[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 48 (Tuesday, March 19, 2024)]
[House]
[Pages H1194-H1195]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION INTEGRITY ACT OF 2023

  Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 6306) to amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 
1956 to prohibit the acquisition or lease of a consular or diplomatic 
post built or owned by an entity beneficially owned by the People's 
Republic of China, and for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 6306

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Embassy Construction 
     Integrity Act of 2023''.

     SEC. 2. RESTRICTIONS ON CONSULAR AND DIPLOMATIC POSTS BUILT 
                   OR OWNED BY CERTAIN ENTITIES.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of State (in this section 
     referred to as the ``Secretary'') shall take such steps as 
     may be necessary to avoid or minimize--
       (1) acquiring or leasing a covered building--
       (A) with respect to which a covered entity performed 
     covered construction on or after January 1, 1949; or
       (B) in which a covered entity has an ownership interest; or
       (2) entering into or renewing a contract or other agreement 
     with a covered entity to perform covered construction with 
     respect to a covered building.
       (b) Notification of Inconsistent Action.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary shall notify the Committee 
     on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate--
       (A) not later than 7 days before entering into an 
     acquisition, lease, or agreement after the date of enactment 
     of this Act that the Secretary is aware is inconsistent with 
     the restriction under subsection (a); and
       (B) not later than 7 days after becoming aware of an 
     acquisition, lease, or agreement occurring after the date of 
     enactment of this Act that is inconsistent with the 
     restriction under subsection (a).
       (2) Determination of national security interest.--The 
     notification required under paragraph (1) shall also include, 
     to the extent applicable--
       (A) a determination of whether the inconsistent 
     acquisition, lease, or agreement is in the national security 
     interest of the United States;
       (B) an identification of the interest advanced by such 
     inconsistent action;
       (C) a detailed explanation for such determination; and
       (D) any action the Secretary has taken or intends to take 
     to mitigate national security vulnerabilities that may be 
     posed by such inconsistent action.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Covered building.--The term ``covered building'' means 
     a building that is used or intended to be used by personnel, 
     or for a function, of a consular or diplomatic post located 
     outside of the United States.
       (2) Covered construction.--The term ``covered 
     construction''--
       (A) means any construction, development, conversion, 
     extension, alteration, repair, or maintenance performed with 
     respect to a building; and
       (B) includes the installation or maintenance of electrical, 
     plumbing, heating, ventilation, air conditioning, 
     communication, fire protection, and energy management systems 
     with respect to such building.
       (3) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity'' means an 
     entity with respect to which the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China, or an agent or instrumentality of the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China, directly or 
     indirectly, including through any contract, arrangement, 
     understanding, or relationship--
       (A) owns or controls a significant percent of the ownership 
     interest; or
       (B) otherwise exercises substantial control.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from 
Missouri (Mrs. Wagner) and the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. Wild) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Missouri.


