1 year after the effective date of this paragraph,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
submit a quarterly report to the congressional intelligence
committees and to the Committees on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives and of the Senate that includes the
number of U.S. person queries conducted during that
quarter.''.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1137, the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Roy) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. ROY. Mr. Chair, the amendment that I have put forward here
requires the FBI to report to Congress on a quarterly basis rather than
an annual basis the number of U.S. person queries conducted.
We simply want to have more information. We simply want to have the
ability to look at this and understand whether the FBI is actually
conducting these the proper way. We think quarterly is more efficient
and more effective. By the way, we extended it, it does not kick in for
1 year.
The FBI was complaining it was too burdensome. The FBI couldn't get
this done. They got a $200 million new headquarters, but they couldn't
figure out how to get this done, so we gave them 1 year.
Great, so you have a year; quarterly reporting.
It also grants the chairs and ranking members of the Committees on
Judiciary and Intelligence in the House and the Senate, the ability to
go to the FISC.
Now, the problem is the chairman is going to say they oppose this. I
know this because they put out their propaganda last night saying: This
amendment would result in an unprecedented expansion of access to
details on the most sensitive and highly classified current
intelligence operations being undertaken by the government to numerous
congressional staff which raises significant counterintelligence
concerns.
We can't have congressional staff in the FISC. No, no, no, that would
be terrible. We don't want to have Article I

[[Page H2348]]

be able to go over and get in front of the FISC and be able to see what
is happening and protect American citizens. We would rather the intel
community in all of its infinite wisdom be able to make all of the
determinations about the security and safety of the American people.
By the way, we have all the provisions in the language that say that
it is up to the intel world and the FBI and all the security people to
set the circumstances and all of the requirements under what the
congressional staff would have to have in terms of clearances. However,
to say that we can't have congressional staff be able to observe the
FISC, to be able to understand what is happening there, and be able to
come back here so Congress can know what is happening to protect the
American people is facially absurd.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, the gentleman is correct, the Intelligence
Committee does oppose this amendment. We oppose this. There was a
working group that was put together by the Speaker which had two
Representatives of the Judiciary Committee, two Representatives of the
Intelligence Committee, two Representatives appointed by the leadership
and the chair, Mario Diaz-Balart. Every person in that working group
opposed this amendment.
Now, the underlying bill already includes a provision of a
requirement that the FISA court now create transcripts and that those
transcripts be transmitted to the Congressional committees of
jurisdiction, which includes Judiciary and Intelligence.
We will already know what is happening. The difference is whether or
not you pull up a seat and you eat popcorn while you are watching the
court.
I want to go back to the Biggs amendment here for a second because
the Biggs/Jayapal amendment is really what is dominating this whole
debate.
This amendment, if you just read the front page of it, clearly says
that it is about the intelligence that is gathered from foreigners
abroad. This is not about Americans' data. Americans' data is safe,
constitutionally protected. They are inboxed and outboxed. No amendment
on this floor can change the Constitution. No statute on this floor can
change the Constitution.
The statute that we are talking about is 702, which is the spying on
foreigners abroad.
Now, everybody in this House is pissed at the FBI and is pissed about
the abuses that occurred. Punish the FBI. Pass this underlying bill. Do
not pass the Biggs amendment and cause us to go blind and make America
less safe.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROY. Mr. Chair, pretty much the entirety of the debate that has
been done here has been focused on the warrant requirement, right.
The reason that we have this particular amendment before us right now
is simply to just be able have more reporting and more understanding of
what is happening in the FISC. But there is always constant resistance
by the intelligence community to looking under the hood. Because it is
always the case that they want to use the fear.
``Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is
to be charged against danger real or pretended from abroad.'' James
Madison, Thomas Jefferson, May 13, 1798.
The fact is, the Founders knew precisely what would occur, that the
government, in the quest to have power in the name of stopping foreign
adversaries and in the name of fear, would use that power against our
own citizens. That is what is occurring. That is what is happening.
We have before us real and obvious abuses--278,000 of those abuses,
going after the American people. And our response is a bunch of
technical stuff that chases the actual core problem.
Our friends don't want to get into peeling back the hood of what is
happening in the intel community because our friends are the intel
community.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, in conclusion, as we look at this debate and
this bill, which is about spying on foreigners abroad, Hezbollah,
Hamas, the Chinese Communist Party, giving them constitutional
protections is unprecedented. There is no court that has ever done it.
There has been no bill that has passed this House that gives
constitutional protections to foreigners abroad.

Americans' constitutional rights are preserved in the Constitution.
This amendment undermines our security by giving Americans'
constitutional rights here in the United States to foreign adversaries.
Mr. Chair, I urge a ``no'' vote on the Biggs amendment, and a ``no''
vote on this amendment.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROY. Mr. Chair, to be clear, this amendment is about reporting
requirements. However, on the point of the warrant, after the rampant
abuses by the Federal Government, it is clear that we should have a
warrant requirement under 702 to protect Americans from the querying of
incidental communications collected en masse, under a broad reign of
power, to target foreign entities. That is the truth.
This is the FBI that targeted Catholics, put pro-life progressive
activists in jail, and targeted President Trump.
The proponents give up the game, saying openly the need to target
U.S. persons, right here on the floor. The only thing that makes this
warrantless collection of millions of Americans' international
communications ``lawful'' is the government's certification that it is
targeting foreigners and only foreigners.
If the government changes its mind and wants to go after an American,
it should have to go back and get the warrant that it skipped on the
front end. This is not that hard.
By the way, the argument that we would need 2,000 judges to filter
through warrant requirements begs the question. Which is it?
The proponents' own data indicate they would only get a hit for 1 to
2 percent via metadata. Some of those will have exceptions under our
warrant amendment that we offered, so it would probably be less than 1
percent; so the 2,000 judges argument is straight up false. It is just
not that hard.
If you want to go after an American, if you want to look at their
information, get a warrant.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Roy).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas will
be postponed.

Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Cline

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3
printed in House Report 118-456.
Mr. CLINE. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Add at the end the following:

SEC. __. REPEAL OF AUTHORITY FOR THE RESUMPTION OF ABOUTS
COLLECTION.

(a) In General.--Section 702(b)(5) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(b)(5))
is amended by striking ``, except as provided under section
103(b) of the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Foreign intelligence surveillance act of 1978.--Section
702(m) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(50 U.S.C. 1881a(m)) is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Reviews, and
Reporting'' and inserting ``and Reviews''; and
(B) by striking paragraph (4).
(2) FISA amendments reauthorization act of 2017.--Section
103 of the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017
(Public Law 115-118; 50 U.S.C. 1881a note) is amended--
(A) by striking subsection (b); and
(B) by striking ``(a) In General.--''.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1137, the gentleman
from Virginia (Mr. Cline) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.

[[Page H2349]]

Mr. CLINE. Mr. Chair, I rise in support of these vital reforms to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, especially section 702.
While H.R. 7888 in its current form includes many provisions that the
Judiciary and Intelligence Committees agree on, it falls short of
preventing numerous documented abuses by our government against U.S.
citizens.
Congress must act to protect Americans' privacy and civil rights. To
do that, any legislation that reauthorizes FISA section 702 must also
include a warrant requirement for searches of Americans' communications
collected; an end to the law enforcement and intelligence agencies'
purchases of Americans' location data and other sensitive information;
the reporting requirements offered by Congressman Roy and my amendment,
which would permanently end the practice of ``abouts'' collection,
which has long been a controversial subject.
On top of collecting communications to or from the selector of an
intelligence target, upstream collection of communications from
companies that operate internet cables that interconnect with ISPs'
local networks has included the collection of communications about the
selector.
FISA court opinions from 2011, since declassified, have shone a light
on this type of collection and noted that it resulted in the collection
of ``tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications each year'' by
the NSA due to what was described then as technical limitations in the
implementation of ``about'' collection.
This practice has been halted by the FBI, but they have acknowledged
that they maintain the right to initiate this upon notification back to
Congress.
This must be codified in order to stop this type of abuse from
occurring, and my amendment would do that.
Mr. Chair, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms.
Jackson Lee).

