[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 50 (Thursday, March 21, 2024)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2541-S2542]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 1724. Mr. JOHNSON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed
by him to the bill H.R. 2882, to reauthorize the Morris K. Udall and
Stewart L. Udall Trust Fund, and for other purposes; which was ordered
to lie on the table; as follows:
At the appropriate place in division F, insert the
following:
SEC. ___. ANY WORLD HEALTH AGENCY CONVENTION OR AGREEMENT OR
OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT RESULTING FROM
THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATING BODY'S FINAL
REPORT DEEMED TO BE A TREATY SUBJECT TO ADVICE
AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``No WHO
Pandemic Preparedness Treaty Without Senate Approval Act''.
(b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On December 1, 2021, at the second special session of
the World Health Assembly (referred to in this section as the
``WHA'') decided--
(A) to establish the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body
(referred to in this section as the ``INB'') to draft and
negotiate a WHO convention (referred to in this section as
the ``Convention''), agreement, or other international
instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and
response, with a view to adoption under article 19 or any
other provision of the WHO Constitution; and
(B) that the INB shall submit a progress report to the
Seventy-sixth WHA and a working draft of the convention for
consideration by the Seventy-seventh WHA, which is scheduled
to take place beginning on March 18, 2024.
(2) On February 24, March 14 and 15, and June 6 through 8
and 15 through 17, 2022, the INB held its inaugural meeting
at which the Director-General proposed the following 5 themes
to guide the INB's work in drafting the Convention:
(A) Building national, regional, and global capacities
based on a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach.
(B) Establishing global access and benefit sharing for all
pathogens, and determining a global policy for the equitable
production and distribution of countermeasures.
(C) Establishing robust systems and tools for pandemic
preparedness and response.
(D) Establishing a long-term plan for sustainable financing
to ensure support for global health threat management and
response systems.
(E) Empowering WHO to fulfill its mandate as the directing
and coordinating authority on international health work,
including for pandemic preparedness and response.
(3) On July 18 through 22, 2022, the INB held its second
meeting at which it agreed that the Convention would be
adopted under article 19 of the WHO Constitution and legally
binding on the parties.
(4) On December 5 through 7, 2022, the INB held its third
meeting at which it accepted a conceptual zero draft of the
Convention and agreed to prepare a zero draft for
consideration at the INB's next meeting.
(5) In early January 2023, an initial draft of the
Convention was sent to WHO member states in advance of its
formal introduction at the fourth meeting of the INB. The
draft includes broad and binding provisions, including rules
governing parties' access to pathogen genomic sequences and
how the products or benefits of such access are to be
distributed.
(6) On February 27 through March 3, 2023, the INB held its
fourth meeting at which it--
(A) formally agreed to the draft distributed in January as
the basis for commencing negotiations; and
(B) established an April 14, 2023 deadline for member
states to propose any changes to the text.
(7) The INB's draft--
(A) was circulated to Member States on May 22, 2023; and
(B) was published online in all WHO official languages on
June 2, 2023.
(8) On March 18 through 28, 2024, the INB is holding its
Ninth Meeting at which it will consider an updated draft of
the Convention reflecting input from Member States considered
during the INB's Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth meetings.
(9) On May 27 through June 1, 2024, the INB is scheduled to
present its final draft of the Convention for consideration
at the Seventy-seventh World Health Assembly.
(10) Section 723.3 of title 11 of the Department of State's
Foreign Affairs Manual states that when ``determining whether
any international agreement should be brought into force as a
treaty or as an international agreement other than a treaty,
the utmost care is to be exercised to avoid any invasion or
compromise of the constitutional powers of the President, the
Senate, and the Congress as a whole'' and includes the
following criteria to be considered when determining
[[Page S2542]]
whether an international agreement should take the form of a
treaty or an executive agreement:
(A) ``The extent to which the agreement involves
commitments or risks affecting the nation as a whole''.
(B) ``Whether the agreement is intended to affect state
laws''.
(C) ``Whether the agreement can be given effect without the
enactment of subsequent legislation by the Congress''.
(D) ``Past U.S. practice as to similar agreements''.
(E) ``The preference of the Congress as to a particular
type of agreement''.
(F) ``The degree of formality desired for an agreement''.
(G) ``The proposed duration of the agreement, the need for
prompt conclusion of an agreement, and the desirability of
concluding a routine or short-term agreement''.
(H) ``The general international practice as to similar
agreements''.
(c) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that--
(1) a significant segment of the American public is deeply
skeptical of the World Health Organization, its leadership,
and its independence from the pernicious political influence
of certain member states, including the People's Republic of
China;
(2) the current draft of the Convention does nothing to
address the critical failures in the response to the COVID-19
pandemic, particularly regarding--
(A) the PRC's failure to inform the international community
of the outbreak in a timely manner;
(B) the WHO repeating the PRC's false claim that there was
no evidence of human-to-human transmission;
(C) the PRC's delay in sharing COVID-19's genomic sequence
data; and
(D) the PRC's refusal to allow a thorough investigation of
the origins of the outbreak.
(3) the Senate strongly prefers that any agreement related
to pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response adopted by
the World Health Assembly pursuant to the work of the INB be
considered a treaty requiring the advice and consent of the
Senate, with two-thirds of Senators concurring;
(4) the scope of the agreement which the INB has been
tasked with drafting, as outlined by the Director-General, is
so broad that any application of the factors referred to in
subsection (b)(11) will weigh strongly in favor of it being
considered a treaty; and
(5) given the level of public distrust, any relevant new
agreement by the World Health Assembly which cannot garner
the \2/3\ vote needed for Senate ratification should not be
agreed to or implemented by the United States.
(d) Applicability of Senate Advice and Consent
Constitutional Requirement.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, any convention, agreement, or other
international instrument on pandemic prevention,
preparedness, and response reached by the World Health
Assembly pursuant to the recommendations, report, or work of
the International Negotiating Body established by the second
special session of the World Health Assembly is deemed to be
a treaty that is subject to the requirements of article II,
section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States,
which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, with \2/
3\ of all Senators concurring.
(e) Funding Limitation.--No funds appropriated by this
division may be used to facilitate the implementation of any
convention, agreement, or other international instrument on
pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response reached by
the WHA.
______