                             General Leave

  Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and 
include extraneous material on this measure.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Missouri?
  There was no objection.
  Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Mills), the author of this bill.
  Mr. MILLS. Mr. Speaker, the Embassy Construction Integrity Act is 
very simple: America's adversaries must not be involved in building our 
diplomatic and consular posts.
  This, in my opinion, is a commonsense bill, or at least it should be. 
Last year, Congress was made aware that a Chinese state-owned 
enterprise was involved in the construction of a post in south Asia.
  Despite all of the bureaucratic red tape the State Department goes 
through to establish these posts, somehow checking whether the Chinese 
Government controls the companies constructing the building didn't 
quite make the list.
  The Chinese Government has established a pattern of leveraging its 
state-owned enterprise to serve dual functions during and after 
construction to spy on sensitive facilities.
  Chinese-owned companies built the African Union headquarters. Like 
many things, they can't just build something, they have to build it 
with Chinese characteristics. In this case, those Chinese 
characteristics were spyware that was utilized to quietly siphon 
enormous amounts of data every night for the Chinese Government.
  According to a study by Joshua Meservey, an expert in African 
geopolitics, Chinese companies have built nearly 200 government 
facilities in Africa, a number that is sure to have only increased 
since the study was published.
  I am not telling other countries who they can or cannot employ to 
construct their buildings. My bill is simple, however, that when our 
adversaries show us how they operate, that we should believe them and 
take steps to mitigate those risks.
  Specifically, this bill requires the State Department, before 
establishing a new diplomatic or consular post, to identify the 
beneficial owners of the companies involved in the construction and 
maintenance of those buildings.
  Further, this bill prohibits the State Department from entering into 
contracts or agreements if the beneficial owners of the companies are 
affiliated with the Chinese Government.
  Finally, if inconsistent actions are discovered, the Secretary of 
State would be required to report it to Congress within 7 days.
  Briefly, it is important to address the fact that it would be 
impossible for the State Department to operate in China if they weren't 
allowed to contract with some of these companies. The bill is carefully 
crafted to avoid stifling the important work of the State Department in 
China or the limited other locations where inconsistent measures may be 
the only option. However, even in these cases, Congress should be 
notified so that we do our job and have proper oversight for all of 
these activities.
  Aside from those extraordinarily limited circumstances, the State 
Department must conduct greater due diligence to secure the integrity 
of our embassies and other consular posts around the world.
  I express my sincere gratitude to Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member 
Meeks, my bipartisan colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee who 
unanimously voted in favor of this bill during its markup, and each of 
their staffs who worked with me to secure it.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support passage of H.R. 6306.
  Ms. WILD. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 6306. Over the past 3 
years, our country has made critical headway in expanding the United 
States' diplomatic footprint, including opening new, strategically 
located facilities in the Indo-Pacific region. Our Nation has always 
been at its best when we engage intensely in diplomatic efforts to 
defend and advance both interests and ideals around the world, and that 
is why it is so critical that we equip our diplomats with the resources 
they need.
  As part of this work, the State Department works regularly to open, 
renew, or modernize its facilities around the world so that U.S. 
diplomats can effectively advance our interests around the world. I am 
proud

[[Page H1195]]

that this work has included reestablishing our embassy operations in 
Kyiv to stand with Ukraine after Russia's unprovoked, full-scale 
invasion in 2022.
  When we raise the U.S. flag on a new or updated diplomatic facility 
abroad, it is a powerful signal of our commitment to democracy and 
peaceful, productive engagement between nations.
  In maintaining its facilities around the world, the State Department 
mitigates security and counterintelligence risks through tailored, 
site-specific measures that address the particular challenges of a 
specific locale. The Department has deep expertise in this area, 
informed by decades of experience to harden our security posture, 
counter our adversaries, and open our doors to those who wish to learn 
about and engage with the United States.
  Congress has played a role in developing this expertise, too, as 
evidenced in bipartisan reforms to the Secure Embassy Construction and 
Counterterrorism Act that we passed into law last Congress. We must 
continue to ensure the State Department has the flexibility to balance 
bold, expeditionary diplomacy, while mitigating operational risks.

  With this bill before us today, the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
worked in a bipartisan fashion to ensure the Department has the needed 
flexibility to advance the Department's ongoing efforts to maintain and 
open new facilities, even as we seek to minimize risks in embassy 
construction or maintenance that our competitors could exploit.
  I am pleased to support this measure, and I invite my colleagues to 
do the same. I encourage my colleagues to join me in supporting this 
measure.
  In closing, the State Department's efforts to expand our diplomatic 
footprint and enhance its existing facilities worldwide showcase 
America's dedication to effective diplomacy and international 
cooperation.
  The operational security and effectiveness of these facilities is 
paramount, and the State Department has demonstrable success in 
building facilities tailored to mitigate country-specific risks. Our 
congressional reforms have supported this mission, providing the 
necessary framework for safe and dynamic diplomacy while ensuring that 
State has the flexibility it needs to build and maintain its facilities 
around the world.
  I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting H.R. 6306, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, I again thank Congressman Mills for his leadership in 
fixing this national security vulnerability. I also thank Chairman 
McCaul, Ranking Member Meeks, and our Committee on Foreign Affairs 
colleagues for bringing this critical, bipartisan bill to the floor.
  This legislation will ensure that our diplomatic buildings overseas 
do not fall victim to the active, ongoing surveillance and espionage 
efforts of the Chinese Communist Party.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge unanimous support for H.R. 6306, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. Wagner) that the House suspend the 
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 6306, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the 
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
  The title of the bill was amended so as to read: ``A bill to direct 
the Secretary of State to avoid or minimize the acquisition or lease of 
a consular or diplomatic post built or owned by an entity owned or 
controlled by the Government of the People's Republic of China, and for 
other purposes.''.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________