{time} 1115

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman very much.
I am delighted to be able to work with the gentleman from Virginia on
what I think is crucial to codify, because as you said, the FBI had
stopped doing it, but here we are again.
Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr.
Himes), the ranking member on the Intelligence Committee.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentlewoman from Texas and the
gentleman from Virginia. I support this amendment and will be
recommending a ``yes'' vote on this amendment to the minority caucus.
I surprised the gentleman from Virginia in asking for a minute,
because I think it is very important that this Chamber not believe that
this is an argument between civil rights and denigrating civil rights.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman will suspend.
Does the gentleman from Virginia yield to the gentleman from
Connecticut?
Mr. CLINE. I yield to the gentleman.
The Acting CHAIR. For?
Mr. CLINE. For 1 minute.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have the time.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentlewoman from Texas may not reyield time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have yielded a minute to the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Himes).
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Virginia controls the time.
Mr. CLINE. If the gentlewoman will yield back, I will yield a minute
to the gentleman from Connecticut.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. He had yielded to me, but I will be happy to yield
back so he can get his time.
Mr. CLINE. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Himes).
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Chair, again, I think I surprised the gentleman from
Virginia in saying that I will recommend a ``yes'' vote on this
amendment because I think it is very, very important that this not
become a debate between civil rights and perhaps those who are less
concerned about civil rights.
I will yield to no one in my defense of the civil rights incorporated
in our Bill of Rights. I am the ranking member of the Intelligence
Committee. I spend my days marinating in the depredations that the
Chinese would visit upon us, but I voted against the TikTok ban because
I felt it had, and courts have held that it has, First Amendment
equities at stake.
This amendment is a good one. ``About'' collection, first of all, is
not undertaken today by the IC; it is too technically difficult and too
risky. There is too much of a risk that communications that are not
about a target to an American get swept up in this ``about''
collection.
I will be adamant and stand with the Second, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits in saying that the Biggs amendment is not addressing
constitutional issues, but this is an important amendment that I
support.
Mr. CLINE. Mr. Chair, I yield such time as she may consume to the
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman from Virginia, the
home of my alma mater, the University of Virginia School of Law, and
the gentleman from Connecticut, also the home of my alma mater.
To be able to find collegiality in a very important question for the
American people is very much a statement that should be made.
This amendment does something Congress should have done 7 years ago,
as I have indicated, prohibiting the government from resuming
``abouts'' collection, a form of section 702 surveillance that poses a
unique risk to Americans.
It is also very disturbing, Mr. Chair, because most Americans would
scratch their heads and wonder why is this relevant to the immediate
investigation. ``Abouts'' collection is a collection of communications
that are neither to nor from an approved target of surveillance under
702, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, but merely
contain information relating to that target. That means that you become
a target because it happened to be sitting around you or it happened to
be going to you or from you.
In the past, ``abouts'' collections focused on collecting
communications that include a target's email or phone, address, Twitter
handle, or something like that, but in theory ``abouts'' collection
could be used to collect emails that merely mention a person who is a
target of 702 surveillance.
I think it is extremely important to recognize ``merely mentions''
that individual, and you could have your materials, your private
information, wrapped up in a roundup or a lassoing of the extended
material that is scattered around you, and you could be subject to some
kind of haul, if you will, a hauling in of data about you.
Nothing in the text or legislative history of 702 indicates that this
type of surveillance is authorized. That is why I think this amendment
with Mr. Cline is extremely important because it shows that we are
working together.
Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of the Cline (VA)/Jackson Lee (TX)
Amendment No. 3 to H.R. 7888--Reforming Intelligence and Securing
America Act (RISAA).
This amendment does something Congress should have done seven years
ago: prohibit the government from resuming ``abouts'' collection, a
form of Section 702 surveillance that poses unique risks to Americans.
``Abouts'' collection is the collection of communications that are
neither to nor from an approved target of surveillance under Section
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), but merely
contain information relating to that target.
In the past, ``abouts'' collection focused on collecting
communications that include a target's email address, or phone address,
or Twitter handle, or something like that. But in theory, ``abouts''
collection could be used to collect emails that merely mention a person
who is a target of Section 702 surveillance.
Nothing in the text or legislative history of Section 702 indicates
that this type of surveillance is authorized.
Under Section 702, the surveillance must target a non-U.S. person
outside the United States. The term ``target'' has a well-understood
meaning. When a person is a target, it means the government can collect
that person's information or other data, not the communications or data
of other individuals.
As we all know, ``abouts'' collection under Section 702 has a sordid
history.
The National Security Agency (NSA) used ``abouts'' collection when it
was conducting upstream surveillance, in

[[Page H2350]]

other words, when it was intercepting communications directly as they
transited over the Internet backbone, rather than collecting stored
communications from service providers.
Not surprisingly, this practice resulted in the collection of tens of
thousands of purely domestic communications--communications between and
among Americans inside the United States.
Moreover, often these Americans were not even discussing the target.
Instead, their communications were lumped in with other communications,
transiting over the Internet backbone as a packet. The NSA was
collecting the entire packet of communications, simply because
somewhere in that packet was a reference to information about a target.
This was a problem from the moment Section 702 went into effect in
2008. And yet for years, the government did not disclose this problem
to the FISA Court.
To the contrary, the government affirmatively misrepresented how the
program was working. It was not until 2011 that the court learned the
government was sweeping in tens of thousands of purely domestic
communications.
The court was livid. It noted that the belated disclosure, and I
quote, ``marks the third instance in less than three years in which the
government has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding the
scope of a major collection program.''
At the time, the court chose not to prohibit the use of ``abouts''
collection. But it held that special minimization rules were required
for upstream communications, and that without those rules, the program
would violate both Section 702 and the Fourth Amendment. One of those
rules was a prohibition on U.S. person queries of communications
obtained through upstream surveillance.
Five years later, the NSA discovered that its agents had been
routinely violating this prohibition. But rather than immediately
report these violations to the FISA Court, the NSA waited for several
months. When it finally admitted the violations, the FISA Court
chastised the NSA for its ``institutional lack of candor,'' and refused
to approve the continuation of Section 702 surveillance until the NSA
cleaned up its act.
The NSA proved incapable of bringing its agents into compliance. The
agents continued to routinely search though the upstream data in an
effort to find and review Americans' communications, in violation of
Section 702, the Fourth Amendment, and the FISA Court's orders. Well
aware that the court would not continue to approve Section 702
surveillance under these conditions, the NSA, in 2017, made the only
decision it could: it terminated ``abouts'' collection.
Well, it has now been seven years since the NSA stopped ``abouts''
collection, and the government has not claimed that ending this
practice has resulted in a loss of critical intelligence or had any
other kind of negative impact on national security. No official has
pointed to a single bad result that could have been averted through the
use of ``abouts'' collection.
Collecting communications that are neither to nor from an approved
target of surveillance is contrary to the text and intent of Section
702.
It inevitably results in the collection of wholly domestic
communications, which Section 702 expressly prohibits.
Over the course of a decade, the NSA proved that it was incapable of
operating ``abouts'' surveillance responsibly and in accordance with
the law--and the past seven years shown that ``abouts'' collection is
not necessary for national security.
It is time for Congress to shut the door on ``abouts'' collection.
In the future, if the government can show that it needs ``abouts''
collection for national security purposes and that it can operate the
program without violating the law and the Fourth Amendment, it can come
to Congress and ask for authorization. But the burden should be on the
government to show the need and the ability to lawfully conduct the
program.
For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the
Cline/Jackson Lee Amendment No. 3.
Mr. Chair, I include in the record a letter from Representative Cline
and myself listing the groups in support of this amendment.

Congress of the United States,

Washington, DC, April 12, 2024.
Dear Colleague: Please join us in supporting our amendment
to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America
Act. Rules Amendment No. 5 would end what is known as
``abouts'' collection, which involves the capturing of
massive amounts of communications by government agencies such
as the National Security Agency (NSA) in which the selector,
for example, an email address, of a target appears somewhere
in communications, even if that target is not a party to the
communications. It has long been controversial.
The FISA Court previously discovered that the government
had misrepresented its activities and held that handling this
type of data was of significant concern and a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Although the NSA abandoned the practice
of ``abouts'' collection in 2017, Congress in 2018 amended
FISA to prohibit this type of collection unless the AG and
DNI notify the House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary
Committees of its plans to resume such collection. But that
only means that if the NSA notifies Congress, they can resume
``abouts'' collection at any time. Our amendment would
proactively end the practice for good.
The following groups support this important amendment:
Freedom Works--Key Vote; Due Process Institute; Americans
for Prosperity; Project for Privacy and Surveillance
Accountability; Reform Government Surveillance; Center for
Democracy and Technology; American Civil Liberties Union;
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC); Restore the
Fourth; Defending Rights & Dissent; Brennan Center for
Justice; Wikimedia Foundation.
Demand Progress; Electronic Frontier Foundation; Project on
Government Oversight; United We Dream; Asian Americans
Advancing Justice; Muslim Advocates; Free Press Action;
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Freedom of
the Press Foundation; New America's Open Technology
Institute; Fight for the Future; Stop AAPI Hate.
We urge you to vote in favor of Amendment No. 5.
Sincerely,
Ben Cline,
Member of Congress.
Sheila Jackson Lee,
Member of Congress.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman from Virginia has
expired.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition because the
National Security Agency stopped ``abouts'' collection in 2017 because
it was fraught with peril. This amendment is not necessary because the
intelligence community is not doing this and hasn't been doing it since
2017.
I do want to go back and assist somewhat in the debate of some of the
terms that are occurring with respect to the Biggs-Jayapal amendment.
The Biggs-Jayapal amendment, as I indicated, would make us go blind.
It would make it so that we can't read the inboxes and outboxes of
foreigners abroad who are al-Qaida, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Chinese
Communist Party.
The reason I say that is because 702, which is the underlying bill
here that is being reauthorized, is tailored only to the adversaries
and those who want to do us harm. It is for national security threats.
It is for our adversaries. Their inbox and their outbox are not
protected. If you are a terrorist or if you are committing espionage or
you are a spy and you are communicating with the Chinese Communist
Party or Hezbollah, Hamas, or al-Qaida, right now, because we are
spying on them, we can read those communications. America wants us to
read those communications because it is how we keep America safe.
On 9/11, we had terrorists inside the United States. For all intents
and purposes, as people were saying in this debate, they were
Americans. They weren't American citizens, but under this law, they
were Americans and they had protection under the Constitution. Their
communications to al-Qaida were not protected. At that time, we weren't
looking. We were not looking. We were blind and we were not listening.
Now, we are looking. If somebody is in this country and they are a
terrorist or they are a spy for the Chinese Communist Party, we are
looking at the Chinese Communist Party and al-Qaida. In reading those,
we can take those to a court and get a warrant and then keep America
safe from people who are here who intend to do us harm. This would shut
that off. It would

[[Page H2351]]

make us be blind with respect to those communications.
Mr. Chair, vote ``no'' on the Biggs-Jayapal amendment, and vote
``no'' on this amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Cline).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Crenshaw

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4
printed in House Report 118-456.
Mr. CRENSHAW. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Add at the end the following new section:

SEC. __. INCLUSION OF COUNTERNARCOTICS IN DEFINITION OF
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

Section 101(e)(1) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; or'' and inserting
a semicolon; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(D) international production, distribution, or financing
of illicit synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or other drugs
driving overdose deaths, or precursors of any aforementioned;
or''.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1137, the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Crenshaw) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. CRENSHAW. Mr. Chair, I want to let my fellow Americans know
something that might shock them.
We all know that fentanyl is a scourge on our country. We all know
that fentanyl is produced by the Mexican drug cartels. We all know that
the precursor chemicals for fentanyl come from Chinese companies.
What you might not know is that we can't even get a FISA warrant to
stop that, to collect intelligence on those production companies, on
those attorneys, on those bankers, on those facilitators that help the
cartels murder and poison tens of thousands of Americans every single
year.
That is a pretty shocking statement. I bet you didn't know that. You
should know that.
FISA, despite all of the misinformation put out about it, is actually
very narrowly tailored. It only allows you to get a warrant on a
foreigner in foreign land if it is related to foreign intelligence, if
it is related to countering weapons of mass destruction, or if it is
related to counterterrorism. Nowhere in there is there anything about
counternarcotics, the thing that is actually killing Americans today
and every single day.
My amendment would simply upgrade that categorization to ensure that
we can collect intelligence on the Chinese precursor being shipped into
Mexico and into our own country so that we can actually stop the death
of Americans.
It is a very narrowly tailored amendment. It is not about all drug
traffickers. It does not swoop in a bunch of Americans. It is about
international drug traffickers trafficking illicit synthetics that are
killing people.
It is a very simple amendment. It is a bipartisan amendment. It is
one of the biggest things that I have learned in my role as chairman on
the cartel task force, that we actually are blind to the supply chains
of fentanyl.
To be against this amendment is to say we should give the cartels and
China more Fourth Amendment rights and more First Amendment rights than
we have. That is what it would mean in practice. I hope that anyone who
votes against this amendment stops talking about the cartels being a
problem. If we are not even allowed to collect intelligence on the
cartels, then what are we doing?
Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania
(Ms. Houlahan).
Ms. HOULAHAN. Mr. Chair, today, I also rise in support of this
important amendment that will help our intelligence community,
strengthen our southern border, and save American lives.
This amendment will fully enlist our country's intelligence agencies
in the fight against foreign drug traffickers. Foreign-made fentanyl is
killing tens of thousands of Americans every year. It is critical that
we start treating this danger as the very serious national threat that
it is.
My legislation, which is called the Enhancing Intelligence Collection
on Foreign Drug Traffickers Act, is now the bipartisan amendment that
is led by myself and Mr. Crenshaw. This would allow our intelligence
community to counter drug cartels as they attempt to bring deadly
fentanyl to our shores.
Today, the intelligence community can only leverage section 702
against counternarcotics targets under one of the existing
certifications, none of which are focused currently on drug
trafficking.
This amendment would close that gap, without expanding domestic law
enforcement's abilities to police drug dealers, in order to keep
fentanyl from ever reaching the United States.
Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to pass this legislation, to pass the
counternarcotics amendment led by myself and Mr. Crenshaw, and to
reject any amendment that would put our national security at risk.
Mr. CRENSHAW. Mr. Chair, to those opposed to the underlying bill, I
understand. We are going to have to agree to disagree, but I cannot
imagine being opposed to this amendment, even if you vote against the
overall bill.
I thought we all agreed that the cartels are one of our number one
threats. They are killing tens of thousands of Americans every year by
poisoning them with fentanyl. We need to know how they are doing it. We
need to know who their suppliers are. We need to know who is laundering
their money. We can't know that within our current law. All we have to
do is allow ourselves to do it.
This is one of the most important things that I think our
constituents actually care about. If we are going to act like we have
sympathy for the sons and daughters who have been killed from an
overdose of fentanyl, then we actually have to take action on it.
I have got to say, too, that the warrant amendment would kill our
ability to do this. Remember, the whole point of drug trafficking is to
get it in the United States.
The whole point of terrorism is to conduct a terrorist attack here in
the United States.
When you are collecting intelligence on foreigners, the only way they
do those things is to communicate with entities inside the United
States. To demand a secondary warrant just to search that communication
kills our ability to connect those dots.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BISHOP of North Carolina. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in
opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from North Carolina is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. BISHOP of North Carolina. Mr. Chair, the Crenshaw amendment would
expand FISA's definition of foreign intelligence to encompass
international drug crimes.
FISA is a counterintelligence and counterterrorism tool. It is
limited to that purpose. The clear distinction between foreign
intelligence and crime are essential to preserving the fundamental
liberties of Americans under our constitutional system.

{time} 1130

It is the essential design of the law: spying abroad, criminal
justice at home.
Simply redefining foreign intelligence to include ordinary crime
eviscerates the entire distinction on which the design of the FISA law
rests.
Moreover, the Intelligence Committee proponents of this amendment
fail even to explain to us why this blurred definition is needed. They
assert it, but they don't explain it.
After all, the DNI's FISA section 702 fact sheet lists the
government's use of section 702 to learn about our adversaries' plans
to smuggle fentanyl into the United States as the number one successful
use of existing section 702.
If section 702 already allows us to go after fentanyl, then why do we
need to change and blur the critical definition of foreign
intelligence? What is the purpose of doing so? What comes next?
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has the only time remaining.
Mr. BISHOP of North Carolina. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Roy).

[[Page H2352]]

Mr. ROY. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman from North Carolina for
yielding.
I will just note that I certainly appreciate the intent of my friend
and colleague from Texas. Obviously, we want to go after cartels, and
we want to make sure we can stop the flow of fentanyl into our
communities that is killing and ravaging Texans and Americans across
our country.
The problem here is it is unnecessary. They can go certify right now.
They can go right now and certify a whole other class. We don't need
this law to do that. That is the important part. We don't need this
amendment, and we don't need to risk expanding it.
Be that as it may, here is my real problem. Just today we have
information where we had a terrorist on an Afghan watch list who was
released into San Antonio, Texas. ICE just walked away from it, and now
we have somebody on the terrorist watch list sitting in San Antonio,
Texas.
So am I supposed to say I want to grant more power to the
intelligence community and more power to the government that is
releasing terrorists as we speak onto the streets of Texas? It defies
any kind of logic.
They have the tools to do what they need to go after fentanyl without
expanding FISA, which is being abused against Americans.
By the way, Mr. Chair, you need the warrant requirement in order to
protect against expansion of FISA.
Mr. BISHOP of North Carolina. Mr. Chair, everyone agrees that the
fentanyl crisis is a terrible and serious public health and crime
issue, but a mass, warrantless surveillance tool created by word games
is not the answer. It is dangerous.
Indeed, the willingness and desire of some to create exactly that
points back to the reason that Congress must impose a warrant
requirement to deter the abuse of the section 702 foreign intelligence
database collected to surveil foreigners abroad to permit backdoor
searches against Americans. That is the issue.
Oppose the Crenshaw amendment and support the Biggs amendment to make
them get a warrant.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Crenshaw).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. CRENSHAW. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas will
be postponed.

amendment no. 5 offered by Mr. Waltz

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5
printed in House Report 118-456.
Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Add at the end the following new section:

SEC. ___. VETTING OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS.

Subsection (f) of section 702, as amended by this Act, is
further amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(6) Vetting of non-united states persons.--For any
procedures for one or more agencies adopted under paragraph
(1)(A), the Attorney General, in consultation with the
Director of National Intelligence, shall ensure that the
procedures enable the vetting of all non-United States
persons who are being processed for travel to the United
States using terms that do not qualify as United States
person query terms under this Act.''.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1137, the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Waltz) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of my amendment to permit the use
of 702 information to vet foreign nationals entering the United States.
This amendment enables the thorough vetting of all foreigners being
processed for traveling to the United States, whether that is a foreign
national applying for a visa, applying for legal immigration, or
illegally crossing our southern border.
This is what I think a lot of Americans probably don't realize:
Currently, section 702 has only been authorized to collect information
to support some Department of Homeland Security efforts to screen and
vet foreign persons applying for travel or immigration to the United
States. This amendment will enhance the vetting of all foreigners who
come here.
If national security concerns are found through this vetting, these
results will be provided to the Department of Homeland Security, the
State Department, and the Department of Defense to ensure the Federal
Government is making the most informed decision before we allow foreign
nationals' admission.
Mr. Chair, we are 3 years into the worst crisis at the southern
border in the history of the United States. Last year, Customs and
Border Protection reported 2\1/2\ million encounters with people
attempting to cross into the United States from Mexico. Alarmingly,
over the last 2 years, CBP has apprehended more than 70,000 special
interest aliens, people from countries identified as having conditions
that promote or protect terrorism.
Mr. Chair, the FBI Director is ringing the alarm bell with the over
300 people on the terrorist watch list who are now somewhere in America
compared to just 12 under the last administration. This population
includes 538 aliens from Syria and 659 aliens from Iran, two state
sponsors of terrorism, I might add, in addition to 139 from Yemen,
which right now houses the Houthis, and over 1,600 from Pakistan. We
just saw ISIS-K attack Moscow. We have just seen six plots stopped in
Europe, and I fear that we are about to suffer another attack like San
Bernardino, like Pulse nightclub, or, God forbid, another 9/11.
Equally concerning, the fastest growing group entering through our
southern border is now from China, our number one adversary. Over
24,000 Chinese nationals have been apprehended at the southern border
just in the last year. Of the 1.3 million illegal immigrants in the
United States with deportation orders, over 100,000 are Chinese
nationals.
The American people expect us to use every tool we legally can, every
intelligence piece of equipment and every database that we can, to
protect them against foreigners who would mean us harm.
Mr. Chair, we have these tools. We have reformed the abuses of these
tools, and we have to allow our national security professionals to have
the best information possible to keep Americans safe. We can't wait
until there is another attack and then throw up our hands in this body
and say: Why didn't we stop it?
I am astounded, frankly, that anyone, any Republican, would oppose
this amendment after we have been here time and time again saying that
we have to protect our border, that we have to protect Americans, and
that if you want to come to the United States, then, fine, you need to
do so legally, but we are going to look into your background, we are
going to make sure you are not a terrorist, and we are going to make
sure you are not a Chinese national spy who means to do us harm.
Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this and use every tool we
can to keep Americans safe, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, now they want to expand it. This is the second
amendment in a row where they are going to expand FISA.
We can't have a warrant for the existing program, this giant haystack
of information. You can't have a warrant when you go search American
citizens there, but now they want to expand it and tell us you still
can't have a warrant.
Holy cow. Pretty soon, this is going to be everybody gets searched
for any darned reason they want. That is not how it works in America,
at least it is not how it is supposed to work.
The third amendment is going to expand it, too. We spent all morning
talking about the warrant requirement, which should be so obvious, and
they want to expand it.
Mr. Chair, I understand we have a border problem. Holy cow, do we
understand that. I may not agree with my

[[Page H2353]]

Democratic colleagues on how to fix it. In fact, I know I don't, but
expanding FISA, you have to be kidding me. This amendment authorizes
surveillance of a whole new category of individuals.
We should absolutely vet foreigners who seek to enter the United
States, whether legally or illegally, but Congress should not expand
FISA or section 702 beyond its current scope of authority.
This whole year, we have been focusing our committee on limiting FISA
and reining it in so that we still can do what we needs to be done:
look after bad guys and look at bad guys but not infringe on Americans'
liberties. This just expands it. That is not what the purpose of this
bill is.
We should address the border problem. Holy cow, our committee spent a
boatload of time on it. That is an issue where, unfortunately, we
didn't get a 35-2 vote on H.R. 2, which is a good piece of legislation.
This is going to sweep up so many more Americans, where the FBI
278,000 times illegally--not illegally but didn't follow their own
rules when they queried the database. Now, they have even more.
Holy cow, Mr. Chair, this is the wrong way to go.
Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Washington (Ms.
Jayapal).
Ms. JAYAPAL. Mr. Chair, I rise in strong opposition to this
amendment, and, yes, I agree with Chairman Jordan on an immigration
amendment because this is an expansion of the government's ability to
surveil. We have this opportunity right here in Congress today to add
critical safeguards and not expand the government's use of this
surveillance authority.
This inexcusable expansion of FISA will further increase warrantless
surveillance, and it is at the expense of a whole slew of innocent
immigrants.
People seeking to come to this country are not monolithic communities
cut off from Americans. Many of them are close family members of U.S.
citizens seeking reunification through family sponsorship or just a
simple visit. Many others are sponsored by U.S. employers.
There is already ample vetting of immigrants. Just look at refugees,
who are the most vetted group of people who come to this country. It
takes years of vetting through multiple agencies, including the FBI,
the National Counterterrorism Center, and other agencies.
This amendment is only going to make these processing backlogs worse.
It will further delay American businesses from getting the workers we
need to maintain our competitiveness and our ability to attract the
best and the brightest. It could harm local economies that rely on
tourism as delays in processing travel visas deter people from travel
to America.
We should not be expanding FISA. We should be creating safeguards to
protect foundational civil liberties rights.
Earlier, one of my colleagues claimed that not a single Federal court
has identified a Fourth Amendment issue with U.S. person queries. Mr.
Chair, that is false. In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit found Fourth Amendment concerns with U.S. person queries, and
that issue is still being debated.
We are talking about an average of 500 warrantless searches of
Americans' private communications every single day. Don't take it from
me.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chair, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the
gentlewoman from Washington.
Ms. JAYAPAL. Here is a quote from Travis LeBlanc, a Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board member:

Although section 702 is touted as a foreign intelligence
tool, it is apparent that a key feature is domestic
intelligence and criminal law enforcement. For example, DOJ
reported that the FBI queried over 19,000 donors to a
congressional campaign. The FBI also has run numerous
improper queries of social advocates, religious community
leaders, and even individuals who provide tips or who are
victims of crime. Five million warrantless searches by the
FBI of Americans' private communications is 5 million too
many.

Vote ``no'' on this amendment.
Mr. JORDAN. I will close my time by saying, Mr. Chairman, every time
you expand FISA, you underscore the need for a warrant. The bigger and
bigger this database gets and the more that U.S. persons are going to
be searched, you underscore the need for a warrant, which we spent a
whole morning debating.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Chair, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Florida has 1 minute remaining.
Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Chair, I find it astounding the leader of the
Progressive Caucus, Ms. Jayapal, and Mr. Jordan agree on these issues.
Mr. Chair, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Turner).
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, we had Members stand and say that they are for
vetting foreigners who want to come into the United States. I assume we
should vet them for whether or not they have ties to terrorist groups
and organizations. Perhaps we should just ask them because I am sure
they will tell us the truth, but they won't, which is why we have 702.
Section 702 collects information on foreigners abroad and terrorist
groups and organizations.
What this amendment does is it allows us to search Hamas on these
individuals who want to come into the United States, to find out if
they are affiliated with Hamas because they are not just going to tell
us.

{time} 1145

If my colleagues are for vetting, my colleagues are for vetting,
looking at terrorist groups and organizations to see if they have ties
to people who are trying to come into the United States.
Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Waltz).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Ms. JAYAPAL. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida will
be postponed.

Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Turner

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6
printed in House Report 118-456.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Add at the end the following new section:

SEC. __. DEFINITION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION SERVICE
PROVIDER.

(a) Section 701(b)(4) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (F);
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``; or'' and inserting
a semicolon;
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new
subparagraph:
``(E) any other service provider who has access to
equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store
wire or electronic communications, but not including any
entity that serves primarily as--
``(i) a public accommodation facility, as that term is
defined in section 501(4);
``(ii) a dwelling, as that term is defined in section 802
of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3602);
``(iii) a community facility, as that term is defined in
section 315 of the Defense Housing and Community Facilities
and Services Act of 1951 (42 U.S.C. 1592n); or
``(iv) a food service establishment, as that term is
defined in section 281 of the Agricultural Marketing Act of
1946 (7 U.S.C. 1638); or'';
(4) in subparagraph (F), as redesignated--
(A) by inserting ``custodian,'' after ``employee,'';
(B) by striking ``or'' before ``(D)''; and
(C) by inserting ``, or (E)'' after ``(D)''.
(b) Paragraph (6) of section 801 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (E) and (F) as
subparagraphs (F) and (G), respectively;
(2) in subparagraph (F), as redesignated, by striking ``;
or'' and inserting a semicolon;
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new
subparagraph:
``(E) any other service provider who has access to
equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store
wire or electronic communications, but not including any
entity that serves primarily as--
``(i) a public accommodation facility, as that term is
defined in section 501(4);
``(ii) a dwelling, as that term is defined in section 802
of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3602);
``(iii) a community facility, as that term is defined in
section 315 of the Defense Housing and Community Facilities
and Services Act of 1951 (42 U.S.C. 1592n); or

[[Page H2354]]

``(iv) a food service establishment, as that term is
defined in section 281 of the Agricultural Marketing Act of
1946 (7 U.S.C. 1638);''; and
(4) in subparagraph (G), as redesignated--
(A) by inserting ``custodian,'' after ``employee,'';
(B) by striking ``or'' before ``(E)''; and
(C) by inserting ``, or (F)'' after ``(E)''.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1137, the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. Turner) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, there is a SCIF off of the House floor to
provide additional information to Members that I am not able to present
here.
This amendment is to correct a technical issue that was found by the
FISA court with respect to critical intelligence and a technological
issue in which there was a gap.
Again, 702 is about collecting data and information on foreigners
abroad. You have to be both. You have to be a foreigner, and you have
to be abroad. You can't be a foreigner in the United States, and you
can't be an American abroad. It is about foreigners abroad.
There have been people who have been saying on this amendment that
this is about collecting at your local Starbucks, this is about
collecting at your local McDonald's. It is not. It is about foreigners
abroad.
I end with this: With respect to the Biggs-Jayapal amendment, this
important surveillance tool of foreigners abroad is limited to just
foreigners abroad and individuals who are in the United States who are
being recruited by terrorist groups and organizations and the Chinese
Communist Party when they communicate with them and their
communications end up in the inboxes of the Chinese Communist Party,
Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaida.
If we are reading the inbox of al-Qaida, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the
Chinese Communist Party, and there is an email in there from somebody
located in the United States because they are being recruited, either
to do espionage, or because they are being recruited for terrorism, my
colleagues want the government to read that.
Now, our constitutional protections, which we dearly uphold here and
everybody is committed to, is that no American shall have their inbox,
their outbox, their electronic communications, and their data spied on
by their government. Our constitutional protections require that there
be a warrant, and no one should stand in this well and pretend that
they do not.
There are constitutional protections for American communications
within their data. However, if a person located in the United States is
communicating with al-Qaida, Hamas, and the Chinese Communist Party, in
this limited group of people that we collect under 702, they can pose a
threat to this country.
Additionally, if the Biggs-Jayapal amendment passes, we will go dark.
We will no longer see solicitations from the Chinese Communist Party to
students in the United States to go and spy for them.
We will no longer see al-Qaida recruiting people in the United States
to undertake terrorist attacks.
We will no longer see people who are sympathetic with Hamas, who
contact Hamas and say: How can I perpetrate a terrorist attack in the
United States?
It is imperative that the Biggs-Jayapal amendment fail and that this
underlying bill, which punishes the FBI but protects the American
people, pass.
Mr. Chair, I urge passage of this bill and a ``no'' vote on the
Biggs-Jayapal amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chair, like all the amendments offered by HPSCI, this amendment
drastically expands the scope of FISA. This amendment will actually
change the definition of ``electronic communication service provider''
to require a whole new class of businesses and other entities to assist
in FISA section 702 surveillance.
When the amendment first came out 1\1/2\ months ago, it caused a
massive commotion, as can be imagined. One of the FISA amici did
something highly unusual. He went public with a warning. He confirmed
that the amendment originally was exactly as broad as it looked, in
that it could force hotels, libraries, and coffee shops to serve as
surrogate spies because, of course, customers in those establishments
might well be engaging in international communications, which would
transit over the WiFi equipment in those locations. That was the
original.
Therefore, the amendment sponsors threw in an exemption for hotels,
libraries, coffee shops and a handful of other establishments, but that
hardly solves the problem because the vast majority of U.S. businesses
are not exempted. Hence, the amendment would still apply to grocery
stores, department stores, hardware stores, barber shops, laundromats,
fitness centers, nail salons.
Perhaps most worrisome of all, it would apply to business landlords
who rent out office space and provide WiFi for their building. That
would include the offices that many of us in this room go to when we
are back in our districts, as well as the offices of tens of millions
of Americans across the country, offices for lawyers, journalists,
nonprofits, and others.
That is how expansive this amendment is. That is why we should defeat
this amendment.
Mr. Chair, I have enjoyed all the attention the Biggs-Jayapal-Jordan-
Nadler-Davidson-Lofgren amendment has received. It has been flattering
that, on every other amendment and the underlying bill, we don't talk
about any of that other stuff, and we talk about the warrants.
That gets to the reality of the situation. The intelligence community
wants control. They want to continue to have control without any
checks.
The Biggs amendment does not require a warrant for the government to
surveil foreigners in foreign countries or to incidentally collect the
communication of Americans under section 702.
Let me repeat that. The amendment does not require a warrant for the
government to surveil foreigners in foreign countries, nor does it
require a warrant for incidentally collecting the communications of
Americans under section 702. It just doesn't, but that is what was
heard.
Instead, it requires that the Federal Government and the spying and
surveillance apparatus get a warrant if they want to read an American's
communications or query them in the 702 database. That is what the
essence of this is.
They don't want to have to get a warrant. They are okay with getting
a warrant under title I of FISA, but not under 702 for some reason. It
is very odd.
Additionally, not only do they not want to get a warrant, but they
want to expand the database and the scope of the Americans that they
can scoop up in that database to include, in this particular amendment,
virtually every retail outlet in the country, virtually every
commercial enterprise in the country, virtually every commercial
property in this country, but we don't want to have a warrant if we are
going to look into U.S. persons' information. We don't want to do that.
After all, that might cause them to actually develop information and
investigate further.
Let me tell you something. This underlying bill loses its quality if
the Biggs amendment on the warrant amendment doesn't pass.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Ellzey). The question is on the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio will be
postponed.

Announcement by the Acting Chair

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings
will now resume on those amendments printed in House Report 118-456 on
which further proceedings were postponed, in the following order:
Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Biggs of Arizona.
Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Roy of Texas.
Amendment No. 4 by Mr. Crenshaw of Texas.
Amendment No. 5 by Mr. Waltz of Florida.

[[Page H2355]]

Amendment No. 6 by Mr. Turner of Ohio.
The Chair will reduce to 2 minutes the minimum time for any
electronic vote after the first vote in this series.

Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Biggs

The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on amendment No. 1, printed in House Report 118-456,
offered by the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Biggs), on which further
proceedings were postponed and on which the ayes prevailed by voice
vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 212,
noes 212, not voting 13, as follows:

[Roll No. 114]

AYES--212

Adams
Alford
Allen
Amodei
Armstrong
Arrington
Baird
Balint
Banks
Bean (FL)
Beatty
Bentz
Bergman
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (NC)
Blumenauer
Boebert
Bonamici
Bost
Bowman
Brecheen
Brown
Burchett
Burlison
Bush
Cammack
Cardenas
Carey
Casar
Castro (TX)
Cherfilus-McCormick
Chu
Ciscomani
Clarke (NY)
Cline
Cloud
Clyde
Collins
Comer
Correa
Crane
Crockett
Curtis
Davidson
Davis (IL)
DeGette
DelBene
Deluzio
DeSaulnier
DesJarlais
Dingell
Doggett
Donalds
Duncan
Dunn (FL)
Edwards
Emmer
Escobar
Espaillat
Evans
Fallon
Finstad
Fischbach
Fitzgerald
Fleischmann
Foushee
Foxx
Frost
Fry
Fulcher
Gaetz
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Garcia, Robert
Good (VA)
Gooden (TX)
Gosar
Graves (LA)
Green (TN)
Green, Al (TX)
Greene (GA)
Griffith
Grothman
Guest
Hageman
Harris
Harshbarger
Hern
Higgins (LA)
Horsford
Houchin
Hoyle (OR)
Hudson
Huffman
Huizenga
Hunt
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jackson (NC)
Jackson (TX)
Jackson Lee
Jacobs
James
Jayapal
Johnson (SD)
Jordan
Joyce (PA)
Kamlager-Dove
Khanna
Kildee
Kiley
LaMalfa
Langworthy
Lee (CA)
Lee (FL)
Lee (PA)
Leger Fernandez
Lofgren
Loudermilk
Luna
Luttrell
Mace
Maloy
Mann
Massie
Mast
Matsui
McClain
McClintock
McCormick
McGarvey
McGovern
Meng
Meuser
Mfume
Miller (IL)
Mills
Molinaro
Moolenaar
Moore (AL)
Moore (WI)
Moran
Nadler
Napolitano
Nehls
Newhouse
Norman
Norton
Ocasio-Cortez
Ogles
Omar
Owens
Pallone
Palmer
Peltola
Perry
Pingree
Pocan
Porter
Posey
Pressley
Ramirez
Reschenthaler
Rodgers (WA)
Rose
Rosendale
Ross
Roy
Sablan
Salinas
Scanlon
Schakowsky
Scholten
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Self
Sessions
Sherman
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NJ)
Spartz
Stansbury
Stauber
Steel
Steil
Steube
Takano
Thanedar
Thompson (PA)
Tiffany
Timmons
Tlaib
Tokuda
Tonko
Torres (NY)
Van Drew
Van Duyne
Velazquez
Walberg
Waters
Watson Coleman
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Westerman
Williams (GA)
Williams (NY)
Williams (TX)
Wilson (SC)
Yakym
Zinke

NOES--212

Aderholt
Aguilar
Allred
Amo
Auchincloss
Bacon
Balderson
Barr
Barragan
Bera
Beyer
Bice
Bishop (GA)
Blunt Rochester
Boyle (PA)
Brownley
Buchanan
Bucshon
Budzinski
Burgess
Calvert
Caraveo
Carbajal
Carl
Carson
Carter (GA)
Carter (LA)
Carter (TX)
Cartwright
Case
Casten
Castor (FL)
Chavez-DeRemer
Clark (MA)
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Cole
Connolly
Costa
Courtney
Craig
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crow
Cuellar
D'Esposito
Davids (KS)
Davis (NC)
De La Cruz
Dean (PA)
DeLauro
Diaz-Balart
Duarte
Ellzey
Eshoo
Estes
Ezell
Feenstra
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick
Fletcher
Flood
Foster
Frankel, Lois
Franklin, Scott
Gallagher
Garamendi
Garbarino
Garcia, Mike
Gimenez
Golden (ME)
Goldman (NY)
Gomez
Gonzales, Tony
Gonzalez, Vicente
Gottheimer
Granger
Graves (MO)
Guthrie
Harder (CA)
Hayes
Hill
Himes
Hinson
Houlahan
Hoyer
Ivey
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (LA)
Joyce (OH)
Kaptur
Kean (NJ)
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kiggans (VA)
Kilmer
Kim (CA)
Kim (NJ)
Krishnamoorthi
Kuster
Kustoff
LaHood
LaLota
Lamborn
Landsman
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latta
LaTurner
Lawler
Lee (NV)
Letlow
Levin
Lieu
Lucas
Lynch
Magaziner
Malliotakis
Manning
McBath
McCaul
McClellan
McCollum
McHenry
Meeks
Menendez
Miller (OH)
Miller (WV)
Miller-Meeks
Moore (UT)
Morelle
Moskowitz
Moulton
Moylan
Mrvan
Mullin
Murphy
Neal
Neguse
Nickel
Norcross
Nunn (IA)
Obernolte
Panetta
Pappas
Pascrell
Pelosi
Pence
Peters
Pettersen
Pfluger
Phillips
Quigley
Raskin
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rouzer
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rutherford
Ryan
Salazar
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schiff
Schneider
Schrier
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sewell
Sherrill
Slotkin
Smith (NE)
Smith (WA)
Smucker
Sorensen
Soto
Spanberger
Stanton
Stefanik
Stevens
Strong
Suozzi
Swalwell
Sykes
Tenney
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Titus
Torres (CA)
Trahan
Trone
Turner
Underwood
Valadao
Van Orden
Vargas
Vasquez
Veasey
Wagner
Waltz
Wasserman Schultz
Wenstrup
Wexton
Wild
Wilson (FL)
Womack

NOT VOTING--13

Babin
Gallego
Gonzalez-Colon
Grijalva
Lesko
Luetkemeyer
Mooney
Payne
Perez
Plaskett
Radewagen
Strickland
Wittman

{time} 1227

Messrs. BURGESS, NUNN of Iowa, Ms. WILD, Mr. SMITH of Washington,
Mses. BROWNLEY, and WILSON of Florida changed their vote from ``aye''
to ``no.''
Mses. LEE of California, MOORE of Wisconsin, CLARKE of New York,
Messrs. JACKSON of Illinois, and SIMPSON changed their vote from ``no''
to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Roy

The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on amendment No. 2, printed in House Report 118-456,
offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Roy), on which further
proceedings were postponed and on which the ayes prevailed by voice
vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 269,
noes 153, not voting 15, as follows:

[Roll No. 115]

AYES--269

Adams
Aderholt
Alford
Allen
Amodei
Armstrong
Arrington
Bacon
Baird
Balderson
Balint
Banks
Barr
Barragan
Bean (FL)
Beatty
Bentz
Bergman
Bice
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (NC)
Blumenauer
Blunt Rochester
Boebert
Bonamici
Bost
Bowman
Brecheen
Brown
Buchanan
Bucshon
Burchett
Burgess
Burlison
Bush
Cammack
Carey
Carl
Carter (GA)
Casar
Castro (TX)
Chavez-DeRemer
Cherfilus-McCormick
Chu
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Cleaver
Cline
Cloud
Clyde
Cohen
Collins
Comer
Correa
Courtney
Crane
Crockett
Cuellar
Curtis
D'Esposito
Davidson
Davis (IL)
De La Cruz
Dean (PA)
DeGette
DelBene
Deluzio
DeSaulnier
DesJarlais
Dingell
Doggett
Donalds
Duncan
Edwards
Ellzey
Escobar
Espaillat
Estes
Evans
Ezell
Fallon
Feenstra
Ferguson
Finstad
Fischbach
Fitzgerald
Fleischmann
Flood
Foster
Foushee
Franklin, Scott
Frost
Fry
Fulcher
Gaetz
Garbarino
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Garcia, Robert
Gimenez
Good (VA)
Gooden (TX)
Gosar
Graves (LA)
Green (TN)
Green, Al (TX)
Greene (GA)
Griffith
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Hageman
Harder (CA)
Harris
Harshbarger
Hayes
Hern
Higgins (LA)
Hill
Hoyle (OR)
Hudson
Huffman
Huizenga
Hunt
Issa
Ivey
Jackson (IL)
Jackson (NC)
Jackson (TX)
Jacobs
James
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (SD)
Jordan
Joyce (PA)
Kaptur
Kean (NJ)
Khanna
Kildee
Kiley
Kim (CA)
Kuster
LaLota
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Langworthy
Latta
LaTurner
Lawler
Lee (CA)
Lee (FL)
Lee (PA)
Letlow
Levin
Lieu
Lofgren
Loudermilk
Luna
Luttrell
Mace
Malliotakis
Maloy
Mann
Massie
Mast
Matsui
McClain

[[Page H2356]]

McClintock
McCormick
McGarvey
Meng
Meuser
Miller (IL)
Miller (OH)
Miller (WV)
Miller-Meeks
Mills
Moolenaar
Moore (AL)
Moore (WI)
Moran
Morelle
Moylan
Mullin
Nadler
Napolitano
Nehls
Newhouse
Norman
Norton
Obernolte
Ocasio-Cortez
Ogles
Omar
Owens
Pallone
Palmer
Pappas
Peltola
Pence
Perez
Perry
Pfluger
Pingree
Pocan
Porter
Posey
Pressley
Ramirez
Raskin
Reschenthaler
Rodgers (WA)
Rose
Rosendale
Ross
Roy
Sablan
Salinas
Sanchez
Scalise
Scanlon
Schakowsky
Scholten
Schrier
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Self
Sessions
Sherman
Smith (MO)
Smith (NJ)
Spartz
Stansbury
Stauber
Stefanik
Steil
Steube
Takano
Tenney
Thanedar
Thompson (PA)
Tiffany
Timmons
Tlaib
Tokuda
Tonko
Trahan
Valadao
Van Drew
Van Duyne
Vargas
Velazquez
Wagner
Walberg
Waltz
Waters
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Williams (GA)
Williams (NY)
Williams (TX)
Wilson (SC)
Zinke

NOES--153

Aguilar
Allred
Amo
Auchincloss
Bera
Beyer
Bishop (GA)
Boyle (PA)
Brownley
Budzinski
Calvert
Caraveo
Carbajal
Cardenas
Carson
Carter (LA)
Carter (TX)
Cartwright
Case
Casten
Castor (FL)
Ciscomani
Clyburn
Cole
Connolly
Costa
Craig
Crawford
Crow
Davids (KS)
Davis (NC)
DeLauro
Diaz-Balart
Duarte
Dunn (FL)
Emmer
Eshoo
Fitzpatrick
Fletcher
Foxx
Frankel, Lois
Gallagher
Garamendi
Garcia, Mike
Golden (ME)
Goldman (NY)
Gomez
Gonzales, Tony
Gonzalez, Vicente
Gottheimer
Granger
Graves (MO)
Himes
Hinson
Horsford
Houchin
Houlahan
Hoyer
Johnson (GA)
Joyce (OH)
Kamlager-Dove
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kiggans (VA)
Kilmer
Kim (NJ)
Krishnamoorthi
Kustoff
LaHood
Landsman
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee (NV)
Leger Fernandez
Lucas
Lynch
Magaziner
Manning
McBath
McCaul
McClellan
McCollum
McGovern
McHenry
Meeks
Menendez
Mfume
Molinaro
Moore (UT)
Moskowitz
Moulton
Mrvan
Murphy
Neal
Neguse
Nickel
Norcross
Nunn (IA)
Panetta
Pascrell
Pelosi
Peters
Pettersen
Phillips
Quigley
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rouzer
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rutherford
Ryan
Salazar
Sarbanes
Schiff
Schneider
Scott, Austin
Sewell
Sherrill
Simpson
Slotkin
Smith (NE)
Smith (WA)
Smucker
Sorensen
Soto
Spanberger
Steel
Stevens
Strong
Suozzi
Swalwell
Sykes
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Titus
Torres (CA)
Torres (NY)
Trone
Turner
Underwood
Van Orden
Vasquez
Veasey
Wasserman Schultz
Watson Coleman
Wexton
Wild
Wilson (FL)
Womack
Yakym

NOT VOTING--15

Babin
Crenshaw
Gallego
Gonzalez-Colon
Grijalva
Jackson Lee
Lesko
Luetkemeyer
Mooney
Payne
Plaskett
Radewagen
Stanton
Strickland
Wittman

{time} 1232

Mr. LaLOTA, Ms. STEFANIK, and Mr. D'ESPOSITO changed their vote from
``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Crenshaw

The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on amendment No. 4, printed in House Report 118-456,
offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Crenshaw), on which further
proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice
vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

[Roll No. 116]

AYES--268

Adams
Aderholt
Aguilar
Alford
Allen
Allred
Amo
Amodei
Auchincloss
Bacon
Baird
Balderson
Barr
Barragan
Bera
Bergman
Beyer
Bishop (GA)
Blunt Rochester
Boyle (PA)
Brownley
Buchanan
Bucshon
Budzinski
Burgess
Calvert
Caraveo
Carbajal
Carey
Carl
Carson
Carter (GA)
Carter (LA)
Carter (TX)
Cartwright
Case
Casten
Castor (FL)
Chavez-DeRemer
Cherfilus-McCormick
Ciscomani
Clark (MA)
Clyburn
Cole
Connolly
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Craig
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crockett
Crow
Cuellar
Curtis
D'Esposito
Davids (KS)
Davis (IL)
Davis (NC)
De La Cruz
Dean (PA)
DeLauro
Diaz-Balart
Doggett
Duarte
Duncan
Dunn (FL)
Edwards
Ellzey
Escobar
Eshoo
Ezell
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick
Fletcher
Flood
Foster
Foxx
Frankel, Lois
Franklin, Scott
Gallagher
Garamendi
Garbarino
Garcia, Mike
Gimenez
Golden (ME)
Goldman (NY)
Gomez
Gonzales, Tony
Gonzalez, Vicente
Gottheimer
Granger
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Harder (CA)
Hayes
Hern
Higgins (LA)
Hill
Himes
Hinson
Horsford
Houchin
Houlahan
Hoyer
Hudson
Ivey
Jackson (NC)
Jackson (TX)
James
Jeffries
Johnson (SD)
Joyce (OH)
Joyce (PA)
Kaptur
Kean (NJ)
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kiggans (VA)
Kiley
Kilmer
Kim (CA)
Kim (NJ)
Krishnamoorthi
Kuster
Kustoff
LaHood
LaLota
Lamborn
Landsman
Langworthy
Larson (CT)
Latta
LaTurner
Lawler
Lee (CA)
Lee (NV)
Leger Fernandez
Letlow
Levin
Loudermilk
Lucas
Luttrell
Lynch
Magaziner
Malliotakis
Manning
Matsui
McBath
McCaul
McClain
McClellan
McCollum
McCormick
McGarvey
McHenry
Meeks
Menendez
Meuser
Miller (WV)
Molinaro
Moore (UT)
Moran
Morelle
Moskowitz
Moulton
Moylan
Mrvan
Murphy
Neal
Neguse
Newhouse
Nickel
Norcross
Nunn (IA)
Obernolte
Owens
Pallone
Palmer
Panetta
Pappas
Pascrell
Pelosi
Peltola
Pence
Perez
Peters
Pettersen
Pfluger
Phillips
Porter
Quigley
Raskin
Reschenthaler
Rodgers (WA)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rose
Rouzer
Ruiz
Rutherford
Ryan
Sablan
Salazar
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schiff
Schneider
Scholten
Schrier
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Sherrill
Simpson
Slotkin
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Smucker
Sorensen
Soto
Spanberger
Stansbury
Stauber
Stefanik
Stevens
Strong
Suozzi
Swalwell
Sykes
Tenney
Thanedar
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Titus
Torres (CA)
Torres (NY)
Trahan
Trone
Turner
Underwood
Valadao
Van Drew
Van Duyne
Vasquez
Veasey
Wagner
Walberg
Waltz
Wasserman Schultz
Wenstrup
Wexton
Wild
Williams (NY)
Williams (TX)
Wilson (SC)
Womack
Zinke

NOES--152

Armstrong
Arrington
Balint
Banks
Bean (FL)
Beatty
Bentz
Bice
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (NC)
Blumenauer
Boebert
Bonamici
Bost
Bowman
Brecheen
Brown
Burchett
Burlison
Bush
Cammack
Cardenas
Casar
Castro (TX)
Chu
Clarke (NY)
Cleaver
Cline
Cloud
Clyde
Cohen
Collins
Comer
Crane
Davidson
DeGette
DelBene
Deluzio
DeSaulnier
DesJarlais
Dingell
Donalds
Emmer
Espaillat
Estes
Evans
Fallon
Feenstra
Finstad
Fischbach
Fitzgerald
Fleischmann
Foushee
Frost
Fry
Fulcher
Gaetz
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Garcia, Robert
Good (VA)
Gooden (TX)
Gosar
Green (TN)
Green, Al (TX)
Greene (GA)
Griffith
Hageman
Harris
Harshbarger
Hoyle (OR)
Huffman
Huizenga
Hunt
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jacobs
Johnson (GA)
Jordan
Kamlager-Dove
Khanna
Kildee
LaMalfa
Larsen (WA)
Lee (FL)
Lee (PA)
Lieu
Lofgren
Luna
Mace
Maloy
Mann
Massie
Mast
McClintock
McGovern
Meng
Mfume
Miller (IL)
Miller (OH)
Miller-Meeks
Mills
Moolenaar
Moore (AL)
Moore (WI)
Mullin
Nadler
Napolitano
Nehls
Norman
Norton
Ocasio-Cortez
Ogles
Omar
Perry
Pingree
Pocan
Posey
Pressley
Ramirez
Rosendale
Ross
Roy
Ruppersberger
Salinas
Scanlon
Schakowsky
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Self
Spartz
Steel
Steil
Steube
Takano
Tiffany
Timmons
Tlaib
Tokuda
Tonko
Van Orden
Vargas
Velazquez
Waters
Watson Coleman
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Westerman
Williams (GA)
Wilson (FL)
Yakym

NOT VOTING--16

Babin
Gallego
Gonzalez-Colon
Grijalva
Jackson Lee
Jayapal
Lesko
Luetkemeyer
Mooney
Payne
Plaskett
Radewagen
Smith (MO)
Stanton
Strickland
Wittman

Announcement by the Acting Chair

The Acting CHAIR (during the vote). There is 1 minute remaining.

[[Page H2357]]

{time} 1236

So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Waltz

The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on amendment No. 5, printed in House Report 118-456,
offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Waltz), on which further
proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice
vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

[Roll No. 117]

AYES--227

Aderholt
Alford
Allen
Allred
Amo
Amodei
Arrington
Auchincloss
Bacon
Balderson
Barr
Bera
Bergman
Bice
Boyle (PA)
Brownley
Buchanan
Bucshon
Budzinski
Burgess
Calvert
Caraveo
Carbajal
Carey
Carl
Carson
Carter (GA)
Carter (LA)
Carter (TX)
Cartwright
Case
Casten
Chavez-DeRemer
Ciscomani
Clyburn
Cole
Costa
Courtney
Craig
Crane
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crockett
Cuellar
Curtis
D'Esposito
Davids (KS)
Davis (NC)
De La Cruz
DeLauro
Diaz-Balart
Duarte
Dunn (FL)
Edwards
Ellzey
Eshoo
Estes
Ezell
Feenstra
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick
Fletcher
Frankel, Lois
Franklin, Scott
Gallagher
Garamendi
Garbarino
Garcia, Mike
Gimenez
Golden (ME)
Goldman (NY)
Gonzales, Tony
Gonzalez, Vicente
Gottheimer
Granger
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Griffith
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Harder (CA)
Hayes
Hern
Hill
Himes
Hinson
Horsford
Houchin
Hudson
Huizenga
Hunt
Jackson (TX)
Johnson (SD)
Joyce (OH)
Joyce (PA)
Kaptur
Kean (NJ)
Keating
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kiggans (VA)
Kiley
Kilmer
Kim (CA)
Kuster
Kustoff
LaHood
LaLota
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Landsman
Larson (CT)
Latta
LaTurner
Lawler
Lee (NV)
Letlow
Levin
Loudermilk
Lucas
Luttrell
Lynch
Magaziner
Malliotakis
Manning
Mast
Matsui
McBath
McCaul
McClain
McClellan
McCollum
McCormick
McGarvey
McHenry
Meeks
Meuser
Miller-Meeks
Mills
Molinaro
Moore (UT)
Moran
Morelle
Moskowitz
Moulton
Moylan
Mrvan
Murphy
Nickel
Norcross
Norman
Nunn (IA)
Obernolte
Panetta
Pappas
Pelosi
Pence
Perez
Peters
Pettersen
Pfluger
Phillips
Posey
Quigley
Reschenthaler
Rodgers (WA)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rose
Rouzer
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rutherford
Ryan
Salazar
Scalise
Schneider
Scholten
Schrier
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Sherrill
Simpson
Slotkin
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smucker
Sorensen
Spanberger
Stauber
Stefanik
Steil
Stevens
Strong
Suozzi
Swalwell
Sykes
Tenney
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Titus
Torres (CA)
Torres (NY)
Trahan
Trone
Turner
Underwood
Valadao
Van Duyne
Vasquez
Veasey
Wagner
Walberg
Waltz
Wenstrup
Wexton
Wild
Williams (NY)
Williams (TX)
Wilson (SC)
Womack
Zinke

NOES--193

Adams
Aguilar
Armstrong
Baird
Balint
Banks
Barragan
Bean (FL)
Beatty
Bentz
Beyer
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NC)
Blumenauer
Blunt Rochester
Boebert
Bonamici
Bost
Bowman
Brecheen
Brown
Burchett
Burlison
Bush
Cammack
Cardenas
Casar
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Cherfilus-McCormick
Chu
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Cleaver
Cline
Cloud
Clyde
Cohen
Collins
Comer
Connolly
Correa
Crow
Davidson
Davis (IL)
Dean (PA)
DeGette
DelBene
Deluzio
DeSaulnier
DesJarlais
Dingell
Doggett
Donalds
Duncan
Emmer
Escobar
Espaillat
Evans
Fallon
Finstad
Fischbach
Fitzgerald
Fleischmann
Flood
Foster
Foushee
Foxx
Frost
Fry
Fulcher
Gaetz
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Garcia, Robert
Gomez
Good (VA)
Gooden (TX)
Gosar
Green (TN)
Green, Al (TX)
Greene (GA)
Hageman
Harris
Harshbarger
Higgins (LA)
Houlahan
Hoyer
Hoyle (OR)
Huffman
Issa
Ivey
Jackson (IL)
Jackson (NC)
Jacobs
James
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Jordan
Kamlager-Dove
Kelly (IL)
Khanna
Kildee
Kim (NJ)
Krishnamoorthi
Langworthy
Larsen (WA)
Lee (CA)
Lee (FL)
Lee (PA)
Leger Fernandez
Lieu
Lofgren
Luna
Mace
Mann
Massie
McClintock
McGovern
Menendez
Meng
Mfume
Miller (IL)
Miller (OH)
Miller (WV)
Moolenaar
Moore (AL)
Moore (WI)
Mullin
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Neguse
Nehls
Newhouse
Norton
Ocasio-Cortez
Ogles
Omar
Owens
Pallone
Palmer
Pascrell
Perry
Pingree
Pocan
Porter
Pressley
Ramirez
Raskin
Rosendale
Ross
Roy
Sablan
Salinas
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Scanlon
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Self
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Soto
Spartz
Stansbury
Steel
Steube
Takano
Thanedar
Tiffany
Timmons
Tlaib
Tokuda
Tonko
Van Drew
Van Orden
Vargas
Velazquez
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson Coleman
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Westerman
Williams (GA)
Wilson (FL)
Yakym

NOT VOTING--16

Babin
Gallego
Gonzalez-Colon
Grijalva
Jackson Lee
Lesko
Luetkemeyer
Maloy
Mooney
Payne
Peltola
Plaskett
Radewagen
Stanton
Strickland
Wittman

Announcement by the Acting Chair

The Acting CHAIR (during the vote). There is 1 minute remaining.

{time} 1240

Mr. DAVIS of Illinois changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated against:
Ms. MALOY. Mr. Chair, had I been present, I would have voted ``no''
on rollcall No. 117.

Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Turner

The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment 6, printed in House Report 118-456,
offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner), on which further
proceedings were postponed and on which the ayes prevailed by voice
vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIR. This is a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 236,
noes 186, not voting 14, as follows:

[Roll No. 118]

AYES--236

Aderholt
Aguilar
Allred
Amodei
Auchincloss
Bacon
Balderson
Barr
Barragan
Bera
Bergman
Beyer
Bice
Bishop (GA)
Blunt Rochester
Boyle (PA)
Brownley
Buchanan
Bucshon
Budzinski
Burgess
Calvert
Caraveo
Carbajal
Carl
Carson
Carter (GA)
Carter (LA)
Carter (TX)
Cartwright
Case
Casten
Castor (FL)
Chavez-DeRemer
Ciscomani
Clark (MA)
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Cole
Costa
Courtney
Craig
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crow
Cuellar
D'Esposito
Davids (KS)
Davis (NC)
De La Cruz
DeLauro
Diaz-Balart
Duarte
Dunn (FL)
Edwards
Ellzey
Emmer
Escobar
Eshoo
Estes
Ezell
Feenstra
Fitzpatrick
Fletcher
Flood
Foster
Frankel, Lois
Franklin, Scott
Fulcher
Gallagher
Garamendi
Garbarino
Garcia, Mike
Gimenez
Golden (ME)
Goldman (NY)
Gomez
Gonzales, Tony
Gonzalez, Vicente
Gottheimer
Granger
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Guest
Guthrie
Harder (CA)
Hayes
Hill
Himes
Hinson
Horsford
Houchin
Houlahan
Hoyer
Hudson
Huizenga
Ivey
Jackson (NC)
Jackson (TX)
Jacobs
James
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Joyce (OH)
Kamlager-Dove
Kaptur
Kean (NJ)
Keating
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kiggans (VA)
Kilmer
Kim (CA)
Kim (NJ)
Krishnamoorthi
Kuster
Kustoff
LaHood
LaLota
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Landsman
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
LaTurner
Lawler
Lee (FL)
Lee (NV)
Letlow
Levin
Lucas
Lynch
Magaziner
Malliotakis
Manning
McBath
McCaul
McClain
McClellan
McCollum
McCormick
McGarvey
McHenry
Meeks
Menendez
Miller (WV)
Moore (UT)
Moran
Morelle
Moskowitz
Moulton
Moylan
Mrvan
Mullin
Murphy
Neguse
Newhouse
Nickel
Norcross
Nunn (IA)
Obernolte
Panetta
Pappas
Pascrell
Pelosi
Pence
Perez
Peters
Pettersen
Pfluger
Phillips
Quigley
Reschenthaler
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rose
Rouzer
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rutherford
Ryan

[[Page H2358]]

Salazar
Sarbanes
Schiff
Schneider
Scholten
Schrier
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sessions
Sewell
Sherrill
Simpson
Slotkin
Smith (NE)
Smith (WA)
Smucker
Sorensen
Soto
Spanberger
Stansbury
Stauber
Stefanik
Steil
Stevens
Strong
Suozzi
Swalwell
Sykes
Tenney
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Titus
Torres (CA)
Torres (NY)
Trahan
Trone
Turner
Underwood
Valadao
Van Duyne
Vasquez
Veasey
Wagner
Walberg
Waltz
Wasserman Schultz
Wenstrup
Wexton
Wild
Williams (NY)
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack

NOES--186

Adams
Alford
Allen
Amo
Armstrong
Arrington
Baird
Balint
Banks
Bean (FL)
Beatty
Bentz
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (NC)
Blumenauer
Boebert
Bonamici
Bost
Bowman
Brecheen
Brown
Burchett
Burlison
Bush
Cammack
Cardenas
Carey
Casar
Castro (TX)
Cherfilus-McCormick
Chu
Clarke (NY)
Cline
Cloud
Clyde
Collins
Comer
Connolly
Correa
Crane
Crockett
Curtis
Davidson
Davis (IL)
Dean (PA)
DeGette
DelBene
Deluzio
DeSaulnier
DesJarlais
Dingell
Doggett
Donalds
Duncan
Espaillat
Evans
Fallon
Ferguson
Finstad
Fischbach
Fitzgerald
Fleischmann
Foushee
Foxx
Frost
Fry
Gaetz
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Garcia, Robert
Good (VA)
Gooden (TX)
Gosar
Green (TN)
Green, Al (TX)
Greene (GA)
Griffith
Grothman
Hageman
Harris
Harshbarger
Hern
Higgins (LA)
Hoyle (OR)
Huffman
Hunt
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jayapal
Johnson (SD)
Jordan
Joyce (PA)
Kelly (IL)
Khanna
Kildee
Kiley
Langworthy
Latta
Lee (CA)
Lee (PA)
Leger Fernandez
Lieu
Lofgren
Loudermilk
Luna
Luttrell
Mace
Maloy
Mann
Massie
Mast
Matsui
McClintock
McGovern
Meng
Meuser
Mfume
Miller (IL)
Miller (OH)
Miller-Meeks
Mills
Molinaro
Moolenaar
Moore (AL)
Moore (WI)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nehls
Norman
Norton
Ocasio-Cortez
Ogles
Omar
Owens
Pallone
Palmer
Perry
Pingree
Pocan
Porter
Posey
Pressley
Ramirez
Raskin
Rodgers (WA)
Rosendale
Ross
Roy
Sablan
Salinas
Sanchez
Scalise
Scanlon
Schakowsky
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Self
Sherman
Smith (MO)
Smith (NJ)
Spartz
Steel
Steube
Takano
Thanedar
Thompson (PA)
Tiffany
Timmons
Tlaib
Tokuda
Tonko
Van Drew
Van Orden
Vargas
Velazquez
Waters
Watson Coleman
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Westerman
Williams (GA)
Williams (TX)
Yakym
Zinke

NOT VOTING--14

Babin
Gallego
Gonzalez-Colon
Grijalva
Jackson Lee
Lesko
Luetkemeyer
Mooney
Payne
Peltola
Plaskett
Radewagen
Stanton
Strickland

Announcement by the Acting Chair

The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Alford) (during the vote). There is 1 minute
remaining.

{time} 1245

Mr. MEUSER changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. MEEKS changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mrs. PELTOLA. Mr. Chair, had I been present, I would have voted
``aye'' on rollcall No. 117 and ``aye'' on rollcall No. 118.
The Acting CHAIR. There being no further amendments under the rule,
the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Ellzey) having assumed the chair, Mr. Alford, Acting Chair of the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 7888) to
reform the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and, pursuant
to House Resolution 1137, he reported the bill, as amended by that
resolution, back to the House with sundry further amendments adopted in
the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any further amendment reported from
the Committee of the Whole? If not, the Chair will put them en gros.
The amendments were agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.

Recorded Vote

Ms. LEE of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 273,
noes 147, not voting 11, as follows:

[Roll No. 119]

AYES--273

Adams
Aderholt
Aguilar
Allen
Allred
Amo
Amodei
Auchincloss
Bacon
Balderson
Barr
Barragan
Bentz
Bera
Bergman
Beyer
Bice
Bishop (GA)
Blunt Rochester
Boyle (PA)
Brownley
Buchanan
Bucshon
Budzinski
Burgess
Calvert
Caraveo
Carbajal
Carl
Carson
Carter (GA)
Carter (LA)
Carter (TX)
Cartwright
Case
Casten
Castor (FL)
Chavez-DeRemer
Ciscomani
Clark (MA)
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Cole
Connolly
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Craig
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crockett
Crow
Cuellar
D'Esposito
Davids (KS)
Davis (NC)
De La Cruz
Dean (PA)
DeLauro
Diaz-Balart
Duarte
Edwards
Ellzey
Emmer
Escobar
Eshoo
Estes
Evans
Ezell
Feenstra
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Fletcher
Flood
Foster
Frankel, Lois
Franklin, Scott
Gallagher
Garamendi
Garbarino
Garcia, Mike
Gimenez
Golden (ME)
Goldman (NY)
Gomez
Gonzales, Tony
Gonzalez, Vicente
Gottheimer
Granger
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Green, Al (TX)
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Harder (CA)
Hayes
Hern
Hill
Himes
Hinson
Horsford
Houchin
Houlahan
Hoyer
Hudson
Huizenga
Ivey
Jackson (NC)
Jackson (TX)
James
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (SD)
Joyce (OH)
Kamlager-Dove
Kaptur
Kean (NJ)
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kiggans (VA)
Kiley
Kilmer
Kim (CA)
Kim (NJ)
Krishnamoorthi
Kuster
Kustoff
LaHood
LaLota
Lamborn
Landsman
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latta
LaTurner
Lawler
Lee (FL)
Lee (NV)
Leger Fernandez
Letlow
Levin
Lieu
Lucas
Lynch
Magaziner
Malliotakis
Maloy
Manning
McBath
McCaul
McClain
McClellan
McCollum
McGarvey
McHenry
Meeks
Menendez
Meng
Mfume
Miller (OH)
Miller (WV)
Miller-Meeks
Molinaro
Moolenaar
Moore (UT)
Moran
Morelle
Moskowitz
Moulton
Mrvan
Mullin
Murphy
Neal
Neguse
Newhouse
Nickel
Norcross
Nunn (IA)
Obernolte
Palmer
Panetta
Pappas
Pascrell
Pelosi
Peltola
Pence
Perez
Peters
Pettersen
Pfluger
Phillips
Quigley
Raskin
Reschenthaler
Rodgers (WA)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rose
Ross
Rouzer
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rutherford
Ryan
Salazar
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schiff
Schneider
Scholten
Schrier
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sessions
Sewell
Sherrill
Simpson
Slotkin
Smith (NE)
Smith (WA)
Smucker
Sorensen
Soto
Spanberger
Stansbury
Stauber
Steel
Stefanik
Steil
Stevens
Strong
Suozzi
Swalwell
Sykes
Tenney
Thanedar
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Titus
Tokuda
Tonko
Torres (CA)
Torres (NY)
Trahan
Trone
Turner
Underwood
Valadao
Vargas
Vasquez
Veasey
Wagner
Walberg
Waltz
Wasserman Schultz
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Wexton
Wild
Williams (NY)
Williams (TX)
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack

NOES--147

Alford
Armstrong
Arrington
Baird
Balint
Banks
Bean (FL)
Beatty
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (NC)
Blumenauer
Boebert
Bonamici
Bost
Bowman
Brecheen
Brown
Burchett
Burlison
Bush
Cammack
Cardenas
Carey
Casar
Castro (TX)
Cherfilus-McCormick
Chu
Clarke (NY)
Cline
Cloud
Clyde
Collins
Comer
Crane
Curtis
Davidson
Davis (IL)
DeGette
DelBene
Deluzio
DeSaulnier
DesJarlais
Dingell
Doggett
Donalds
Duncan
Dunn (FL)
Espaillat
Fallon
Finstad
Fischbach
Fitzgerald
Foushee
Foxx
Frost
Fry
Fulcher
Gaetz
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Garcia, Robert
Good (VA)
Gooden (TX)
Gosar
Green (TN)
Greene (GA)
Griffith
Hageman
Harris
Harshbarger

[[Page H2359]]

Higgins (LA)
Hoyle (OR)
Huffman
Hunt
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jacobs
Jayapal
Jordan
Joyce (PA)
Khanna
LaMalfa
Langworthy
Lee (CA)
Lee (PA)
Lofgren
Loudermilk
Luna
Luttrell
Mace
Mann
Massie
Mast
Matsui
McClintock
McCormick
McGovern
Meuser
Miller (IL)
Mills
Moore (AL)
Moore (WI)
Nadler
Napolitano
Nehls
Norman
Ocasio-Cortez
Ogles
Omar
Owens
Pallone
Perry
Pingree
Pocan
Porter
Posey
Pressley
Ramirez
Rosendale
Roy
Salinas
Scanlon
Schakowsky
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Self
Sherman
Smith (MO)
Smith (NJ)
Spartz
Steube
Takano
Tiffany
Timmons
Tlaib
Van Drew
Van Duyne
Van Orden
Velazquez
Waters
Watson Coleman
Weber (TX)
Westerman
Williams (GA)
Yakym
Zinke

NOT VOTING--11

Babin
Gallego
Grijalva
Jackson Lee
Kildee
Lesko
Luetkemeyer
Mooney
Payne
Stanton
Strickland

Announcement by the Speaker

The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There is 1 minute
remaining.

{time} 1257

So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated against:
Mr. KILDEE. Mr. Speaker, had I been present, I would have voted
``nay'' on rollcall No. 119, H.R. 7888.

personal explanation

Mr. STANTON. Mr. Speaker, I was necessarily absent and missed five
votes. Had I been present, I would have voted ``no'' on rollcall No.
115, Roy Amendment, ``aye'' on rollcall No. 116, Crenshaw Amendment,
``aye'' on rollcall No. 117, Waltz Amendment, ``aye'' on rollcall No.
118, Turner Amendment, and ``aye'' on rollcall No. 119, final passage
of H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, a motion to reconsider
was laid on the table.
Mrs. LUNA. Mr. Speaker, I object.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The objection is heard.

motion to reconsider

Ms. LEE of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion at the desk.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion.
The Clerk read as follows:

Ms. Lee of Florida moves to reconsider the vote on passage
of H.R. 7888.

motion to table

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion at the desk.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion.
The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. Turner of Ohio moves to table the motion to reconsider.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to table.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.

Recorded Vote

Mrs. LUNA. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this question will be postponed.

____________________